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THE TRUE

INTELLECTUAL SYSTEM

OF THE

UNIVERSE.

THE TRUE

INTELLECTUAL SYSTEM

OF

THE UNIVERSE:

WHEREIN ALL THE

REASON AND PHILOSOPHY OF ATHEISM IS CONFUTED

AND ITS

IMPOSSIBILITY DEMONSTRATED.

A TREATISE ON IMMUTABLE MORALITY;

WITH

A DISCOURSE

CONCERNING THE

TRUE NOTION OF THE LORD'S SUPPER;

AND

TWO SERMONS ON 1 JOHN 2:3, 4. AND 1 COR. 15:57.

By RALPH CUDWORTH, D. D.

FIRST AMERICAN EDITION;

WITH REFERENCES TO THE SEVERAL QUOTATIONS IN THE INTELLECTUAL SYSTEM;
AND AN ACCOUNT OF THE LIFE AND WRITINGS OF THE AUTHOR:

By THOMAS BIRCH, M. A. F. R. S.

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THE TRUE

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THE UNIVERSE.

CHAP. IV. CONTINUED.

And now, upon all these considerations, our Platonic Christian would conclude, that the orthodox Trinity of the ancient Christian church did herein agree with the genuinely Platonic trinity, that it was not monoousian, one sole singular essence, under three notions, conceptions, or modes only, but three hypostases or persons. As, likewise, the right Platonic trinity does agree with the Trinity of the ancient orthodox Christians in this, that it is not heteroousian, but homoousian, coessential, or consubstantial; none of their three hypostases being creatures, or particular beings, made in time; but all of them uncreated, eternal, and infinite.

Notwithstanding all which, it must be granted, that though this homoousiotes, or coessentiality of the three persons in the trinity, does imply them to be all God, yet does it not follow from thence of necessity that they are therefore one God. What then? shall we conclude, that Athanasius himself also entertained that opinion before mentioned and exploded, of the three persons in the Trinity being but three individuals under the same species (as Peter, Paul, and Timothy), and having no other natural unity or identity than specifical only? Indeed, some have confidently fastened this upon Athanasius, because, in those Dialogues of the Trinity,[1] published amongst his works, and there entitled to him, the same is grossly owned, and in defence thereof this absurd paradox maintained, that Peter, Paul, and Timothy,

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[1] Dialog. I. p. 160. tom. ii. oper.

though they be three hypostases, yet are not to be accounted three men, but only then when they dissent from one another, or disagree in will or opinion. But it is certain, from several passages in those dialogues themselves, that they could not be written by Athanasius; and there hath been also another father found for them, to wit, Maximus the martyr. Notwithstanding which, thus much must not be denied by us, that Athanasius, in those others his reputedly-genuine writings, does sometime approach so near hereunto, that he lays no small stress upon this homoousiotes, this coessentiality and common nature of the Godhead, to all the three persons, in order to their being one God. For thus, in that book entitled, Concerning the common Essence of the Three Persons, and the chapter inscribed, "*Οτι οὐκ εἰσὶ τρεῖς θεοὶ*, That there are not three gods—doth Athanasius lay his foundation here. When too that question proposed, How it can be said, that the Father is God, the Son God, and the Holy Ghost God, and yet that there are not three gods? the first reply which he makes is this: *ὅπου κοινὰ τὰ τῆς φύσεως, κοινὸν καὶ ὄνομα τῆς ἀξίας· οἷον ὁ θεὸς τὰ εἰς πλήθη διῃρημένα ἀπὸ μιᾶς φύσεως, ἑνὶ ὀνόματι καλεῖ· καὶ ὅτε ὀργίζεται τοῖς ἀνθρώποις, τὸν πάντα ἄνθρωπον τῇ ὀργῇ ὑποκείμενον, ἕνα ἄνθρωπον καλεῖ· καὶ ὅτι διαλλάσσεται τῷ, κόσμῳ, ὡς ἑνὶ ἀνθρώπῳ διαλλάσσεται·* Where there is a communion of nature, there is also one common name of dignity bestowed. And thus doth God himself call things, divided into multitudes from one common nature, by one singular name. For both when he is angry with men, doth he call all those, who are the objects of his anger, by the name of one man; and when he is reconciled to the world, is he reconciled thereto as to one man.—The first instances, which he gives hereof, are in Gen. the sixth, 3d and 7th verses; "My Spirit shall not always strive with man, and I will destroy man whom I have created." —Upon which, Athanasius makes this reflection; *καίτοι οὐκ ἦν εἷς, ἀλλὰ μυριάδες ἄπειροι· ἀλλὰ τῷ ὀνόματι τῆς φύσεως, τὸν πάντα ἄνθρωπον ἕνα ἐκάλεσεν ἄνθρωπον διὰ τὸ κοινὸν τῆς οὐσίας.* Though there was not then only one man, but infinite myriads of men, nevertheless by the name of one nature, doth the Scripture call all those men one man, by reason of their community of essence or substance.—Again,[1] he commenteth in like manner upon that other Scripture passage, Exodus 15: 1. "The horse and his rider hath he thrown into the sea;" "*Οτε ἐξῆλθε Φαραὼ κατὰ τὴν θάλασσαν, πίπτων μετὰ μυρίων ἁρμάτων ἐν τῇ θαλάσσῃ, καὶ ἦσαν πολλοὶ ἄνθρωποι οἱ βυθισθέντες μετ' ἐκείνου, καὶ ἵπποι πολλοί· ὁ δὲ Μωσῆς εἶδως, ὅτι πάντων τῶν βυθισθέντων μία ἐστὶν ἡ φύσις, καὶ περὶ τῶν ἵππων*

[1] Page 213, 214.

καὶ περὶ τῶν ἀνδρῶν λέγει ἵππον καὶ ἀναβάτην ἔρριψεν εἰς θάλασσαν· τὰ πλήθη τῶν ἀνδρῶν ἐκάλεσεν ἕνα ἄνθρωπον, καὶ τὰ πλήθη τῶν ἵππων ἐκάλεσεν ἵππον ἕνα, διὰ τὴν κοινωνίαν τῆς φύσεως· When Pharaoh went out to the Red Sea, and fell, with infinite chariots in the same; and there were many men, that were drowned together with him, and many horses: yet Moses knowing, that there was but one common nature of all those, that were drowned, speaketh thus both of the men and horses; The Lord hath thrown both the horse and the rider into the sea: he calleth such a multitude of men but one singular man, and such a multitude of horses but one horse.—Whereupon Athanasius thus concludeth; [1] εἰ οὖν ἐν τοῖς ἀνθρώποις, ὅπου συγκέχυται τὰ τῆς φύσεως· ὅπου διάφορα τὰ τῆς μορφῆς καὶ δυνάμεως καὶ βουλῆς· οὐ γάρ ἐστιν οὔτε γνώμη ἴση, οὔτε μορφή, οὔτε ἰσχύς· καὶ διάφοροι γλῶτται, διὸ καὶ ἄνθρωποι μέροπες λέγονται· ἀλλὰ διὰ τὸ κοινὸν τῆς φύσεως πᾶσα ἡ οἰκουμένη εἷς ἄνθρωπος ἐκλήθη· ὅπου δὲ ἀμέριστος ἡ ἀξία, μία βασιλεία, μία δύναμις, καὶ βουλή, καὶ ἐνέργεια, ἐδιάζουσα τὴν τριάδα ἀπὸ τῆς κτίσεως, Ἕνα λέγω Θεόν. If therefore amongst men, where the things of nature are confounded, and where there are differences of form, power and will (all men, not having the same disposition of mind, nor form, nor strength), as also different languages (from whence men are called by the poets Meropes), nevertheless, by reason of the community of nature, the whole world is called one man; might not that Trinity of persons, where there is an undivided dignity, one kingdom, one power, one will, and one energy, be much rather called one God?—But though it be true, that Athanasius in this place (if at least this were a genuine fœtus of Athanasius) may justly be thought to attribute too much to this κοινὸν τῇ φύσεως καὶ οὐσίας, a common nature, essence, or substance—of all the three persons, as to the making of them to be truly and properly one God; and that those Scripture passages are but weakly urged to this purpose: yet it is plain, that he did not acquiesce in this only, but addeth other things to it also, as their having not only one will, but also one energy or action, of which more afterwards. Moreover,[2] Athanasius elsewhere plainly implieth, that this common essence or nature of the Godhead is not sufficient alone to make all the three hypostases one God. As in his fourth oration against the Arians, where he tells us, that his Trinity of Divine hypostases cannot therefore be accounted three gods, nor three principles, because they are not resembled by him to three original suns, but only to the sun, and its splendor, and the light from both. Now, three suns, according to the language of Athanasius, have κοινὸν τῆς φύσεως

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[1] Page 214. [2] Page 467.

καὶ οὐσίας, a common nature, essence, and substance—and therefore are coessential or consubstantial; and since they cannot be accounted one sun, it is manifest, that according to Athanasius, this specific identity or unity, is not sufficient to make the three Divine hypostases one God. Again, the same Athanasius, in his Exposition of Faith,[1] writeth thus; *οὔτε τρεῖς ὑποστάσεις· μέμερισμένας καθ' ἑαυτὰς, ὥσπερ σωματοφυῶς ἐπ' ἀνθρώπων ἐστὶ λογίσασθαι, ἵνα μὴ πολυθείαν ὡς τὰ ἔθνη φρονήσωμεν·* Neither do we acknowledge three hypostases, divided or separate by themselves (as is to be seen corporeally in men) that we may not comply with the Pagan Polytheism.—From whence it is evident, that neither three separate men, though coessential to Athanasius, were accounted by him to be one man, nor yet the community of the specific nature and essence of the Godhead can alone, by itself, exclude Polytheism from the Trinity. Wherefore, the true reason, why Athanasius laid so great a stress upon this homoousiotes, or coessentiality of the Trinity, in order to the unity of the Godhead in them, was not because this alone was sufficient to make them one God, but because they could not be so without it. Thus Athanasius often urges against the Arians, as in his fourth oration, where he tells them, *πολλοὺς ἂν εἰσάγοιεν [θεοὺς] διὰ τὸ ἑτεροειδὲς αὐτῶν*, that they must needs introduce a plurality of gods, because of the heterogeneity of their trinity.—And again afterwards determining, that there is *ἓν εἶδος τῆς θεότητος*, one species of the Godhead in Father, Son, and Spirit, he adds;[2] *οὕτω καὶ ἕνα διὰ τῆς τριάδος ὁμολογοῦμεν εἶναι τὸν θεὸν· καὶ πολὺ μᾶλλον εὐσεβέστερον λέγομεν τῆς πολυειδοῦς τῶν αἱρετικῶν θεότητος, ὅτι τὴν μίαν ἐν τριάδι θεότητα φρονοῦμεν· εἰ γὰρ μὴ οὕτως ἔχει, ἀλλ ἐξ οὐκ ὄντων ποίημα καὶ κτίσμα ἐστὶν ὁ λόγος——— ἀνάγκη λέγειν αὐτοὺς δύο θεοὺς, ἕνα μὲν κτιστὴν, τὸν δὲ ἕτερον κτιστόν·* And thus do we acknowledge one only God in the Trinity; and maintain it more religiously, than those heretics do, who introduce a multiform deity, consisting of divers species; we supposing only one universal Godhead in the whole. For if it be not thus, but the Son be a creature, made out of nothing, however called god by these Arians, then must he and his Father of necessity be two gods; one of them a creator, the other a creature.—In like manner, in his book of the Nicene council,[3] he affirmeth, concerning the Arians, *τρεῖς θεοὺς τρόπον τινὰ κηρύττουσιν εἰς τρεῖς ὑποστάσεις ξένας, ἀλλήλων παντάπασι κεχωρισμένας, διαιροῦντες τὴν ἁγίαν μονάδα*, that they make in a manner three gods, dividing the holy monad into three heterogeneous substances, separate from one another.—Whereas the right orthodox Trinity, on the contrary, is else-

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[1] Tom. i. oper. p. 241. [2] Page 468. [3] Page 275.

where thus described by him ; [1] *Τριὰς τοίνυν ἁγία καὶ τελία ἐστὶν, ἐν πατρὶ, καὶ υἱῷ, καὶ τῷ ἁγίῳ πνεύματι θεολογουμένη, οὐδὲν ἀλλότριον ἢ ἔξωθεν ἐπιμιγνύμενον ἔχουσα, οὐδὲ ἐκ δημιουργοῦ καὶ γεννητοῦ συνεσταμένη, ἀλλ' ὅλη τοῦ κτίζειν καὶ δημιουργεῖν οὖσα·* The holy and perfect Trinity theologised in the Father, Son, and Spirit, hath nothing alien, foreign or extraneous intermingled with it ; nor is it compounded of heterogeneous things, the creator and creature joined together.—And whereas the Arians interpreted that of our Saviour Christ, "I and my Father are one," only in respect of consent or agreement of will Athanasius showing the insufficiency hereof, concludeth thus, *ἀνάγκη λοιπὸν κατὰ τὴν οὐσίαν νοεῖν καὶ τὴν υἱοῦ καὶ πατρὸς ἑνότητα*, wherefore, besides this consent of will, there must of necessity be another unity of essence or substance also, acknowledged in the Father and the Son.—Where by unity of essence or substance, that Athanasius did not mean a unity of singular and individual, but of general or universal essence only, appears plainly from these following words: [2] *τὰ μὲν γὰρ γεννητὰ κἂν συμφωνίαν ἔχῃ πρὸς τὸν πεποιηκότα, ἀλλ' ἐν κινήσει καὶ μετουσίᾳ ταύτην ἔχει, ὥσπερ ὁ μὴ φυλάξας ἐκβέβληται τῶν οὐρανῶν, ὁ δὲ υἱὸς ἐκ τῆς οὐσίας ὢν γέννημα, οὐσίᾳ καὶ ἕν ἐστιν αὐτὸς καὶ ὁ γεννήσας πατήρ·* for those things, which are made or created, though they may have an agreement of will with their Creator, yet have they this by participation only, and in way of motion ; as he, who retaining not the same, was cast out of heaven. But the Son being begotten from the essence or substance of the Father, is essentially or substantially one with him. —So that the opposition here is betwixt unity of consent with God in created beings, which are mutable, and unity of essence in that, which is uncreated, and immutably of the same will with the Father. There are also many other places in Athanasius, which though some may understand of the unity of singular essence, yet were they not so by him intended, but either of generic or specific essence only, or else in such other sense as shall be afterwards declared. As, for example, in his fourth oration,[3] *τὴν μίαν ἐν τριάδι θεότητα φρονοῦμεν*, we acknowledge only one Godhead in the Trinity ;—where the following words plainly imply this to be understood, in part at least, of one common or general essence of the Godhead, *εἰ γὰρ μὴ οὕτως ἔχει, ἀλλ' ἐξ οὐκ ὄντων ποίημα καὶ κτίσμα ἐστὶν ὁ λόγος*, etc. Because if it be not so, but the Word be a creature, made out of nothing, he is either not truly God, or if he be called by that name, then must they be two gods, one a creator, the other a creature.—Again, when in the same book it is said, [4] *ἓν εἰσὶν ὁ υἱὸς καὶ*

[1] Ep. ad Serap. p. 202.

[2] Ep. de Syn. Arim. et Sel. p. 923. [3] Page 468. [4] Page 456.

ὁ πατὴρ τῇ ἰδιότητι καὶ οἰκειότητι τῆς φύσεως, καὶ τῇ ταυτότητι τῆς μιᾶς θεότητος· That the Son and Father are one thing in the propriety of nature, and in the sameness of one Godhead ;—it is evident from the context, that this is not to be understood of a sameness of singular essence, but partly of a common and generical one, and partly of such another sameness or unity, as will be hereafter expressed. Lastly, when the three hypostases are somewhere[1] said by him to be *μία οὐσία*, one essence or substance—this is not to be understood neither in that place, as if they had all three the same singular essence, but in some of those other senses before mentioned.

But though Athanasius nowhere declare the three hypostases of the Trinity to have only one and the same singular essence, but, on the contrary, denies them to be monoousian ; and though he lay a great stress upon their *εἰδικὴ ἑνότης*, their specific or generic unity, and coessentiality, in order to their being one God, forasmuch as without this they could not be God at all ; yet doth he not rely wholly upon this as alone sufficient to that purpose, but addeth certain other considerations thereunto, to make it out, in manner as followeth. First, that this Trinity is not a trinity of principles, but that there is only one principle or fountain of the Godhead in it, from which the other are derived. Thus doth he write in his fifth oration,[2] *μία ἀρχὴ, καὶ κατὰ τοῦτο εἷς θεὸς*, there is but one principle, and accordingly but one God. —Again, in his book against the Sabellianists, [3]*οὐκ εἰσὶ δύο θεοὶ, ὅτι μηδὲ δύο πατέρες, μηδὲ ἑτερούσιος τοῦ γεννήσαντος ἢ γεγενημένος· ὁ μὲν γὰρ ἀρχὰς εἰσάγων δύο, δύο κηρύττει Θεοὺς, αὕτη Μαρκίωνος ἡ δυσσέβεια·* There are not two gods, both because there are not two fathers, and because that, which is begotten, is not of a different essence from that which begat. For he that introduceth two principles, preacheth two gods ; which was the impiety of Marcion.—Accordingly, the same Athanasius declareth, [4]*τὴν οὐσίαν τοῦ πατρὸς ἀρχὴν καὶ ῥίζαν καὶ πηγὴν εἶναι τοῦ υἱοῦ*, that the essence or substance of the Father is the principle, and root, and fountain of the Son.—And in like manner doth he approve of this doctrine of Dionysius, *ὅτι πηγὴ τῶν ἀγαθῶν ἁπάντων ἐστιν ὁ θεὸς, ποταμὸς δὲ ὑπ' αὐτοῦ προχεόμενος ὁ υἱός·* That God (the Father) is the first fountain of all good things, but the Son a river poured out from him —To the same purpose is it also, when he compareth the Father and the Son to the water and the vapor arising from it ; to the light and the splendor ; to the prototype and the image. And he concludeth the unity of the

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[1] Vide Quæstion. vi. p. 442. tom. ii. oper. Athanas.

[2] Page 509. [3] Page 656. [4] Et Syn. Arim. De Sel. p. 920.

Godhead from hence, in this manner: [1]*τὴν θείαν τριάδα εἰς ἕνα ὥσπερ εἰς κορυφήν τινα, τὸν θεὸν τῶν ὅλων τὸν παντοκράτορα λέγω, συγκεφαλαιοῦσθαι καὶ συνάγεσθαι πᾶσα ἀνάγκη·* The Divine Trinity must needs be collected and gathered up together, under that omnipotent God of the whole world, as under one head.—But the chief force of this consideration is only to exclude the doctrine of the Marcionists, who made more independent and self-existent principles and gods. Notwithstanding which, it might still be objected, that the Christian Trinity, is a trinity of distinct subordinate gods; in opposition whereunto, this argument seems only to prepare the way to what follows; namely, of the close conjunction of these three hypostases into one God: forasmuch, as were they three independent principles, there could not be any coalescence of them into one.

In the next place, therefore, Athanasius further addeth, that these three Divine hypostases are not *μεμερισμέναι* and *κεχωρισμέναι*, separate and disjoined beings, but *ἀδιαίρετοι*, indivisibly united to one another. Thus in his fifth oration;[2] *πατέρα καὶ υἱὸν ἓν ὄντας τῇ θεότητι, καὶ τῷ ἐξ αὐτοῦ, ἀμέριστον, καὶ ἀδιαίρετον καὶ ἀχώριστον εἶναι τὸν λόγον ἀπὸ τοῦ πατρός·* The Father and the Son are both one thing in the Godhead, and in that the Word, being begotten from him, is indivisibly and inseparably conjoined with him.—Where, when he affirmeth the Father and the Son to be one in the Godhead, it is plain, that he doth not mean them to have one and the same singular essence, but only generical and universal; because in the following words he supposes them to be two, but indivisibly and inseparably united together. Again, in his book De Sent. Dionys. *ἔστιν ἀδιαίρετος τοῦ πατρὸς ὁ υἱὸς, ὡς ἔστι τὸ ἀπαύγασμα πρὸς τὸ φῶς*, the Son is indivisible from the Father, as the splendor is from the light.—And afterwards, in the same book, he insisteth further upon this point, according to the sense of Dionysius, after this manner; [3]*ὁ δὲ ἴδιον καὶ ἀδιαίρετον τῆς τοῦ πατρὸς οὐσίας τον υἱὸν εἶναι διδάσκει, ὡς ἔστιν ὁ λόγος πρὸς τὸν νοῦν καὶ ποταμὸς πρὸς τὴν πηγήν· εἰ μὲν οὖν διαιρεῖν καὶ ἀποξενοῦν τὸν λόγον καὶ τὸν νοῦν τίς δύναται, ἢ τὸν ποταμὸν καὶ τὴν πηγὴν μερίσαι καὶ τειχίσαι διελεῖν, ἢ τὸ ἀπαύγασμα ἅμα διελεῖν ἀπὸ τοῦ φωτὸς*, etc. Dionysius teacheth, that the Son is cognate with the Father, and indivisible from him, as reason is from the mind, and the river from the fountain. Who is there, therefore, that would go about to alienate reason from the mind, and to separate the river from the fountain, making up a wall between them? or to cut off the splendor from the light?—Thus also in his epistle to Serapion, that the Holy Ghost is not a crea-

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[1] De Syn. Nic. p. 275. [2] Page 529. [3] P. 566.

ture, [1]ἢ διελέτωσαν πρῶτον αὐτοί τοῦ ἀπαυγάσματος τὸ φῶς, ἢ τὴν σοφίαν τοῦ σοφοῦ, ἢ μὴ εἰπάτωσαν, πῶς ἐστι ταῦτα· Let these men first divide the splendor from the light, or wisdom from him that is wise; or else let them wonder no more how these things can be.—Elsewhere Athanasius calls the whole trinity τριάδα ἀδιαίρετον καὶ ἡνωμένην πρὸς ἑαυτήν, a Trinity undivided and united to itself.—Which Athanasian indivisibility of the Trinity is not so to be understood, as if three were not three in it; but, first of all, that neither of these could be without the other, as the original light or sun could not be without the splendor, nor the splendor without the original light, and neither one nor the other of them without a diffused derivative light. Wherefore God the Father being an eternal sun, must needs have also an eternal splendor, and an eternal light. And, secondly, that these are so nearly and intimately conjoined together, that there is a kind of συνέχεια, continuity, betwixt them; which yet is not to be understood in the way of corporeal things, but so as is agreeable to the nature of things incorporeal.

Thirdly, Athanasius ascendeth yet higher, affirming the hypostases of the Trinity not only to be indivisibly conjoined with one another, but also to have a mutual inexistence in each other, which later Greek fathers[2] have called ἐμπεριχώρησιν, their circuminsession. To this purpose does he cite the words of Dionysius,[3] ἀπόῤῥοιο γὰρ νοῦ λόγος, καὶ ἀπὸ καρδίας διὰ στόματος, ἐξοχετεύεται, ἕτερος γενόμενος τοῦ ἐν καρδίᾳ λόγου· καὶ οὕτως ἐστὶν ἑκάτερος ἐν ἑκατέρῳ, ἕτερος ὢν θατέρου, καὶ ἕν εἰσιν ὄντες δύο· οὕτω καὶ ὁ πατὴρ καὶ ὁ λόγος ἕν, καὶ ἐν ἀλλήλοις ἐλέχθησαν εἶναι· for reason is the efflux of the mind which in men is derived from the heart into the tongue, where it is become another reason or word, differing from that in the heart; and yet do these both mutually exist in each other; they belonging to one another; and so though being two, are one thing. Thus are the Father and the Son one thing, they being said to exist in each other.—And Athanasius further illustrates this also by certain similitudes; as that again of the original light and the splendor, he affirming φῶς εἶναι ἐν τῷ ἀπαυγάσματι, καὶ ἀπαύγασμα ἐν τῷ ἡλίῳ, that the original light is in the splendor, and again the splendor in the sun;—and also that of the prototype and the image, or the king and his picture; which he thus insisteth upon: [4]ἐν τῇ εἰκόνι τοῦ βασιλέως τὸ εἶδος καὶ ἡ μορφή ἐστι, καὶ ἐν τῷ βασιλεῖ τὸ ἐν τῇ εἰκόνι εἰδός ἐστιν· In the picture is contained the form

[1] Page 194.

[2] See Petav. lib. iv. de Trinitate, cap. xvi. p. 263. tom. ii. Dogmat. theolog.

[3] Page 665. (tom. i. oper. Libro de Sentent. Dionys. p. 565.)

[4] Orat. iv. p. 457.

and figure of the king, and in the king the form and figure of the picture. And therefore if any one, when he had seen the picture, should afterward desire to see the king, the picture would by a *prosopopœia*, bespeak him after this manner: [1]*ἐγὼ καὶ ὁ βασιλεὺς ἕν ἐσμεν, ἐγὼ γὰρ ἐν ἐκείνῳ εἰμὶ, κἀκεῖνος ἐν ἐμοί· καὶ ὃ ὁρᾷς ἐν ἐμοὶ, τοῦτο ἐν ἐκείνῳ βλέπεις, καὶ ὃ ἑώρακας ἐν ἐκείνῳ, τοῦτο βλέπεις ἐν ἐμοί· ὁ γὰρ προσκυνῶν τὴν εἰκόνα, ἐν αὐτῇ προσκυνεῖ τὸν βασιλέα·* I and the king am one, for I am in him, and he is in me; and what you take notice of in me, the same may you observe in him also; and what you see in him, you may see likewise in me; he, therefore, that worshippeth the image, therein worshippeth the king, the image being nothing but the form of the king.—Elsewhere, in the fourth oration, he thus insisteth upon this particular: [2]*ἔστι γὰρ ὁ υἱὸς ἐν τῷ πατρὶ, ὥσγε νοεῖν ἔξεστιν, ἐπειδὴ σύμπαν τὸ εἶναι τοῦ υἱοῦ, τοῦτο τῆς πατρὸς οὐσίας ἴδιόν ἐστιν, ὡς ἐκ φωτὸς ἀπαύγασμα, καὶ ἐκ πηγῆς ποταμὸς, ὥστε τὸν ὁρῶντα τὸν υἱὸν ὁρᾷν τὸ νοῦ πατρὸς ἴδιον. Ἔστι δὲ καὶ ὁ πατὴρ ἐν τῷ υἱῷ, ἐπειδὴ τὸ ἐκ τοῦ πατρὸς ἴδιον, τοῦτο ὁ υἱὸς τυγχάνει ὤν, ὡς ἐν τῷ ἀπαυγάσματι ὁ ἥλιος, καὶ ἐν τῷ λόγῳ ὁ νοῦς, καὶ ἐν τῷ ποταμῷ ἡ πηγή.* The Son is in the Father, as may be conceived from hence; because the whole being of the Son is proper to the essense of the Father, he being derived from it, as the splendor from the light, and the river from the fountain: so that he, who sees the Son, sees that which is the Father's own and proper. Again, the Father is in the Son, because that which is the Father's own and proper, that is the Son; accordingly as the sun is also in the splendor, the mind in reason, and the fountain in the river.—What cavils the Arians had against this doctrine, Athanasius also informs us: [3]*ἤρξαντο διασύρειν τὸ ὑπὸ τοῦ Κυρίου λεγόμενον, Ἐγὼ ἐν τῷ πατρὶ, καὶ ὁ πατὴρ ἐν ἐμοί· λέγοντες, πῶς δύναται οὗτος ἐν ἐκείνῳ, κἀκεῖνος ἐν τούτῳ χωρεῖν; ἢ πῶς ὅλως δύναται ὁ πατὴρ μείζων ὤν, ἐν τῷ υἱῷ ἐλάττονι ὄντι χωρεῖν· καίτοι τί θαυμαστὸν εἰ ὁ υἱὸς ἐν τῷ πατρὶ, ὅπουγε καὶ περὶ ἡμῶν γέγραπται. Ἐν αὐτῷ γὰρ ζῶμεν καὶ κινούμεθα καὶ ἐσμέν.* Here the Arians begin to quarrel with that of our Lord, "I am in the Father, and the Father in me:" objecting, How is it possible, that both the former should be in the latter, and the latter in the former? or how can the Father, being greater, be received in the Son, who is lesser? And yet what wonder is it if the Son should be in the Father; since it is written of us men also, that "in him we live, and move, and have our being?"—In way of reply whereunto, Athanasius first observes, that the ground of this Arian cavilation was the grossness of their apprehensions, and that they did *τὰ ἀσώματα σωματικῶς ἐκ-*

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[1] Orat. iv. p. 457. [2] Page 456. [3] Orat iv. (p. 453.)

λαμβάνειν, conceive of incorporeal things after a corporeal manner.—And then does he add, *οὐ γὰρ ὡς ἐκεῖνοι νομίζουσιν, ἀντεμβιβαζόμενοι εἰς ἀλλήλους εἰσὶν, ὥσπερ ἐν ἀγγείοις κενοῖς ἐξ ἀλλήλων πληρουμένοις, ὥστε τὸν μὲν υἱὸν πληροῦν τὸ κοῖλον τοῦ πατρὸς, τὸν δὲ πατέρα πληροῦν τὸ κοῖλον τοῦ υἱοῦ, καὶ ἑκάτερον αὐτῶν μὴ εἶναι πλήρη καὶ τέλειον·* For the Father and Son are not, as they suppose, transvasated and poured out one into another, as into an empty vessel; as if the Son filled up the concavity of the Father, and again, the Father that of the Son; and neither of them were full or perfect in themselves. For all this is proper to bodies: wherefore though the Father be, in some sense greater than the Son; yet notwithstanding may he be in him after an incorporeal manner.—And he replieth to their last cavil thus: "That the Son is not so in the Father, as we ourselves are said to live, and move, and be in God;" *αὐτὸς γὰρ ὡς ἐκ πηγῆς τοῦ πατρός ἐστι ζωὴ, ἐν ᾧ τὰ πάντα ζωογονεῖται καὶ συνέστηκεν, οὐ γὰρ ἡ ζωὴ ἐν ζώῳ ζῇ*, etc. For he himself, from the fountain of the Father, is that life, in whom all things are quickened and consist; neither does he, who is the life, live in another life, which were to suppose him not to be the life itself.—"Nor (saith he) must it be conceived, that the Father is no otherwise in the Son, than he is in holy men corroborating of them; for the Son himself is the power and wisdom of God, and all created beings are sanctified by a participation of him in the Spirit." Wherefore this perichoresis, or mutual in-being of the Father and the Son, is to be understood after a peculiar manner, so as that they are really thereby one; and what the Son and Holy Ghost doth, the Father doth in them, according to that of Athanasius,[1] *ἡ τοῦ υἱοῦ θεότης τοῦ πατρὸς θεότης ἐστί· καὶ οὕτως ἐν τῷ υἱῷ τὴν τῶν πάντων πρόνοιαν ποιεῖται·* The Godhead of the Son is the Godhead of the Father; and so the Father exercises a providence over all things in the Son.

Lastly, The same Athanasius, in sundry places, still further supposes those three Divine hypostases to make up one entire Divinity, after the same manner as the fountain and the stream make up one entire river; or the root, and the stock, and the branches, one entire tree. And in this sense, also, is the whole Trinity said by him to be *μία θεότης*, and *μία φύσις*, and *μία οὐσία*, and *εἷς θεὸς*, one Divinity, and one nature, and one essence, and one God.—And accordingly the word homoousios seems here to be taken by Athanasius in a further sense, besides that before mentioned; not only for things agreeing in one common and general essence, as three individual men are coessential with one another; but also for such as concurrently together make up one

[1] Page 457.

entire thing, and are therefore jointly essential thereunto. For when he affirmeth, *τὸ φυτὸν εἶναι ῥίζης ὁμοφυές*, and *τὰ κλήματα ὁμοούσια τῆς ἀμπέλου*, that the tree is congenerous or homogeneal with the root, and the branches coessential with the vine;—his meaning is, that the root, stock, and branches, are not only of one kind, but also all together make up the entire essence of one plant or tree. In like manner, those three hypostases, the Father, Son, and Holy Ghost, are not only congenerous and coessential, as having all the essence of the Godhead alike in them, but also as concurrently making up one entire Divinity. Accordingly whereunto, Athanasius further concludes, that these three Divine hypostases have not a consent of will only, but essentially one and the self-same will, and that they do also jointly produce *ad extra*, *μίαν ἐνέργειαν*, one and the self-same energy, operation, or action; nothing being peculiar to the Son, as such, but only the economy of the incarnation: [1] *Ὁμοία ἑαυτῇ καὶ ἀδιαίρετός ἐστι τῇ φύσει ἡ Τριάς· καὶ μία ταύτης ἡ ἐνέργεια· ὁ γὰρ Πατὴρ διὰ τοῦ Λόγου, ἐν τῷ Πνεύματι τῷ ἁγίῳ τὰ πάντα ποιεῖ· καὶ οὕτως ἡ ἑνότης τῆς ἁγίας Τριάδος σώζεται· καὶ οὕτως εἷς Θεὸς ἐν τῇ ἐκκλησίᾳ κηρύττεται ὁ ἐπὶ πάντων, καὶ διὰ πάντων, καὶ ἐν πᾶσιν· ἐπὶ πάντων μὲν ὡς πατὴρ, ὡς ἀρχὴ καὶ πηγή· διὰ πάντων δὲ διὰ τοῦ λόγου· ἐν πᾶσι δὲ, ἐν τῷ πνεύματι τῷ ἁγίῳ·* The Trinity is like itself, and by nature indivisible, and there is one energy or action of it; for the Father by the Word, in the Holy Ghost, doth all things. And thus is the unity of the Holy Trinity conserved, and one God preached in the church: namely, such as is above all, and by or through all, and in all. Above all, as the Father, the principle and fountain; through all, by the Word; and in all, by the Holy Spirit.—And elsewhere he writeth often to the same purpose. Thus have we given a true and full account, how, according to Athanasius, the three Divine hypostases, though not monoousios, but homoousios only, are really but one God or Divinity. In all which doctrine of his there is nothing but what a true and genuine Platonist would readily subscribe to. From whence it may be concluded, that the right Platonic trinity differs not so much from the doctrine of the ancient church, as some late writers have supposed.

Hitherto hath the Platonic Christian endeavored partly to rectify and reform the true and genuine Platonic trinity, and partly to reconcile it with the doctrine of the ancient church. Nevertheless, to prevent all mistakes, we shall here declare, that wheresoever this most genuine Platonic trinity may be found to differ, not only from the

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[1] Ep. ad Serap. p. 202.

Scripture itself, (which yet notwithstanding is the sole rule of faith) but also from the form of the Nicene and Constantinopolitan councils; and further from the doctrine of Athanasius too, in his genuine writing, (whether it be in their inequality, or in any thing else) it is there utterly disclaimed and rejected by us. For as for that Creed, commonly called Athanasian, which was written a long time after by some other hand; since at first it derived all its authority, either from the name of Athanasius, to whom it was entitled, or else because it was supposed to be an epitome and abridgment of his doctrine; this (as we conceive) is therefore to be interpreted according to the tenor of that doctrine, contained in the genuine writings of Athanasius. Of whom we can think no otherwise, than as a person highly instrumental and serviceable to Divine Providence, for the preserving of the Christian church from lapsing, by Arianism, into a kind of paganic and idolatrous Christianity; in religiously worshipping of those, which themselves concluded to be creatures; and by means of whom especially, the doctrine of the Trinity, (which before fluctuated in some loose uncertainty) came to be more punctually stated and settled.

Now the reason why we introduce the Platonic Christian here thus apologizing was, first, because we conceive it not to be the interest of Christianity, that the ancient Platonic trinity should be made more discrepant from the Christian, than indeed it is. And, secondly, because, as we have already proved, the ancient and genuine Platonic trinity was doubtless anti-Arian, or else the Arian trinity anti-Platonic; the second and third hypostases, in the Platonic trinity, being both eternal, infinite, and immutable. And as for those Platonic *βαθμοὶ*, or gradations, so much spoken of, these (by St. Cyril's[1] leave) were of a different kind from the Arian, there being not the inequality of creatures in them to the Creator. Wherefore Socrates, the ecclesiastic historian, not without cause wonders, how those two presbyters, Georgius and Timotheus, should adhere to the Arian faction, since they were accounted such great readers of Plato and Origin;[2] *θαυμάσαι οὖν μοι ἔπεισι, πῶς οὗτοι οἱ ἄνδρες, τῇ Ἀρειανῶν θρησκείᾳ παρέμειναν, ὧν ὁ μὲν Πλάτωνα ἀεὶ μετὰ χεῖρας εἶχεν, ὁ δὲ τὸν Ὠριγένην ἀνέπνεεν οὐδὲ γὰρ Πλάτων τὸ Δεύτερον καὶ τὸ Τρίτον αἴτιον, ὡς αὐτὸς ὀνομάζειν εἴωθεν, ἀρχὴν ὑπάρξεως, εἰληφέναι φησὶ· καὶ Ὠριγένης συναΐδιον πανταχοῦ ὁμολογεῖ τὸν υἱὸν τῷ πατρί.* It seems to me wonderful, how those two persons should persist in the Arian persuasion; one of them having always Plato in his hands,

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[1] Advers. Julian. lib. viii. p. 270. et lib. i. p. 34.

[2] L. vii. c. vi. [p. 343.]

and the other continually breathing Origen. Since Plato no where affirmeth his first and second cause (as he was wont to call them) to have had any beginning of their existence; and Origen every where confesseth the Son to be coeternal with the Father.

Besides which, another reason for this apology of the Christian Platonist was, because as the Platonic Pagans after Christianity did approve of the Christian doctrine concerning the Logos, as that which was exactly agreeable with their own; so did the generality of the Christian fathers, before and after the Nicene council, represent the genuine Platonic trinity as really the same thing with the Christian, or as approaching so near to it, that they differed chiefly in circumstances, or the manner of expresssion. The former of these is evident from that famous passage of Amelius contemporary with Plotinus, recorded by Eusebius, St. Cyril, and Theodoret; [1] *Καὶ οὗτος ἄρα ἦν ὁ Λόγος, καθ' ὃν αἰεὶ ὄντα, τὰ γινόμενα ἐγίνετο, ὡς ἂν καὶ ὁ Ἡράκλειτος ἀξιώσειε, καὶ νὴ Δί' ὃν ὁ Βάρβαρος ἀξιοῖ ἐν τῇ τῆς ἀρχῆς τάξει τε καὶ ἀξίᾳ καθεστηκότα, πρὸς τὸν Θεὸν εἶναι, καὶ Θεὸν εἶναι· δι' οὗ πάνθ' ἁπλῶς γεγενῆσθαι· ἐν ᾧ τὸ γενόμενον ζῶν καὶ ζωὴν καὶ ὂν πεφυκέναι· καὶ εἰς τὰ σώματα πίπτειν καὶ σάρκα ἐνδυσάμενον, φαντάζεσθαι ἄνθρωπον, μετὰ καὶ τοῦ τηνικαῦτα δεικνύειν τῆς φύσεως τὸ μεγαλεῖον ἀμέλει· καὶ ἀναλυθέντα πάλιν ἀποθεοῦσθαι, καὶ Θεὸν εἶναι, οἷος ἦν πρὸ τοῦ εἰς τὸ σῶμα, καὶ τὸν ἄνθρωπον καταχθῆναι·* And this was the Logos or Word, by whom existing from eternity, according to Heraclitus, all things were made, and whom that barbarian also placeth in the rank and dignity of a principle, affirming him to have been with God, and to be God; and that all things were made by him, and that whatsoever was made, was life and being in him. As also, that he descended into a body, and, being clothed in flesh, appeared as man, though not without demonstration of the Divinity of his nature. But that afterwards being loosed or separated from the same, he was deified, and became God again, such as he was before he came down into a mortal body.—In which words, Amelius speaks favorably also of the incarnation of that eternal Logos. The same is further manifest from what St. Austin writeth concerning a Platonist in his time: [2] "Initium sancti evangelii, cui nomen est secundum Johannem, quidam Platonicus, sicut a sancto sene Simpliciano, qui postea Mediolanensi ecclesiæ præsedit episcopus, solebamus audire, aureis literis conscribendum, et per omnes ecclesias in locis eminentissimis proponendum esse dicebat." We have often heard from that holy man Sim-

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[1] Pr. Ev. l. xi. c. ix. [cap. xix. p. 540.]

[2] De Civ. Dei. l. x. c. xxix. [p. 202. tom. vii. oper.]

plicianus, afterwards bishop of Milan, that a certain Platonist affirmed, the beginning of St. John's Gospel deserved to be writ in letters of gold, and to be set up in all the most eminent places throughout the Christian churches.—And the latter will sufficiently appear from these following testimonies: Justin Martyr, in his apology affirmeth of Plato, [1] *δευτέραν χώραν τῷ παρὰ Θεοῦ λόγῳ δίδωσι· τὴν δὲ τρίτην τῷ λεχθέντι ἐπιφέρεσθαι τῷ ὕδατι πνεύματι*, etc. That he gave the second place to the Word of God; and the third to that Spirit, which is said to have moved upon the waters.—Clemens Alexandrinus, speaking of that passage in Plato's second epistle to Dionysius, concerning the first, second, and third, writeth thus: [2] *οὐκ ἄλλως ἔγωγε ἐξακούω, ἢ τὴν ἁγίαν τριάδα μηνύεσθαι, τρίτον μὲν γὰρ εἶναι τὸ ἅγιον πνεῦμα· τὸν υἱὸν δὲ δεύτερον, δὶ οὗ πάντα ἐγένετο κατὰ βούλησιν τοῦ πατρός·* I understand this no otherwise, than that the holy Trinity is signified thereby, the third being the Holy Ghost, and the second the Son, by whom all things were made, according to the will of the Father.—Origen also affirmeth the Son of God to have been plainly spoken of by Plato, in his epistle to Hermias and Coriscus, [3] *ὁ πάντ' ἐπαγγελλόμενος εἰδέναι Κέλσος, καὶ πολλὰ τῶν Πλάτωνος παρατιθέμενος, ἑκών, οἶμαι, σιωπᾷ τὸν περὶ υἱοῦ θεοῦ λόγον, τὸν παρὰ Πλάτωνι λεγόμενον ἐν τῇ πρὸς Ἑρμείαν καὶ Κορίσκον ἐπιστολῇ·* Celsus, who pretendeth to know all things, and who citeth so many other passages out of Plato, doth purposely (as I suppose) dissemble and conceal that, which he wrote concerning the Son of God, in his epistle to Hermias and Coriscus; [4] where he calls him the God of the whole universe, and the prince of all things, both present and future; afterwards speaking of the Father of this prince and cause.—And again, elsewhere in that book, he writeth to the same purpose: [5] *ἀλλ' οὐδ' ἐβουλήθη τὸ παρὰ Πλάτωνι ἐν ταῖς ἐπιστολαῖς λελεγμένον, οὗ ἐν τοῖς ἀνωτέρω ἐμνήσθημεν, περὶ τοῦ διακοσμήσαντος τόδε τὸ πᾶν, ὡς ὄντος υἱοῦ, θεοῦ, παραθέσθαι· ἵνα μὴ καὶ αὐτὸς, ὑπὸ τοῦ Πλάτωνος, ὃν πολλάκις ἐσέμνυνεν, ἀναγκασθῇ παραδέξασθαι, ὅτι ὁ μὲν δημιουργὸς τοῦδε τοῦ παντὸς, υἱός ἐστι τοῦ θεοῦ, ὁ δὲ πρῶτος καὶ ἐπὶ πᾶσι θεὸς πατήρ ἐστιν αὐτοῦ·* Neither would Celsus (here speaking of Christians making Christ the Son of God) take any notice of that passage in Plato's epistle beforementioned, concerning the

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[1] Page 93. [Apol. ii.]

[2] Strom. 1. v. p. 598. [p. 710. edit. Potteri.]

[3] L. vi. c. Cels. [p. 280.]

[4] The following are not Origen's words, but Dr. Cudworth's, who thus explains the passage of Plato cited by Origen.

[5] Cont. Cels. 1. vi. p. 308.

framer and governor of the whole world, as being the Son of God; lest he should be compelled by the authority of Plato, whom he so often magnifieth, to agree with this doctrine of ours, that the Demiurgus of the whole world is the Son of God; but the first and supreme Deity, his Father.—Moreover, St. Cyprian, or whoever were the author of the book inscribed De Spiritu Sancto, affirmeth the Platonists first and universal Psyche, to be the same with the Holy Ghost in the Christian theology, in these words: "Hujus sempiterna virtus et divinitas, cum in propria natura, ab inquisitoribus mundi antiquis philosophis proprie investigari non posset; subtilissimis tamen intuiti conjecturis compositionem mundi, et distinctis elementorum affectibus, præsentem omnibus animam adfuisse dixerunt; quibus, secundum genus et ordinem singulorum, vitam præberet et motum, et intransgressibiles figeret metas, et stabilitatem assignaret; et universam hanc vitam, hunc motum, hanc rerum essentiam, animam mundi vocaverunt." In the next place,[1] Eusebius Cæsariensis gives a full and clear testimony of the concordance and agreement of the Platonic, at least as to the main, with the Christian Trinity, which he will have to have been the cabala of the ancient Hebrews, thus: *τῶν παρ᾽ Ἑβραίοις λογίων μετὰ τὸν περὶ πατρὸς καὶ Υἱοῦ λόγον, ἐν τρίτῃ τάξει τὸ Ἅγιον Πνεῦμα καταλεγόντων· καὶ τήν γε ἁγίαν καὶ μακαρίαν Τριάδα τοῦτον ὑποτιθεμένων τὸν τρόπον, ὡς ἂν τῆς τρίτης δυνάμεως πᾶσαν ὑπερβεβηκυίας γενητὴν φύσιν· οὖσαν πρώτην μὲν τῶν διὰ τοῦ Υἱοῦ συστασῶν νοερῶν οὐσιῶν, τρίτην δὲ ἀπὸ τοῦ πρώτου Αἰτίου· θέα ὅπως καὶ ὁ Πλάτων τοιαῦτά τινα ἠνίξατο διὰ τῆς πρὸς Διονύσιον ἐπιστολῆς*, etc. The oracles of the Hebrews, placing the Holy Ghost after the Father, and the Son in the third rank, and acknowledging a holy and blessed Trinity after this manner, so as that this third power does also transcend all created nature, and is the first of those intellectual substances, which proceed from the Son, and the third from the first cause: see how Plato enigmatically declareth the same things in his epistle to Dionysius; in these words, etc. These things the interpreters of Plato refer to a first god, and to a second cause, and to a third the soul of the world, which they call also the third god. And the Divine Scriptures in like manner rank the holy Trinity of Father, Son, and Holy Ghost, in the place or degree of a principle.—But it is most observable what Athanasius affirmeth of the Platonists; that though they derived the second hypostasis of their trinity from the first, and the third from the second, yet they supposed both their second and third hypostases to be uncreated; and therefore

[1] Pr. Ev. l. xi. c. xx. [p. 541.]

does he send the Arians to school thither, who, because there is but one *Ἀγέννητος*, one self-originated Being would unskilfully conclude, that the Word or Son of God must therefore needs be a creature. Thus in his book concerning the decrees of the Nicene council; [1] *ἐχρήσαντο παρ᾽ Ἑλλήνων λοιπὸν τὴν λέξιν τοῦ Ἀγεννήτου· ἵνα προφάσει καὶ τούτου τοῦ ὀνόματος, ἐν τοῖς γενητοῖς πάλιν καὶ τοῖς κτίσμασι συναριθμῶσι τὸν τοῦ θεοῦ Λόγον· δι᾽ οὗ αὐτὰ τὰ γενητὰ γέγονεν· εἰ μὲν οὖν ἀγνοοῦντες τὸ ὄτομα οὕτως ἀναισχυντοῦσιν, ἔδει μαθεῖν αὐτοὺς παρὰ τῶν αὐτοῖς δεδωκότων αὐτὸ, ὅτι καὶ ὂν λέγουσιν ἐκ τοῦ Ἀγαθοῦ Νοῦν, καὶ τὸν ἐκ τοῦ Νοῦ ψυχήν· καίτο γινώσκοντες τὸ ἐξ ὧν εἰσιν, οὐκ ἐφοβήθησαν ὅμως καὶ αὐτὰ εἰπεῖν Ἀγένητα· εἰδότες ὅτι καὶ τοῦτο λέγοντες οὐκ ἐλαττοῦσι τὸ πρῶτον ἐξ οὗ καὶ ταῦτα πέφυκε· καὶ ἢ καὶ αὐτοὺς οὕτω λέγειν, ἢ μηδόλως λέγειν περὶ ὧν οὐκ ἴσασιν·* The Arians borrowing the word Agennetos from the Pagans, (who acknowledge only one such) make that a pretence to rank the Word or Son of God, who is the creator of all, amongst creatures or things made. Whereas they ought to have learned the right signification of that word Agennetos from those very Platonists, who gave it them: who, though acknowledging their second hypostasis of Nous or Intellect, to be derived from the first called Tagathon, and their third hypostasis or Psyche from the second; nevertheless doubt not to affirm them both to be ageneta or uncreated, knowing well, that hereby they detract nothing from the majesty of the first, from whom these two are derived. Wherefore, the Arians either ought so to speak as the Platonists do, or else to say nothing at all concerning these things, which they are ignorant of. In which words of Athanasius, there is a plain distinction made betwixt *ἀγέννητος* and *ἀγένητος*, that is, unbegotten and uncreated; and the second person of the Trinity, the Son or Word of God, though acknowledged by him not to be *Ἀγέννητος*, unbegotten, (he being begotten of the Father, who is the only Agennetos) yet is he here said to be *Ἀγένητος*, uncreated; he declaring the Platonists thus to have affirmed the second and third hypostases of their trinity, not to be creatures, but uncreated. Which signal testimony of Athanasius, concerning the Platonic trinity, is a great vindication of the same. We might here further add St. Austin's confession also, that God the Father, and God the Son, were by the Platonists[2] acknowledged in like manner, as by the Christians; though, concerning the Holy Ghost, he observes some difference betwixt Plotinus and Porphyrius, in that the former did postponere animæ naturam paterno intellectui; the latter, interponere: Plotinus did postpone his Psyche, or soul, after the paternal Intellect; but Por-

[1] Page 278. [2] De Civit. Dei. [lib. x. cap. xxiii.]

phyrius interponed it betwixt the Father and the Son, as a middle between both.—It was before observed, that St. Cyril of Alexandria affirmeth nothing to be wanting to the Platonic trinity, but only that homoousiotes of his and some other fathers in that age, that they should not only all be God, or uncreated, but also three coequal individuals, under the same ultimate species, as three individual men; he conceiving that gradual subordination, that is in the Platonic trinity, to be a certain tang of Arianism. Nevertheless, he thus concludeth,[1] πλὴν οὐκ ἠγνόηκεν ὁλοτρόπως τὸ ἀληθὲς, that Plato notwithstanding was not altogether ignorant of the truth, but that he had the knowledge of the only-begotten Son of God, as likewise of the Holy Ghost, called by him Psyche; and that he would have every way expressed himself rightly, had he not been afraid of Anitus and Melitus, and that poison, which Socrates drunk. Now, whether this were a fault or no in the Platonists, that they did not suppose their hypostases to be three individuals under the same ultimate species, we leave to others to judge. We might here add the testimony of Chalcidius, because he is unquestionably concluded to have been a Christian; though his language indeed be too much paganical, when he calls the three Divine hypostases, a chief, a second, and a third god: [2] "Istius rei dispositio talis mente concipienda est; originem quidem rerum esse summum et ineffabilem Deum; post providentiam ejus secundum Deum, latorem legis utriusque vitæ tam æternæ quam temporariæ; tertium esse porro substantiam, quæ secunda mens intellectusque dicitur, quasi quædam custos legis æternæ. His subjectas esse rationabiles animas, legi obsequentes, ministras vero potestates, etc. Ergo summus Deus jubet, secundus ordinat, tertius intimat. Animæ vero legem agunt." This thing is to be conceived after this manner: that the first Original of things is the supreme and ineffable God; after his providence, a second god, the establisher of the law of life both eternal and temporary; and the third (which is also a substance, and called a second mind or intellect) is a certain keeper of this eternal law. Under these three are rational souls, subject to that law, together with the ministerial powers, etc. So that the sovereign or supreme God commands, the second orders, and the third executes. But souls are subject to the law.—Where Chalcidius, though seeming indeed rather more a Platonist than a Christian, yet acknowledgeth no such beings as henades and noes; but only three Divine hypostases, and under them rational souls. But we shall conclude

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[1] Advers. Julian. lib. i. p. 34.

[2] Page 277. [cap. vii. § 186. p. 346, 347. edit. Fabricii.]

with the testimony of Theodoret in his book De Principio;[1] *τὴν Πλάτωνος διάνοιαν ἀναπτύσσοντες ὁ Πλωτῖνος καὶ ὁ Νουμήνιος, τρία φασὶν αὐτὸν εἰρηκέναι ὑπέρχρονα καὶ ἄϊδια, τ' ἀγαθὸν, καὶ νοῦν, καὶ τοῦ παντὸς τὴν ψυχήν· ὃν μὲν ἡμεῖς Πατέρα καλοῦμεν τ' ἀγαθὸν ὀνομάζοντες, Νοῦν δὲ ὃν ἡμεῖς Λόγον προσαγορεύομεν, τὴν δὲ τὰ πάντα ψύχουσαν καὶ ζωοποιοῦσαν δύναμιν, Ψυχὴν καλοῦντα, ἣν Πνεῦμα ἅγιον οἱ θεῖοι προσαγορεύουσι λόγοι· καὶ ταῦτα δὲ ἐκ τῆς Ἑβραίων φιλοσοφίας καὶ θεολογίας σεσύληται.* Plotinus and Numenius, explaining Plato's sense, declare him to have asserted three supertemporals or eternals, Good, Mind or Intellect, and the Soul of the universe; he calling that Tagathon which to us is Father; that Mind, or Intellect, which to us is the Son or Word; and that Psyche, or a power animating and enlivening all things, which our Scriptures call the Holy Ghost. And these things (saith he) were by Plato purloined from the philosophy and theology of the Hebrews.

Wherefore, we cannot but take notice here of a wonderful providence of Almighty God, that this doctrine of a trinity of Divine hypostases should find such admittance and entertainment in the Pagan world, and be received by the wisest of all their philosophers, before the time of Christianity; thereby to prepare a more easy way for the reception of Christianity among the learned Pagans: which that it proved successful accordingly, is undeniably evident from the monuments of antiquity. And the junior Platonists, who were most opposite and adverse to Christianity, became at length so sensible hereof, that besides their other adulterations of the Trinity before mentioned, for the countenancing of their polytheism and idolatry, they did, in all probability for this very reason, quite innovate, change and pervert the whole cabala, and no longer acknowledge a trinity, but either a quaternity, or a quinary, or more of Divine hypostases; the first of all contending, that before the Trinity, there was another supreme and highest hypostasis, not to be reckoned with the others, but standing alone by himself. And we conceive the first innovator in this kind to have been Jamblichus, who, in his Egyptian Mysteries,[2] where he seems to make the Egyptian theology to agree with his own hypotheses, writeth in this manner: *πρὸ τῶν ὄντως ὄντων καὶ τῶν ὅλων ἀρχῶν, ἐστι θεὸς εἷς πρῶτος καὶ τοῦ πρώτου θεοῦ καὶ βασιλέως· ἀκίνητος ἐν μονότητι τῆς ἑαυτοῦ ἑνότητος μένων· οὔτε γὰρ νοητὸν αὐτῷ ἐπιπλέκεται, οὔτε ἄλλό τι· παράδειγμα δὲ ἵδρυται τοῦ αὐτοπάτορος αὐτογόνου καὶ μονοπάτορος θεοῦ τοῦ ὄντως ἀγαθοῦ· μεῖζον γάρ τε καὶ πρῶτον καὶ πηγὴ τῶν πάντων, καὶ πυθμὴν τῶν νοουμένων πρώτων ἰδεῶν ὄντων· ἀπὸ δὲ τοῦ ἑνὸς τούτου, ὁ αὐτάρκης θεὸς, ἑαυτὸν ἐξέ-*

[1] Tom. ii. oper. p. 496. [2] Sect. viii. cap. ii. p. 158.

λαμψε, διὸ καὶ αὐτοπάτωρ καὶ αὐτάρκης· ἀρχὴ γὰρ οὗτος καὶ θεὸς θεῶν· μονὰς ἐκ τοῦ ἑνὸς, προούσιος καὶ ἀρχὴ τῆς οὐσίας. Before those things, which truly are, and the principles of all, there is one God superior to the first God and king, immovable, and always remaining in the solitude of his own unity; there being nothing intelligible, nor any thing else mingled with him; but he being the paradigm of that God truly good, which is self-begotten and his own parent. For this is greater, and before him, and the fountain of all things, the foundation of all the first intelligible ideas. Wherefore, from this one did that self-sufficient God, who is autopater, or his own parent, cause himself to shine forth; for this is also a principle, and the God of gods, a monad from the first one, before all essence.—Where, so far as we can understand, Jamblichus's meaning is, that there is a simple unity in order of nature, before that Tagathon, or monad, which is the first of three Divine hypostases. And this doctrine was afterwards taken up by Proclus, he declaring it in this manner; [1]πανταχοῦ ὁ Πλάτων ἀπὸ τοῦ πλήθους ἐπὶ τὰς ἑνάδας ἀνατρέχειν εἴωθεν· μᾶλλον δὲ καὶ πρὸ τοῦ Πλάτωνος κατὰ τὴν τῶν πραγμάτων τάξιν πρὸ τοῦ πλήθους ἓν ἀεί ἐστι, καὶ πᾶσα θεία τάξις ἀπὸ μονάδος ἄρχεται· δεῖ μὲν γὰρ ἐκ τριάδος προϊέναι τὸν ἀριθμὸν τὸν θεῖον, ἀλλὰ πρὸ τῆς τριάδος ἡ μονάς· ἔστω μὲν οὖν καὶ οἱ δημιουργικοὶ τρεῖς ἀλλὰ τὶς ὁ πρὸ τῶν τριῶν εἷς, οὐδεμία γὰρ τῶν θείων τάξεων ἐκ πλήθους ἄρχειαι· οὐκ ἄρα ἀπὸ τριάδος ἄρχεσθαι δεῖ τὸν δημιουργικὸν ἀριθμὸν, ἀλλ' ἀπὸ μονάδος· Plato every where ascends from multitude to unity, from whence also the order of the many proceeds; but before Plato, and according to the natural order of things, one is before multitude, and every Divine order begins from a monad. Wherefore, though the Divine number proceed in a trinity, yet before this trinity must there be a monad. Let there be three demiurgical hypostases; nevertheless, before these must there be one, because none of the Divine orders begins from multitude. We conclude, that the demiurgical number does not begin from a trinity, but from a monad, standing alone by itself before that trinity.—Here Proclus, though endeavoring to gain some countenance for this doctrine out of Plato, yet, as fearing lest that should fail him, does he fly to the order of nature, and from thence would infer, that before the trinity of demiurgic hypostases, there must be a single monad or henad, standing alone by itself, as the head thereof. And St. Cyril of Alexandria, who was junior to Jamblichus, but senior to Proclus, seems to take notice of this innovation in the Platonic theology, as a thing then newly crept up, and after the time of Porphyry:[2] ἀλλ' οἵ γε προειρημένοι καὶ πρὸς τοῦτο ἀντιλέγουσι,

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[1] In Timæ. lib. ii. p. 93. [2] C. Jul. lib. viii. p. 271.

φάσκοντες μὴ δεῖν Τ᾽ΑΓΑΘΟ᾽Ν συναριθμεῖν τοῖς ἀπ᾽ αὐτοῦ· ἐξῃρῆσθαι γὰρ ἀπὸ πάσης κοινωνίας διὰ τὸ εἶναι ἁπλοῦν πάντη καὶ ἄδεκτον τινὸς συμβάσεως· Ἀπὸ δὲ τοῦ ΝΟ᾽Υ, (ἀρχὴ γὰρ οὗτος) τὴν τριάδα μίαν σωθῆναι· But those before mentioned contradict this doctrine (of Porphyrius and the ancient Platonists), affirming that the Tagathon ought not to be connumerated or reckoned together with those which proceed from it, but to be exempted from all communion, because it is altogether simple, and incapable of any commixture or consociation with any other. Wherefore these begin their trinity with Nous or Intellect, making that the first.—The only difference here is, that Jamblichus seems to make the first hypostasis of the trinity after a monad to be Tagathon, but St. Cyril, Nous. However, they both meant the same thing, as also did Proclus after them. Wherefore, it is evident, that when from the time of the Nicene council and Athanasius, the Christian doctrine of the Trinity came to be punctually stated and settled, and much to be insisted upon by Christians, Jamblichus, and other Platonists, who were great antagonists of the same, perceiving what advantage the Christians had from the Platonic trinity, then first of all innovated this doctrine, introducing a quaternity of Divine hypostases, instead of a trinity, the first of them being not co-ordinate with the other three, nor consociated or reckoned with them; but all of them, though subordinate, yet universal, and such as comprehend the whole; that is, infinite and omnipotent; and therefore none of them creatures. For it is certain, that before this time, or the age that Jamblichus lived in, there was no such thing at all dreamed of by any Platonist, as an unity before and above the Trinity, and so a quaternity of Divine hypostases; Plotinus positively determining, that there could neither be more nor fewer than three: and Proclus himself acknowledging the ancient tradition, or cabala, to have run only of three gods; and Numenius, who was senior to them both, writing thus of Socrates, [1] *Τρεῖς θεοὺς τιθεμένου Σωκράτους*, that he also (before Plato) asserted three gods;—that is, three Divine hypostases, and no more, as principles; therein following the Pythagoreans.

Moreover, the same Proclus, besides in his henades and noes beforementioned, added certain other fantastic trinities of his own also; as this, for example, of the first essence, the first life, and the first intellect (to omit others); whereby that ancient cabala and *θεοπαράδοτος θεολογία*, theology of Divine tradition—of three archical hypostases, and no more, was disguised, perverted, and adulterated.

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[1] Euseb. P. E. lib. xiv. cap. v. (p. 728.)

But, besides this advantage from the ancient Pagan Platonists and Pythagoreans admitting a trinity into their theology, in like manner as Christianity doth (whereby Christianity was the more recommended to the philosophic Pagans), there is another advantage of the same extending even to this present time, probably not unintended also by Divine Providence; that whereas bold and conceited wits, precipitately condemning the doctrine of the Trinity for nonsense, absolute repugnancy to human faculties, and impossibility, have thereupon some of them quite shaken off Christianity, and all revealed religion, professing only Theism; others have frustrated the design thereof, by paganizing it into creature-worship or idolatry; this ignorant or conceited confidence of both may be returned, and confuted from hence, because the most ingenious and acute of all the Pagan philosophers, the Platonists and Pythagoreans, who had no bias at all upon them, nor any Scripture revelation, that might seem to impose upon their faculties, but followed the free sentiments and dictates of their own minds, did notwithstanding not only entertain this trinity of Divine hypostases eternal and uncreated, but were also fond of the hypothesis, and make it a main fundamental of their theology.

It now appears from what we have declared, that as to the ancient and genuine Platonists and Pythagoreans, none of their trinity of gods, or Divine hypostases, were independent, so neither were they γενετοὶ θεοὶ, creature-gods,—but uncreated; they being all of them not only eternal, and necessarily existent and immutable, but also universal, that is infinite and omnipotent; causes, principles, and creators of the whole world. From whence it follows, that these Platonists could not justly be taxed for idolatry, in giving religious worship to each hypostasis of this their trinity. And we have the rather insisted so long upon this Platonic trinity, because we shall make use of this doctrine afterwards, in our defence of Christianity, where we are to show, that one grand design of Christianity being to abolish the Pagan idolatry, or creature-worship, itself cannot justly be charged with the same from that religious worship given to our Saviour Christ, and the Trinity (the Son and Holy Ghost), they being none of them, according to the true and orthodox Christianity, creatures; however the Arian hypothesis made them such. And this was indeed the grand reason, why the ancient fathers so zealously opposed Arianism, because that Christianity, which was intended by God Almighty for a means to extirpate Pagan idolatry, was thereby itself paganized and idolatrized, and made highly guilty of that very thing, which it so much condemned in the Pagans, that is, creature-worship. This might be proved by sundry testimonies of Atha-

nasius, Basil, Gregory Nyssen, Gregory Nazianzen, Epiphanius, Chrysostom, Hilary, Ambrose, Austin, Faustinius, and Cyril of Alexandria; all of them charging the Arians as guilty of the very same idolatry with the Gentiles or Pagans, in giving religious worship even to the Word and Son of God himself (and consequently to our Saviour Christ), as he was supposed by them to be but a creature. But we shall content ourselves here only to cite one remarkable passage out of Athanasius, in his fourth oration against the Arians: [1] *διὰ τί οὖν οἱ Ἀρειομανῖται τοιαῦτα λογιζόμενοι καὶ νοοῦντες, οὐ συναριθμοῦσιν ἑαυτοὺς μετὰ τῶν Ἑλλήνων, καὶ γὰρ κἀκεῖνοι ὥσπερ οὗτοι τῇ κτίσει λατρεύουσι παρὰ τὸν κτίσαντα τὰ πάντα Θεόν——εἰ δὲ οἱ μὲν Ἕλληνες ἑνὶ ἀγενήτῳ καὶ πολλοῖς γενητοῖς λατρεύουσιν, οὗτοι δὲ ἑνὶ γενητῷ καὶ ἀγενήτῳ, οὐδ' οὕτω διαφέρουσιν ἀλλήλων· ὅ τε γὰρ παρ' αὐτῶν λεγόμενος εἷς γενητὸς ἐκ πολλῶν ἐστι, καὶ οἱ πολλοὶ δὲ πάλιν τῶν Ἑλλήνων τὴν αὐτὴν τῷ ἑνὶ τούτῳ φύσιν ἔχουσι, καὶ οὕτως γὰρ κἀκεῖνοι κτίσματά εἰσιν· ἄθλιοι καὶ πλέον ὅσον ἐβλάβησαν κατὰ Χριστοῦ φρονοῦντες· ἐξέπεσον γὰρ τῆς ἀληθείας· καὶ τὴν μὲν Ἰουδαίων προδοσίαν ὑπερέβησαν ἀρνούμενοι τὸν Χριστὸν· τοῖς δὲ Ἕλλησι συγκυλίονται, κτίσμασι καὶ διαφόροις θεοῖς λατρεύοντες οἱ θεοστυγεῖς·* Why therefore do not these Arians, holding this, reckon themselves amongst the Pagans or Gentiles, since they do in like manner worship the creature, besides the Creator? For though the Pagans worship one uncreated and many created gods, but these Arians only one uncreated and one created, to wit, the Son or Word of God; yet will not this make any real difference betwixt them; because the Arians' one created is one of those many Pagan gods; and those many gods of the Pagans or Gentiles have the same nature with this one, they being alike creatures. Wherefore these wretched Arians are apostates from the truth of Christianity, they betraying Christ more than the Jews did, and wallowing or tumbling in the filth of Pagan idolatry; worshipping creatures, and different kinds of gods:—where, by the way, we may take notice that when Athanasius affirmeth of the Arians, what St. Paul doth of the Pagans, that they did *τῇ κτίσει λατρεύειν παρὰ τὸν κτίσαντα*, his meaning could not well be, that they worshipped the creature more than the Creator; forasmuch as the Arians constantly declared, that they gave less worship to Christ the Son or Word of God, he being by them accounted but a creature, than they did to the Father the Creator; but either that they worshipped the creature besides the Creator, or the creature instead of the Creator, or in the room of him, who was alone of right to be religiously worshipped. Again, when the same Athanasius de-

[1] Page 468, 469.

clareth, that the Greeks, Gentiles, or Pagans, did universally worship ἑνὶ ἀγενητῷ, only one uncreated,—he seems to imply, that the Platonic trinity of hypostases, affirmed by him to be all uncreated, were by them looked upon only as one entire Divinity.

But the principal things, which we shall observe from this passage of Athanasius, and those many other places of the fathers, where they parallel the Arians with the Pagans, making the former guilty of the very same idolatry with the latter, even then, when they worshipped our Saviour Christ himself, or the Word and Son of God, as he was by them supposed to be nothing but a creature, are these following; first, that it is here plainly declared by them, that the generality of the Pagans did not worship a multitude of independent gods, but that only one of their gods was uncreated or self-existent, and all their other many gods looked upon by them as his creatures. This, as it is expressly affirmed by Athanasius here, that the Greeks or Pagans did ἑνὶ ἀγενήτῳ καὶ πολλοῖς γενητοῖς λατρεύειν, worship only one uncreated, and many created gods;—so is it plainly implied by all those other forementioned fathers, who charge the Arians with the guilt of Pagan idolatry: because, had the Pagans worshipped many uncreated and independent gods, it would not therefore follow, that the Arians were idolaters, if the Pagans were. But that this was indeed the sense of the fathers, both before and after the Nicene council, concerning the Pagan polytheism and idolatry, that it consisted not in worshipping many uncreated and independent gods, but only one uncreated and many created, hath been already otherwise manifested; and it might be further confirmed by sundry testimonies of them; as this of St. Gregory Nazianzen in his 37th oration;[1] Τί δαὶ οὐχι καὶ παρ᾽ Ἕλλησι φαῖεν ἂν Μία Θεότης, ὡς οἱ τὰ τελεώτερα παρ᾽ ἐκείνοις Φιλοσοφοῦντες; What then, would some say, is there not one Divinity also amongst the Pagans, as they, who philosophize more fully and perfectly amongst them, do declare? —And that full and remarkable one of Irenæus, where he plainly affirmeth of the Gentiles; [2] "Ita creaturæ potius quam Creatori serviebant, et his qui non sunt dii, ut primum deitatis locum attribuerunt uni alicui et summo fabricatori hujus universitatis Deo:" that they so served the creature, and those who are not gods, rather than the Creator; that notwithstanding they attributed the first place of the Deity to one certain supreme God, the maker of this universe. The second thing is, that Athanasius, and all those other orthodox fathers, who

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[1] Page 601. tom. i. oper.

[2] L. ii. c. ix. [p. 129. ed. Grabii, p. 126. ed. Massueti.]

charged the Arians with Pagan idolatry, did thereby plainly imply, those not to be incapable of idolatry, who worship one sovereign Numen, or acknowledge one supreme Deity, the maker of the whole world; since not only the Arians unquestionably did so, but also, according to these fathers the very Pagans themselves. The third thing is, that, in the judgment of Athanasius, and all the orthodox anti-Arian fathers, to give religious worship to any created being whatsoever, though inferior to that worship which is given to the supreme God, and therefore, according to the modern distinction, not *λατρεία*, but *δουλεία*, is absolutely idolatry. Because it is certain, that the Arians gave much an inferior worship to Christ, the Son, or Word of God, whom they contended to be a mere creature, made in time, mutable and defectible, than they did to that eternal God, who was the Creator of him. As those fathers imply, the Pagans themselves to have given much an inferior worship to their *πολλοὶ γενητοὶ θεοὶ*, their many gods,—whom themselves looked upon as creatures, than they did *ἑνὶ ἀγενήτῳ*, to that one uncreated God.

Now if the Arians, who zealously contended for that unity of the Godhead, were nevertheless, by the fathers, condemned as guilty of idolatry, for bestowing but an inferior kind of religious worship upon Christ, the Son or Word of God himself, as he was supposed by them to be a creature; then certainly cannot they be excusedfro m that guilt, who bestow religious worship upon these other creatures, angels and souls of men, though inferior to what they give to the supreme omnipotent God, the creator of all. Because the Son or Word of God, however conceived by these Arians to be a creature, yet was looked upon by them as the first, the most glorious, and most excellent of all creatures, and that by which, as an instrument, all other creatures, as angels and souls, were made; and therefore, if it were idolatry in them, to give an inferior kind of religious worship to this Son and Word of God himself, according to their hypothesis, then can it not possibly be accounted less to bestow the same upon those other creatures, made by him, as angels and men deceased. Besides which, the Word and Son of God, however supposed by these Arians to be a creature, yet was not really such; and is in Scripture unquestionably declared to be a true object of religious worship ("Worship him, all ye gods"); so that the Arians, though formally idolaters, according to their own false hypothesis, yet were not materially and really so: whereas these religious angel and saint-worshippers must be as well materially as formally such. And here it is observable, that these ancient fathers made no such distinction of religious worship, into Latria, as peculiar to the supreme

God, it being that whereby he is adored as self-existent and omnipotent, or the Creator of all; and Doulia, such an inferior religious worship, as is communicable to creatures: but concluded of religious worship, universally, and without distinction, that the due object of it all was the Creator only, and not any creature. Thus Athanasius plainly in his third oration: [1] *εἰ γὰρ ὡς τῇ δόξῃ ὑπερέχων προσεκυνεῖτο, ἔδει καὶ ἕκαστον τῶν ὑποβεβηκότων, τὸν ὑπερέχοντα προσκυνεῖν· ἀλλ᾽ οὐκ ἔστιν οὕτως, κτίσματι γὰρ κτίσμα οὐ προσκυνεῖ, ἀλλὰ κτίσμα θεόν.* If the Son or Word of God were to be worshipped (though a creature) because transcending us in glory and dignity, then ought every inferior being to worship what is superior to it: whereas the case is otherwise; for a creature doth not religiously worship a creature, but only God the Creator.—Now they, who distinguish religious worship into Latria and Doulia, must needs suppose the object of it in general to be that, which is superior to us, and not the Creator only; which is here contradicted by Athanasius. But because it was objected against these orthodox fathers by the Arians, that the humanity of our Saviour Christ, which is unquestionably a creature, did share in their religious worship also; it is worth the while to see what account Athanasius gives of this: [2] *οὐ κτίσμα προσκυνοῦμεν, μὴ γένοιτο· Ἐθνικῶν γὰρ καὶ Ἀρειανῶν ἡ τοιαύτη πλάνη· ἀλλὰ τὸν Κύριον τῆς κτίσεως σαρκωθέντα τὸν τοῦ θεοῦ Λόγον προσκυνοῦμεν· εἰ γὰρ καὶ ἡ σὰρξ αὐτὴ καθ᾽ ἑαυτὴν μέρος ἐστὶ τῶν κτισμάτων, ἀλλὰ θεοῦ γέγονε σῶμα καὶ οὕτε τὸ τοιοῦτον σῶμα, καθ᾽ ἑαυτὸ διαιροῦντες ἀπὸ τοῦ λόγου, προσκυνοῦμεν, οὔτε τὸν Λόγον προσκυνῆσαι θέλοντες, μακρύνομεν αὐτὸν ἀπὸ τῆς σαρκός· ἀλλ᾽ εἰδότες, τὸ, ὁ Λόγος σὰρξ ἐγένετο, τοῦτον καὶ ἐν σαρκὶ γενόμενον ἐπιγινώσκομεν θεόν.* We give no religious worship to any creature, far be it from us; for this is the error of the Pagans and of the Arians; but we worship the Word of God, the Lord of the creation incarnated. For though the flesh of Christ, considered alone by itself, were but a part of the creatures, nevertheless was it made the body of God. And we neither worship this body by itself alone, divided from the Word, nor yet, intending to worship the Word, do we remove it at a great distance from this flesh; but knowing that of the Scripture, "the Word was made flesh," we look upon this Word even in the flesh as God.—And again to the same purpose, [3] *Καὶ γινωσκέτωσαν ὅτι τὸν Κύριον ἐν σαρκὶ προσκυνοῦντες, οὐ κτίσματι προσκυνοῦμεν, ἀλλὰ τὸν κτίστην, ἐνδυσάμενον τὸ κτιστὸν σῶμα.* Let these Arians know at length, that we, who worship the Lord in flesh, worship no creature, but only

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[1] Page 394. tom. i. oper. [2] Ad Adelph. p. 157. [Tom. i. oper.]
[3] Page 160.

the Creator clothed with a creaturely body.—And for the same cause was it, that Nestorius afterwards, dividing the Word from the flesh, the Divinity of Christ from the humanity, and not acknowledging such an hypostatic union betwixt them as he ought, but, nevertheless, religiously worshipping our Saviour Christ, was therefore branded by the Christian church with the name of Ἀνθρωπολάτρης, a man-worshipper, or idolater.—To conclude, they who excuse themselves from being idolaters no otherwise than because they do not give that very same religious worship to saints and angels, which is peculiar to God Almighty, and consists in honoring him as self-existent, and the Creator of all things, but acknowledge those others to be creatures; suppose that to be necessary to idolatry, which is absolutely impossible, viz. to acknowledge more omnipotents, as creators of all, than one, or to account creatures as such creators; as they imply all those to be incapable of idolatry, who acknowledge one supreme God the creator of the whole world; which is directly contradictious to the ancient church.

Hitherto, in way of answer to an atheistic objection against the naturality of the idea of a God, as including oneliness in it, from the Pagan Polytheism, have we largely proved, that at least the civilized and intelligent Pagans generally acknowledged one sovereign Numen; and that their polytheism was partly but fantastical, nothing but the polyonymy of one supreme God, or the worshipping him under different names and notions, according to his several virtues and manifestations; and that though, besides this, they had another natural and real polytheism also; yet this was only of many inferior or created gods, subordinate to one supreme Ἀγένητος, or uncreated.

Which, notwithstanding, is not so to be understood, as if we did confidently affirm, that the opinion of many independent deities never to have so much as entered into the mind of any mortal. For since human nature is so mutable and depravable, as that notwithstanding the connate idea and prolepsis of God in the minds of men, some unquestionably do degenerate and lapse into Atheism; there can be no reason, why it should be thought absolutely impossible, for any ever to entertain that false conceit of more independent deities. But as for independent gods invisible, we cannot trace the footsteps of such a polytheism as this any where, nor find any more than a Ditheism, of a good and evil principle: only Philo and others seem to have conceived, that amongst the ancient Pagans, some were so grossly sottish, as to suppose a plurality of independent gods visible, and to take the sun, and moon, and all the stars, for such. However, if there were any such, and these writers were not mistaken, as it frequently happened, it is certain,

that they were but very few; because, amongst the most barbarian Pagans at this day, there is hardly any nation to be found, without an acknowledgement of a sovereign Deity, as appears from all those discoveries which have been made of them, since the improvement of navigation.

Wherefore, what hath been hitherto declared by us, might well be thought a sufficient answer to the forementioned atheistic objection against the idea of God. Notwithstanding which, when we wrote the contents of this chapter, we intended a further account of the natural and real Polytheism of the Pagans, and their multifarious idolatry, chiefly in order to the vindication of the truth of Christianity against Atheists; forasmuch as one grand design hereof was unquestionably to destroy the Pagan Polytheism and idolatry, which consisted in worshiping the creature besides the Creator.

But we are very sensible, that we have been surprised in the length of this chapter, which is already swelled into a disproportionate bigness; by means whereof we cannot comprehend, within the compass of this volume, all that belongs to the remaining contents, together with such a full and copious confutation of the atheistic grounds, as was intended. Wherefore we shall here divide the chapter, and reserve those remaining contents, together with a further confutation of Atheism, if need be, for another volume, which, God affording life, health, and leisure, we intend shall follow. Only subjoining, in the mean time, a short and compendious confutation of all the atheistic arguments proposed.

The reader will observe that the foregoing paragraph refers to the 4to edit. of 1743, as published by Dr. Cudworth.

A

CONFUTATION

ON

ATHEISM.

CHAP. V.

Having in the second chapter revealed all the dark mysteries of Atheism, and produced the utmost strength of that cause; and in the third made an introduction to the confutation of those Atheistic grounds, by representing all the several forms and schemes of Atheism, and showing both their disagreements amongst themselves, and wherein they all agree together against Theists; we have been hitherto prevented of that full and copious confutation of them, intended by us, by reason of that large account given of the Pagan Polytheism: which yet was no impertinent digression neither, it removing the grand objection against the naturality of the idea of God, as including oneliness in it; as also preparing a way for that defence of Christianity, designed by us against Atheists. Wherefore, that we may not here be quite excluded of what was principally intended, we shall subjoin a contracted and compendious confutation of all the premised Atheistic principles. The first whereof was this, that either men have no idea of God at all, or else none but such as is compounded and made up of impossible and contradictious notions: from whence these Atheists would infer him to be an inconceivable nothing. In answer whereunto, there hath been something done already, it being declared in the beginning of the fourth chapter, what the idea of God is, viz. a perfect understanding nature, necessarily self-existent, and the cause of all other things. And as there is nothing either unconceivable or contradictious in this idea, so have we showed, that these confounded Atheists do not only, at the same time when they verbally deny an idea of God, implicitly acknowledge and confess it, forasmuch as otherwise, denying his existence, they should deny the existence of nothing; but also that they agree with Theists in this very idea; it being the only thing that Atheists contend for, that the first original and head of all things is no perfect understanding nature, but that all sprung from Tohu and Bohu, or dark and

senseless matter fortuitously moved. Moreover, we have not only thus declared the idea of God, but also largely proved, and made it clearly evident, that the generality of mankind in all ages have had a prolepsis or anticipation in their minds, concerning the real and actual existence of such a being: the Pagans themselves, besides their other many gods (which were understanding beings superior to men), acknowledging one chief and sovereign Numen, the maker of them all, and of the whole world. From whence it plainly appears, that those few Atheists, that formerly have been, and still are, here and there up and down in the world, are no other than the monsters and anomalies of human kind. And this alone might be sufficient to repel the first Atheistic assault, made against the idea of God.

Nevertheless, that we may not seem to dissemble any of the Atheists' strength, we shall here particularly declare all their most colorable pretences against the idea of God, and then show the folly and invalidity of them. Which pretences are as follow: first, That we have no idea nor thought of any thing not subject to corporeal sense; nor the least evidence of the existence of any thing, but from the same. Secondly, That Theists themselves acknowledging God to be incomprehensible, he may be from thence inferred to be a nonentity. Thirdly, That the Theists' idea of God, including infinity in it, is therefore absolutely inconceivable and impossible. Fourthly, That theology is an arbitrarious compilement of inconsistent and contradictious notions. And, lastly, That the idea and existence of God owes all its being, either to the confounded nonsense of astonished minds, or else to the fiction and imposture of politicians.

We begin with the first: That we can have no idea, conception, or thought, of any thing, not subject to sense; nor the least evidence of the existence of any thing, but from the same. Thus a modern Atheistic writer;[1] "Whatsoever we can conceive, hath been perceived first by sense, either at once or in parts; and a man can have no thought representing any thing not subject to sense." From whence it follows, that whatsoever is not sensible and imaginable, is utterly unconceivable, and to us nothing. Moreover, the same writer adds, that "the only evidence, which we have of the existence of any thing, is from sense;" the consequence whereof is this, that there being no corporeal sense of a Deity, there can be no evidence at all of his existence. Wherefore, according to the tenor of the Atheistic philosophy, all is resolved into sense, as the only criterion of truth, accordingly as Pro-

[1] Hobbes's Leviathan, part i. cap. i.

tagoras in Plato's Theætetus[1] concludes knowledge to be sense; and a late writer of our own, determines sense to be original knowledge. Here have we a wide ocean before us, but we must contract our sails. Were sense knowledge and understanding, then he, who sees lights and colors, and feels heat and cold, would understand light and colors, heat and cold, and the like of all other sensible things: neither would there be any philosophy at all concerning them. Whereas the mind of man remaineth altogether unsatisfied concerning the nature of these corporeal things, even after the strongest sensations of them, and is but thereby awakened to a further philosophic inquiry and search about them, what this light and colors, this heat and cold, etc. really should be; and whether they be indeed qualities in the objects without us, or only phantasms and sensations in ourselves. Now it is certain, that there could be no suspicion of any such thing as this, were sense the highest faculty in us; neither can sense itself ever decide this controversy; since one sense cannot judge of another, or correct the error in it; all sense as such (that is, as fancy and apparition) being alike true. And had not these Atheists been notorious dunces in that atomic philosophy which they so much pretend to, they would clearly have learned from thence, that sense is not knowledge and understanding, nor the criterion of truth as to sensible things themselves; it reaching not to the essence or absolute nature of them, but only taking notice of their outside, and perceiving its own passions from them, rather than the things themselves; and that there is a higher faculty in the soul, of reason and understanding, which judges of sense; detects the fantastry and imposture of it; discovers to us that there is nothing in the objects themselves, like to those forementioned sensible ideas; and resolves all sensible things into intelligible principles; the ideas whereof are not foreign and adventitious, and mere passive impressions upon the soul from without, but native and domestic to it, or actively exerted from the soul itself; no passion being able to make a judgment either of itself, or other things. This is a thing so evident, that Democritus himself could not but take notice of it, and acknowledge it, though he made not a right use thereof; he in all probability continuing notwithstanding a confounded and besotted Atheist; Sextus Empiricus having recorded this of him:[2] *Ἐν τοῖς κανόσι δύο φησὶν εἶναι γνώσεις, τὴν μὲν διὰ τῶν αἰσθήσεων, τὴν δὲ διὰ τῆς διανοίας· ὧν τὴν μὲν διὰ τῆς διανοίας γνῶσιν κατάγει, προσμαρτυρῶν αὐτῇ τὸ πιστὸν εἰς ἀληθείας κρίσιν, τὴν δὲ διὰ τῶν αἰσθήσεων σκοτίην ὀνομάζει, ἀφαιρούμενος αὐτῆς τὸ πρὸς διάγνωσιν τοῦ ἀλη-*

[1] Page 118. [2] Lib. vii. advers. Mathemat. sec. 138, 139. p. 400.

θοῦς ἀπλανές· λέγει δὲ κατὰ λέξιν, Γνώμης δὲ δύο εἰσὶν ἰδέαι· ἡ μὲν γνησίη· ἡ δὲ σκοτίη· καὶ σκοτίης μὲν, τάδε σύμπαντα, ὄφις, ἀκοὴ, ὀδμὴ, γεῦσις, ψεῦσις· ἡδὲ γνησίη ἀποκεκρυμμένη δὲ ταύτης. Democritus in his Canons affirmeth that there are two kinds of knowledges; one of the senses and another by the mind. Of which that by the mind is only accounted knowledge, he bearing witness to the faithfulness and firmness thereof for the judgment of truth. The other by the senses he calleth dark, denying it to be a rule and measure of truth. His own words are these: There are two species of knowledge, the one genuine, the other dark and obscure. The dark and obscure knowledge is seeing, hearing, smelling, tasting, touching. But the genuine knowledge is another more hidden and recondite. — To which purpose there is another fragment also of this Democritus preserved by the same Sextus; [1] *Νόμῳ γλυκὺ καὶ νόμῳ πικρὸν, νόμῳ θερμὸν, νόμῳ ψυχρόν· νόμῳ χροιή· αἰτία δὲ ἄτομα καὶ κενόν· ὅπερ νομίζεται μὲν εἶναι καὶ δοξάζεται τὰ αἰσθητὰ οὐκ ἔστι δὲ κατ' ἀλήθειαν ταῦτα·* Bitter and sweet, hot and cold, are only in opinion or fancy. Color is only in opinion; atoms and vacuum alone in truth and reality. That which is thought to be are sensibles; but these are not according to truth, but atoms and vacuum only.—Now the chief ground of this rational discovery of the ancient Atomists, that sensible things, as heat and cold, bitter and sweet, red and green, are no real qualities in the objects without, but only our own fancies, was because in body there are no such things intelligible, but only magnitude, figure, site, motion, and rest. Of which we have not only sensible ideas, passively impressed upon us from without, but also intelligible notions, actively exerted from the mind itself. Which latter, notwithstanding, because they are not unaccompanied with sensible phantasms, and by many unskilfully confounded with them. But, besides these, we have other intelligible notions, or ideas, also which have no genuine phantasms at all belonging to them. Of which whosoever doubts, may easily be satisfied and convinced, by reading but a sentence or two that he understands in any book almost that shall come next to his hand; and reflexively examining himself, whether he have a phantasm, or sensible idea, belonging to every word or no. For whoever is modest and ingenious will quickly be forced to confess, that he meets with many words, which though they have a sense or intelligible notion, yet have no genuine phantasm belonging to them. And we have known some, who were confidently engaged in the other opinion, being put to read the beginning of Tully's Offices, presently nonplussed and confounded in that first word *quanquam;* they being neither able to

[1] Id. ibid. sec. 135. p. 399.

deny, but that there was a sense belonging to it, nor yet to affirm, that they had any phantasm thereof, save only of the sound or letters. But to prove that there are cogitations not subject to corporeal sense, we need go no further than this very idea or description of God ; a substance absolutely perfect, infinitely good, wise, and powerful, necessarily self-existent, and the cause of all other things. Where there is not one word unintelligible to him, that hath any understanding in him, and yet no considerative and ingenuous person can pretend, that he hath a genuine phantasm, or sensible idea, answering to any one of those words, either to substance, or to absolutely perfect, or to infinitely, or to good, or to wise, or to powerful, or to necessity, or to self-existence, or to cause; or indeed to all, or other, or things. Wherefore it is nothing but want of meditation, together with a fond and sottish dotage upon corporeal sense, which hath so far imposed upon some, as to make them believe, that they have not the least cogitation of any thing not subject to corporeal sense; or that there is nothing in human understanding, or conception, which was not first in bodily sense; a doctrine highly favorable to Atheism. But since it is certain, on the contrary, that we have many thoughts not subject to sense, it is manifest, that whatsoever falls not under external sense, is not therefore unconceivable, and nothing. Which whosoever asserts, must needs affirm life and cogitation itself, knowledge or understanding, reason and memory, volition and appetite, things of the greatest moment and reality, to be nothing but mere words without any signification. Nay, fancy and sense itself, upon this hypothesis, could hardly escape from becoming nonentities too, forasmuch as neither fancy nor sense falls under sense, but only the objects of them; we neither seeing vision, nor feeling action, nor hearing audition, much less hearing sight, or seeing taste, or the like. Wherefore, though God should be never so much corporeal, as some Theists have conceived him to be ; yet since the chief of his essence, and as it were his inside, must by these be acknowledged to consist in mind, wisdom and understanding, he could not possibly, as to this, fall under corporeal sense (sight or touch) any more than thought can. But that there is substance incorporeal also, and therefore in itself altogether insensible, and that the Deity is such, is demonstrated elsewhere.

We grant, indeed, that the evidence of particular bodies, existing *hic et nunc*, without us, doth necessarily depend upon the information of sense ; but yet, nevertheless, the certainty of this very evidence is not from sense alone, but from a complication of reason and understanding together with it. Were sense the only evidence of things,

there could be no absolute truth and falsehood, nor certainty at all of any thing ; sense, as such, being only relative to particular persons, seeming and fantastical, and obnoxious to much delusion. For if our nerves and brain be inwardly so moved, and affected, as they would be by such an object present, when indeed it is absent, and no other motion or sensation in the mean time prevail against it and obliterate it ; then must that object of necessity seem to us present. Moreover, those imaginations, that spring and bubble from the soul itself, are commonly taken for sensations by us when asleep, and sometimes in melancholic and fanciful persons also when awake. That Atheistic principle, that there is no evidence at all of any thing as existing, but only from corporeal sense, is plainly contradicted by the atomic Atheists themselves, when they assert atoms and vacuum to be the principles of all things, and the exuvious images of bodies to be the causes both of sight and cogitation : for single atoms, and those exuvious images, were never seen nor felt ; and vacuum, or empty space, is so far from being sensible, that these Atheists themselves allow it to be the one only incorporeal. Wherefore they must here go beyond the ken of sense, and appeal to reason only for the existence of these principles : as Protagoras, one of them in Plato, professedly doth ; [1] *ἄθρει περισκοπῶν μή τις τῶν ἀμυήτων ἐπακούῃ· εἰσὶ δὲ οὗτοι, οἱ οὐδὲν ἄλλο οἰόμενοι εἶναι, ἢ οὗ ἄν δύνωνται ἀπρὶξ ταῖν χεροῖν λαβέσθαι, πᾶν τὸ ἀόρατον οὐκ ἀποδεχόμενοι, ὡς ἐν οὐσίας μέρει.* Have a care that none of the profane and uninitiated in mysteries overhear you. By the profane I mean (saith he) those, who think nothing to exist but what they can feel with their fingers, and exclude all that is invisible out of the rank of being.—Were existence to be allowed to nothing, that doth not fall under corporeal sense, then must we deny the existence of soul and mind in ourselves and others, because we can neither feel nor see any such thing. Whereas we are certain of the existence of our own souls, partly from an inward consciousness of our own cogitations, and partly from that principle of reason, that nothing cannot act. And the existence of other individual souls is manifest to us, from their effects upon their respective bodies, their motions, actions, and discourse. Wherefore, since the Atheists cannot deny the existence of soul or mind in men, though no such thing fall under external sense, they have as little reason to deny the existence of a perfect mind, presiding over the universe, without which it cannot be conceived, whence our imperfect ones should be derived. The existence of that God, whom no eye

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[1] Theaet. p. 155. Steph.

hath seen nor can see, is plainly proved by reason from his effects, in the visible phenomena of the universe, and from what we are conscious of within ourselves.

The second pretence of Atheists against the idea of God, and consequently his existence, is, because Theists themselves acknowledging God to be incomprehensible, it may be from thence inferred, that he is a nonentity. Which argumentation of the Atheists supposes these two things: first, that what is incomprehensible is altogether unconceivable; and then, that what is unconceivable is nothing. The latter of which two, perhaps, may be granted to them, that which is so utterly inconceivable is nothing, as that no man can frame any manner of idea or conception of it, is therefore either in itself, or at least to us, nothing. Because though that of Protagoras be not true, in his sense, [1]*πάντων χρεμάτων μέτρον ἄνθρωπον εἶναι, τῶν μὲν ὄντων ὡς ἔστι, τῶν δὲ μὴ ὄντων, ὡς οὐκ ἔστιν·* That man is the measure of all things, either as existing or not existing—he meaning indeed nothing else thereby, but that there was no absolute truth or falsehood of any thing, but all was relative to particular persons, and fantastical or seeming only. And though it must not be granted, that whatsoever any man's shallow understanding cannot easily and fully comprehend, is therefore presently to be expunged out of the catalogue of beings; which is the reason, or rather infidelity of the anti-trinitarians; yet is there notwithstanding some truth in that of Aristotle, that *ψυχὴ πῶς πάντα*, the rational soul or mind is in a manner all things;—it being able to frame some idea and conception or other of whatsoever is in the nature of things, and hath either an actual or possible existence, from the very highest to the lowest. Mind and understanding is, as it were, a diaphanous and crystalline globe, or a kind of notional world, which hath some reflex image, and correspondent ray, or representation in it, to whatsoever is in the true and real world of being. And upon this account may it be said, that whatsoever is in its own nature absolutely inconceivable, is indeed a nonentity.

But the former is absolutely denied by us, that whatsoever is incomprehensible is inconceivable; and therefore when we affirm, that God is incomprehensible, our meaning is only this, that our imperfect minds cannot have such a conception of his nature, as doth perfectly master, conquer, and subdue, that vast object under it; or at least is so fully adequate and commensurate to the same, as that it doth every way match and equalize it. Now it doth not at all follow from hence,

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[1] Plato Theaet. [p. 118.]

because God is thus incomprehensible to our finite and narrow understandings, that he is utterly inconceivable by them, so that they cannot frame any idea at all of him, and he may therefore be concluded to be a nonentity. For, it is certain, that we cannot fully comprehend ourselves, and that we have not such an adequate and comprehensive knowledge of the essence of any substantial thing, as that we can perfectly master and conquer it. It was a truth, though abused by the Skeptics, that there is ἀκατάληπτόν τι, something incomprehensible—in the essence of the lowest substances. For even body itself, which the Atheists think themselves so well acquainted with, because they can feel it with their fingers, and which is the only substance, that they acknowledge either in themselves or the universe, hath such puzzling difficulties and entanglements in the speculation of it, that they can never be able to extricate themselves from. We might instance also in some accidental things, as time and motion. Truth is bigger than our minds, and we are not the same with it, but have a lower participation only of the intellectual nature, and are rather apprehenders than comprehenders thereof. This is indeed one badge of our creaturely state, that we have not a perfectly comprehensive knowledge, or such as is adequate and commensurate to the essences of things; from whence we ought to be led to this acknowledgment, that there is another perfect Mind or understanding Being above us in the universe, from which our imperfect minds were derived, and upon which they do depend. Wherefore if we can have no idea or conception of any thing, whereof we have not a full and perfect comprehension, then can we not have an idea or conception of the nature of any substance. But though we do not comprehend all truth, as if our mind were above it, or master of it, and cannot penetrate into, and look quite through the nature of every thing, yet may rational souls frame certain ideas and conceptions, of whatsoever is in the orb of being proportionate to their own nature, and sufficient for their purpose. And though we cannot fully comprehend the Deity, nor exhaust the infiniteness of its perfection, yet may we have an idea or conception of a being absolutely perfect; such a one as is *nostro modulo conformis*, agreeable and proportionate to our measure and scantling—as we may approach near to a mountain and touch it with our hands, though we cannot encompass it all round, and enclasp it within our arms. Whatsoever is in its own nature absolutely inconceivable, is nothing; but not whatsoever is not fully comprehensible by our imperfect understandings.

It is true, indeed, that the Deity is more incomprehensible to us than any thing else whatsoever, which proceeds from the fulness of its

being and perfection, and from the transcendency of its brightness; but for the very same reason may it be said also, in some sense, that it is more knowable and conceivable than any thing. As the sun, though by reason of its excessive splendor, it dazzle our weak sight, yet it is notwithstanding far more visible also, than any of the *nebulosae stellae*, the small misty stars. Where there is more of light, there is more of visibility; so where there is more of entity, reality, and perfection, there is there more of conceptibility and cognoscibility; such an object filling up the mind more, and acting more strongly upon it. Nevertheless, because our weak and imperfect minds are lost in the vast immensity and redundancy of the Deity, and overcome with its transcendant light and dazzling brightness, therefore hath it to us an appearance of darkness and incomprehensibility; as the unbounded expansion of light, in the clear transparent ether, hath to us the apparition of an azure obscurity; which yet is not an absolute thing in itself, but only relative to our sense, and a mere fancy in us.

The incomprehensibility of the Deity is so far from being an argument against the reality of its existence, as that is most certain, on the contrary, that were there nothing incomprehensible to us, who are but contemptible pieces, and small atoms of the universe; were there no other being in the world, but what our finite and imperfect understandings could span or fathom, and encompass round about, look through and through, have a commanding view of, and perfectly conquer and subdue under them; then could there be nothing absolutely and infinitely perfect, that is, no God. For though that of Empedocles be not true in a literal sense, as it seems to have been taken by Aristotle,[1] *γαίᾳ μὲν γὰρ γαῖαν*, etc. that by earth we see earth, by water water, and by fire fire; and understand every thing by something of the same within ourselves: yet is it certain, that every thing is apprehended by some internal congruity in that which apprehends, which perhaps was the sense intended by that noble philosophic poet. Wherefore it cannot possibly otherwise be, but that the finiteness, scantness, and imperfection, of our narrow understandings must make them asymmetral, or incommensurate, to that which is absolutely and infinitely perfect.

And nature itself plainly intimates to us, that there is some such absolutely perfect Being, which though not inconceivable, yet is incomprehensible to our finite understandings, by certain passions, which it hath implanted in us, that otherwise would want an object to display themselves upon; namely those of devout veneration, adoration, and admiration, together with a kind of ecstasy and pleasing horror; which

[1] De Anima, lib. i. cap. ii. p. 3. tom. ii. oper.

in the silent language of nature, seems to speak thus much to us, that there is some object in the world, so much bigger and vaster than our mind and thoughts, that it is the very same to them, that the ocean is to narrow vessels; so that when they have taken into themselves as much as they can thereof by contemplation, and filled up all their capacity, there is still an immensity of it left without, which cannot enter in for want of room to receive it, and therefore must be apprehended after some other strange and mysterious manner, viz. by their being as it were plunged into it, and swallowed up or lost in it. To conclude, the Deity is indeed incomprehensible to our finite and imperfect understandings, but not inconceivable and therefore there is no ground at all for this atheistic pretence, to make it a nonentity.

We come to the third atheistic argumentation; That because infinity (which according to theology is included in the idea of God, and pervadeth all his attributes) is utterly inconceivable, the Deity itself is therefore an impossibility and nonentity. To this sense sound sundry passages of a modern writer; as, "Whatsoever we know, we learn from our phantasms; but there is no phantasm of infinite, and therefore no knowledge or conception of it." Again, "Whatsoever we imagine is finite, and therefore there is no conception or idea of that which we call infinite. No man can have in his mind an image of infinite time, or of infinite power. Wherefore the name of God is used not to make us conceive him, but only that we may honor him." The true meaning whereof (as may be plainly gathered from other passages of the same writer) is thus to be interpreted; That there is nothing of philosophic truth and reality in the idea or attributes of God; nor any other sense in those words, but only to signify the veneration and astonishment of men's own confounded minds. And, accordingly, the word infinite is declared to signify nothing at all in that which is so called (there being no such thing really existing,) but only the inability of men's own minds, together with their rustic astonishment and admiration. Wherefore when the same writer determines, that God must not be said to be finite, this being no good courtship nor compliment; and yet the word infinite signifieth nothing in the thing itself, nor hath any conception at all answering to it; he either does plainly abuse his reader, or else he leaves him to make up this conclusion, That since God is neither finite nor infinite, he is an inconceivable nothing. In like manner, another learned well-willer to Atheism declareth, That he, who calleth any thing infinite, doth but "rei quam non capit, attribuere nomen, quod non intelligit," attribute an unintelligible name to a thing inconceivable; because all conception is finite, and it is impossible to conceive any

thing that hath no bounds or limits. But that, which is mistaken for infinite, is nothing but a confused chaos of the mind, or an unshaken embryo of thought; when men going on further and further, and making a continual progress, without seeing any end before them; being at length quite weary and tired out with this their endless journey, they sit down, and call the thing by this hard and unintelligible name, infinite.—And from hence does he also infer, that because we can have no idea of infinite, as to signify any thing in that which is so called, we therefore cannot possibly have "germanam ideam Dei," any true and genuine idea or notion of God.—Of which they, who understand the language of Atheists, know very well the meaning to be this; that there is indeed no such thing, or that he is a non-entity.

Now since this exception against the idea of God, and consequently his existence, is made by our modern and neoteric Atheists; we shall, in the first place, show how contradictious they are herein to their predecessors, the old philosophic Atheists; and consequently, how inconsistent and disagreeing Atheists in several ages have been with one another. For whereas these modern Atheists would have this thought a sufficient confutation of a Deity, that there can be nothing infinite; it is certain, that the ancient philosophic Atheists were so far from being of this persuasion, that some of them, as Anaximander expressly made Ἄπειρον, or Infinite, the principle of all things; that is, infinitely extended and eternal matter, devoid of all life and understanding. For though Melissus's Ἄπειρον, or Infinite, which he made the first principle, was a most perfect Being eminently containing all things (as hath been already showed) and therefore the true deity; Anaximander's Ἄπειρον, or Infinite, yet however called Θεῖον, or Divine by him, (it being the only divinity which he acknowledged) was nothing but senseless matter, an atheistic infinite. Wherefore both Theists and Atheists in those former times did very well agree together in this one point, that there was something or other infinite, as the first principle of all things; either infinite mind, or infinite matter; though this latter atheistic infinity of extended matter be indeed repugnant to conception (as shall be proved afterwards) there being no true infinite, but a perfect Being, or the holy Trinity. Furthermore, not only Anaximander, but also after him Democritus and Epicurus, and many others of that atheistic gang, heretofore asserted likewise a numerical infinity of worlds, and therefore much more than an infinity of atoms, or particles of matter. And though this numerical infinity of theirs were also inconceivable and impossible; yet does it sufficiently appear from hence, that these ancient philosophic Atheists were so far

from being abhorrent from infinity, as a thing impossible, and a non-entity, that they were on the contrary very fond thereof; and therefore never went about to disprove a Deity after this manner, because there can be nothing infinite.

But, in the next place, we shall make it manifest, that these modern Atheists do no less contradict plain reason and their very selves also, than they do their predecessors in that impiety, when they thus go about to disprove the existence of a God, because there can be nothing infinite, neither in duration, nor in power, nor in any other regard. For, first, though it should be doubted whether there be a God or no; yet must it needs be acknowledged to be as indubitable as any thing in all geometry, that there was something or other infinite in duration, or eternal, without beginning: because, if there had been once nothing at all, there could never have been any thing; that common notion, or principle of reason, having here an irresistible force, that nothing could ever come from nothing. Now, if there were never nothing, but always something, then must there of necessity be something infinite in duration, and eternal without beginning. Wherefore it cannot be accounted less than extreme sottishness and stupidity of mind in these modern Atheists, thus to impugn a Deity from the impossibility of infinite duration without beginning. But, in the next place, we must confess it seems to us hardly conceivable, that any Atheist whatsoever could possibly be so prodigiously sottish, or so monstrously infatuated, as really to think, that once there was nothing at all, but that afterwards senseless matter happened (nobody knows how) to come into being, from whence all other things were derived. According to which hypothesis it would follow also, that matter might as well some time or other happen again to cease to be, and so all things vanish into nothing. To conclude, therefore, these Atheists must of necessity be guilty of one or other of these two things; either of extreme sottishness and stupidity in acknowledging neither God, nor matter, nor any thing, to have existed infinitely from eternity without beginning; or else, if they do acknowledge the pre-eternity of matter, or its infinite past duration without beginning, then of the most notorious impudence, in making that an argument against the existence of a God, which themselves acknowlege to matter.

Nevertheless we shall here readily comply with these modern Atheists thus far, as to grant them these two following things; First, That we can have no proper and genuine phantasm of any infinite whatsoever, because we never had corporeal sense of any neither of infinite number nor of infinite magnitude, and therefore much less of infinite

time or duration, and of infinite power; these two latter things, time and power, themselves not falling under corporeal sense. Secondly, That as we have no phantasm of any infinite, so neither is infinity fully comprehensible by our human understandings, that are but finite. But since it is certain, even to mathematical evidence, that there was something infinite in duration, or without beginning, insomuch that no intelligent Atheist, upon mature consideration, will ever venture to contradict it; we shall from hence extort from these Atheists an acknowledgment of the falseness of these two theorems of theirs, that whatsoever we have no phantasm or sensible idea of, as also whatsoever is not fully comprehensible by us, is therefore a pure non-entity or nothing; and enforce them to confess, that there is something really existing in nature which we have neither any phantasm of, not yet can fully comprehend with our imperfect understandings.

Nay, we will yet go further in compliance with them, and acknowledge likewise, that as for those infinities, of number, of corporeal magnitude; and of time or successive duration, we have not only no phantasm, nor full intellectual comprehension of them, but also no manner of intelligible idea, notion or conception. For though it be true, that number be somewhere said by Aristotle[1] to be infinite, yet was his meaning there only in such a negative sense as this, that we can never possibly come to an end thereof by addition, but may in our minds still add number to number infinitely; which is all one as if he should indeed have affirmed, that there can be no number actually and positively infinite, according to Aristotle's own definition of infinite, elsewhere given,[2] namely that to which nothing can be added; no number being ever so great, but that one or more may still be added to it. And as there can be no infinite number, so neither can there be any infinity of corporeal magnitude; not only because if there were, the parts thereof must needs be infinite in number, but also because, as no number can be so great, but that more may be added to it; so neither can any body or magnitude be ever so vast, but that more body or magnitude may be supposed still further and further; this addition of finites never making up infinite. Indeed, infinite space, beyond the finite world, is a thing which hath been much talked of; and it is by some supposed to be infinite body, but by others to be an incorporeal infinite; through whose actual distance notwithstanding (mensurable by poles and miles) this

[1] Metaphys. lib. xi. cap. xi. p. 434. tom. iv. oper. et. Phys. Auscultat. lib. iii. cap. v. p. 486. tom. i. oper. et cap. viii. p. 491.

[2] Phys. Auscultat. lib. iii. cap. ix. p. 492 tom. i. oper.

finite world might roll and tumble infinitely. But as we conceive, all that can be demonstrated here is no more than this, but how vast soever the finite world should be, yet there is a possibility of more and more magnitude and body, still to be added to it, further and further, by Divine power infinitely; or that the world could never be made so great, no not by God himself, as that his own omnipotence could not make it greater. Which potential infinity, or indefinite increasableness of corporeal magnitude, seems to have been mistaken for an actual infinity of space. Whereas, for this very reason, because more could be added to the magnitude of the corporeal world infinitely, or without end, therefore is it impossible, that it should ever be positively and actually infinite; that is such as to which nothing more can possibly be added. Wherefore we conclude concerning corporeal magnitude, as we did before of number, that there can be no absolute and actual infinity thereof; and that how much vaster soever the world may be, than according to the supposition of vulgar astronomers, who make the starry sphere the utmost wall thereof; yet is it not absolutely infinite, such as really hath no bounds or limits at all, nor to which nothing more could, by Divine power, be added. Lastly, We affirm likewise concerning time, or successive duration, that there can be no infinity of that neither, no temporal eternity without beginning: and that not only because there would then be an actual infinity and more than an infinity of number; but also because, upon this supposition, there would always have been an infinity of time past, and consequently an infinity of time past, which was never present. Whereas all the moments of past time must needs have been once present; and, if so, then all of them, at least save one, future too; from whence it will follow, that there was a first moment, or beginning of time. And thus does reason conclude, neither the world, nor time itself, to have been infinite in their past duration, nor eternal without beginning.

Here will the Atheist think presently, he hath got a great advantage to disprove the existence of a God; "Nonne, qui æternitatem mundi sic tollunt, eadem opera etiam mundi conditori æternitatum tollunt?" Do not they, who thus destroy the eternity of the world, at the same time destroy also the eternity of the Creator? For if time itself were not eternal, then how could the Deity, or any thing, be so?—the Atheist securely taking it for granted, that God himself could not be otherwise eternal, than by a successive flux of infinite time; but we say, that this will on the contrary afford us a plain demonstration of the existence of a Deity. For since the world and time itself were not infinite in their past duration, but had a beginning, therefore were they

both certainly made together by some other Being, who is in order of nature, senior to time, and so without time, before time; he being above that successive flux, and comprehending in the stability and immutable perfection of his own being, his yesterday, and to-day, and for ever. Or thus: Something was of necessity infinite in duration, and without beginning; but neither the world, nor motion, nor time that is no successive being was such; therefore is there something else, whose being and duration is not successive and flowing, but permanent, to whom this infinity belongeth. The Atheists here can only smile, or make faces, and show their little wit in quibbling upon *nunc-stans*, or a standing *now* of eternity; as if that standing eternity of the Deity (which with so much reason hath been contended for by the ancient genuine Theists) were nothing but a pitiful small moment of time standing still, and as if the duration of all beings whatsoever must needs be like our own; whereas the duration of every thing must of necessity be agreeable to its nature: and, therefore, as that, whose imperfect nature is ever flowing like a river, and consists in continual motion and changes one after another, must needs have accordingly a successive and flowing duration, sliding perpetually from present into past, and always posting on towards the future expecting something of itself, which is not yet in being, but to come; so must that, whose perfect nature is essentially immutable, and always the same, and necessarily existent, have a permanent duration, never losing any thing of itself once present, as sliding away from it, nor yet running forwards to meet something of itself before, which is not yet in being; and it is as contradictious for it ever to have begun, as ever to cease to be.

Now whereas the modern Atheists pretend to have proved, that there is nothing infinite, neither in duration nor otherwise, and consequently no Deity, merely because we have no sense nor phantasm of infinite, nor can fully comprehend the same; and therefore will needs conclude, that the words infinite and eternal signify nothing in the thing itself, but either men's own ignorance and inability to conceive, when, or whether, that which is called eternal, began; together with the confounded nonsense of their astonished minds, and their stupid veneration of that, which their own fear and fancy has raised up as a bug-bear to themselves; or else the progress of their thoughts further and further backward indefinitely, (though they plainly confute themselves in all this, by sometimes acknowledging matter and motion infinite and eternal, which argues either their extreme sottishness or impudence:) we have showed, with mathematical evidence and certainty, that there is really something infinite in duration, or eternal; by which

therefore cannot be meant men's own ignorance or the confounded nonsense of their devotion, nor yet the idle progress of their minds further and further indefinitely, which never reaches infinite, but a reality in the thing itself, namely this,—that it never was not, nor had any beginning. Moreover, having demonstrated concerning this infinity and eternity, without beginning, that it cannot possibly belong to any successive being, we confidently conclude against these Atheists also, that it was not matter and motion, or this mundane system, but a perfect immutable nature, of a permanent duration (that is, a God,) to whom it belonged. To sum up all, therefore, we say, that infinite and eternal are not words, that signify nothing in the thing itself, nor mere attributes of honor, compliment, and flattery, that is of devout and religious nonsense, error, and falsehood; but attributes belonging to the Deity, and to that alone, of the most philosophic truth and reality. And though we, being finite, have no full comprehension and adequate understanding of this infinity and eternity (as not of the Deity), yet can we not be without some notion, conception, and apprehension thereof, so long as we can thus demonstrate concerning it, that it belongs to something, and yet nothing neither, but a perfect immutable nature. But the notion of this infinite eternity will be yet further cleared in the following explanation and vindication of infinite power.

For the Atheists principally quarrel with infinite power, or omnipotence, and pretend, in like manner, this to be utterly inconceivable and impossible, and subjected in nothing. Thus a modern atheistic writer concludes, that since no man can conceive infinite power, this is also but an attribute of honor, which the confounded nonsense of astonished minds bestows upon the object of their devotion, without any philsophic truth and reality. And here have our modern Atheists indeed the suffrage and agreement of the ancient philosphic Atheists also with them, who, as appears from the verses before cited out of Lucretius, concerned themselves in nothing more, than asserting all power to be finite, and omnipotence, or infinite power, to belong to nothing.

First, therefore, it is here observable, that this omnipotence, or infinite power, asserted by Theists, has been commonly either ignorantly mistaken, or wilfully misrepresented by these Atheists, out of design to make it seem impossible and ridiculous, as if by it were meant a power of producing and doing any thing whatsoever, without exception, though never so contradictious; as a late atheistic person, seeming to assert this Divine omnipotence and infinite power really and designedly, notwithstanding abused the same with this skeptic irony, That God by his omnipotence, or infinite power, could turn this tree into a syllogism.

Children, indeed, have sometimes such childish apprehensions of the Divine omnipotence; and Ren. Cartesius [1] (though otherwise an acute philosopher) was here no less childish, in affirming, that all things whatsoever, even the natures of good and evil, and all truth and falsehood, do so depend upon the arbitrary will and power of God, as that if he had pleased, twice two should not have been four; nor the three angles of a plain triangle equal to two right ones, and the like: he only adding, that all these things, notwithstanding, when they were once settled by the Divine decree, became immutable; that is, I suppose, not in themselves, or to God, but unto us: than which no paradox of any old philosopher was ever more absurd and irrational. And certainly, if any one did desire to persuade the world that Cartesius, notwithstanding all his pretences to demonstrate a Deity, was indeed but an hypocritical Theist, or personated and disguised Atheist, he could not have a fairer pretence for it out of all his writings than from hence; this being plainly to destroy the Deity, by making one attribute thereof to devour and swallow up another; infinite will and power, infinite understanding and wisdom. For to suppose God to understand, and to be wise only by his will, is all one as to suppose him to have really no understanding at all. Wherefore we do not affirm God to be so omnipotent, or infinitely powerful, as that he is able to destroy or change the intelligible natures of things at pleasure; this being all one as to say, that God is so omnipotent and infinitely powerful, that he is able to destroy, or to baffle and befool his own wisdom and understanding, which is the very rule and measure of his power. We say not, therefore, that God by his omnipotence, or infinite power, could make twice two not to be four, or turn a tree into a syllogism; but we say, that omnipotence, or infinite power, is that which can produce and do all whatsoever is possible, that is, whatsoever is conceivable, and implies no manner of contradiction; the very essence of possibility being no other than conceptibility. And thus has the point been stated all along, not only by christian Theists, but even the ancient pagan theologers themselves, that omnipotence, or infinite power, is that which can do all things, that do not imply a contradiction, or which are not inconceivable. This appearing from that of Agatho, cited before out of Aristotle, [2] That nothing is exempted from the Divine power, but only to make πεπραγμένα ἀγένητα, what hath been done to be undone, or the like hereunto. Now infinite power

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[1] Vide Respons. ad Objectiones sextas, sect. vi. p. 160. edit. Amstel. 1685, in 4to.

[2] Lib. vi. ad. Nicomach. cap. ii. p. 98. tom. iii. oper.

being nothing else but a power of doing whatsoever is conceivable, it is plainly absurd to say, that a power of doing nothing but what is conceivable, is inconceivable.

But, because the Atheists look upon infinity as such a desperate and affrightful thing, we shall here render it something more easy, and take off that frightful vizard from it, which makes it seem such a *mormo*, or bug-bear to them, by declaring, in the next place, that infinity is really nothing else but perfection. For infinite understanding and knowledge is nothing else but perfect knowledge, that which hath no defect or mixture of ignorance with it, or the knowledge of whatsoever is knowable. So, in like manner, infinite power is nothing else but perfect power, that which hath no defect or mixture of impotency in it; a power of producing and doing all whatsoever is possible, that is whatsoever is conceivable. Infinite power can do whatsoever infinite understanding can conceive, and nothing else; conception being the measure of power, and its extent, and whatsoever is in itself inconceivable being therefore impossible. Lastly, infinity of duration or eternity, is really nothing else but perfection, as including necessary existence and immutability in it; so that it is not only contradictious to such a Being to cease to be or exist, but also to have had a newness or beginning of being, or to have any flux or change therein, by dying to the present, and acquiring something new to itself, which was not before. Notwithstanding which, this being comprehends the differences of past, present, and future, or the successive priority and posteriority of all temporary things; and because infinity is perfection, therefore can nothing, which includeth any thing of imperfection, in the very idea and essence of it, be ever truly and properly infinite, as number, corporeal magnitude, and successive duration. All which can only *mentiri infinitatem*, counterfeit and imitate infinity—in their having more and more added to them infinitely, whereby notwithstanding they never reach it, or overtake it. There is nothing truly infinite, neither in knowledge, nor in power, nor in duration, but only one absolutely perfect Being, or the holy Trinity.

Now, that we have an idea or conception of perfection, or a perfect Being, is evident from the notion that we have of imperfection, so familiar to us; perfection being the rule and measure of imperfection and not imperfection of perfection; as a straight line is the rule and measure of a crooked, and not a crooked line of a straight: so that perfection is first conceivable, in order of nature, before imperfection, as light before darkness, a positive before the privative or defect. For perfection is not properly the want of imperfection, but imperfection of perfection.

Moreover, we perceive divers degrees of perfection in the essences of things, and consequently a scale or ladder of perfections in nature one above another, as of living and animate things above senseless and inanimate, of rational things above sensitive; and this by reason of that notion or idea, which we first have of that which is absolutely perfect, as the standard; by comparing of things with which, and measuring of them, we take notice of their approaching more or less near thereunto. Nor indeed could these gradual ascents be infinite, or without end, but they must come at last to that which is absolutely perfect, as the top of them all. Lastly, We could not perceive imperfection in the most perfect of all those things, which we ever had sense or experience of in our lives, had we not a notion or idea of that which is absolutely perfect, which secretly comparing the same with, we perceive it to come short thereof. And we might add here, that it is not conceivable neither, how there should be any lesser perfection existent in any kind, were there not first something perfect in that kind from whence it was derived: this of Boetius[1] being the very sense and language of nature in rational beings; "Omne, quod imperfectum esse dicitur, id diminutione perfecti imperfectum esse perhibetur. Quo fit, ut si in quolibet genere imperfectum quid esse videatur, in eo perfectum quoque aliquid esse, necesse sit. Etenim sublata perfectione, unde illud, quod imperfectum perhibetur, existerit, ne fingi quidem potest. Neque enim a diminutis inconsummatisque natura rerum cepit exordium; sed ab integris absolutisque procedens, in hæc extrema, atque effœta dilabitur." Whatsoever is said to be imperfect, is accounted such by the diminution of that which is perfect; from whence it comes to pass, that if in any kind any thing appear imperfect, there must of necessity be something also in that kind perfect. For perfection being once taken away, it could not be imagined, from whence that which is accounted imperfect should have proceeded. Nor did the nature of things take beginning from inconsummate and imperfect things, but proceeding from things absolute and complete, thence descend down to these lower, effete, and languid things. — But of this more elsewhere.

Wherefore since infinite is the same with absolutely perfect, we having a notion or idea of the latter, must needs have of the former. From whence we learn also, that though the word infinite be in the form thereof negative, yet is the sense of it, in those things which are really capable of the same, positive, it being all one with absolutely perfect; as likewise the sense of the word finite is negative, it being the same with imperfect. So that finite is properly the negation of infinite,

[1] De Consolat. Philos. lib. iii. p. 69, 70. edit. Vallini.

as that which in order of nature is before it; and not infinite the negation of finite. However, in those things which are capable of no true infinity, because they are essentially finite, as number, corporeal magnitude, and time, infinity being there a mere imaginary thing, and a nonentity, it can only be conceived by the negation of finite; as we also conceive nothing by the negation of something; that is, we can have no positive conception thereof.

We conclude to assert an infinite Being is nothing else but to assert a Being absolutely perfect, such as never was not, or had no beginning, which could produce all things possible and conceivable, and upon which all other things must depend. And this is to assert a God: one absolutely perfect Being, the Original of all things: God, and Infinite, and absolutely Perfect, being but different names for one and the same thing.

We come now to the fourth atheistic objection, That theology is nothing but an abitrarious compilement of inconsistent and contradictious notions. Where, first, we deny not, but that as some theologers (or bigotical religionists) of later times extend the Divine omnipotence to things contradictious and impossible, as to the making of one and the same body, to be all of it in several distant places at once; so may others sometimes unskilfully attribute to the Deity things inconsistent or contradictious to one another, because seeming to them to be all perfections. As for example, though it be concluded generally by theologers, that there is a natural justice and sanctity in the Deity, yet do some notwithstanding contend, that the will of God is not determined by any antecedent rule or nature of justice and sanctity in the Deity, yet do some notwithstanding contend, that the will of God is not determined by any antecedent rule of nature of justice, but that whatsoever he could be supposed to will arbitrarily, would therefore be *ipso facto* just; which is called by them the Divine sovereignty, and looked upon as a great perfection; though it be certain, that these two things are directly contradictious to one another, *viz.* That there is something φύσει, in its own nature just and unjust, or a natural sanctity in God; and that the arbitrary will and command of the Deity is the only rule of justice and injustice. Again, some theologers determining, That whatsoever is in God, is God, or essential to the Deity; they conceiving such an immutability to be a necessary perfection thereof, seem thereby not only to contradict all liberty of will in the Deity, which themselves notwithstanding contend for in a high degree, that all things are arbitrarily determined by a divine decree; but also to take away from it all power of acting *ad extra*, and of perceiving or animadverting things done successively here in the world. But it will not follow from these and the

like contradictions of mistaken theologers, that therefore theology itself is contradictious, and hath nothing of philosophic truth at all in it; no more than because philosophers also hold contradictory opinions, that therefore philosophy itself is contradictious, and that there is nothing absolutely true or false, but (according to the Protagorean doctrine) all seeming and fantastical.

But in the next place we add, that though it be true, that the nature of things admits of nothing contradictious, and that whatsoever plainly implies a contradiction, must therefore of necessity be a non-entity; yet is this rule notwithstanding, obnoxious to be much abused, when whatsoever men's shallow and gross understandings cannot reach to, they will therefore presently conclude to be contradictious and impossible. As, for example, the Atheists and Materialists cannot conceive of any other substance besides body, and therefore do they determine presently, that incorporeal substance is a contradiction in the very terms, it being as much as to say incorporeal body:[1] wherefore when God is said by theologers to be an incorporeal substance, this is to them an absolute impossibility. Thus a modern writer: "The universe, that is, the whole mass of all things, is corporeal; that is to say, body. Now every part of body is body, and consequently every part of the universe is body; and that which is not body, is no part thereof. And because the universe is all, that which is no part of it, nothing. Therefore when spirits are called incorporeal, this is only a name of honor, and it may with more piety be attributed to God himself, in whom we consider not what attribute best expresseth his nature, which is incomprehensible, but what best expresseth our desire to honor him." Where incorporeal is said to be an attribute of honor; that is, such an attribute, as expresseth only the veneration of men's minds, but signifieth nothing in nature, nor hath any philosophic truth or reality under it; a substance incorporeal being as contradictious as something and nothing. Notwithstanding which, this contradiction is only in the weakness and childishness of these men's understandings, and not the thing itself; it being demonstrable, that there is some other substance besides body, according to the true and genuine notion of it. But because this mistake is not proper to Atheists only, there being some Theists also, who labor under this same infirmity of mind, not to be able to conceive any other substance besides body, and who therefore assert a corporeal Deity; we shall in the next place show, from a passage of a modern writer, what kind of contradictions they are, which these Atheists impute to all theology, namely, such as these; that it supposes God to perceive

[1] Hobbes's Leviath. cap. xxxiv.

things sensible, without any organs of sense; and to understand and be wise without any brains. "Pious men (saith he) attribute to God Almighty, for honor's sake, whatsoever they see honorable in the world, as seeing, hearing, willing, knowing, justice, wisdom, etc. But they deny him such poor things, as eyes, ears and brains, and other organs, without which we worms neither have, nor can conceive, such faculties to be: and so far they do well. But when they dispute of God's actions philosophically, then do they consider them again, as if he had indeed such faculties. This is not well, and thence is it, that they fall into so many difficulties. We ought not to dispute of God's nature. He is no fit subject of our philosophy. True religion consisteth in obedience to Christ's lieutenants, and in giving God such honor, both in attributes and actions, as they in their several lieutenancies shall ordain." Where the plain and undisguised meaning of the author seems to be this: That God is no subject of philosophy, as all real things are; (accordingly as he declareth elsewhere, that [1]"Religio non est philosophia, sed lex;" Religion is not a matter of philosophy, but only of law and arbitrary constitution)—he having no real nature of his own, nor being any true inhabitant of the world or heaven, but (as all other ghosts and spirits) an inhabitant of men's brains only, that is, a figment of their fear and fancy, or a mere political scare-crow. And therefore such attributes are to be given to him, without any scrupulosity, as the civil law of every country shall appoint, and no other; the wise and nasute very well understanding, that all this business of religion is nothing but mere pageantry, and that the attributes of the Deity indeed signify neither true nor false, nor any thing in nature, but only men's reverence and devotion towards the object of their fear: the manner of expressing which is determined by civil law. Wherefore to say, that God sees all things, and yet hath no eyes; and that he hears all things, and yet hath no ears; and that he understands, and is wise, and yet hath no brains; and whatsoever else you will please to say of him, as attributes of honor, and only as signifying devotion, is thus far well enough. But when men, not understanding the true cabala, will needs go further, they mistaking attributes of honor for attributes of nature, and of philosophic truth, and making them premises to infer absolute truth, and convince falsehood from, or matters to dispute and reason; that is, when they will needs suppose such a thing as a God really to exist in the world, then do they involve themselves in all manner of contradiction, nonsense, and absurdity; as, for example, to affirm seriously, that this God really sees all things in the world, and yet hath

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[1] De Homine, cap. xiv.

no eyes; and that he indeed hears all things, and yet hath no ears; and, lastly, that he understands and is wise, and yet hath no brains, which things are all absolutely contradictious, unconceivable and impossible. The sum of all is this, that when religion and theology, which is indeed nothing but law and fantastry, is made philosophy, then is it all mere jargon and insignificant nonsense. And now we see what those contradictions are, which the Atheists charge upon theology; such as owe all their being only to the grossness, sottishness, and brutishness of these men's own apprehensions. From whence proceedeth likewise, this following definition of knowledge and understanding,[1] That it is nothing but a tumult of the mind, raised by external things, pressing the organical parts of man's body. "O ye brutish among the people, when will ye understand? and ye fools, when will ye be wise? He that planted the ear, (and gave man's soul a power of hearing thereby) shall not he (though himself have no ears) hear? He that formed the eye (and gave the human soul a power of seeing, by it as an instrument) shall not he (though himself have no eyes) see? Lastly, he that teacheth man knowledge, (or gave him an understanding mind, besides brains) shall not he (though himself be without brains) know and understand?"

It is certain, that no simple idea, as that of a triangle or square, of a cube or sphere, can possibly be contradictious to itself; and therefore much less can the idea of a perfect Being (which is the compendious idea of God,) it being more simple than any of the other. Indeed this simple idea of a perfect Being is pregnant of many attributes; and therefore, the idea of God, more fully declared by them all, may seem to be in this respect a compounded idea, or one idea and conception, consisting or made up of many; which, if they were really contradictious, would render the whole a non-entity. As, for example, this; a plain triangle, whose three angles are greater than two right ones, it being contradictious and unconceivable, is therefore no true idea, but a non-entity. But all the genuine attributes of the Deity, of which its entire idea is made up, are things as demonstrable of a perfect Being, as the properties of a triangle or a square are of those ideas respectively, and therefore cannot they possibly be contradictious, neither to it, nor to one another, because those things, which agree in one third, must needs agree together amongst themselves.

Nay, the genuine attributes of the Deity, namely such as are demonstrable of an absolute perfect Being, are not only not contradictious but also necessarily connected together, and inseparable from one another. For there could not possibly be one thing infinite in wisdom

[1] Leviathan, cap. xxxi. et Elementa de Cive, cap. xv.

only, another thing infinite only in power, and another thing only infinite in duration or eternal. But the very same thing, which is infinite in wisdom, must needs be also infinite in power, and infinite in duration, and so *vice versa.* That, which is infinite in any one perfection, must of necessity have all perfections in it. Thus are all the genuine attributes of the Deity not only not contradictious, but also inseparably concatenate; and the idea of God no congeries either of disagreeing things; or else of such, as are unnecessarily connected with one another.

In very truth, all the several attributes of the Deity are nothing else but so many partial and inadequate conceptions of one and the same simple perfect Being, taken in as it were by piecemeal, by reason of the imperfection of our human understandings, which could not fully conceive it all together at once; and therefore are they really all but one thing, though they have the appearance of multiplicity to us. As the one simple light of the sun, diversely refracted and reflected from a rorid cloud, hath to us the appearance of the variegated colors of the rainbow.

Wherefore the attributes of God are no bundle of unconceivables and impossibles, huddled up together; nor attributes of honor and compliment only, and nothing but the religious nonsense of astonished minds, expressing their devotion towards what they fear; but all of them attributes of nature, and of most severe philosophic truth. Neither is the idea of God an arbitrarious compilement of things unnecessarily connected, and separable from one another; it is no factitious nor fictitious thing, made up by any feigning power of the soul, but it is a natural and most simple uncompounded idea; such as to which nothing can be arbitrariously added, nor nothing detracted from. Notwithstanding which, by reason of the imperfection of human minds there may be, are, different apprehensions concerning it. For as every one, that hath a conception of a plain triangle in general doth not therefore know, that it includes this property in it, to have three angles equal to two right ones; nor doth every one, who hath an idea of a rectangular triangle, presently understand, that the square of the subtense is equal to the squares of both the sides; so neither doth every one, who hath a conception of a perfect Being, therefore presently know all that is included in that idea. Moreover, men may easily mistake things for absolute perfections, which are not such, as hath been partly already showed.

And now, whereas the Atheists pretend, in the next place, to give an account of that supposed contradictiousness in the idea and attributes of God, namely, that it proceeded principally from fear, or the confounded nonsense of men's astonished minds, huddling up together

all imaginable attributes of honor, courtship, and compliment, without any philosophic truth, sense or signification; as also, in part, from the fiction and imposture of politicians: all this hath been already prevented, and the foundation thereof quite taken away, by our showing, that there is nothing in the genuine idea of God and his attributes, but what is demonstrable of a perfect Being, and that there cannot be the least either added to that idea, or detracted from it, any more than there can be any thing added to or detracted from the idea of a triangle, or of a square. From whence it follows unavoidably, that there cannot possibly be any thing either contradictious or arbitrarious in the Divine idea, and that the genuine attributes thereof are attributes of necessary philosophic truth: namely, such as do not only speak the piety, devotion, and reverence of men's own minds, but declare the real nature of the thing itself. Wherefore, when a modern atheistic writer affirmeth of all those, who reason and conclude concerning God's nature from his attributes, "That, losing their understanding in the very first attempt, they fall from one inconvenience (or absurdity) to another without end; after the same manner, as when one ignorant of court ceremonies, coming into the presence of a greater person than he was wont to speak to, and stumbling at his entrance, to save himself from falling, lets slip his cloak; to recover his cloak, lets fall his hat; and so, with one disorder after another, discovers his rusticity and astonishment:" we say, that, though there be something of wit and fancy in this, yet, as it is applied to theology, and the genuine attributes of the Deity, there is not the least of philosophic truth. However, we deny not but that some, either out of superstition, or else out of flattery, (for thus are they styled by St. Jerome, [1] "stulti adulatores Dei," foolish flatterers of God Almighty) — have sometimes attributed such things to him as are incongruous to his nature, and, under a pretence of honoring him, by magnifying his power and sovereignty, do indeed most highly dishonor him; they representing him to be such a Being as is no way amiable or desirable.

But the Atheists are most of all concerned to give an account of that unquestionable phenomenon— the general persuasion of the existence of a God in the minds of men, and their propensity to religion in all ages and places of the world; whence this should come, if there be really no such thing in nature: and this they think to do in the last place, also, partly from men's own fear, together with their ignorance of causes, and partly from the fiction of law-makers and politicians, they endeavoring thereby to keep men in civil subjection under them; where we shall first plainly and nakedly declare the Atheist's meaning

[1] Comment. in Habacuc. lib. i. p. 148, tom. vi. oper.

and then manifest the invalidity and foolery of these pretences to solve the forementioned phenomenon.

First, therefore, these Atheists affirm, That mankind by reason of their natural imbecility, are in perpetual solicitude, anxiety and fear, concerning future events, or their good and evil fortune to come; and this passion of fear inclining men to imagine things formidable and fearful, and to suspect or believe the existence of what really is not; I say, that this distrustful fear and jealousy in the minds of men, concerning their future condition, raises up to them the phantasm of a most affrightful spectre, an invisible understanding Being, arbitrarily governing and swaying the affairs of the whole world, and at pleasure tyrannizing over mankind. And when men's exorbitant fear and fancy has thus raised up to itself such a mormo, or bug-bear, such an affrightful spectre, as this, a thing that is really no inhabitant of the world, or of heaven, but only of men's brains, they afterward stand in awe of this their own imagination, and tremblingly worship this creature and figment of their own fear and fancy, as a thing really existing without them; or a God; devising all manner of expressions of honor and reverence towards it, and anxiously endeavoring by all ways conceivable, to propitiate and atone the same. And thus have they brought upon themselves a most heavy yoke of bondage, and filled their lives with all manner of bitterness and misery.

Again, to this fear of future events the Atheists add also ignorance of causes, as a further account of this phenomenon of religion, so generally entertained in the world. For mankind (say they) are naturally inquisitive into the causes of things; and that not only of the events of their own good and evil fortune, but also of the phenomenon of the world, and the effects of nature: and such is their curiosity, that wheresoever they can discover no visible and natural causes, there are they prone to feign and imagine other causes, invisible and supernatural. As it was observed of the tragic dramatists that, whenever they could not well extricate themselves, they were wont to bring in a god upon the stage: and as Aristotle[1] recordeth of Anaxagoras, that he never betook himself to Mind, or Understanding, that is, to God for a cause, but only when he is at a loss for other natural and necessary causes. From whence these Atheists would infer, that nothing but ignorance of causes made Anaxagoras to assert a Deity. Wherefore it is no wonder (say they) if the generality of mankind, being ignorant of the causes almost of all events and effects of nature, have, by reason of

[1] Metaphys. lib. i. cap. iv. p. 267. tom. iv. oper.

their natural curiosity and fear, feigned or introduced one invisible power or agent omnipotent, as the supreme cause of all things; they betaking themselves thereto, as to a kind of refuge, asylum, or sanctuary for their ignorance.

These two accounts of the phenomenon of religion, from men's fear and solicitude about future events, and from their ignorance of causes, together with their curiosity, are thus joined together by a modern writer:[1] "Perpetual fear of future evils always accompanying mankind, in the ignorance of causes, as it were in the dark, must needs have for object something. And therefore when there is nothing to be seen, there is nothing to accuse for their evil fortune, but some power or agent invisible." Moreover, it is concluded, that from the same originals sprang, not only that vulgar opinion of inferior ghosts and spirits also, subservient to the supreme Deity (as the great ghost of the whole world, apparitions being nothing but men's own dreams and fancies taken by them for sensations), but also men's taking things casual for prognostics, and their being so superstitiously addicted to omens and portents, oracles, and divinations and prophecies; this proceeding likewise from the same fantastic supposition, that the things of the world are disposed of, not by nature, but by some understanding and intending agent or person.[2]

But lest these two forementioned accounts of the phenomenon of religion, and the belief of a Deity, so epidemical to mankind, should yet seem insufficient; the Atheists will superadd a third to them, from the fiction and imposture of civil sovereigns, crafty law makers, and designing politicians; who perceiving a great advantage to be made, from the belief of a God and religion, for the better keeping of men in obedience and subjection to themselves, and in peace and civil society with one another (when they are persuaded, that besides the punishments appointed by laws, which can only take place upon open and convicted transgressors, and are often eluded and avoided, there are other punishments, that will be inflicted even upon the secret violators of them, both in this life and after death, by a Divine, invisible, and irresistible hand) have thereupon dexterously laid hold of men's fear and ignorance, and cherished those seeds of religion in them (being the infirmities of their nature) and further confirmed their belief of ghosts and spirits, miracles and prodigies, oracles and divinations, by

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[1] Hobbes, Leviath. cap. xii.

[2] This is levelled against Hobbes De Domine, cap. xiii. and Leviathan, cap. xii.

tales or fables, publicly allowed and recommended; according to that definition of religion given by a modern writer,[1] "Fear of power invisible, feigned by the mind, or imagined from tales publicly allowed, religion; not allowed, superstition." And that religion, thus nursed up by politicians, might be every way compliant with, and obsequious to, their designs, and no way refractory to the same; it hath been their great care to persuade the people, that their laws were not merely their own inventions, but that themselves were only the interpreters of the gods therein, and that the same things were really displeasing to the gods, which were forbidden by them; God ruling over the world no otherwise, than in them, as his vicegerents; according to that assertion of a late writer,[2] "Deum nullum regnum in homines habere nisi per eos, qui imperium tenent," that God reigneth over men only in the civil sovereigns.—This is therefore another atheistic account of religion's so generally prevailing in the world, from its being a fit engine of state, and politicians generally looking upon it as an *arcanum imperii*, a mystery of government—to possess the minds of the people with the belief of a God, and to keep them busily employed in the exercises of religion, thereby to render them the more tame and gentle, apt to obedience, subjection, peace, and civil society.

Neither is all this the mere invention of modern Atheists, but indeed the old Atheistic cabal, as may appear partly from that known passage of the poet,[3] That the gods were first made by fear—and from Lucretius's so frequently insisting upon the same, according to the mind of Epicurus. For in his first book he makes "terrorem animi, et tenebras," terror of mind, and darkness—the chief causes of Theism; and in his sixth, he further pursues the same grounds, especially the latter of them, after this manner:

[4] Cætera quæ fieri in terris cœloque tuentur
Mortales, pavidis quom pendent mentibu' sæpe,
Efficiunt animos humiles formidine divum:
Depressosque premunt ad terram, propterea quod
IGNORANTIA CAUSARUM conferre deorum
Cogit ad imperium res; et concedere regnum, et,
Quorum operum causas nulla ratione videre
Possunt, hæc fieri divino numine rentur.

[1] Leviathan, cap. vi.

[2] Tract. Theol. Polit. [Ben. Spinozæ, cap. ix. p. 214.]

[3] Petron. in Fragment. p. 676. edit. Burman.

[4] Lamb. 523. (ver. 49.)

To this sense; Mortals, when with trembling minds they behold the objects both of heaven and earth, they become depressed and sink down under the fear of the gods; ignorance of causes setting up the reign and empire of the gods. For when men can find no natural causes of these things, they suppose them, presently, to have been done by a Divine power.

And this ignorance of causes is also elsewhere insisted upon by the same poet, as the chief source of religion, or the belief of a God.

> [1] Præterea cœli rationes ordine certo,
> Et varia annorum cernebant tempora verti;
> Nec poterant quibus id fieret cognoscere causis.
> Ergo PERFUGIUM sibi habebant, omnia divis
> Tradere, et ipsorum nutu facere omnia flecti.

Moreover, when a modern writer declares the opinion of ghosts to be one of those things, in which consisteth the natural seeds of religion: as also that this opinion proceedeth from the ignorance how to distinguish dreams, and other strong fancies from vision and sense; he seemeth herein to have trodden likewise in the footsteps of Lucretius, giving, not obscurely, the same account of religion in his fifth book.[2]

> Nunc quæ causa deum per magnas numina gentes
> Pervolgarit, et ararum compleverit urbes, etc.
> Non ita difficile est rationem reddere verbis.
> Quippe etenim jam tum divum mortalia secla
> Egregias animo facies vigilante videbant,
> Et magis in somnis, mirando corporis auctu.
> His igitur sensum tribuebant, etc.

That is, How the noise of the gods came thus to ring over the whole world, and to fill all places with temples and altars, is not a thing very difficult to give an account of; it proceeding first from men's fearful dreams, and their phantasms when awake, taken by them for visions and sensations. Whereupon they attributed not only sense to these things as really existing, but also immortality and great power. For though this were properly an account only of those inferior and plebeian gods, called demons and genii, yet was it supposed, that the belief of these things did easily dispose the minds of men also to the persuasion of one supreme omnipotent Deity over all.

Lastly, that the ancient Atheists, as well as the modern, pretended,

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[1] Lib. v. Lamb. p. 500. [ver. 1182.] [2] Ver. 1160.

the opinion of a God and religion to have been a political invention, is frequently declared in the writings of the Pagans as in this of Cicero,[1] "Ii, qui dixerunt totam de diis immortalibus opinionem fictam esse ab hominibus sapientibus, reipublicæ causa, ut quos ratio non posset, eos ad officium religio duceret; nonne omnem religionem funditus sustulerunt?" They, who affirmed the whole opinion of the gods to have been feigned by wise men for the sake of the commonwealth, that so religion might engage those to their duty, whom reason could not, did they not utterly destroy all religion?—And the sense of the ancient Atheists is thus represented by Plato;[2] *Θεοὺς, ὦ μακάριε, εἶναι πρῶτον φασὶν οὗτοι τέχνῃ, οὐ φύσει, ἀλλὰ τισὶ νόμοις· καὶ τούτους ἄλλους ἄλλοις, ὅπῃ ἕκαστοι συνωμολόγησαν νομοθετούμενοι·* They first of all affirm, that the gods are not by nature, but by art and laws only; and that from thence it comes to pass, that they are different to different nations and countries, according as the several humors of their law-makers did chance to determine.—And before Plato, Critias, one of the thirty tyrants of Athens, plainly declared religion at first to have been a political intrigue, in those verses of his recorded by Sextus[3] the philosopher, beginning to this purpose; "that there was a time at first, when men's life was disorderly and brutish, and the will of the stronger was the only law: after which they consented and agreed together to make civil laws;" that so the disorderly might be punished. Notwithstanding which, it was still found, that men were only hindered from open but not from secret injustices: whereupon some sagacious and witty person was the author of a further invention, to deter men as well from secret as from open injuries:

Ἐντεῦθεν οὖν τὸ θεῖον εἰσηγήσατο·
Ὡς ἔστι δαίμων ἀφθίτῳ θάλλων βίῳ,
Νόῳ τ' ἀκούων καὶ βλέπων, φρονῶντε·
Ὑφ' οὗ πᾶν μὲν τὸ λεχθὲν ἐν βροτοῖς ἀκούεται,
Δρώμενον δὲ πᾶν ἰδεῖν δυνήσεται.

Namely, by introducing or feigning a God immortal and incorruptible, who hears, and sees, and takes notice of all things.—Critias then concluding his poem in these words;

Οὕτω δὲ πρῶτον οἴομαι πεῖσαί τινα
Θνητοὺς νομίζειν δαιμόνων εἶναί γένος.

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[1] De Nat. Deor. lib. i. cap. xlii. p. 2945. tom. ix. oper.

[2] De Leg. lib. x. (p. 666.)

[3] Lib. viii. advers. Mathemat. § 54. p. 562.

And in this manner do I conceive, some one at first to have persuaded mortals to believe, that there is a kind of gods.[1]

Thus have we fully declared the sense of the Atheists, in their account of the phenomenon of religion and the belief of a God; namely, that they derive it principally from these three springs or originals; first, from men's own fear and solicitude concerning future events, or their good and evil fortune. Secondly, from their ignorance of the causes both of those events, and the phenomena of nature; together with their curiosity. And, lastly, from the fiction of civil sovereigns, lawmakers and politicians. The weakness and foolery of all which we shall now briefly manifest. First, therefore, it is certain, that such an excess of fear, as makes any one constantly and obstinately to believe the existence of that, which there is no manner of ground neither from sense nor reason for, tending also to the great disquiet of men's own lives, and the terror of their minds, cannot be accounted other than a kind of crazedness or distraction. Wherefore, the Atheists themselves acknowledging the generality of mankind to be possessed with such a belief of a Deity, when they resolve this into such an excess of fear; it is all one, as if they should affirm, the generality of mankind to be frighted out of their wits, or crazed and distempered in their brains: none but a few Atheists, who being undaunted and undismayed have escaped this panic terror, remaining sober and in their right senses. But, whereas the Atheists thus impute to the generality of mankind, not only light-minded credulity and phantastry, but also such an excess of fear, as differs nothing at all from crazedness and distraction or madness; we affirm, on the contrary, that their supposed courage, stayedness and sobriety, is really nothing else but the dull and sottish stupidity of their minds; dead and heavy incredulity, and earthly diffidence or distrust; by reason whereof they will believe nothing but what they can feel or see.

Theists indeed have a religious fear of God, which is consequent from him, or their belief of him (of which more afterwards); but the Deity itself, or the belief thereof, was not created by any antecedent fear, that is, by fear concerning men's good and evil fortune; it being certain, that none are less solicitous concerning such events, than they who are most truly religious. The reason whereof is, because these place their chief good in nothing that is ἀλλότριον, *aliene*, or in anoth-

[1] To these passages of the ancients, wherein the origin of all religion is ascribed to state-policy, add Seneca, Quæst. Natur. lib. ii. cap. xlii. p. 536. tom. ii. oper and Sextus Empiric. lib. viii. advers. Mathemat. p. 551.

er's power—and exposed to the strokes of fortune: but in that which is most truly their own, namely, the right use of their own will. As the Atheists on the contrary, must needs, for this very reason, be liable to great fears and solicitudes concerning outward events, because they place their good and evil in the πάθος ἡδονῆς καὶ λύπης, the passion of pleasure and pain;—or at least, denying natural honesty, they acknowledge no other good but what belongs to the animal life only, and so is under the empire of fortune. And that the Atheists are indeed generally timorous and fearful, suspicious and distrustful things, seems to appear plainly from their building all their politics, civil societies, and justice (improperly so called), upon that only foundation of fear and distrust.

But the grand error of the Atheists here is this, that they suppose the Deity, according to the sense of the generality of mankind, to be nothing but a mormo, bug-bear, or terriculum, an affrightful, hurtful, and most undesirable thing: whereas men every where invoke the Deity in their straits and difficulties for aid and assistance, looking upon it as exorable and placable; and by their trust and confidence in it, acknowledge its goodness and benignity. Synesius affirms, that though men were otherwise much divided in their opinions, yet [1]ἀγαθὸν τὸν Θεὸν ὑμνοῦσιν ἅπαντες ἁπανταχοῦ καὶ σοφοὶ καὶ ἄσοφοι, they all every where, both wise and unwise, agree in this, that God is to be praised, as one who is good and benign.

If among the Pagans there were any who understood that proverbial speech, φθονερὸν τὸ δαιμόνιον, in the worst sense, as if God Almighty were of an envious and spiteful nature;—these were certainly but a few ill-natured men, who therefore drew a picture of the Deity according to their own likeness. For the proverb, in that sense, was disclaimed and cried down by all the wiser Pagans; as Aristotle, who affirmed the poets to have lied in this, as well as they did in many other things; and Plutarch,[2] who taxeth Herodotus for insinuating τὸ θεῖον πᾶν φθονερόν τι καὶ ταραχῶδες, the Deity universally (that is, all the gods) to be of an envious and vexatious or spiteful disposition;—whereas himself appropriated this only to that evil demon or principle asserted by him, as appeareth from the life of P. Æmilius,[3] written by him, where he affirmeth, not that τὸ θεῖον πᾶν φθονερὸν, the Deity univer-

[1] De Regno, p. 9. (oper. edit. Petavii.)

[2] Metaph. lib. i. cap. 2. (p. 263. tom. iv. oper.) οὔτε τὸ θεῖον φθονερὸν ἐνδέχεται εἶναι, ἀλλὰ πολλὰ ψεύδονται ἀοιδοί. c. de Herod. Malign. (p. 857. tom. ii. oper.)

[3] Tom. ii. oper. p. 273.

sally was of an envious nature:—but, that there is a certain deity or demon, whose proper task it is, to bring down all great and over-swelling human prosperity, and so to temper every man's life, that none may be happy in this world, sincerely and unmixedly, without a check of adversity;—which is, as if a Christian should ascribe it to the devil. And Plato[1] plainly declares the reason of God's making the world at first, to have been no other than this, ἀγαθὸς ἦν, ἀγαθῷ δὲ οὐδεὶς περὶ οὐδενὸς οὐδέποτε ἐγγίγνεται φθόνος; because he was good, and there is no manner of envy in that which is good.—From whence he also concluded, πάντα ὅτι μάλιστα ἐβουλήθη γενέσθαι παραπλήσια αὐτῷ, that God therefore willed all things should be made most like himself;—that is, after the best manner. But the true meaning of that ill-languaged proverb seems, at first, to have been no other, than what, besides Hesiod, the Scripture itself also attributes to God Almighty, that he affecteth to humble and abase the pride of men, and to pull down all high, towering and lofty things, whether as noxious and hurtful to the men themselves, or as in some sense invidious to him, and derogatory from his honor, who alone ought to be exalted, and no flesh to glory before him. And there hath been so much experience of such a thing as this in the world, that the Epicurean poet himself could not but confess, that there was some hidden force or power, which seemed to have a spite to all over-swelling greatnesses, and affect to cast contempt and scorn upon the pride of men;

> [2] Usque adeo res humanas vis abdita quædam
> Obterit, et pulchros fasces, sævasque secures,
> Proculcare, ac ludibrio sibi habere videtur.

Where he plainly reeled and staggered in his Atheism, or else was indeed a Theist, but knew it not; it being certain, that there can be no such force as this, "in regno atomorum," in the reign or empire of senseless atoms.—And as for those among Christians, who make such a horrid representation of God Almighty, as one who created far the greatest part of mankind, for no other end or design, but only this, that he might recreate and delight himself in their eternal torments; these also do but transcribe or copy out their own ill-nature, and then read it in the Deity; the Scripture declaring on the contrary, that God is love. Nevertheless these very persons, in the mean time, dearly hug and embrace God Almighty in their own conceit, as one that is fondly

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[1] In Timæo, cap. xiv. p. 237. edit. Fabricii.

[2] Lamb. 503. (lib. v. ver. 1232.)

good, kind, and gracious to themselves; he having fastened his affections upon their very persons, without any consideration of their dispositions or qualifications.

It is true, indeed, that religion is often expressed in the Scripture by the fear of God, and fear hath been said to be "prima mensura Deitatis," the first measure of the Divinity in us,—or the first impression that religion makes upon men in this obnoxious and guilty state, before they have arrived to the true love of God and righteousness. But this religious fear is not a fear of God, as a mere arbitrary omnipotent Being, much less as hurtful and mischievous (which could not be disjoined from hatred); but an awful regard of him, as of one who is essentially just, and as well a punisher of vice and wickedness, as a rewarder of virtue; Lucretius himself, when he describes this religious fear of men, confessing it to be conjoined with a conscience of their duty, or to include the same within itself;

> [1] Tunc populi gentesque tremunt, etc.
> Ne quod ob admissum fœde dictumve superbe,
> Pœnarum grave sit solvendi tempus adactum.

And this is the sense of the generality of mankind, that there being a natural difference of good and evil moral, there is an impartial justice in the Deity, which presideth over the same, and inclines it as well to punish the wicked, as to reward the virtuous: Epicurus[2] himself acknowledging thus much, ἔνθεν καὶ μεγίστας βλάβας οἴονται, τοῖς κακοῖς ἐκ θεῶν ἐπάγεσθαι, καὶ ὠφελείας τοῖς ἀγαθοῖς, Theists suppose, that there are both great evils inflicted upon the wicked from the gods; and also great rewards by them bestowed upon the good.—And this fear of God is not only beneficial to mankind in general, by repressing the growth of wickedness, but also wholesome and salutary to those very persons themselves, that are thus religiously affected, it being preservative of them both from moral evils, and likewise from the evils of punishment consequent thereupon. This is the true and genuine fear of religion, which when it degenerates into a dark kind, of jealous and suspicious fear of God Almighty, either as a hurtful, or as a mere arbitrary and tyrannical Being, then is it looked upon as the vice or extreme of religion, and distinguished from it by that name of δεισιδαιμονία, superstition.—

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[1] Page 503. (lib. v. vers. 1223.)

[2] Ep. ad Menœc. p. 46. Gass. (tom. v. oper. vide etiam Diog. Laert. lib. x. § 124. p. 665.)

Thus is the character of a superstitious man given by Plutarch,[1] *οἴεται θεοὺς εἶναι, λυπηροὺς δὲ καὶ βλαβεροὺς*, that he thinks there are gods, but that they are noxious and hurtful; and *ἀνάγκη καὶ μισεῖν τὸν δεισιδαίμονα, καὶ φοβεῖσθαι τοὺς θεοὺς*, a superstitious man must needs hate God, as well as fear him.—"The true fear of God (as the son of Sirach[2] speaks) is the beginning of his love, and faith is the beginning of cleaving to him." As if he should have said, The first entrance into religion is an awful regard to God as the punisher of vice; the second step forwards therein is faith or confidence in God, whereby men rely upon him for good, and cleave to him; and the top and perfection of all religion is the love of God above all, as the most amiable Being. Christianity, the best of religions, recommendeth faith to us, as the inlet or introduction into all true and ingenuous piety; for [3]"he that cometh to God, must not only believe that he is, but also that he is a rewarder of those that seek him." Which faith is better defined in the Scripture than by any scholastic, to be the substance of things (that are to be) hoped for, and the evidence of things not seen; that is, a confident persuasion of things that fall not under sight (because they are either invisible or future), and which also are to be hoped for. So that religious fear consisteth well with faith, and faith is near of kin to hope, and the result of both faith and hope is love; which faith, hope and love, do all suppose an essential goodness in the Deity. God is such a being, who, if he were not, were of all things whatsoever most to be wished for; it being indeed no way desirable (as that noble Emperor concluded) for a man to live in a world void of a God and providence. He that believes a God, believes all that good and perfection in the universe which his heart can possibly wish or desire. It is the interest of none, that there should be no God, but only of such wretched persons as have abandoned their first and only true interests of being good, and friends to God, and are desperately resolved upon ways of wickedness.

The reason why the Atheists do thus grossly mistake the notion of God, and conceive of him differently from the generality of mankind, as a thing which is only to be feared, and must consequently be hated, is from nothing but their own vice and ill-nature. For, first, their vice so far from blinding them, as to make them think, that the moral differences of good and evil have no foundation in nature, but only in law or arbitrary constitution (which law is contrary to nature, nature being liberty, but law restraint); as they cannot but really hate that

[1] *περὶ δεισιδαιμ.* (p. 165. tom. ii. oper.) [2] Chap. 25: 12. [3] Heb. 11: 6.

which hinders them of their true liberty and chief good, so must they needs interpret the severity of the Deity so much spoken of against wickedness, to be nothing else but cruelty and arbitrary tyranny. Again, it is a wretched ill-natured maxim, which these Atheists have, that there is "nulla naturalis charitas," no natural charity,—but that [1]"omnis benevolentia oritur ex imbecillitate et metu," all benevolence ariseth only from imbecility and fear;—that is, from being either obnoxious to another's power, or standing in need of his help. So that all that is now called love and friendship amongst men, is, according to these, really nothing, but either a crouching under another's power, whom they cannot resist, or else "mercatura quædam utilitatum," a certain kind of merchandizing for utilities.—And thus does Cotta in Cicero[1] declare their sense; "Ne homines quidem censetis, nisi imbecilli essent, futuros beneficos aut benignos;" You conceive that no man would be any way beneficent or benevolent to another, were it not for his imbecility or indigence.—But as for God Almighty, these Atheists conclude, that upon the supposition of his existence, there could not be so much as this spurious love or benevolence in him neither towards any thing: because by reason of his absolute and irresistible power, he would neither stand in need of any thing, and be devoid of all fear. Thus the forementioned Cotta:[1] "Quid est præstantius bonitate et beneficentia? Qua cum carere Deum vultis, neminem Deo nec Deum nec hominem carum, neminem ab eo amari vultis. Ita fit, ut non modo homines a diis, sed ipsi dii inter se ab aliis alii negligantur." What is there more excellent than goodness and beneficence? which when you will needs have God to be utterly devoid of, you suppose that neither any God nor man is dear to the supreme God, or beloved of him. From whence it will follow, that not only men are neglected by the gods, but also the gods among themselves are neglected by one another.—Accordingly a late pretender to politics, who in this manner discards all natural justice and charity, determines concerning God, [2]"Regnandi et puniendi eos, qui leges suas violant, jus Deo esse a sola potentia irresistibili;" that he has no other right of reigning over men, and of punishing those who transgress his laws, but only from his irresistible power.—Which indeed is all one as to say, that God has no right at all of ruling over mankind, and imposing commands upon them, but what he doth in this kind, he doth it only by force and power, right and might (or power) being very different things

[1] Cic. de N. D. lib. i. 213. Lamb. (cap. xliii. p. 2948. oper.)

[2] Hobbes, Elem. de Cive, cap. xv. § 4. p. 112. et alias.

from one another, and there being no *jus* or *right* without natural justice; so that the word *right* is here only abused. And consentaneously hereunto the same writer further adds,[1] "si jus regnandi habeat Deus ab omnipotentia sua, manifestum est obligationem ad præstandam ipsi obedientiam incumbere hominibus propter imbecillitatem;" that if God's right of commanding be derived only from his omnipotence, then it is manifest that men's obligations to obey him lie upon them only from their imbecility.—Or, as it is further explained by him, "homines ideo Deo subjectos esse, quia omnipotentes non sunt, aut quia ad resistendum satis virium non habent;" that men are therefore only subject to God, because they are not omnipotent, or have not sufficient power to resist him.—Thus do we see plainly how the Atheists, by reason of their vice and ill-nature (which make them deny all natural justice and honesty, all natural charity and benevolence), transform the Deity into a monstrous shape; such an omnipotent Being, as, if he were, could have nothing neither of justice in him, nor of benevolence towards his creatures; and whose only right or authority of commanding them would be his irresistible power; whom his creatures could not place any hope, trust, or confidence in, nor have any other obligation to obey, than that of fear and necessity, proceeding from their imbecility, or inability to resist him. And such a Deity as this is indeed a mormo or bug-bear, a most formidable and affrightful thing.

But all this is nothing but the Atheist's false imagination, true religion representing a most comfortable prospect of things from the Deity; whereas on the contrary, the atheistic scene of things is dismal, hopeless and forlorn, that there should be no other good, than what depends upon things wholly out of our own power, the momentary gratification of our insatiate appetites, and the perpetual pouring into a "dollium pertusum," a perforated and leaking vessel:—that ourselves should be but a congeries of atoms, upon the dissolution of whose compages our life should vanish into nothing, and all our hope perish: that there should be no providence over us, nor any kind and good-natured being above to take care of us, there being nothing without us but dead and senseless matter. True, indeed, there could be no spiteful design in senseless atoms, or a dark unconscious nature. Upon which account, Plutarch[2] would grant, that even this atheistic hypothesis itself, as bad as it is, were, notwithstanding, to be preferred before that of an omnipotent, spiteful, and malicious being (if there can be any such hypothesis as this), a monarchy of the Manichean evil principle, reigning

[1] Ibid. § 7. p. 114. [2] De Superest. (p. 164. tom. ii. oper.)

all alone over the world, without any cor-rival, and having an undisturbed empire. Nevertheless it is certain also, that there could be no faith nor hope neither in these senseless atoms, both necessarily and fortuitously moved, no more than there could be faith and hope in a whirlwind, or in a tempestuous sea, whose merciless waves are inexorable, and deaf to all cries and supplications. For which reason Epicurus[1] himself confessed,[2] that it was better to give credit to the fable of gods (as he calls it), than to serve the atheistic fate, or that material necessity of all things, introduced by those atheistic philosophers, Leucippus and Democritus: *κρεῖττον ἦν τῷ περὶ θεῶν μύθῳ κατακολουθεῖν, ἢ τῇ τῶν φυσικῶν εἱμαρμένῃ· ὁ μὲν γὰρ ἐλπίδα παραιτήσεως ὑπογράφει θεῶν διὰ τιμῆς· ἡ δὲ ἀπαραίτητον ἔχει τὴν ἀνάγκην·* Because there is hopes, that the gods may be prevailed with by worship and prayer; but the other (necessity) is altogether deaf and inexorable.—And though Epicurus thought to mend the matter, and make the atheistic hypothesis more tolerable, by introducing into it (contrary to the tenor of those principles) liberty of will in men; yet this, being not a power over things without us, but ourselves only, could alter the case very little. Epicurus himself was in a panic fear, lest the frame of heaven should sometime upon a sudden crack, and tumble about his ears, and this fortuitous compilement of atoms be dissolved into a chaos;

[3] ———— Tria talia texta
Una dies dabit exitio; multosque per annos
Sustentata ruet moles et machina mundi.

And what comfort could his liberty of will then afford him, who placed his happiness in security from all external evils? *Τέλος τοῦ μὴ νομίζειν θεοὺς, μὴ φοβεῖσθαι* (saith Plutarch):[4] The Atheistic design in shaking off the belief of a God, was to be without fear; but by means hereof, they framed such a system of things to themselves, as under which they could not have the least hope, faith, or confidence. Thus running from fear did they plunge themselves into fear; for they, who are without hope, can never be free from fear. Endless of necessity must the fears and anxieties of those men be, who shake off that one fear of God that would only preserve them from evil, and have no faith nor hope in them. Wherefore we might conclude upon better grounds than the Atheists do of Theism, that Atheism (which hath no foundation at all

[1] Vide Diog. Laert. lib. x. segm. 134. p. 659.
[2] Epist. ad Men. p. 49. Gass. [3] Lucret. lib. v. ver. 95.
[4] De Superest. (p. 165. tom. ii. oper.)

in nature nor in reason) springs first from the imposture of fear. For the faith of religion being the substance or confidence of such things not seen as are to be hoped for; atheistic infidelity must needs on the contrary, be a certain heavy diffidence, despondence, and misgiving of mind, or a timorous distrust and disbelief of good to be hoped for, beyond the reach of sense; namely, of an invisible being omnipotent, that exerciseth a just, kind, and gracious providence, over all those who commit their ways to him, with an endeavor to please him, both here in this life and after death. But vice, or the love of lawless liberty, prevailing over such disbelieving persons, makes them by degrees more and more desirous, that there should be no God; that is, no such hinderer of their liberty; and to count it a happiness to be freed from the fear of him, whose justice (if it were) they must needs be obnoxious to.

And now have we made it evident, that these Atheists, who make religion and the belief of a God to proceed from the imposture of fear, do first of all disguise the Deity, and put a monstrous, horrid, and affrightful vizard upon it, transforming it into such a thing, as can only be feared and hated; and then do they conclude concerning it (as well indeed they may), that there is no such thing as this really existing in nature, but that it is only a mormo or bug-bear, raised up by men's fear and fancy. Of the two, it might better be said, that the opinion of a God sprung from men's hope of good, than from fear of evil; but really it springs neither from hope nor fear (however in different circumstances it raises both these passions in our minds); nor is it the imposture of any passion, but that whose belief is supported and sustained by the strongest and clearest reason, as shall be declared in due place. But the sense of a Deity often preventing ratiocination in us, and urging itself more immediately upon us, it is certain, that there is also, besides a rational belief thereof, a natural prolepsis or anticipation in the minds of men concerning it, which, by Aristotle, is called *Μαντεία*, a vaticination.

Thus have we sufficiently confuted the first atheistic pretence to solve the phenomenon of religion, and the belief of a God, so generally entertained, from the imposture of fear. We come now to the second, That it proceeded from the ignorance of causes also, or men's want of philosophy; they being prone, by reason of their innate curiosity, where they find no causes to make or feign them; and from their fear, in the absence of natural and necessary causes, to imagine supernatural and Divine; this also affording them a handsome cover and pretext for their ignorance: for which cause these Atheists stick not to affirm of God Almighty, what some philosophers do of occult qualities, that he is

but "perfugium et asylum ignorantiæ," a refuge and shelter for men's ignorance;—that is, in plain and downright language, the mere sanctuary of fools.

And these two things are here commonly joined together by these Atheists, both fear, and ignorance of causes, as which jointly concur in the production of Theism; because as the fear of children raises up bug-bears, especially in the dark, so do they suppose in like manner the fear of men, in the darkness of their ignorance of causes especially, to raise up the mormo, spectre, or phantasm of a God; which is thus intimated by the Epicurean poet,[1]

——————Omnia cæcis
In tenebris metuunt.

And accordingly Democritus[2] gave this account of the original Theism or religion, *ὁρῶντες τὰ ἐν τοῖς μετεώροις παθήματα οἱ παλαιοὶ τῶν ἀνθρώπων, καθάπερ βροντὰς καὶ ἀστραπὰς καὶ κεραυνοὺς, ἡλίου τε καὶ σελήνης ἐκλείψεις, ἐδειματοῦντο θεοὺς οἰόμενοι τούτων αἰτίους;* that when in old times men observed strange and affrightful things in the meteors and the heaven, as thunder, lightning, thunderbolts, and eclipses, they not knowing the causes thereof, and being terrified thereby, presently imputed them to the gods.—And Epicurus declares this to have been the reason, why he took such great pains in the study of physiology, that, by finding out the natural and necessary causes of things, he might be able to free both himself and others from the terror of a God, which would otherwise invade and assault them; the importunity of men's minds, whenever they are at a loss for natural causes, urging them so much with the fear, suspicion, and jealousy, of a Deity.

Wherefore the Atheists thus dabbling in physiology, and finding out as they conceive, material and mechanical causes for some of the phenomena of nature, and especially such for them as the unskilful vulgar sometimes impute to God himself, when they can prove eclipses (for example) to be no miracles, and render it probable that thunder is not the voice of God Almighty himself, as it were roaring above in the heavens, merely to affright and amaze poor mortals, and make them quake and tremble; and that thunderbolts are not there flung by his own hands, as the direful messengers of his wrath and displeasure;

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[1] Lucret. lib. ii. ver. 34, 55.

[2] Steph. Poe. Phil. 158. ex Sexto. (vide Sextum Empir. lib. viii. advers. Mathemat. § 24. p. 554.)

they presently conclude triumphantly thereupon concerning nature or matter, that it doth

[1] Ipsa sua per se, sponte, omnia Diis agere expers,

do all things alone of itself without a God.—But we shall here make it appear in a few instances, as briefly as we may, that philosophy and the true knowledge of causes, leads to God; and that Atheism is nothing but ignorance of causes and of philosophy.

For, first, no Atheist, who derives all from senseless atoms, or matter, is able to assign any cause at all of himself, or give any true account of the original of his own soul or mind, it being utterly inconceivable and impossible, that soul and mind, sense, reason, and understanding, should ever arise from irrational and senseless matter, however modified; or result from atoms, devoid of all manner of qualities, that is, from mere magnitude, figure, site, and motion of parts: for though it be indeed absurd to say (as these Atheists allege) that laughing and crying things are made out of laughing and crying principles,

[2] Et ridere potest non ex ridentibu' factus,

yet does it not therefore follow, that sensitive and rational beings might result from a composition of irrational and senseless atoms; which, according to the Democritic hypothesis, have nothing in them but magnitude, figure, site, and motion, or rest, because laughing and crying are motions, which result from the mechanism of human bodies, in such a manner organized; but sense and understanding are neither local motion, nor mechanism. And the case will be the very same, both in the Anaximandrian or Hylopathian, and in the Stratonic or Hylozoic Atheism; because sense and conscious understanding could no more result, either from those qualities of heat and cold, moist and dry, contempered together; or from the mere organization of inanimate and senseless matter, than it could from the

[3] Concursus, motus, ordo, positura, figuræ,

of atoms devoid of all manner of qualities. Had there been once nothing but senseless matter, fortuitously moved, there could never

[1] Lucret. lib. ii. ver. 1091. [2] Lucret. lib. ii. ver. 985.
[3] Id. lib. i. ver. 686.

have emerged into being any soul or mind, sense or understanding; because no effect can possibly transcend the perfection of its cause. Wherefore Atheists, supposing themselves, and all souls and minds, to have sprung from stupid and senseless matter, and all that wisdom, which is any where in the world, both political and philosophical, to be the result of mere fortune and chance, must needs be concluded to be grossly ignorant of causes: which had they not been, they could never have been Atheists. So that ignorance of causes is the seed, not of Theism, but of Atheism; true philosophy, and the knowledge of the cause of ourselves, leading necessarily to a Deity.

Again, Atheists are ignorant of the cause of motion in bodies also; by which, notwithstanding, they suppose all things to be done; that is, they are never able to solve this phenomenon so long as they are Atheists, and acknowledge no other substance besides matter or body. For, first, it is undeniably certain, that motion is not essential to all body, as such, because then no particles of matter could ever rest; and consequently there could have been no generation, nor no such mundane system produced as this is, which requires a certain proportionate commixture of motion and rest; no sun, nor moon, nor earth, nor bodies of animals; since there could be no coherent consistency of any thing, when all things fluttered and were in continual separation and divulsion from one another. Again, it is certain likewise, that matter or body, as such, hath no power of moving itself freely or spontaneously neither, by will or appetite; both because the same inconvenience would from hence ensue likewise, and because the phenomena or appearances do plainly evince the contrary. And as for that prodigiously absurd paradox of some few hylozoic Atheists, that all matter, as such, and therefore every smallest particle thereof, hath not only life essentially belonging to it, but also perfect wisdom and knowledge, together with appetite, and self-moving power, though without animal sense or consciousness: this, I say, will be elsewhere in due place further confuted. But the generality of the ancient Atheists, that is, the Anaximandrians and Democritics, attributed no manner of life to matter, as such; and therefore could ascribe no voluntary or spontaneous motion to the same, but fortuitous only; according to that of the Epicurean poet[1] already cited,

> Nam certe neque consilio, primordia rerum
> Ordine se quæque, atque sagaci mente locarunt;
> Nec quos quæque darent motus pepigere profecto.

[1] Lib. i. ver. 1020.

Wherefore these Democritics, as Aristotle somewhere[1] intimates, were able to assign no other cause of motion, than only this, That one body moved another from eternity infinitely, so that there was no πρῶτον κινοῦν, no first unmoved mover,—ever to be found; because there is no beginning nor first in eternity. From whence probably, that doctrine of some atheistic Stoics in Alex. Aphrodisius[2] was derived, That there is no first in the rank and order of causes.—In the footsteps of which philosophers a modern writer seemeth to have trodden, when declaring himself after this manner;[3] "Si quis ab effectu quocunque, ad causam ejus immediatam, atque inde ad remotiorem, ac sic perpetuo ratiocinatione ascenderit, non tamen in æternum procedere poterit, sed defatigatus aliquando deficiet." If any one will from whatsoever effect ascend upwards to its immediate cause, and from thence to a remoter, and so onwards perpetually, in his ratiocination; yet shall he never be able to hold on through all eternity; but at length being quite tired out with his journey, be forced to desist, or give over.—Which seems to be all one as if he should have said, one thing moved or caused another infinitely from eternity, in which there being no beginning, there is consequently no first mover or cause to be reached unto. But this infinite progress of these Democritics, in the order of causes, and their shifting off the cause of motion, from one thing to another without end or beginning, was rightly understood by Aristotle,[4] to be indeed the assigning of no cause of motion at all, εἰς ἄπειρον εἶσιν, εἰ μήτι ἔσται κατὰ φύσιν κινοῦν πρῶτον, they acknowledging (saith he) no first mover according to nature, must needs make an idle progress infinitely;—that is, in the language of this philosopher, assign no cause at all of motion. Epicurus therefore, to mend the matter, though according to the principles of the atomic physiology, he discarded all other qualities, yet did he notwithstanding admit this one quality of gravity or ponderosity in atoms, pressing them continually downwards in infinite space. In which, as nothing could be more absurd or unphilosophical than to make upwards and downwards in infinite space, or a gravity tending to no centre, nor place of rest; so did he not assign any cause of motion neither, but only in effect affirm, the atoms therefore to tend downwards, because they did so; a quality of gravity, signifying only an endeavor to tend downwards, but why or wherefore, nobody knows. And

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[1] Vide Physic. lib. viii. cap. i. § 3. p. 796. tom. i. oper. et § 27. p. 579.

[2] Alex. Aph. lib. de Fato, p. (§ 25. p. 118. edit. Lond.)

[3] Hobbes, Elem. Philosoph. part iv. cap. xxvi. p. 204.

[4] Physic. Auscultat. lib. vii. cap. ii. p. 365. tom. i. oper.

it is all one as if Epicurus should have said, that atoms moved downwards by an occult quality, he either betaking himself to this as an asylum, a sanctuary, or refuge, for his ignorance; or else indeed, more absurdly, making his very ignorance itself (disguised under that name of a quality) to be the cause of motion. Thus the Atheists universally either assigned no cause at all for motion, as the Anaximandrians and Democritics; or else no true one, as the Hylozoists; when, to avoid incorporeal substance, they would venture to attribute perfect understandings, appetite or will, and self-moving power, to all senseless matter whatsoever. But since it appears plainly, that matter or body cannot move itself, either the motion of all bodies must have no manner of cause; or else must there of necessity be some other substance besides body, such as is self-active and hylarchical, or hath a natural power of ruling over matter. Upon which latter account Plato rightly determined, that cogitation, which is self-activity or autokinesy, was, in order of nature, before the local motion of body, which is heterokinesy. Though motion considered passively in bodies, or taken for their translation, or change of distance and place, be indeed a corporeal thing, or a mode of those bodies themselves moving; yet, as it is considered actively for the *vis movens*, that active force, which causes this translation, or change of place, so is it an incorporeal thing; the energy of a self-active substance upon that sluggish matter or body, which cannot at all move itself. Wherefore, in the bodies of animals, the true and proper cause of motion, or the determination thereof at least, is not the matter itself organized, but the soul either as cogitative, or plasticly self-active, vitally united thereunto, and naturally ruling over it. But in the whole world it is either God himself, originally impressing a certain quantity of motion upon the matter of the universe, and constantly conserving the same, according to that of the Scripture,[1] "In him we live and move" (which seems to have been the sense also of that noble Agrigentine poet and philosopher,[2] when he described God to be only "a pure or holy mind, that with swift thoughts agitates the whole world"); or else it is instrumentally an inferior created spirit, soul, or life of nature; that is, a subordinate hylarchical principle, which hath a power of moving matter regularly, according to the direction of a superior perfect Mind. And thus do we see again, that ignorance of causes is the seed of Atheism, and not of Theism; no Atheists being

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[1] Acts 17: 28.

[2] Empedocles, cujus duos versus vide apud Ammonium Comm. in librum Aristot. περὶ Ἑρμηνείας, p. 107. edit. Aldinæ.

able to assign a true cause of motion, the knowledge whereof plainly leadeth to a God.

Furthermore, those Atheists, who acknowledge no other principle of things but senseless matter fortuitously moved, must needs be ignorant also of the cause of that grand phenomenon, called by Aristotle, the τὸ εὖ καὶ καλῶς, the well and fit in nature;—that is, of the most artificial frame of the whole mundane system in general, and of the bodies of animals in particular, together with the conspiring harmony of all. For they, who boasted themselves able to give natural causes of all things whatsoever, without a God, can give no other cause at all of this phenomenon, but only that the world happened by chance to be thus made as it is. Now, they who make fortune and chance to be the only cause of this so admirable phenomenon, the most regular and artificial frame and harmony of the universe, they either make the mere absence and want of a cause, to be a cause, fortune and chance being nothing else but the absence or want of an intending cause; or else do they make their own ignorance of a cause, and they know not how, to be a cause; as the author of the Leviathan[1] interprets the meaning hereof: "Many times (saith he) men put for cause of natural events their own ignorance, but disguised in other words; as when they say, that fortune is the cause of things contingent; that is, of things whereof they know no cause." Or they affirm against all reason, one contrary to be the cause of another, as confusion to be the cause of order, pulchritude, and harmony; chance and fortune, to be the cause of art and skill; folly and nonsense, the cause of the most wise and regular contrivance: or lastly, they deny it to have any cause at all, since they deny an intending cause, and there cannot possibly be any other cause of artificialness and conspiring harmony, than mind and wisdom, counsel and contrivance.

But because the Atheists here make some pretences for this their ignorance, we shall not conceal any of them, but bring them all to light; to the end that we may discover their weakness and foolery. First, therefore, they pretend, that the world is not so artificially and well made, but that it might have been made much better, and that there are many faults and flaws to be found therein; from whence they would infer, that it was not made by a perfect God, he being supposed by Theists to be no bungler, but a perfect Mind, or a Being infinitely good and wise, who therefore should have made all things for the best.

But this being already set down by itself, as a twelfth atheistic ob-

[1] Cap. xi. et alias.

jection against a Deity, we must reserve the confutation thereof for its proper place. Only we shall observe thus much here by the way; that those Theists of later times, who, either because they fancy a mere arbitrary Deity; or because their faith in the Divine Goodness is but weak; or because they judge of things according to their own private appetites and selfish passions, and not with a free uncaptivated universality of mind, and an impartial regard to the good of the whole; or because they look only upon the present scene of things, and take not the future into consideration, nor have a comprehensive view of the whole plot of Divine Providence together; or lastly, because we mortals do all stand upon too low a ground, to take a commanding view and prospect upon the whole frame of things; and our shallow understandings are not able to fathom the depths of Divine wisdom, nor trace all the methods and designs of Providence; grant, that the world might have been made much better than now it is; which indeed is all one as to say, that it is not well made: these neotoric Christians (I say) seem hereby to give a much greater advantage to the Atheists, than the Pagan Theists themselves heretofore did, who stood their ground, and generously maintained against them, that Mind being the maker of all things, and not fortune or chance, nor arbitrary self-will, and irrational humor omnipotent, the τὸ βέλτιστον, that which is absolutely the best in every case, so far as the necessity of things would admit, and in compliance with the good of the whole, was the measure and rule both of nature and Providence.

Again, the atomic Atheists further allege, that though there be many things in the world, which serve well for uses, yet it does not at all follow, that therefore they were made intentionally and designedly for those uses; because, though things happen by chance to be so or so made, yet may they serve for something or other afterward, and have their several uses consequent. Wherefore all the things of nature happened (say they) by chance to be so made as they are, and their several uses notwithstanding were consequent, or following thereupon. Thus the Epicurean poet:

[1] ———Nil ideo natum est in corpore, ut uti
Possemus, sed quod natum est id procreat usum.

Nothing in man's body was made out of design for any use; but all the several parts thereof, happening to be so made as they are, their uses were consequent thereupon.—In like manner the old atheistic

[1] Lucret. lib. iv. p. 367. Lamb. (vers. 832, 833).

philosophers in Aristotle[1] concluded, *τοὺς ὀδόντας ἐξ ἀνάγκης ἀνατεῖλαι, τοὺς μὲν ἐμπροσθίους ὀξεῖς, ἐπιτηδείους πρὸς τὸ διαιρεῖν, τοὺς δὲ γομφίους πλατεῖς, καὶ χρησίμους πρὸς τὸ λεαίνειν τὴν τροφήν· ἐπεὶ οὐ τούτου ἕνεκα γενέσθαι, ἀλλὰ συμπεσεῖν· ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ περὶ τῶν ἄλλων μερῶν, ἐν ὅσοις δοκεῖ ὑπάρχειν τὸ ἕνεκα τοῦ·* That the former teeth were made by material or mechanical necessity, thin and sharp, by means whereof they became fit for cutting; but the jaw-teeth thick and broad, whereby they became useful for the grinding of food. But neither of them were intended to be such, for the sake of these uses, but happened by chance only. And the like concerning all the other parts of the body, which seem to be made for ends.—Accordingly the same Aristotle represents the sense of those ancient Atheists, concerning the other parts of the universe, or things of nature, that they were all likewise made such, by the necessity of material (or mechanical) motions undirected, and yet had nevertheless their several uses consequent upon this their accidental structure. *Τί κωλύει τὴν φύσιν μὴ ἕνεκα τοῦ ποιεῖν, μηδ᾽ ὅτι βέλτιον, ἀλλ᾽ ὥσπερ ὕει ὁ Ζεύς, οὐχ ὅπως τὸν σῖτον αὐξήσῃ, ἀλλ᾽ ἐξ ἀνάγκης,* etc. What hinders but that nature might act without any respect to ends or good and better, as Jupiter, or the heaven, raineth not intentionally to make the corn grow, but from necessity? because the vapors being raised up into the middle region, and there refrigerated and condensed, must needs descend down again in the form of water. But this happens by mere chance, and without any intention, that the grain is made to grow thereby; as the contrary sometimes happens by the excess of it.

But to this we reply, that though a thing, that happens accidentally to be so or so made, may afterward, notwithstanding, prove often serviceable for some use or other: yet, when any thing consisteth of many parts, that are all artificially proportioned together, and with much curiosity accommodated one to another, any one of which parts having been wanting, or otherwise in the least placed and disposed of, would have rendered the whole altogether inept for such a use; then may we well conclude it not to have been made by chance, but by counsel and design, intentionally, for such uses. As, for example, the eye, whose structure and fabric consisting of many parts (humors and membranes), is so artificially composed, no reasonable person, who considers the whole anatomy thereof, and the curiosity of its structure, can think otherwise of it, but that it was made out of design for the use of seeing; and did not happen accidentally to be so made, and then the use of seeing follow; as the Epicurean poet would fain persuade us,

[1] Phys. lib. ii. cap. viii. (p. 475. tom. i. oper.)

[1] Lumina ne facias oculorum clara creata,
Prospicere ut possimus.

You are by all means to take heed of entertaining that so dangerous opinion (to Atheism), that eyes were made for the sake of seeing, and ears for the sake of hearing.—But for a man to think, that not only eyes happened to be so made, and the use of seeing unintended followed; but also, that in all the same animals, ears happened to be so made too, and the use of hearing followed them; and a mouth and tongue happened to be so made likewise, and the use of eating, and (in men) of speaking, was also accidentally consequent thereupon; and feet were in the same animals made by chance too, and the use of walking followed; and hands made in them by chance also, upon which so many necessary uses depend; besides innumerable other parts of the body, both similar and organical, none of which could have been wanting, without rendering the whole inept or useless: I say, to think, that all these things should happen by chance to be thus made in every one and the same animal, and not designed by mind or counsel, that they might jointly concur and contribute to the good of the whole; this argues the greatest insensibility of mind imaginable. But this absurd and ridiculous conceit hath been long since so industriously confuted, and the folly thereof manifested by that learned Pagan philosopher and physician, Galen, in his book of the Use of Parts, that it would be altogether superfluous to insist any more upon it.[2]

Wherefore, that the former teeth are made thin and sharp, and the jaw-teeth thick and broad, by chance only, and not for use, was one of the Democritic dotages; as also, that nothing in the clouds and meteors was intended for the good of this habitable earth, within whose atmosphere they are contained, but all proceeded from material and mechanical necessity. Which conceit, though Cartesius seem to have written his whole book of Meteors in favor of, he beginning it with the derision of those, who "seat God in the clouds, and imagine his hands to be employed in opening and shutting the cloisters of the winds, in sprinkling the flowers with dews, and thunder-striking the tops of mountains;" and closing his discourse with this boast, that he had now made it manifest, that there was no need to fly to miracles (that is, to bring in a God upon the stage) to solve those phenomena; yet were it easy enough to demonstrate the defectiveness of those his mechanical undertakings in sundry particulars, and to evince that all

[1] Page 367. Lamb. (lib. iv. ver. 823.)

[2] Vide Lactant. de Opificio Dei, cap. vi. p. 1003.

those things could not be carried on with such constant regularity, by mere fortuitous mechanism, without any superior principle to guide and steer them. Nevertheless, we acknowledge, that God and nature do things every where, in the most frugal and compendious way, and with the least operoseness; and therefore that the mechanical powers are not rejected, but taken in, so far as they could comply serviceably with the intellectual model and platform; but still so, as that all is supervised by one understanding and intending Cause, and nothing passes without his approbation, who, when either those mechanic powers fall short, or the stubborn necessity of matter proves uncompliant, does overrule the same, and supply the defects thereof, by that which is vital; and that without setting his own hands immediately to every work too, there being a subservient minister under him, an artificial nature, which, as an Archeus of the whole world, governs the fluctuating mechanism thereof, and does all things faithfully, for ends and purposes, intended by its director.

But our atomic Atheists still further allege, that though it might well seem strange, that matter fortuitously moved, should at the very first jump, fall into such a regular frame as this is, having so many aptitudes for uses, so many correspondences between several things, and such an agreeing harmony in the whole; yet ought it not to seem a jot strange, if atoms, by motion, making all possible combinations and contextures, and trying all manner of conclusions and experiments, should, after innumerable other freaks, and discongruous forms produced, in length of time fall into such a system as this is. Wherefore they affirm, that this earth of ours, at first, brought forth divers monstrous and irregular shapes of animals;

> [1] Orba pedum partim, manuum viduata vicissim;
> Multa sine ore etiam, sine voltu cæca reperta.

Some without feet, some without hands, some with a mouth and face, some wanting fit muscles and nerves for the motion of their members. —And the old philosophic Atheists were so frank and lavish herein, that they stuck not to affirm, amongst those monstrous shapes of animals, there were once produced centaurs and scyllas, and chimæras; *βουγενῆ καὶ ἀνδρόπρωρα*, mixedly boviform and homimiform—biform and triform animals. But Epicurus, a little ashamed of this, as that which must needs look oddly and ridiculously, and seeming more cautious and castiga e, pretends to correct the extravagancy of this fancy;

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[1] Lucret. lib. v. p. 476. Lamb. (ver. 838.)

[1] Sed neque centauri fuerunt, neque tempore in ullo
Esse queat duplici natura, et corpore bino,
Ex alienigenis membris compacta potestas.

Nevertheless, there were not then any centaurs, nor biform and triform animals;—he adding, that they, who feigned such things as these, might as well fancy rivers flowing with golden streams, and trees germinating sparkling diamonds and such vastly gigantean men, as could stride over seas, and take up mountains in their clutches, and turn the heavens about with the strength of their arms. Against all which, notwithstanding, he gravely gives such a reason, as plainly overthrows his own principles;

[2] Res sic quæque suo ritu procedit, et omnes
Fœdere naturæ certo discrimina servant.

Because things, by a certain covenant of nature, always keep up their specific differences, without being confounded together.—For what covenant of nature can there be in infinite chance? or what law can there be set to the absolutely fortuitous motions of atoms, to circumscribe them by? Wherefore it must be acknowledged, that, according to the genuine hypothesis of the atomic Atheism, all imaginable forms of inanimate bodies, plants, and animals, as centaurs, scyllas and chimæras, are producible by the fortuitous motions of matter, there being nothing to hinder it, whilst it doth

[3] Omnimodis coire, atque omnia pertentare,
Quæcunque inter se possint congressa creare;

put itself into all kind of combinations, play all manner of freaks, and try all possible conclusions and experiments.

But they pretend, that these monstrous irregular shapes of animals were not therefore now to be found, because by reason of their inept fabric, they could not propagate their kind by generation, as neither indeed preserve their own individuals. Thus does Lucretius declare the sense of Epicurus;

[4] ———Quoniam natura absterruit auctum,
Nec potuere cupitum ætatis tangere florem,
Nec reperire cibum, nec jungi per veneris res.

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[1] Lucret. lib. v. p. 479. (ver. 876.) [2] Page 480. (ver. 920.)
[3] Lucret. lib. v. ver. 191. [4] Lamb. p. 476. (lib. v. ver. 844.)

And that this atheistic doctrine was older than Epicurus, appeareth from these words of Aristotle;[1] *ὅπου μὲν οὖν ἅπαντα συνέβη, ταῦτα μὲν ἐσώθη ἀπὸ τοῦ αὐτομάτου συστάντα ἐπιτηδείως· ὅσα δὲ μὴ οὕτως, ἀπώλετο, καθάπερ Ἐμπεδοκλῆς λέγει τὰ βουγενῆ καὶ ἀνδρόπρωρα·* When animals happened at first to be made, in all manner of forms, those of them only were preserved, and continued to the present time, which chanced to be fitly made (for generation), but all the others perished, as Empedocles affirmeth of the partly ox and partly man animals.—Moreover, the ancient both Anaximandrian and Democritic Atheists concluded, that, besides this one world of ours, there were other infinite worlds (they conceiving it as absurd to think, there should be but one only world in infinite space, as that, in a vast ploughed and sowed field, there should grow up only one ear of corn, and no more); and they would have us believe, that amongst these infinite worlds (all of them fortuitously made) there is not one of a thousand, or, perhaps, of ten thousand, that hath such regularity, concinnity, and harmony in it, as this world that we chanced to emerge in. Now it cannot be thought strange (as they suppose), if, amongst infinite worlds, one or two should chance to fall into some regularity. They would also confidently assure us, that the present system of things, in this world of ours, shall not long continue such as it is, but after a while fall into confusion and disorder again;

> [2] ———Mundi naturam totius ætas
> Mutat, et ex alio terram status excipit alter,
> Quod potuit nequeat, possit quod non tulit ante:

The wheel same of fortune, which, moving upward, hath brought into view this scene of things that now is, turning round, will, some time or other, carry it all away again, introducing a new one in its stead:—and then shall we have Centaurs, and Scyllas, and Chimæras again, all manner of inept forms of animals, as before.

But because men may yet be puzzled with the universality and constancy of this regularity, and its long continuance through so many ages, that there are no records at all of the contrary any where to be found; the atomic Atheist further adds, that the senseless atoms, playing and toying up and down, without any care or thought, and from eternity trying all manner of tricks, conclusions, and experiments, were at length (they know not how) taught, and by the necessity of things

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[1] Nat. Ausc. lib. ii. cap. viii. (p. 475. tom. i. oper.)

[2] Lucret. lib. v. ver. 832.

themselves, as it were, driven, to a certain kind of trade of artificialness and methodicalness; so that though their motions were at first all casual and fortuitous, yet in the length of time they became orderly and artificial, and governed by a certain law, they contracting as it were upon themselves, by long practice and experience, a kind of habit of moving regularly; or else being, by the mere necessity of things, at length forced so to move, as they should have done, had art and wisdom directed them. Thus Epicurus[1] in his epistle to Herodotus,[2] *ἀλλὰ μὴν ὑποληπτέον καὶ τὴν φύσιν πολλὰ καὶ παντοῖα ὑπὸ τῶν αὐτῶν τῶν πραγμάτων διδαχθῆναί τε καὶ ἀναγκασθῆναι·* It must be held, that nature is both taught and necessitated by the things themselves:—or else, as Gassendus interprets the words, "quadam veluti naturali necessariaque doctrina sensim imbuta;"—by little and little embued with a certain kind of natural and necessary doctrine.

To which atheistic pretences we shall briefly reply, first, That it is but an idle dream, or rather impudent forgery, of these Atheists, that heretofore there were in this world of ours all manner of monstrous and irregular shapes of animals produced, Centaurs, Scyllas, and Chimæras, etc. and indeed at first none but such; there being not the least footstep of any such thing appearing in all the monuments of antiquity, and traditions of former times: and these Atheists being not able to give any manner of reason, why there should not be such produced as well at this present time, however the individuals themselves could not continue long, or propagate by generation; or at least why it should not happen, that, in some ages or countries, there were either all Androgyna, of both sexes, or else no animal but of one sex, male or female only; or, lastly, none of any sex at all. Neither is there any more reason to give credit to these Atheists, when (though enemies to divination) they would prophesy concerning future times, that in this world of ours, all shall some time fall into confusion and nonsense again. And, as their infinity of worlds is an absolute impossibility, so, to their bold and confident assertion concerning those supposed other worlds, as if they had travelled over them all, that, amongst ten thousand of them, there is hardly one, that hath so much regularity in it as this world of ours, it might be replied with equal confidence, and much more probability of reason, that were every planet about this sun of ours a habitable earth, and every fixed star a sun, having likewise its several other planets or habitable earths moving round about it, and not any one of these desert or uninhabited, but all peopled with animals; we say, were this so ex-

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[1] Apud Diog. Laert. lib. x. segm. 75. p. 633. [2] Page 28. Gass.

travagant supposition true, that there would not be found any one ridiculous or inept system amongst them all, but that the Divine art and wisdom (which being infinite, can never be defective nor any where idle) would exercise its dominion upon all, and every where impress the sculptures and signatures of itself.

In the next place we affirm, That the fortuitous motions of senseless atoms, trying never so many experiments and conclusions, and making never so many combinations and aggregate forms of things, could never be able to produce so much as the form or system of one complete animal, with all the organic parts thereof so artificially disposed (each of these being as it were a little world), much less the system of this great world, with that variety of animals in it; but least of all could it constantly continue such regularity and artificialness every where: for, that the fortuitous motions of irrational, senseless, and stupid matter should in length of time grow artificial, and contract a habit, of acting as regularly and methodically as if perfect art or wisdom had directed them, this is the most prodigious nonsense imaginable, and can be accounted no other than atheistic fanaticism.

It is no more possible, that the fortuitous motion of dead and senseless matter should ever from itself be taught and necessitated to produce such an orderly and regular system as the frame of this whole world is, together with the bodies of animals, and constantly to continue the same, than that a man perfectly illiterate, and neither able to write nor read, taking up a pen into his hand, and making all manner of scrawls, with ink upon paper, should at length be taught and necessitated, by the thing itself, to write a whole quire of paper together, with such characters, as being decyphered by a certain key, would all prove coherent philosophic sense: or than that we ourselves writing down the mere letters of the alphabet, transposedly, any how, as it happens, without the least thought, either of words or sense, after our scribbling a long time together what was altogether insignificant, should at length have been taught and necessitated by the thing itself, without the least study and consideration of our own, to write this whole volume. Or, to use another instance, this is no more possible, than that ten or a dozen persons, altogether unskilled in music, having several instruments given them, and striking the strings or keys thereof, any how, as it happened, should, after some time of discord and jarring, at length be taught and necessitated to fall into most exquisite harmony, and continue the same uninterruptedly for several hours together.

Wherefore, if it be ridiculous for one, that hath read over the works of Plato or Aristotle, or those six books of T. Lucretius Carus, De Na-

tura Rerum, to contend, that possibly the letters of those books might be all put together by chance, or scribbled at random, without the least thought or study of the writer, he having also no manner of philosophic skill in him; or for one, that hears ten or a dozen persons playing in concert upon instruments of music, and making ravishing harmony, to persuade himself, that none of those players had, for all that, the least musical art or skill in them, but struck the strings as it happened; it must needs be much more ridiculous and absurd, to suppose this artificial system of the whole world to have resulted from the fortuitous motion of senseless atoms, without the direction of any art or wisdom, there being much more of sense, art, and philosophy therein, than in any philosophic volume or poem ever written by men; and more of harmony and proportion, than in any composition of vocal music. We conclude therefore with Aristotle,[1] ἀδύνατον δὲ ταῦτα τοῦτον ἔχειν τὸν τρόπον· that it is absolutely impossible things should have come to pass after this manner;—that is, by mere fortune and chance, and without the direction of any Mind or God. The Divine Mind and Wisdom hath so printed its seal or signature upon the matter of the whole corporeal world, as that fortune or chance could never possibly have counterfeited the same.

Notwithstanding all which, the ancient Atheists would undertake, by their wonderful skill in logic, to demonstrate, that the frame of nature could not possibly be made by any intending cause, and for the sake of ends and uses; as, for example, that eyes could not be first of all made intentionally for the use of seeing, nor ears intentionally for the use of hearing, and so for the rest; because, forsooth, these things were all of them, in order of time and nature, before their several uses. The argument is seriously propounded by Lucretius, after this manner:—

> [2] Nec fuit ante, videre, oculorum lumina nata,
> Nec dictis orare, prius quam lingua creata est;
> Sed potius longe linguæ præcessit origo
> Sermonem, multoque creatæ sunt prius aures,
> Quam sonus est auditus; et omnia denique membra
> Ante fuere, ut opinor, eorum quam fuit usus.
> Haud igitur potuere utendi crescere causa.

To this sense: There was no such thing as seeing before eyes were

[1] Nat. Ausc. lib. ii. cap. viii. (p. 475. tom. i. oper.)
[2] Lamb. p. 367. (lib. iv. ver. 834.)

made, nor hearing before ears, nor speaking before the tongue. But the original of the tongue much preceded speech: so likewise eyes and ears were made before there was any seeing of colors or hearing of sounds. In like manner, all the other members of the body were produced before their respective uses. And therefore they could not be made intentionally, for the sake of those uses.—The force of which argument consisteth in this proposition: That whatsoever is made for the sake of another thing, must exist in time after that other thing, for whose sake it was made: or, That, for which any thing is made, must not only be, in order of nature, but also of time, before that which is made for it.—And this that Epicurean poet endeavors to prove by sundry instances;

> [1] At contra conferre manu certamina pugnæ,
> Ante fuit multo quam lucida tela volarent, etc.

Darts were made for the sake of fighting, but fighting was before darts, or else they had never been invented. Bucklers were excogitated and devised, for the keeping off of blows and strokes, but the declining of strokes was before bucklers. So were beds contrived for the sake of resting and sleeping, but resting and sleeping were older than beds, and gave occasion for the invention of them. Cups were intended and designed for the sake of drinking, which they would not have been, had there not been drinking before.—According to the force of which instances, the poet would infer, that whosoever affirms eyes to have been made for the sake of seeing, must suppose, in like manner, there was some kind of seeing or other before eyes. But since there was no seeing at all before eyes, therefore could not eyes be made for the sake of seeing. And this is the Atheistic demonstration, that the parts of men's bodies, and other things of nature, could not be made by any intending cause, for the sake of ends and uses.

But it is evident, that this logic of Atheists differs from that of all other mortals, according to which, the end, or that for which any thing is made, is only in intention before the means, or that which is made, for it, but in time and execution after it. And thus was the more effectual way of fighting and doing execution, for whose sake darts were invented, in time after darts, and only in intention before them. It is true, indeed, that fighting in general was before darts, sleeping before beds, and drinking before cups; and thereby did they give occasion for men to think of means for the more effectual fighting, and more commodi-

[1] Lamb. p. 367. (lib. iv. ver. 834.)

ous sleeping and drinking; men being commonly excited from the experience of things, and the sense of their needs and wants, to excogitate and provide fit means and remedies. But it doth not therefore follow, that the Maker of the world could not have at once beforehand a preventive knowledge of whatsoever would be useful and for the good of animals, and so make them intentionally for those uses. Wherefore the argument should have been framed thus; Whatsoever any thing is made for, as the end, that must needs be, in the knowledge and intention of the maker, before the existence of that which is made for it. And, therefore, if eyes were made for the sake or end of seeing, seeing must of necessity be in the knowledge and intention of the maker of eyes, before there were any eyes actually existing. But there could be no knowledge of seeing before there were any eyes. Wherefore eyes could not be made for the sake of seeing.

And this indeed is the genuine scope and drift of the premised atheistic argument, however it were disguised by them in their manner of propounding it. The reason whereof was, because they took it for granted, that all knowledge, as such, is derived by sense from the things themselves known pre-existing. From whence it follows, that there could be no knowledge of vision or seeing, before there was actual seeing and eyes; and so they think it to be demonstrated, that eyes could not be made by any Deity for the sake of seeing before there was seeing; no more than spectacles by men for the sake of eyes, before there were eyes. Thus does the Epicurean poet[1] conclude triumphantly;

> Illa quidem seorsum sunt omnia, quæ prius ipsa
> Nata, dedere suæ post notitiam utilitatis.
> Quo genere imprimis sensus et membra videmus.
> Quare etiam atque etiam procul est, ut credere possis,
> Utilitatis ob officium potuisse creari.

That is, The members of men's bodies, and organs of sense, were first made by themselves, and then did they afterward give the notice or knowledge of their several utilities; none of which could have been had before. Wherefore we affirm again and again, that it is impossible these things should have been made designedly for their uses.

So that the controversy is at last resolved wholly into this; Whether or no, all knowledge and understanding, as such, universally does arise from things antecedently existing without the knower? Which

[1] (Lib. iii. p. 368. lib. iv. ver. 851.)

being asserted by Atheists, they conclude from thence, that the things of the world could not be made by the previous counsel, contrivance, and intention of any understanding Deity, but that they all blundered out themselves, one after another, according to the train or sequel of the fortuitous motions of matter; and that from thence knowledge and understanding, counsel and intention, sprung up afterward, as junior to things, and the world. But this being already made the eleventh atheistic argument against a Deity, viz. That all knowledge and mental conception is the information of the things themselves known, existing before and without the knower, and a passion from them; and therefore that the world must needs be before any knowledge or conception of it, and no knowledge or conception before the world, as its cause—we shall refer the answer to it, and confutation of it, to its proper place; where we shall plainly demonstrate, that knowledge or understanding is not, in its own nature, ectypal, but archetypal; and that it is older than the world and the Maker of all things.

But the Atheists yet further urge, against the proving of a God from the τὸ εὖ καὶ καλῶς, the regular frame of the whole world in general, and the artificial structure of the bodies of animals, after this manner; That it is altogether unreasonable to suppose, there should be no cause in nature for the phenomena thereof, especially for those things, which are daily generated, as the bodies of animals; but (as by the tragic poets) a god should be introduced, as it were from a machine, forcibly to solve them. And, indeed, though there were a god, yet they think he ought not to be detruded to such mean offices as this, viz. to make the body of every the most contemptible animal, as it were with his own hands miraculously; nor ought nature or the world to be supposed so imperfect, as if it must be bungled and botched up every where after this manner. It is nature, therefore, which is the cause of these natural productions and generations. Which nature, that it doth not intend nor act designedly for ends and uses, appears not only from hence, because it never consults or deliberates (which Aristotle[1] intimates to have been the reason, why some of old denied the things of nature to have been made for ends), but also because it hath no animal sense or consciousness, no understanding or appetite. Wherefore this opinion of intending, and final causality in nature, can be accounted no other than an *idolum specus* (as some[2] affect to phrase it), or a prejudice of men's minds, when they apply their own properties to things without

[1] Vide de Nat. Auscultat. lib. ii. cap. viii. p. 477. tom. i. oper.

[2] Lord Bacon in his Novum Organum, p. ii. § 53. p. 47.

them, and think, because themselves intend and act for ends, that therefore nature doth the like. And they might as well say, that nature laughs and cries, speaks and walks, syllogizes and philosophizes, because themselves do so. But, as a modern philosopher concludeth, "The universe, as one aggregate of things natural, hath no intention belonging to it." And, accordingly, were all final causes rightly banished by Democritus out of physiology, as Aristotle[1] recordeth of him, τὸ οὗ ἕνεκα ἀφεὶς λέγειν, πάντα ἀνάγει οἷς χρῆται ἡ φύσις· That he reduced all things to natural and necessary causes, altogether rejecting final.

To all which we briefly reply: That there are indeed two extremes here to be avoided; the one, of those, who derive all things from the fortuitous motions of senseless matter, which is the extreme of the atomic Atheists; the other, of bigotical religionists, who will needs have God αὐτουργεῖν ἅπαντα, to do all things himself immediately—as if all in nature were miracle. But there is a middle betwixt both these extremes; namely, to suppose, that besides God, and in subordination to him, there is a nature (not fortuitous, but) artificial and methodical, which governing the motion of matter, and bringing it into regularity, is a secondary or inferior cause of generations. Now, this *natura artificiosa*, this artificial nature, though itself indeed do not understand the reason of what it doth, nor properly intend the ends thereof, yet may it well be conceived to act regularly for the sake of ends understood and intended by that perfect Mind, upon which it depends. As the manuary opificers understand not the designs of the architect, but only drudgingly perform their several tasks imposed by him; and as types or forms of letters composed together, print coherent philosophic sense, which themselves understand nothing of. (Upon which artificial or spermatic nature, we have largely insisted before, in the Appendix to the third chapter.) And thus, neither are all things performed immediately and miraculously by God himself; neither are they all done fortuitously and temerariously, but regularly and methodically, for the sake of ends, though not understood by nature itself, but that higher Mind, which is the cause of it, and doth, as it were, continually inspire it. Some, indeed, have unskilfully attributed their own properties, or animal idiopathies to inanimate bodies; as when they say, that matter desires forms, as the female doth the male; and that heavy bodies descend down by appetite towards the centre, that so they may rest therein; and that they sometimes again ascend in discretion, to avoid a

[1] De Generat. Animal. lib. v. cap. viii. p. 713. tom. ii. oper.

vacuum. Of which fanciful extravagancies, if the Advancer of Learning be understood, there is nothing to be reprehended in this following passage of his; "Incredibile est quantum agmen idolorum philosophiæ immiserit naturalium operationum ad similitudinum actionum humanarum reductio:" It is incredible, how many errors have been transfused into philosophy, from this one delusion, of reducing natural actions to the mode of human; or of thinking, that nature acteth as a man doth.—But if that of his be extended further, to take away all final causes from the things of nature, as if nothing were done therein for ends intended by a higher mind, then is it the very spirit of Atheism and infidelity. It is no idol of the cave or den (to use that affected language), that is, no prejudice or fallacy imposed upon ourselves, from the attributing our own animalish properties to things without us, to think, that the frame and system of this whole world was contrived by a perfect understanding Being or Mind (now also presiding over the same), which hath every where printed the signatures of its own wisdom upon the matter. As also, that though nature itself do not properly intend, yet it acteth according to an intellectual platform prescribed to it, as being the manuary opificer of the Divine architectonic art, or this art itself as it were transfused into the matter, and embodied in it. Thus Cicero's[1] Balbus long since declared concerning it, that it was not "vis quædam sine ratione, ciens motus in corporibus necessarios; sed vis particeps ordinis, tanquam via progrediens, cujus solertiam nulla ars, nemo artifex consequi potest imitando:" Not a force unguided by reason, exciting necessary motions in bodies temerariously: but such a force, as partakes of order, and proceeds as it were methodically; whose cunning or ingeniosity no art or human opificer can possibly reach to by imitation.—For it is altogether unconceivable, how we ourselves should have mind and intention in us, were there none in the universe, or in that highest principle, from whence all proceeds. Moreover, it was truly affirmed by Aristotle,[2] that there is much more of art in some of the things of nature, than there is any thing artificially made by men; and therefore intention, or final and mental causality, can no more be secluded from the consideration of natural, than it can from that of artificial things. Now it is plain, that things artificial, as a house or clock, can neither be understood, nor any true cause of them assigned, without design or intention for ends and good. For to say, that a house is stones, timber, mortar, iron, glass, lead, etc. all put together,

[1] De Natur. Deor. lib. ii. cap. xxxii. p. 3001. tom. ix. oper.

[2] Vide Natur. Auscult. lib. ii. cap. x. p. 476. tom. i. oper.

is not to give a definition thereof, or to tell what indeed it is, it being such an apt disposition of all these materials, as may make up the whole fit for habitation, and the uses of men. Wherefore this is not sufficiently to assign the cause of a house neither, to declare out of what quarry the stones were dug, nor in what woods or forests the timber was felled, and the like: nor, as Aristotle[1] addeth, *εἴτις τὸν τοῖχον γεγενῆσθαι ἐξ ἀνάγκης νομίζοι, ὅτι τὰ μὲν βαρέα κάτω πέφυκε φέρεσθαι, τὰ δὲ κοῦφα ἐπιπολῆς· διὸ οἱ λίθοι μὲν κάτω καὶ θεμέλια, ἡ δὲ γῆ ἄνω διὰ τὴν κουφότητα, ἐπιπολῆς δὲ μάλιστα τὰ ξύλα· κουφότατα γάρ·* If any one should go about thus to give an account of a house from material necessity (as the atheistic philosophers then did of the world and the bodies of animals), that the heavier things being carried downward of their own accord, and the lighter upward; therefore the stones and foundation lay at the bottom, and the earth for the walls being lighter, was higher; and the timber, being yet lighter, higher than that; but above all the straw, or thatch, it being the lightest of all.—Nor, lastly, if, as the same Aristotle elsewhere[2] also suggesteth, one should further pretend, that a house was therefore made such, *ἐμπεσόντος τοῦ ὀργάνου,* etc. merely because the hands of the laborers, and the axes, and hammers, and trowels, and other instruments, chanced all to be moved so and so; we say, that none of all these would be to assign the true cause of a house, without declaring, that the architect first framed in his mind a model or platform of such a thing to be made out of those materials, so aptly disposed into a foundation, walls, roof, doors, rooms, stairs, chimneys, windows, etc. as might render the whole fit for habitation, and other human uses. And no more certainly can the things of nature (in whose very essence final causality is as much included) be either rightly understood, or the causes of them assigned, merely from matter and mechanism, or the necessary and unguided motion thereof, without design or intention for ends and good. Wherefore to say,[3] that the bodies of animals become such, merely because the fluid seed, by motion, happened to make such traces, and beget such stamina and lineaments, as out of which that compages of the whole resulted; is not to assign a cause of them, but to dissemble, smother, and conceal their true efficient cause, which is the wisdom and contrivance of that Divine Architect and Geometer, making them every way fit for the

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[1] Nat. Ausc. lib. ii. cap. ix. (p. 478. tom. i. oper.)

[2] De Partib. Animal. lib. i. cap. i. p. 473. tom. ii. oper.

[3] This seems to be levelled against Des Cartes' book De formatione Fœtus.

inhabitation and uses of their respective souls. Neither indeed can we banish all final, that is, all mental causality, from philosophy or the consideration of nature, without banishing at the same time reason and understanding from ourselves, and looking upon the things of nature with no other eyes than brutes do. However, none of the ancient Atheists would ever undertake to assign necessary causes for all the parts of the bodies of animals, and their efformation, from mere matter, motion, and mechanism; those small and pitiful attempts in order thereunto, that have been made by some of them in a few instances (as that the *spina dorsi*[1] came from the flexure of the bodies of animals, when they first sprung out of the earth, the intestines from the flux of humors excavating a crooked and winding channel for itself, and that the nostrils were broken open by the eruption of breath); these, I say, only shewing the unfeasableness and impossibility thereof. And therefore Democritus was so wise, as never to pretend to give an account in this way of the formation of the fœtus, he looking upon it as a thing absolutely desperate; nor would he venture to say any more concerning it (as Aristotle[2] informeth us) than *ὅτι οὕτως ἀεὶ ἐξ ἀνάγκης γίνεται*, that it always cometh so to pass of necessity—but stopped all further inquiry concerning it in this manner, *τὸ ἐρωτᾷν τὸ διὰ τί, περὶ τῶν τοιούτων τινὸς, τὸ ζητεῖν εἶναι τοῦ ἀπείρου ἀρχὴν*, that to demand, about any of these things, for what cause it was thus, was to demand a beginning of infinite.—As if all the motions from eternity had an influence upon, and contribution to, whatsoever corporeal thing was now produced. And Lucretius, notwithstanding all his swaggering and boasting, that he and Epicurus were able to assign natural and necessary causes for every thing without a God, hath no where so much as one word concerning it. We conclude therefore that Aristotle's judgment concerning final causes in philosophy is much to be preferred before that of Democritus,[3] *καὶ ἄμφω μὲν τῷ φυσικῷ λεκτέαι αἱ αἰτίαι, μᾶλλον δὲ, ᾗ τινὸς ἕνεκα· αἴτιον γὰρ τοῦτο τῆς ὕλης, ἀλλ᾽ οὐχ αὕτη τοῦ τέλους*, that both kinds of causes (material and final) ought to be declared by a physiologer, but especially the final: the end being the cause of the matter, but the matter not the cause of the end.—And thus do we see plainly, that the atomic Atheists are utterly ignorant of the cause *τοῦ εὖ καὶ καλῶς*, of the regular and artificial frame of the things in nature,—and consequently the whole mundane system, the true knowledge whereof necessarily leadeth to a God.

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[1] Vide Aristot. de Partib. Animal. lib. i. cap. i. p. 471, 472.

[2] De Generat. Animal. lib. ii. cap. vi. p. 629. tom. ii. oper.

[3] Nat. Ausc. lib. ii. cap. ix. (p. 478. tom. i. oper.)

But it is prodigiously strange, that these Atheists should, in this their ignorance and sottishness, be justified by any professed Theists and Christians of later times, who atomizing in their physiology also, would feign persuade us in like manner, that this whole mundane system, together with plants and animals, was derived merely from the necessary and unguided motion of the small particles of matter, at first turned round in a vortex, or else jumbled altogether in a chaos, without any intention for ends and good, that is, without the direction of any mind; God in the meantime standing by, only as an idle spectator of this *lusus atomorum*, this sportful dance of atoms—and of the various results thereof. Nay, these mechanic Theists have here quite outstripped and outdone the atomic Atheists themselves, they being much more immodest and extravagant than ever these were; for the professed Atheists durst never venture to affirm, that this regular system of things resulted from the fortuitous motions of atoms at the very first, before they had for a long time together produced many other inept combinations or aggregate forms of particular things, and nonsensical systems of the whole. And they supposed also, that the regularity of things here in this world would not always continue such neither, but that some time or other confusion and disorder would break in again. Moreover, that, besides this world of ours, there are at this very instant innumerable other worlds irregular, and that there is but one of a thousand, or ten thousand, amongst the infinite worlds, that have such regularity in them. The reason of all which is, because it was generally taken for granted, and looked upon as a common notion, that *τῶν ἀπὸ τύχης καὶ τοῦ αὐτομάτου, οἰθὲν ἀεὶ οὕτω γίνεται*, as Aristotle expresseth it,[1] that none of those things, which are from fortune or chance, come to pass constantly and always alike.—But our mechanic or atomic Theists will have their atoms never so much as once to have fumbled in these their fortuitous motions, nor to have produced any inept system, or incongruous forms at all; but from the very first all along, to have taken up their places, and have ranged themselves so orderly, methodically and discreetly, as that they could not possibly have done it better, had they been directed by the most perfect wisdom. Wherefore these atomic Theists utterly evacuate the grand argument for a God, taken from the phenomenon of the artificial frame of things, which hath been so much insisted on in all ages, and which commonly makes the strongest impression of any other upon the minds of men, they leaving only certain metaphysical arguments for a Deity; which, though never so good, yet

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[1] Natur. Auscult. lib. ii. cap. iv. p. 469. tom. i. oper.

by reason of their subtilty, can do but little execution upon the minds of the generality, and even amongst the learned do sometimes beget more of doubtful disputation and scepticism, than of clear conviction and satisfaction; the Atheists in the mean time laughing in their sleeves and not a little triumphing, to see the cause of Theism thus betrayed by its professed friends and assertors, and the grand argument for the same totally slurred by them; and so their work done, as it were, to their hands, for them.

Now, as this argues the greatest insensibility of mind, or sottishness and stupidity in pretended Theists, not to take the least notice of the regular and artificial frame of things, or of the signatures of the Divine art and wisdom in them, nor to look upon the world, and things of nature, with any other eyes than oxen and horses do; so are there many phenomena in nature, which being partly above the force of these mechanic powers, and partly contrary to the same, can therefore never be solved by them, nor without final causes, and some vital principle. As for example, that of gravity, or the tendency of bodies downward, the motion of the diaphragma in respiration, the systole and diastole of the heart, which was before declared to be a muscular constriction and relaxation, and therefore not mechanical but vital. We might also add, amongst many others, the intersection of the plains of the equator and ecliptic, or the earth's diurnal motion, upon an axis not parallel with that of the ecliptic, nor perpendicular to the plain thereof. For though Cartesius[1] would needs imagine this earth of ours once to have been a sun, and so itself the centre of a lesser vortex, whose axis was then directed after this manner, and which therefore still kept the same site or posture, by reason of the striate particles, finding no fit pores or traces for their passage through it, but only in this direction; yet does he himself confess, that because these two motions of the earth, the annual and diurnal, would be much more conveniently made upon parallel axes, therefore, according to the laws of mechanism, they should perpetually be brought nearer and nearer together, till at length the equator and the ecliptic come to have their axes parallel to one another, which, as it hath not yet come to pass, so neither hath there been, for the last two thousand years (according to the best observations and judgments of astronomers), any nearer approach made of them to one another. Wherefore the continuation of these two motions of the earth, the annual and diurnal, upon axes different or not parallel, is resolvable into nothing, but a final and mental cause, or the τὸ βέλτιστον,

[1] Vide Principia ejus Philosoph. part iii. § 155. p. 136. et part iv. § 2. p. 137.

because it was best it should be so, the variety of the seasons of the year depending hereupon. But the greatest of all the particular phenomena is the organization and formation of the bodies of animals, consisting of such variety and curiosity, which these mechanic philosophers being no way able to give an account of from the necessary motion of matter, unguided by mind for ends, prudently therefore break off their system there, when they should come to animals, and so leave it altogether untouched. We acknowledge indeed, that there is a posthumous piece extant, imputed to Cartesius, and entitled, De la Formation du Fœtus, wherein there is some pretence made to solve all this by fortuitous mechanism. But as the theory thereof is wholly built upon a false supposition, sufficiently confuted by the learned Harvey, in his book of Generation, "that the seed doth materially enter into the composition of the egg;" so is it all along precarious and exceptionable; nor does it extend at all to the differences, that are in several animals, or offer the least reason, why an animal of one species or kind might not be formed out of the seed of another.

It is here indeed pretended by these mechanic Theists, that final causes therefore ought not to be of any regard to a philosopher, because we should not arrogate to ourselves to be as wise as God Almighty is, or to be privy to his secrets. Thus in the Metaphysical Meditations;[1] "Atque ob hanc unicam rationem totum illud causarum genus, quod a fine peti solet, in rebus physicis nullum usum habere existimo; non enim absque temeritate me puto, investigare posse fines Dei." And again likewise in the Principles of Philosophy:[2] "Nullas unquam rationes circa res naturales a fine, quem Deus aut natura in iis faciendis sibi proposuit, admittimus, quia not tantum nobis debemus arrogare, ut ejus consiliorum particepes esse possimus." But the question is not, whether we can always reach to the ends of God Almighty, and know what is absolutely best in every case, and accordingly make conclusions, that therefore the thing is, or ought to be so; but, whether any thing at all were made by God for ends and good, otherwise than would of itself have resulted from the fortuitous motion of matter. Nevertheless, we see no reason at all, why it should be thought presumption, or intrusion into the secrets of God Almighty, to affirm, that eyes were made by him for the end of seeing (and accordingly so contrived as might best conduce thereunto), and ears for the end of hearing, and the like. This being so plain, that nothing but sottish stupidity, or

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[1] Meditat. iv. p. 26. edit. Amstelod. 1685.

[2] Vide part i. § 28. p. 8. et part iii. § 2, 3. p. 50.

atheistic incredulity (masked perhaps under a hypocritical veil of humility), can make any doubt thereof. And therefore Aristotle[1] justly reprehended Anaxagoras for that absurd aphorism of his, *διὰ τὸ χεῖρας ἔχειν, φρονιμώτατον εἶναι τῶν ζώων τὸν ἄνθρωπον*, that man was therefore the wisest (or most solert) of all animals, because he chanced to have hands. He not doubting to affirm on the contrary, *εὔλογον διὰ τὸ φρονιμώτατον εἶναι τῶν ζώων χεῖρας ἔχειν· ἡ γὰρ φύσις ἀεὶ διανέμει καθάπερ ἄνθρωπος φρόνιμος, τῷ δυναμένῳ χρῆσθαι ἕκαστον· προσήκει γὰρ τῷ ὄντι αὐλητῇ δοῦναι μᾶλλον αὐλοὺς, ἢ τῷ αὐλοὺς ἔχοντι προσθεῖναι αὐλητικήν·* that it was far more reasonable to think, that because man was the wisest (or most solert and active) of all animals, therefore he had hands given him. For nature (saith he) distributeth, as a wise man doth, what is suitable to every one; and it is more proper to give pipes to one that hath musical skill, than upon him that pipes, to bestow musical skill.

Wherefore these mechanic Theists would further allege, and that with some more color of reason, that it is below the dignity of God Almighty to condescend to all those mean and trivial offices, and to do the things of nature himself immediately: as also, that it would be but a botch in nature, if the defects thereof were every where to be supplied by a miracle. But to this also the reply is easy, that though the Divine wisdom itself contrived the system of the whole world for ends and good, yet nature, as an inferior minister, immediately executes the same; I say, not a dead, fortuitous, and merely mechanical, but a vital, orderly, and artificial nature. Which nature, asserted by most of the ancient philosophers, who were Theists, is thus described by Proclus:[2] *ἡ φύσις ἐσχάτη μέν ἐστι τῶν τὸ σωματοειδὲς τοῦτο καὶ αἰσθητὸν δημιουργούντων αἰτίων, καὶ τὸ πέρας τοῦ τῶν ἀσωμάτων οὐσιῶν πλάτους· πλήρης δὲ λόγου καὶ δυνάμεων δι᾽ ὧν κατευθύνει τὰ ἐγκόσμια· τοιαύτη δὲ οὖσα προελήλυθεν ἀπὸ τῆς ζωογόνου θεᾶς,*

Νώτοις δ᾽ ἀμφὶ θεᾶς φύσις ἄπλετος αἰώρηται·

ἀφ᾽ ἧς πᾶσα ζωὴ πρόεισιν, ἥ τε νοερὰ καὶ ἡ ἀχώριστος τῶν διοικουμένων· ἐξηρτημένη δ᾽ ἐκεῖθεν καὶ ἀπηωρημένη, φοιτᾷ διὰ πάντα ἀκωλύτως, καὶ πάντα ἐμπνεῖ, δι᾽ ἣν τὰ ἀψύχωτα ψυχῆς μετέχει τινὸς, καὶ τὰ φθειρόμενα μένει διαιωνίως ἐν τῷ κόσμῳ, ταῖς ἐν αὐτῇ τῶν εἰδῶν αἰτίαις συνεχόμενα·[3]

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[1] De Partib. Animal. lib. iv. cap. x. p. 559. 560. tom. ii. oper.

[2] Steph. Poet. Philos.

[3] Comment. in Timæum Platon. lib. i. p. 4. edit. Græc.

Ἄρχει δ' αὖ φύσις ἀκαμάτη κόσμων τε καὶ ἔργων,

φησὶ τὸ λόγιον,

Οὐρανὸς ὄφρα θέῃ δρόμον ἀΐδιον κατασύρων·

Καὶ τὰ ἑξῆς· Nature is the last of all causes, that fabricate this corporeal and sensible world, and the utmost bound of incorporeal substances. Which, being full of reasons and power, orders and presides over all mundane affairs. It proceeding (according to the Magic Oracles) from that supreme goddess, the Divine wisdom, which is the fountain of all life, as well intellectual, as that which is concrete with matter. Which wisdom this nature always essentially depending upon, passes through all things unhinderably; by means whereof even inanimate things partake of a kind of life, and things corruptible remain eternal in their species, they being contained by its standing forms or ideas, as their causes. And thus does the oracle describe nature, as presiding over the whole corporeal world, and perpetually turning round the heavens.—Here have we a description of one universal, substantial life, soul, or spirit of nature, subordinate to the Deity: besides which the same Proclus elsewhere[1] supposeth other particular natures, or spermatic reasons, in those words of his: *Μετὰ τὴν ψυχὴν τὴν πρώτην, ψυχαί· καί μετὰ τὴν ὅλην φύσιν, φύσεις·* After the first soul, are there particular souls, and after the universal nature, particular natures. Where it may be observed, by the way, that this Proclus, though he were a superstitious Pagan, much addicted to the multiplying of gods (subordinate to one supreme) or bigotic Polytheist, who had a humor of deifying almost every thing, and therefore would have this nature, forsooth, to be called a goddess too; yet does he declare it not properly to be such, but abusively only (viz. because it was no intellectual thing), as he saith the bodies of the sun, moon, and stars, supposed to be animated, were called gods too, they being the statues of the gods. This is the meaning of those words: *Καὶ θεὸς μὲν τῷ ἐκθεοῦσθαι, καὶ οὐκ αὐτόθεν ἔχουσα τὸ εἶναι Θεός· καὶ γὰρ τὰ θεῖα σώματα, θεοὺς καλοῦμεν, ὡς ἀγάλματα τῶν θεῶν·* Nature is a god or goddess, not as having godship properly belonging to it, but as the Divine bodies are called gods, because they are statues of the gods.

Wherefore we cannot otherwise conclude concerning these our mechanic Theists, who will thus needs derive all corporeal things from a dead and stupid nature, or from the necessary motions of senseless mat-

[1] Comment. in Timæum Platon. lib. i. p. 118. edit. Græc.

ter, without the direction of any mind or intention for ends and good; but that they are indeed cousins-german to Atheists, or possessed, in a degree, with a kind of atheistic enthusiasm, or fanaticism, they being so far forth inspired with a spirit of infidelity, which is the spirit of Atheism.

But these mechanic Theists are again counterbalanced by another sort of Atheists, not mechanical nor fortuitous; namely, the Hylozoists, who are unquestionably convinced, that "opera naturæ sunt opera intelligentiæ," the works of nature are works of understanding; and that the original of these corporeal things was not dead and stupid matter fortuitously moved: upon which account Strato derided Democritus's rough and crooked atoms, as mere dreams and dotages. But these notwithstanding, because they would not admit of any other substance besides matter, suppose life and perception essentially to belong to all matter as such; whereby it hath a perfect knowledge of whatsoever itself could do or suffer (though without animal consciousness), and can form itself to the best advantage, sometimes improving itself by organization to sense in brutes, and to reason and reflexive understanding in men. Wherefore, according to the principles of these Hylozoists, there is not any need of a God at all; that is, of one perfect mind or understanding being presiding over the whole world; they concluding accordingly, the opinion of a God to be only a mistaking of the inadequate conception of matter in general, its life and energetic nature taken alone abstractly, for a complete substance by itself. Nevertheless these hylozoic Atheists are no way able, by this hypothesis of theirs neither, to solve that phenomenon of the regularity and harmony of the whole universe; because every part of matter being, according to them, a distinct percipient by itself, whose knowledge extendeth only to its own concernment; and there being no one thing presiding over all, the things of the whole world (ἐν ᾧ πάντα συντέτακται, in which all things are co-ordered together—) could never have fallen into one such agreeing and conspiring harmony.

And as for those other Cosmo-plastic Atheists, who suppose the whole world to be as it were but one huge plant, tree, or vegetable, or to have one spermatic, plastic, and artificial nature only, orderly and methodically disposing the whole, but without sense and understanding; these can no way do the business neither, that is, solve the fore-mentioned phenomenon, it being utterly impossible, that there should be any such artificial and regular nature, otherwise than as deriving from, and depending upon, a perfect mind or wisdom.

And thus do we see plainly, that no Atheists whatsoever can solve

the phenomena of nature, and this particularly of the regular frame and harmony of the universe; and that true philosophy, or the knowledge of causes, necessarily leadeth to a God.

But besides these phenomena of cogitation, or soul and mind in animals, local motion in bodies, and the artificial frame of things for ends and uses, together with the conspiring harmony of the whole, which can no way be solved without a Deity; we might here further add, that the fortuitous, that is, the Anaximandrian and Democritic Atheists, who universally asserted the novity of this mundane system, were not able to give any tolerable account neither of the first beginning of men, and those greater animals, that are no otherwise begotten, than in the way of generation, by the commixture of male and female.

Aristotle, in his book of the Generation of Animals,[1] writeth thus: *Περὶ τῆς τῶν ἀνθρώπων καὶ τετραπόδων γενέσεως, ὑπολάβοι τὶς ἂν, εἴπερ ἐγίγνοντό ποτε γηγενεῖς, ὥσπερ φασί τινες, δύο τρόπων γίνεσθαι τὸν ἕτερον· ἢ γὰρ ὡς σκώληκος συνισταμένου τὸ πρῶτον, ἢ ἐξ ὠῶν·* If men and four-footed animals were ever generated out of the earth, as some affirm, it may be probably conceived to have been one of these two ways, either that they were produced as worms, out of putrefaction, or else formed in certain eggs,—growing out of the earth. And then, after a while, he concludes again,[2] *εἴπερ ἦν τὶς ἀρχὴ τῆς γενέσεως πᾶσι τοῖς ζώοις, εὔλογον δυεῖν τούτων εἶναι τὴν ἑτέραν*, that if there were any beginning of the generation of all animals, it is reasonable to think it to have been one of these two forementioned ways. It is well known, that Aristotle, though a Theist, elsewhere affirmeth the world's eternity; according to which hypothesis of his, there was never any first male nor female in any kind of animals, but one begat another infinitely, without any beginning: a thing utterly repugnant to our human faculties, that are never able to frame any conception of such an infinity of number and time, and of a successive generation from eternity. But here Aristotle himself seems staggering, or sceptical, about it, "if men were ever generated out of the earth, and if there were any beginning of the generation of animals;" as he doth also, in his Topics, propound it for an instance of a thing disputable,[3] *Πότερον ὁ κόσμος ἀΐδιος ἢ οὔ*; Whether the world were eternal or no? he ranking it amongst *περὶ ὧν λόγον μὴ ἔχομεν ὄντων μεγάλων*, those great things, for which we can give no certain reason one way nor another. Now (saith he) if the world had a beginning, and if men were once *γηγενεῖς*, or *αὐτόχθονες*, earth-born

[1] Lib. iii. cap. ult. (p. 665. tom. ii. oper.) [2] Ibid. p. 666.

[3] Lib. i. cap. ix. (cap. xi. p. 265. tom. i. oper.)

—then must they have been, in all probability, either generated, as worms, out of putrefaction, or else out of eggs; he supposing (it seems) those eggs to have grown out of the earth. But the generality of Atheists in Aristotle's time, as well as Theists, denying this eternity of the mundane system, as not so agreeable with their hypothesis, because so constant and invariable an order in the world, from eternity, hath not such an appearance or semblance of chance, nor can be easily supposed to have been without the providence of a perfect mind presiding over it, and senior to it (as Aristotle conceived) in nature, though not in time; they therefore, in all probability, concluded likewise, men at first to have been generated one of these two ways, either out of putrefaction, or from eggs; and this by the fortuitous motion of matter, without the providence or direction of any deity. But, after Aristotle, Epicurus fancied those first men and other animals to have been formed in certain wombs or bags growing out of the earth;

[1] Crescebant uteri terrae radicibus apti;

And this is no otherwise than by the fortuitous motion of atoms also.

But if men had been at first formed after this manner, either in wombs or eggs (growing out of the earth), or generated out of putrefaction, by chance; then there could be no reason imaginable, why it should not sometimes so happen now, the motions of atoms being as brisk and vigorous as ever they were, and so to continue to all eternity: so that there is not the least ground at all for that precarious fancy and pretence of Epicurus,[2] that the earth, as a child-bearing woman, growing old, became at length effete and barren. Moreover, the men thus at first excluded out of bags, wombs, or egg-shells, or generated out of putrefaction, were supposed by these Atheists themselves to have been produced, not in a mature and adult, but an infant-like, weak, and tender state, just such as they are now born into the world; by means whereof they could neither be able to feed and nourish themselves, nor defend themselves from harms and injuries. But when the same Epicurus[3] would here pretend also, that the earth, which had been so fruitful a mother, became afterward, by chance too, as tender and indulgent a nurse of this her own progeny, and sent forth streams or rivers of milk after them out of those gaps of her wounded surface, which they had before burst out of, as Critolaus[4] long since observed, he might

[1] Lucret. lib. v. ver. 806.

[2] Vide Lucret. lib. v. ver. 823, 824. et lib. ii. ver. 1149.

[3] Vide Lucret. lib. v. ver. 810.

[4] In Philo. Quod Mund. Incorr. (p. 945.)

as well have feigned the earth to have had breasts and nipples too, as wombs and milk; and then what should hinder, but that she might have arms and hands also, and swaddling-bands to boot? Neither is that less precarious, when the same atheistic philosopher adds, that in this imaginary state of the new-born world, there was for a long time neither any immoderate heat nor cold, nor any rude and churlish blasts of wind, the least to annoy or injure those tender, earth-born infants and nurselings. All which things being considered, Anaximander[1] seems of the two to have concluded more wisely, that men, because they require a longer time than other animals to be hatched up in, were at first generated in the bellies of fishes, and there nourished up for a good while, till they were at length able to defend and shift for themselves, and then were disgorged, and cast up upon dry land. Thus do we see, that there is nothing in the world so monstrous, nor prodigiously absurd, which men, atheistically inclined, will not rather imagine, and swallow down, than entertain the notion of a God.

Wherefore here is "dignus vindice nodus," and this phenomenon of the first beginning of mankind, and other greater animals, cannot be solved otherwise than according to the Mosaic history, by admitting of θεὸν ἀπὸ μηχανῆς, a God out of a machine,—that is, an extraordinary manifestation of the Deity, in forming man, and other animals, male and female, once out of the earth; and that not in a rude, tender, and infant-like state, but mature and adult, that so they might be able immediately to shift for themselves, multiply and propagate their kind by generation: and this being once done, and now no longer any necessity of such an extraordinary way of proceeding, then putting a stop immediately thereunto, that so no more *terrigenæ*, nor *autochthones*, earth-born men,—should be any longer produced. For all these circumstances being put together, it plainly appears, that this whole phenomenon surpasses not only the mechanical, but also the plastic powers; there being much of discretion in it, which the latter of these cannot arrive to neither, they always acting fatally and necessarily. Nevertheless, we shall not here determine, whether God Almighty might not make use of the subservient ministry of angels or superior spirits, created before man, in this first extraordinary efformation of the bodies of animals out of the earth, in a mature and adult state; as Plato, in his Timæus,[2] introduceth the supreme God (whom he supposeth to be the immediate Creator of all immortal souls) thus bespeaking the junior

[1] Vide Censorinum de Die Natali, cap. iv. p. 26. edit. Lindenbrogii.

[2] § 27. p. 250.

gods, and setting them a work in the fabrication of mortal bodies: *Τὸ δὲ λοιπὸν ὑμεῖς, ἀθανάτῳ θνητὸν προσυφαίνοντες, ἀπεργάζεσθε ζῶα καὶ γεννᾶτε.* It is your work now to adaptate the mortal to the immortal, and to generate or make terrestrial animals:—he afterwards adding,[1] *μετὰ τὸν σπόρον, τοῖς νέοις παρέδωκε θεοῖς, σώματα πλάττειν θνητά*, that after the sowing of immortal souls (the supreme God) committed to these junior gods the task of forming mortal bodies.—Which of Plato's some conceive to have been derived from that of Moses, "Let us make man after our own image."

Moreover, these Atheists are no more able to solve that other common and ordinary phenomenon neither, of the conservation of the species of all animals, by keeping up constantly in the world a due numerical proportion between the sexes of male and female. For did this depend only on fortuitous mechanism, it cannot well be conceived, but that, in some ages or other, there should happen to be either all males or all females; and so the species fail. Nay, it cannot well be thought otherwise, but that there is in this a providence also, superior to that of the plastic or spermatic nature, which hath not so much of knowledge and discretion allowed to it, as whereby to be able alone to govern this affair.

Lastly, there are yet other phenomena, no less real, though not physiological, which Atheists can no way solve; as that of natural justice, and honesty, duty and obligation; the true foundation both of ethics and politics; and the *τὸ ἐφ' ἡμῖν*, liberty of will,—properly so called, not that of fortuitous determination, when there is a perfect equality or indifferency of eligibility in objects; but that whereby men deserve commendation and blame, rewards and punishments, and so become fit objects for remunerative justice to display itself upon, a main hinge upon which religion turneth; (though those two be not commonly so well distinguished as they ought.) For when Epicurus (an absolute Atheist), departing here from Democritus, pretended to solve this by his "exiguum clinamen principiorum," this attempt of his was no other than a plain delirancy, or atheistic frenzy in him.

And now have we already preventively confuted the third atheistic pretence also, to solve the phenomenon of religion and the belief of a God, so generally entertained; namely, from the fiction and imposture of politicians: we having not only manifested, that there is a natural prolepsis and anticipation of a God, in the minds of men, as the object of their fear, preventing reason; but also that the belief thereof is sus-

[1] § 29. p. 252.

tained and upheld by the strongest reason ; the phenomena of nature being no way solvable, nor the causes of things assignable, without a Deity ; so that religion being founded, both upon the instincts of nature, and upon solid reason, cannot possibly be any fiction or imposture of politicians. Nevertheless, we shall speak something particularly to this also. The Atheists therefore conceive, that though those infirmities of human nature, men's fear and ignorant credulity, do much dispose and incline them to the belief of a God, or else of a rank of beings superior to men (whether visible or invisible), commonly called by the Pagans, gods; yet would not this be so generally entertained as it is, especially that of the one supreme Deity, the first Original of all things, and Monarch of the universe, had it not been for the fraud and fiction of law-makers and civil foreigners, who, the better to keep men in peace and subjection under them, and in a kind of religious and superstitious observation of their laws, and devotion to the same, devised this notion of a God, and then possessed the minds of men with a belief of his existence, and awe of him.

Now, we deny not, but that politicians may sometimes abuse religion, and make it serve for the promoting of their own private interests and designs; which yet they could not do so well neither, were the thing itself a mere cheat and figment of their own, and had no reality at all in nature, nor any thing solid at the bottom of it. But since religion obtains so universally every where, it is not conceivable, how civil sovereigns throughout the whole world, some of which are so distant, and have so little correspondence with one another, should, notwithstanding, all so well agree in this one cheating mystery of government, or piece of state-cozenage ; nor, if they could, how they should be able so effectually to possess the generality of mankind (as well wise as unwise) with such a constant fear, awe, and dread, of a mere counterfeit thing, and an invisible nothing ; and which hath not only no manner of foundation neither in sense nor reason, but also (as the Atheists suppose) tends to their own great terror and disquietment, and so brings them at once under a miserable vassalage both of mind and body. Especially since men are not generally so apt to think, that how much the more they have of power and dignity, they have therefore so much the more of knowledge and skill in philosophy and the things of nature above others. And is it not strange, that the world should not all this while have suspected or discovered this cheat and jungle of politicians, and have smelt out a plot upon themselves, in the fiction of religion, to take away their liberty, and enthral them under bondage ; and that so many of these politicians, and civil sovereigns

themselves also, should have been unacquainted herewith, and as simply awed with the fear of this invisible nothing, as any others? All other cheats and juggles, when they are at once never so little detected, are presently thereupon dashed quite out of countenance, and have never any more the confidence to obtrude themselves upon the world. But though the Atheists have, for these two thousand years past, been continually buzzing into men's ears, that religion is nothing but a mere state-juggle and political imposture; yet hath not the credit thereof been the least impaired thereby, nor its power and dominion over the minds of men abated: from whence it may be concluded, that it is no counterfeit and fictitious thing, but what is deeply rooted in the intellectual nature of man; a thing solid at the bottom, and supported by its own strength. Which yet may more fully appear from Christianity, a religion founded in no human policy, nor tending to promote any worldly interest or design; which yet by its own, or the Divine force, hath prevailed over the power and policy, the rage and madness, of all civil states, Jewish and Pagan, and hath conquered so great a part of the persecuting world under it; and that not by resisting, or opposing force, but by suffering deaths and martyrdoms in way of adherence to that principle, [1]"That it is better to obey God than men." Which thing was thus presignified in the prophetic Scripture;[2] "Why do the heathen rage, and the people imagine a vain thing? The kings of the earth set themselves, and the rulers take counsel together, against the Lord, and against his Christ," etc. "He that sitteth in the heavens shall laugh; the Lord shall have them in derision. Then shall he speak unto them in his wrath," etc. "Yet have I set my King upon my holy hill of Sion. I will give thee the heathen for thine inheritance, and the uttermost parts of the earth for thy possession. Be wise now therefore, O ye kings," etc.

But that Theism, or religion, is no gullery or imposture, will be yet further made unquestionably evident. That the generality of mankind have agreed in the acknowledgment of one supreme Deity, as a being eternal and necessarily existent, absolutely perfect and omnipotent, and the maker of the whole world, hath been already largely proved in the foregoing discourse. To which purpose is this of Sextus the philosopher:[3] *Κοινὴν γὰρ προλήψιν ἔχομαι πάντες ἄνθρωποι περὶ Θεοῦ, καθ᾽ ἣν μακάριόν τι ἐστι ζῶον καὶ ἄφθαρτον καὶ τέλειον ἐν εὐδαιμονίᾳ, καὶ παντὸς*

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[1] Acts v. 29. [2] Psalm 2: 1.

[3] Lib. i. advers. Physicos, sive lib. viii. advers. Mathemat. sect. 1. § 33. p. 556. ed. Fabricii.

κακοῦ ἀνεπίδεκτον· All men have this common prolepsis concerning God, that he is a living being, incorruptible, perfectly happy, and incapable of all manner of evil.—And the notion of that God, which Epicurus opposed, was no other than this, "An understanding Being, having all happiness, with incorruptibility, that framed the whole world." Now, I say, that if there be no such thing as this existing, and this idea of God be a mere fictitious thing, then was it altogether arbitrarious. But it is inconceivable, how the generality of mankind (a few Atheists only excepted) should universally agree in one and the same arbitrarious figment. This argumentation hath been formerly used by some Theists, as appeareth from the forementioned Sextus :[1] Τελέως δέ ἐστιν ἄλογον, τὸ κατὰ τύχην πάντας τοῖς αὐτοῖς ἐπιβάλλειν ἰδιώμασιν, ἀλλὰ μὴ φυσικῶς οὕτως ἐκκινεῖσθαι· It is altogether irrational to think, that all men should by chance light upon the same properties (in the idea of God) without being naturally moved thereunto. Neither is that any sufficient account, which the Atheists would here give, that statesmen and politicians every where thus possessed the minds of men with one and the same idea; the difficulty still remaining, how civil sovereigns and lawmakers, in all the distant parts of the world, and such as had no communication or intercourse with one another, should universally jump in one and the same fictitious and arbitrarious idea.

Moreover, were there no God, it is not conceivable how that forementioned idea should ever have entered into the minds of men, or how it could have been formed in them. And here the Atheists again think it enough to say, that this notion or idea was put into the minds of the generality of mankind by law-makers and politicians, telling them of such a being, and persuading them to believe his existence; or that it was, from the first feigner or inventor of it, propagated all along and conveyed down by oral tradition. But this argues their great ignorance in philosophy, to think, that any notion or idea is put into men's minds from without, merely by telling, or by words; we being passive to nothing else from words but their sounds and the phantasms thereof, they only occasioning the soul to excite such notions as it had before within itself (whether innate or adventitious) which those words, by the compact and agreement of men, were made to be signs of; or else to reflect also further upon those ideas of their own, consider them more distinctly and compare them with one another. And though all learning be not the remembrance of what the soul once before actually un-

[1] Adv. Math. 314. (p. 557.)

derstood, in a pre-existent state, as Plato somewhere would have it, according to that of Boëtius,[1]

> Quod si Platonis musa personat verum,
> Quod quisque discit, immemor recordatur:

yet is all human teaching but maieutical, or obstetricious; and not the filling of the soul as a vessel, merely by pouring into it from without, but the kindling of it from within; or helping it so as to excite and awaken, compare and compound, its own notions, as whereby to arrive at the knowledge of that, which it was before ignorant of: as the thing was better expressed by the forementioned philosophic poet, in these words,

> Hæret profecto semen introrsum veri,
> Quod excitatur ventilante doctrina.

Wherefore the mere telling of men, there is a God, could not infuse any idea of him into their minds; nor yet the further giving this definition of him, that he is a being absolutely perfect, eternal, and self-existent, make them understand any thing of his nature, were they not able to excite notions or ideas from within themselves, correspondent to those several words. However, the difficulty still remains, how those civil sovereigns and law-makers, or how Critias's very first inventor of that cheat of a god, could form that idea within themselves; since upon supposition of his non-existence, it is the idea of nothing, or of a nonentity. And this was judiciously hinted also by the same Sextus;[2] *οἱ δὲ διαμφοδοκοῦντες φασὶν, ὅ τι νομοθέται τινὲς ἐνεποίησαν τοῖς ἀνθρώποις, τὴν περὶ Θεου δόξαν, μὴ εἰδότες ὅτε τὸ ἀρχῆθεν ἄτοπον αὐτοὶς περιμένει, ζητήσαντος ἄν τινος, πόθεν δὲ οἱ νομοθέται, μηδενὸς πρότερον παραδόντος, ἦλθον εἰς ἐπίνοιαν θεοῦ*: The Atheists affirming, that certain law-makers first put this notion of a God into the minds of men, do not consider, that they still remain entangled in the difficulty, if any one further demands of them, how those law-makers themselves could first form that idea?—From whence it is afterwards concluded,[3] *οὐ τοίνυν θέσει, οὐδέ κατά τινα νομοθεσίαν, παρεδέξαντο οἱ παλαιοὶ τῶν ἀνθρώπων εἶναι Θεόν;* that therefore the notion of a God sprung not from the arbitratious fiction of law-makers and politicians.

But some Atheists will yet further reply, that there is a feigning power in the human soul, whereby it can frame ideas or conceptions of

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[1] De Consolat. Philos. lib. iii. p. 79, 80.

[2] Adv. Math. 313, 314. (p. 556.) [3] Ibid. p. 557.

such things, as actually never were nor will be, as of a centaur, or of a golden mountain; and that by such a feigning power as this, the idea of God, though there be no such thing existing, might be framed. And here we deny not but that the human soul hath a power of compounding ideas and things together, which exist severally, and apart in nature, but never were, nor will be, in that conjunction: and this indeed is all the feigning power that it hath. For the mind cannot make any new cogitation, which was not before, but only compound that which is. As the painter cannot feign colors, but must use such as exist in nature; only he can variously compound them together, and by his pencil draw the figures and lineaments of such things as no where are; as he can add to the head and face of a man the neck, shoulders, and body, of a horse. In like manner, that more subtile painter or limner, the mind and imagination of man, can frame compounded ideas of things, which no where exist, but yet his simple colors, notwithstanding, must be real: he cannot feign any cogitation which was not in nature, nor make a positive conception of that which is absolutely nothing; which were no less than to make nothing to be something, or create something out of nothing. And though the whole of these fictitious ideas (as of a golden mountain) does not any where actually exist, yet forasmuch as it doth not absolutely imply a contradiction for it so to do, therefore hath it also a possible entity too, and otherwise it could not be conceivable. As a triangular square, for example, being a contradictious thing, hath not so much as a possible entity, and therefore is not conceivable as such (though both a triangle and a square severally be conceivable); it being mere nonsense, nothing, and no idea at all. Nay, we conceive, that a Theist may presume with reverence to say, that God Almighty himself, though he can create more or fewer really existent things, as he pleaseth, and could make a whole world out of nothing, yet can he not make more cogitation or conception, than is, or was before contained in his own infinite mind and eternal wisdom, nor have a positive idea of any thing, which hath neither actual nor possible entity.

But the idea of God is not a compilement or aggregation of things, which exists scatteredly and apart in the world; for then would it be a mere arbitrarious thing, and it might be what every one pleased, one adding more things together, and another fewer, but each of them writing the name or title of God, as bungling painters did under these their several figments: whereas we have already proved, that the idea of God is one most simple idea of an absolutely perfect being, though having several partial and inadequate conceptions, so that nothing can be

added to it, nor detracted from it, there being nothing included therein but what is demonstrable of a perfect being, and therefore nothing at all arbitrarious.

Moreover, many of these partial conceptions contained in the idea of God are no where else to be found in the whole world, existing singly and apart; and therefore, if there be no God, they must needs be absolute nonentities; as immutability, necessary existence, infinity, and perfection, etc. So that the painter, that makes this idea, must here feign colors themselves, or create new cogitation and conception out of nothing, upon the atheistic supposition.

Lastly, if there be no God now existing, it is impossible that ever there should be any, and so the whole idea of God would be the idea of that, which hath no possible entity neither; whereas those other fictitious ideas, made by the mind of men, though they be of such things as have no actual existence, yet have they all a possible entity, as was said before.

But that we may conceal nothing of the Atheists' strength, we must here acknowledge, that some of them have yet pretended further, that besides this power of compounding things together, the human soul hath also another ampliating, or increasing and improving power; by both which together, though there be no God existing, nor yet possible, the idea of him may be fictitiously made; those partial ideas, which are no where else to be found, arising, as they say, from a *μετάβασις ἀπὸ τῶν ἀνθρώπων*, a transition and gradual procession, from men, in way of amplification, augmentation, and improvement.—Thus do we read in Sextus:[1] *Τὸ ἀΐδιον εἶναι τὸν Θεὸν, καὶ ἄφθαρτον, καὶ τέλειον ἐν εὐδαιμονίᾳ, παρῆλθε κατὰ τὴν ἀπὸ τῶν ἀνθρώπων μετάβασιν· ὡς γὰρ τὸν κοινὸν ἄνθρωπον αὐξήσαντες τῇ φαντασίᾳ, νόησιν ἔχομεν Κύκλωπος, οὕτως ἄνθρωπον εὐδαίμονα νοήσαντες καὶ μακάριον καὶ συμπεπληρωμένον πᾶσι τοῖς ἀγαθοῖς, εἶτα ταῦτα ἐπιτείναντες, τὸν ἐν αὐτοῖς ἐκείνοις ἄκρον ἐνοήσαμεν Θεόν· καὶ πάλιν πολυχρόνιόν τινα φαντασιωθέντες ἄνθρωπον οἱ παλαιοὶ, ἐπηύξησαν τὸν Χρόνον εἰς ἄπειρον, εἶτα ἐντεῦθεν εἰς ἔννοιαν ἀΐδιον παραγενόμενοι, ἔφασαν καὶ ἀΐδιον εἶναι τὸν Θεόν.* The ideas of the eternity, incorruptibility, and perfect happiness, of the Deity, were fictitiously made by way of transition from men; for as, by increasing a man of an ordinary stature in our imagination, we fictitiously make the phantasm of a Cyclops; so when beholding a happy man, that aboundeth with all good things, we amplify, intend, and, as it were, swell the same in our minds higher

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[1] Adv. Math. p. 317. (lib. viii. seu adv. Physic. lib. 1. sect. 2. § 46. p. 559, 560.)

and higher, we then arrive at length to the idea of a being absolutely happy, that is, a God. So did the ancients, taking notice of a very longeve man, and increasing this length of age further and further infinitely, by that means frame the notion or idea of eternity, and attribute the same to God.

But to this we reply, first, that, according to the principles of the Atheists themselves, there could not possibly be any such amplifying and feigning power of the soul, as whereby it could make more than is; because they suppose it to have no active power at all, but all our conceptions to be nothing but mere passions from the objects without; according to that of Protagoras in Plato's Theætetus;[1] *Οὔτε γὰρ τὰ μὴ ὄντα δυνατὸν δοξάσαι, οὔτε ἄλλα παρ' ἃ ἂν πάσχῃ·* It is neither possible for a man to conceive that which is not; nor any more or otherwise, than he suffers. — Again, as Sextus[2] the philosopher also intimates, the Atheists are here plainly guilty of that fallacy or error in ratiocination, which is commonly called a circle, or *δι' ἀλλήλων.* For whereas they could not otherwise judge the greatest perfection and happiness, which ever they had experience of in men, to be imperfect, than by unanticipated idea of perfection and happiness, with which it was in their minds compared (by virtue of which idea also it comes to pass, that they are able to amplify those lesser perfections of men further and further, and can take occasion, from imperfect things, to think of that which is absolutely perfect); that is, whereas these Atheists themselves first make the idea of imperfection from perfection; they, not attending to this, do again go about to make up the notion or idea of that which is absolutely perfect (by way of amplification) from that which is imperfect. But that men have a notion of absolute perfection in them, by which, as the rule or measure, they (comparing other things therewith) judge them to be imperfect, and which is therefore in order of nature first, may appear from hence, because all theologers, as well Pagan as Christian, give this direction, for the conceiving of God, that it should principally be done "per viam remotionis," by way of remotion of all imperfection from him.—Thus Alcinous:[3] *Πρώτη μὲν αὐτοῦ νοήσις ἡ κατὰ ἀφαίρεσιν.* The first way of conceiving of God is by remotion or abstraction.—We add, in the last place, that finite things put together can never make up infinite, as may appear from that instance of hu-

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[1] Page 167. Serr.

[2] Vide lib. viii. adv. Mathemat. sect. 2. § 47. p. 560.

[3] Introduct. in Doctrin. Platon. cap. x. p. 602. printed at the end of Dan. Heinsius's edit. of Maximus Tyrius.

man longevity proposed; for, if one should amplify that never so much, by adding of more and more past time or years to it, yet would he never thereby be able to arrive at eternity without beginning. God differs not from these imperfect created things in degrees only, but in the whole kind. And though infinite space may perhaps be here objected, as a thing taken for granted, which being nothing but extension or magnitude, must therefore consist, or be made up, of finite parts, as it was before declared, we have no certainty of any more than this, that the finite world might have been made bigger and bigger infinitely, or without end; which infinity of magnitude is but like that of number, potential; from whence it may be inferred as well of the one as the other, that it can never be actually infinite. Wherefore, were there no infinitely perfect being in nature, the idea thereof could never be made up by any amplifying power of the soul, or by the addition of finites. Neither is that of any moment which Gassendus[1] so much objecteth here to the contrary, that though there were no God, or infinite being, yet might the idea of him as well be feigned by the mind, as that of infinite worlds, or of infinite matter, was by some philosophers: for infinite worlds, and infinite matter, are but words ill put together, infinity being a real thing in nature (and no fiction of the mind), as well as the world or matter, but yet proper to the Deity only. But it is no wonder, if they, who denied a God, yet retaining this notion of infinity, should misapply the same, as they did also other properties of the Deity, to matter.

To conclude this: our human soul cannot feign or create any new cogitation or conception, that was not before, but only variously compound that which is; nor can it ever make a positive idea of an absolute nonentity, that is, such as hath neither actual nor possible existence: much less could our imperfect beings create the entity of so vast a thought, as that of an infinitely perfect being, out of nothing; this being indeed more than for God Almighty, or a perfect being, to create a real world out of nothing; because there is no repugnancy at all in the latter, as there is in the former. We affirm therefore, that were there no God, the idea of an absolutely or infinitely perfect being could never have been made or feigned, neither by politicians, nor by poets, nor philosophers, nor any other. Which may be accounted another argument for a Deity.

But that religion is no figment of politicians, will further unques-

[1] In Disquisit. Metaphys. seu dubitationibus et instantiis ad Cartesii Metaphys. dubit. iv. p. 336. tom. iii. oper.

tionably appear from that, which now shall follow. As the religion of an oath is a necessary vinculum of civil society; so obligation in conscience, respecting the Deity as its original, and as the punisher of the violation thereof, is the very foundation of all civil sovereignty: for pacts and covenants (into which some would resolve all civil power), without this obligation in conscience, are nothing but mere words and breath; and the laws and commands of civil sovereigns do not make obligation, but presuppose it, as a thing in order of nature before them, and without which they would be invalid. Which is a truth so evident, that the writer De Cive could not dissemble it (though he did not rightly understand this natural obligation), but acknowledgeth it in these words; [1]"Obligatio ad obedientiam civilem, cujus vi leges civiles validæ sunt, omni lege civili prior est.——Quod si quis princeps summus legem civilem in hanc formulam conciperet, Non rebellabis, nihil efficeret. Nam nisi prius obligentur cives ad obediendum, hoc est, ad non rebellandum, omnis lex invalida est; et si prius obligentur est superflua." The obligation to civil obedience, by the force of which all the civil laws become valid, is before those civil laws. And if any prince should make a law to this purpose, That no man should rebel against him, this would signify nothing, because unless they, to whom it is made, were before obliged to obey, or not to rebel, the law is invalid; and if they were, then is it superfluous.—Now this previous obligation to civil obedience cannot be derived (as the forementioned writer De Cive, and of the Leviathan supposes) from men's private utility only; because every man being judge of this for himself, it would then be lawful for any subject to rebel against his sovereign prince, and to poison or stab him, whensoever he could reasonably persuade himself, that it would tend to his own advantage, or that he should thereby procure the sovereignty. Were the obligation to civil obedience made only by men's private utility, it would as easily be dissolved by the same. It remaineth, therefore, that conscience, and religious obligation to duty, is the only basis, or essential foundation of a polity or commonwealth; without which there could be no right or authority of commanding in any sovereign, nor validity in any laws. Wherefore religious obligation cannot be thought to be the fiction or imposture of civil sovereigns, unless civil sovereignty itself be accounted a fiction and imposture, or a thing which hath no foundation in nature, but is either wholly artificial or violent.

Moreover, had a religious regard to the Deity been a mere figment

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[1] Imper. cap. xiv. sect. 21. (p. 109.)

or invention of politicians, to promote their own ends, and keep men in obedience and subjection under them, then would they doubtless have so framed and contrived it, as that it should have been every way flexible and compliant; namely, by persuading the world, that whatsoever was commanded by themselves, was agreeable to the Divine will, and whatever was forbidden by their laws, was displeasing to God Almighty, and would be punished by him; God ruling over the world no otherwise than by and in these civil sovereigns, as his vicegerents, and as the only prophets and interpreters of his will to men. So that the civil law of every country, and the arbitrary will of sovereigns, should be acknowledged to be the only measure of just and unjust (there being nothing naturally such), the only rule of conscience and religion: for, from religion thus modelled, civil sovereigns might think to have an absolute power, or an infinite right of doing or commanding whatsoever they pleased, without exception, nothing being unlawful to them, and their subjects being always obliged, in conscience, without the least scruple, to obey.

But this is but a mere *larva* of religion, and would be but a mocking of God Almighty; and indeed this is the only religion that can be called a political figment. Neither could the generality of mankind be ever yet thus persuaded, that the arbitrary will of civil sovereigns was the only rule of justice and conscience; and that God Almighty could command nothing, nor reveal his will concerning religion to mankind otherwise than by these as his prophets and interpreters. True religion and conscience are no such waxen things, servilely addicted to the arbitrary wills of men, but immorigerous, stiff, and inflexible; they respecting the Deity only, his eternal or everlasting laws, and his revealed will; with which whensoever human laws clash (a thing not impossible) they conclude, that then God ought to be obeyed and not men. For which cause the profane politicians declare open war against this religion, as a thing utterly inconsistent with civil sovereignty, because it introduces a fear greater than the fear of the Leviathan, namely, that of him, who can inflict eternal punishments after death; as also because it clashes with that monstrous, infinite, and unlimited power of theirs, which is such a thing, as is not attributed by genuine Theists to God Almighty himself; a power of making their mere arbitrary will the rule of justice, and not justice the rule of their will. Thus does a modern writer of politics condemn it for seditious doctrine, tending to the dissolution of a commonwealth; [1]That subjects may make a judgment of

[1] Leviathan, p. 168.

good and evil, just and unjust; or have any other conscience besides the law of the land. As also this, [1]That subjects may sin in obeying the commands of their sovereign. He likewise adds, [2]That it is impossible a commonwealth should stand, where any other than the sovereign hath a power of giving greater rewards than life, and of inflicting greater punishments than death. Now, eternal life is a greater reward than the life present, and eternal torment than the death of nature Wherefore, God Almighty being the dispenser of eternal rewards and punishments, this is all one as if he should have said, It is impossible a commonwealth should stand, where the belief of a God, who can punish with eternal torments after this life, is entertained. Thus does the same writer declare, [3]That if the superstitious fear of spirits (whereof God is the chief), and things depending thereupon, were taken away, men would be much more fitted than they are for civil obedience: and that they, who assert the immortality of souls, or their capability of receiving punishments after death, fright men from obeying the laws of their country, with empty names, as men fright birds from the corn, with an empty doublet, a hat, and a crooked stick.[4] And accordingly he concludes, that civil sovereigns do not only make justice, but religion also; and that no Scripture, or Divine revelation can oblige, unless it be first made law, or stamped with their authority. Now, since that which can make religion and gods must itself needs be greater than all gods, it follows, according to the tenor of this doctrine, that the civil sovereign is in reality the supreme Numen; or else at least, that the Leviathan (the king over all the children of pride) is the highest deity next to senseless omnipotent matter; the one of these being the Atheists' natural, the other their artificial god. Nevertheless we shall here observe by the way, that whilst these atheistic politicians thus endeavor to swell up the civil sovereign, and to bestow upon him an infinite right, by removing to that end out of his way, natural justice, conscience, religion, and God himself, they do indeed thereby absolutely divest him of all right and authority, since the subject is now no longer obliged in conscience to obey him; and so instead of true right and authority, they leave him nothing but mere brutish force. Wherefore, since Theism and true religion are thus plainly disowned and disclaimed by these politicians, as altogether inconsistent with their designs, they cannot be supposed to have been the figments of civil sovereigns, or the mere creatures of political art. And thus have we abundantly confuted

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[1] De Civ. cap. xii. sect. 2. (p. 83.) [2] Lev. cap. xxxviii. p. 238.
[3] Lev. p. 8. [4] Page 373.

those three atheistic pretences, to solve the phenomenon of religion, from fear, and the ignorance of causes, and the fiction of politicians.

But since, besides those ordinary phenomena before mentioned, which are no way solvable by Atheists, there are certain other phenomena extraordinary, that either immediately prove a God and Providence, or else that there is a rank of understanding beings, invisible, superior to men, from whence a Deity may be afterwards inferred; namely, these three especially, apparitions, miracles, and prophecies (where the Atheists obstinately denying matter of fact and history, will needs impute these things, either to juggling fraud and knavery; or else to men's own fear and fancy, and their ignorance how to distinguish dreams, and other strong imaginations, from vision and sense; or lastly, to certain religious tales or legends, allowed by the public authority of civil sovereigns, for political ends): we shall here suggest something briefly, to vindicate the historic truth of these phenomena against Atheists.

First, therefore, as for apparitions, though there be much of fabulosity in these relations, yet can it not reasonably be concluded, that there is nothing at all of truth in them; since something of this kind hath been averred in all ages, and many times attested by persons of unquestionable prudence, and unsuspected veracity. And whereas the Atheists impute the original of these things to men's mistaking both their dreams, and their waking fancies, for real visions and sensations; they do hereby plainly contradict one main fundamental principle of their own philosophy, that sense is the only ground of certainty, and the criterion of all truth: for if prudent and intelligent persons may be so frequently mistaken, in confounding their own dreams and fancies with sensations, how can there be any certainty of knowledge at all from sense? However, they here derogate so much both from sense, and from human testimonies, as that if the like were done in other cases, it would plainly overthrow all human life.

Wherefore other Atheists, being apprehensive of this inconvenience, of denying so many sensible appearances, and testimonies, or relations of facts, have chosen rather to acknowledge the reality of apparitions; nevertheless concluding them to be things caused and created, by the power of imagination only; as if the strength of imagination were such that it could not only create fancies, but also real sensible objects, and that at a distance too from the imaginers, such as whereby the sense of others shall be for the time affected, though they quickly vanish away again. From which prodigious paradox, we may take notice of the fanaticism of some Atheists, and that there is nothing so monstrously

absurd, which men infected with atheistic incredulity will not rather entertain into their belief, than admit of any thing that shall the least hazard or endanger the existence of a God. For, if there be once any invisible ghosts or spirits acknowledged as things permanent, it will not be easy for any to give a reason, why there might not be one supreme ghost also, presiding over them all and the whole world.

In the last place therefore we shall observe, that Democritus was yet further convinced by these relations of apparitions, so as to grant, that there was a certain kind of permanent beings, and independent upon the imagination, superior to men, which could appear in different forms, and again disappear at pleasure, called by him idols, or images; he supposing them to be of the same nature with those exuvious effluxes, that stream continually from the surface of bodies: only he would not allow them to have any thing immortal at all in them, but their concretions to be at length all dissolvable, and their personalities then to vanish into nothing. Thus Sextus[1] the philosopher: *Δημόκριτος εἴδωλά τινά φησιν ἐκπελάζειν τοῖς ἀνθρώποις, καὶ τούτων τὰ μὲν εἶναι ἀγαθοποιά, τὰ δὲ κακοποιά· ἔνθεν καὶ εὔχεται εὐλόγων τυχεῖν εἰδώλων· εἶναι δὲ ταῦτα μεγάλα τε καὶ ὑπερμεγέθη, καὶ δύσφθαρτα μέν, οὐκ ἄφθαρτα δέ, προσημαίνειν τε τὰ μέλλοντα τοῖς ἀνθρώποις, θεωρούμενα καὶ φωνὰς ἀφιέντα.* Democritus affirmeth, that there are certain idols or spectres, that do often approach to men, some of which are beneficent, and some maleficent. Upon which account he wisheth, that it might be his good hap to meet with fortunate idols. And he addeth, that these are of a vast bigness, and very longeve, but not incorruptible; and that they sometimes do foresignify unto men future events, both visibly appearing to them, and sending forth audible voices.—Now, though Democritus were much blamed for this concession of his by his fellow Atheists, as giving thereby too great an advantage to Theists: yet, in his own opinion, did he sufficiently secure himself against the danger of a God from hence, by supposing all these idols of his to be corruptible, they being indeed nothing but certain finer concretions of atoms, a kind of aërial and etherial animals, that were all body, and without any immortal soul, as he supposed men also to be: so that a God could be no more proved from them, than from the existence of men. For thus he adds in Sextus: *Ὅθεν τούτων αὐτῶν φαντασίαν λαβόντες οἱ παλαιοὶ, ὑπενόησαν εἶναι Θεὸν, μηδενὸς ἄλλου παρὰ ταῦτα ὄντος Θεοῦ, τοῦ ἄφθαρτον φύσιν ἔχοντος·* Men, in ancient times, having a sense of these apparitions or idols, fell from thence into the opinion of a God, although there be, besides these

[1] Adv. Math. p. 311. (lib. viii. § 19. p. 552.)

idols, no other God, that hath an incorruptible nature.—However, though Democritus continued thus grossly atheistical, yet was he further convinced than our modern Atheists will be, that the stories of apparitions were not all fabulous, and that there are not only terrestrial, but also aërial and etherial animals: nor this earth of ours alone peopled and inhabited, whilst all those other vast regions above lie desert, solitary and waste. Where it may be observed again, that divers of the ancient fathers, though they agreed not so far with Democritus, as to make the angelical beings to be altogether corporeal, yet did they likewise suppose them to have their certain subtile etherial or aërial bodies. In which respect St. Austin, in his 115th epistle,[1] calleth angels *æthereos*, and devils, *aëreos animantes*. Thus Psellus in his Dialogue:[2] *Περὶ ἐνεργείας δαιμόνων· ἀλλ' οὐκ ἀσώματων, ὦ γενναῖε, τὸ δαιμόνιόν ἐστι φῦλον, μετὰ σώματος δέ γε, καὶ ἀμφὶ σώματος διατέτρυφε· Καὶ τοῦτό ἐστι μὲν καὶ παρ' αὐτῶν μαθεῖν τῶν σεμνῶν πατέρων· Καὶ Βασίλειος δὴ ὁ θεῖος, οὐ δαίμοσι μόνον, ἀλλὰ καὶ τοῖς ἀχράντοις ἀγγέλοις, ἐνεῖναι σώματα διατείνεται, οἷά τινα πνεύματα λεπτὰ καὶ ἀερώδη καὶ ἄχραντα, καὶ ἑξῆς.* But you are to know, that demons or devils are not altogether incorporeal, but that they are joined to bodies, and so converse with bodies; which may be learned also from the fathers, the divine Basil contending, that there are bodies, not only in devils, but also in the pure angels themselves, as certain subtile, airy, defacate spirits. Where afterwards he shows how the *συμφυὲς ἀγγέλοις σῶμα*, that body which is connate with angels,—differs from that which devils are united to, in respect of the radiant splendor of the one, and the dark fuliginous obscurity of the other. Moreover, that devils are not without bodies, he endeavors further to confirm from the words of our Saviour, that they shall be punished with fire; which (saith he) were a thing impossible, were they all of them incorporeal. And some perhaps will attempt to prove the same concerning angels too, from those other words of our Saviour, where, speaking of the resurrection state, he affirmeth, that they who shall be accounted worthy thereof, shall neither marry nor be given in marriage, but be *ἰσάγγελοι*,[3] equal to the angels:—which comparative expression of men, as to their bodies with angels, would be thought not so proper, were the angels absolutely devoid of all body. But of this we determine not.

To this phenomenon of apparitions might be added those two others of magicians or wizards, demoniacs or *energumeni;* both of these prov-

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[1] Epist. ix. ad Nebridium, p. 9. tom. ii. oper. edit. Benedict.

[2] Page 29. (vel p. 44, 45. edit. Gaulmini.) [3] Luke 20: 34, 36.

ing also the real existence of spirits, and that they are not mere fancies and imaginary inhabitants of men's brains only, but real inhabitants of the world. As also, that among these spirits there are some foul, unclean, and wicked ones (though not made such by God, but by their own apostasy), which is some confirmation of the truth of Christianity, the Scripture insisting so much upon these evil demons or devils, and declaring it to be one design of our Saviour Christ's coming into the world, to oppose these confederate powers of the kingdom of darkness, and to rescue mankind from the thraldom and bondage thereof. As for wizards and magicians, persons who associate and confederate themselves in a peculiar manner with these evil spirits, for the gratification of their own revenge, lust, ambition, and other passions; besides the Scriptures, there hath been so full an attestation given to them by persons unconcerned in all ages, that those our so confident exploders of them, in this present age, can hardly escape the suspicion of having some hankering towards Atheism. But as for the demoniacs and *energumeni*, it hath been wondered, that there should be so many of them in our Saviour's time, and hardly any, or none, in this present age of ours. Certain it is, from the writings of Josephus, in sundry places, that the pharisaic Jews were then generally possessed with an opinion of these *δαιμονιζόμενοι*, demoniacs, men possessed with devils, or infested by them. And that this was not a mere phrase or form of speech only amongst them for persons very ill affected in their bodies, may appear from hence, that Josephus[1] declares it as his opinion concerning the demons or devils, that they were *πονηρῶν ἀνθρώπων πνεύματα τοῖς ζῶσιν εἰσδυόμενα*, the spirits or souls of wicked men deceased getting into the bodies of the living. From hence it was, that the Jews, in our Saviour's time, were not at all surprised with his casting out devils, it being usual for them also to exercise the same; an art which they pretended to have learned from Solomon. Of whom thus Josephus.[2] *Πάρεσχε δ' αὐτῷ μαθεῖν ὁ θεὸς, καὶ τὴν κατὰ τῶν δαιμόνων τέχνην, εἰς ὠφέλειαν καὶ θεραπείαν τοῖς ἀνθρώποις· ἐπωδάς τε συντάξαμενος αἷς παρηγορεῖται τὰ νοσήματα, καὶ τρόπους ἐξορκώσεων κατέλειπεν, οἷς ἐνδούμενα, τὰ δαιμόνια ὡς μηκέτ' ἐπανελθεῖν, ἐκδιώκουσι. Καὶ αὕτη μέχρι νῦν ἡ θεραπεία πλεῖστον ἰσχύει.* God also taught Solomon an art against demons and devils, for the benefit and cure of men; who composed certain incantations, by which diseases are cured, and left forms of exorcisms, whereby devils are ex-

[1] De Bello Judaico, lib. vii. cap. vi. sect. 3. p. 417. tom. ii. edit. Havercamptii.

[2] Ant. Jud. lib. viii. cap. ii. (p. 419, 420.)

pelled and driven away. Which method of curing prevails much amongst us to this day.—Notwithstanding which, we think it not at all probable what a late atheistic writer[1] hath asserted, that the heads of the Jews were then all of them so full of demons and devils, that they generally took all manner of bodily diseases, such as fevers and agues, and dumbness and deafness, for devils. Though we grant, that this very thing was imputed by Plotinus afterward to the Gnostics, that they supposed all diseases to be devils, and therefore not to be cured by physic, but expelled by words or charms. Thus he, En. ii. lib. ix. c. xiv.[2] *Νῦν δὲ ὑποστησάμενοι τὰς νόσους δαιμόνια εἶναι, καὶ ταῦτα ἐξαιρεῖν λόγῳ φάσκοντες δύνασθαι, καὶ ἐπαγγελλόμενοι, σεμνότεροι μὲν ἂν εἶναι δόξαιεν παρὰ τοῖς πολλοῖς, οἳ τὰς παρὰ τοῖς μάγοις δυνάμεις θαυμάζουσι, τοὺς μέντοι εὐφρονοῦντας οὐκ ἂν πείθοιεν, ὡς οὐκ αἱ νόσοι τὰς αἰτίας ἔχουσι, ἢ πλησμοναῖς, ἢ ἐνδείαις,* etc. *δηλοῦσι δὲ καὶ αἱ θεραπείαι αὐτῶν, γαστρὸς γὰρ ῥυείσης ἢ φαρμάκου δοθέντος, διεχώρησε κάτω τὸ νόσημα· καὶ αἵματος ἀφῃρημένου καὶ ἐνδείᾳ δὴ ἰάσατο· ἢ πεινήσαντος τοῦ δαιμονίου, καὶ τοῦ φαρμάκου ποιήσαντος τήκεσθαι.* Now when they affirm diseases to be demons or devils, and pretend, that they can expel them by words, undertaking to do the same, they hereby indeed render themselves considerable to the vulgar, who are wont not a little to admire the powers of magicians. But they will not be able to persuade wise men, that diseases have no natural causes, as from repletion, or imitation, or putrefaction, or the like; which is a thing manifest from their cure, they being oftentimes removed by purgation, and bleeding, and abstinence; unless perhaps these men will say, that the devil is by this means starved, and made to pine away.—Nor can we think, that the Jews, in our Saviour's time, either suppose all madmen to be demoniacs, or all demoniacs madmen (though this letter seems to be asserted by an eminent writer of our own), we reading of devils cast out from others besides madmen; and of a woman, which had a spirit of infirmity only, and was bowed together, and could not lift up herself, which is said by our Saviour Christ to have been bowed by Satan. Wherefore the sense of the Jews formerly seems to have been this, that when there was any unusual and extraordinary symptom in any bodily distemper, but especially that of madness, this being looked upon as something more than natural, was imputed by them to the possession or infestation of some devil. Neither was this proper to the Jews only at that time, to suppose evil demons to be the causes of such bodily diseases as had extraordinary symptoms, and especially madness; but the Greeks, and other gentiles

[1] Hobbes. See Leviathan, cap. xl. [2] Page 212. oper.

also, were imbued with the same persuasion: as appeareth from Apollonius Tynæus's curing a laughing demoniac[1] at Athens, he ejecting that evil spirit by threats and menaces, who is said at his departure, to have tumbled down a royal porch in the city with great noise; as also,[2] from his freeing the city of Ephesus from the plague, by stoning an old ragged beggar, said by Apollonius to have been the plague, which appeared to be a demon, by his changing himself into the form of a shagged dog.

But that there is some truth in this opinion, and that at this very day evil spirits, or demons, do sometimes really act upon the bodies of men, and either inflict or augment bodily distempers and diseases, hath been the judgment of two very experienced physicians, Sennertus and Fernelius. The former in his book De Mania, lib. i. cap. xv. writing thus: "Etsi sine ulla corporis morbosa dispositione, Deo permittente, hominem obsidere et occupare dæmon possit, tamen quandoque morbis, et præcipue melancholicis, sese immiscet dæmon; et forsan frequentius hoc accidit, quam sæpe creditur." Although the devil may, by Divine permission, possess men without any morbid disposition, yet doth he usually intermingle himself with bodily diseases, and especially those of melancholy; and perhaps this cometh to pass oftener that is commonly believed or suspected.—The other in his De abditis Rerum Causis, where, having attributed real effects upon the bodies of men to witchcraft and enchantment, he addeth, "Neque solum morbos, verum etiam dæmonas, scelerati homines in corpora immittunt. Hi quidem visuntur furoris quadam specie distorti; hoc uno tamen a simplici furore distant, quod summe ardua obloquantur, præterrita et occulta renuntient, assidentiumque arcana reserent." Neither do these wicked magicians only inflict diseases upon men's bodies, but also send devils into them; by means whereof they appear distorted with a kind of fury and madness, which yet differs from a simple madness, (or the disease so called) in this, that they speak of very high and difficult matters, declare things past and unknown, and discover the secrets of those that sit by.—Of which he subjoins two notable instances of persons, well known to himself, that were plainly demoniacal, possessed or acted by an evil demon; one whereof shall be afterwards mentioned. But when maniacal persons do not only discover secrets, and declare things past, but future also, and, besides this, speak in languages which they had never learned; this puts it out of all doubt and question, that they are not

[1] Vide Philostrat. de Vita Apollonii Tyanæi, lib. x. cap. xx. p. 157.

[2] Id ibid. lib. iv. cap. x. p. 147.

mere madmen, or *maniaci*, but demoniacs or *energumeni*. And that since the time of our Saviour Christ there have often been such, may be made evident from the records of credible writers. Psellus in his book *Περὶ Ἐνεργείας Δαιμόνων*, De Operat. Dæm. avers it of a certain maniacal woman, that though she knew nothing but her own mother-tongue, yet, when a stranger, who was an Armenian, was brought into the room to her, she spake to him presently in the Armenian language: [1]*Ἡμεῖς δὲ τεθηπότες ἦμεν, ὅτι κατ᾽ Ἀρμενίων ἐφθέγγετο, γυνὴ μηδέποτε μηδ᾽ εἰς ὄψιν ἀφιγμένη τούτοις, μηδὲ κερκίδος εἰδυῖα πλέον οὐδέν·* We all stood amazed when we heard a woman, that had never seen an Armenian before in all her life, nor had learnt any thing but the use of her distaff, to speak the Armenian language readily.—Where the relater also affirmeth the same maniacal person to have foretold certain future events, which happened shortly after to himself: [2]*Σὺ δὲ, στραφεὶς πρὸς ἐμέ, μεγάλων ἐν χρῷ συμφορῶν ὑποστήσῃ· χολᾷ γάρ σοι δεινῶς τὰ δαιμόνια παραλύοντι τὰς αὐτῶν λατρείας· ἀμέλει τοι καὶ χαλεπούς ἐπιῤῥάψουσι καὶ βαρεῖς κινδύνους, οὓς οὐκ ἂν διαφεύξασθαι δυνηθείης, εἰ μήτις δύναμις κρεῖττων, ἢ κατὰ δαίμονας, ἀπ᾽ αὐτῶν ἐξέλῃ·* Then looking upon me, she (or rather the demon) said, Thou shalt suffer wonderful pains and torments in thy body, for the demons are extremely angry with thee for opposing their services and worship; and they will inflict great evils upon thee, out of which thou shalt not be able to escape, unless a power, greater than that of demons, exempt thee from them. All which things (saith he) happened shortly after to me, and I was brought very low, even near to death, by them; but was by my Saviour wonderfully delivered.—Whereupon Psellus concludes, *Τίς οὖν ἐκεῖνον τὸν χρησμὸν ἑωρακὼς, ἐρεῖ τὰς μανίας πάσας, ὕλης πλημμελοῦς κινήσεις, ἀλλὰ πάθη τραγικὰ δαιμόνων·* Who is there therefore that, considering this oracle or prediction, will conclude (as some physicians do) all kind of madnesses to be nothing but the exorbitant motions of the matter or humors, and not the tragic passions of the demons. But because this instance is remoter from our present times, we shall set down another remarkable one of a later date, out of the forementioned Fernelius, who was an eye-witness thereof. A young man of a noble family, who was strangely convulsed in his body, having sometimes one member, and sometimes another violently agitated, insomuch that four several persons were scarcely able to hold them; and this at first without any distemper at all in his head, or crazedness in brain. To whom Fernelius, with other skilful physicians, being called, applied all manner of remedies; blisters, purgations, cup-

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[1] Page 69. (p. 105.) [2] Page 65. (p. 99.)

ping-glasses, fomentations, unctions, plasters, and strengthening medicines; but all in vain. The reason whereof is thus given by the same Fernelius: "Quoniam omnes longe aberamus a cognitione veri, nam mense tertio primum deprehensus dæmon quidam totius mali author, voce, insuetisque verbis ac sententiis tum Latinis tum Græcis (quanquam ignarus linguæ Græcæ laborans esset), se prodens; is multa assidentium maximaque medicorum secreta detegebat, ridens, quod irritis pharmacis corpus hoc pene jugulassent." Because we were all far from the knowledge of the truth; for in the third month, it was first plainly discovered to us, that it was a certain demon who was the author of all this mischief; he manifesting himself by his speech, and by unusual words and sentences, both in Greek and Latin (though the patient were altogether ignorant of the Greek tongue): and by his revealing many of the secrets of those who stood by, especially of the physicians, whom he also derided for tormenting the patient in that manner with their frustraneous remedies.—Here therefore have we an unquestionable instance of a demoniac in these latter times of ours, and such an one, who at first, for two months together, had no manner of madness or mania at all upon him, though afterward the demon possessing his whole body, used his tongue, and spake therewith. Fernelius concludes his whole discourse in this manner; "These things do I produce, to make it manifest, that evil demons (or devils) do sometimes enter into the very bodies of men, afflicting and tormenting them after an unheard-of manner; but that at other times, though they do not enter into and possess their whole body, yet partly by exagitating and disturbing the profitable humors thereof, partly traducing the noxious into the principal parts, or else by obstructing the veins and other passages with them, or disordering the structure of the members, they cause innumerable diseases." There are many other instances of this kind, recorded by modern writers unexceptionable, of persons either wholly demoniacal, and possessed by evil demons (this appearing from their discovering secrets, and speaking languages which they had never learnt), or else otherwise so affected and infested by them, as to have certain unusual and supernatural symptoms; which, for brevity's sake we shall here omit. However, we thought it necessary thus much to insist upon this argument of demoniacs, as well for the vindication of Christianity, as for the conviction of Atheists; we finding some so staggering in their religion, that from this one thing alone of demoniacs (they being so strongly possessed, that there neither is nor ever was any such) they are ready enough to suspect the whole gospel, or New Testament itself, of fabulosity and imposture.

We come now to the second head proposed, of miracles and effects supernatural. That there hath been something miraculous or above nature, sometimes done even among the Pagans (whether by good or evil spirits), appears not only from their own records, but also from the Scripture itself. And it is well known, that they pretended (besides oracles) to miracles also, even after the times of Christianity; and that not only in Apollonius Tyanæus, and Apuleius, but also in the Roman emperors themselves, as Vespasian and Adrian, but especially in the temple of Æsculapius; thus much appearing from that Greek table therein hung up at Rome,[1] in which amongst other things this is recorded; "That a blind man being commanded by the oracle to kneel before the altar, and then passing from the right side thereof to the left, to lay five fingers upon the altar, and afterwards lifting up his hand, to touch his eyes therewith; all this being done accordingly, he recovered his sight, the people all applauding, that great miracles were done under the Emperor Antoninus," etc. But we have in the Scripture an account of miracles, both greater in number, and of a higher nature; done especially by Moses, and our Saviour Christ and his apostles.

Wherefore it seems, that there are two sorts of miracles or effects supernatural. First, such as though they could not be done by any ordinary and natural causes here amongst us, and in that respect may be called supernatural; yet might notwithstanding be done, God permitting only, by the ordinary and natural power of other invisible created spirits, angels or demons. As for example, if a stone or other heavy body should ascend upwards, and then hang in the air, without any visible either mover or supporter, this would be to us a miracle or effect supernatural; and yet according to vulgar opinion, might this be done by the natural power of created invisible beings, angels or demons; God only permitting, without whose special providence it is conceived they cannot thus intermeddle with our human affairs. Again, if a perfectly illiterate person should readily speak Greek or Latin, this also would be to us a miracle, or effect supernatural; for so is the apostles' speaking with tongues accounted; and yet in demoniacs is this sometimes done by evil demons, God only permitting. Such also amongst the Pagans was that "miraculum cotis" (as Apuleius calls it), that miracle of the whetstone, done by Accius Navius, when, at his command, it was divided into two with a razor.[2] But, secondly, there is another sort of miracles, or effects supernatural, such as are above the

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[1] Vide Gruteri Inscription. tom. i. p. lxxi.

[2] Vide Livium, lib. i. cap. xxxvi. p. 67.

power of all second causes, or any natural created being whatsoever, and so can be attributed to none but God Almighty himself, the author of nature, who therefore can control it at pleasure.

As for that late theological politician, who, writing against miracles, denies as well those of the former as of this latter kind, contending that a miracle is nothing but a name, which the ignorant vulgar give to "opus naturæ insolitum," any unwonted work of nature, or to what themselves can assign no cause of;—as also, that if there were any such thing done contrary to nature, or above it, it would rather weaken than confirm our belief of the Divine existence;[1] we find his discourse every way so weak, groundless, and inconsiderable, that we could not think it here to deserve a confutation.

But of the former sort of those miracles, is that to be understood, Deut. xiii. "If there arise amongst you a prophet, or dreamer of dreams, and giveth thee a sign or a wonder, and the sign or wonder come to pass whereof he spake unto thee, saying, Let us go after other gods, and serve them; thou shalt not hearken to the words of that prophet, or dreamer of dreams; for the Lord your God proveth you, to know whether you love the Lord your God with all your heart, and with all your soul." For it cannot be supposed, that God Almighty would himself purposely inspire any man to exhort others to idolatry, and immediately assist such an one with his own supernatural power of doing miracles, in confirmation of such doctrine. But the meaning is, that by the suggestion of evil spirits, some false prophets might be raised up to tempt the Jews to idolatry; or at least, that by the assistance of them, such miracles might be wrought in confirmation thereof, as those sometimes done by the Egyptian sorcerers or magicians, God himself not interposing in this case to hinder them, for this reason, that he might hereby prove and try their faithfulness towards him. Forasmuch as both, by the pure light of nature, and God's revealed will, before confirmed by miracles, idolatry, or the religious worship of any but God Almighty, had been sufficiently condemned. From whence it is evident, that miracles alone (at least such miracles as these) are no sufficient confirmation of a true prophet, without consideration had of the doctrine taught by him. For though a man should have done never so many true and real miracles amongst the Jews, and yet should persuade to idolatry, he was by them confidently to be condemned to death for a false prophet.

Accordingly in the New Testament do we read, that our Saviour

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[1] Vide Spinosæ Tractat. Theologico-politic. cap. vi.

Christ forewarned his disciples, that [1] "false prophets and false Christs should arise, and show great signs or wonders, insomuch that, if it were possible, they should seduce the very elect." And St. Paul foretelleth concerning the man of sin, or antichrist,[2] "that his coming should be after the working of Satan, with all power, and signs, and wonders (or miracles) of a lie." For we conceive, that by τέρατα ψεύδους in this place, are not properly feigned and counterfeit miracles, that is, mere cheating and juggling tricks, but true wonders and real miracles (viz. of the former sort mentioned), done for the confirmation of a lie, as the doctrine of this man of sin is there afterwards called; for otherwise how could his coming be said to be "according to the working of Satan, with all power?" In like manner also, in St. John's Apocalypse, where the coming of the same man of sin, and the mystery of iniquity, are again described, we read chap. xiii. of a two-horned beast like a lamb, "that he shall do great wonders, and deceive those, that dwell on the earth, by means of those miracles, which he hath power to do, in the sight of the beast." And again, chap. xvi. "of certain unclean spirits like frogs, coming out of the mouth of the dragon, and of the beast, and of the false prophet, which are the spirits of devils working miracles that go forth to the kings of the earth." And, lastly, chap. xix. "of the false prophet, that wrought miracles before the beast." All which seem to be understood, not of feigned and counterfeit miracles only, but of true and real also, effected by the working of Satan, in confirmation of a lie, that is, of idolatry, false religion, and imposture; God Almighty permitting it, partly in way of probation or trial of the faithfulness of his own servants, and partly in way of just judgment and punishment upon those, who "receive not the love of the truth, that they might be saved;" as the apostle declareth.[3] Wherefore those miracles, pretended, for divers ages past, to have been done before the relics of saints and images, etc. were they all true, could by no means justify or warrant that religious worship by many given to them; because true and real miracles, done in order to the promoting of idolatry, are so far from justifying that idolatry, that they are themselves condemned by it to be τέρατα ψεύδους, the miracles of a lie,—done by the working of Satan.

But as for the miracles of our Saviour Christ, had they been all of them only of the former kind, such as might have been done, God permitting, by the natural power of created spirits, and their assistance; yet forasmuch as he came in the name of the Lord, teaching neither

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[1] Luke 24: 24. [2] 2 Thess. 2: 9. [3] Thess. 2: 10.

idolatry, nor any thing contrary to the clear light and law of nature, therefore ought he, by reason of those miracles, to have been received by the Jews themselves, and owned for a true prophet, according to the doctrine of Moses himself: who, both in the 13th and 18th chapters of Deuteronomy, plainly supposeth, that God would in no other case permit any false prophet to do miracles by the assistance of evil spirits, save only in that of idolatry (which is always understood of what is plainly discoverable by the light of nature to be false, or evil). The reason whereof is manifest, because if he should, this would be an invincible temptation, which it is inconsistent with the divine goodness to expose men unto. And our Saviour Christ was unquestionably that one eximious prophet, which God Almighty by Moses promised to send unto the Israelites, upon occasion of their own desire made to him at Horeb. [1]"Let me not hear again the voice of the Lord my God, nor let me see this great fire any more, that I die not." Whereupon the Lord said, "They have well spoken that which they have spoken; I will raise them up a Prophet from among their brethren like unto thee, and put my words in his mouth, and he shall speak unto them all that I shall command him; and whosoever will not hearken to the words which he shall speak in my name, I will require it of him." Which is all one as if he should have said, I will no more speak to them with thunder and lightning, nor reveal my will with a terrible voice out of flaming fire; but the next great manifestation of myself, or further revelation of my will, shall be by a Prophet from amongst their own brethren, I putting my words into his mouth, and speaking to them by him. Whose words they shall be as much obliged to hearken to, as if I had spoken them (as before) from the top of the fiery mount. And that they may have no color for their disbelieving this great prophet especially, or their disobeying of him, I plainly declare, that whosoever cometh in my name, and does true and real miracles, shall be acknowledged undoubtedly for a true prophet sent by me, and accordingly believed and obeyed; and none rejected under the notion of false prophets, but only such, as either do not real miracles, or else if they do, come in the name of other gods, or exhort to idolatry. Nevertheless, our Saviour Christ wrought other miracles also, of a higher nature, by the immediate power of God Almighty himself; as for example, when before himself he raised Lazarus, who had been dead four days to life, since it cannot be conceived to be in the power of created spirits (whether bad or good), whenever they please, to bring back the souls of men

[1] Deuteronomy xviii.

deceased to their bodies again, or change the laws of nature and fate. However, it must not be thought, that God will ever set this seal of his to a lie, or that which is plainly contrary to the light and law of nature.

The conclusion is, that though all miracles promiscuously do not immediately prove the existence of a God, nor confirm a prophet, or whatsoever doctrine; yet do they all of them evince, that there is a rank of invisible understanding beings, superior to men, which the Atheists commonly deny. And we read of some such miracles also, as could not be wrought, but by a power perfectly supernatural, or by God Almighty himself. But to deny and disbelieve all miracles, is either to deny all certainty of sense, which would be indeed to make sensation itself miraculous; or else monstrously and unreasonably to derogate from human testimonies and history. The Jews would never have so stiffly and pertinaciously adhered to the ceremonial law of Moses, had they not all along believed it to have been unquestionably confirmed by miracles: and that the Gentiles should at first have entertained the faith of Christ without miracles, would itself have been the greatest of miracles.

The last extraordinary phenomenon proposed was that of divination, oracles, prophecies, or predictions of future events, otherwise unforeknowable to men; which either evince a God, or at least that there are understanding beings superior to men. For if there be presension or foreknowledge of such future events, as are to human understanding alone altogether unforeknowable, then it is certain, that there is some more perfect understanding, or knowledge in the world, than that of men. And thus is that maxim of the ancient Pagan Theists,[1] in the genuine and proper sense thereof, unquestionably true; "Si divinatio est, dii sunt;" If there be divination, or presension of future events (undiscoverable by men), then are there gods:—which, in their language, was no more than to say, understanding beings superior to men.

Wherefore we must here distinguish of oracles and predictions, after the same manner as we did before of miracles, that they may be of two kinds. First, such as might proceed only from the natural presaging power of created spirits superior to men, whether called angels or demons. For these being supposed to have not only clearer understandings than men, and a greater insight into nature, but also by reason of their agility and invisibility, opportunity of knowing things re-

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[1] The Stoics. Vide Ciceron. de Divinat. lib. i. cap. v, vi. p. 3113, 3114. tom. ix. oper.

motely distant, and of being privy to men's secret machinations and consultations; it is easily conceivable that many future events nigh at hand, which cannot be foreknown by men, may be (probably at least) foreseen by them; and that without any miraculous Divine revelation, their causes being already in being. As men learned in astronomy can foretel eclipses of the sun and moon, which to the vulgar are altogether unforeknowable; and as princes or statesmen, that are furnished with great intelligence, foreign and domestic, can presage more of war and peace, either at home or abroad, and of the events of kingdoms, than ignorant plebeians. And such were those predictions, which Democritus, though otherwise much addicted to Atheism, allowed of; Cicero[1] writing thus of him: "Plurimis locis, gravis auctor Democritus præsensionem rerum futurarum comprobat;" Democritus, a grave writer, doth in many places approve of the presension of future events.—The reason whereof was, because he supposed certain understanding beings superior to men, called by him idols, which having a larger comprehension of things, and other advantages of knowledge, could therefore foretel many future events, that men were ignorant of. And though perhaps it may be thought, that Democritus would not have entertained this opinion of the foreknowledge of human events, had he not asserted the necessity of all human actions and volitions, but held liberty of will, as Epicurus afterwards did (as if this were inconsistent with all manner of presage, and probable or conjectural foreknowledge): yet is it certain, that there is not so much contingency in all human actions, by reason of this liberty of will, as heretofore was by Epicurus, and still is by many supposed; it being plain, that men act according to an appearance of good, and that in many cases and circumstances it may be foreknown, without any Divine revelation, what such or such persons would do. As for example, that a voluptuous person, having a strong temptation to satisfy his sensual appetite, and that without incurring any inconvenience of shame or punishment, would readily close with the same. Besides which, such invisible spirits, as angels or demons, may sometimes predict also what themselves cause and effect.

Secondly, There is another sort of predictions of future events, which cannot be imputed to the natural presaging faculty of any such created spirits, but only to the supernatural prescience of God Almighty, or a Being infinitely perfect: as when events remotely distant in time, and of which there are yet no immediate causes actually in be-

[1] De Div. lib. i. (cap. iii. p. 3111. tom. ix. oper.)

ing, which also depend upon many circumstances, and a long series of things, any one of which being otherwise would alter the case; as likewise upon much uncertainty of human volitions, which are not always necessarily linked and concatenated with what goes before, but often loose and free; and upon that contingency that arises from the indifferency or equality of eligibility in objects. Lastly, such things as do not at all depend upon external circumstances neither, nor are caused by things natural anteceding, but by some supernatural power; I say, when such future events as these are foretold, and accordingly come to pass, this can be ascribed to no other but such a being as comprehends, sways, and governs all, and is, by a peculiar privilege or prerogative of its own nature, omniscient. Epicurus, though really he therefore rejected divination and prediction of future events, because he denied Providence: yet did he pretend this further reason also against it, because it was a thing absolutely inconsistent with liberty of will, and destructive of the same; [2] ἡ μαντικὴ ἀνύπαρκτος· εἰ δὲ καὶ ὑπαρκτική, οὐδὲν παρ' ἡμᾶς ἤδη τὰ γινόμενα· Divination is a thing, which hath no existence, nor possibility in nature: and if there were such a thing it would take away all liberty of will, and leave nothing in men's own power.—Thus also Carneades, in Cicero,[2] maintained, "Ne Apollinem quidem futura posse dicere, nisi ea, quorum causas natura ita contineret, ut ea fieri necesse esset;" that Apollo himself was not able to foretel any future events, other than such as had necessary causes in nature antecedent.—And some Christian Theists of later times have, in like manner, denied to God Almighty all foreknowledge of human actions, upon the same pretence, as being both inconsistent with men's liberty of will, and destructive thereof. For, say they, if men's actions be free, then are they unforeknowable, they having no necessary causes; and again, if there be any foreknowledge of them, then can they not be free, they being *ipso facto* necessitated thereby. But as it is certain that prescience does not destroy the liberty of man's will, or impose any necessity upon it, men's actions being not therefore future, because they are foreknown, but therefore foreknown, because future; and were a thing never so contingent, yet upon supposition that it will be done, it must needs have been future from all eternity: so is it extreme arrogance for men, because themselves can naturally foreknow nothing, but by some causes antecedent, as an eclipse of the sun or moon, therefore to presume to measure the knowledge of God Almigh-

[1] Diog. Laert. in V. Epic. (lib. x. segm. 135. p. 660.)

[2] De Fato, cap. xiv. p. 3281. tom. ix. oper.

ty according to the same scantling, and to deny him the prescience of human actions, not considering, that, as his nature is incomprehensible, so his knowledge may well be looked upon by us as such too; that which is past our finding out, and too wonderful for us. However, it must be acknowledged for an undoubted truth, that no created being can, naturally, and of itself, foreknow any future events, otherwise than in and by their causes anteceding. If therefore we shall find, that there have been predictions of such future events as had no necessary antecedent causes; as we cannot but grant such things therefore to be foreknowable, so must we needs from thence infer the existence of a God, that is, a Being supernatural, infinitely perfect and omniscient, since such predictions as these could have proceeded from no other cause.

That there is foreknowledge of future events to men naturally unforeknowable, hath been all along the persuasion of the generality of mankind. Thus Cicero:[1] "Vetus opinio est, jam usque ab heroicis ducta temporibus, eaque et populi Romani, et omnium gentium firmata consensu, versari quandam inter homines divinationem, quam Græci μαντικὴν appellant, id est, præsensionem et scientiam rerum futurarum." This is an old opinion derived down all along from the heroic times (or the mythical age), and not only entertained amongst the Romans, but also confirmed by the consent of all nations, that there is such a thing as divination, and presension or foreknowledge of future events.—And the same writer elsewhere, in the person of Balbus: [2]"Quamvis nihil tam irridet Epicurus, quam prædictionem rerum futurarum, mihi videtur tamen vel maxime confirmare, Deorum providentia consuli rebus humanis. Est enim profecto divinatio; quæ multis locis, rebus, temporibus apparet, cum in privatis tum maxime in publicis. Multa cernunt aruspices, multa augures provident, multa oraculis providentur, multa vaticinacionibus, multa somniis, multa portentis." Although Epicurus deride nothing more than the prediction of future things; yet does this seem to me to be a great confirmation of the providence of the gods over human affairs, because there is certainly divination, it appearing in many places, things, and times, and that not only private, but especially public. Soothsayers foresee many things, the augurs many; many things are declared by oracles, many by prophecies, many by dreams, and many by portents.—And indeed that there were even amongst the Pagans predictions of future events, not discoverable by

[1] De Div. lib. i.

[2] De N. D. lib. ii. p. 239. Lamb. (cap. lxv. p. 3046. tom. ix. oper.)

any human sagacity, which accordingly came to pass, and therefore argue a knowledge superior to that of men, or that there are certain invisible understanding beings or spirits, seems to be undeniable from history. And that the augurs themselves were sometimes not unassisted by these officious genii, is plain from that of Attius Navius before mentioned, as the circumstances thereof are related by historians; that Tarquinius Priscus having a mind to try what there was in this skill of augury,[1] "dixit ei se cogitare quiddam; id possetne fieri, consuluit. Ille augurio acto, posse respondet. Tarquinius autem dixit se cogitasse cotem novacula posse præcidi; tum Attium jussisse experiri; ita cotem in comitium illatam, inspectante et rege et populo, novacula esse discissam;" told Navius, that he thought of something, and he would know of him, whether it could be done or no. Navius having performed his augurating ceremonies, replied, that the thing might be done. Whereupon Priscus declared what his thought was, namely, that a whetstone might be cut in two with a razor. Navius willed them to make trial: wherefore a whetstone being brought immediately into the court, it was in the sight of the king and all the people divided with a razor.—But the predictions amongst those Pagans were, for the most part, only of the former kind, such as proceeded merely from the natural presaging faculty of these demons; this appearing from hence, because their oracles were often expressed ambiguously, so as that they might be taken either way; those demons themselves, it seems, being then not confident of the event; as also, because they were sometimes plainly mistaken in the events. And from hence it was, that they seldom ventured to foretel any events remotely distant, but only what were nigh at hand, and shortly to come to pass; and therefore might be probably conjectured of from things then in being. Notwithstanding which, we acknowledge, that there are some few instances of predictions amongst the Pagans, of the other kind. Such as that intimated by Cicero in his book of Divination,[2] where he declareth the doctrine of Diodorus concerning necessity and contingency; "non necesse fuisse Cypselum regnare Corinthi, quanquam id millesimo ante anno Apollinis oraculo editum esset:" that it was not necessary Cypselus the tyrant should reign at Corinth, though that were a thing predicted by Apollo's oracle a thousand years before. As also this recorded by Varro,[3] of Vectius Valens, an augur in the time of Romulus, who

[1] Cicero de Divinat. lib. ii. cap. xvii. p. 3129. tom. ix. oper.

[2] It should be, De Fato, cap. vii. p. 3269.

[3] In the Fragments of the eighteenth book of his Antiquitates Rerum Humanarum.

when Rome was a building, from the flying of twelve vultures presaged, that the continuance of that city would be for twelve hundred years: which seems to have been accordingly fulfilled, in the year of our Lord four hundred and fifty-five, immediately after the death of the third Valentinean (whom some make to be the last real emperor of the west or Rome), when Gensericus the Vandal took the city the second time and fired it. But above all, that of the sibyls; of whose prophecies such things are recorded by Pagan writers, as makes it very suspicious, that they did foretel the coming of our Saviour Christ, and the times of Christianity. But were these, and the like pagan prophecies, real, then must they needs have had some higher original than the natural presaging faculty of their demons especially those of the sibyls; who, for aught we know, might be as well assisted supernaturally to predict our Saviour Christ, amongst the Pagans in the west, as Balaam was in the east.

But here the Scripture triumpheth over Paganism, and all its oracles and divinations; there being contained in it so many unquestionable predictions of events to follow a long time after, and such as can be imputed to nothing but the supernatural foreknowledge and omniscience of God Almighty. As for example, those concerning the Messiah, or our Saviour Christ, delivered by Jacob, Moses, David, Isaias, Jeremy, Daniel, and most of the prophets: foretelling sundry particular circumstances of his coming, and that grand event, which followed after, of the Gentiles or Pagan's so general reception and entertainment of Christianity; that is, the belief of the Messiah promised to the Jews; together with the shaking off of their gods and idols. Amongst which Scripture prophecies, concerning our Saviour Christ, we must needs reckon for one, and none of the least considerable neither, that of Daniel's weeks, or of four hundred and ninety years, to commence from the going forth of the word, or the decree made by Artaxerxes the son of Xerxes, in the seventh year of his reign, for the return of the people of Israel, priests and Levites, to Jerusalem; and to terminate in the death of the Messiah and the preaching of the gospel to the Jews only: though we are not ignorant how some learned men both of the former and latter times, have stretched their wits, they sometimes using no small violence to divert this prophecy another way. For that these prophecies, concerning our Saviour Christ, could have no other original than the immediate supernatural revelation of God Almighty, is evident from the thing itself; it being such as depended

on no natural causes, much less upon those constellations of the astrological Atheists,[1] but only upon his own secret will and counsel.

But besides these prophecies concerning our Saviour Christ, there are others contained in the Scripture, concerning the fates and successions of the chief kingdoms, empires, and polities of the world; as of the rise of the Persian monarchy; of its fall and conquest by the Macedonian Alexander; of the quadripartite division of this Greekish empire after Alexander's death; of the succession of the Seleucidæ and Lagidæ, a prophetic history, so agreeable with the events, that it was by Porphyrius[2] pretended to have been written after them; and, lastly, of the rise and continuance of the Roman empire. For notwithstanding the endeavors of some to pervert all those Scripture prophecies that extend to the present times, it is clearly demonstrable, that this was Daniel's fourth ten-horned beast, or the legs and toes of Nebuchadnezzar's statue, that fourth empire, strong as iron, which came at length to be broken or divided into ten or many principalities, called in the prophetic language, and according to the *eichon*, horns; amongst whom was to start up another horn with eyes, speaking great words against the Most High, and making war with the saints, and prevailing against them, for a time, times, and half a time. Which prophecy of Daniel's is the ground-work of St. John's Apocalypse, it being there further insisted upon, filled up, and enlarged, with the addition of several particulars; so that both Daniel and John have each of them, from their respective ages, set down a prophetic calendar of times, in a continued series (the former more compendiously and generally, the latter more copiously and particularly), to the very end of the world.

And thus do we see plainly, that the Scripture prophecies evince a Deity; neither can these possibly be imputed by Atheists, as other things, to men's fear and fancy, nor yet to the fiction of politicians. Nor do they only evince a Deity, but confirm Christianity also; partly as predicted by them in its several circumstances, a grand one whereof was the Gentiles' reception of it; and partly as itself predicting future events, this spirit of prophecy being the testimony of Jesus. Both which Scripture prophecies, of Christ in the Old Testament, and from him in the New, are of equal if not greater force to us in this present age, for the confirmation of our faith, than the miracles themselves re-

[1] Cardan, etc.

[2] Vide Hieronymum Comment. in Daniel. tom. v. oper. p. 481.

corded in the Scripture; we having now certain knowledge ourselves of many of those events, and being no way able to suspect but that the prophecies were written long before.

To conclude; all these extraordinary phenomena of apparitions, witchcraft, possessions, miracles, and prophecies, do evince that spirits, angels or demons, though invisible to us, are no fancies, but real and substantial inhabitants of the world; which favors not the atheistic hypothesis: but some of them, as the higher kind of miracles and predictions, do also immediately enforce the acknowledgement of a Deity; a being superior to nature, which therefore can check and control it; and which comprehending the whole, foreknows the most remotely distant and contingent events.

And now have we not only fully answered and confuted all the atheistic pretences against the idea of God, tending to disprove his existence; but also occasionally proposed several solid and substantial arguments for a Deity: as, that all successive things, the world, motion, and time, are in their own nature absolutely incapable of an ante-eternity; and, therefore, there must of necessity be something else of a permanent duration, that was eternal without beginning: that no Atheist, according to his principles, can possibly give any account of the original of his own soul or mind: that the phenomenon of motion cannot be solved without an incorporeal principle, presiding over the whole: that the τὸ εὖ καὶ καλῶς, the artificial, regular, and orderly frame of things—together with the harmony of the whole, demonstrate an understanding and intending cause of the world, that ordered things for ends and good. Besides, that there are several other phenomena, both ordinary and extraordinary, which Atheists, being no way able to solve, are forced to deny.

True indeed, some of the ancient Theists have themselves affirmed, that there could be no demonstration of a God: which assertion of theirs hath been by others misunderstood into this sense, as if there were therefore no certainty at all to be had of God's existence, but only a conjectural probability; no knowledge or science, but only faith and opinion. Whereas the true meaning of those ancient Theists, who denied that there could be any demonstration of a God, was only this, That the existence of a God could not be demonstrated *a priori*, himself being the first cause of all things. Thus doth Alexander Aphrodisius, in his Physical Doubts and Solutions,[1] after he had propounded an argument for a God, according to Aristotelic principles, from motion,

[1] Lib. i. cap. ii. (p. 2. edit. Græc. Venet. 1536. fol.)

declare himself, ἡ δεῖξις κατὰ ἀνάλυσιν, οὐ γὰρ οἰόντε τῆς πρώτης ἀρχῆς ἀπόδειξιν εἶναι, ἀλλὰ δεῖ ἀπὸ τῶν ὑστέρων τε καὶ φανερῶν ἀρξαμένους, κατὰ τὴν πρὸς ταῦτα συμφωνίαν ἀναλύσει χρωμένους συστῆσαι τὴν ἐκείνου φύσιν· that this argument or proof of his was in way of analysis only; it being not possible, that there should be a demonstration of the first principles of all. Wherefore (saith he) we must here fetch our beginning from things that are after it, and manifest; and thence, by way of analysis, ascend to the proof of that first nature, which was before them.—And to the same purpose Clemens Alexandrinus,[1] having first affirmed, ὡς δυσμεταχειριστότατος ὁ περὶ θεοῦ λόγος· ἐπεὶ γὰρ ἀρχὴ παντὸς πράγματος δυσεύρετος, πάντως που ἡ πρώτη καὶ πρεσβυτάτη ἀρχὴ δύσδεικτος, ἥτις καὶ τοῖς ἄλλοις ἅπασιν αἰτία τοῦ γενέσθαι, καὶ γενομένους εἶναι· that God is the most difficult thing of all to be discoursed of; because, since the principle of every thing is hard to find out, the first and most ancient principle of all, which was the cause to all other things of their being made, must needs be the hardest of all to be declared or manifested;—he afterwards subjoins, Ἀλλὰ οὐδὲ ἐπιστήμῃ λαμβάνεται τῇ ἀποδεικτικῇ· αὕτη γὰρ ἐκ προτέρων καὶ γνωριμωτέρων συνίσταται· τοῦ δὲ ἀγεννήτου οὐδὲν προϋπάρχει· But neither can God be apprehended by any demonstrative science; for such science is from things before in order of nature, and more knowable; whereas nothing can exist before that which is altogether unmade.—And certain it is, that it implies a contradiction, that God, or a perfect being, should be thus demonstrated by any thing before him as his cause. Nevertheless it doth not therefore follow, that there can be no certainty at all had of the existence of a God, but only a conjectural probability; no knowledge, but faith and opinion only. For we may have a certain knowledge of things, the διότι whereof cannot be demonstrated *a priori*, or from antecedent necessary causes; as for example, that there was something eternal of itself, without beginning, is not at all demonstrable by any antecedent cause, it being contradictious to such a thing to have a cause. Nevertheless upon supposition only, that something doth exist, which no man can possibly make any doubt of, we may not only have an opinion, but also certain knowledge, from the necessity of irrefragable reason, that there was never nothing, but something or other did always exist from eternity, and without beginning. In like manner, though the existence of a God or perfect being cannot be demonstrated *a priori*, yet may we notwithstanding, from our very selves (whose existence we cannot doubt of), and from what is contained in our own minds, or otherwise consequent from him,

[1] Strom. lib. v. p. 388. (cap. xii. p. 695. edit. Potteri.)

by undeniable principles of reason, necessarily infer his existence. And whensoever any thing is thus necessarily inferred from what is undeniable and indubitable, this is a demonstration, though not of the διότι, yet of the ὅτι of it; that the thing is, though not why it is. And many of the geometrical demonstrations are no other.

It hath been asserted by a late eminent philosopher,[1] that there is no possible certainty to be had of any thing, before we be certain of the existence of a God essentially good; because we can never otherwise free our minds from the importunity of that suspicion, which with irresistible force may assault them; that ourselves might possibly be so made, either by chance, or fate, or by the pleasure of some evil demon, or at least of an arbitrary omnipotent deity, as that we should be deceived in all our most clear and evident perceptions; and therefore in geometrical theorems themselves, and even in our common notions. But when we are once assured of the existence of such a God as is essentially good, who therefore neither will nor can deceive; then, and not before, will this suspicion utterly vanish, and ourselves become certain, that our faculties of reason and understanding are not false and imposturous, but rightly made. From which hypothesis it plainly follows, that all those Theists, who suppose God to be a mere arbitrary being, whose will is not determined by any nature of goodness or rule of justice, but itself is the first rule of both (they thinking this to be the highest perfection, liberty, and power), can never be reasonably certain of the truth of any thing, not so much as that two and two are four; because, so long as they adhere to that persuasion, they can never be assured, but that such an arbitrary omnipotent deity might designedly make them such, as should be deceived in all their clearest perceptions.

Now though there be a plausibility of piety in this doctrine, as making the knowledge of a God essentially good so necessary a præcognitum to all other science, that there can be no certainty of truth at all without it; yet does that very supposition, that our understanding faculties might possibly be so made, as to deceive us in all our clearest perceptions (wheresoever it is admitted), render it utterly impossible ever to arrive to any certainty concerning the existence of a God essentially good; forasmuch as this cannot be any otherwise proved, than by the use of our faculties of understanding, reason, and discourse. For to say, that the truth of our understanding faculties is put out of all doubt and question, as soon as ever we are assured of the existence of a

[1] Des Cartes. See his Meditat. Metaphys. iv. p. 25. and v. p. 31.

God essentially good, who therefore cannot deceive; whilst this existence of a God is in the mean time itself no otherwise proved, than by our understanding faculties; that is, at once to prove the truth of God's existence from our faculties of reason and understanding, and again to prove the truth of those faculties from the existence of a God essentially good: this, I say, is plainly to move round in a circle, and to prove nothing at all; a gross oversight, which the forementioned philosopher seems plainly guilty of.

Wherefore, according to this hypothesis, we are of necessity condemned to eternal scepticism, both concerning the existence of a God, when, after all our arguments and demonstrations for the same, we must at length gratify the Atheists with this confession in the conclusion, that it is possible notwithstanding there may be none; and also concerning all other things, the certainty whereof is supposed to depend upon the certainty of the existence of such a God as cannot deceive.

So that if we will pretend to any certainty at all concerning the existence of a God, we must of necessity explode this new sceptical hypothesis of the possibility of our understandings being so made, as to deceive us in all our clearest perceptions; by means whereof we can be certain of the truth of nothing, and to use our utmost endeavor to remove the same. In the first place therefore we affirm, that no power, how great soever, and therefore not Omnipotence itself, can make any thing to be indifferently either true or false, this being plainly to take away the nature both of truth and falsehood, or to make them nothing but words without any signification. Truth is not factitious; it is a thing which cannot be arbitrarily made, but is. The Divine will and Omnipotence itself (now supposed by us) hath no imperium upon the Divine understanding; for if God understood only by will, he would not understand at all. In the next place we add, that though the truth of singular contingent propositions depends upon the things themselves existing without, as the measure and archetype thereof; yet as to the universal and abstract theorems of science, the terms whereof are those reasons of things, which exist no where but only in the mind itself (whose noemata and ideas they are) the measure and rule of truth concerning them can be no foreign or extraneous thing without the mind, but must be native and domestic to it, or contained within the mind itself, and therefore can be nothing but its clear and distinct perception. In these intelligible ideas of the mind, whatsoever is clearly perceived to be, is; or, which is all one, is true. Every clear and distinct perception is an entity or truth, as that, which is repugnant to

conception, is a nonentity or falsehood. Nay, the very essence of truth here is this clear perceptibility, or intelligibility; and therefore can there not be any clear or distinct perception of falsehood: which must be acknowledged by all those, who, though granting false opinions, yet agree in this, that there can be no false knowledge. For the knowledge of these universal abstract truths is nothing but the clear and distinct perception of the several ideas of the mind, and their necessary relations to one another: wherefore, to say, that there can be no false knowledge, is all one as to say, that there can be no clear and distinct perceptions of the ideas of the mind false. In false opinions, the perception of the understanding power itself is not false, but only obscure. It is not the understanding power or nature in us, that erreth, but it is we ourselves, who err, when we rashly and unwarily assent to things not clearly perceived by it. The upshot of all is this, that since no power, how great soever, can make any thing indifferently to be true; and since the essence of truth in universal abstract things is nothing but clear perceptibility, it follows, that Omnipotence cannot make any thing, that is false, to be clearly perceived to be, or create such minds and understanding faculties, as shall have as clear conceptions of falsehoods, that is, of nonentities, as they have of truths or entities. For example, no rational understanding being, that knows what a part is, and what a whole, what a cause and what an effect, could possibly be so made, as clearly to conceive the part to be greater than the whole, or the effect to be before the cause, or the like. Wherefore, we may presume with reverence to say, that there could not possibly be a world of rational creatures made by God, either in the moon, or in some other planet, or elsewhere, that should clearly and distinctly conceive all things contrary to what are clearly perceived by us; nor could our human faculties have been so made, as that we should have as clear conceptions of falsehoods as of truths. Mind or understanding faculties in creatures may be made more or less weak, imperfect, and obscure, but they could not be made false, or such as should have clear and distinct conceptions of that which is not, because every clear perception is an entity; and though Omnipotence can make something out of nothing, yet can it not make something to be nothing, nor nothing something. All which is no more than is generally acknowledged by theologers, when they affirm, that God Almighty himself cannot do things contradictious; there being no other reason for this assertion, but only this, because contradictiousness is repugnant to conception. So that conception and knowledge are hereby made to be the measure of all power, even Omnipotence, or infinite power itself, being deter-

mined thereby; from whence it follows, that power hath no dominion over understanding, truth and knowledge; nor can infinite power, make any thing whatsoever to be clearly conceivable. For could it make contradictious things clearly conceivable, then would itself be able to do them; because whatsoever can be clearly conceived by any, may unquestionably be done by infinite power.

It is true indeed, that sense, considered alone by itself, doth not reach to the absoluteness either of the natures, or of the existence of things without us, it being, as such, nothing but seeming, appearance, and fancy. And thus is that saying of some ancient philosophers to be understood, that *πᾶσα φαντασία ἀληθὴς*, every phantasy is true—namely, because sense and fancy reach not to the absolute truth and falsehood of things, but contain themselves only within seeming and appearance; and every appearance must needs be a true appearance. Notwithstanding which, it is certain, that sense often represents to us corporeal things otherwise than indeed they are, which though it be not a formal, yet is it a material falsity. Wherefore sense in the nature of it is not absolute, but *πρὸς τὶ*, or *τινὶ*, relative to the sentients. And by sense alone, without any mixture of reason or understanding, we can be certain of no more concerning the things without us, but only this, that they so seem to us. Hence was that of the ancient atomic philosophers in Plato, [1] *Ἦ σὺ διϊσχυρίσαιο ἂν ὡς οἷόν σοι φαίνεται ἕκαστον χρῶμα, τοιοῦτον καὶ κυνὶ καὶ ὁτῳοῦν ζώῳ·* Neither you nor any man else can be certain, that every other man and brute animal hath all the very same phantasms of colors, that himself hath.—Now were there no other perception in us but that of sense (as the old atheistic philosophers concluded knowledge to be sense,) then would all our human perceptions be merely seeming, fantastical and relative; and none of them reach to the absolute truth of things. Every one in Protagoras's language would then *τὰ αὐτοῦ μόνον δοξάζειν*, think or opine only his own things—all his truths being private and relative to himself. And that Protagorean aphorism were to be admitted also in the sense of that philosopher, that *πάντων χρημάτων μέτρον ἄνθρωπος*, every man is the measure of all things to himself; and, that no one man's opinion was righter than another's, —but *τὸ φαινόμενον ἑκάστῳ*, that which seemed to every one, was to him true, to whom it seemed—all truth and perception being but seeming and relative. But here lies one main difference betwixt understanding, or knowledge, and sense; that whereas the latter is fantastical and relative only; the former reacheth beyond fancy and appearance

[1] Theæt. p. 154. [b. 119. edit. Ficini.]

to the absoluteness of truth. For as it hath been already declared, whatsoever is clearly and distinctly perceived in things abstract and universal, by any one rational being in the whole world, is not a private thing, and true to himself only that perceived it: but it is, as some Stoics[1] have called it, ἀληθὲς καθολικὸν, a public, catholic and universal truth: it obtains every where, and as Empedocles sang of natural justice,

[2] ——————Διὰ τ᾽ εὐρυμέδοντος
Αἰθέρος, ἠνεκέως τέταται, διὰ τ᾽ ἀπλέτου αὐγῆς·

It is extended throughout the vast ether, and through infinite light or space.—And were there indeed infinite worlds, all thickly peopled with rational animals, it would be alike true to every one of them. Nor is it conceivable, that Omnipotence itself could create any such understanding beings, as could have clear and distinct perceptions of the contrary to all that is perceived by us, no more than it could do things contradictious. But in all probability, because sense is indeed but seeming, fantastical and relative, this is the reason, that some have been so prone and inclinable to suspect the like of understanding, and all mental perception too, that this also is but seeming and relative; and that therefore men's minds or understandings might have been so made, by an arbitrary omnipotent deity, as clearly and distinctly to perceive every thing that is false. But, if notwithstanding all that hath been said, any will still sing over the old song again; that all this, which hath been hitherto declared by us, is indeed true, if our human faculties be true, or rightly made; but we can go no further than our faculties; and whether these be true or no, no man can ever be certain; we have no other reply to make, but that this is an over-stiff and heavy adherence to a prejudice of their own minds; that not only sense, but also reason and understanding, and all human perception, is merely seeming or fantastical, and relative to faculties only, but not reaching to the absoluteness of any truth; and that the human mind hath no criterion of truth at all within itself.

Nevertheless, it will probably be here further objected, that this is too great an arrogance, for created beings to pretend to an absolute certainty of any thing, it being the sole privilege and prerogative of God Almighty to be infallible, who is therefore styled in Scripture, ὁ μόνος σοφὸς, the only wise;—to which we briefly answer that the Deity is the first original fountain of wisdom and truth, which is said to be the bright-

[1] Vide Platon. in Theæteto, p. 118.

[2] Apud Aristot. Rhetoric. lib. i. cap. xiii. p. 737. tom. iii. oper.

ness of the everlasting light, the unspotted mirror of the power of God, and the image of his goodness. The Divine Word is the archetypal pattern of all truth; it is ignorant of nothing, and knoweth all things infallibly. But created beings have but a derivative participation hereof, their understandings being obscure, and they erring in many things, and being ignorant of more. And it seems to be no derogation from Almighty God to suppose, that created minds, by a participation of the Divine mind, should be able to know certainly that two and two make four; that equals added to equals will make equals: that a whole is greater than the part; and the cause before the effect; and that nothing can be made without a cause; and such like other common notions, which are the principles from whence all their knowledge is derived. And indeed, were rational creatures never able to be certain of any such thing as this at all, what would their life be but a mere dream or shadow? and themselves but a ridiculous and pompous piece of fantastic vanity? Besides, it is no way congruous to think, that God Almighty should make rational creatures, so as to be an utter impossibility of ever attaining to any certainty of his own existence; or of having more than an hypothetical assurance thereof, if our faculties be true (which possibly may be otherwise), then is there a God. We shall conclude this discourse against the Cartesian scepticism with that of Origen's, *Μόνον τῶν ὄντων βέβαιον ἐπιστήμη*, Knowledge is the only thing in the world, which creatures have, that is in its own nature firm;—they having here something of certainty, but no where else.

Wherefore we having now that, which Archimedes required, some firm ground and footing to stand upon, such a certainty of truth in our common notions, as that they cannot possibly be false; without which nothing at all could be proved by reason: we shall in the next place endeavor not to shake or dissettle any thing thereby (which was the undertaking of that geometrician,) but to confirm and establish the truth of God's existence, and that from the very idea of him, hitherto made good and defended against all the assaults of Atheists.

It is well known, that Cartesius[1] hath lately made a pretence to do this, with mathematical evidence and certainty, and he despatches the business briefly after this manner: God, or a perfect being, includeth necessary existence in his very idea; and therefore he is. But though the inventor of this argument, or rather the reviver of that, which had been before used by some scholastics, affirmeth it to be as good a de-

[1] Vide Principia ejus Philosophiæ, part. i. sect. 13. p. 4. et Meditat. Metaphysic. v. p. 31. et alias.

monstration for the existence of a God, from his idea, as that in geometry, for a triangle's having three angles equal to two right, is from the idea of a triangle; yet nevertheless, it is certain, that by one means or other, this argument hath not hitherto proved so fortunate and successful, there being many, who cannot be made sensible of any efficacy therein, and not a few, who condemn it to be a mere sophism. As for ourselves, we neither have any mind to quarrel with other men's arguments *pro Deo;* nor yet would we be thought to lay stress, in this cause, upon any thing which is not every way solid and substantial. Wherefore we shall here endeavor to set down the utmost that possibly we can, both against this argument and for it, impartially and candidly; and then, when we have done, leave the intelligent readers to make their own judgment concerning the same.

Against it in this manner; first, because we can frame an idea in our own minds of an absolutely perfect being, including necessary existence in it, it will not at all follow from thence, that therefore there is such a perfect being really existing without our minds; we being able to frame in our minds the ideas of many other things, that never were, nor will be. All that can be certainly inferred from the idea of a perfect being seems to be this, that if it contain nothing which is contradictious to it, then it is not impossible but that there might be such a being actually existing. But the strength of this argument, not lying merely in this, that because we have an idea of a perfect being, therefore it is; but because we have such an idea of it as includeth necessary existence in it, which the idea of nothing else besides doth; therefore may it be here further objected in this manner: That though it be very true that a perfect being doth include necessary existence in it, because that cannot be every way perfect, whose existence is not necessary, but contingent; yet will it not follow from hence, that therefore there is such a perfect being actually existing; but all that can be deduced from it, will be no more than this, that whatsoever hath no necessary and eternal existence, is no absolutely perfect being. And again, that if there be any absolutely perfect being, then was its existence always necessary, and will be always such; that is, it did both exist of itself, from all eternity, without beginning, and must needs exist to eternity incorruptibly; it being never able to cease to be. It seems indeed no more to follow, that because a perfect being includes necessary existence in its idea, therefore there is such a perfect being actually existing; than because a perfect being includes necessary omniscience and omnipotence in it, that therefore there is such a perfect omniscient and omnipotent being: all that follows in both cases, being only this; that if there be any be-

ing absolutely perfect, then it is both omniscient and omnipotent, and it did exist of itself necessarily, and can never cease to be. Wherefore here lies a fallacy in this argumentation, when from the necessity of existence affirmed only hypothetically, or upon a supposition of a perfect being the conclusion is made concerning it absolutely. As some would prove the necessity of all human events, as for example Adam's sinning, in this manner, that it always was true before, that either Adam would eat the forbidden fruit, or not eat it; and if he would eat it, he would certainly eat it, and not contingently; and again, if he would not eat it, then would he certainly and necessarily not eat it; wherefore whether he will eat it, or not eat it, he will do either necessarily, and not contingently. Where it is plain, that an absolute necessity is wrongly inferred in the conclusion from an hypothetical one in the premises. In like manner, when upon supposition of an absolutely perfect being, it is affirmed of it, that its existence must not be contingent, but necessary, and from thence the conclusion is made absolutely, that there is such a perfect being; this seems to be the very same fallacy. From the idea of a perfect being including necessary existence in it, it follows undeniably, that if there be any thing absolutely perfect, it must exist necessarily, and not contingently: but it doth not follow, that there must of necessity be such a perfect being existing; these two propositions carrying a very different sense from one another. And the latter of them, that there must of necessity be a God, or perfect being existing, seems to be a thing altogether indemonstrable, it implying, that the existence of God, or a perfect being, may be proved *a priori*, or from some antecedent necessary cause; which was before declared to be a thing contradictious and impossible.

And now in justice are we obliged to plead the best we can also on the defensive side. Thus, therefore, the idea of God, or an absolutely perfect being, including in it not an impossible nor a contingent, but a necessary schesis or relation to existence, it follows from thence absolutely, and without any *ifs* and *ands*, that he doth exist. For as of things contradictious, having therefore in the idea of them an impossible schesis to existence, we can confidently conclude, that they never were nor will be; and as of other things not contradictious or impossible, but imperfect only, which therefore have a contingent schesis to existence, we can pronounce also, that possibly they might be, or might not be: in like manner, a perfect being including in the idea of it a necessary schesis to existence, or an impossible one to non-existence, or containing existence it its very essence: we may by parity of reason conclude concerning it, that it is neither impossible to be, nor

yet contingent to be, or not to be; but that it certainly is, and cannot but be; or that it is impossible it should not be. And indeed when we say of imperfect beings, implying no contradiction in them, that they may possibly either be, or not be, we herein tacitly suppose the existence of a perfect being, because nothing which is not, could be possible to be, were there not something actually in being, that hath sufficient power to cause or produce it. True, indeed, we have the ideas of many things in our minds, that never were, nor will be; but these are only such as include no necessary, but contingent existence in their nature; and it does not therefore follow, that a perfect being, which includes necessity of existence in its idea, may, notwithstanding, not be. Wherefore this necessity of existence, or impossibility of non-existence, contained in the idea of a perfect being, must not be taken hypothetically only or consequentially after this manner, that if there be any thing absolutely perfect, then its existence both was and will be necessary; but absolutely, that though contradictious things cannot possibly be, and things imperfect may possibly either be, or not be, yet a perfect being cannot but be; or it is impossible that it should not be. For otherwise were the force of the argumentation merely hypothetical in this manner: If there be a perfect being, then its existence both was, and will be necessary; this would plainly imply, that a perfect being, notwithstanding that necessity of existence included in its nature, might either be, or not be, or were contingent to existence; which is a manifest contradiction, that the same thing should exist both contingently and necessarily. And this hypothetical absurdity will more plainly appear, if the argument be expressed in other words, as that necessity of existence, and impossibility of non-existence, and actual existence, belong to the very essence of a perfect being; since it would be then ridiculous to go about to evade in this manner, that if there be a perfect being, then it is, and cannot but be. Which identical proposition is true of every thing else, but absurd. Wherefore there is something more to be inferred from the necessity of existence included in the idea of a perfect being than so; which can be nothing else but this, that it absolutely and actually is. Moreover, no Theists can be able to prove, that God, or a perfect being (supposed by them to exist), might not happen by chance only to be; if from the necessity of existence included in the idea of God, it cannot be inferred, that he could not but be. Notwithstanding which, here is no endeavor (as is pretended) to prove the existence of a God, or perfect being, *a priori*, neither, or from any necessary cause antecedent; but only from that necessity, which is included within itself, or is concomitant and con-

current with it; the necessity of its own perfect nature. And now we shall leave the intelligent and impartial reader to make his own judgment concerning the forementioned Cartesian argument for a Deity, drawn from its idea, as including necessity of existence in it, that therefore it is; whether it be merely sophistical, or hath something of solidity and reality in it. However, it is not very probable, that many Atheists will be convinced thereby, but that they will rather be ready to say that this is no probation at all of a Deity, but only an affirmation of the thing in dispute, and a mere begging of the question; that therefore God is, because he is, or cannot but be.

Wherefore we shall endeavor to make out an argument, or demonstration for the existence of a God, from his idea, as including necessary existence in it, some other ways: and, first, we shall make an offer towards it in this manner. Though it will not follow from hence, because we can frame an idea of any thing in our minds, that therefore such a thing really existeth; yet nevertheless, whatsoever we can frame an idea of, implying no manner of contradiction in its conception, we may certainly conclude thus much of it, that such a thing was not impossible to be; there being nothing to us impossible, but what is contradictious and repugnant to conception. Now, the idea of God, or perfect being, can imply no manner of contradiction in it, because it is only the idea of such a thing; as hath all possible and conceivable perfections in it; that is, all perfections, which are neither contradictious in themselves, nor to one another. And they, who will not allow of this consequence, from the idea of a perfect being, including necessity of existence in it, that it doth therefore actually exist, yet cannot deny, but that this at least will follow, from its implying, no manner of contradiction in it, that it is therefore a thing possible, or not impossible to be. For thus much being true of all other contingent things, whose idea implieth no contradiction, that they are therefore possible; it must needs be granted of that, whose very idea and essence containeth a necessity of existence in it, as the essence of nothing else but a perfect being doth. And this is the first step, that we now make in way of argumentation, from the idea of God, or a perfect being, having nothing contradictious in it, that therefore God is at least possible, or no way impossible to have been. In the next place, as this particular idea of that, which is possible, includeth necessity of existence in it; from these two things put together at least, the possibility of such a being, and its necessary existence (if not from the latter alone) will it according to reason follow, that he actually is. If God, or a perfect being, in whose essence is contained necessary existence, be possible, or no way

impossible to have been; then he is: because upon supposition of his nonexistence, it would be absolutely impossible that he should ever have been. It does not thus follow concerning imperfect beings, that are contingently possible, that if they be not, it was therefore impossible for them ever to have been; for that which is contingent, though it be not, yet might it for all that possibly have been. But a perfect necessarily existent being, upon the bare supposition of its non-existence, could no more possibly have been, than it could possibly hereafter be; because if it might have been, though it be not, then would it not be a necessary existent being. The sum of all is this, a necessary existent being, if it be possible, it is; because, upon supposition of its non-existence, it would be impossible for it ever to have been. Wherefore God is either impossible to have been, or else he is. For if God were possible, and yet be not, then is he not a necessary but contingent being; which is contrary to the hypothesis.

But because this argumentation may perhaps run the same fate also with the former, and, by reason of its subtlety, do but little execution neither, if not be accounted sophistical too; men being generally prone to distrust the firmness and solidity of such thin subtle cobwebs (as these and the like may seem to be), or their ability to support the weight of so great a truth; and to suspect themselves to be illaqueated, and circumvented in them: therefore shall we lay no stress upon this neither, but proceed to something which is yet more plain and downright, after this manner. Whatsoever we can frame an idea of in our minds, implying no manner of contradiction, this either actually is, or else if it be not, it is possible for it to be. But, if God be not, he is not possible hereafter to be; therefore he is. The reason and necessity of the minor is evident; because, if God be not, and yet possible hereafter to be, then would he not be an eternal and necessarily existent being, which is contradictious to his idea. And the ground of the major, upon which all the weight lies, hath been already declared, where we proved before, that if there were no God, or perfect being, we could never have had any conception or idea of him in our minds, because there can be no positive conception of an absolute nothing, that which hath neither actual nor possible existence. Here the posture of the argument is only inverted; because we have an idea of God, or a perfect being, implying no manner of contradiction in it, therefore must it needs have some kind of entity or other, either an actual or possible one; but God, if he be not, is not possible to be, therefore he doth actually exist.

But perhaps this argumentation also, how firm and solid soever, may prove less convictive of the existence of a God to the generality;

because whatever is received, is received according to the capacity of the recipient: and though a demonstration be never so good in itself, yet is it more or less such to particular persons, according to their ability to comprehend it; therefore shall we, in the next place, form yet a plainer demonstration for a God from the idea of him, including necessary existence in it: it being first premised, that unquestionably something or other did exist from all eternity, without beginning. For it is certain, that every thing could not be made, because nothing could come from nothing, or be made by itself; and therefore if once there had been nothing, there could never have been any thing. Whence it is undeniable, that there was always something, and consequently there was something unmade, which existed of itself from all eternity. Now all the question is, and indeed this is the only question betwixt Theists and Atheists; since something did certainly exist of itself from all eternity, what that thing is, whether it be a perfect, or an imperfect being? We say, therefore, that whatsoever existed of itself from eternity, and without beginning, did so exist naturally and necessarily, or by the necessity of its own nature. Now, nothing could exist of itself from eternity, naturally and necessarily, but that which containeth necessary and eternal self-existence in its own nature. But there is nothing which containeth necessary eternal existence in its own nature or essence, but only an absolutely perfect being; all other imperfect things being in their nature contingently possible, either to be, or not to be. Wherefore since something or other must and doth exist of itself naturally and necessarily from eternity unmade, and nothing could do this, but what included necessary self-existence in its nature or essence; it is certain, that it was a perfect being, or God, who did exist of himself from eternity, and nothing else; all other imperfect things which have no necessary self-existence in their nature, deriving their being from him. Here therefore are the Atheists infinitely absurd and unreasonable, when they will not acknowledge that, which containeth independent self-existence, or necessity of existence (which indeed is the same with an impossibility of non-existence), in its nature and essence, that is, a perfect being, so much as to exist at all: and yet in the mean time assert that, which hath no necessity of existence in its nature, the most imperfect of all beings, inanimate body and matter, to have existed of itself necessarily from all eternity.

We might here add, as a further confirmation of this argument, what hath been already proved, that no temporary successive being (whose duration is a continual flux, as if it were every moment generated anew), and therefore neither our own souls, nor the world, nor mat-

ter moving, could possibly have existed from eternity, and independently upon any other thing, but must have had a beginning, and been caused by something else; namely, by an absolutely perfect being, whose duration therefore is permanent, and without any successive generation, or flux.

But besides all these arguments, we may otherwise from the idea of God (already declared) be able both exactly to state the controversy betwixt Theists and Atheists, and satisfactorily to decide the same. In order whereunto there is yet something again to be premised; namely this, that as it is certain every thing was not made, but something existed of itself from eternity unmade; so is it likewise certain, that every thing was not unmade neither, nor existed of itself from eternity, but something was made and had a beginning. Where there is a full agreement betwixt Theists and Atheists, as to this one point, no Atheist asserting every thing to have been unmade, but they all acknowledging themselves to have been generated, and to have had a beginning; that is, their own souls and personalities, as likewise the lives and souls of all other men and animals. Wherefore, since something certainly existed of itself from eternity, but other things were made, and had a beginning (which therefore must needs derive their being from that which existed of itself unmade), here is the state of the controversy betwixt Theists and Atheists, whether that, which existed of itself from all eternity, and was the cause of all other things, were a perfect being and God, or the most imperfect of all things whatsoever, inanimate and senseless matter. The former is the doctrine of Theists, as Aristotle[1] affirmeth of those ancients, who did not write fabulously concerning the first principles, *οἷον Φερεκύδης, καὶ ἕτεροί τινες, τὸ γεννησαν πρῶτον τὸ Ἄριστον τιθέασι, καὶ οἱ Μάγοι· καὶ τῶν ὑστέρων δέ σοφῶν, οἷον Ἐμπεδοκλῆς τε καὶ Ἀναξαγόρας*; As namely, Pherecides, and the Magi, and Empedocles and Anaxagoras, and many others; that they agreed in this, that the first original of all things was the best, and most perfect.—Where by the way we may observe also, that, according to Aristotle, the ancient magi did not acknowledge a substantial evil principle, they making that, which is the best and most perfect being, alone by itself, to be the first begetter of all. This, I say, is the hypothesis of Theists, that there is one absolutely perfect being, existing of itself from all eternity, from whence all other lesser perfections, or imperfect beings, did gradually descend, till at last they end in senseless matter, or inanimate body. But the atheistic hypothesis, on the contrary,

[1] Met. l. xii. c. 5. [cap. iv. p. 446. tom. iv. oper.]

makes senseless matter the most imperfect thing, to be the first principle, or the only self-existent being, and the cause of all other things; and consequently all higher degrees of perfections that are in the world-to have climbed up or emerged by the way of ascent from thence; as life, sense, understanding, and reason, from that which is altogether dead and senseless. Nay, as it was before observed, there hath been amongst the ancient Pagans, a certain kind of religious Atheists, such as acknowledging verbally a God, or soul of the world presiding over the whole, supposed this notwithstanding to have first emerged also, out of senseless matter, night and chaos; and therefore doubtless to be likewise dissolvable again into the same. And of these is that place in Aristotle[1] to be understood, *βασιλεύειν καὶ ἄρχειν φασὶν οὐ τοὺς πρώτους οἷον Νύκτα, καὶ Οὐρανὸν, ἢ Χάος, ἢ καὶ Ὠκεανὸν, ἀλλὰ τὸν Δία·* They suppose not the first things, as Night, and the Heaven, and Chaos, and the Ocean, but Jupiter (or God) to rule and govern all.—Where it is intimated, that the Heaven, Night, Chaos, and the Ocean, according to these, were seniors to Jupiter, or in order of nature before him; they apprehending that things did ascend upward from that, which was most imperfect, as Night and Chaos, to the more perfect, and at length to Jupiter, himself, the mundane soul, who governeth the whole world, as our soul doth our body. Which same opinion is afterwards again taken notice of, and reprehended by Aristotle[2] in these words; *οὐκ ὀρθῶς δ' ὑπολαμβάνει οὐδ' εἴτις παρεικάζει τὰς τοῦ ὅλου ἀρχὰς, τῇ τῶν ζώων καὶ φυτῶν· ὅτι ἐξ ἀορίστων δὴ ἀεὶ τὰ τελείοτερα· ἄνθρωπος γὰρ ἄνθρωπον γεννᾷ καὶ οὐκ ἔστι σπέρμα πρῶτον·* Nor would he think rightly, who should resemble the principle of the universe to that of animals and plants: where, from indeterminate and imperfect things (as seeds) do always arise the more perfect. For even here also is the case otherwise than they suppose; for it is a man that generates a man; nor is the seed the first.

The controversy being thus clearly stated betwixt Theists and Atheists, it may now with great ease, and to the full conviction of all minds unprejudiced and unprepossessed with false principles, be determined; it being on the one hand undeniably evident, that lesser perfections may naturally descend from greater, or at least from that which is absolutely perfect, and which virtually containeth all: but, on the other hand, utterly impossible, that greater perfections, and higher degrees of being, should rise and ascend out of lesser and lower, so as that, which is the most absolutely imperfect of all things, should be the first

[1] Met. l. xii. c. 4. [p. 446. tom. iv. oper.]

[2] Met. l. xii. c. 5. Du Vall. [p. 448. tom. iv. oper.]

fountain and original of all: since no effect can possibly transcend the power of its cause. Wherefore it is certain, that in the universe things did not thus ascend and mount, or climb up from lower perfection to higher; but, on the contrary, descend and slide down from higher to lower: so that the first original of all things was not the most imperfect, but the most perfect being. But to speak more particularly; it is certain, notwithstanding all the vain pretences of Lucretius, and other Atheists, or semi-Atheists, to the contrary, that life and sense could never possibly spring out of dead and senseless matter, as its only origin, either in the way of atoms (no composition of magnitudes, figures, sites, and motions, being ever able to produce cogitation), in the way of qualities, since life and perception can no more result from any mixture of elements, or combinations of qualities of heat and cold, moist and dry, etc. than from unqualified atoms. This being undeniably demonstrable from that very principle of reason, which the Atheists are so fond of, but misunderstanding abuse (as shall be manifested afterward,) that nothing can come from nothing. Much less could understanding and reason in men ever have emerged out of stupid matter, devoid of all manner of life. Wherefore we must needs here freely declare against the darkness of that philosophy, which hath been sometimes unwarily entertained by such as were no Atheists, that sense may rise from a certain modification, mixture, or organization of dead and senseless matter; as also that understanding and reason may result from sense: the plain consequence of both which is, that senseless matter may prove the original of all things, and the only Numen. Which doctrine therefore is, doubtless, a main piece of the philosophy of the kingdom of darkness. But this darkness hath been of late in great measure dispelled by the light of the atomic philosophy, restored, as it was in its first genuine and virgin state, undeflowered as yet by Atheists; this clearly showing, how far body and mechanism can go, and that life and cogitation can never emerge out from thence; it being built upon that fundamental principle, as we have made it evident in the first chapter, that *Nothing can come from nothing.* And Strato and the hylozoic Atheists were so well aware, and so sensible of this, that all life and understanding could not possibly be generated or made, but that there must be some fundamental and substantial, or eternal unmade life and knowledge, that they therefore have thought necessary to attribute life, and perception (or understanding,) with appetite, and self-moving power, to all matter as such, that so it might be thereby fitly qualified to be the original of all things; than which opinion as nothing can be more monstrous, so shall we elsewhere evince the impos-

sibility thereof. In the meantime, we doubt not to aver, that the argument proposed is a sufficient demonstration of the impossibility of Atheism; which will he further manifested in our answer to the second atheistic objection against a Divine creation, because nothing can come from nothing.

But this controversy betwixt Theists and Atheists may be yet more particularly stated from the idea of God, as including mind or understanding in it essentially, *viz.* Whether mind be eternal and unmade, as being the maker of all; or else, Whether all mind were itself made or generated, and that out of senseless matter? For, according to the doctrine of the Pagan Theists, mind was *προγενέστατος, καὶ Κύριος κατὰ φύσιν*, the oldest of all things, senior to the world and elements, and by nature hath a princely and lordly dominion over all.—But, according to those Atheists, who make matter, or body, devoid of all life and understanding, to be the first principle, mind must be *ὑστερογενὴς*, a postnate thing—younger than the world; a weak, umbratile, and evanid image and next to nothing.

And the controversy, as thus stated, may be also clearly and satisfactorily decided. For, first, we say, that as it is certainly true, that if there had been once nothing at all, there could never have been any thing; so is it true likewise, that if once there had been no life in the whole universe, but all had been dead, then could there never have been any life or motion in it; and if once there had been no mind, understanding, or knowledge, then could there never have been any mind or understanding produced. Because, to suppose life and understanding to rise and spring up out of that which is altogether dead and senseless, as its only original, is plainly to suppose something to come out of nothing. It cannot be said so of other things, as of the corporeal world and matter, that if once they had not been, they could never possibly have been; because, though there had been no world nor matter, yet might these have been produced from a perfect, omnipotent incorporeal being, which in itself eminently containeth all things. Dead and senseless matter could never have created or generated mind and understanding, but a perfect omnipotent mind could create matter. Wherefore, because there is mind, we are certain, that there was some mind or other from eternity without beginning; though not because there is body, that therefore there was body or matter from eternity unmade. Now these imperfect minds of ours were by no means themselves eternal or without beginning; but from an antecedent non-existence brought forth into being; but since no mind could spring out of dead and senseless matter, and all minds could not possibly be made,

nor one produced from another infinitely; there must of necessity be an eternal unmade mind, from whence those imperfect minds of ours were derived. Which perfect omnipotent mind was as well the cause of all other things, as of human souls.

But before we proceed to any further argumentation, we must needs take notice here, that the Atheists suppose no small part of their strength to lie in this very thing, namely, their disproving a God from the nature of understanding and knowledge: nor do they indeed swagger in any thing more than this. We have already set it for the eleventh atheistic argument, that knowledge being the information of the things themselves known, and all conception the action of that which is conceived, and the passion of the conceiver; the world and all sensible things must needs be before there could be any knowledge or conception of them, and no knowledge or conception before the world as its cause. Or more briefly thus: the world could not be made by knowledge and understanding, because there could be no knowledge or understanding of the world, or of any thing in it, before it was made. For, according to these Atheists, things made knowledge, and not knowledge things; they meaning by things here such only as are sensible and corporeal. So that mind and understanding could not be the creator of the world and these sensible things, itself being the mere creature of them; a secondary derivative result from them, or a fantastic image of them; the youngest and most creaturely thing in the whole world. Whence it follows, that to suppose mind and understanding to be the maker of all things would be no better sense, than if one should suppose the images in ponds and rivers to be the makers of the sun, moon, and stars, and other things represented in them. And upon such a ground as this, does a modern writer presume to determine, that knowledge and understanding are not to be attributed to God Almighty, because they imply imperfection, and dependence upon corporeal things without: [1]"Quoniam scientia et intellectus in nobis nihil aliud sunt, quam suscitatus a rebus externis organa prementibus animi tumultus, non est putandum aliquid tale accidere Deo. Signum enim potentiæ ab alio dependentis." Which is again Englished thus: [2]Knowledge and understanding being in us nothing else but a tumult in the mind, raised by external things, that press the organical parts of man's body; there is no such thing in God, nor can they be attributed to him, they being things, which depend upon natural causes.—Where this writer thus denying knowledge and understanding to God, upon

[1] De Cive Rel. cap. xv. sect. 14. [2] Leviathan, cap. xxxi.

pretence, that it speaks imperfection, and dependence upon external corporeal things (it being nothing but a tumult raised by the motions and pressures of them), he must needs absolutely deny the first principle of all things to be any knowing understanding nature, unless he had asserted some other kind of knowledge distinct from that of men, and clearly attributed the same to God Almighty. Hitherto the sense of Atheists.

Now we shall, for the present, only so far forth concern ourselves in confuting this atheistic doctrine, as to lay a foundation thereby for the demonstration of the contrary, namely, the existence of a God, or a mind before the world, from the nature of knowledge and understanding. First, therefore, it is a sottish conceit of these Atheists, proceeding from their not attending to their own cogitations, that not only sense, but also knowledge and understanding in men, is but a tumult, raised from corporeal things without, pressing upon the organs of their body; or else, as they declare themselves more distinctly, nothing but the activity of sensible objects upon them, and their passion from them. For if this were true, then would every thing, that suffered and reacted motion, especially polite bodies, as looking-glasses, have something both of sense and understanding in them. It is plain, that there comes nothing to us from bodies without us, but only local motion and pressure. Neither is sense itself the mere passion of those motions, but the perception of their passions in a way of fancy. But sensible things themselves (as, for example, light and colors) are not known or understood either by the passion, or the fancy of sense, nor by any thing merely foreign and adventitious, but by intelligible ideas exerted from the mind itself, that is, by something native and domestic to it: nothing being more true, than this of Boetius,[1] that, "Omne, quod scitur, non ex sua, sed ex comprehendentium natura, vi, et facultate cognoscitur;" Whatsoever is known, is known not by its own force and power, but by the force and power, the vigor and activity, of that thing itself, which knows or comprehends it.—Wherefore, besides the phantasms of singular bodies, or of sensible things existing without us (which are not mere passions neither), it is plain, that our human mind hath other cogitations or conceptions in it; namely, the ideas of the intelligible natures and essences of things, which are universal, and by and under which it understands singulars. It is a ridiculous conceit of a modern atheistic writer, that universals are nothing else but names, attributed to many singular bodies, because whatsoever *is* is singular. For though

[1] Vide Consolat. Philosoph. lib. v. p. 131.

whatsoever exists without the mind be singular, yet it is plain, that there are conceptions in our minds objectively universal. Which universal objects of our mind, though they exist not as such any where without it, yet are they not therefore nothing, but have an intelligible entity for this very reason, because they are conceivable; for since nonentity is not conceivable, whatsoever is conceivable, and an object of the mind, is therefore something. And as for axiomatical truths, in which something is affirmed or denied, as these are not all passions from bodies without us; (for what local motions could impress this common notion upon our minds, that things which agree in one third, agree amongst themselves, or any other?) so neither are these things only gathered by induction from repeated and reiterated sensations; we clearly apprehending at once, that it is impossible they should be otherwise. Thus Aristotle[1] ingeniously: *Οὐδὲ ἐπίστασθαι δὶ' αἰσθήσεώς ἐστιν, ὅτι καὶ εἰ ἦν αἰσθάνεσθαι, ὅτι τὸ τρίγωνον δυσὶν ὀρθαῖς ἔχει τὰς γωνίας, ἐζητοῦμεν ἂν ἀπόδειξιν, καὶ οὐχ ὡς φασί τινες ἐπιστάμεθα· αἰσθάνεσθαι μὲν γὰρ ἀνάγκη καθ' ἕκαστον, ἡ δὲ ἐπιστήμη τῷ καθόλου γνωρίζειν ἔστι.* It is evident, that there is no knowledge (of the universal theorems of geometry) by sense. For if we could perceive by sense, that the three angles of a triangle were equal to two right; yet should we not rest satisfied in this, as having therefore a sufficient knowledge hereof; but would seek further after a demonstration of it: sense reaching only to singulars, but knowledge to universals.—When from the universal idea of a triangle, which is neither here, nor there, nor any where, without our mind, but yet hath an intelligible entity, we see a plain necessity, that its three angles must be equal to two right, then do we know the truth of this universal theorem, and not before: as also we understand, that every singular triangle (so far as it is true) hath this property in it. Wherefore the knowledge of this, and the like truths, is not derived from singulars, nor do we arrive to them in way of ascent from singulars to universals: but, on the contrary, having first found them in the universals, we afterward descending, apply them to singulars: so that our knowledge here is not after singular bodies, and secondarily or derivatively from them, but in order of nature before them, and proleptical to them.

Now these universal conceptions, some of which are also abstract (as life, sense, reason, knowledge and the like), many of them are of such things, whose singulars do not fall at all under sense; which therefore could never possibly be impressed upon us from singular bodies by local

[1] Analytic. posterior. lib. i. p. 226. tom. i. oper.

motion: and again some such, as though they belong to corporeal and sensible things, yet, as their accuracy cannot be reached to by sense, so neither did they ever exist in that matter of this lower world, which here encompasseth us, and therefore could not be stamped upon us from without: as for example, the ideas of a perfect straight line, and a plain superficies, or of an exact triangle, circle, sphere, or cube; no material thing here amongst us being terminated in so straight lines, but that even by microscopes there may be discovered much irregularity and deformity in them; and very probable it is, that there are no perfectly straight lines, no such triangles, circles, spheres, or cubes, as answer to the exactness of our conceptions, in any part of the whole material universe, nor never will be. Notwithstanding which, they are not absolute nonentities, since we can demonstrate things concerning them, and though they never were nor will be, yet are they possible to exist, since nothing can be conceived, but it either is, or else is possible to be. The human mind therefore hath a power of framing ideas and conceptions, not only of what actually is, but also of things, which never were, nor perhaps will be, they being only possible to be. But when, from our conceptions, we conclude of some things, that though they are not, yet they are possible to be, unless there be something actually in being, which hath sufficient power to produce it; we do implicitly suppose the existence of a God or omnipotent being thereby, which can make whatever is conceivable, though it yet be not to exist; and therefore material triangles, circles, spheres, cubes, mathematically exact.

The result of what we have hitherto said is this, that since singular bodies are not the only objects of our mind and cogitation, it having also universal and abstract ideas of the intelligible natures or essences of things (some of which are such, whose singulars do not at all fall under sense; others, though they belong to bodies, yet sense can never reach to them, nor were they ever in matter): moreover, since our mind can conceive of things, which no where actually exist, but are only possible, and can have such a demonstrative science of universal truths, as sense can never ascend to: that therefore human knowledge and understanding itself is not the mere image and creature of singular bodies only; and so derivative, or ectypal from them, and in order of nature junior to them, but that, as it were hovering aloft over all the corporeal universe, it is a thing independent upon singular bodies, or proleptical to them, and in order of nature before them.

But what account can we then possibly give of knowledge and understanding, their nature and original? since there must be νοητὸν, that

which is intelligible—in order of nature, before *νόησις*, or intellection. —Certainly no other than this, that the first original knowledge is that of a perfect being, infinitely good and powerful, comprehending itself, and the utmost extent of its own fecundity and power, that is, the possibilities of all things; their ideas, with their several relations to one another; all necessary and immutable truths. Here therefore is there a knowledge before the world and all sensible things, that was archetypal and paradigmatical to the same. Of which one perfect mind and knowledge all other imperfect minds (being derived from it) have a certain participation; whereby they are enabled to frame intelligible ideas, not only of whatsoever doth actually exist, but also of such things as never were nor will be, but are only possible, or objects of Divine power.

Wherefore, since it is certain, that even human knowledge and understanding itself is not a mere passion from sensible things, and singular bodies existing without (which is the only foundation of that forementioned atheistic argument, that things made knowledge, and not knowledge things), and consequently it must needs have some other original: moreover, since knowledge and understanding apprehend things proleptically to their existence (mind being able to frame conceptions of all possible entities and modifications), and therefore in their nature do plainly suppose the actual existence of a perfect being, which is infinitely fecund and powerful and could produce all things possible or conceivable; the first original Knowledge, or Mind, from whence all other knowledges and minds are derived, being that of an absolutely perfect and omnipotent Being, comprehending itself, and the extent of its own power, or of its communicability, that is, the ideas of all possibilities of things, that may be produced by it, together with their relations to one another, and their necessary immutable truths; accordingly as wisdom and understanding are described to be, [1]*ἀτμὶς τῆς τοῦ θεοῦ δυνάμεως, ἀπόῤῥοια τῆς τοῦ παντοκράτορος δόξης, ἔσοπτρον τῆς τοῦ θεοῦ ἐνεργείας, καὶ εἰκὼν τῆς ἀγαθότητος αὐτοῦ*, the breath (or vapor) of the power of God, and an efflux (or emanation) from the glory of the Almighty, a clear mirror (or looking-glass) of his active energy or virtue, and the image of his goodness:—I say, the result of all is this, that the nature of knowledge and understanding is so far from being a ground of disproving a Deity (as the Atheists ignorantly pretend), that it affordeth a firm demonstration to us, on the contrary, of the existence of a God, a perfect omnipotent being, comprehending itself, and the extent of its own power, or all possibilities of things; a mind before the

[1] Wisd. c. vii.

world, and senior to all things; no ectypal, but archetypal thing, which comprehended in it, as a kind of intellectual world, the paradigm or platform, according to which this sensible world was made.

And this may be further confirmed from what is generally acknowledged, and indeed cannot reasonably be denied by any, viz. that there are eternal verities, such as were never made, nor can ever be destroyed, or cease to be: as for example, such common notions as these, that equals added to equals make equals; that the cause is in order of nature before the effect, etc. together with all geometrical theorems; as Aristotle himself declareth, he writing in his Ethics[1] after this manner: *περὶ ἀϊδίων οὐδεὶς βουλεύεται, οἷον περὶ τῆς διαμέτρου καὶ τῆς πλευρᾶς ὅτι ἀσύμμετροι·* Concerning eternal (and immutable) things no man does consult; as for example, concerning the diameter or diagonal of a square, whether it should be incommensurable to the sides, or no.—Where he plainly affirmeth this geometrical theorem, that the diameter or diagonal of a square is incommensurable to the sides, to be an eternal truth. Neither are such eternal truths as these only in mathematics, and concerning quantity, but also in ethics concerning morality; there being here *αἰώνια δίκαια*, as Justin Martyr calls them, things eternally just—which were not made such at certain times by law and arbitrary command, but being such in their own nature immutably, were from everlasting to everlasting, and (as it is said of that eternal Word, which comprehends all truth) the same yesterday, to-day, and for ever.[2] For of these is that famous passage of Sophocles in his Antigona,[3]

Οὐ γάρ τι νῦνγε κἀχθὲς, ἀλλ' ἀεί ποτε
Ζῇ ταῦτα, κοὐδεὶς οἶδεν ἐξ ὅτου ηφάν'·

These are not things of to-day, or yesterday, but they ever live, and no man knows their date, or from whence they came. No man can declare the time, when all common notions, and geometrical truths, were first made and generated out of nothing, or brought out of antecedent nonexistence into being. Certain it is, that such truths as these, that the diameter and sides of a square are incommensurable, or that the power of the hypotheneuse in a rectangular triangle is equal to the powers of both the sides, were not made by any man's thinking, or by those first geometricians, who discovered or demonstrated the same; they discovering and demonstrating only that which was. Wherefore these truths were before there was any man to think of them, and they would con-

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[1] Ethicor. ad Nicomach. lib. iii. cap. v. p. 39. tom. iii. oper.

[2] Heb. xiii. 8. [3] Ver. 467, 468.

tinue still to be, though all the men in the world should be annihilated: nay, though there were no material squares and triangles any where in the whole world neither, no, nor any matter at all: for they were ever without beginning before the world, and would of necessity be ever after it, should it cease to be.

Now, if there be eternal truths, which were never made, and could not but be, then must the "rationes rerum," the simple reasons of things also, or their intelligible natures and essences, out of which those truths are compounded, be of necessity eternal likewise. For how can this be an eternal truth, that the diameter of a square is incommensurable with the sides, if the *rationes*, the reasons of a square, diameter, and sides, or their intelligible essences, were not themselves eternal? These are therefore called by Plato (a man of much meditation, and no contemptible philosopher) not only *ἀεὶ ταῦτα καὶ ὡσαύτως ἔχοντα*, things which are always the same, and unchangeable—but also *τὰ μὴ γιγνόμενα, ἀλλ' ἀεὶ ὄντα*, things which were never made but always are—and sometimes, *μήτε γιγνόμενα, μήτε ἀπολλύμενα*, things that were neither made, nor can be destroyed—sometimes, *τὰ ἀγέννητα καὶ ἀνώλεθρα*, things ingenerable and incorruptible.—Of which Cicero[1] thus: "Hæc Plato negat gigni, sed semper esse, et ratione et intelligentia contineri." These things Plato affirmeth to have been never made, but always to be, and to be contained in reason and understanding.—And, though perhaps it may seem strange, even Aristotle[2] himself also, notwithstanding his so often clashing with Plato's ideas, here really agreeth in the main, that the forms and species, or the universal intelligible essences of things, which are the proper and immediate objects of science, were eternal and never made; thus in his Metaphysics, *Τὸ εἶδος οὐδεὶς ποιεῖ οὐδὲ γεννᾶται*, No man makes the form, or species of a thing, nor was it ever generated; and again, *Τοῦ σφαῖρα εἶναι οὐκ ἔστι γένεσις*, There is no generation of the essence of a sphere;—and, *Ἄνευ γενέσεως καὶ φθορᾶς τὰ εἴδη*, The forms or species of things are without any generation or corruption.—And he sometimes calleth these objects of science *ἀκίνητον οὐσίαν*[3] or *φύσιν*, an immutable essence of nature.—Lastly, where he writeth against the Heraclitics, and those other sceptics, who denied all certainty of science he first discovers the ground of their error herein to have been this, that they supposed singular bodies,

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[1] De Oratore ad Brutum, cap. ii. p. 695. tom. iii. oper.

[2] Vide Metaphysic. lib. vii. cap. viii. p. 361. et lib. xiv. cap. iii. p. 473. tom. iv. oper.

[3] Ibid. lib. xiv. cap. ii. p. 472. et cap. vi. p. 477.

or sensibles existing without, to be the only things or objects of the mind, or knowledge :[1] *Αἴτιον τῆς δόξης τούτοις, ὅτι περὶ τῶν ὄντων τὴν ἀλήθειαν ἐσκόπουν, τὰ δὲ ὄντα ὑπέλαβον εἶναι τὰ αἰσθητὰ μόνον, ἐν δὲ τούτοις πολλὴ ἡ τοῦ ἀορίστου φύσις ἐνυπάρχει—ἔτι δὲ πᾶσαν ὁρῶντες ταύτην κινουμένην τὴν φύσιν, κατάγε τοῦ μεταβάλλοντος οὐδὲν ἀληθευόμενον, περίγε τὸ πάντως πάντα μετάβαλλον, οὐκ ἐκδέχεσθαι ἀληθεύειν.* The original of these men's mistake was this, because truth was to be looked for in things, and they conceived the only things to be sensibles, in which it is certain there is much of the indeterminate nature. Wherefore they, perceiving all the nature of sensibles to be movable, or in perpetual flux and mutation, since nothing can possibly be verified or constantly affirmed concerning that, which is not the same but changeable, concluded, that there could be no truth at all, nor certainty of science; those things, which are the only objects of it, never continuing the same.—And then he subjoins, in way of opposition to this sceptical doctrine of theirs, and the forementioned ground thereof, *Ἀξιώσομεν αὐτοὺς ὑπολαμβάνειν καὶ ἄλλην οὐσίαν εἶναι τῶν ὄντων, ᾗ οὔτε κίνησις ὑπάρχει οὔτε φθορὰ οὔτε γένεσις τὸ παράπαν·* We would have these men therefore to know, that there is another kind of essence of things, besides that of sensibles, to which belongeth neither motion, nor corruption, nor any generation at all.—By which essences of things, they have no generation nor corruption, he could understand nothing else but those intelligible natures, species, and ideas, which are the standing and immutable objects of science. And certain it is, that there could be no constant and immutable science at all, were there no other objects of the mind, but singulars and sensibles, because these are all mutable. Wherefore the proper and immediate objects of the geometrical science are no singular and material triangles, squares, spheres, and cubes, etc. not only because none of these are found mathematically exact, and because geometricians, in all the several distant ages and places of the world, could not have the same singular bodies before them, but also because they do none of them continue immutably the same; all corporeal things being more or less in perpetual motion and mutation; whereas, that of which any geometrical theorem is verified and demonstrated, must be immutably and unalterably the same. The triangles and circles, spheres and cubes, of Euclid, Archimides, Pappus, Apollonius, and all other ancient and modern geometricians, in all the distant places and times of the world, were both indivisibly one and the same, and also perfectly immutable and incorruptible, the science of geome-

[1] Ibid. lib. iv. cap. v. p. 313.

try being such. For which cause it is affirmed also of these mathematical things, by the forementioned Aristotle,[1] that they are no where as in a place, as all singular bodies are, *Ἄτοπον δὲ καὶ τὸν τόπον ἅμα τοῖς στερεοῖς τοῖς Μαθηματικοῖς ποιῆσαι, ὁ μὲν γὰρ τόπος τῶν καθ' ἕκαστον ἴδιος· διὸ χωριστὰ τόπῳ· τὰ δὲ Μαθηματικά, οὐ ποῦ.* It is absurd to make mathematical things to be in a place, as solid bodies are; for place belongeth only to singulars, which are therefore separable from one another by place; but mathematical things are not any where.—Because they being universal and abstract, are only in minds: nevertheless, for the same reason are they also every where, they being in every mind that apprehends them. Lastly, these intelligible essences and ideas of things are called also by Philo,[2] *ἀναγκαιότατται οὐσίαι*, the most necessary essences;— as being not only eternal, but having likewise necessary existence belonging to them: for though there be no absolute necessity, that there should be matter or body, yet is there an absolute necessity that there should be truth.

If therefore there be eternal intelligibles or ideas, and eternal truths, and necessary existence do belong to them; then must there be an eternal mind necessarily existing, since these truths and intelligible essences of things cannot possibly be any where but in a mind. For by the essences of things, when they are said to be eternal, must not be meant their very substances, as if every thing were in itself eternal and uncreated; or that God in creation, did only, as a modern writer abusively expresseth it, "sartoris instar, vestire essentias rerum nova existentia," clothe the antecedent essences of things with a new garment of existence;—but only their *esse cognitum*, their possible and intelligible natures,—as they were objects of infinite power and understanding before they were made. There must be a mind senior to the world, and all sensible things, and such as at once comprehends in it the idea of all intelligibles, their necessary scheses and relations to one another, and all their immutable truths; a mind, which doth not *ὅτὲ μὲν νοεῖν, ὅτὲ δὲ οὐ νοεῖν* (as Aristotle[3] writeth of it), sometimes understand, and sometimes not understand, as if we were sometimes awake and sometimes asleep, or like an eye, sometimes open, and sometimes shut; but *οὐσία ἐνέργεια*, such a mind as is essentially act and energy, and hath no defect in it. And this, as we have already declared, can be no other than the mind of an omnipotent and infinitely perfect being, com-

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[1] Met. lib. xii. cap. v. (page 448. tom. iv. oper.)

[2] Legis Allogor. lib. i. p. 68. oper.

[3] Vide Metaphys. lib. xiv. cap. ix. p. 483.

prehending itself, and the extent of its own power, or how far itself is communicable, that is, all the possibilities of things, that may be made by it, and their respective truths; mind and knowledge, in the very nature of it, supposing the actual existence of an omnipotent or infinitely powerful being, as its *νοητὸν*, or intelligible;—it being nothing but the comprehension of the extent of infinite or Divine power, and the measure of the same.

And from hence it is evident also, that there can be but one only original mind, or no more than one understanding being self-existent; all other minds whatsoever partaking of one original mind; and being, as it were, stamped with the impression or signature of one and the same seal. From whence it cometh to pass, that all minds, in the several places and ages of the world, have ideas or notions of things exactly alike, and truths indivisibly the same. Truths are not multiplied by the diversity of minds that apprehend them; because they are all but ectypal participations of one and the same original or archetypal mind and truth. As the same face may be reflected in several glasses; and the image of the same sun may be in a thousand eyes at once beholding it; and one and the same voice may be in a thousand ears listening to it: so when innumerable created minds have the same ideas of things, and understand the same truths, it is but one and the same eternal light, that is reflected in them all ("that light which enlighteneth every man that cometh into the world"); or the same voice of that one everlasting Word, that is never silent, re-echoed by them. Thus was it concluded by Themistius, that one man by teaching, could not possibly beget in the mind of another the very same notions, conceptions, knowledges, which himself had in his own mind, *εἰ μὴ τοὐτὸν ἦν τὸ νόημα τοῦ διδάσκοντος καὶ τοῦ μανθάνοντος;* were not the minds both of the teacher and of the learner, as it were, printed and stamped alike.—As also that men could not possibly so confer together as they do, presently apprehending one another's meaning, and raising up the very same senses in their minds, and that merely by occasion of words and sounds, *εἰ μήτις ἦν Εἷς Νοῦς οὗ πάντες ἐκοινωνοῦμεν*, were there not some one mind which all men did partake of.—As for that anti-monarchical opinion of many understanding beings, or minds, self-originated, and independent (none of which therefore could be omnipotent), it is neither conceivable, how such should all agree in the same truths, there being no common measure of truth betwixt them, no more than any common rule of their wills; nor indeed how they should have any knowledge or understanding at all, properly so called, that being the comprehension of the possibilities of things, or of the extent of infinite power: whereas, according to

this hypothesis, there is no infinite power at all, the power of each of those many supposed principles or deities being limited and finite, and therefore indeed not creative of any thing neither, since that, which could create one thing, could create all, and consequently would have all depending upon it. We conclude therefore, that from the nature of mind and knowledge it is demonstrable, that there can be but one original and self-existent mind, or understanding being, from which all other minds were derived. And now have we, more copiously than we designed, confuted the first atheistic argument; we having not only asserted the idea of God, and fully answered and refelled all the atheistic pretences against the same; but also from this very idea of God, or a perfect being, demonstrated his existence. We shall dispatch the following atheistic objections with more brevity.

We come, in the next place, to the Achilles of the Atheists, their invincible argument against a Divine creation and omnipotence; because, "Nothing could come from nothing." It being concluded from hence, that whatsoever substantially or really is, was from all eternity of itself unmade or uncreated by any deity. Or else thus; by God is always understood a creator of some real entity or other out of nothing; but it is an undoubted principle of reason and philosophy, an undeniable common notion, that "Nothing can be made out of nothing," and therefore there can be no such creative power as this. And here we shall perform these three things; first, we shall show, that, in some senses, this is indeed an unquestionable truth, and common notion, that "Nothing can come from nothing," and what those senses are. Secondly, we shall make it evident, that in the sense of this atheistic objection, it is absolutely false, that "Nothing can come from nothing," or be made out of nothing; and that a Divine creation and omnipotence can be no way impugned from the forementioned principle rightly understood. Thirdly, and lastly, we shall prove, that as from this principle or common notion, "Nothing out of nothing," there can be no execution at all done against Theism, or a Divine creation; so from the very same, rightly understood, the impossibility of all Atheism may be demonstratively proved, it bringing something out of nothing in an impossible sense, as also the existence of a God evinced.

We grant therefore, in the first place, that this is in some sense an undoubted principle of reason, or an undeniable common notion, that "Nothing can come from nothing." For, first, it is unquestionably true, that "Nothing, which once was not, could ever of itself come into being;" or, that "Nothing could bring itself out of nonexistence into

being;" that "Nothing can take beginning of existence from itself;" or, that "Nothing can be made or produced without an efficient cause." And from hence, as hath been already intimated, it is demonstratively certain, that every thing was not made, but that there is something necessarily self-existent, and which could not but be. For had every thing been made, then must something of necessity have been made out of nothing by itself; which is impossible.

Again; As nothing, which was not, could ever of itself come into being, or be made, without an efficient cause; so is it certain likewise, that nothing can be efficiently caused or produced by that, which hath not in it at least equal (if not greater) perfection, as also sufficient power to produce the same. We say, nothing which was not, could ever be brought into being by that which hath not formally equal perfection in it; because no thing can give what it hath not, and therefore so much of the perfection or entity of the effect, as is greater than that of the supposed cause, so much thereof must needs come from nothing, or be made without a cause. Moreover, whatsoever hath equal perfection to another thing, could not therefore cause or produce that other thing; because it might either have no active power at all, as matter hath not, it being merely passive, or else no sufficient active and productive power. As for example, though it be not impossible, that motion, which once was not, should be produced; yet is it impossible, that it should be ever produced without a sufficient cause. Wherefore, if there were once no motion at all in the whole world, nor no life, or self-active power, in any thing, but all were dead; then is it certain, that there could never possibly arise any motion or mutation in it to all eternity. There being no sufficient cause to produce the same; since nothing can produce motion but that which hath life or self-activity in it; and if motion, or any thing else, should begin to be, without a sufficient cause, then must it needs be caused by itself, or of itself come into being; which is a thing impossible. Now no imperfect being whatsoever hath a sufficient emanative power to create any other substance, or produce it out of nothing; the utmost that can be done by imperfect beings, is only to produce new accidents and modifications; as human souls can produce new cogitations in themselves, and new local motion in bodies.

No imperfect being is substantially emanative, or can produce another substance out of nonexistence. Therefore, for any substance to be brought into being by an imperfect substance, which hath not sufficient emanative or creative power, is a thing plainly impossible; it being all one as to say, that a substance might of itself come out of nothing into being. And thus is it granted, that no substance could be created, or brought

out of nonexistence into being, but by the sole efficiency of an absolutely perfect being, which hath both greater perfection (it eminently containing all things in it), and also a sufficient emanative or creative power.

And now have we given an account of two senses, wherein it is impossible for "any thing to come from nothing;" one, for a thing, which was not, to bring itself into being, or to be made without an efficient cause. Another, for a thing to be efficiently caused by that, which hath not at least equal perfection in it, or a sufficient emanative or productive power. Both which senses of this axiom respect the efficient cause; and thus was it frequently understood by divers of the ancients and particularly by Cicero.[1] We shall now propound a third sense, wherein this axiom is also verified, that "Nothing can be made out of nothing," respecting chiefly the material cause. For since no imperfect natural being hath any creative power, or can efficiently produce any new substance, or real entity, which was not before, into being, but only act upon pre-existing matter by motion, and modify the same, and since matter, as such, being merely passive, cannot cause any thing that was not before, or will not result from the composition or modification of it; it follows undeniably, that in all natural generations and productions out of pre-existent matter (without a Divine creation), there can never be any new substance or real entity brought out of nonexistence into being. And this was that very thing, and no other, which the ancient physiologers meant, when (as Aristotle[2] tells us) they so much insisted upon this principle, *Τὸ γιγνόμενον ἐκ μὴ ὄντων γίνεσθαι ἀδύνατον*, That it was impossible, that any real entity should be (naturally) made or generated out of nothing;—or, as it is also otherwise expressed.[3] *Οὐδὲν οὐδὲ γίνεσθαι οὐδὲ φθείρεσθαι τῶν ὄντων*, that no real entity was either generated or corrupted.—That is, that in natural generations, corruptions, and alterations (where God is supposed not miraculously to interpose), there is no creation of any new substance, or real entity, out of nothing, nor annihilation, or destruction of any into nothing.

We are not ignorant, that the generality of modern writers have interpreted this doctrine of the old physiologers in Aristotle into quite different sense; as designing therein to take away all Divine creation

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[1] Vide lib. ejus de Fato.

[2] Natural. Auscultat. lib. i. p. 451. tom. i. oper. vide etiam. cap. viii. p. 457, et alias.

[3] Ibid. lib. i. cap. viii. p. 457.

out of nothing (or nonexistence); they making all things to have sprung out of matter (existing of itself from eternity) either without a God, or else rather (because Parmenides and Empedocles, and other asserters of this doctrine, were undoubted Theists) with him. So that God could not create any new entity out of nothing, but only make things out of pre-existing unmade matter, as a carpenter doth a house, or a weaver a piece of cloth. And thus it is commonly taken for granted, that no Pagan philosopher ever went so far, as to acknowledge a Divine creation of any thing out of nothing, in the sense of Christian theologers. And here we grant indeed, that, besides the Stoics, there have been some other philosophic Theists amongst the Pagans of this persuasion, that nothing was, nor could be made by God, otherwise than out of something pre-existing; as Plutarchus Chæronensis for one, who in a place already cited positively affirmeth,[1] *τὸν μὲν κόσμον ὑπο θεοῦ γεγονέναι, τὴν δὲ οὐσὶαν καὶ ὕλην ἐξ ἧς γέγονεν, οὐ γενομένην, ἀλλὰ ὑποκειμένην, ἀεὶ τῷ δημιουργῷ;* that though the world were indeed made by God, yet the substance or matter, out of which it was made, was not made.—And then he subjoins this very reason for it, *οὐ γὰρ ἐκ τοῦ μὴ ὄντος γένεσις, ἀλλ᾽ οὐκ τοῦ μὴ καλῶς, μηδ᾽ ἱκανῶς ἔχοντος, ὡς οἰκίας καὶ ἱματίου καὶ ἀνδριάντος·* because there can be no making of any thing out of nothing, but only out of something pre-existing, not rightly ordered, or sufficiently disposed; as in a house, garment, or statue.—From which conceit of Plutarch's though he were otherwise ingenious, it may well be supposed, that the dull Bœotic air had too much effect upon him. However, neither Plutarch nor the Stoics, as we conceive, are for this to be accounted absolute and downright Atheists, but only imperfect, mongrel, and spurious Theists. And therefore were Atheists never so much able to prove, that there could be no creation out of nothing pre-existing, which they cannot at all do; yet would not this overthrow Theism in general, there being a latitude therein. Nevertheless, it will undeniably appear from what shall follow, that those ancient Italics and Pythagorics were so far from intending here any such thing, to deduce all things out of matter, either without or with a God, as that they plainly designed the very contrary; namely, to prove that no new real entity could be made out of matter, and particularly that souls could not be generated out of the same; which therefore of necessity must, according to them, have another Divine original, and be made by God, not out of matter, but out of nothing pre-existing; since it could not be supposed by any, that all souls existed of themselves from eternity unmade.

[1] Libro de Procreat. Animæ ex Timæo, p. 1014. tom. ii. oper.

And indeed all those Pagan philosophers, who asserted the incorporeity of souls, must of necessity, in like manner, suppose them not to have been made out of pre-existing matter, but by God out of nothing. Plutarch being only here to be excepted, by reason of a certain odd hypothesis which he had, that was peculiarly his own, of a third principle, besides God and matter, a disorderly soul, or evil demon self-existent who therefore seems to have supposed all particular human souls to have been made neither out of nothing, nor yet out of matter or body pre-existing, but out of a certain strange commixture of the substance of that evil soul and God blended together: upon which account does he affirm souls to be, not so much ἔργον as μέρος θεοῦ, not so much the work of God, as a part of him.—And now let any one judge, whether upon Plutarch's account, there be not yet further reason to complain of this Bœotic air. Wherefore we conclude, that those old physiologers in Aristotle, who insisted so much upon that principle, that no real entity could be made or generated out of nothing, acted only as physiologers therein, and not as theologers or metaphysicians; they not opposing a Divine creation out of nothing pre-existing, but only contending, that no new entity could be made out of matter, and that in natural generations and corruptions there was no creation or annihilation of any thing.

But what the true scope and meaning of these physiologers indeed was, will more plainly appear from that use or improvement which themselves made of this philosophic principle; and this was twofold. For, first, it is certain, that upon this foundation, they all of them endeavored to establish a peculiar kind of physiology, and some atomology or other, either a homœomery, a similar or dissimilar atomology. For Anaxagoras looking upon this maxim of the Italic philosophers, that nothing could be physically made out of nothing, or no real entity generated or corrupted, as an undoubted principle of reason; and being also not able to conceive otherwise of the forms and qualities of bodies, than that they were real entities, distinct from the substance of matter, or its modifications; concluded, that therefore in generations, corruptions, and alterations, these were not created out of nothing, and annihilated into nothing, but that every thing was naturally made, ἐκ προϋπαρχόντων καὶ ἐνυπαρχόντων, out of pre-existent, and in-existent things; —and consequently that there were, in all things, similar atoms and particles of every kind, though by reason of their parvitude insensible to us, and every thing seemed to be only that which was most predominant and conspicuous in it. To wit, that bone was made out of bony atoms, and flesh out of fleshy, hot things out of hot atoms, and cold things out of cold, black out of black, and white out of white, etc., and

nothing out of nothing, but every thing out of pre-existing similar atoms. Thus was the sense of Anaxagoras plainly declared by Aristotle,[1] that because contraries were made out of one another, they were therefore before in-existent. For since every thing must of necessity be made, either out of something, or out of nothing, and all physiologers agree, that it is impossible for any thing to be made out of nothing; it follows unavoidably, that whatsoever is generated, must be generated out of things pre-existing and in-existing, though by reason of their parvitude insensible to us; that is, out of similar or homogeneal atoms, of which there are some of all kinds in every thing; every thing being mingled in every thing. Here therefore have we the Anaxagorean homœomery, or similar atomology, built upon this principle of reason, as its foundation, that "Nothing can naturally be made or generated out of nothing."

But the Italics or Pythagorics, as well before Anaxagoras as after him (with whom also hitherto concurred Leucippus, Democritus, and Epicurus, those atheizers of the Italic physiology), did with much better reason from the same fundamental principle conclude, that since these forms and qualities of bodies were unquestionably generated and corrupted they were therefore no entities really distinct from the substance of matter, or its modifications, but only different dispositions or modifications of the insensible parts thereof, causing in us different phantasms: and this was the first original of the dissimilar atomology. In matter or body therefore, as such, there was nothing else to these philosophers conceivable, but only magnitude of parts, figure, site, and motion, or rest; and these were those few elements, out of which in-existing, and variously combined together, they supposed all those forms and qualities of bodies (commonly so called) in generations to result, without the production of any new real entity out of nothing. For as out of a few letters in the alphabet of every language, differently placed and combined, do result innumerable syllables, words, and sounds, signifying all the several things in heaven and earth; sometimes from all the very same letters, neither more nor fewer, but only transposed, are begotten very different phantasms of sounds in us, but without the production of any new real entity out of nothing: in the very same manner, from those fewer letters in the alphabet of the corporeal nature, variously combined, or from the different modifications of matter, in respect of magnitude of parts, figure, site, and motion, are made up and spelled out all those syllables of things, that are in the whole world, without the production of any new real entity. Many times the very

[1] Natural. Auscultat. lib. cap. v. p. 451. tom. i. oper.

same numerical matter, neither more nor less, only differently modified, causing very different phantasms in us, which are therefore vulgarly supposed to be forms and qualities in the things ; as when the same water is successively changed and transformed into vapor, snow, hail, and ice. And to this very purpose is the forementioned similitude elegantly pursued by the Epicurean poet, in these following verses ;[1]

> Quin etiam refert nostris in versibus ipsis,
> Cum quibus et quali sint ordine quæque locata.
> Namque eadem cœlum, mare, terras, flumina, solem,
> Significant, eadem fruges, arbusta, animantes.
> Sic ipsis in rebus item jam materiai
> Concursus, motus, ordo, positura, figuræ,
> Cum permutantur, mutari res quoque debent.

For were those supposed forms and qualities, produced in generations and alterations, entities really distinct from the substance of matter, or its different modifications, in respect of the magnitude, figure, site, and motion of parts (there being no such things before in-existing, as Anaxagoras supposed); then would they materially proceed from nothing, which is a thing impossible. And this dissimilar atomology of the ancient Italics, so far as to these material forms and qualities, seems to be undoubtedly the only true physiology ; it being built upon this sure principle of reason, that because nothing can give what it hath not, therefore no new substance of real entity can be materially produced in the generations and alterations of nature as such, but only modifications. As when an architect builds a house, or a weaver makes a piece of cloth, there is only a different modification of the pre-existent matter.

This is the first improvement which the ancient Italic philosophers made of this principle, that "Nothing can be (physically and materially) generated out of nothing ;" or that "No real entity is naturally generated or corrupted ;" that therefore the forms and qualities of bodies were no real entities, but only different modifications. But besides this, there was also another thing, which these philosophers principally aimed at herein, as a corollary deducible from the same principle concerning souls; that since the souls of animals, especially human, are unquestionably entities really distinct from matter, and all its modifications (no magnitudes, figures, sites, and motions, being ever able to beget cogitation or consciousness, much less a power of understanding eternal verities); that therefore these could not be generated out of matter,

[1] L. ii. p. 191. Lamb. (ver. 1012.)

nor corrupted into the same. Because forms and qualities are continually generated and corrupted, made out of nothing, and reduced to nothing again; therefore are they no entities really distinct from matter, and its different modifications: but because souls, at least human, are unquestionably entities really distinct from matter, and all its modifications; therefore can they not possibly be generated out of matter, nor corrupted into the same. For if human souls were generated out of matter, then must some real entity be materially produced of nothing, there being nothing of life and cogitation in matter; which is a thing absolutely impossible. Wherefore, these philosophers conclude concerning souls, that being not generated out of matter, they were insinuated or introduced into bodies in generations. And this was always a great controversy betwixt Theists and Atheists concerning the human soul, as Lucretius expresseth it;[1]

Nata sit, an contra nascentibus insinuetur,

Whether it were made or generated out of matter (that is, indeed, out of nothing), or else were θύραθεν, from without,—insinuated into bodies in generations? Which latter opinion of theirs supposes souls as well to have existed before the generations of all animals, as to exist after their deaths and corruptions; there being properly nothing of them generated, but only their union with those particular bodies. So that the generations, and corruptions, or deaths of animals, according to this hypothesis, are nothing but an anagrammatical transposition of things in the universe, pre and post-existent souls being sometimes united to one body, and sometimes to another. But it doth not therefore follow, because these ancient philosophers held souls to be thus ingenerable, and to have pre-existed before the generation of animals, that therefore they supposed all souls to have existed of themselves from eternity unmade: this being a thing which was never asserted any more by Theist than Atheist; since even those philosophic Theists, who maintained *æternitatem animorum*, the eternity of human minds and souls,—together with the worlds, did notwithstanding assert their essential dependence upon the Deity, like that of the lights upon the sun; as if they were a kind of eternal effulgency, emanation, or eradiation, from an eternal sun. Even Proclus[2] himself, that great champion for the eternity of the world and souls in this very case, when he writes against Plutarch's self-existent evil soul, expressly declaring, that πᾶσα ψυχὴ γένημά ἐστι τοῦ θεοῦ, there is no self-existent soul; but every soul whatsoever is the

[1] Lib. i. ver. 114.

[1] Comment. in Timaeum Platon. lib. ii. p. 116.

work, effect, and production, of God.—Wherefore, when they affirmed souls to be ingenerable, their meaning was no more than this, that they were not mere accidental things, as forms and qualities are, nor any more generated out of matter, than matter itself is generated out of something else; upon which account, as Aristotle[1] informs us, souls were called also by them, ἀρχαὶ, principles,—as well as matter, they being both of them substances in the universe alike original; that is, neither of them made out of the other. But they did not suppose them to be ἀγενήτους, ingenerate or unmade—in the other sense, as if they had been self-originated, and independent, as Plutarch's second and third principles, his evil soul, and matter, were by him imagined to be; but so doubtless, as that if the world had had any beginning, they should then have been all created together with it out of nothing pre-existing. But as for the perpetual creation of new souls, in the successive generations of animals, this indeed is a thing which these philosophers were extremely abhorrent from, as thinking it incongruous, that souls, which are in order of nature senior to bodies, should be in order of time juniors to them; as also not reasonable, that Divine creation (as it were prostituted) should without end perpetually attend and wait upon natural generations, and be intermingled with them.

But as for this pre-existence of souls, we have already declared our own sense concerning it in the first chapter. Though we cannot deny, but that, besides Origen,[2] several others of the ancient fathers before the fifth council, seem either to have espoused it, or at least to have had a favor and kindness for it; insomuch that St. Augustine[3] himself is sometimes staggering in this point, and thinks it to be a great secret, whether men's souls existed before their generations or no; and somewhere concludes it to be a matter of indifferency, wherein every one may have his liberty of opening either way without offence. Wherefore, all that can be certainly affirmed in this case is that human souls could not possibly be generated out of matter, but were some time or other created by God Almighty out of nothing pre-existing, either in generations or before them. Lastly, as for brute animals, we must confess, that if they be not mere machines or *automata*, as some seem inclinable to believe, but conscious and thinking beings; then from the same principle of reason it will likewise follow, that their souls cannot

[1] Vide lib. i. de Anima. cap. ii. p. 5. tom. ii. oper.

[2] Vide Petr. Dan. Huetium in Origenianis, lib. ii. Quæst. vi. §. 4. p. 93 et §. 10. p. 97.

[3] Vide Hen. Noris. Vindic. Augustian. cap. iv. p. 101.

be generated out of matter neither, and therefore must be derived from the fountain of all life, and created out of nothing by him; who since he can as easily annihilate as create, and does all for the best, no man need at all to trouble himself about their permanency or immortality.

And now have we given a full and particular account of all the several senses wherein this axiom must be acknowledged to be undeniably true, that "Nothing can possibly be made out of nothing," or "come from nothing;" namely, these three. First, that "Nothing, which was not, could ever bring itself into being, or efficiently produce itself;" or, that "Nothing can possibly be made without an efficient cause." Secondly, that "Nothing, which was not, could be produced, or brought into being by any other efficient cause, than such as hath at least equal perfection in it, and a sufficient active or productive power." For if any thing were made by that, which hath not equal perfection, then must so much of the effect, as transcendeth the cause, be indeed made without a cause (since nothing can give what it hath not), or be caused by itself, or by nothing. Again, to suppose a thing to be produced by that which hath no sufficient productive power, is really to suppose it also to be produced from itself without a cause, or from nothing. Where it is acknowledged by us, that no natural, imperfect created being can create, or emanatively produce a new substance, which was not before, and give it its whole being. Hitherto is the axiom verified in respect of the efficient cause. But in the third place, it is also true in respect of the material likewise. Not that "nothing could possibly be ever made" by any power whatsoever, but only out of pre-existent matter; and consequently, that matter itself could be never made, but was self-existent. For the falsity of this is sufficiently evident from what hath been already declared concerning human souls, their being undoubtedly substances incorporeal, which therefore could never be generated out of matter; and it will be further manifested afterwards. But the third and last sense is this; that "Nothing, which is materially made out of things pre-existing (as some are), can have any other real entity," than what was either before contained in or resulteth from the things themselves so modified. Or, that there can be no new entities or substances naturally generated out of matter; and therefore that all natural generations are really nothing else but mixtures, or new modifications of things pre-existing.

These, I say, are all the senses wherein it is impossible, that any thing should be made out of nothing, or come from nothing; and they may be all reduced to this one general sense, that "Nothing can be made out of nothing causally;" or, that "Nothing cannot cause any

thing, either efficiently or materially." Which as it is undeniably true, so is it so far from making any thing against a Divine creation, or the existence of a God, that the same may be demonstratively proved, and evinced from it, as shall be showed afterward.

But there is another sense, wherein things may be said to be made ἐξ οὐκ ὄντων, or out of nothing,—when those words are not taken causally, but only so as to signifiy the *terminus a quo*, or term from which—they are made, to wit, an antecedent nonexistence. And then the meaning of this proposition, that "Nothing can possibly be made out of nothing," will be this; that *nothing, which once was not*, could by any power whatsoever be afterwards brought into being. And this is the sense insisted on in this second atheistic argumentation, framed according to the principles of the Democritic or Epicurean Atheism; that no real entity, which once was not, could by any power whatsoever be made, or brought out of nonexistence into being; and consequently, that no creative power out of nothing can possibly belong to any thing, though supposed never so perfect.

In answer whereunto, we shall perform these two things; first, we shall make it appear, that "Nothing out of nothing," taken in this sense declared, is so far from being a common notion, that it is not at all true. And secondly, we shall prove, that if it were true, yet would it of the two make more against Atheism, than it does against Theism, and therefore ought by no means to be used by Atheists, as an argument against a Deity. First, therefore, it is unquestionably certain, that this cannot be universally true, that nothing, which once was not, could possibly be made or brought out of nonexistence into being; because if it were true, then could there be no such thing as making or causing at all; no action nor motion, and consequently no generation nor mutation in the corporeal universe, but the whole world would be like a stiff immovable adamantine rock: and this would doubtless be a better argument against motion than any of Zeno's was. But we have all experience within ourselves of a power of producing new cogitations in our own minds, new intellectual and moral habits, as also new local motion in our bodies, or at least new determinations thereof, and of causing thereby new modifications in bodies without us. And therefore are the Atheists forced to restrain the sense of this proposition to substantial things only, that though there may be new accidents and modifications produced out of nothing, yet there can be no new substances made; however they be not able in the mean time to give any reason, why one of those should be in itself more impossible than the other, or why no substance should be makeable. But that some are so

staggered with the seeming plausibility of this argument, is chiefly upon these following accounts. First, by reason of the confusion of their own conceptions; for, because it is certain, that "nothing can possibly be made out of nothing," in one sense, to wit, causally; they not distinguishing senses, nor being aware of the equivocation, that is, in this ἐξ οὐκ ὄντων, out of nothing,—inadvertently give their assent to those words in a wrong sense; that no substance (as matter) could possibly be brought out of nonexistence into being. Secondly, by reason of their unskilful arguing from artificial things; when, because nothing can be artificially made but out of pre-existing matter, as a house or garment, and the like (there being nothing done in the production of these things, but only a new modification of what before substantially was), they over hastily conclude, that no power whatsoever could produce any thing otherwise than out of pre-existing matter, and that matter itself therefore could not possibly be made. In which conceit they are again further confirmed from hence, because the old physiologers maintained the same thing concerning natural generations likewise, that nothing was in them produced ἐξ οὐκ ὄντων, out of nothing—neither: or that there was no new substance or entity made in them really distinct from the pre-existing matter and its modifications; they unwarily extending this beyond the bounds of physics into metaphysics, and unduly measuring, or limiting infinite power accordingly. Lastly, because it is undeniably certain concerning ourselves, and all imperfect created beings, that none of these can create any new substance which was not before; men are therefore apt to measure all things by their own scantling, and to suppose it universally impossible, according to human reason, for any power whatsoever thus to create; whence it follows, that theology must in this be acknowledged to be contradictious to the principles of natural light and understanding. But since it is certain, that imperfect created beings can themselves produce some things out of nothing pre-existing, as new cogitations, and new local motion, new modifications and transformations of things corporeal; it is very reasonable to think, that an absolutely perfect being could do something more, that is, create new substances out of nothing, or give them their whole being. And it may well be thought to be as easy for God, or an omnipotent being, to make a whole world, matter and all, ἐξ οὐκ ὄντων, out of nothing—as it is for us to create a thought, or to move a finger, or for the sun to send out rays, or a candle light; or lastly, for any opaque body to produce the image of itself in glasses or water, or to project a shadow; all these imperfect things being but the energies, rays, images, or shadows, of the Deity. For a substance, which once

was not, to be made by God, or a being infinitely perfect, this is not for it to be made out of nothing, in the impossible sense, it coming from him who is all. Nor can it be said to be impossible, for any thing whatsoever to be made by that, which hath not only infinitely greater perfection, but also a sufficient active power to produce the same, it being substantially emanative. It is true, indeed, that infinite power itself cannot do things in their own nature impossible; and this is therefore the only thing which the Atheists have to prove, that it is in itself absolutely impossible, for a substance (though not for an accident or modification) to be produced out of nonexistence into being. Whereas nothing is in itself absolutely impossible but what implies a contradiction; and though it be contradictious for a thing to be, and not be, at the same time; yet is there no manner of contradiction at all in this, for any imperfect contingent being, which before was not, afterwards to be. Wherefore, this being in itself no way impossible, it must be acknowledged to be a due object of infinite power, or that which may be done by a perfect omnipotent being existing.

If nothing could be made ἐξ οὐκ ὄντων, out of nothing,—in this latter sense, that is, *nothing which before was not*, afterwards brought into being; then must the reason hereof be, because no substance or real entity can be caused by any other substance, so as to receive and derive its whole being from it: and consequently whatsoever substance or real entity is in the whole world, was not only from eternity without beginning, but also existed of itself necessarily and independently upon any thing else. But, first, it hath been already declared, that it is repugnant to the human faculties, that any temporary successive being whatsoever, or that time itself, should be eternal without beginning because upon that hypothesis there should always have been an infinity of time past;[1] and if so, then would there of necessity have been time past, which was never present. But, to make every substantial thing, not only to have existed from eternity without beginning (which hath yet been done by some mistaken Theists), but also to have existed independently upon any thing else as its cause, or original, and therefore of itself necessarily; this, I say, is itself to make "something to come from nothing in the impossible sense," to wit, causally. For as when some Atheists affirm, that, "Nothing could ever move itself," and yet suppose notwithstanding, that there hath been motion from all eternity, they plainly make this motion (however supposed to be eternal) to come from nothing in the impossible sense: so, in like manner, they, who suppose things to

[1] See Enchir. Met. cap. x.

have existed of themselves necessarily, which have no self-existence, and necessary existence contained in their nature (as nothing but a perfect being hath), do make this necessary existence of such things to have come from nothing. Wherefore though it be certain that something did exist of itself necessarily from all eternity, namely, a perfeet being (whose necessary existence is therefore not from nothing, because essentially included in its own nature), yet it is certain, likewise, that there can be but one such thing; necessity of existence being natural and essential to no more. But as for all other things, which are in their own nature contingently possible to be or not to be, reason pronounces of them, that they could not exist of themselves necessarily, but were caused by something else; and derived their original from that one absolutely perfect, and necessarily existent being. So that Plato's[1] distinction must needs be here allowed of betwixt two kinds of beings, τὸ μὲν ἀεὶ ὄν, γένεσιν δὲ οὐκ ἔχον, that which always is, and was never made, nor had beginning;—and τὸ γιγνόμενον μὲν, ὂν δὲ οὐδέποτε, that which was made, or had beginning, but never truly is;—it having not a permanent, but successive or flowing duration. Accordingly whereunto, Aristotle also affirmeth,[2] That there is no necessity all things should be unmade or self-originated; but some things might be made from others unmade.

Lastly, We shall disprove the truth of this assertion, that whatsoever substantially and really is, did exist of itself from all eternity unmade, after this manner. Because it would follow from thence, that not only matter, and unqualified atoms (as the Democritic Atheists suppose), but also souls, especially human, must needs have existed of themselves too, from eternity unmade. For as no man can be so sottish, as to conceive himself, or that which thinketh in him, his own soul or mind, and personality to be no real entity, whilst every clod of earth is such; so is it certain, that mind can never be generated out of dead and senseless matter or body, nor result, as a modification thereof, out of magnitudes, figures, sites, and motions, and therefore must needs be a thing really distinct from it, or substance incorporeal; the Democritic Atheists being here grossly deceived in thinking, that because forms and qualities of bodies may be resolved into these forementioned elements of matter, and consequently concluded to be no entities really distinct from the substance thereof, but only different modifications of the same, that therefore the like may be said of souls too, the rational not except-

[1] Vide Phædon. p. 384, 385. et de Repub. lib. vi. p. 479.

[2] Vide lib. ii. de Cœlo. cap. ii. p. 674. tom. i. oper.

ed. Wherefore, if no substance or real entity could ever be brought out of nonexistence into being, or be caused by any thing else, then must all human souls and personalities, as well as matter and atoms, have existed not only from eternity, without beginning, but also of themselves independently upon any other thing. But the Atheists are so abhorrent from this eternity of human souls, that they will by no means admit of their post-existence or immortality; they apprehending that if any living understanding being should prove immortal, they could not sufficiently secure themselves against the possibility and danger of a God. Some Theists, indeed, have asserted *æternitatem animorum*, not only the pre-existence, but also the eternity of all human minds, together with the world, as Cicero more than once doth; who also, in his book of Divination,[1] thus further declares himself concerning it: "Animus, quia vixit ab omni æternitate, versatusque est cum innumerabilibus animis, omnia, quæ in natura rerum sunt, videt:" Our mind, because it hath existed from all eternity, and conversed with innumerable minds, seeth all things that are in nature:—and again, "Cum animi hominum semper fuerint futurique sint:" Since the minds of men ever were, and ever will be.—Nevertheless none of these ever maintained, that human minds, and their distinct personalities, were thus all, of themselves, independently upon any thing as their cause or original. And, as it was before demonstrated from the nature of knowledge and understanding (it comprehending the possibilities of all things, and therefore supposing infinite power), that there can be but one mind, or understanding being, self-existent, all minds partaking of that one mind; so is it hardly possible for any one in good earnest to entertain such a conceit as this, that his own particular soul, mind, and personality, and consequently all human souls, though subject to such laws of fate as now they are, did not only pre-exist before their respective bodies, and were from eternity without beginning, but also existed of themselves necessarily and independently upon any thing else. Wherefore, if human souls, minds, and personalities, being unquestionably substantial things and really distinct from matter (which therefore could not possibly be generated out of it), did not all exist from eternity of themselves, necessarily and independently, it is certain, that they must derive their whole being from the Deity, or be created ἐξ οὐκ ὄντων, out of nothing,—or nonexistence by it. And if human souls were unquestionably thus created, it cannot reasonably be doubted, but that matter or body itself was created likewise out of nothing, or caused by

[1] Lib. i. cap. li. p. 3174. tom. ix. oper.

the Deity: forasmuch as that, which created one thing out of nothing, could create every thing; and there is really more of substance, that is, a higher degree of entity, in minds and souls, conscious self-moving and understanding beings, than in senseless mattter, or unactive bulk.

But forasmuch as this doctrine of a Divine creation out of nothing pre-existing lies under no small prejudice upon this account, because it is so generally taken for granted, that none of the Pagan Theists, who are supposed to have kept close to the simple light of nature, did ever acknowledge in the Deity any such creative power out of nothing, or that God was the cause of any substance; we must of necessity here declare this, how common soever it be, to be a great mistake. For besides that Plato, in his Sophist,[1] having defined the efficient or effective power in general after this manner, *ποιητικὴν πᾶσαν ἔφαμεν εἶναι δύναμιν, ἥτις ἂν αἰτία γίγνηται τοῖς μὴ πρότερον οὖσιν ὕστερον γίγνεσθαι*, to be a power or causality, whereby that, which was not before, was afterwards made to be;—and then dividing this efficiency into Divine and human, he immediately subjoins concerning the former, *Ζῶα δὴ πάντα*, etc. *μῶν ἄλλου τινὸς ἢ θεοῦ δημιουργοῦντος φήσομεν ὕστερον γίγνεσθαι, πρότερον οὐκ ὄντα;* Shall we not then say, that all animals, and other things, were by the Divine efficiency alone, after they had not been made to be?—Where thus much at least is certain, that Plato did not at all question the possibility of a thing's being made out of nothing in this sense; that is, brought into being, after it had not been, by a Divine power. But because it may be thought that he meant this no further than of the first compages of animals, in which notwithstanding every thing, souls, and all, might be made out of pre-existing matter; we shall here further add, what in his Timæus[2] he declareth concerning the soul, *τὴν ψυχὴν οὐχ ὡς νῦν ὑστέραν ἐπιχειροῦμεν λέγειν, οὕτως ἐμηχανήσατο καὶ ὁ θεὸς νεωτέραν, οὐ γὰρ ἂν ἄρξασθαι πρεσβύτερον ὑπὸ νεωτέρου εἴασεν, ὁ δὲ καὶ γενέσει καὶ ἀρετῇ προτέραν καὶ πρεσβυτέραν ψυχὴν σώματος, ὡς δεσπότιν καὶ ἄρξουσαν ἀρξομένου συνεστήσατο·* that God did not make it after body, and junior to it; since it was not fit that the elder should be ruled or governed by the younger; but he made soul before body, older than it, and superior to it, as well in respect of time as dignity.—Which notion is further pursued by him in his tenth de Legibus:[3] *Ὀρθῶς ἄρα καὶ κυρίως ἀληθέστατά τε καὶ τελεώτατα εἰρηκότες ἂν ἦμεν, ψυχὴν μὲν προτέραν γεγονέναι σώματος ἡμῖν· σῶμα δὲ δεύτερόν τε καὶ ὕστερον ψυχῆς ἀρχούσης ἀρχόμενον κατὰ φύσιν.* Wherefore it was rightly, properly, and most truly affirmed by us, that soul was made first, as

[1] Page 168. oper. edit. Ficini. [2] Page 528. oper. [3] Page 669.

that which ruleth; but body afterward, as that which is to be ruled and governed thereby.—From whence also he draws this consectary, *ὡς εἰ ἡ ψυχὴ φανείη πρεσβυτέρα σώματος οὖσα, καὶ τὰ ψυχῆς τῶν τοῦ σώματος ἔσοιτο πρεσβύτερα· τρόποι καὶ ἤθη καὶ βουλήσεις καὶ λογισμοὶ καὶ δόξαι ἀληθεῖς, ἐπιμέλειαί τε καὶ μνῆμαι, πρότερα μήκους σωμάτων καὶ πλάτους καὶ βάθους, εἴη γεγονότα ἄν, εἴπερ καὶ ψυχὴ σώματος*· that if the soul be older than the body, then must the things of the soul also be older than those of the body; and therefore cogitation, and the several species of it, must be, in order of nature, not only before local motion, but also before longitude, latitude, and profundity of bodies.—From whence it is plain, that Plato's first *γένεσις*, or production of souls by God, could not be out of any pre-existing body or matter, they being affirmed by him to be before, not only this and that particular body, but all body whatsoever, before longitude, latitude, and profundity. Which may be further confirmed from hence, because in his Sophist[1] he plainly condemns that opinion of some, *τὴν ψυχὴν αὐτὴν σῶμά τι κεκτῆσθαι*, that the soul itself had something of body in it;—and he often elsewhere declares the soul to be incorporeal. It is certain also, that not only Plato, but all those other Pagan philosophers too, who asserted the incorporeity and immortality of human souls, could not possibly conceive souls to have been made out of pre-existent matter, but either *ἐξ οὐκ ὄντων*, out of nothing,—they being not eternal, but having a newness of being (as Plato himself seemed to suppose); or else, if they were conceived to be eternal by them (which was the opinion of most of the junior Platonists, yet), to have derived their whole substance from the Deity, and always to depend upon it; as eternal light would depend upon an eternal sun. Plutarch and his followers being only here to be excepted, who would neither have souls made out of nothing by God, nor yet out of corporeal matter pre-existing (they being themselves incorporeal); but out of a strange commixture of the substance of God himself with the substance of a certain disorderly soul, self-existent and uncreated; of which we have spoken already. But that the genuine Platonists did universally suppose, that one substance might be caused by another, and derive its whole being from it, is undeniably evident from hence, because their second Divine hypostasis or substance (though eternal) was according to them derived from, or begotten by, their first, and their third hypostasis or substance produced both from the first and second; and other inferior orbs of being, as the particular souls of demons and men, from that whole trinity of Divine hypostases

[1] Page 170.

jointly concurring. And as for matter or body itself, it is certain also that Proclus and other Platonists expressly denied it to have been ἀγέννητον, unmade or self-existent,—and conceived it to have derived its whole being from the Deity; who accordingly is styled by Proclus,[1] ἄῤῥητος αἰτία τῆς ὕλης, the ineffable Cause of matter.—In like manner have we already showed, that, according to the Chaldee oracles, matter itself was also caused or produced by the Deity, to which purpose is this verse cited by Proclus,[2] Ἔνθεν ἄδην θρώσκει γένεσις πολυποικίλου ὕλης. From whence (that is, from the Deity) abundantly springs forth the generation of the multiform matter.—The metre here requiring that it should be read ἄδην, and not ἄρδην, as it is in Proclus's copy. Moreover, Jamblichus hath recorded in his Mysteries,[3] that Hermes, and the old Egyptian theologers likewise, held matter not to be ἀγέννητον, that is, self-existent, unmade, or underived—from the Deity, to have been caused by it. Whence does Proclus[4] conclude it probable, that Plato was of the same persuasion also;[5] as likewise Orpheus before had been, he deriving this, as is supposed, with other things, from the Egyptians. It is true, indeed, that many of these philosophers asserted matter, souls, and the whole world, to have been eternal without beginning, and consequently not created ἐξ οὐκ ὄντων, in that stricter sense, that is, out of an antecedent nonexistence in time. Notwithstanding which, they did suppose them to have received their whole being from the Deity, and to have depended upon it every jot as much, as if, having once not been, they had afterward been made by it. And that, which gives to any substance its whole being, though from eternity, so that it never was not; the same upon supposition, that it once had not been, could unquestionably have produced it, ἐξ οὐκ ὄντων, out of nothing,—or an antecedent nonexistence.

We have now sufficiently disproved the truth of that assertion, that "Nothing could be made out of nothing," in the atheistic sense thereof; viz. that "Nothing, which before was not, could afterwards possibly be made to be:" though this should not be extended so far, as to accidental things, and modifications, but restrained and confined only

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[1] Comment. in Timæum. Platon. lib. ii. p. 116. [2] Ibid. p. 118.

[3] De Mysteriis Ægyptior. sect. v. cap. xxiii. p. 138. sect. viii. cap. iii. p. 159.

[4] Comment. in Timæum. Platon. lib. ii.

[5] Thus Hierocles in Photius: δημιουργὸν θεὸν προϋφίστησιν ὁ Πλάτων πάσης ἐμφανοῦς τε καὶ ἀφανοῦς διακοσμήσεως, ἐκ μηδενὸς προϋποκειμένου γεγενημένης, etc. Plato censuit mundum a Deo, ex nulla prius existente materia, productum, etc.

to substantials; "That no substance whatsoever could have a newness of being, or be caused by any other substance:" but whatsoever substantial thing any where is in the world, the same did exist of itself from eternity, and independently upon any thing else; nothing but different modifications being made or produced. Which same assertion has been also sometimes otherwise thus expressed; "Nothing can be made but out of pre-existing substance:" the meaning hereof being this, that nothing can be made, but new accidental modifications of what before substantially was; no substance itself being makeable or producible by any other substance, neither in time (so as to have a newness or beginning of being), nor yet from eternity. Where the Atheists and some others taking it for granted, that there is no other substance besides body, or matter, do further limit and restrain the sense of that proposition in this manner; "Nothing can be made but out of pre-existing matter;" that is, nothing can be made but out of corporeal substance pre-existing. An *idolum specus* (if I may use that language) which in all probability had its first original chiefly from men's measuring the extent of all power by their own production of artificial things. Because, forsooth, a carpenter or architect cannot make a house, but out of pre-existing timber, bricks, and stones; nor a tailor a garment, but out of pre-existing cloth; nor a cook, puddings or pies, but out of pre-existing materials or ingredients; that therefore no power whatsoever, no, not that of God Almighty, can extend any further, than to the new modifying of pre-existent matter, but not to the production or causing of any substance. We shall in the next place make it appear, that were this assertion true, That no substance or real entity, which once was not, could be caused or produced, yet would it notwithstanding, of the two, more impugn Atheism than Theism (it being possible for falsehoods, though not for truths, to disagree), forasmuch as the Atheists do bring more out of nothing, or non-existence, than the Theists do; and therefore ought not to make this an objection against Theism. For though, according to the true and genuine theology, God, or a perfect being, be supposed to be the only necessary self-existent thing, and the cause of all other substance, and consequently to have produced all imperfect things, not only souls, but also matter itself, ἐξ οὐκ ὄντων, out of nothing,—or an antecedent nonexistence; yet is there, by reason of the weakness of human understandings, a latitude in Theism. Wherefore some there are, who though imposed upon by that *idolum specus*, or imprisoned in it, that "nothing can possibly be made, but out of pre-existing matter," by the new modification thereof; do notwithstanding devoutly worship a Deity, according to their notion of it, a perfectly

understanding being unmade; though not the creator of matter, yet the maker of the whole world out of it, and the supreme governor of the same; they thus supposing two principles in the universe, an active and a passive one, God and matter. Besides which it is not impossible for others to think, that though matter or body be not the only substance, but human souls are incorporeal, yet the substance of these souls was not created out of nothing, no more than that of body, but they were made either out of some pre-existing common soul (as their intelligible matter), or out of the substance of the Deity itself; or else existed of themselves from eternity unmade: and yet nevertheless may these acknowledge one supreme understanding being self-existent also, though neither the creator of matter, nor of souls, yet the supreme governor and orderer of all. And it is certain, that Plutarch's god was no better than this; and yet was that Pagan, notwithstanding, a devout religionist in his kind, as well as a hearty moralist. And such a Theism or theology, as either of those forementioned (though not genuine and sincere, but imperfect and mongrel things), would perhaps be to the Atheists little less troublesome and uneasy than the truth. Thus have we showed, that this principle, "That nothing can come out of nothing," or be made, otherwise than out of pre-existing substance or matter, though it be indeed contradictious to the true and genuine theology, yet it is not absolutely inconsistent with all manner of religion; there being certain spurious or imperfect forms of Theism built upon this foundation. But now, on the contrary, we shall make it manifest, that this very principle, made use of by the Atheists, is in truth and reality contradictious to all manner of Atheism, and destructive of the same; the Atheists universally generating and corrupting real entities, and substantial things, that is, producing them out of nothing, or nonexistence, and reducing them to nothing again: forasmuch as they make all things whatsoever, the bare substance of matter only excepted (which to them is either no determinate thing, or else nothing but mere bulk, or resisting and divisible magnitude), to come out of nothing, and to go to nothing. Thus does Aristotle,[1] in a place before cited, declare the atheistic sense: *Εἰσὶ γάρ τινες, οἵ φασιν οὐδὲν ἀγέννητον εἶναι τῶν πραγμάτων, ἀλλὰ πάντα γίγνεσθαι·* There are certain men, who affirm, that nothing is unmade, but all things generated or made.—Whose sense is afterwards more distinctly thus proposed by him, *τὰ μὲν ἄλλα γίγνεσθαί τε καὶ ῥεῖν, εἶναι δὲ παγίως οὐδέν· ἓν δέ τι μόνον ὑπομένειν, ἐξ οὗ ταῦτα πάντα μετασχηματίζεσθαι πέφυκεν·* that all oth-

[1] De Cœlo. lib. iii. cap. i. p. 668. tom. i. oper.

er things are generated and flow, and none of them firmly is (they being perpetually educed out of nothing, and reduced to nothing), but that there is only one thing which remaineth; namely that, out of which all the other are made, by the transformation thereof.—Which one thing (to wit, matter) as the same Aristotle further adds, they affirmed to be the only substance, and from eternity unmade; but all other things whatsoever, being, but *πάθη καὶ ἕξεις καὶ διαθέσεις*, passions, affections, and dispositions thereof, *γίγνεσθαι καὶ φθείρεσθαι, ἀπειράκις*, to be generated and corrupted infinitely;—that is, to be produced out of nothing, or nonexistence, and reduced again to nothing without end. And doubtless, this is the true meaning of that passage in Plato's tenth de Legibus,[1] not understood by the Latin interpreters; where, being to represent the atheistic hypothesis of the system of the universe, he discovereth their grand arcanum, and that which they accounted, *σοφώτατον ἁπάντων λόγων*, the wisest and most mysterious of all doctrines, after this manner; *λέγουσί πού τινες ὡς πάντα ἐστι τὰ πράγματα γιγνόμενα καὶ γενόμενα, καὶ γενησόμενα· τὰ μὲν φύσει, τὰ δὲ τέχνῃ, τὰ δὲ διὰ τύχης.* Certain men affirm, that all things are made, and have been made, and will be made; some by nature, and some by art, and some by fortune or chance.—For unquestionably here, Plato's *λέγουσί πού τινες ὡς πάντα ἐστὶ τὰ πράγματα γιγνόμενα*, certain men affirm, that all things are generated or made, etc.—is the very same with Aristotle's *εἰσὶ γάρ τινες, οἵ φασιν, οὐδὲν ἀγέννητον εἶναι τῶν πραγμάτων, ἀλλὰ πάντα γίγνεσθαι*, certain men affirm, that there is nothing unmade, but that all things are made or generated.—And perhaps this of Aristotle's was taken out of that of Plato's: which yet nevertheless is so to be understood as it is afterwards explained by Aristotle; all things whatsoever, the bare substance of matter only excepted. Wherefore it is certain, that either there is no real entity in the whole world, besides the bare substance of matter; that is, besides divisible and separable extension, or resisting magnitude, and consequently that life and cogitation, sense and consciousness, reason and understanding, all our own minds and personalities, are no real entities; or else, that there are, according to the atheistic hypothesis, real entities produced out of nothing, and reduced to nothing again. Whereas Theists suppose all the greatest perfections in the universe, as life and understanding, to have been eternal and unmade in a perfect being, the Deity, and neither brought out of nothing or nonexistence, nor reducible to nothing; only imperfect beings to have been made out of nothing, or produced out of nonexist-

[1] Page 665. oper.

ence, by this one perfect being or Deity: the Atheists, on the contrary, supposing the lowest and most imperfect of all beings, matter, bulk, or divisible and resisting extension, to be the only self-existent and unmade thing, conclude all the greatest perfections in the universe, life, cogitation, and understanding, to be made out of nothing or nonexistence, as also to be reduced to nothing again. Indeed the hylozoic Atheists, being sensible somewhat of this inconvenience of making all life and understanding out of nothing, and that there must of necessity be some fundamental life and perception, which is not accidental but substantial, and which was never generated, and cannot be corrupted, have therefore attributed a kind of life and perception to all matter, as such. Notwithstanding which, even these also, forasmuch as they deny to matter animal sense, and consciousness, suppose all animal life or sense, and conscious understanding, to be generated and corrupted, produced out of nothing, and reduced to nothing again. Neither can life, cogitation, and understanding, be reckoned amongst the modes of matter, that is, of magnitude, or divisible and antitypous extension, since they may be conceived without the same: whereas modes cannot be conceived without their substance. Standing, sitting, and walking, cannot be conceived without a body, and that fitly organized too; and therefore are they nothing but different modes of such a body. When that human body, which before did stand, doth afterwards sit, or walk, no man can think, that here is the miraculous production of any new real entity out of nothing; nor when the same matter, which was square or cubical, is made spherical or cylindrical. But when there is life and understanding, which was not before, then is there unquestionably a new real entity produced. But the Democritic and Epicurean Atheists themselves, according to the tenor of the atomic physiology, acknowledge no other modes of matter or body, but only more or less magnitude of parts, figure, site, motion, or rest. And upon this very account do they explode qualities, considered as entities really distinct from these modes; because in the generation and alteration of them, there would be real entities made out of nothing, or without a cause: whereupon they resolve these qualities into mechanism and fancy. But life, cogitation, and understanding, are things which have more real entity in them, and can no way be solved by mechanism and fancy; wherefore undoubtedly they are no modes of matter or body, but attributes of another kind of substance incorporeal. All cogitative beings, especially human souls, and personalities, are unquestionably substantial things; and yet do the Atheists bring these, and consequently themselves, out of nothing or nonexistence, and reduce them to

nothing again. The conclusion is; that these very Atheists, who contend against Theists, that "Nothing can be made out of nothing," do themselves bring all things out of nothing or nonexistence, and perpetually reduce them to nothing again; according to whose principles, as once there was no life nor understanding at all in the universe, so may there be none again. They who deny a God, because there can be no creative power belonging to any thing, do themselves notwithstanding attribute to matter (though a mere passive, sluggish, and unactive thing) a creative power of things substantial (as human souls and personalities) out of nothing. And thus is that formidable argument of the Atheists, that there can be no God, because nothing can be made out of nothing, not only proved to be false, but also retorted upon these Atheists themselves, they bringing all things besides senseless and unqualified matter out of nothing.

We have now declared, first, in what sense this proposition is unquestionably true, that nothing can be made out of nothing, or come from nothing, *viz.* causally, that nothing which before was not, could afterward be made without a cause, and a sufficient cause. Or more particularly these three ways; first, that nothing which before was not could afterward be brought into being by itself, or without an efficient cause. Secondly, that nothing which once was not, could be made or produced efficiently by any thing, which had not at least equal perfection in it, and a sufficient active or productive power; and consequently that no new substance can be made, but by a perfect being, which only is substantially emanative. Thirdly and lastly, that when things are made out of pre-existing matter, as in artificial productions, and natural generations, there can be no new real entity produced, but only different modifications of what before substantially was; the material cause, as such, efficiently producing nothing. And thus was this axiom understood by Cicero, that "Nothing could be made out of nothing," *viz.* causally, in his book de Fato,[1] where he reprehendeth Epicurus for endeavoring to avoid fate, and to establish liberty of will by that absurd figment of atoms declining uncertainly from the perpendicular. "Nec cum hæc ita sint, est causa, cur Epicurus fatum extimescat, et ab atomis petat præsidium, easque de via deducat; et uno tempore suscipiat res duas inenodabiles, unam, ut sine causa fiat aliquid, ex quo existet, ut de nihilo quippiam fiat; quod nec ipsi, nec cuiquam physico placet." Nor is there for all that any reason, why Epicurus should be so much afraid of fate, and seek refuge in atoms, he

[1] Cap. ix. p. 3273. tom. ix. oper.

supposing them, in their infinite descents, to decline uncertainly from the perpendicular, and laying this as a foundation for liberty of will; whereby he plunged himself at once into two inextricable difficulties, the first whereof was the supposing of something to be made without a cause, or, which is all one, out of nothing; a thing which will neither be allowed by any physiologer, nor could Epicurus himself be pleased or satisfied therewith. The reason whereof is, because it was a fundamental principle of the atomic philosophy, that "Nothing (in this sense) could be made out of nothing." Moreover, we have in the next place declared, in what other sense this proposition, that "Nothing can be made out of nothing," is false, namely, when this out of nothing is not taken causally, but so as to signify the *terminus* from which; that nothing can be made out of an antecedent nonexistence: that no real entity or substance which before was not, could by any power whatsoever be afterwards brought into being: or, that nothing can possibly be made, but out of something pre-existing, by the new modification thereof. And it appears from that of Cicero, that the true and genuine sense of this proposition, "De nihilo nihil fit" (according to the mind of those ancient physiologers, who laid so great stress thereupon), was not, that nothing could by any power whatsoever be brought out of nonexistence into being; but only, that "nothing could be made without a cause." Nor did they here by *cause* mean the material only, in this sense, as if nothing could possibly be made but out of pre-existing matter; Epicurus being taxed by Cicero, for introducing that his third motion of atoms, or *clinamen principiorum*,[1] out of nothing, or without an efficient cause; as indeed all motion also was, to those atomic Atheists in this sense, from nothing. Nevertheless, we have also showed, that if this proposition, "Nothing out of nothing," in that atheistic sense (as levelled against a Deity,) were true; yet would it of the two more impugn Atheism itself, than it does Theism; the Atheists generating and corrupting all things, the substance of matter only excepted, all life, sense, and understanding, human souls, minds and personalities, they producing these, and consequently themselves, out of nothing, and resolving them all to nothing again. We shall now in the third and last place, make it manifest, that the Atheists do not only bring real entities and substantial things out of nothing in the second sense, that is, out of an antecedent nonexistence (which yet is a thing possible only to God, or a perfect being), but also that they bring them out of nothing in the absolutely impossible sense; that is, suppose them to be made without a cause, or "nothing to be the cause of something."

[1] Vide Lucret. lib. ii. ver. 292.

But we must prepare the way hereunto, by setting down, first, a brief and compendious sum of the whole atheistic hypothesis. The Atheists therefore, who contend, that nothing can be made, but only new accidents, or modifications of pre-existing substance; taking it for granted, that there is no other substance besides body or matter, do conclude accordingly that nothing can be made, but out of pre-existing matter or body. And then they add hereunto, that matter being the only substance, the only unmade self-existent thing, whatsoever else is in the world, besides the bare substance of this matter, was made out of it, or produced by it. So that there are these three things contained in the atheistic hypothesis; first, that no substance can be made or caused by any thing else, but only new modifications. Secondly, that matter or body is the only substance; and therefore whatsoever is made, is made out of pre-existing matter. Thirdly, and lastly, that whatsoever there is else in the whole world besides the substance of matter, it is made or generated out of matter. And now we shall demonstrate the absolute impossibility of this atheistic hypothesis, from that very principle of the ancient physiologers, that "Nothing can be made out of nothing," in the true sense thereof; it not only bringing real entities, and substantial things, out of an antecedent nonexistence (though nothing but an infinitely-perfect being neither can thus create), but also producing them without a cause.

First, therefore, when they affirm matter to be the only substance, and all things else whatsoever to be made out of that alone, they hereby plainly suppose all things to be made without an efficient cause, which is to bring them out of nothing, in an impossible sense. For though it be not true, that nothing can be made, but out of pre-existing matter (and consequently that God himself, supposed to exist, could in this respect do no more than a carpenter or tailor doth); I say, though it be not universally true, that every thing that is made must have a material cause (so that the quaternio of causes in logic is not to be extended to all things caused whatsoever); yet is it certain that nothing, which once was not, could possibly be made without an efficient cause. Wherefore, if there be any thing made, which was not before, there must of necessity, besides matter, be some other substance existing, as the efficient cause thereof; forasmuch as matter alone could not make any thing; as marble cannot make a statue, nor timber and stones a house, nor cloth a garment. This is our first demonstration of the impossibility of the atheistic hypothesis; it supposing all things, besides the bare substance of matter, to be made out of matter alone, without any other active principle or Deity, or to be made without an efficient

cause; which is to bring them from nothing, in an impossible sense. To which may be added, by way of appendix, that whereas the Democritic and Epicurean Atheists admit of no other efficient causality in nature, than only local motion, and allow to matter or body, their only substance, no self moving power, they hereby make all the motion that is in the whole world to be without a cause, and from nothing: action without any subject or agent, and the efficiency of all things without an efficient.

In the next place, should we be so liberal as to grant to the atomic Atheists motion without a cause, or permit Strato and the hylozoic Atheists to attribute to matter a self-moving power; yet do we affirm, that this matter and motion both together could not possibly produce any new real entity which was not before; matter, as such, efficiently causing nothing, and motion only changing the modifications of matter, as figure, place, site, and disposition of parts. Wherefore, if matter, as such, have no animal sense and conscious understanding, essentially belonging to it (which no Atheists as yet have had the impudence to assert); then can no motion or modification of matter, no contexture of atoms, possibly beget sense and understanding, soul and mind; because this would be to bring something out of nothing, in the impossible sense, or to suppose something to be made by itself without a cause. Which may serve also for a confutation of those imperfect and spurious Theists, who will not allow to God Almighty (whether supposed by them to be corporeal or incorporeal) a power of making any thing, but only out of pre-existent matter, by the new-modifying thereof; as a carpenter makes a house out of pre-existing timber and stone, and a tailor a garment out of pre-existing cloth. For since animal life and understanding are not by them supposed to belong at all to matter, as such; and since they cannot result from any modifications or contextures thereof, it would plainly follow from hence, that God could not possibly make animals, or produce sense and understanding, souls and minds, which nevertheless these Theists suppose him to have done; and therefore ought in reason to acknowledge him, not only to be the maker of new modifications of matter (and one, who built the world only as a carpenter doth a house), but also of real entities distinct from the same.

And this was the very doctrine (as we have already declared) of the most ancient atomic physiologers; not that every thing whatsoever might be made out of pre-existing matter; but, on the contrary, that in all natural generations there is no real entity produced out of the matter, which was not before in it, but only new modifications; and

consequently, that souls and minds being not mere modifications of matter in respect of magnitude, figure, site, and motion, could never be produced out of it, because they must then of necessity come from nothing; that is, be made either by themselves without a cause, or without a sufficient cause. It hath also been before noted out of Aristotle, how the old atheistic materialists being assaulted by those Italic philosophers after that manner, that nothing, which was not before in matter, besides its modifications, could possibly be produced out of it, because nothing can come out of nothing, and consequently, that in all natural generations and corruptions, there is no real entity made or destroyed; endeavored, without denying the words of that proposition, to evade after this manner; *διὰ τοῦτο οὔτε γίνεσθαι οὐδὲν οἴονται, οὔτε ἀπόλλυσθαι, ὡς τῆς τοιαύτης φύσεως ἀεὶ σωζομένης, ὥσπερ δὲ τὸν Σωκράτην*, etc. That there is indeed nothing generated or corrupted (in some sense), forasmuch as the same substance of matter always remains, it being never made or destroyed. For, as men do not say, that Socrates is made, when he is made musical or handsome; nor destroyed, when he loseth these dispositions, because the subject Socrates was before, and still remaineth; so neither is any substantial thing, or real entity in the world, made or destroyed in this sense; because matter, which is the substance of all, perpetually remains;—and all other things whatsoever are but *πάθη καὶ ἕξεις καὶ διαθέσεις*, passions and affections, and dispositions thereof,—as musicalness and unmusicalness, in respect of Socrates. Which is all one, as if they should say, that all things whatsoever, besides matter, being but accident thereof, are generated out of it, and corruptible into it, without the production of any real entity out of nothing, or the deduction of any into nothing, so long as the substance of matter, which is the only real entity, remains always the same. Wherefore, though life, sense, and understanding, all souls and minds, be generated out of matter; yet does it not follow from thence, that therefore there is any real entity made or produced, because these are nothing but accidents, and modifications of matter. This was the subterfuge of the old hylopathian Atheists.[1]

Now it is true indeed, that whatsoever is in the universe, is either substance, or accidents; and that the accidents of any substance may be generated and corrupted, without the producing of any real entity out of nothing, and reducing of any into nothing; forasmuch as the substance still remains entirely the same. But the Atheists taking it for granted, that there is no other substance besides body or matter, do

[1] Vide Aristot. Metaphys. lib. i. cap. iii. p. 264. tom. iv. oper.

therefore falsely suppose that, which is really incorporeal substance, or else the attributes, properties, and modes thereof, to be the mere accidents of matter, and consequently conclude these to be generable out of it, without the production of any real entity out of nothing. We say therefore, that it does not at all follow, because the same numerical matter (as for example a piece of wax) may be successively made spherical, cubical, cylindrical, pyramidal, or of any other figure; and the same man may successively stand, sit, kneel, and walk; both without the production of any thing out of nothing; or because a heap of stones, bricks, mortar, and timber lying all together disorderly and confusedly, may be made into a stately palace, and that without the miraculous creation of any real entity out of nothing; that therefore the same may be affirmed likewise of every thing else, besides the bare substance of matter, as namely, life and understanding, soul and mind, that though there be no such thing in matter itself, yet the production of them out of matter would be no production of something out of nothing. One ground of which mistake hath been from men's not rightly considering what the accidents of a substance are, and that they are indeed nothing but the modes thereof. Now, a mode is such a thing as cannot possibly be conceived, without that whereof it is a mode; as standing, sitting, kneeling, and walking, cannot be conceived, without a body organizéd, and therefore are but modes thereof; but life and cogitation may be clearly apprehended without body, or any thing of extension; nor indeed can a thought be conceived to be of such a length, breadth, and thickness, or to be hewed and sliced out into many pieces, all of which laid together, as so many small chips thereof, would make up again the entireness of that whole thought. From whence it ought to be concluded, that cogitation is no accident, or mode of matter, or bulky extension, but a mode or attribute of another substance, really distinct from matter, or incorporeal. There is indeed nothing else clearly conceivable by us in body or bulky extension, but only more or less magnitude of parts, figures, site, motion, or rest; and all the different bodies that are in the whole world, are but several combinations or syllables, made up out of these few letters: but no magnitudes, figures, sites, and motions, can possibly spell or compound life and sense, cogitation and understanding, as the syllables thereof; and therefore to suppose these to be generated out of matter, is plainly to suppose some real entity to be brought out of nothing, or something to be made without a cause; which is impossible.

But that which hath principally confirmed men in this error, is the business of sensible qualities and forms, as they are vulgarly conceived to be distinct entities, from those forementioned modifications of mat-

ter, in respect of magnitude of parts, figure, site, motion, or rest. For since these qualities and forms are unquestionably generated and corrupted, there seems to be no reason, why the same might not be as well acknowledged of life, sense, cogitation, and understanding, that these are but qualities or accidents of matter also (though of another kind), and consequently may be generated out of it, without the making of any real thing out of nothing. But the Democritic and Epicurean Atheists themselves have, from the principles of the atomic philosophy, sufficiently confuted and rectified this mistake concerning sensible qualities; they exploding and banishing them all, as conceived to be entities really distinct from the forementioned modifications of matter, and that for this very reason, because the generation of them would, upon this supposition, be the production of something out of nothing, or without a cause; and concluding them therefore to be really nothing else but mechanism, or different modifications of matter, in respect of the magnitude of parts, figure, site, and motion, or rest; they only causing different fancies and apparitions in us. And, in very truth, this vulgar opinion of real qualities of bodies seems to have no other original at all, than men's mistaking their own fancies, passions, and affections, for things really existing in the objects without them. For as sensible qualities are conceived to be things distinct from the forementioned modifications of matter, so are they really nothing but our own fancies, passions, and affections; and consequently no accidents or modifications of matter, but accidents and modifications of our own souls, which are substances incorporeal. Now if these Democritic and Epicurean Atheists themselves concluded, that no real qualities, considered as distinct from the modifications of matter, could not possibly be generated out of it, because this would be the production of something out of nothing; they ought certainly much more to have acknowledged the same, concerning life and cogitation, sense and understanding, that the generation of these out of senseless matter would be an impossible production of something out of nothing; and consequently, that these are therefore no corporeal things, but the attributes, properties, or modes of substance incorporeal; since they can no way be resolved into mechanism and fancy, or, the modifications of matter, as the vulgar sensible qualities may, and ought to be. For though the Democritics and Epicureans did indeed suppose all human cogitations to be caused or produced by the incursion of corporeal atoms upon the thinker; yet did never any of them arrive to such a degree, either of sottishness or impudence, as a modern writer [1] hath done, to maintain, that cogitation, in-

[1] Hobbes. vide Physic. cap. xxv. et Leviathan, part i. cap. i. et ii.

tellection, and volition, are themselves really nothing else but local motion or mechanism, in the inward parts of the brain and heart; or that "mens nihil aliud præterquam motus in partibus quibusdam corporis organici," that mind itself is nothing but motion in some parts of the organized body;—who therefore, as if Cartesius had not been sufficiently paradoxical, in making brute animals (though supposed by him to be devoid of all cogitation) nothing but mere machines, and not contented herewith, hath advanced much further, in making this prodigious conclusion, that all cogitative beings, and men themselves, are really nothing else but machines and automata; whereas he might as well have affirmed heaven to be earth, color to be sound, number to be figure, or any thing else in the world to be any thing, as cogitation and local motion to be the very self-same thing. Nevertheless, so strong was the atheistic intoxication in those old Democritic and Epicureans, that though denying real qualities of bodies, for this very reason, because "Nothing could be produced out of nothing," they notwithstanding contradicting themselves, would make sense, life and understanding, to be qualities of matter, and therefore generable out of it; and so unquestionably produced real entities out of nothing, or without a cause.

Moreover, it is observable, that Epicurus having a mind to assert contingent liberty in men, in way of opposition to that necessity of all human actions, which had been before maintained by Democritus and his followers, plainly acknowledges, that he could not possibly do this, according to the grounds of his own philosophy, without supposing something of contingency in the first principles, that is, in the motion of those atoms, out of which men and other animals are made:[1]

———Si semper motus connectitur omnis,
Et vetere exoritur semper novus ordine certo,
Nec declinando faciunt primordia motus
Principium quoddam, quod fati fœdera rumpat,
Ex infinito ne causam causa sequatur;
Libera per terras unde hæc animantibus extat,
Unde est hæc, inquam, fatis avolsa voluntas?

The reason for which is afterwards thus expressed by him, *quoniam de nihilo nil fit*, because nothing can be made out of nothing.—Upon which account he therefore ridiculously feigned, besides his two other motions of atoms from *pondus* and *plagæ*, weight and strokes,—a third motion of them which he calls *clinamen principiorum*, a contingent and

[1] L. ii. p. 134. Lamb. (ver. 251).

uncertain declination,—every way from the perpendicular; out of design to solve this phenomenon of free-will in men, without bringing something out of nothing, according as he thus subjoineth,[1]

> Quare in seminibus quoque idem fateare necesse est,
> Esse aliam præter plagas et pondera causam
> Motibus, unde hæc est nobis innata potestas;
> De NIHILO quoniam FIERI NIL posse videmus.
> Pondus enim prohibet, ne plagis omnia fiant
> Externa quasi vi. Sed ne mens ipsa necessum
> Intestinum habeat cunctis in rebus agendis,
> Et devicta quasi cogatur ferre patique,
> Id facit exiguum CLINAMEN PRINCIPIORUM,
> Nec ratione loci certa, nec tempore certo.

Now if Epicurus himself conceived, that liberty of will could not possibly be generated in men out of matter or atoms, they having no such thing at all in them (that is, no contingent uncertainty in their motion), without bringing of something out of nothing; which was contrary to the fundamental principles of the atomic philosophy, though this were intolerably absurd in him, thus to suppose contingency, and a kind of free-will in the motions of senseless atoms, so that indeed he brought his liberty of will out of nothing); certainly sense and understanding, soul and mind, in animals and men, could not possibly be generated out of atoms or matter, devoid of all sense and understanding; for the very same reason, *quoniam de nihilo nil fit*, because nothing can be made out of nothing. For unquestionably, were all life and understanding, all souls and minds, generated out of dead and senseless matter; and were there no substantial or essential life and understanding in the whole universe; then must it of necessity be all made out of nothing, or without a cause, and consequently real entities and substantial things be made out of nothing, which is absolutely impossible. For though we do not say, that life and cogitation, sense and understanding, abstractly considered, are substances; yet do we affirm them to be entities really distinct from matter, and no modifications or accidents thereof, but either accidents and modifications, or rather essential attributes, of substance incorporeal, as also that souls and minds, which are the subjects of them, are indeed substantial things. Wherefore, we cannot but here again condemn the darkness of that philosophy, which educes not only species visible and audible (entities perfectly unintelli-

[1] Lucret. lib. ii. ver. 283.

gible), and real qualities, distinct from all the modes of body, and even substantial forms too (as they call them), but also sensitive souls themselves, both in men and brutes, *ex potentia materiæ*, out of the power of the matter;—that is, indeed, out of nothing. Forasmuch as this prepares a direct way to Atheism; because, if life and sense, cogitation and consciousness, may be generated out of dead and senseless matter, then might this well be supposed the first original of all things; nor could there reasonably be any stop made at rational souls, especially by these men, who also conclude them to be *rasæ tabulæ*, mere white sheets of paper,—that have nothing at all in them, but what is scribbled upon them by corporeal objects from without; there being nothing in the understanding or mind of man, which was not before in sense: so that sense is the first original knowledge, and understanding but a secondary and derivative thing from it, more umbratile and evanid.

Hitherto have we demonstrated, that all things whatsoever could not possibly be made out of matter, and particularly that life and sense, mind and understanding, being no accidents or modes of matter, could not by motion be generated out of it, without the production of real entities out of nothing. But because some may possibly imagine, that matter might otherwise than thus by motion, by a miraculous efficiency, produce souls and minds, we shall add in the last place, that nothing can efficiently produce any real entity or substantial thing that was not before, unless it have at least equal perfection to it, and a substantially emanative or creative power. But scarcely any man can be so sottish, as to imagine that every atom of dust hath equal perfection in it to that of the rational soul in man, or to attribute a creative power to all matter (which is but a passive thing), whilst this is in the meantime denied by him to be a perfect being; both these assertions also, in like manner as the former, producing real entities out of nothing causally. And thus have we demonstrated the impossibility and nonsense of all Atheism, from this very principle, by which the Atheists would assault Theism in the true sense thereof, that Nothing can be made without a cause, or that Nothing cannot be the cause of any thing.

Now, if there be no middle betwixt Atheism and Theism, and all things must of necessity either spring from senseless matter, or else from a perfect understanding being: then is this demonstration of the impossibility of Atheism a sufficient establishment of the truth of Theism; it being such a demonstration of a God, as the geometricians call a deduction *ad impossibile*, which they allow of for good, and frequently make use of. Thus, either there is a God; or else matter must needs be acknowledged to be the only self-existent thing, and all things else what-

soever to be made out of it; but it is impossible, that all things should be made out of senseless matter: therefore is there a God. Nevertheless, we shall here, for further satisfaction, show how the existence of a God may be directly demonstrated also from this very principle, which the Atheists endeavor to take sanctuary in, and from thence to impugn Theism, *De nihilo nihil*, that Nothing can be made out of nothing causally, or that Nothing cannot be the cause of any thing.

In the first place, therefore, we shall fetch our beginning from what hath been already often declared, that it is mathematically certain, that Something or other did exist of itself from all eternity, or without beginning, and unmade by any thing else. The certainty of which proposition dependeth upon this very principle, as its foundation, that Nothing can come from nothing, or be made out of nothing, or that Nothing, which once was not, can of itself come into being without a cause; it following unavoidably from thence, that if there had been once nothing, there could never have been any thing. And having thus laid the foundation, we shall in the next place make this further superstructure, that because something did certainly exist of itself from eternity unmade, therefore is there also actually a necessarily-existent being. For to suppose, that any thing did exist of itself from eternity, by its own free-will and choice, and therefore not necessarily but contingently, since it might have willed otherwise; this is to suppose it to have existed before it was, and so positively to have been the cause of itself; which is impossible, as hath been already declared. When a thing therefore is said to be of itself, or the cause of itself, this is to be understood no otherwise, than either in a negative sense, as having nothing else for its cause; or because its necessary eternal existence is essential to the perfection of its own nature. That therefore, which existed of itself from eternity, independently upon any thing else, did not so exist contingently, but necessarily; so that there is undoubtedly something actually in being, whose existence is and always was necessary. In the next place, it is certain also, that nothing could exist necessarily of itself, but what included necessity of existence in its own nature. For to suppose any thing to exist of itself necessarily, which hath no necessity of existence in its own nature, is plainly to suppose that necessary existence of it to come from nothing, since it could neither proceed from that thing itself, nor yet from any thing else. Lastly, there is nothing, which includes necessity of existence in its very nature and essence, but only an absolute perfect being. The result of all which is, that God, or a perfect being, doth certainly exist; and that there is nothing else, which existed of itself from eternity, necessarily

and independently: but all other things whatsoever derived their being from him, or were caused by him, matter or body itself not excepted.

That which hath staggered some Theists here, and made them so inclinable and prone to believe, that matter also existed from eternity unmade, is partly (as hath been already intimated) an idiotical conceit, that because nothing can be artificially made by men, otherwise than out of pre-existing matter, as houses and garments, puddings and pies: therefore there could be no other making of any thing, by any power whatsoever: though even men themselves can produce something out of no pre-existent matter, as cogitations and local motion. And the same partly proceedeth also from certain false opinions entertained concerning matter. For some Theists have supposed *ὕλην ἀσώματον*, an incorporeal first matter;—out of which incorporeal matter, together with an incorporeal form joined to it, they conceived the essence of body to have been compounded, and made. And no wonder, if these same fanciful philosophers have further added also hereunto, that from this incorporeal matter, by an incorporeal form, were begotten likewise incorporeal qualities of body. Now it is not conceivable, what else should be meant by this incorporeal *hyle*, or matter, but only a metaphysical notion of the potentiality, or possibility of things, respectively to the Deity; which, because it is indeed eternal, and as much unmade as God himself is, it being nothing but the Divine power considered passively or the reverse of it; therefore, in all probability, were these philosophers, so prone to think the physical matter of this corporeal universe to have been eternal and unmade. Neither was this incorporeal *hyle*, or matter, a novel opinion, entertained only by some junior Platonists, but older than Aristotle himself, as appeareth plainly from these following words of his in his Metaphysics:[1] *Οἱ μὲν γὰρ ὡς ὕλην τὴν ἀρχὴν λέγουσιν, ἐάντε σῶμα, ἐάντε ἀσώματον τιθῶσιν.* Some speak of the principle as matter; whether they suppose this matter to be body, or to be incorporeal.—But this incorporeal matter in physiology can be accounted no better than a kind of metaphysical nonsense. Again, others seem to have been the more prone to think matter or body to have been self-existent and unmade, because they both conceived it to be really the same thing with space, and also took it for granted, that space was infinite and eternal, and consequently necessarily existent. In answer whereunto, we reply, first, that though space and distance

[1] Lib. i. cap. vi. (p. 273. tom. iv. oper.) Thus Porphyr. *Τῆς ὕλης τὰ ἴδια κατὰ τοὺς ἀρχαίους τάδε, ἀσώματας*, etc. Materiæ Proprietates, secundum Veteres, hæ sunt; quod sit Incorporea, etc. (In Sentent. ad Intelligibilia ducentibus. § xxi. p. 226. ed. Cantab.)

should be granted to be positively infinite, or to have no bounds nor limits at all, as also to have been eternal; yet according to the opinion of some, would it not follow from thence, that matter was infinite, eternal, and necessarily existent; not as if space or distance could exist alone by itself, an accident without a substance, it being plainly impossible, that nothing should have any accidents, modifications, and attributes, or be mensurable by yards and poles; but because this space is by them supposed, not to be the extension of body, but the infinite and unbounded extension of the Deity. But, in the next place, if space be concluded to be certainly nothing else but the extension and distance of body, or matter, considered in general (without respect to this or that particular body), and abstractly in order to the conception of motion, and the mensuration of things (for space thus considered, is necessarily immoveable, as to the parts thereof respectively; as the two extremes of a yard distance can never possibly come nearer to one another); then do we say, that there appeareth no sufficient ground for this positive infinity of space, we being certain of no more than this, that be the world, or any figurative body, never so great, it is not impossible, but that it might be still greater and greater, without end. Which indefinite increasibleness of body and space seems to be mistaken for a positive infinity thereof. Whereas for this very reason, because it can never be so great, but that more magnitude may still be added to it, therefore can it never be positively infinite. Nor is there perhaps so great an absurdity in this, that another world could not possibly be made a mile distant from this, forasmuch as there being nothing between them, they must needs touch; or that this finite world could have no mountains and valleys in the exterior surface of it, since it might be either spherical, cubical, or cylindrical, or of any other regular figure, whatsoever the maker pleased to form it in. To conclude, therefore, by space without the finite world, is to be understood nothing but the possibility of body, further and further, without end, yet so as never to reach to infinity; and such a space as this was there also, before this world was created, a possibility of so much body to be produced. But space and actual distance as really mensurable by yards and poles, though it may be greater and greater without end, yet can it not be positively infinite, so as that there could be no more added to it; and therefore there can be no argument from hence, to prove the necessary existence of matter.

Moreover, the existence of a Deity might be further demonstrated from this common notion, That nothing can come from nothing causally; because, if there were no God, as we could not have had any idea of him, or a perfect being, since it must have come from nothing, and

have been the idea or conception of nothing; so neither could there have been indeed any knowledge or understanding at all. For singular bodies existing without us cannot enter into us, and put understanding in us; nor is there any thing but local motions propagated from them to our organs of sense. The mind must have its immediate intelligibles within itself, for otherwise it could not possibly understand any thing; which intelligences and their relations to one another, or verities, are (as was said before) eternal. Moreover, the mind can frame ideas or conceptions, not only of things actually existing, but also of all possibilities; which plainly implies and supposes the actual existence of a being infinitely powerful, that could produce them. So that the proper object of mind and understanding is a perfect being, and all the extent of its power; which perfect being, comprehending itself and the extent of its own power; or the possibilities of all things, is the first original mind, of which all other minds partake. Wherefore, were there no perfect omnipotent being comprehending itself, and its own power, or all the possibilities of things; the intelligible objects of the mind and ideas must have come from nothing.

However, it hath been already proved from this principle, Nothing from nothing, that the powers of sense and understanding, or the entities of soul and mind could never have resulted from any modifications of senseless matter whatsoever. Wherefore since it is mathematically certain, that our human souls and persons could not possibly have been generated out of matter, one of these two things will undeniably follow; that either they must all have existed of themselves, from eternity unmade; or else have been created ἐξ οὐκ ὄντων, out of an antecedent nonexistence,—by a perfect understanding being unmade, or at least have derived their whole substance from it. So that it is altogether as certain, that there is a God, as that our human souls and persons did not all exist from eternity themselves. And that there must be some eternal unmade mind, hath been already demonstrated also from the same principle, Nothing out of nothing. Thus, have we abundantly confuted the second atheistic argumentation, that there can be no omnipotence, nor Divine creation, because nothing can be made out of nothing; we have plainly showed, that this very principle, in the true sense thereof, affordeth a demonstration for the contrary.

The six following atheistic argumentations, driving at these two things, first, the disproving of an incorporeal and then of a corporeal Deity (from both which, the Atheists conceive, it must follow of necessity, that there can be none at all); we shall take them all together,

and, in order to the confutation of them, perform these three things. First, we shall answer the atheistic argumentations against an incorporeal Deity (contained in the third and fourth heads). Secondly, we shall show that from the very principles of the atheistic corporealism (as represented in the fifth and sixth heads), incorporeal substance is demonstrable. And, lastly, that there being undeniably incorporeal substance, the two following atheistic argumentations also, against a corporeal Deity (in the seventh and eighth sections), prove altogether insignificant.

We begin with the first of these; to show the invalidity of the atheistic argumentations against an incorporeal Deity. It hath been already observed, that though all Corporealists be not therefore of necessity Atheists, yet Atheists universally have been Corporealists; this being always their first and grand postulatum, That there is no other substance besides body. Thus Plato long ago declared concerning them: [1]*Διϊσχυρίζονται τοῦτο εἶναι μόνον ὃ παρέχει προσβολὴν καὶ ἐπαφήν τινα, ταυτὸν σῶμα καὶ οὐσίαν ὁριζόμενοι· τῶν δὲ ἄλλων εἴτις φησὶ μὴ σῶμα ἔχον εἶναι, καταφρονοῦντες τοπαράπαν, καὶ οὐδὲν ἐθέλοντες ἄλλο ἀκούειν.* They contend strongly, that that only really is, which is tangible, or can resist their touch; concluding body and substance to be one and the selfsame thing: and if any one should affirm, that there is any thing incorporeal, they will presently cry him down, and not hear a word more from him.—For there can be no doubt, but that the persons here intended by Plato were those very Atheists which himself spake of afterward in the same dialogue:[2] *Μῶν τῷ τῶν πολλῶν δόγματι καὶ ῥήματι χρώμενοι φήσομεν, τὴν φύσιν αὐτὰ πάντα γεννᾷν ἀπό τινος αἰτίας αὐτομάτης, καὶ ἄνευ διανοίας φυούσης; ἢ μετὰ λόγου καὶ ἐπιστήμης θείας, ἀπὸ θεοῦ γιγνομένης.* Whether shall we assent to that opinion now-a-days entertained by so many, that nature generateth all things from a certain fortuitous cause, without the direction of any mind or understanding? or rather, that it produceth them, according to reason and knowledge, proceeding from God?—Indeed the philosopher there tells us, that some of these atheistic persons began then to be somewhat ashamed of making prudence, and justice, and other moral virtues, corporeal things, or bodies: *Ἀποκρίνονται τὴν μὲν ψυχὴν αὐτὴν δοκεῖν σφίσι σῶμά τι κεκτῆσθαι, φρόνησιν δὲ καὶ τῶν ἄλλων ἕκαστον ὧν ἠρώτηκας αἰσχύνονται τὸ τολμᾷν, ἢ μηδὲν τῶν ὄντων αὐτὰ ὁμολογεῖν, ἢ πάντ' εἶναι σώματα διϊσχυρίζεσθαι.* Though they affirm concerning the soul itself, that this seems to them to be corporeal; yet, concerning prudence, and those other virtues

[1] Soph. p. 172. Fic. (p. 160.) [2] Page 168.

mentioned, some have now scarcely the confidence to maintain these to be either bodies or nothing.—But this (saith he) was indeed no less than the quite giving up of the cause of Atheism; *εἰ γάρ τι καὶ σμικρὸν ἐθέλουσι τῶν ὄντων συγχωρεῖν ἀσώματον, ἐξαρκεῖ·* because, if it be but once granted, that there is never so little incorporeal, this will be sufficient to overthrow the atheistic foundation.—Wherefore he concludes, that such as these were but mongrel and imperfect Atheists; *ἐπεὶ τούτων οὐδ' ἂν ἓν ἐπαισχυνθεῖεν, οἵ γε αὐτῶν σπαρτοὶ καὶ αὐτόχθονες, ἀλλὰ διατείνοιντ' ἄν, πᾶν ὃ μὴ δυνατοὶ ταῖς χερσὶ συμπιέζειν, ὡς ἄρα τοῦτο οὐδὲν τοπαράπαν ἐστί·* for they, who are thorough-paced and genuine Atheists indeed, will boggle at neither of those forementioned things, but contend, that whatsoever they cannot grasp with their hands, is altogether nothing.—That is, that there is no other substance nor entity in the world, but only body, that which is tangible, or resists the touch. Aristotle also representeth the atheistic hypothesis after the same manner: *Τοῦτο καὶ τοσαύτην φασὶν εἶναι τὴν ἅπασαν οὐσίαν, τὰ δὲ ἄλλα πάντα πάθη τούτων·* They affirm, that matter, or body, is all the substance that is; and that all other things are but the passions and affections thereof.—And again, in his Metaphysics:[1] *Ἓν τὸ πᾶν, καὶ μίαν εἶναί τινα φύσιν, ὡς ὕλην τιθέασι, καὶ ταύτην σωματικὴν καὶ μέγεθος ἔχουσαν.* These men maintain all to be one, and that there is but one only nature, as the matter of all things, and this corporeal, or endued with magnitude.—And now we see plainly, that the ancient Atheists were of the very same mind with these in our days, that body, or that which is tangible and divisible, is the only substantial thing; from whence it follows that an incorporeal substance would be the same with an incorporeal body, *i. e.* an impossibility, and that there can be no incorporeal Deity.

But in the management of this cause, there hath been some disagreement amongst the Atheists themselves. For, first, the Democritics and Epicureans, though consenting with all the other Atheists, in this, that whatsoever was unextended, and devoid of magnitude, was therefore nothing (so that there could neither be any substance, unextended); did notwithstanding distinguish concerning a double nature. First, that which is so extended, as to be impenetrable, and tangible, or resist the touch, which is body. And, secondly, that which is extended also, but penetrably and intangibly; which is space or vacuum: a nature, according to them, really distinct from body, and the only incorporeal thing that is. Now since this space, which is the only incorporeal, can neither do nor suffer any thing, but only give place or room to bodies to subsist in, or pass through; therefore can there not be any

[1] Met. lib. i. cap. vii. (p. 274. tom. iv. oper.)

active, understanding, incorporeal Deity. This is the argumentation of the Democritic Atheists.

To which we reply, that if space be indeed a nature distinct from body, and a thing really incorporeal, as they pretend, then will it undeniably follow from this very principle of theirs, that there must be an incorporeal substance; and (this space being supposed by them also to be infinite) an infinite incorporeal Deity. Because, if space be not the extension of body, nor an affection thereof, then must it of necessity be either an accident existing alone by itself without a substance, which is impossible; or else the extension or affection of some other incorporeal substance that is infinite. But here will Gassendus step in to help out his good friends the Democritics and Epicureans at a dead lift; and undertake to maintain, that though space be indeed an incorporeal thing, yet it would neither follow of necessity from thence, that it is an accident existing alone by itself, without a substance; because this space is really neither accident nor substance, but a certain middle nature or essence betwixt both. To which subterfuge of his, that we may not quarrel about words, we shall make this reply; that unquestionably, whatsoever is, or hath any kind of entity, doth either subsist by itself, or else is an attribute, affection, or mode of something, that doth subsist by itself. For it is certain, that there can be no mode, accident, or affection of nothing; and consequently, that nothing cannot be extended, nor mensurable. But if space be neither the extension of body, nor yet of substance incorporeal, then must it of necessity be the extension of nothing, and the affection of nothing; and nothing must be mensurable by yards and poles. We conclude therefore, that from this very hypothesis of the Democritic and Epicurean Atheists, that space is a nature distinct from body, and positively infinite, it follows undeniably, that there must be some incorporeal substance, whose affection its extension is; and because there can be nothing infinite, but only the Deity, that it is the infinite extension of an incorporeal Deity; just as some learned Theists and Incorporealists have asserted. And thus is the argument of these Democritic and Epicurean Atheists, against an incorporeal Deity, abundantly confuted; we having made it manifest, that from that very principle of their own, by which they would disprove the same, it is against themselves demonstrable.

To which it might be here further added, that Epicurus, who professedly opposed Plato's incorporeal God, as an impossibility, did notwithstanding manifestly contradict himself, when he asserted such a democracy of monogrammous gods, as were not compounded of atoms and vacuum (though, according to him, the only principles of body),

that so they might be incorruptible; nor yet could touch or be touched, but were penetrable, as is declared in those verses of Lucretius,[1]

> Tenuis enim natura deum, longeque remota
> Sensibus a nostris, animi vix mente videtur.
> Quæ quoniam manuum tactum suffugit et ictum,
> Tactile nil nobis quod sit, contingere debet.
> Tangere enim non quit, quod tangi non licet ipsum.

(though tangibility and impenetrability were elsewhere made by him the very essence of body); and, lastly, such as had not *corpus*, but *quasi corpus*, and therefore must needs be really incorporeal. Though there is no doubt to be made, but that Epicurus colluded in all this; himself not believing a jot of it, nor any such gods at all.

But other Atheists there were, who concluding likewise, that whatsoever was unextended was nothing, were sensible of the inconvenience of making space thus to be a thing really distinct from body (from whence it would follow unavoidably that it was an affection of incorporeal substance); and therefore acknowledged, not two natures of extended things, but as we had it before in Aristotle, *μίαν τινὰ φύσιν καὶ ταύτην σωματικὴν*, one only nature, and that bodily;—space being therefore to them, either a mere imaginary thing that hath no reality without our minds, but only a phantasm of our own, and, in their modern language, a kind of ghost, apparition, or spectre of a body: or else, indeed, the very extension of body itself, considered in general, and abstractly, from this or that singular body, moveable. And these men therefore framed their argumentation against an incorporeal Deity after this manner: nothing truly is, but what is extended, or hath a certain magnitude (because that which is unextended, and hath no magnitude, is no where, and consequently nothing). But whatsoever is extended, and in a place, is body. Therefore is there no other substance besides body; and consequently there can be no incorporeal Deity. Or else, to put the argument into a more approvable syllogistic form; whatsoever is extended, is body, or corporeal; but whatsoever is, is extended. Therefore whatsoever is, is body, or corporeal: and by consequence, there can be no incorporeal Deity.

To which argumentation the assertors of incorporeal substance have replied two manner of ways. For, first, the generality of the ancient Incorporealists taking it for granted, that whatsoever was extended in magnitude, and had parts one without another, was divisible, as also

[1] Lib. v. ver. 149.

probably impenetrable by any thing else extended, because there can be no penetration of dimensions; and therefore no one magnitude can be imbibed or swallowed up into another, but must of necessity stand without it, adding so much to the quantity thereof; they readily gave their assent to that proposition, That whatsoever is extended into longitude, latitude and profundity, is body. But being strongly persuaded of the existence of some other substance besides body, they denied that other proposition of theirs, That whatsoever is, is extended; or what is unextended, is nothing: maintaining, that besides body, or extended substance, there was another substance incorporeal, which therefore was *ἀδιάστατος*, and *ἀμεγέθες*, and *ἄποσος*, and *ἀμερὴς*, and *ἀδιαίρετος*, unextended, and devoid of quantity and magnitude, without parts, and indivisible.—That Plato himself philosophized after this manner, might be proved from sundry passages of his writings; as that in his tenth De Legibus, where he affirmeth, that the soul itself, and those things which belong to it, as cogitative, are *πρότερα μήκους σωμάτων καὶ βάθους καὶ πλάτους*, in order of nature, before the longitude, and latitude, and profundity of bodies.—Where, doubtless, his meaning was not, as if there were longitude, latitude, and profundity in souls, but of a different kind from that longitude, latitude, and profundity of bodies, and before it; but that longitude, latitude, and profundity, being the essential properties of body only, soul and cogitation, as devoid of these, was in order of nature before them. Again, from that in his Timæus, where speaking of place, space, and matter, he condemneth this for a vulgar error, That whatsoever is, must of necessity be in some place or other, and what is in no place, is nothing. *Τρίτον δὲ αὖ γένος τὸ τῆς χώρας, ἕδραν παρέχον ὅσα ἔχει γένεσιν πᾶσιν——πρὸς ὃ δὲ καὶ ὀνειροπολοῦμεν βλέποντες, καὶ φαμὲν ἀναγκαῖον εἶναί που, τὸ ὂν ἅπαν ἔν τινι τόπῳ, καὶ κατέχον χώραν τινά· τὸ δὲ μήτε ἐν γῇ, μήτέ που κατ᾽ οὐρανὸν, οὐδὲν εἶναι·* The third kind is that of space, which gives room to all things that are generated. And when we look upon this, we dreamingly affirm, that every thing that is must of necessity be in some place, and possess a certain room and space, and that whatsoever is not somewhere, either in earth or in heaven, is nothing. Which drowsy or dreaming imagination (saith he), like a ghost, continually haunteth and possesseth men, and that even then, when they think of that true and awakened nature of the Deity.—Whereas this philosopher himself, discoursing elsewhere of God, under the title of *πολὺ πέλαγος τοῦ καλοῦ*, the vast sea of pulchritude,—describeth him after this manner; *οὐδέπου ὖν, ἢ ἐν γῇ, ἢ ἐν οὐρανῷ, ἀλλ᾽ αὐτὸ, μεθ᾽ αὑτοῦ, μονοειδὲς ἀεὶ ὄν, τὰ δὲ ἄλλα πάντα καλὰ ἐκείνου μετέχοντα·* as that which is not any where, either in earth, or in

heaven, but itself alone by itself, and with itself, all other beautiful things partaking of it.—And as for Aristotle's sense in this particular; that he here departed not, as he did in some other things from his master Plato, may appear from that whole chapter, or section, at the end of his Physics, spent upon this very subject, to prove *ὅτι τοῦτ' ἀμερὲς ἀναγκαῖον εἶναι, καὶ μηδὲν ἔχειν μέγεθος*, that his first Immoveable Mover (which is God Almighty) must of necessity be devoid of parts, or indivisible, and have no magnitude at all.—The conclusion of which section, and his whole book of Physics,[1] is this: *Διωρισμένων δὲ τούτων, φανερὸν ὅτι ἀδύνατον τὸ πρῶτον κινοῦν καὶ ἀκίνητον ἔχειν τι μέγεθος· εἰ γὰρ μέγεθος ἔχει, ἀνάγκη ἤτοι πεπερασμένον αὐτὸ εἶναι, ἢ ἄπειρον· ἄπειρον μὲν οὖν ὅτι οὐκ ἐνδέχεται μέγεθος εἶναι, δέδεικται πρότερον ἐν τοῖς φυσικοῖς· ὅτι δὲ τὸ πεπερασμένον ἀδύνατον ἔχειν ἄπειρον δύναμιν, δέδεικται νῦν· φανερὸν τοίνυν, ὅτι ἀδιαίρετόν ἐστι, καὶ ἀμερὲς, καὶ οὐδὲν ἔχον μέγεθος·* These things being thus determined, it is manifestly impossible, that the first Mover should have any magnitude. For if it hath magnitude, that must of necessity be either finite or infinite. But that there can be no infinite magnitude, was before demonstrated in the Physics; and that nothing, which hath a finite magnitude, can have infinite power, hath been now proved. Wherefore it is plain, that the first Mover is indivisible, and devoid of parts, and hath no magnitude at all.—Which same doctrine is again taught and asserted by Aristotle, in his Metaphysics:[2] *Ὅτι μὲν οὖν ἐστὶν οὐσία τις ἀΐδιος καὶ ἀκίνητος, καὶ κεχωρισμένη τῶν αἰσθητῶν, φανερὸν ἐκ τῶν εἰρημένων. δέδεικται δὲ καὶ ὅτι μέγεθος οὐδὲν ἐνδέχεται ἔχειν ταύτην τὴν οὐσίαν, ἀλλὰ ἀμερὴς καὶ ἀδιαίρετός ἐστι· οὐδὲν γὰρ ἔχει δύναμιν ἄπειρον πεπερασμένον, καὶ ὅλως οὐκ ἔστιν οὐδὲν ἄπειρον·* From what hath been declared, it is manifest, that there is an eternal and immoveable substance, separate from sensibles; as also, that this substance cannot possibly have any magnitude, but is devoid of parts and indivisible. Because no finite thing can have infinite power, and there is no such thing possible as infinite magnitude.—Neither doth Aristotle appropriate this to the supreme Deity, "to be thus devoid of magnitude and of parts, and consequently indivisible;" he somewhere[3] attributing the same also to all other immaterial or incorporeal things, and particularly to the human mind, *ἀδιαίρετον πᾶν τὸ μὴ ὕλην ἔχον, ὥσπερ ὁ ἀνθρώπινος νοῦς*, every thing, that is devoid of matter, is indivisible, as the human mind.—And the like doth he assert, at once, both concerning the mundane and the human soul, that they are no magnitudes,

[1] Page 608. tom. i. oper. [2] Page 14. cap. vii. (p. 480. tom. iv. oper.)

[3] Metaphys. lib. xiv. cap. ix. p. 484. tom. iv. oper.

though ridiculously (after his manner) imputing the contrary opinion to Plato: [1]*Οὐ καλῶς τὸ λέγειν τὴν ψυχὴν μέγεθος εἶναι. Ὁ δὲ νοῦς εἷς καὶ συνεχής, ὥσπερ καὶ ἡ νόησις· ἡ δὲ νόησις τὰ νοήματα· ταῦτα δὲ τῷ ἐφεξῆς ἓν, ὡς ὁ ἀριθμός, ἀλλ' οὐχ ὡς τὸ μέγεθος· διόπερ οὐδὲ νοῦς οὕτῳ συνεχής· ἀλλ' ἤτοι ἀμερής, ἢ οὐχ ὡς τὸ μέγεθός τι συνεχής· πῶς γὰρ δὲ καὶ νοήσει μέγεθος ὤν, ὅτῳ οὖν τῶν μορίων τῶν αὐτοῦ; μορίων δὲ ἤτοι κατὰ μέγεθος, ἢ κατὰ στιγμήν· εἰ μὲν οὖν κατὰ στιγμὴν, αὗται δ' ἄπειροι, δῆλον ὡς οὐδέποτε διέξεισιν· εἰ δὲ κατὰ μέγεθος, πολλάκις ἢ ἀπειράκις νοήσει τὸ αὐτό. Ἔτι δὲ πῶς νοήσει τὸ ἀμερὲς μεριστῷ·* It is not rightly affirmed either of the mundane, or rational soul, that they are magnitudes. For the Intellect is one and continuous, as Intellection is, which is the same with the Intelligibles. But these are one, not as magnitudes, but as numbers. Wherefore the Intellect is not so continuous, but either devoid of parts, or not continuous as magnitude. For how, being magnitude, could it understand with any of its parts, whether conceived as points, or as lesser magnitudes; since either way there would be an innumerable company of intellections; moreover, how can it conceive any thing that is indivisible by what is divisible?—Furthermore, in this same book De Anima,[2] Aristotle stiffly denies souls in general either to be in a place, or to be locally moved, otherwise than by accident, as they are said to be moved together with the motion of the body. Thus Simplicius:[3] *Ὅρα ὡς πανταχοῦ τὰς σωματικὰς ἀποσείεται τῆς ψυχῆς κινήσεις.* See how Aristotle doth every where remove, or exclude from the soul, corporeal (or local) motions.—And again: [4]*Ἀπαγορεύει μὴ κινεῖσθαι τὰ ἀσώματα τῆς κινήσεως αἴτια κἂν πρῶτα κἂν μέσα κἂν ἔσχατα ᾖ,* Aristotle will by no means allow any incorporeal things whatsoever, whether of the first, second, or lowest rank (they being all the causes of motion), themselves to be moved.—Philoponus[5] likewise: *Ὁρᾷς ὡς πρὸς τὰς σωματικὰς κινήσεις ἀποβλέπων, οὕτως αὐτὴν ἀκίνητον εἶναί φησι· πᾶν γὰρ τὸ ἐν τόπῳ σῶμά ἐστιν.* You see how Aristotle, respecting corporeal motions, pronounces of the soul, that it is immoveable. For whatsoever is in a place (and moveable) is body.—Lastly, in that passage before cited, Aristotle plainly makes the essence of corporeal substance, as opposed to incorporeal, to consist in magnitude.

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[1] De Anima, lib. i. cap. iii. pp. 9, 10. tom. ii. oper.

[2] Lib. i. cap. iv. p. 12. tom. ii. oper.

[3] Comment. in Libros Aristot. de Anima, fol. 6. ed. Græc. Franc. Asulani, Venet. 1527. fol. [4] Fol. 6.

[5] Comment. in Libros tres Aristot. de Anima, fol. 13. ed. Græc. Venet. 1553. fol.

Besides Plato and Aristotle, we might here instance in sundry other of the ancient Incorporealists, who clearly maintained the same doctrine. Philo doth not only assert in general a double essence or substance, ἀδιάστατον, and διαστηματικὴν, a distant, and indistant one;—but somewhere writeth thus concerning the Deity:[1] Ὑπὸ τοῦ Θεοῦ πεπλήρωται τὰ πάντα, περιέχοντος οὐ περιεχομένου, ᾧ πανταχοῦ τε καὶ οὐδαμοῦ συμβέβηκεν εἶναι μόνῳ· οὐδαμοῦ μὲν, ὅτι καὶ χώραν καὶ τόπον αὐτὸς τοῖς σώμασι συγγεγέννηκε· τὸ δὲ πεποιηκὸς ἐν οὐδενὶ τῶν γεγονότων θέμις εἰπεῖν περιέχεσθαι· πανταχοῦ δὲ, ὅτι τὰς δυνάμεις αὐτοῦ διὰ γῆς καὶ ὕδατος ἀέρος τε καὶ οὐρανοῦ τείνας, etc. All things are filled with God, as containing them, but not as being contained by them, or in them; to whom alone it belongeth to be both every where, and no where. No where, because himself created space and place, together with bodies, and it is not lawful to include the Creator, within any of his creatures. And every where, because he extendeth his virtues and powers throughout earth and water, air and heaven, and leaveth no part of the world destitute thereof; but, collecting all things together under himself, hath bound them fast with invisible bonds.—But none hath more industriously pursued this business than Plotinus, who every where asserts body and magnitude to be one and the same thing; and that besides this, there is another substance incorporeal, which, consequently, is ἄποσος, and ἀμεγέθης, and ἀμερὴς, devoid of quantity, and of magnitude, and of parts, locally distant from one another; ὃ ἐν τῇ αὐτοῦ οὐσίᾳ τὸ ποσὸν εἶναι ὑπερβέβηκεν, it having in its nature transcended the imperfection of quantity.—And who hath also written two whole books[2] upon this very subject, τὸ ὂν ἓν καὶ ταυτὸν ἀριθμῷ ἅμα πανταχοῦ εἶναι ὅλον; that one and the self-same numerical thing may be all of it entirely every where. —Wherein his principal design was to prove, that the Deity is not part of it here, and part of it there; and so much thereof in one place, and so much in another (as if the very substance of it were mensurable by yards and poles); but the whole undivided Deity every where; [3] Πρὸ τῶν ἐν τόπῳ ἁπάντων (saith he); "God is before all things, that are in a place." And [4] θαυμάζειν οὐ δεῖ, εἰ αὐτὸ μὴ ὂν ἐν τόπῳ παντὶ τῷ ἐν τόπῳ ὄντι, ὅλως πάρεστι, φησὶ γὰρ ὁ λόγος, ὡς ἀνάγκη αὐτῷ τόπον οὐκ εἰληχότι, ᾧ πάρεστι, τούτῳ ὅλον παρεῖναι, it is not at all to be wondered at, that God, being not in a place, should be present to every thing, that is in a place, wholly and entirely; reason pronouncing, that he, having no place, must therefore of necessity be ὅλως, all of him indivisibly pres-

[1] De Confus. Ling. p. 339. [2] Lib. iv. et v. Ennead. vi.
[3] Lib. iv. Ennead. vi. cap. iii. p. 647. [4] Page 667. [lib. iv. cap. ix.]

ent to whatsoever he is present.—Neither is this, saith he, a thing only deduced by reason, but that, which is before reason, suggested by the instincts of mankind; *τὸ ἓν καὶ ταυτὸν ἀριθμῷ, πανταχοῦ ἅμα ὅλον εἶναι, κοινὴ ἔννοιά φησιν εἶναι, ὅταν πάντες κινούμενοι αὐτοφυῶς λέγωσι, τὸν ἐν ἑκάστῳ ἡμῶν Θεὸν, ὡς ἕνα καὶ τὸν αὐτόν·* that one and the same numerical substance (to wit, of the Deity) is at once entirely every where, is agreeable to the common notions, as sentiments of mankind, when we do so often by the instincts of nature speak of that God, who is in every one of us, supposing him to be one and the same in all.—Where the philosopher subjoins, *Καὶ ἔστι πάντων βεβαιοτάτη ἀρχὴ, ἣν ὥσπερ αἱ ψυχαὶ ἡμῶν φθέγγονται*, etc. And this is the firmest of all principles, that, which our souls do, as it were, naturally and of themselves speak; and which is not collected by reason, but comes forth from them before ratiocination.—Moreover, he often affirmeth of the human soul, or rather takes it as a thing for granted, that this is the whole or all of it, in every part of the body, that is, undividedly: [1] *Ἐπὶ δὲ τῆς ψυχῆς, τὸ αὐτὸ ἀριθμῷ, τὸ ἐν τῷ ποδὶ, καὶ τῇ χειρὶ ὑπάρχει.* As for the human soul, it is one and the same numerically in the hand, and in the foot.—And again: *Εἶτά πως ἐν ποδὶ καὶ χειρὶ τὴν αὐτὴν, τὴν δὲ ἐν τῷ δὲ μέρει τοῦ παντὸς, οὐ τὴν αὐτὴν τὴν ἐν τῷδε·* Since we commonly suppose our own soul to be the same, both in our foot and in our hand, why should we not, in like manner, acknowledge that of the mundane soul, or Deity,—which is in one part of the universe, to be the same with that in another? In like manner, Simplicius, [2] proving that body is not the first principle, because there must of necessity be something self moving, and what is so, must needs be incorporeal, writeth thus: *Τὸ δὲ τοιοῦτον ἀμερὲς εὐθὺς ἀνάγκη εἶναι καὶ ἀδιάστατον, μεριστὸν γὰρ καὶ διαστατὸν ὑπάρχον, οὐ δύναται ὅλον ὅλῳ ἑαυτῷ ἐφαρμόττειν, ὡς τὸ ὅλον εἶναι κινοῦν, καὶ ὅλον τὸ αὐτὸ κινούμενον.* Because what is such, must of necessity be indivisible, and indistant; for were it divisible, and distant, it could not all of it be conjoined with its whole self; so that the whole should both actively move and be moved. —Which same thing seems further evident in the soul's being all conscious of itself, and reflexive of its whole self; which could not be, were one part of it distant from another. Again, the same philosopher expressly denieth the soul, though a self-moving substance, to be at all locally moved, otherwise than by accident, in respect of the body, which is moved by it, *οὐ τὰς σωματικὰς κινούμενον κινήσεις (κατὰ γὰρ ἐκείνας ἀκίνητόν ἐστι) ἀλλὰ τὰ ςψυχικὰς, αἷς ὀνὸματά ἐστι σκοπεῖσθαι, βουλεύεσθαι, διανοεῖν, δοξάξειν, κινεῖ τὰ σῶματα κατὰ τὰς σωματικὰς κινήσεις·* The soul, being not moved

[1] Page 644. [2] Ubi supra, fol. 7.

by corporeal, or local motions (for in respect of these it is immoveable), but by cogitative ones only, (the names whereof are Consultation and Deliberation, etc.) by these moveth bodies locally.—And that this was really Plato's meaning also, when he determined the soul to be a self-moving substance, and the cause of all bodily motion; that moving itself in a way of cogitation, it moved bodies locally (notwithstanding that Aristotle would not take notice of it), sufficiently appears from his own words, and is acknowledged by the Greek scholiasts themselves upon Aristotle's De Anima. Thus again Simplicius elsewhere: *Ἐπεὶ δ' οὐκ ἐν τόπῳ ψυχή, οὐδ' ἂν κινοῖτο, τὰς τῶν ἐν τόπῳ ὄντων κινήσεις.* Since the soul is not in a place, it is not capable of any local motion.

We should omit the testimonies of any more philosophers, were it not that we find Porphyrius so full and express herein, who makes this the very beginning of his *ἀφορμαὶ πρὸς τὰ νοητὰ*, his manuduction to intelligibles;—*πᾶν σῶμα ἐν τόπῳ, οὐδὲν δὲ τῶν καθ' ἑαυτὸ ἀσωμάτων ἐν τόπῳ*, that though every body be in a place, yet nothing, that is properly incorporeal, is in a place:—and who afterwards further pursues it in this manner: *Οὐδὲ τοπικῶς διέρχεται τὸ ἀσώματον, ὅπου βούλεται· ὄγκῳ γὰρ συνυφίσταται τόπος· τὸ δ' ἄογκον παντελῶς καὶ ἀμέγεθες, ὑπὸ τῶν ἐν ὄγκῳ ἀκράτητον, τοπικῆς τε κινήσεως ἄμοιρον, διαθέσει τοίνυν ποίᾳ ἔχει εὑρίσκεται, ὅπου καὶ διάκειται· καὶ ἐκ τῶν ἔργων αὐτοῦ φανερὰ ἡ παρουσία αὐτοῦ γίνεται·* Neither does that, which is incorporeal, move locally by will, place being relative only to magnitude and bulk. But that, which is devoid of bulk and magnitude, is likewise devoid of local motion. Wherefore, it is only present by a certain disposition and inclination of it to one thing more than another; nor is its presence there discernible otherwise, than by its operations and effects.—Again, concerning the three Divine hypostases he writeth thus; [2]*ὁ Θεὸς πανταχοῦ ὅτι οὐδαμοῦ, καὶ ὁ νοῦς πανταχοῦ ὅτι οὐδαμοῦ, καὶ ψυχὴ πανταχοῦ ὅτι οὐδαμοῦ*, etc. The supreme God is therefore every where, because he is no where; and the same is true also of the second and third Divine hypostases, Nous and Psyche. The supreme God is every where and no where, in respect of those things which are after him, and only his own, and in himself. Nous, or intellect, is in the supreme God, every where and no where, as to those things that are after him. Psyche, or the mundane soul, is both in intellect and the supreme God, and every where and no where, as to bodies. Lastly, body is both in the soul of the world and in God.—Where he denies God to be locally in the corporeal world, and thinks it more proper to say, that the corporeal world is

[1] Pages 229, 230. (sect. xxviii. ed. Cantab. [2] Page 231.

in God, than God in it; because the world is held and contained in the Divine power, but the Deity is not in the locality of the world. Moreover, he further declares his sense after this manner:[1] *Οὐδ' εἰ κενὸν οὖν τι ἐπινοηθείη ἀσώματον, ἐν κενῷ οἷόν τε εἶναι Νοῦν, σώματος μὲν γὰρ δεκτικὸν ἂν εἴη τὸ κενόν. Νοῦ δὲ ἐνέργειαν χωρῆσαι ἀμήχανον, καὶ τόπον δοῦναι ἐνεργείᾳ.* Nor, if there were conceived to be such an incorporeal space, or vacuum (as Democritus and Epicurus supposed), could Mind, or God, possibly exist in this empty space (as coextended with the same), for this would be only receptive of bodies, but it could not receive the energy of mind or intellect, nor give any place or room to that, that being no bulky thing.—And again:[2] *Ὁ μὲν κόσμος ἐν τῷ νῷ διαστατικῶς πάρεστι, τὸ δὲ ἀσώματον τῷ κόσμῳ ἀμερῶς καὶ ἀδιαστάτως· τὸ δὲ ἀμερὲς ἐν διαστατῷ ὅλον γίνεται κατὰ πᾶν μέρος, ταυτὸν ὂν καὶ ἓν ἀριθμῷ· αὐτὸ ἀμερῶς πάρεστι καὶ ἀπληθύντως καὶ ἀτόπως, κατὰ τὴν αὐτοῦ φύσιν, τῷ μεριστῷ, καὶ πεπληθυσμένῳ, καὶ ὄντι ἐν τόπῳ.* The corporeal world is distantly present to the intelligible (or the Deity); and that is indivisibly and indistantly present with the world. But when that, which is indistant and unextended, is present with that which is distant and extended; then is the whole of the former one and the same numerically in every part of the latter. That is, it is indivisibly and unmultipliedly, and illocally there (according to its own nature) present with that, which is naturally divisible, and multipliable, and in a place. —Lastly, he affirmeth the same likewise of the human soul, that this is also *οὐσία ἀμεγέθης*, a substance devoid of magnitude,—and which is not locally present to this or that body, but by disposition and energy; and therefore the whole of it in every part thereof undividedly.[3]

And as for the Christian writers besides Origen, who was so famous an assertor of incorporeal substance, that (as Socrates[4] recordeth) the Egyptian monks and Anthropomorphites threatened death to Theophilus the Alexandrian bishop, unless he would at once execrate and renounce the writings of Origen, and profess the belief of a corporeal God of human form; and who also maintained incorporeal substance to be unextended, as might be proved from sundry passages, both of his book against Celsus, and that Peri Archon; we say (besides Origen, and others of the Greeks), St. Austin amongst the Latins clearly asserted

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[1] In Appendice sententiarum, sive graduum ad intelligibilia, sect. 45, p. 278. ed. Cantab.

[2] Par. ii. Sententiarum ad intelligibilia docentium, sect. 35. p. 241.

[3] Vide par. i. Sententiar. sect. 18. p. 225.

[4] Histor. Eccles. lib. vi. cap. vii. p. 310.

the same, he maintaining in his book De Quantitate Animæ,[1] and elsewhere, concerning the human soul, that being incorporeal, it hath no dimensions of length, breadth, and profundity, and is *illocabilis*, no where as in a place. We shall conclude with the testimony of Boethius, who was both a philosopher and a Christian: "Quædam sunt (saith he)[2] communes animi conceptiones, per se notæ, apud sapientes tantum; ut incorporalia non esse in loco." There are certain common conceptions, or notions of the mind, which are known by themselves amongst wise men only; as this, for example, that incorporeals are in no place.—From whence it is manifest, that the generality of reputed wise men were not formerly of this opinion, "quod nusquam est, nihil est," that what is no where, or in no certain place, is nothing;—and that this was not looked upon by them as a common notion, but only as a vulgar error.

By this time we have made it unquestionably evident, that this opinion of incorporeal substance being unextended, indistant and devoid of magnitude, is no novel or recent thing, nor first started in the scholastic age; but that it was the general persuasion of the most ancient and learned assertors of incorporeal substance, especially that the Deity was not part of it here, and part of it there, nor the substance thereof mensurable by yards and poles, as if there were so much of it contained in one room, and so much and no more in another, according to their several dimensions; but that the whole undivided Deity was at once in every part of the world, and consequently no where locally after the manner of bodies. But, because this opinion seems so strange and paradoxical, and lies under so great prejudices, we shall in the next place show, how these ancient Incorporealists endeavored to acquit themselves in repelling the several efforts and plausibilities made against it. The first whereof is this, that to suppose incorporeal substances unextended and divisible is to make them absolute parvitudes, and by means of that, to render them all (even the Deity itself) contemptible: since they must of necessity be either physical minimums, that cannot actually be divided further by reason of their littleness (if there be any such thing), or else mere mathematical points, which are not so much as mentally divisible: so that thousands of these incorporeal substances, or spirits, might dance together at once upon a needle's point. To

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[1] It is published in the first volume of the Benedictine edition of St. Augustine's works.

[2] Dr. Cudworth seems to have quoted this passage from memory out of Boethius's book, entitled, "Quomodo Substantiæ in eo, quod sint, bonæ sint, cum non sint Substantialia bona." p. 167.

which it was long since thus replied by Plotinus: [1]*Οὐχ οὕτω δὲ ἀμερὲς ὡς μικρόν· ὅτῳ γὰρ οὐδὲν ἧττον καὶ μεριστὸν ἔσται· καὶ οὐ παντὶ αὐτὸ ἐφαρμόσει· οὐδ' ἂν αὐξομένῳ τὸ αὐτὸ συνέσται· ἀλλ' οὐδ' οὕτως ὡς σημεῖον, ου γὰρ ἓν σημεῖον ὁ ὄγκος, ἀλλ' ἄπειρα ἐν αὐτῷ, οὐδ' ὡς ἐφαρμόσει·* God, and all other incorporeal substances, are not so indivisible, as if they were parvitudes, or little things, as physical points; for so would they still be mathematically divisible; nor yet as if they were mathematical points neither, which indeed are no bodies nor substances, but only the *termini* of a line. And neither of these ways could the Deity *congruere* with the world; nor souls with their respective bodies, so as to be all present with the whole of them.—Again, he writeth particularly concerning the Deity thus: [2]*Οὔτε οὕτως ἀμερὲς, ὡς τὸ σμικρώτατον, μέγιστον γὰρ ἁπάντων, οὐ μεγέθει, ἀλλὰ δυνάμει·———ληπτέον δὲ καὶ ἄπειρον αὐτὸν, οὐ τῷ ἀδιεξιτήτῳ, ἢ τοῦ μεγέθους, ἢ τοῦ ἀριθμοῦ, ἀλλὰ τῷ ἀπεριλήπτῳ τῆς δυνάμεως.* God is not so indivisible, as if he were the smallest or least of things, for he is the greatest of all, not in respect of magnitude, but of power. Moreover, as he is indivisible, so is he also to be acknowledged infinite; not as if he were a magnitude, or a number, which could never be passed through, but because his power is incomprehensible.—Moreover, the same philosopher condemneth this for a vulgar error, proceeding from sense and imagination, that whatsoever is unextended, and indistant, must therefore needs be little; he affirming, on the contrary, the vulgar to be much mistaken, as to true greatness and littleness: [3]*Μέγα νομίζοντες τὸ αἰσθητὸν, ἀποροῦμεν, πῶς ἐν μεγάλῳ καὶ τοσούτῳ ἐκείνη ἡ φύσις ἐκτείνεται· τὸ δὲ ἐστὶ τοῦτο τὸ λεγόμενον μέγα μικρόν· ὃ δὲ νομίζεται μικρὸν εἶναι μέγα. ἐπεὶ ὅλον ἐπὶ πᾶν τούτου μέρος φθάνει, μᾶλλον δὲ τοῦτο πανταχόθεν τοῖς αὐτοῦ μέρεσιν ἐπ' ἐκεῖνο ἰὸν εὑρίσκει αὐτὸ πανταχοῦ πᾶν καὶ μεῖζον ἑαυτοῦ.* We commonly, looking upon this sensible world as great, wonder how that (indivisible and unextended) nature of the Deity can every where comply, and be present with it. Whereas that, which is vulgarly called great, is indeed little; and that which is thus imagined to be little, is indeed great. Forasmuch as the whole of this diffuseth itself through every part of the other;[4] or rather, this whole corporeal universe, in every one of its parts, findeth that whole and entire, and therefore greater than itself.—To the same purpose also Porphyrius: *Τὸ ὄντως ὂν οὔτε μέγα, οὔτε μικρόν ἐστι· (τὸ γὰρ μέγα καὶ μικρὸν κυρίως ὄγκου ἴδια) ἐκβεβηκὸς δὲ τὸ μέγα καὶ μικρόν· καὶ*

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[1] Page 656. (Ennead. vi. lib. iv. cap. xiii.)

[2] Page 764. (Ennead. vi. lib. ix.)

[3] Page 645. (Ennead. vi. lib. iv. cap. ii.)

[4] Sent. p. 243. (§ xxxvi.)

ὑπὲρ τὸ μέγιστον καὶ ὑπὲρ τὸ ἐλάχιστον, ταυτὸ καὶ ἓν ἀριθμῷ ὄν· εἰ καὶ εὑρίσκεται ἅμα ὑπὸ παντὸς μεγίστου, καὶ ὑπὸ παντὸς ἐλαχίστου εὑρισκόμενον· μήτε ἄρα ὡς μέγιστον αὐτὸ ὑπονοήσεις· εἰ δὲ μή, ἀπορήσεις, πῶς μέγιστον ὂν τοῖς ἐλαχίστοις ὄγκοις πάρεστι, μὴ μειωθὲν, ἢ συσταλέν· μήτε ὡς ἐλάχιστον, εἰ δὲ μή, πάλιν ἀπορήσεις, πῶς ἐλάχιστον ὂν τοῖς μεγίστοις ὄγκοις πάρεστι, μὴ πολλαπλασιασθὲν, ἢ αὐξηθέν. The Deity, which is the only true being, is neither great nor little (forasmuch as great and little properly belong to corporeal bulk, or magnitude); but it exceedeth both the greatness of every thing that is great, and the littleness of whatsoever is little (it being more indivisible, and more one with itself, than any thing that is little, and more powerful than any thing that is great; so that it is above both the greatest and the least; it being found all one and the same by every greatest, and every smallest thing participating thereof. Wherefore you must neither look upon God as the greatest thing (that is, in a way of quantity), for then you may well doubt, how being the greatest, he can be all of him present with every least thing, neither diminished, nor contracted; nor yet must you look upon him as the least thing neither: for if you do so, then will you be at loss again, how, being the least thing, he can be present with all the greatest bulks; neither multiplied, nor augmented.—In a word, the sum of their answer amounts to this, that an incorporeal unextended Deity, is neither a physical point, because this hath distance in it, and is mentally divisible; nor yet a mathematical one, because this, though having neither magnitude nor substance in it, hath notwithstanding, site and position; a point being, according to Aristotle,[1] a monad having site and position. It is not to be conceived as a parvitude, or very little thing, because then it could not *congruere* with all the greatest things; nor yet as a great thing, in a way of quantity and extension; because then it could not be all of it present to every least thing. Nor does true greatness consist in a way of bulk or magnitude, all magnitude being but little; since there can be no infinite magnitude, and no finite magnitude can can have infinite power, as Aristotle before urged. And to conclude, though some, who are far from Atheists, may make themselves merry with that conceit of thousands of spirits dancing at once upon a needle's point; and though the Atheists may endeavor to rogue and ridicule all incorporeal substance in that manner, yet does this run upon a clear mistake of the hypothesis, and make nothing at all against it; forasmuch as an unextended substance is neither any parvitude, as is here

[1] De Anima, lib. li. cap. vi. p. 13. vide etiam Metaphys. lib. xiii. cap. xii. p. 471. tom. iv. oper.

supposed (because it hath no magnitude at all), nor hath it any place, or site, or local motion, properly belonging to it; and therefore can neither dance upon a needle's point, nor any where else.

But in the next place, it is further objected, that what is neither great nor little, what possesses no space, and hath no place nor site amongst bodies, must therefore needs be an absolute nonentity, forasmuch as magnitude or extension is the very essence of being or entity, as such; so that there can be neither substance nor accident unextended. Now, since whatsoever is extended is bodily, there can therefore be no other substance, besides body, nor any thing incorporeal, otherwise than as that word may be taken for a thin and subtile body; in which sense fire was, by some in Aristotle,[1] said to be *μάλιστα τῶν στοιχείων ἀσώματον*, and *ἀσωματώτον*, the most incorporeal of all the elements;—and Aristotle[2] himself useth the word in the same manner, when he affirmeth, that all philosophers did define the soul by three things, motion, sense, and incorporeity; several of those there mentioned by him understanding the soul to be no otherwise incorporeal, than as *σῶμα λεπτομερὲς*, a thin and subtile body.—In answer to which objection, we may remember, that Plato, in the passage before cited, declareth this to be but a vulgar error, that whatsoever doth not take up space, and is in no place, is nothing. He intimating the original hereof to have sprung from men's adhering too much to those lower faculties of sense and imagination which are able to conceive nothing but what is corporeal. And accordingly Plotinus:[3] *Ἡ μὲν αἴσθησις, ᾗ προσέχοντες ἀπιστοῦμεν τοῖς λεγομένοις, λέγει ὅτι ὧδε καὶ ὧδε· ὁ δὲ λόγος τὸ ὧδε καὶ ὧδέ φησιν, οὐκ ἐκταθεῖσαν ὧδε καὶ ὧδε γεγονέναι, ἀλλὰ τὸ ἐκταθὲν πᾶν αὐτοῦ μετειληφέναι, ὄντος ἀδιαστάτου αὐτοῦ.* Sense, indeed, which we attending to, disbelieve these things, tells us of here and there; but reason dictates, that here and there is so to be understood of the Deity, not as if it were extendedly here and there, but because every extended thing, and the several parts of the world, partake every where of that, being indistant and unextended.—To the same purpose Porphyrius:[4] *Δεῖ τοίνυν ἐν ταῖς σκέψεσι κατακρατοῦντας τῆς ἑκατέρου ἰδιότητος μὴ ἐπαλλάττειν τὰς φύσεις· μᾶλλον δὲ τὰ προσόντα τοῖς σώμασιν, ἢ τοιαῦτα, μὴ φαντάζεσθαι καὶ δοξάζειν περὶ τὸ ἀσώματον· τῶν μὲν γὰρ σωμάτων, ἐν συνηθείᾳ πᾶς· ἐκείνων δὲ μόλις ἐν γνώσει γίνεται. ἀοριστῶν περὶ αὐτά, ἕως ἂν ὑπὸ φαντασίας κρατῆται·* We ought therefore, in our disquisitions concerning corporeal and incorporeal beings, to conserve the property of each,

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[1] De Anima, lib. i. cap. ii. p. 6. tom. ii. oper. [2] Ibid.

[3] Page 656. [4] *Ἀφ.* p. 242.

and not to confound their natures; but especially to take heed, that our fancy and imagination do not so far impose upon our judgments, as to make us attribute to incorporeals what properly belongeth to bodies only. For we are all accustomed to bodies; but as for incorporeals, scarcely any one reaches to the knowledge of them; men always fluctuating about them, and diffiding them, so long as they are held under the power of their imagination.—Where afterwards he propoundeth a form for this, how we should think of incorporeals, so as not to confound their nature with corporeals; *ἐν ἀπείροις μέρεσι τοῦ διαστατοῦ παρὸν ὅλον τὸ ἀδιάστατον, οὔτε μερισθὲν πάρεστι, τῷ μέρει διδὸν μέρος, οὔτε πληθυνθὲν τῷ πλήθει παρέχον ἑαυτὸ πολλὰ πλησιασθέν· ἀλλ' ὅλον πᾶσί τε τοῖς μέρεσι τοῦ ὀγκωμένου, ἑνί τε ἑκάστῳ τοῦ πλήθους, ἀμερῶς καὶ ἀπληθύντως καὶ ὡς ἓν ἀριθμῷ· τὸ δὲ μερικῶς καὶ διῃρημένως ἀπολαύειν αὐτοῦ·* That the indistant and unextended Deity is the whole of it present in infinite parts of the distant world, neither divided, as applying part to part; nor yet multiplied into many wholes, according to the multiplicity of those things that partake thereof. But the whole of it (one and the same in number) is present to all the parts of the bulky world, and to every one of those many things in it, undividedly and unmultipliedly; that in the mean time partaking thereof dividedly.—It was granted therefore by these ancients, that this unextended and indistant nature of incorporeals is *ἀφάνταστον*, a thing altogether unimaginable;—and this was concluded by them to be the only reason, why so many have pronounced it to be impossible, because they attended only to sense and imagination, and made them the only measure of things and truth; it having been accordingly maintained by divers of them (as Porphyrius tells us), that imagination and intellection are but two different names for one and the same thing: [1] *Ὀνόματος διαφορᾶς προστεθείσης τῇ τοῦ νοῦ ὑποστάσει, καὶ τῆς φαντασίας, ᾗ γὰρ ἐν λογικῷ ζώῳ φαντασία εδέδοκτο αὐτοῖς νόησις,* There is a difference of names only, and no more, betwixt mind and fancy; fancy and imagination, in rational animals, seeming to be the same thing with intellection.—But there are many things, which no man can have any phantasm or imagination of, and yet are they, notwithstanding, by all unquestionably acknowledged for entities, or realities; from whence it is plain, that we must have some other faculties in us, which extend beyond fancy and imagination. Reason indeed dictates, that whatsoever can either do or suffer any thing, must therefore be undoubtedly something; but that whatsoever is unextended, and hath no distant parts one without another, must there-

[1] Page 224. *Ἀφ.*

fore needs be nothing, is no common notion, but the spurious suggestion of imagination only, and a vulgar error. There need to be no fear at all, lest a Being infinitely wise and powerful, which acts upon the whole world, and all the parts thereof, in framing and governing the same, should prove a nonentity, merely for want of bulk and extension; or, because it swells not out into space and distance, as bodies do, therefore vanish into nothing. Nor do active force and power, as such, depend upon bulk and extension; because then whatsoever had the greater bulk, would have the greater activity. There are therefore two kinds of substances in the universe; the first corporeal, which are nothing but *ὄγκοι*, bulks, or tumors,—devoid of all self-active power; the second incorporeal, which are *ἄογκοι δυνάμεις*, substantial powers, vigors, and activities;—which, though they act upon bulk and extension, yet are themselves unbulky, and devoid of quantity and dimensions; however, they have a certain *βάθος* in them in another sense, an essential profundity, according to this of Simplicius:[1] *Μεριστὴ μὲν ἁπλῶς ἡ σωματικὴ οὐσία πᾶσα, ἄλλων ἀλλαχοῦ τῶν μερίων κειμένων· ἀμέριστος δὲ εἰλικρίνως ἡ νοερά, πολὺ δὲ βάθος ἔχουσα.* All corporeal substance is simply divisible, some parts of it being here, and some there; but intellectual substance is indivisible, and without dimensions, though it hath much of depth and profundity in it in another sense.—But that there is something *ἀφάνταστατον*, unimaginable,—even in body itself, is evident, whether you will suppose it to be infinitely divisible, or not, as you must of necessity suppose one or other of these. And that we ought not always to pronounce of corporeal things themselves according to imagination, is manifest from hence; because, though astronomical reasons assure us, that the sun is really more than a hundred times bigger than the whole earth, yet can we not possibly, for all that, imagine the sun of such a bigness, nor indeed the earth itself, half so big, as we know it to be. The reason whereof is, partly because we never had a sense or sight of any such vast bigness at once, as that of either of them; and partly because our sense always representing the sun to us, but *ὡς πεδιαῖον*, as of a foot diameter;[2]—and we being accustomed always to imagine the same according to the appearance of sense, are not able to frame any imagination of it as very much bigger. Wherefore if imagination be not to be trusted, nor made the criterion or measure of truth, as to sensible things themselves, much less ought it to be,

[1] In Ar. Phys. p. 3.

[2] Vide Ciceron. Acad. Question. lib. iv. cap. xxvi. p. 2294. tom. viii. oper.

as to things insensible. Besides all which, the ancient Incorporealists argued after this manner, that it is as difficult for us to conceive a substance whose duration is unextended or unstretched out in time, into past, present, and future, and therefore without beginning; as that which is unextended as to parts, place, or space, in length, breadth and thickness; yet does reason pronounce, that there must needs be not only a duration without beginning, but also *ἄχρονος αἰὼν*, a timeless eternity,—or a permanent duration, differing from that successive flux of time (which is one of Plato's[1] *γεννητὰ*, things generated,—or that had a beginning), this parity of reason is by Plotinus[2] thus insisted on: *Διὸ οὐδ' ἐν χρόνῳ, ἀλλὰ παντὸς χρόνον ἔξω, τοῦ μὲν χρόνου σκιδναμένου αἰεὶ πρὸς διάστασιν, τοῦ δ' αἰῶνος ἐν τῷ αὐτῷ μένοντος καὶ κρατοῦντος, καὶ πλείονος ὄντος δυνάμει ἀϊδίῳ, τοῦ ἐπὶ πολλὰ δοκοῦντος ἰέναι χρόνου.* For the same reason that we deny local extension to the Deity, must we also deny temporal distance to the same; and affirm, that God is not in time, but above time, in eternity. Forasmuch as time is always scattered and stretched out in length and distance, one moment following after another; but eternity remaineth in the same, without any flux, and yet nevertheless outgoeth time, and transcendeth the flux thereof, though seeming to be stretched and spun out more into length. Now, the reason, why we cannot frame a conception of such a timeless eternity, is only, because ourselves are essentially involved in time, and accordingly are our conceptions chained, fettered, and confined, to that narrow and dark dungeon, that ourselves are imprisoned in; notwithstanding which, our freer faculties, assuring us of the existence of a being, which far transcendeth ourselves, to wit, one that is infinitely perfect; we have, by means hereof, *μαντείαν τινὰ*, a certain vaticination,—of such a standing timeless eternity, as its duration.

But as for that conceit of immaterial or incorporeal bodies, or that God and human souls are no otherwise incorporeal than as *σῶμα λεπτομερὲς*, a thin and subtile body,—such as wind or vapor, air or ether; it is certain, that, according to the principles of the most ancient atomic philosophy (before it was atheized), there being no such real quantity of subtilty or tenuity (because this is altogether unintelligible), but this difference arising wholly from motion, dividing the insensible parts, and every way agitating the same, together with a certain contexture of those parts; it is not impossible, but that the finest and most subtile body that is, might become as gross, hard, heavy, and opaque, as flesh, earth, stones, lead, or iron; and again, that the grossest of these bodies,

[1] Page 669. (Ennead. vi. lib. v. cap. xi.) [2] In Timæo, p. 529. oper.

by motion, and a different contexture of parts, might not only be crystallized, but also become as thin, soft, and fluid, as the finest ether. So that there is no specific difference betwixt a thick and thin, a gross and fine, an opaque and pellucid, a hard and soft body, but accidental only; and therefore is there no reason, why life and understanding should be thought to belong to the one rather than to the other of them. Besides which, the reasons of the ancient Incorporealists (afterwards to be produced) will evince, that the human soul and mind cannot possibly be any body whatsoever, though never so fine, thin, and subtile, whose parts are by motion dividable, and separable from one another.

But it is further objected against this unextended nature, of incorporeal substances, as they are said to be all in the whole, and all in every part of that body, which they are united into, or act upon; that this is an absolute contradiction and impossibility, because if the whole of the Deity be in this one point of matter, then can there be nothing at all of it in the next adjoining, but that must needs be another whole, and nothing the same with the former. In like manner, if the whole human soul be in one part of this organized body, then can there be none at all of it in every other part thereof; and so not the whole in the whole. To which objection the ancient Incorporealists made this twofold reply: first, in way of concession, That this is indeed an absolute contradiction for an extended substance, or body to be all of it in every one part of that space, which the whole occupieth. Thus Plotinus:[1] *Σώματι ἀδύνατον ἐν πλείοσι τὸ αὐτὸ ὅλον εἶναι, καὶ τὸ μέρος ὅπερ τὸ ὅλον ὑπάρχειν.* It is impossible for a body, or extended substance, to be one and the same, all of it in every part of that space which it possesses; and for every part thereof to be the same with the whole.—But, secondly, as for an unextended and indistant substance, which hath no parts one without another, it is so far from being a contradiction, that, it should be all of it in every part of that body, which it acts upon; that it is impossible it should be otherwise, only a part in a part thereof, so that an equal quantity of both should coexist together, because this is to suppose an unextended substance to be extended. We say it is contradictious to the nature of that substance, which is supposed to be *ἀμεγέθης, ἄποσος, ἀδιάστατος, ἀμερὴς, ἀδιαίρετος,* devoid of magnitude, and of quantity, and of parts indistant, and indivisible;—that it should be otherwise united to, or conjoined with, an extended body, than after this way, which is looked upon as such conjuring; namely, that the whole of it should be present with, and act upon every part thereof. Thus Plotinus:[2] *Οὗτος ὁ λόγος ἐξ αὐτοῦ τοῦ πράγματος, καὶ τῆς οὐσίας*

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[1] En. 4. l. vii. p. 460. [2] Page 662.

ἀλλότριον οὐδὲν, οὐδ' ἐκ τῆς ἑτέρας φύσεως ἑλκύσας. This form of doctrine, concerning Incorporeals, is necessarily taken from the thing itself (viz. the nature of them as unextended), and hath nothing in it alien from that essence, as confounding the corporeal nature therewith.—Whatsoever is unextended and indistant, cannot possibly coexist with an extended substance, point by point and part by part, but it must of necessity be ὅλον ἓν καὶ ταυτὸν ἀριθμῷ, all of it, one and the same numerically;—that is (like itself), undividedly, in every part of that which it acts upon. Wherefore the word ὅλον, in this form, when it is said, that the whole Deity is in every part of the world, and the whole soul in every part of the body, is not to be taken in a positive sense, for a whole consisting of parts, one without another, but in a negative only, for μὴ μεμερισμένον, an whole undivided;—so that the meaning thereof is no more than this, that the Deity is not dividedly in the world, nor the soul dividedly in the body, a part here and a part there; but the Τὸ Θεῖον is πανταχοῦ ὅλον μὴ μεμερισμένον, every where all of it, undividedly.—Thus again Plotinus: Εἰ οὖν πανταχοῦ θεὸς, οὐχ' οἷόν τε μεμερισμένον· οὐ γὰρ ἂν ἔτι πανταχοῦ αὐτὸς εἴη, ἀλλ' ἕκαστον αὐτοῦ μέρος, τὸ μὲν ὧδὶ, τὸ δὲ ὧδὶ ἔσται, αὐτὸς οὐχ εἷς ἔτι ἔσται, ὥσπερ εἰ τμηθείη τι μέγεθος εἰς πολλὰ, καὶ τὰ μέρη πάντα, οὐκ ἔτι τὸ ὅλον ἐκεῖνο ἔσται· πρὸς τούτοις δὲ καί σῶμα· εἰ δὲ ταῦτα ἀδύνατα, πάλιν ἂν ἀνεφάνη τὸ ἀπιστούμενον, ἐν φύσει ἀνθρώπου, ὁμοῦ θεὸν νομίζειν καὶ πανταχοῦ τὸ αὐτὸ ὅμα ὅλον εἶναι· If therefore God be every where, it cannot possibly be, that he should be so dividedly; because then himself would not be every where, but only a part of him here and a part of him there, throughout the world; himself being not one undivided thing. Moreover, this would be all one, as if a magnitude were cut and divided into many parts, every one of which parts could not be that whole magnitude.—Lastly, this would be the very same, as to make God a body.—Now if these things be impossible, then must that so-much-disbelieved thing (looked upon as such a puzzling *griphus*, or rather as contradictious nonsense) be an undoubted truth, according to the common notions of mankind, that God is every where; to wit, that he is all of him the same whole, undividedly, every where. The sum of all is, that though it be an absolute contradiction, for a body, or *quantum*, to be ὁμοῦ πᾶν, all of it in every part of that space,—which the whole is in; yet it is no contradiction at all for an unextended and indistant being, to be all of it undividedly, in every part of that body it acts upon; but, on the contrary, it would be flatly contradictious to it, to say, that it is only part of it in a part; this being to divide an indivisible thing into parts.

The fourth and last objection against incorporeal and unextended

substance is from that illocality and immobility (which will follow thereupon) of human souls, and other finite particular spirits, such as demons or angels; that this is not only itself very absurd, to suppose these finite and particular beings, to be thus illocal and immovable, no where, and every where (from whence it would seem to follow, that they might act the whole corporeal universe, or take cognizance of all things therein every where); but also, that this conceit is contradictious to the very principles of religionists themselves, and plainly confuted by the same; they acknowledging universally, that human souls (at death) departing out of this body, do locally move from thence into a certain other place, called Hades, Hell, or Inferi. Now the latter part of this objection is first to be answered. And this is indeed a thing, which the ancient assertors of incorporeal substance, as unextended, were not unaware of; that the vulgarly-received tradition, of human souls (after death) going into hades, might be objected against them. For the satisfying whereof, Plotinus [1] suggesteth these two things; first, *Τὸ μὲν εἰς Ἅιδου γίνεσθαι, εἰ μὲν ἐν τῷ Ἀϊδεῖ τὸ χωρὶς μέγεται·* That if by hades be meant nothing but *τὸ ἀειδὲς* the invisible (as many times it is), then is there no more signified by the soul's going into hades, than its no longer being vitally united to this earthy body, and but acting apart by itself, and so hath nothing of place necessarily included in it. Secondly: *Εἰ δέ τινα χείρω τόπον· τί θαυμαστόν; ἐπεὶ καὶ νῦν οὗ τὸ σῶπα ἡμῶν ἐν τῷ τόπῳ κἀκείνη λέγεται ἐκεῖ· ἀλλ' οὐκ ὄντος ἔτι σώματος; ἢ τὸ εἴδωλον εἰ μὴ ἀποσπασθείη, πῶς οὐκ ἐκεῖ οὗ τὸ εἴδωλον·* But if by hades be understood a certain worser place (as sometimes it also is), what wonder is this? since now where our body is, there in the same place is our soul said to be also? But you will reply, How can this be, when there is now no longer any body left? We answer, that if the idol of the soul be not quite separated from it, why should not the soul itself be said to be there also, where its idol is? Where, by the idol of the soul, Plotinus seems to mean an airy or spirituous body, quickened and vitalized by the soul, adhering to it after death. But when the same philosopher supposes this very idol of the soul to be also separable from it, and that so as to subsist apart by itself too, this going alone into hades, or the worser place, whilst that liveth only, in the intelligible world (where there is no place or distance), lodged in the naked Deity, having nothing at all of body hanging about it, and being now not a part but the whole, and so situate neither here nor there; in this high flight of his, he is at once both absurdly paradoxical, in dividing the life of the soul as it were in-

[1] En. 6. l. iv. [cap. xvi. p. 659.]

to two, and forgat the doctrine of his own school, which, as himself elsewhere intimateth, was this; [1]*τὴν ἡμετέραν ψυχὴν τόδε μὲν σῶμα καταλείψειν, οὐ πάντη δὲ ἔξω σώματος ἔσεσθαι·* that our soul, though it shall quit this body, yet shall it never be disunited from all body. Wherefore Porphyrius answering the same objection, though he were otherwise much addicted to Plotinus, and here uses his language too, yet does he in this depart from him, adhering to the ancient Pythagoric tradition; which, as will appear afterwards, was this, [2]"That human souls are always united to some body or other." *Ὥσπερ τὸ ἐπὶ γῆς εἶναι ψυχῇ ἐστὶν, οὐ τὸ γῆς ἐπιβαίνειν, ὡς τὰ σώματα· τὸ δὲ προεστάναι σώματος, ὃ γῆς ἐπιβαίνει· οὕτω καὶ ἐν ᾅδου εἶναι ἐστὶ ψυχῇ, ὅταν προεστήκει εἰδώλου, φύσιν μὲν ἔχοντος εἶναι ἐν τόπῳ, σκότει δὲ τὴν ὑπόστασιν κεκτημένου· ὥστε εἰ ὁ Ἅιδης ὑπόγειός ἐστι τόπος σκοτεινὸς, ἡ ψυχὴ ἐν ᾅδου γίγνεται ἐφελκομένη τὸ εἴδωλον· ἐξελθούσῃ γὰρ αὐτῇ τοῦ στερεοῦ σώματος, τὸ Πνεῦμα συνομαρτεῖ, ὃ ἐκ τῶν σφαιρῶν συνελέξατο· ἐπεὶ δὲ διήκει τὸ βαρὺ πνεῦμα, καὶ ἔνυγρον, ἄχρι τῶν ὑπογείων τόπων, οὕτω καὶ αὕτη λέγεται χωρεῖν ὑπὸ γῆν· οὐχ ὅτι ἡ αὐτὴ οὐσία μεταβαίνει τόπους, καὶ ἐν τόποις γίνεται. ἀλλ' ὅτι τῶν πεφυκότων σωμάτων, τόπους μεταβαίνειν, σχέσεις ἀναδέχεται·* As the soul's being here upon earth (saith he) is not its moving up and down upon it, after the manner of bodies, but its presiding over a body, which moveth upon the earth; so is its being in hades nothing but its presiding over that idol, or enlivened vaporous body, whose nature it is to be in a place, and which is of a dark subsistence. Wherefore, if hades be taken for a subterraneous and dark place, yet may the soul nevertheless be said to go into hades, because when it quits this gross earthy body, a more spirituous and subtile body, collected from the spheres (or elements) doth still accompany it. Which spirit being moist and heavy, and naturally descending to the subterraneous places, the soul itself may be said in this sense to go under the earth also with it, not as if the substance thereof passed from one place to another, but because of its relation and vital union to a body which does so. Where Porphyrius addeth, contrary to the sense of Plotinus; That the soul is never quite naked of all body, but hath always some body or other joined with it suitable and agreeable to its own present disposition (either a purer or impurer one). But that at its first quitting this gross earthy body, the spirituous body, which accompanieth it (as its vehicle), must needs go away fouled and incrassated with the gross vapors and steams thereof, till the soul afterwards by degrees purging itself, this becometh at length a dry splendor, which hath no misty obscurity, nor casteth any shadow.

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[1] En. 4. lib. iii. cap. iv. (p. 374.) [2] *Ἀφ.* p. 235.

But because all this doctrine of the ancient Incorporealists, concerning the human soul's being always (after death) united to some body or other, is more fully declared by Philoponus than by any other that we have yet met withal, we shall here excerp some passages out of him[1] about it. First, therefore, he declareth this for his own opinion, agreeable to the sense of the best philosophers; *τὴν μὲν λογικὴν χωριστὴν, τὴν δὲ ἄλογον, τούτου μὲν χωριστὴν, ἄλλου μέντοι τινὸς σώματος ἀχώριστον, λέγω δὲ τοῦ Πνευματικοῦ, ἔστιν ἀληθὴς δόξα, ὡς δείξομεν·* that the rational soul, as to its energy, is separable from all body; but the irrational part or life thereof, is separable only from this gross body, and not from all body whatsoever, but hath (after death) a spirituous or airy body, in which it acteth;—this I say is a true opinion, as shall be afterwards proved by us. And again: *Ἡ δὲ ἄλογος οὐκ ἔτι ἐν τούτῳ ἔχει τὸ εἶναι, ἐπιδιαμένει γὰρ καὶ μετὰ ἔξοδον τὴν ἐκ τούτου τῆς ψυχῆς, Ὄχημα καὶ Ὑποκείμενον ἔχουσα τὸ πνευματικὸν σῶμα· ὃ καὶ αὐτό ἔστι μὲν ἐκ τῶν τεσσάρων, λέγεται δὲ ἐκ τοῦ πλεονάζοντος τοῦ ἀέρος· ὥσπερ καὶ τοῦτο γήϊνον, λέγεται ἐκ τοῦ πλεονάζοντος.* The irrational life of the soul hath not all its being in this gross earthy body, but remaineth after the soul's departure out of it, having for its vehicle and subject, the spirituous body; which itself is also compounded out of the four elements, but receiveth its denomination from the predominant part, to wit, air; as this gross body of ours is called earthy, from what is most predominant therein.—Thus do we see, that, according to Philoponus, the human soul after death does not merely exercise its rational powers, and think only of metaphysical and mathematical notions, abstract things, which are neither in time nor place, but exerciseth also its lower sensitive and irrational faculties, which it could not possibly do, were it not then vitally united to some body; and this body then accompanying the soul he calls pneumatical, that is, (not spiritual in the Scripture sense, but), spirituous, vaporous, or airy. Let us therefore, in the next place, see what rational account Philoponus can give of this doctrine of the ancients, and of his own opinion agreeable thereunto; *Ἡ ψυχὴ ἡ ἡμετέρα, μετὰ τὴν ἐκ τοῦ σώματος τούτου ἔξοδον, ὁμολογεῖται, μᾶλλον δὲ ἀποδείκνυται, εἰς ᾅδου ἀφικνεῖσθαι, καὶ ποινὰς ἐκεῖ τῶν οὐ καλῶς βεβιωμένων παρέχειν· οὐ γὰρ μόνον τοῦ εἶναι ἡμῶν φροντίζει ἡ πρόνοια, ἀλλὰ καὶ τοῦ εὖ εἶναι· διὸ οὐκ ἀμελεῖται ἡ ψυχὴ εἰς τὸ παρὰ φύσιν ἐξολισθήσασα, ἀλλὰ τυγχάνει τῆς προσηκούσης ἐπιμελείας· καὶ ἐπειδὴ τὸ ἁμαρτανεῖν αὐτῇ διὰ γλυκυθυμίαν ἐγένετο, ἐξ ἀνάγκης καὶ τὸ καθαρθῆναι δι' ἀλγύνσεως αὐτῇ γενήσεται· κἀνταῦθα γὰρ τὰ ἐναντία τῶν ἐναντίων ἰάματα. διὰ τοῦτο ἀλγύνεται ἡ καθαιρομένη ἐν τοῖς ὑπὸ γῆν δι-*

[1] Proœm. in Aristot. de An.

καιωτηρίοις διὰ κολάσεως· Ἀλλ' εἰ ἀσώματος ἡ ψυχὴ ἀδύνατον αὐτὴν παθεῖν· πῶς οὖν κολάζεται; ἀνάγκη οὖν πᾶσα σῶμά τι αὐτῆς ἐξῆφθαι, ὃ διακρινόμενον ἀμέτρως ἢ συγκρινόμενον, ὑπὸ ψύξεως ἢ καύσεως ἀμέτρου, ἀλγύνει τὴν ψυχὴν διὰ τὴν συμπάθειαν· ποῖον οὖν σῶμά ἐστι τὸ ἐξαμμένον, αὐτῆς; οὐ δήπου τοῦτο ἀνελύθη γὰρ εἰς τὰ ἐξ ὧν συνέστηκεν, ἀλλὰ τοῖτο, τὸ Πνευματικὸν, ὃ λέγομεν, ἐν τούτῳ οὖν εἰσι πάντως διὰ τοῦτο ὡς ἐν ὑποκειμένῳ, θυμὸς καὶ ἐπιθυμία· καὶ τὰ ἑξῆς· Our human soul (in those who are not purged and cleansed in this life), after its departure out of this body, is acknowledged, or rather demonstrated, to go into hades, there to receive punishment for its evil actions past. For Providence does not only take care of our being, but also of our well-being. Therefore is the soul, though lapsed into a preternatural state, yet not neglected by Providence, but hath a convenient care taken of it, in order to its recovery. And since sinning had its original from the desire of pleasure, it must of necessity be cured by pain: for here also contraries are the cures of contraries. Therefore the soul being to be purged, is punished and pained in those subterraneous judicatories and prisons, in order to its amendment. But if the soul be incorporeal, it is impossible for it to suffer. How then can it be punished? There must of necessity be some body joined with it; which, being immoderately constringed or agitated, concreted or secreted, and discordantly moved by heat and cold, or the like, may make the soul sensible of pain, by reason of sympathy, as it is here in this life. What body therefore is that, which is then conjoined with the soul, after the dissolution of that earthy body into its elements? Certainly it can be no other than this pneumatical, or spirituous body, which we now speak of; for in this are seated, as their subject, the irascible and concupiscible passions, and they are inseparable from the same; nor could they be in the soul disunited from all body: and that soul which is freed from these, would be forthwith freed from generation; nor would it be concerned in those subterraneous judicatories and prisons, but be carried up aloft to the higher celestial regions, etc.—After which he endeavors further to confirm this opinion from the vulgar phenomena: Δῆλον δὲ ἔτι μᾶλλον ὅτι τί ἐστι τὸ πνευματικὸν σῶμα, καὶ τούτου ἀχώριστα θυμὸς καὶ ἐπιθυμία, ἐξ αὐτῆς τῶν πραγμάτων ἐνεργείας· πόθεν γὰρ ἐν τοῖς τάφοις τὰ σκιοειδὴ φαίνονται φαντάσματα; οὐ γὰρ δήγε ἡ ψυχὴ ἐσχημάτισται, ἢ ὅλως ἐστιν ὁρατή· ἀλλά φασι τὰς ἀκαθάρτους ψυχὰς, μετὰ τὴν ἔξοδον τούτου τοῦ σώματος πλανᾶσθαι ἐπί τινα χρόνον μετὰ τοῦ Πνεύματος, καί τοῦτο παραδεικνῦναι περὶ τοὺς τάφους· διο φροντιστέον εὐζωΐας· ὑπὸ τούτου γάρ φασι τοῦ πνεύματος, παχυνθέντος ἐκ μοχθηρᾶς διαίτης, κατασπᾶσθαι περὶ τὰ πάθη τὴν ψυχήν· Furthermore, that there is such a pneumatical (spirituous, vaporous, or

airy) body, which accompanieth souls unpurged after death, is evident also from the phenomena themselves. For what account can otherwise be given of those spectres and phantoms, which appear shadow-like about graves or sepulchres, since the soul itself is neither of any figure, nor yet at all visible? Wherefore these ancients say, that impure souls, after their departure out of this body, wander here, up and down for a certain space, in their spirituous, vaporous, and airy body, appearing about sepulchres, and haunting their former habitations. For which cause there is great reason, that we should take care of living well, as also of abstaining from a fouler and grosser diet; these ancients telling us likewise, that this spirituous body of ours, being fouled and incrassated by evil diet, is apt to render the soul, in this life also, more obnoxious to the disturbances of passions.—And here Philoponus goes on to gratify us with a further account of some other of the opinions of these ancients, concerning this spirituous or airy body, accompanying the soul after death: *Ἔχει γάρ τι καὶ αὐτό, φασὶ, τῆς φυτικῆς ζωῆς, καὶ γὰρ τρέφεσθαι. τρέφεσθαι δὲ οὐχ οὕτως ὡς τοῦτο τὸ σῶμα, ἀλλὰ δὶ ἀτμῶν οὐ διὰ μορίων, ἀλλ᾽ ὅλον δὶ ὅλου, φέρι εἰπεῖν, ὡς οἱ σπόγγοι, δέχονται τοὺς ἀτμούς· διὰ τοῦτο φροντίζουσιν οἱ σπουδαῖοι τῆς λεπτοτέρας διαίτης καὶ ξηροτέρας, διὰ τὸ μὴ παχύνεσθαι τὸ πνεῦμα ἀλλὰ λεπτύνεσθαι· πρὸς τοῦτο καὶ τοὺς καθαρμούς φασι παραλαμβάνειν· τοῦτο μὲν γὰρ τὸ σῶμα ὕδατι πλύνεται, ἐκεῖνο δὲ καθαρμοῖς διὰ τῶν ἀτμῶν, διὰ γὰρ ἀτμῶν τινῶν τρέφεται τινῶν δὲ καθαίρεται· οὐ διωργανῶσθαι δὲ φασιν αὐτό, ἀλλ᾽ ὅλον δὶ ὅλου ἐνεργεῖν, κατὰ τὰς αἰσθήσεις, καὶ τῶν αἰσθητῶν ἀντιλαμβάνεσθαι· διὸ καὶ Ἀριστοτέλης φησὶν ἐν τοῖς μετὰ τὰ φυσικὰ, ὅτι ἡ κυρίως αἴσθησις μία, καὶ τὸ κυρίως αἰσθητήριον ἕν·* They further add, that there is something of a plantal and plastic life also, exercised by the soul, in those spirituous or airy bodies after death; they being nourished too, though not after the same manner, as these gross earthy bodies of ours are here, but by vapors; and that not by parts or organs, but throughout the whole of them (as sponges), they imbibing every where those vapors.—For which cause, they who are wise, will in this life also take care of using a thinner and drier diet, that so that spirituous body (which we have also at this present time within our grosser body) may not be clogged and incrassated, but attenuated. Over and above which, those ancients made use of catharms, or purgations, to the same end and purpose also: for as this earthy body is washed by water, so is that spirituous body cleansed by cathartic vapors; some of these vapors being nutritive, others purgative. Moreover, these ancients further declared concerning this spirituous body, that it was not organized, but did the whole of it, in every part throughout, exercise all functions of sense, the soul

hearing, and seeing, and perceiving all sensibles, by it every where. For which cause, Aristotle himself affirmeth, in his Metaphysics, that there is properly but one sense, and but one sensory; he, by this one sensory, meaning the spirit, or subtile airy body, in which the sensitive power doth all of it, through the whole, immediately apprehend all variety of sensibles. And if it be demanded, how it comes then to pass, that this spirit appears organized in sepulchres, and most commonly of human form, but sometimes in the form of some other animals? to this those ancients replied, That their appearing so frequently in human form proceedeth from their being incrassated with evil diet, and then, as it were, stamped upon with the form of this exterior ambient body in which they are, as crystal is formed and colored like to those things, which it is fastened in, or reflects the image of them; and that their having sometimes other different forms proceedeth from the fantastic power of the soul itself, which can at pleasure transform this spirituous body into any shape: for being airy, when it is condensed and fixed, it becometh visible; and again invisible, and vanishing out of sight, when it is expanded and rarified.

Now, from these passages cited out of Philoponus, it further appeareth, that the ancient assertors of the soul's immortality did not suppose human souls, after death, to be quite stripped stark naked from all body; but that the generality of souls had then a certain spirituous, vaporous, or airy body accompanying them, though in different degrees of purity or impurity respectively to themselves. As also, that they conceived this spirituous body (or at least something of it) to hang about the soul also here in this life, before death, as its anterior indument or vestment, which also then sticks to it, when that other gross earthly part of the body is, by death, put off as an outer garment. And some have been inclinable to think (by reason of certain historic phenomena) these two to be things so distinct, that it is not impossible for this spirituous body, together with the soul, to be locally separated from the other grosser body, for some time before death, and without it. And indeed thus much cannot be denied, that our soul acteth, not immediately only upon bones, flesh, and brains, and other such-like gross parts of this body, but first and chiefly upon the animal spirits, as the immediate instruments of sense and fancy, and that, by whose vigor and activity the other heavy and unwieldly bulk of the body is so nimbly moved. And therefore we know no reason but we may assent here to that of Porphyrius,[1] *τὸ αἷμα νομὴ καὶ τροφή ἐστι τοῦ πνεύματος, τὸ δὲ*

[1] Vide lib. de Antro. Nymphar. p. 257, 259.

πνεῦμα ὄχημα τῆς ψυχῆς; that the blood is the food and nourishment of the spirit (that is, that subtle body called the animal spirits), and that this spirit is the vehicle of the soul, or the more immediate seat of life.

Nevertheless, the same Philoponus there addeth, that, according to these ancients, besides the terrestrial body, and this spirituous and airy body too, there is yet a third kind of body, of a higher rank than either of the former (peculiarly belonging to such souls after death, as are purged and cleansed from corporeal affections, lusts, and passions), called by them σῶμα αὐγοειδές, and οὐράνιον, and αἰθέριον, etc. a luciform, and celestial, and ethereal body. The soul (saith he) continueth either in the terrestrial or the aërial body so long ἕως ἑαυτὴν καθήρασα ἀνενεχθῇ, τῆς γενέσεως ἀπαλλαγεῖσα· τότε τοίνυν καὶ τὸν θυμὸν, καὶ τὴν ἐπιθυμίαν ἀποτίθεται, μετὰ τούτου τοῦ ὀχήματος, τοῦ πνεύματος λέγω· εἶναι δέ τι καὶ μετὰ τοῦτο ἄλλοτι ἀΐδιως αὐτῆς ἐξημμένον, σῶμα οὐράνιον καὶ διὰ τοῦτο ἀΐδιον, ὅ φασιν Αὐγοειδὲς ἢ Ἀστροειδές· τῶν γὰρ ἐγκοσμίων οὖσαν ἀνάγκη πάντως ἔχειν τινὰ κλῆρον, ὃν διοικεῖ, μέρος ὄντα τοῦ κόσμου· καὶ εἰ ἀεικίνητός ἐστι, καὶ δεῖ αὐτὴν ἀεὶ ἐνεργεῖν, δεῖ ἔχειν ἀΐδίως ἐξημμένον τὸ σῶμα, ὃ ἀεὶ ζωοποιήσει· διὰ ταῦτα οὖν τὸ αὐγοειδές φασι σῶμα αὐτὴν ἀεὶ ἔχειν, until that, having purged itself, it be carried aloft, and freed from generation. And then doth it put off both the irascible and concupiscible passions at once, together with this second vehicle, or body, which we call spirituous. Wherefore these ancients say that there is another heavenly body always conjoined with the soul, and eternal, which they call luciform, and star-like: for it being a mundane thing, must of necessity have some part of the world as a province allotted to it, which it may administer. And since it is always movable and ought always to act, it must have a body eternally conjoined with it, which it may always enliven. And for these causes do they affirm the soul always to have a luciform body.—Which lucid and ethereal body of the soul is a thing often mentioned by other writers also; as Proclus, in his commentary upon the Timæus:[1] Καὶ τῆς ἀνθρωπίνης ψυχῆς ἐξήρτηταί τι τοιοῦτον ὄχημα αἰθέριον, ὡς αὐτός φησιν· ἐμβιβάσαι γοῦν εἰς ὄχημα καὶ αὐτήν φησι τὸν δημιουργόν· καὶ γὰρ πᾶσαν ψυχὴν ἀνάγκη πρὸ τῶν θνητῶν σωμάτων, ἀϊδίοις καὶ εὐκινήτοις χρῆσθαι σώμασιν, ὡς κατ' οὐσίαν ἔχουσαν τὸ κινεῖν. The human soul hath also (saith he) such an etherial vehicle belonging to it, as Plato himself intimates, when he affirmeth the Demiurgus at first to have placed it in a chariot. For of necessity every soul, before this mortal body, must have an eternal and easily movable body, it being essential to it to move. And elsewhere the same Proclus:[2]

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[1] Page 290. [2] Page 164.

Ἄνω μένοντες οὐδὲν δεόμεθα τούτων τῶν μεριστῶν ὀργάνων· ἃ ἡμῖν συνήρτηται κατελθοῦσιν εἰς γένεσιν, ἀλλ' ἀρκεῖ τὸ ὄχημα τὸ Αὐγοειδὲς, πάσας ἔχον ἡνωμένας τὰς αἰσθήσεις. Whilst we remain above, we have no need of these divided organs, which now we have descending into generation; but the uniform, lucid, or splendid vehicle is sufficient, this having all senses united together in it.—Which doctrine of the unorganized, luciform, and spirituous vehicles, seems to have been derived from Plato, he, in his Epinomis, writing thus concerning a good and wise man after death; *ὃν καὶ διϊσχυρίζομαι παίζων καὶ σπουδάζων ἅμα; ἐάνπερ θανάτῳ, τὴν αὐτοῦ μοῖραν ἀναπλήσει, μήτε μεθέξειν ἔτι πολλῶν τότε, καθάπερ νῦν αἰσθήσεων, μιᾶς μοίρας μετειληφότα μόνον, καὶ ἐκ πολλῶν ἕνα γεγονότα εὐδαίμονα ἔσεσθαι·* of whom, whether I be in jest or earnest, I constantly affirm, that when dying he shall yield to fate, he shall no longer have this variety of senses, which now we have, but one uniform body, and live a happy life.—Moreover, Hierocles[1] much insisteth upon this, *αὐγοειδὲς σῶμα*, luciform and ethereal body,—*ὃ καὶ ψυχῆς λεπτὸν ὄχημα οἱ χρησμοὶ καλοῦσι*, which also (saith he) the oracles call the thin and subtle vehicle or chariot of the soul; he meaning, doubtless, by these oracles, the magical or Chaldaic oracles before mentioned. And amongst those now extant under that title, there seems to be a clear acknowledgement of these two vehicula of the soul, or interior induments thereof; the spirituous and the luciform body, the latter of which is there enigmatically called *ἐπίπεδον*, or a plain superficies in these words:[2] *Μὴ Πνεῦμα μολύνῃς, μηδὲ βαθύνῃς τὸ Ἐπίπεδον.* Take care not to defile or contaminate the spirit; nor to make the plain superficies deep.—For thus Psellus glosseth upon that oracle: *Δύο χιτῶνας ἐπενδύουσι τὴν ψυχὴν οἱ Χαλδαῖοι· καὶ τὸν μὲν Πνευματικὸν ὠνόμασαν, ἀπὸ τοῦ αἰσθητοῦ ἐξυφανθέντα αὐτῇ· τὸν δὲ Αὐγοειδῆ, λεπτὸν καὶ ἀναφῆ, ὅνπερ Ἐπίπεδον·* The Chaldaic philosophers bestow upon the soul two interior tunicles or vestments, the one of which they called pneumatical, or the spirituous body, which is weaved out, as it were, to it, and compounded of the gross sensible body (it being the more thin and subtle part thereof); the other the luciform vestment of the soul, pure and pellucid, and this is that which is here called the plain superficies.—Which, saith Pletho,[3] is not so to be understood, as if it had not three dimensions (forasmuch as it is a body also), but only to denote the subtlety and tenuity thereof. Wherefore, when the aforesaid Hierocles[4]

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[1] Comment. in aurea Pythagor. Carmina, p. 214, 215.

[2] Oracul. Zoroastr. sect. 10. vers. 275. p. 394. ed. Clerici.

[3] Comment. in hoc Oraculum. [4] Ubi supra, p. 222.

also calls this luciform and ethereal body, τὸ Πνευματικὸν Ὄχημα τῆς λογικῆς ψυχῆς, the spiritual vehicle of the rational soul—he takes not the word πνευματικὸν, in that sense wherein it is used by Philoponus and others, as if he intended to confound this ethereal body with that other spirituous or airy body, and to make but one of them, but rather styles it spiritual, in a higher sense (and which cometh near to that of the Scripture), as being a body more suitable and cognate with that highest and divinest part of the soul, mind, or reason, than the other terrestrial body is (which upon that account, is called also, by the same Hierocles,[1] as well as it is by St. Paul,[2] σῶμα ψυχικὸν, the animal or natural body.) So that this spiritual body of Hierocles is not the airy, but the ethereal body, and the same with Synesius's,[3] θεσπέσιον σῶμα, Divine body.—And that this distinction of two interior vehicles or tunicles of the soul, besides that outer vestment of the terrestrial body (styled in Plato τὸ ὀστρεῶδες, the crustaceous, or ostraceous body)—is not a mere figment of the latter Platonists since Christianity, but a tradition derived down from antiquity, appeareth plainly from Virgil, in his sixth Æneid, where, though not commonly understood, he writeth first of the spirituous or airy body, in which unpurged souls receive punishment after death, thus:

> Quin et supremo cum lumina vita reliquit,
> Non tamen omne malum miseris, nec funditus omnes
> Corporæ excedunt pestes; penitusque necesse est
> Multa diu concreta modis inolescere miris.
> Ergo exercentur pœnis, veterumque malorum
> Supplicia expendunt; aliæ panduntur inanes
> Suspensæ ad ventos; aliis sub gurgite vasto
> Infectum eluitur scelus, aut exuritur igni.

And then again of the other pure ethereal and fiery body, after this manner:

> Donec longa dies perfecto temporis orbe
> Concretam exemit labem, purumque reliquit
> Æthereum sensum, atque aurai simplicis ignem.

Now, as it was before observed, that the ancient assertors of the soul's immortality, supposed it to have, besides this terrestrial body, another spirituous or airy body, conceived this not only to accompany the

[1] Ubi supra, p. 214. [2] 1 Cor. 15: 44. [3] De Insomniis, p. 140. oper.

soul after death, but also to hang about it here in this life, as its interior vest or tunicle (they probably meaning hereby the same with that, which is commonly called the animal spirits, diffused from the brain, by the nerves, throughout this whole body); in like manner it is certain, that many of them supposing the soul, besides those two forementioned, to have yet a third luciform, or ethereal body, conceived this in like manner to adhere to it even in this mortal life too, as its inmost clothing or tunicle; yet, so as that they acknowledged the force thereof to be very much weakened and abated, and its splendor altogether obscured by the heavy weight and gross steams or vapors of the terrestrial body. Thus Suidas, upon the word *Αὐγοειδής*, tells us out of Isodore, *ὡς ἔχει ἡ ψυχὴ Αὐγοειδὲς Ὄχημα, λεγόμενον ἀστροειδές τε καὶ ἀΐδιον· καὶ τοῦτο μὲν τὸ Αὐγοειδὲς σῶμα τῷδε ἀποκέκλεισται ἐνίοις μὲν εἴσω τῆς κεφαλῆς·* that, according to some philosophers, the soul hath a certain luciform vehicle, called also star, or sun-like, and eternal; which luciform body is now shut up within this terrestrial body (as a light in a dark lantern), it being supposed by some of them to be included within the head, etc.—With which agreeth Hierocles:[1] *Ἐν τῷ θνητῷ ἡμῶν σώματι, τὸ Αὐγοειδὲς ἔγκειται, προσπνέον τῷ ἀψύχῳ σώματι ζωὴν, καὶ τὴν ἁρμονίαν αὐτοῦ συνέχον·* The splendid or luciform body lieth in this mortal body of ours, continually inspiring it with life, and containing the harmony thereof.—The ground of which opinion was, because these philosophers generally conceived the human soul to have pre-existed before it came into this earthly body, and that either from eternity, or else from the first beginning of the world's creation; and being never without a body, and then in a perfect state, to have had a lucid and ethereal body, either coeternal, or coeve with it (though in order of nature junior to it), as its chariot or vehicle: which being incorruptible, did always inseparably adhere to the soul, in its after-lapses and descents, into an aëreal first, and then a terrestrial body; this being, as it were, the vinculum of union betwixt the soul and them. Thus Pletho[2] declares their sense: *Διὰ δὲ τοιούτου σώματος τῷ δήποτε τῷ θνητῷ τήνγε ἀνθρωπίνην ψυχὴν συγγίγνεσθαι, ὅλου ὅλῳ τῷ τοῦ ἐμβρύου ζωτικῷ πνεύματι διὰ συγγένειαν ἐπιπλεκομένου ἅτε πνεύματός τινος καὶ αὐτοῦ ὄντος.* By this ethereal body is our human soul connected with its mortal body; the whole thereof being implicated with the whole vital spirit of the embryo, for as much as this itself is a spirit also.—But long before Pletho was this doctrine declared and asserted by Galen,[3] as agreeable

[1] Page 293. (p. 214. edit. Needhami.) [2] In Orac. Chald.

[3] Dog. Hip. et Plat. lib. vii. (cap. xiii. p. 1043. tom. i. oper.)

both to Plato's and his own sense; he first premising, that the immediate organ or instrument of sight was *αὐγοειδὲς*, a luciform and ethereal spirit:—*Δεόντως οὖν ἐροῦμεν αὐγοειδὲς μὲν εἶναι τὸ τῆν ὄψεως ὄργανον, ἀεροειδὲς δὲ τὸ τῆς ἀκοῆς, ἀτμοειδὲς δὲ τὸ τῆς ὀδμῆς, καὶ τὸ μὲν τῆς γεύσεως ὑγρὸν, τὸ δὲ τῆς ἁφῆς γεῶδες*, etc. Wherefore we may reasonably affirm, that the organ of sight is a luciform or ethereal body; as that of hearing is aërial; that of smelling vaporous; that of taste moist or watery; and that of touch earthly; like being perceived by like.—And he accordingly thus understanding those known verses of Empedocles, which, as Aristotle otherwise interprets them, are nonsense: *Καὶ τοῦτ' ἄρ' ἦν ὃ βούλεται δηλοῦν ὁ Ἐμπεδοκλῆς ἐν οἷς φησι, Γαίῃ μὲν γὰρ γαῖαν*, etc. *αἰσθανόμεθα γὰρ ὄντως τῷ μὲν γεωδεστέρῳ τῶν αἰσθητηρίων, τῆς γεώδους φύσεως, τῷ δ' αὐγοειδεστέρῳ τῆς ὄψεως, ηῆς Αὐγοειδοῖς·* And this was that, which Empedocles meant to signify, in those famous verses of his; it being certain, that by the most earthy of our senses, the touch, we perceive the earthy nature of sensibles: and by the most luciform, viz. that of sight, the passions of light; by that, which is aëreal, sounds; by that, which is moist and sponge-like, tastes; and lastly, by the organ of smelling, which is the extremity of those former cavities of the brain, as replenished with vapors, odors.—After which he writeth of the essence or substance of the soul, in this manner: *Εἰ δὲ καὶ περὶ ψυχῆς οὐσίας ἀποφῄνασθαι χρὴ, δυοῖν θάτερον ἀναγκαῖον εἰπεῖν, ἢ τοῦτ' εἶναι τὸ οἷον Αὐγοειδὲς, καὶ Αἰθερῶδες σῶμα λεκτέον αὐτὴν, εἰς ὃ κἂν μὴ βούλωνται κατ' ἀκολουθίαν ἀφικνοῦνται στωϊκοὶ, ἢ αὐτὴν μὲν ἀσώματον ὑπάρχειν οὐσίαν, ὄχημά τε τὸ πρῶτον αὐτῆς εἶναι τουτὶ τὸ σῶμα, δι' οὗ μέσου τὴν πρὸς τ' ἄλλα σώματα κοινωνίαν λαμβάνει· τοῦτο μὲν οὖν αὐτὸ δι' ὅλου λεκτέον ἡμῖν ἐκτετάσθαι τοῦ ἐγκεφάλου· τῇ δέ γε πρὸς αὐτὸ κοινωνίᾳ τὸ κατὰ τὰς ὄψεις αὐτῶν πνεῦμα φωτοειδὲς γίγνεσθαι·* And if we should now declare any thing concerning the essence or substance of the soul, we must needs affirm one or other of these two things; that either itself is this luciform and ethereal body (which the Stoics whether they will or no, by consequence will be brought unto, as also Aristotle himself), or else that the soul is itself an incorporeal substance, but that this luciform ethereal body is its first vehicle, by which, as a middle, it communicates with the other bodies. Wherefore we must say, that this ethereal lucid body is extended throughout the whole brain; whence is that luciform spirit derived, that is the immediate instrument of sight.—Now from hence it was, that these philosophers, besides the moral purgation of the soul, and the intellectual or philosophical, recommended very much a mystical or telestic way of purifying this ethereal body in

us, by diet and catharms. Thus the forementioned Hierocles:[1] *Ἐπειδὴ καὶ τῷ Αὐγοειδεῖ ἡμῶν σώματι προσέφυ σῶμα θνητὸν ὄν, καθαρεῖσαι δεῖ καὶ τοῦτο,*[2] etc. Since to our lucid or splendid body, this gross mortal body is come by way of accession, we ought to purify the former also, and free it from sympathy with the latter.—And again afterwards: *Αἱ τῆς λογικῆς καθάρσεις καὶ τοῦ Αὐγοειδοῦς ὀχήματος προμηθοῦνται, ὅπως ἂν αὐταῖς ὑπόπτερον καὶ τοῦτο γενόμενον μὴ ἐμποδὼν ἵστηται πρὸς τὴν ἄνω πορείαν, καὶ τὰ ἑξῆς·* Together with the purgations of the rational soul, the purification of the luciform or ethereal vehicle is also to be regarded, that this being made light, and elate or wingy, might no way hinder the soul's ascent upward: but he that endeavors to purify the mind only, neglecting the body, applies not himself to the whole man.—Whereupon he concludes: *Τὴν Τελεστικὴν ἐνέργειαν λέγω, Τὴν τοῦ Αὐγοειδοῦς καθαρτικὴν δύναμιν·* I therefore call this the telestic or mystic operation; which is conversant about the purgation of the lucid or ethereal vehicle.—And whereas philosophy was by Plato and Socrates[3] defined to be a continual exercise of dying (which Pliny[4] thought to be nothing but an hypochondriacal or atrabilarian distemper in them, in those words of his, which Salmasius, and other critics, can by no means understand, "est etiam quidam morbus, per sapientiam mori:" that the dying by wisdom or philosophy, is also but a certain kind of bodily disease or overgrown melancholy)—though they supposed this principally to consist in a moral dying to corporeal lusts and passions: yet was the design thereof partly mystical and telestic also, it driving at this further thing, that when they should put off this terrestrial body, they might at once die also to the spirituous or aëreal; and then their soul have nothing left hanging about it, but only the pure ethereal body, its light-winged chariot: in Virgil's language is

———Purumque relinqui
Æthereum sensum, atque aurai simplicis ignem.

Notwithstanding which, the Pythagoreans and Platonists seem not to have been all of them of this persuasion, that the same numerical ethereal body, which the soul was at first created with, continueth still about it, and adhereth to it inseparably to all eternity, during its descents into other grosser bodies; but rather to have supposed, that according to the moral disposition of the soul, it always finds or makes a

[1] Page 294. (p. 214. ed. Needhami.) [2] Ibid. p. 216.

[3] Vide Platon. in Phædon. p. 378. [4] Hist. Natur. lib. vii. cap. 50.

cognate and suitable body correspondently pure or impure; and consequently, that by moral virtue and philosophy, it might again recover that celestial body, which was lost by its fall and descent hither. This seemeth to have been Porphyrius's [1] sense, in these words of his: *Ὡς ἂν διετέθη ἡ ψυχή, εὑρίσκει σῶμα τάξει καὶ τοῖς οἰκείοις διωρισηένον· διὸ καθαρώτερον μὲν διακειμένῃ σύμφυτον τὸ ἐγγὺς τοῦ ἀΰλου σῶμα, ὅπερ ἐστὶ τὸ αἰθέριον·* However the soul be in itself affected, so does it always find a body suitable and agreeable to its present disposition; and therefore to the purged souls does naturally accrue a body, that comes next to immateriality; that is, an ethereal one.—And probably Plato [2] was of the same mind, when he affirmed the soul to be always in a body, but sometimes of one kind, and sometimes of another.

Now from what hath been declared, it appeareth already, that the most ancient assertors of the incorporeity and immortality of the human soul supposed it, notwithstanding, to be always conjoined with a body. Thus Hierocles [3] plainly: *Ἡ λογικὴ οὐσία συμφυὲς ἔχουσα σῶμα, οὕτω παρὰ τοῦ δημιουργοῦ εἰς τὸ εἶναι παρῆλθεν, ὡς μήτε τὸ σῶμα εἶναι αὐτὴν, μήτε ἄνευ σώματος· ἀλλ' αὐτὴν μὲν ἀσώματον, ἀποπερατοῦσθαι δὲ εἰς σῶμα τὸ ὅλον αὐτῆς εἶδος.* The rational nature having always a cognate body, so proceeded from the Demiurgus, as that neither itself is body, nor yet can it be without body; but though itself be incorporeal, yet its whole form, notwithstanding, is terminated in a body. Accordingly whereunto, the definition, which he gives of a man, is this,[4] *ψυχὴ λογικὴ μετὰ συμφυοῦς ἀθανάτου σώματος*, a rational soul, together with a cognate immortal body.—He concluding there afterwards, that this enlivened terrestrial body, or mortal man, is nothing but *εἴδωλον ἀνθρώπου*, [5] the image of the true man,—or an accession thereunto, which is therefore separable from the same. Neither doth he affirm this only of human souls, but also of all other rational beings whatsoever, below the supreme Deity, and above men, that they always naturally actuate a body. Wherefore a demon or angel (which words are used as synonymous by Hierocles) is also defined by him after the same manner, *ψυχὴ λογικὴ μετὰ φώτεινοῦ σώματος*, a rational soul together with a lucid body.—And accordingly Proclus upon Plato's Timæus [6] affirmeth, *πάντα δαίμονα τῶν ἡμετέρων κρείττονα ψυχῶν, καὶ νοερὰν ἔχειν ψυχὴν, καὶ ὄχημα αἰθέριον·* that every demon, superior to human souls, hath both an intellectual soul and an ethereal vehicle, the entireness

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[1] In Sententiis ad Intelligibilia ducentibus, § 32. p. 233.

[2] De Legibus, lib. x. [3] Page 289. (p. 120. edit. Needhami.)

[4] Page 290. (p. 212.) [5] Page 214. [6] Lib. v. p. 320.

thereof being made up or compounded of these two things.—So that there is hardly any other difference left betwixt demons or angels, and men, according to these philosophers, but only this, that the former are lapsable into aëreal bodies only, and no further; but the latter into terrestrial also.[1] Now Hierocles positively affirmeth[2] this to have been the true cabala, and genuine doctrine of the ancient Pythagoreans, entertained afterwards by Plato; *Καὶ τοῦτο τῶν Πυθαγορείων ἦν δόγμα, ὃ δὴ Πλάτων ὕστερον ἐξέφηνεν, ἀπεικάσας ξυμφύτῳ δυνάμει ὑποπτέρου ζεύγους τε καὶ ἡνιόχου, πᾶσαν θείαν τε καὶ ἀνθρωπίνην ψυχήν.* And this was the doctrine of the Pythagoreans, which Plato afterwards declared; he resembling every, both human and Divine soul (that is, in our modern language, every created rational being) to a winged chariot, and a driver or charioteer, both together:—meaning by the chariot, an enlivened body;—and by the charioteer, the incorporeal soul itself acting it.

And now have we given a full account, in what manner the ancient assertors of incorporeal substance, as unextended, answered that objection against the illocality and immobility of particular finite spirits, demons, or angels, and human souls; that these being all naturally incorporate, however in themselves and directly immovable, yet were capable of being in sense moved, by accident, together with those bodies, respectively, which they are vitally united to. But as for that pretence, that these finite spirits, or substances incorporeal, being unextended, and so having in themselves no relation to any place, might therefore actuate and inform the whole corporeal world at once, and take cognizance of all things therein; their reply hereunto was, that these being essentially but parts of the universe, and therefore not comprehensive of the whole, finite or particular, and not universal beings (as the three hypostases of the Platonic trinity are), the sphere of their activity could not possibly extend any further, than to the quickening and enlivening of some certain parts of matter and the world, allotted to them, and thereby of becoming particular animals; it being peculiar to the Deity, or that incorporeal substance, which is infinite, to quicken and actuate all things.

But it would be no impertinent digression here, (as to the main scope of our present undertaking) should we briefly compare the forementioned doctrine and cabala of the ancient Incorporealists (the Pythagoreans and Platonists) with that of Christianity: and consider the

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[1] Vide Porphyr. de Abstinent. ab Esu Animal. lib. ii. § 38. p. 81. et alios.

[2] Ubi supra. p. 213.

agreement, or disagreement, that is betwixt them. First, therefore, here is a plain agreement of these best and most religious philosophers with Christianity in this: That the most consummate happiness, and highest perfection, that human nature is capable of, consisteth not in a separate state of souls, stripped naked from all body, and having no manner of converse with matter, as some high-flown persons in all ages have heen apt to conceit. For such amongst the philosophers (and Platonists too) was Plotinus; the unevenness and unsafeness of whose temper may sufficiently appear from hence, that as he conceived human souls might possibly ascend to so high a pitch, as quite to shake off commerce with all body; so did he on the other hand again imagine, that they might also descend and sink down so low, as to animate not only the bodies of brutes, but even of trees and plants too: two inconsistent paradoxes; the latter whereof is a most prodigious extravagancy, which yet Empedocles, though otherwise a great wit, seems to have been guilty of also, from those verses of his in Athenæus;[1]

Ἤδη γὰρ ποτ' ἐγὼ γενόμην κούρη τε κόρος τε,
Θάμνος τ', οἰωνός τε καὶ εἰν ἁλὶ ἔλλοπος ἰχθύς.

And amongst the Jews, the famous Maimonides was also of this persuasion, it being a known aphorism of his, in his great work, הכא אין גיף או רויה שכעילם: That in the world to come, or state of consummate happiness, there shall be nothing at all of body, but pure incorporeity. —Upon which account, being accused as a denier of the resurrection, (an article as well of the Jewish as of the Christian faith) he wrote that book entitled Iggereth Teman, purposely to purge himself, and to reconcile those two assertions together, which he doth after such a manner, as that there should be indeed a resurrection, at the first coming of the Jewish Messias, of some certain persons, to live here awhile upon the earth, eat and drink, marry and be given in marriage, and then die again; after which, in the world to come, they should forever continue pure souls, ununited to any body. In which it may be well suspected, that the design Maimonides drove at, was against Christianity; which, notwithstanding, as to this particular, hath the concurrent suffrages of the best philosophers, that the most genuine and perfect state of the human soul, which in its own nature is immortal, is to continue for ever, not without, but with a body; and yet our high-flown enthusiasts generally (however calling themselves Christians), are such great spiritualists, and so much for the inward resurrection, (which we deny not

[1] Deipnosophist, lib. viii. p. 510.

to be a Scripture notion also; as in that of St. Paul,[1] "If ye be risen with Christ," etc. And again, [2]"If by any means I might attain to the resurrection of the dead,") as that they quite allegorize away, together with other parts of Christianity the outward resurrection of the body; and, indeed, will scarcely acknowledge any future immortality, or life to come, after death, their spirituality thus ending in Sadducism and infidelity, if not at length in downright Atheism and sensuality.

But besides this, there is yet a further correspondence of Christianity with the forementioned philosophic cabala, in that the former also supposes the highest perfection of our human souls, not to consist in being eternally conjoined with such gross bodies as these we now have, unchanged and unaltered: for as the Pythagoreans and Platonists have always complained of these terrestrial bodies, as prisons, or living sepulchres of the soul; so does Christianity seem to run much upon the same strain, in these Scripture expressions: [3]"In this we groan earnestly, desiring to be clothed upon with our house which is from heaven:" and again, [4]"We that are in this tabernacle do groan, being burdened, not that we would be unclothed (that is, stripped quite naked of all body), but so clothed upon, that mortality might be swallowed up of life:" and, lastly, [5]"Ourselves, also, which have the first fruits of the Spirit, groan within ourselves, waiting for the adoption (sonship or inheritance), namely, the redemption of our bodies;" that is, the freedom of them from all those evils and maladies of theirs, which we here lie oppressed under. Wherefore we cannot think, that the same heavy load and luggage, which the souls of good men, being here burdened with, do so much groan to be delivered from, shall, at the general resurrection, be laid upon them again, and bound fast to them, to all eternity: for, of such a resurrection as this, Plotinus (though perhaps mistaking it for the true Christian resurrection), might have some cause to affirm, that it would be but *ἀνάστασις εἰς ἄλλον ὕπνον*, a resurrection to another sleep;—the soul seeming not to be thoroughly awake here, but, as it were, soporated with the dull steams and opiatic vapors of this gross body. For thus the author of the Book of Wisdom, [6]"The corruptible body presseth down the soul, and the earthly tabernacle weigheth down the mind, that museth upon many things." But the same will further appear from that account, which the Scripture itself giveth us of the resurrection: and first, in general, when St. Paul, an-

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[1] Col. 3: 1. [2] Phil. 3: 2. [3] 2 Cor. 5: 2. [4] 2 Cor. 5: 4.
[5] Rom. 8: 23. [6] Chap. 9: 15.

swering that query of the philosophic infidel, "How are the dead raised, or with what body do they come?" replieth in this manner, "Thou fool (that is, thou who thinkest to puzzle or baffle the Christian article of the resurrection, which thou understandest not,) that which thou sowest is not quickened (to the production of any thing), except it first die to what it was." And "thou sowest not that body that shall be, but bare grain," as of wheat, or of barley, or the like; but God (in the ordinary course of nature), giveth it a body, as it hath pleased him (that is, a stalk, and an ear, having many grains with husks in it, and therefore neither in quantity nor quality the same with that, which was sowed under ground), nor does he give to all seeds one and the same kind of body neither, but to every seed its own correspondent body; as to wheat one kind of ear, and to barley another. As if he should have said: Know that this present body of ours is to be looked upon but as a kind of seed of the resurrection-body, which therefore is accordingly in some sense the same, and in some sense not the same with it. Besides which general account, the particular oppositions, which the Scripture makes betwixt the present and future body, seem very agreeable to those of the philosophic cabala: for, first, the present body is said[1] to be sowed "in corruption," but the future "raised in incorruption." For the children of the resurrection cannot die any more.[2] And then "mortality shall be swallowed up of life."[3] Wherefore the Christian resurrection body, as well as that of the philosophic cabala, is σῶμα ἀθάνατον, and ἀΐδιον too, (2 Cor. 5: 1.) an immortal and eternal body. Again, the body sowed is said[4] to be a dishonorable, ignominious, and inglorious body; and therefore called also by St. Paul,[5] τὸ σῶμα τῆς ταπεινώσεως ἡμῶν, the body of our humility, or humiliation;—a body agreeable to the lapsed state of the soul, but the body, which shall be raised, shall be a glorious body; and σύμμορφον τῷ σώματι τῆς δόξης αὐτοῦ, "conformable to that glorious body of Christ;" who, when but externally transfigured, his face "did shine as the sun," and his "raiment was white as the light." The glory of a body consisteth only in the comeliness of its proportion, and the splendor thereof: thus is there [6]"one glory of the sun, another glory of the moon, and another glory of the stars;" that is, a different splendor of them. Wherefore the future body of the righteous, according to the Scripture also, as well as the philosophic cabala, will be σῶμα φωτεινὸν, and σῶμα αὐγοειδὲς, and σῶμα ἀστροειδὲς, a glorious, splendid, luciform and star-like body:—(Wisdom 3: 7.) ἐν

[1] 1 Cor. 15: 42. [2] Luke 20: 36. [3] 1 Cor. 15: 54. [4] 1 Cor. 15: 43.
[5] Phil. 3: 21. [6] 1 Cor. 15: 41.

καιρῷ ἐπισκοπῆς αὐτῶν ἐκλάμψουσι, "The righteous, in the time of their visitation, shall shine forth."—(Dan. 12: 2, 3.) "They that be wise, shall shine as the brightness of the firmament; and they that turn many to righteousness, as the stars for ever and ever." And (Matt. 13: 43.) "Then shall the righteous shine forth as the sun in the kingdom of their Father." And therefore probably this future glorious resurrection body is that "inheritance of the saints in light," which the Scripture speaks of, Col. 1: 12. Moreover, there is another difference betwixt this present and that future body of the righteous, wherein St. Paul[1] and Hierocles[2] do well agree; the first being called by both of them σῶμα ψυχικὸν, "an animal body"—the second σῶμα πνευματικὸν, "a spiritual body."—Which latter expression, in Scripture, not only denotes the subtilty and tenuity thereof; but also as this present body is called an "animal body," because it is suitable and agreeable to that animal life, which men have common with brutes, so is that future called spiritual, as bearing a fit proportion and correspondency to souls renewed in the spirit of their mind, or in whom the Divine spirit dwelleth and acteth, exercising its dominion. [3]"There is an animal body, and there is a spiritual body." And, "the first Adam was made a living soul, the last Adam a quickening spirit." And thus are ψυχικοὶ, in the Scripture, taken for οἱ πνεῦμα μὴ ἔχοντες, "they who have not the Spirit."—And [4]ψυχικὸς ἄνθρωπος οὐ δέχεται τὰ τοῦ πνεύματος τοῦ θεοῦ, "the animal man receiveth not the things of the Spirit of God." Which Spirit is also said, in Scripture, to be the earnest of that our future inheritance, (Eph. 1: 14.) and the earnest of this spiritual and heavenly body, (2 Cor. 5: 5.) It is also said to be that, by which (efficiently) these mortal bodies shall be quickened. (Rom. 8: 11.) "If the Spirit of him, that raised up Jesus from the dead, dwell in you; he, that raised up Christ from the dead, shall also quicken your mortal bodies by his Spirit, that dwelleth in you." Neither doth Hierocles fall much short of this Scripture notion of a spiritual body when he describes it to be that [5]ὃ τῇ νοερᾷ τελειότητι τῆς ψυχῆς συνάπτεται, which is agreeable to the intellectual perfection of the soul.—This spiritual body is that, which the ancient Hebrews called כנפי תנשר eagle's wings—we reading thus in the Gemara of the Sanhedrin, (c. 11. fol. 92. col. 2.) אם תאכר אותן שגים שעמיר תקבה לחרש בהן את תעולם צריקים

[1] 1 Cor. 15: 41.

[2] Comment. in aurea Pythag. carmina, p. 214. edit. Needhami.

[3] 1 Cor. 15: 45. [4] 1 Cor. 2: 14.

[5] Page 297. (p. 217. edit. Needhami.)

מה הן עושן תקכה עישה להן כנפים כנשטין על פגי המים. If you ask, What shall become of the righteous, when God shall renew the world? the answer is, God shall make them wings like eagles, whereby they shall fly upon the face of the waters.—Again, as this present body is called, in Scripture, an *earthly* body, so is the future body of the righteous styled by St. Paul, as well as the Pythagoreans, a *heavenly* body, and they, who shall then be possessors thereof, ἐπουράνιοι ἄνθρωποι, heavenly men—(1 Cor. xv.) "As is the heavenly, such are they that are heavenly." Besides which, as philosophers supposed both demons (or angels), and men, to have one and the same σῶμα αἰγοειδὲς, οὐράνιον, and αἰθέριον, or a like lucid, heavenly, and ethereal body; so from that of our Saviour, when he affirmeth, that they, who [1]"shall be accounted worthy to obtain that world, and the resurrection from the dead, will neither marry, nor be given in marriage; nor can die any more; for they are ἰσάγγελοι, equal to the angels."—From hence, I say, we may venture to call this resurrection body of the just also an angelical or isangelical body; and the rather because the ancient Hebrews (as we learn from Nachmonides, in Shaar Haggemul), styled it לכושת תנפש המלאכותי the angelical clothing of the soul;—and Tertullian himself, "angelificatam carnem," angelified flesh.[2]—But, lastly, St. Paul is not only positive in his docrine here, but also negative;[3] "Now this I say, brethren, that flesh and blood cannot inherit the kingdom of God; neither doth corruption inherit incorruption." Which place being undoubtedly not to be allegorized, it may be from thence inferred, that the happy resurrection body shall not be this foul and gross body of ours only varnished and gilded over on the outside of it, it remaining still nasty, sluttish and ruinous within, and having all the same seeds of corruption and mortality in its nature, which it had before, though by perpetual miracle kept off, it being as it were by violence defended from being seized upon and devoured by the jaws of death; but that it shall be so inwardly changed in its nature, as that the possessors thereof cannot die any more. But all this which hath been said of the resurrection body, is not so to be understood, as if it belonged universally to all, that shall be raised up at the last day, or made to appear upon the earth in their own persons, at that great and general assizes: that they shall have all alike (wicked as well as good) such glorious, spiritual and celestial bodies: but it is only a description

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[1] Luke 20: 36.

[2] Thus St. Austin, Corpora angelica; and Qualia sunt angelorum.

[3] 1 Cor. 15: 50.

of the ἀνάστασις τῆς ζωῆς, the resurrection of life;—which is emphatically called also by our Saviour Christ,[1] ἀνάστασις ἡ ἐκ τῶν νεκρῶν, the resurrection from the dead,—or to a happy immortality; as they, who shall be thought worthy thereof, are likewise styled by him υἱοὶ ἀναστάσεως, the children of the resurrection.—Of which resurrection only it is that St. Paul treateth in that fifteenth chapter of his to the Corinthians. And we say, that this Christian resurrection of life is the vesting and settling of the souls of good men in their glorious, spiritual, heavenly and immortal bodies. The complete happiness of a man, and all the good that can be desired by him, was by the heathen poet thus summed up: "Ut sit mens sana in corpore sano," That there be a sound mind in a sound body:—and the Christian happiness seems to be all comprised in these two things; first, in being inwardly regenerated and renewed in the spirit of their mind, cleansed from all pollution of flesh and spirit, and made partakers of the Divine life and nature; and then, secondly, in being outwardly clothed with glorious, spiritual, celestial and incorruptible bodies. The Scripture plainly declareth, that our souls are not at home here, in this terrestrial body, and these earthly mansions, but that they are strangers and pilgrims therein; which the patriarchs also confessing, plainly declared, that they sought a country, not that which they came out from, but a heavenly one. From which passages of Scripture some indeed would infer, that souls being at first created by God pure, pre-existed, before this their terrene nativity, in celestial bodies; but afterwards straggled and wandered down hither, as Philo for one,[2] ἀπολιποῦσα μὲν γὰρ ἡ ψυχὴ τὸν οὐράνιον τόπον, καθάπερ εἰς ξένην χώραν ἦλθετο σῶμα· Our soul (saith he), having left its heavenly mansion, came down into this earthly body, as a strange place. —But thus much is certain, that our human souls were at first intended and designed by God Almighty, the maker of them, for other bodies and other regions, as their proper home and country, and their eternal resting place: however, to us, that "be not first, which is spiritual, but that which is natural, and afterward that which is spiritual." Now, though some, from that of St. Paul,[3] where he calls this happy resurrection body, οἰκητήριον ἡμῶν τὸ ἐξ οὐρανοῦ, that house of ours, that is from heaven—or which cometh out of heaven—would infer, that therefore it will not be taken out of graves and charnel houses; they conceiving,

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[1] Luke 20: 25.

[2] De Agricul. p. 197, et in libro, quis divinarum rerum hæres, p. 519, et alias.

[3] 2 Cor. 5: 1.

also, that the individuation and sameness of men's persons does not necessarily depend on the numerical identity of all the parts of matter, because we never continue thus the same, our bodies always flowing like a river, and passing away by insensible transpiration; and, it is certain, that we have not all the same numerical matter, and neither more nor less, both in infancy and in old age, though we be for all that the self-same persons: yet, nevertheless, according to the best philosophy, which acknowledges no essential or specifical difference of matter, the foulest and grossest body that is, merely by motion may not only be crystalized, but also brought into the purity and tenuity of the finest ether. And, undoubtedly, that same numerical body of our Saviour Christ, which lay in the sepulchre, was after his resurrection thus transformed into a spiritual and heavenly body; the subtilty and tenuity whereof appeared from his entering in when the doors were shut, and his vanishing out of sight; however its glory were for the time suspended, partly for the better convincing his disciples of the truth of his resurrection, and partly because they were not then able to bear the splendor of it. We conclude, therefore, that the Christian mystery, of the resurrection of life, consisteth not in the soul's being reunited to these vile rags of mortality, these gross bodies of ours, (such as now they are;) but in having them changed into the likeness of Christ's glorious body, and in this mortal's putting on immortality.

Hitherto have we seen the agreement, that is betwixt Christianity and the old philosophic cabala, concerning the soul, in these two things: First, that the highest happiness and perfection of the human soul consisteth not in a state of separation from all body; and, secondly, that it does not consist neither in an eternal union with such gross terrestrial bodies, as these unchanged; the soul being not at home, but a stranger and pilgrim in them, and oppressed with the load of them: but that at last, the souls of good men shall arrive at glorious, spiritual, heavenly and immortal bodies. But now, as to that point, whether human souls be always united to some body or other, and consequently when by death they put off this gross terrestrial body, they are not thereby quite divested, and stripped naked of all body, but have a certain subtile and spirituous body, still adhering to them, and accompanying them? or else, whether all souls, that have departed out of this life, from the very beginning of the world, have ever since continued in a state of separation from all body, and shall so continue forwards till the day of judgment or general resurrection? we must confess, that this is a thing not so explicitly determined, or expressly decided in Christianity, either way. Nevertheless, it is first of all certain from Scripture, that

souls departed out of these terrestrial bodies are therefore neither dead nor asleep,[1] till the last trump and general resurrection, but still alive and awake; our Saviour Christ affirming, that they all live unto God; the meaning whereof seems to be this, that they, who are said to be dead, are dead only unto men here upon earth; but neither dead unto themselves, nor yet unto God, their life being not extinct, but only disappearing to us, and withdrawn from our sight; forasmuch as they are gone off this stage, which we still continue to act upon. And thus it is said also of our Saviour Christ himself, and that after his resurrection too, that "he liveth unto God." (Rom. 6: 10.) From whence it is evident, that they, who are said to live to God, are not therefore supposed to be less alive, than they were, when they lived unto men. Now it seemeth to be a privilege or prerogative proper to the Deity only, to live and act alone, without vital union or conjunction with any body. [2]"Quærendum (saith Origen), si possibile est, penitus incorporeas remanere rationabiles creaturas, cum ad summum sanctitatis ac beatitudinis venerent? An necesse est eas semper conjunctas esse corporibus?" It is worth our inquiry, whether it be possible for rational creatures to remain perfectly incorporeal, and separate from all body, when they are arrived to the highest degree of holiness and happiness? or whether they be always of necessity conjoined with some bodies;—and afterward he plainly affirmeth it to be impossible: "Vivere præter corpus ullam aliam naturam, præter Patrem, et Filium, et Spiritum Sanctum:" For any other nature, besides the Father, and the Son, and Holy Ghost, to live quite without a body.—Indeed, if this were most natural to the human soul, and most perfective of it, to continue separate from all body, then doubtless (as Origen implied) should the souls of good men, rather after the day of judgment, continue in such a state of separation to all eternity. But, on the contrary, if it be natural to souls to enliven and inform some body or other, (though not always a terrestrial one) as our inward sense inclines us to think, then can it not seem so probable, that they should, by a kind of violence, be kept so long in an unnatural or preternatural state of nakedness and separation from all body, some of them even from Adam till the day of judgment.

Again, the Scripture also intimates, that souls departed out of this life have a knowledge of one another, and are also capable of the punishment of sense or pain: "Fear him (saith our Saviour) who, after he

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[1] Death, called sleep in Scripture, only *κατ' εὐφημισμόν.*

[2] *περὶ ἀρχῶν*, lib. ii. (cap. ii. p. 69. oper.)

hath killed, hath power to cast into hell." (Luke xii.) And the soul of the rich man is said to be immediately after death in torments, before the day of judgment; as likewise to have known Abraham and Lazarus. And it seems neither agreeable to our common notions, nor yet to piety, to conclude, that the souls of wicked men, departing out of this life, from the beginning of the world in their several ages, till the day of judgment, have all of them no manner of punishment inflicted on them, save only that of remorse of conscience and future expectation. Now it is not conceivable, how souls after death should know and be knowable, and converse with one another, and have any punishment of sense or pain inflicted on them, were they not vitally united to some bodies. And thus did Tertullian[1] reason long ago: "Dolet apud inferos anima cujusdam, et punitur in flamma, et cruciatur in lingua, et de digito animæ fœlicioris implorat solatium roris. Imaginem existimas, exitum illum pauperis lætantis, et divitis mœrentis. Et quid illic Lazari nomen, si non in veritate res est? Sed etsi imago credenda est, testimonium erit veritatis. Si enim non habet anima corpus, non caperet imaginem corporis. Nec mentiretur de corporalibus membris scriptura, si non erant. Quid est autem illud, quod ad inferna transfertur, post divortium corporis? quod detinetur, et in diem judicii reservatur? Ad quod et Christus moriendo descendit? puto ad animas patriarcharum? Incorporalitas animæ ab omni genere custodiæ libera est; immunis a pœna et a fovela. Per quod enim punitur aut fovetur, hoc erit corpus. Igitur si quid tormenti sive solatii anima præcepit in carcere, vel diversorio inferum, in igni vel in sinu Abrahæ, probata erit corporalitas animæ. Corporalitas enim nihil patitur, non habens per quod pati possit: aut si habet, hoc erit corpus. In quantum enim omne corporale passibile est; in tantum quod passibile est, corporale est." We read in Scripture of a soul tormented in hell, punished with flames, and desirous of a drop of water to cool his tongue. You will say, perhaps, that this is parabolical and fictitious. What then does the name of Lazarus signify there, if it were no real thing? But if it be a parable never so much, yet must it, notwithstanding, as to the main, speak agreeably to truth. For if the soul (after death) have no body at all, then can it not have any corporeal image, shape, or figure. Nor can it be thought that the Scripture would lie concerning corporeal members, if there were none. But what is that, which, after its separation from this body, is carried down into hell, and there detained prisoner, and reserved till the day of judgment? And what is that, which Christ dy-

[1] De An. p. 309. Rigal. (cap. vii. p. 165.)

ing descended down unto? I suppose to the souls of the patriarchs. But incorporality is free from all custody or imprisonment, as also devoid of pain and pleasure. Wherefore, if souls be sensible of pain after death, and tormented with fire, then must they needs have some corporeity; for incorporality suffers nothing. And as every corporeal thing is passive or patible, so again whatsoever is passive is corporeal. [1]Tertullian would also confirm this from a vision or revelation of a certain sister-prophet, (miracles and prophecy being said by him not to be then altogether extinct,) "Inter cætera ostensa est mihi anima corporaliter, et spiritus videbatur, tenera et lucida, et aërii coloris, et formæ per omnia humanæ." There was (said she) amongst other things, a soul corporeally exhibited to my view, and it was tender and lucid, and of aëreal color, and every way of human form.—Agreeably to which, Tertullian himself addeth; "Effigiem non aliam animæ humanæ deputandam præter humanam, et quidem ejus corporis, quod unaquæque circumtulit." There is no other shape to be assigned to human soul but human; and, indeed, that of the body, which is before carried about.—It is true, indeed, that Tertullian here drives the business so far, as to make the soul itself to be corporeal, figurate, and colorate, and after death to have the very same shape, which its respective body had before in this life; he being one of those, who were not able to conceive of any thing incorporeal, and therefore, being a religionist, concluded God himself to be a certain body also. But the reasons, which he here insisteth on, will indeed extend no further than to prove, that the soul hath after death some body vitally united to it, by means whereof it is both capable of converse, and sensible of pain, forasmuch as body alone can have no sense of any thing.

And this is that, which Irenæus from the same Scripture gathereth; not that the soul is a body, but that it hath a body, after death, conjoined with it, and that of the same form and figure with that body which it had before here in this life: [2]"Plenissime autem Dominus docuit, non solum perseverare, non de corpore in corpus transgredientes animas, sed et characterem corporis, in quo etiam adaptantur custodire eundem; et meminisse eas operum, quæ egerunt hic, et a quibus cessaverunt; in enarratione, quæ scribitur de Divite et de Lazaro, qui refrigerabatur in sinu Abrahæ; in qua ait Divitem cognoscere Lazarum post mortem; et manere in suo ordine unumquemque ipsorum." Our Lord hath most plainly taught us, that souls do not only continue after

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[1] Ubi supra, cap. ix. p. 166.

[2] Lib. ii. cap. lxii. (cap. xxxiv. p. 168. edit. Massueti.)

death, without passing out of one body into another; but also, that they keep the character of body, wherein they are then also adapted, the same, which they had before; as likewise, that they remember the actions and omissions of their life past; in that enarration, which is written concerning the rich man and Lazarus, who was refreshed in Abraham's bosom; wherein he affirmeth the rich man to have known both Lazarus and Abraham after death, as also each of them to remain in their own order.—And thus again in the following chapter: [1]"Per hæc manifestissime declaratum est et perseverare animas; et non de corpore in corpus exire; et habere hominis figuram; (ut etiam cognoscantur) et meminisse eorum, quæ hic sint; et dignam habitationem unamquamque gentem percipere, etiam ante judicium." By these things it is most manifestly declared, that souls do both persevere after death, and that they do not transmigrate out of one body into another, and that they have a human figure or shape (whereby they may be known); as also they remember the things here upon the earth, and their own actions; and, lastly, that each kind of good and bad have their distinct and suitable habitations assigned them, even before the judgment.—Now, that Irenæus did not here mean, that souls are themselves bodily substances, and consequently have a certain character, form, and figure of their own, but only that they have certain bodies conjoined with them, which are figurate, is first of all evident from the words themselves: "characterem corporis, in quo etiam adaptantur, custodire eundem;" the natural sense whereof is this, that they keep the character of body (wherein they are then also adapted after death) the same with that, which these bodies before had in this life.—And it is further manifest from hence, because he elsewhere plainly declareth souls themselves to be incorporeal; as in his fifth book and seventh chapter,[2] "Flatus autem vitæ incorporalis est," but the breath of life is incorporeal.—

Furthermore, Origen was not only of the same persuasion, that souls after death had certain subtile bodies united to them, and that those bodies of theirs had the same *εἶδος χαρακτηρίζον*, characterising form—which these their terrestrial bodies before had; but also thinks, that this, together with the soul's immortality, may be sufficiently proved from the frequent apparitions or ghosts of departed souls; in way of opposition to Celsus, endeavoring to invalidate the Scripture testimonies concerning the apparitions of our Saviour Christ, and imputing them either to magical imposture, or fanatic frenzy, or the disciples mis-

[1] C. lxiii. (cap. xxxiv. p. 168.) [2] Page 300.

taking their own dreams and fancies for visions and sensations, after the Epicurean way,[1] *τοῦτο δὲ οὐδὲν ἧττον κατασκευαστικόν ἐστιν ἀναγκαίου δόγματος, ὡς ἄρα ἡ ψυχὴ ὑφέστηκε τῶν ἀποθανόντων· καὶ οὐ μάτην πεπίστευκε περὶ τῆς ἀθανασίας αὐτῆς, ὁ τοῦτο τὸ δόγμα ἀνειληφώς· ὡς καὶ Πλάτων ἐν τῷ περὶ τῆς ψυχῆς λέγει, σκιοειδῆ φαντάσματα περὶ μνημεῖα τισὶ γεγονέναι τῶν ἤδη τεθνηκότων·* Though this might seem to have been smartly opposed by Celsus, yet are those very apparitions of ghosts, notwithstanding, a sufficient argument or proof of a certain necessary opinion, that souls do subsist after death. Neither did Plato vainly conclude the immortality and permanency of the soul, besides other things, from those shadow-like phantasms of the dead, that have appeared to many about graves and monuments.—Whereupon he giveth this further account of these apparitions; *τὰ μὲν οὖν γινόμενα περὶ ψυχῆς τεθνηκότων φαντάσματα ἀπό τινος ὑποκειμένου γίνεται, τοῦ κατὰ τὴν ὑφεστηκυῖαν ἐν τῷ καλουμένῳ Ἀυγοειδεῖ Σώματι ψυχήν.* For these apparitions of the dead are not mere groundless imaginations, but they proceed from souls themselves, really remaining and surviving after death, and subsisting in that, which is called a luciform body.—Where, notwithstanding Origen takes this *Ἀυγοειδὲς Σῶμα*, or luciform body, in a larger sense than the Greek philosophers were wont to do; namely, so as to comprehend under it that airy or vaporous body also, which belongeth to unpurged souls, who do therein most frequently appear after death; whereas it is thought proper to the purged souls to be clothed with the luciform body only. Besides which, the same Origen tells us, that the thing, which St. Thomas the apostle disbelieved, was not our Saviour's appearing after death, as if he had thought it impossible for ghosts or souls departed, visibly to appear, but only his rising and appearance in that same solid body, which had been before crucified, and was laid in the sepulchre; *συγκατετίθετο μὲν γὰρ ἐκεῖνος τῇ φασκούσῃ αὐτὸν ἑωρακέναι, ὡς οὐκ ἀδυνάτου ὄντος, τοῦ τὴν ψυχὴν τοῦ τεθνηκότος ὀφθῆναι· οὐκέτι δ' ἐνόμιζεν εἶναι τὸ ἐν σώματι αὐτὸν ἀντιτύπῳ ἐγηγέρθαι·* Thomas also, as well as the other apostles, assented to the woman affirming, that she had seen Jesus; as not thinking it at all impossible for the soul of a dead man to be seen: but he did not believe him to have risen and appeared in that self-same solid body, which before he lived in; for which cause he said, not only, unless I see him; but added also, "And unless I shall put my finger into the print of the nails, and thrust my hand into his side, I will not believe."—Where again Origen subjoins, *Ταῦτα δ' ἐλέγετο ὑπὸ τοῦ Θῶμα, κρίνοντος ὅτι δύναται Ὀφθαλμοῖς αἰσθητοῖς*

[1] Adv. Celsum, lib. ii. p. 97.

φανῆναι ψυχῆς Σῶμα πάντα τῷ προτέρῳ εἴδει,———μέγεθός τε, καὶ ὄμματα καὶ ἐοικυίας, καὶ φωνὴν,

Πολλάκι δὴ καὶ τοῖα περὶ χροῖ εἵματ' ἐχούσης.

These things were said by Thomas, not as doubting at all, but that the body of a soul departed (to wit, condensed) might be seen with the eyes of sense, every way resembling that form which it had before in this life, both in respect of bigness, figure, color, and voice; and oftentimes also in the same customary garments.—Wherefore, according to Origen, the Jews were at that time generally possessed with this opinion, that souls after death had certain bodies united to them, wherein they might visibly appear; neither is that of any great moment to the contrary, which a learned critic objecteth, that Josephus, writing of their opinions, maketh no mention hereof; he omitting, besides this, other considerable dogmata of theirs also, as that of the resurrection. However this at least is certain from hence, that Origen himself took it for granted, that human souls departed were not altogether naked or unclothed, but clothed with a certain subtile body, wherein they could also visibly appear, and that in their pristine form.

Moreover, it might be here observed also, that when upon our Saviour's first apparition to his disciples, it is said, that they were affrighted, as supposing that they had seen a spirit; our Saviour does not tell them, that a spirit or ghost had no body at all, wherein it could visibly appear; but (as rather taking that for granted),[1] that a spirit had no flesh and bones (no *σῶμα ἀντίτυπον*), no such solid body as they might find him to have; bidding them therefore handle him, to remove that scruple of theirs. As if he should have said, Though spirits or ghosts, and souls departed, have bodies (or vehicles), which may by them be so far condensed, as sometimes to make a visible appearance to the eyes of men; yet have they not any such solid bodies as those of flesh and bone; and therefore by feeling and handling may you satisfy yourselves, that I am not a mere spirit, ghost, or soul, appearing, as others have frequently done, without a miracle; but that I appear in that very same solid body, wherein I was crucified by the Jews, by miraculous Divine power, raised out of the sepulchre, and now to be found no more there. Agreeable to which of our Saviour Christ is that of Apollonius in Philostratus;[2] *λαβοῦ μοι, ἔφη, κἂν μὲν διαφύγω σε, εἴδωλόν εἰμι· εἰ δὲ ὑπομείναιμι ἁπτόμενος, πεῖθε καὶ ζῇν τέ με, καὶ μὴ ἀποβεβληκέναι τὸ σῶμα.* Touch me and handle me, and if you find me to avoid the touch, then

[1] Luke 24: 37. [2] In Vita Apollonii Tyanei, lib. ix. cap. xii. p. 355.

may you conclude me to be a spirit or ghost (that is, a soul departed); but if I firmly resist the same, then believe me really to live, and not yet to have cast off the body.—And, indeed, though spirits or ghosts had certain subtile bodies, which they could so far condense, as to make them sometimes visible to men; yet is it reasonable enough to think, that they could not constipate or fix them into such a firmness, grossness, and solidity, as that of flesh and bone is, to continue therein; or at least, not without such difficulty and pain, as would hinder them from attempting the same. Notwithstanding which, it is not denied, but that they may possibly sometimes make use of other solid bodies, moving and acting them, as in that famous story of Phlegon's,[1] where the body vanished not, as other ghosts use to do, but was left a dead carcass behind. Now, as for our Saviour Christ's body, after his resurrection, and before his ascension; which notwithstanding its solidity in handling, yet sometimes vanished also out of his disciples' sight: this probably, as Origen conceived, was purposely conserved for a time, in a certain middle state, betwixt the crassities of a mortal body, and the spirituality of a perfectly glorified, heavenly, and ethereal body.

But there is a place of Scripture, which, as it hath been interpreted by the generality of the ancient fathers, would naturally imply, even the soul of our Saviour Christ himself, after his death, and before his resurrection, not to have been quite naked from all body, but to have had a certain subtile or spirituous clothing, and it is this of St. Peter;[2] *θανατωθεὶς μὲν σαρκὶ, ζωοποιηθεὶς δὲ τῷ πνεύματι, ἐν ᾧ καὶ τοῖς ἐν φυλακῇ πνεύμασι πορευθεὶς ἐκήρυξε·* Which being understood by those ancients of our Saviour Christ's descending into Hades or hell,[3] is accordingly thus rendered in the vulgar Latin, "Put to death in the flesh, but quickened in the spirit: in which (spirit) also, he went and preached to those spirits that were in prison," etc.—So that the word *πνεύματι,* or spirit here, according to this interpretation, is to be taken for a spirituous body; the sense being this, That when our Saviour Christ was put to death in the flesh, or the fleshly body, he was quickened in the spirit, or a spirituous body: in which (spirituous body) also, he went and preached to those spirits that were in prison, etc.—And doubtless

[1] In Libello de Rebus Mirabilibus, cap. i. in Jac. Gronovii Thesauro Antiq. Græcar. tom. viii. p. 2694.

[2] 1 Pet. 3: 18, 19.

[3] Of this St. Austin, in his twelfth book, De Gen. ad Lit. cap. 33. Et Christi quidem animam venisse usque ad ea loca, in quibus peccatores cruciantur, ut eos solvere, quos esse solventos occulta nobis sua justitia judicabat, non immerito creditur.

it would be said, by the assertors of this interpretation, that the word spirit could not be here taken for the soul of our Saviour Christ, because this being naturally immortal, could not properly be said to be quickened and made alive. Nor could he, that is, our Saviour Christ's soul, be so well said to go, in this spirit neither, that is, in itself, the soul in the soul, to preach to the spirits in prison. They would add also, that spirit here could not be taken for the Divine Spirit neither, which was the efficient cause of the vivification of our Saviour's body at his resurrection; because then there would be no direct opposition betwixt being put to death in the flesh, and quickened in the spirit; unless they be taken both alike materially. As also the following verse is thus to be understood: that our Saviour Christ went in that spirit, wherein he was quickened, when he was put to death in the flesh, and therein preached to the spirits in prison. By which spirits in prison also would be meant, not pure incorporeal substances, or naked souls, but souls clothed with subtile spirituous bodies; as that word may be often understood elsewhere in Scripture. But thus much we are unquestionably certain of from the Scripture, that not only Elias, whose terrestrial body seems to have been, in part at least, spiritualized, in his ascent in that fiery chariot, but also Moses appeared visibly to our Saviour Christ and his disciples upon the mount, and therefore (since piety will not permit us to think this a mere prestigious thing) in real bodies; which bodies also seem to have been Ἀυγοειδῆ, luciform or lucid, like to our Saviour's then transfigured body.

Again there are sundry places of Scripture, which affirm, that the regenerate and renewed have here in this life a certain earnest of their future inheritance; which is their spiritual or heavenly body; as also the quickening of their mortal bodies is therein attributed to the efficiency of the spirit dwelling in them. Which is a thing that hath been taken notice of by some of the ancients, as Irenæus: [1] "Nunc autem partem aliquam spiritus ejus sumimus, ad perfectionem et præparationem incorruptelæ, paulatim assuescentes capere et portare Deum. Quod et pignus dixit apostolus; hoc est, partem ejus honoris, qui a Deo nobis promissus est.——Si ergo pignus hoc habitans in nobis jam spirituales effecit, et absorbetur mortale ab immortalite."—Now have we a part of that spirit for the preparation and perfection of incorruption; we being accustomed by little and little to receive and bear God. Which also the apostle hath called an earnest; that is, a part of that honor which is promised to us from God. If therefore this earnest (or

[1] Lib. v. cap. viii. (p. 301. edit. Massueti.

pledge), dwelling in us hath made us already spiritual, the mortal is also swallowed up by immortality.—And Novatian,[1] "Spiritus Sanctus id agit in nobis, ut ad æternitatem et ad resurrectionem immortalitatis corpora nostra perducat, dum illa in se assuefacit cum cœlesti virtute misceri." That is that which the Holy Spirit doth in us, namely, to bring and lead on our bodies to eternity, and the resurrection of immortality; whilst in itself it accustometh us to be mingled with the heavenly virtue. Moreover, there are some places, also, which seem to imply, that good men shall, after death, have a further inchoation of their heavenly body, the full completion whereof is not to be expected before the resurrection or day of judgment. We know, that[2] "if our earthly house of this tabernacle were dissolved, we have a building of God, a house not made with hands, eternal in the heavens. For in this we groan earnestly." And, verse 5. "He that hath wrought us for the self-same thing is God, who also hath given us the earnest of the Spirit." Now how these preludiums and prelibations of an immortal body can consist with the soul's continuance after death, in a perfect separation from all manner of body, till the day of judgment, is not so easily conceivable.

Lastly, It is not at all to be doubted, but that Irenæus, Origen, and those other ancients, who entertained that opinion of souls being clothed after death with a certain thin and subtile body, suspected it not in the least to be inconsistent with that of the future resurrection; as it is no way inconsistent for one, who hath only a shirt or waistcoat on, to put on a suit of clothes, or exterior upper-garment. Which will also seem the less strange, if it be considered, that even here in this life, our body is, as it were, two-fold, exterior and interior; we having, besides the grossly tangible bulk of our outward body, the soul's immediate instrument, both of sense and motion; which latter is not put into the grave with the other, nor imprisoned under the cold sods. Notwithstanding all which that hath been here suggested by us, we shall not ourselves venture to determine any thing in so great a point, but sceptically leave it undecided.

The third and last thing in the forementioned philosophic or Pythagoric cabala is concerning those beings superior to men, commonly called by the Greeks demons, which Philo[3] tells us are the same with angels amongst the Jews, and accordingly are those words, demons and angels, by Hierocles[4] and Simplicius, and other of the latter Pagan

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[1] De Trinitate, cap. xxix. p. 450, ad. calcem Operum Tertulliani.

[2] 2 Cor. 5: 1. [3] De Insomniis, p. 586.

[4] Comment. in Aurea Pythagor. Carmina, sect. 67, p. 210.

writers, sometimes used indifferently as synonymous; viz. That these demons or angels are not pure, abstract, incorporeal substances, devoid of vital union with any matter; but that they consist of something incorporeal, and something corporeal joined together: so that, as Hierocles writeth of them, *τὸ μὲν ἄνω αὐτῶν ἀσώματος οὐσία, τὸ δὲ κάτω σωματικὴ*, They have a superior and an inferior part in them; and their superior part is an incorporeal substance; their inferior corporeal.—In a word, that they all, as well as men, consist of soul and body, united together, there being only this difference betwixt them, that the souls of these demons or angels never descend down to such gross and terrestrial bodies, as human souls do; but are always clothed either with aërial or ethereal ones. And, indeed, this Pythagoric cabala was universal, concerning all understanding beings, besides the supreme Deity, or trinity of Divine hypostases; that is, concerning all the Pagan inferior gods; that they are no other than souls vitally united to some bodies, and so made up of incorporeal and corporeal substance, joined together. For thus Hierocles plainly expresseth himself in the forecited place;[1] *ἡ λογικὴ οὐσία παρὰ τοῦ δημιουργοῦ εἰς τὸ εἶναι οὕτω παρῆλθεν, ὡς μήτε τὸ σῶμα εἶναι αὐτὴν μήτε ἄνευ σώματος*, etc. The rational nature (in general) was so produced by God, as that it neither is body, nor yet without body; but an incorporeal substance, having a cognate or cogenite body.—Which same thing was elsewhere also thus declared by him,[2] *ἔστι γὰρ πᾶς μὲν ὁ λογικὸς διάκοσμος, μετὰ τοῦ συμπεφυκότος αὐτῷ ἀφθάρτου σώματος, εἰκὼν ὅλον τοῦ δημιουργοῦ*, the whole rational order, or rank of being, with its congenite immortal body, is the image of the whole Deity, the maker thereof.—Where, by Hierocles's rational nature or essence, and by the whole rational order, is plainly meant all understanding beings created, of which he acknowledgeth only these three kinds and degrees; first, the immortal gods, which are to him the animated stars; secondly, demons, angels, or heroes; and thirdly, men, called also by him *καταχθόνιοι δαίμονες*, terrestrial demons;—he pronouncing of them all, that they are alike incorporeal substances, together with a cogenite immortal body; and that there is no other understanding nature than such, besides the Supreme Deity, which is complete in itself, without the conjunction of any body. So that, according to Hierocles, the ancient Pythagoric cabala acknowledged no such entities at all, as those intelligences of Aristotle, and the noes of some high-flown Platonists (that is, perfectly unbodied minds); and

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1 Comment. in Aurea Pythagor. Carmina, sect. 67, p. 210.

2 Page 17. (p. 19.)

much less any rank of henades or unities, superior to these noes. And indeed, such particular created beings as these, could neither have sense or cognizance of any corporeal thing existing without them (sense, as Aristotle hath observed, resulting from a complication of soul and body, as weaving results from a complication of the weaver and weaving instruments): nor yet could they act upon any part of the corporeal universe. So that these immovable beings would be but like adamantine statues, and things unconnected with the rest of the world, having no commerce with any thing at all but the Deity; a kind of insignificant metaphysical gazers or contemplators. Whereas the Deity, though it be not properly ψυχὴ ἐγκόσμιος, a mundane soul,—such as, together with the corporeal world, as its body, makes up one complete and entire animal; yet because the whole world proceeded from it, and perpetually dependeth on it, therefore must it needs take cognizance of all, and act upon all in it; upon which account it hath been styled by these Pythagoreans, ψυχὴ ὑπερκόσμιος, (not a mundane, but) a supramundane soul. Wherefore this ancient Pythagoric cabala seems to be agreeable to reason also, that God should be the only incorporeal being in this sense, such whose essence is complete, and life entire within itself, without the conjunction or appendage of any body; but that all other incorporeal substances created should be completed and made up by a vital union with matter, so that the whole of them is neither corporeal nor incorporeal, but a complication of both; and all the highest and divinest things in the universe, next to the supreme Deity, are animals consisting of soul and body united together. And after this manner did the ancient assertors of incorporeal substance, as unextended, decline that absurdity objected against them, of the illocality of all finite created spirits, that these being incorporeal substances, vitally clothed with some body, may, by reason of the locality and mobility of their respective bodies, truly be said to be here and there, and to move from place to place.

Wherefore we are here also to show what agreement or disagreement there is betwixt this part of the Pythagoric cabala and the Christian philosophy. And, first, it hath been already intimated, that the very same doctrine with this of the ancient Pythagoreans was plainly asserted by Origen. Thus, in his first book, Peri Archon, c. vi. "Solius Dei (saith he) id est Patris, et Filii, et Spiritus sancti, naturæ id proprium est, ut sine materiali substantia, et absque ulla corporeæ adjectionis societate, intelligatur subsistere." It is proper to the nature of God only, that is, of the Father, Son, and Holy Ghost, to subsist without material substance, or the society of any corporeal adjection.—

Again, l. ii. c. ii. "Materialem substantiam opinione quidem et intellectu solum separari, a naturis rationalibus, et pro ipsis, vel post ipsas effectam videri; sed nunquam sine ipsa eas vel vixisse, vel vivere: solius namque trinitatis incorporea vita existere recte putabitur." Material substance in rational natures is indeed separable from them in conception and understanding, it seeming to be made for them, and in order of nature after them; but it is not really and actually separable from the same; nor did they ever, nor can they live without it: for a life perfectly incorporeal is rightly deemed to belong to the trinity only.—So also, in his fourth book, and his Anacephalæosis, "Semper erunt rationabiles naturæ, quæ indigent indumento corporeo. Semper ergo erit natura corporea, cujus indumentis uti necesse est rationabiles creaturas. Nisi quis putet se posse ostendere, quod natura rationabilis absque ullo corpore vitam degere possit. Sed quam difficile id sit, et quam prope impossibile intellectui nostro, in superioribus ostendimus." There always will be rational natures, which stand in need of a corporeal indument. Wherefore there will be always corporeal nature, as a necessary indument or clothing for these rational creatures. Unless any one could show, that it is possible for the rational nature to live without a body. Which how difficult and almost impossible it is to our understanding, hath been already declared. Aquinas affirmeth[1] Origen, in this doctrine of his, to have followed the opinion of certain ancient philosophers; and undoubtedly it was the old Pythagoric cabala, which the learned Origen here adhered to; that ἡ λογικὴ οὐσία, as it is in Hierocles, and πᾶς ὁ λογικὸς διάκοσμος, the rational nature made by God; —that is, all created understanding beings are neither body, nor yet without body, but have always a cognate or cogenite body, as their vehicle or indument. So that angels or demons, as well according to Origen as Hierocles, are all of them incorporeal substances, not naked and abstract, but clothed with certain subtile bodies, or animals compounded and made up of soul and body together.

Wherefore Huëtius,[2] and other learned men, seem not well to have understood Origen here, but to have confounded two different opinions together, when they suppose him to have asserted angels, and all understanding creatures, not to *have* bodies, but to *be* bodies, and nothing else; and, consequently, that there is no incorporeal substance at all besides the Deity: whereas Origen only affirmeth, that nothing besides the Trinity, could subsist and live alone, "absque ulla corporeæ adjec-

[1] In Summa Theolog. part i. Quæst. li. p. 1.

[2] In Origenianis, lib. ii. Quæst. v. p. 68.

tionis societate," without the society of any corporeal adjection;—and that the material nature is only a necessary indument or clothing of all rational or understanding creatures. And in this sense is it, that an incorporeal life is said by him to be proper only to the Trinity; because all other understanding beings are animals compounded of soul and body together. But that Origen acknowledged even our human soul itself to be incorporeal, as also that there is something in angels incorporeal, might be made evident from sundry passages in his writings: as this particularly in his sixth book against Celsus; *ἡμεῖς ἀσώματον οὐσίαν οὐκ ἔσμεν ἐκπυρουμένην, οὐδ' εἰς πῦρ ἀναλυομένην τὴν ἀνθρώπου ψυχὴν, ἢ τὸν ἀγγέλων ἢ θρόνων*, etc. *ὑπόστασιν·* We do not think an incorporeal substance to be combustible, nor that the soul of man can be resolved into fire, or the substance of angels, thrones, dominions, principalities or powers.—Where, by the substance of angels, he doubtless meant the souls of them; Origen's sense being thus declared by St. Jerome:[1] in libris *περὶ ἀρχῶν*, angelos, et thronos, et dominationes, et potestates, et rectores mundi et tenebrarum, et omne nomen quod nominatur, dicit, animas esse eorum corporum, quæ vel desiderio vel ministerio susceperint:" that in his book of principles he affirmeth, angels, and thrones, and dominions, and powers, and the governors of the darkness of this world, and every name that is named (in St. Paul), to be all of them the souls of certain bodies, such as either by their own desire and inclination, or the Divine allotment, they have received.—Now there can be no question made, but that he, who supposed the souls of men to be incorporeal, in a strict philosophic sense, and such as could not suffer any thing from fire, did also acknowledge something incorporeal in angels. And thus doth he somewhere declare himself, in that book, Peri Archon,[2] "Per Christum creata dixit (Paulus) omnia visibilia et invisibilia; per quod declaratur, esse etiam in creaturis quasdam invisibiles, secundum proprietatem suam, substantias; sed hæ, quamvis ipsæ non sunt corporeæ, utuntur tamen corporibus, licet ipsæ sunt corporea substantia meliores. Illa vero substantia trinitatis neque corpus, neque in corpore, esse credenda est; sed in toto incorporea." When Paul affirmeth all things, visible, and invisible, to have been created by Christ or the *Λόγος*, he intimated, that even amongst the creatures, there are some properly invisible substances. Which invisible substances created, though they be not bodies, yet do they use bodies, themselves be-

[1] Epist. lxi. ad Pammachium de Erroribus Johan. Hierosolymitani, tom. ii. oper. p. 118.

[2] Lib. iv. cap. ii.

ing better than corporeal substance. But the substance of the Trinity is neither body, nor yet in body, but altogether incorporeal—Wherefore angelical and human souls are not, as Huetius supposeth, called incorporeal by Origen, only as subtile bodies sometimes are by the more simple and unskilful, but in a strict philosophic sense; only he supposed them to differ from the Deity in this, that though they be not bodies, yet they are always in bodies, or clothed with bodies; whereas the Deity is in both senses incorporeal, it having not so much as any corporeal indument. So that there is here no contradiction at all to be found in Origen, he constantly asserting angels to have something incorporeal in them as their superior part, and not in that vulgar sense of a subtile body, but in the philosophic; nevertheless, to have also a corporeal indument or clothing, as their outside or lower part, and in that regard only he calling them corporeal.

It is true, indeed, that there were, amongst the ancient fathers, some, who were so far from supposing angels to be altogether incorporeal, that they ran into the other extreme, and concluded them to have nothing at all incorporeal in them, but to be mere bodies. But these either asserted that there was no such thing at all as any incorporeal substance; and that not only angels, and human souls, but also God himself was a body: or at least they concluded, that nothing created was incorporeal; and that God, though himself incorporeal, yet could create nothing but bodies. These are here the two extremes; one, that angels have nothing corporeal at all belonging to them; the other, that they are altogether corporeal, or having nothing incorporeal in them: a middle betwixt both which is the Origenic hypothesis, the same with the Pythagoric; that in angels there is a complication of incorporeal and corporeal substance both together, or that they are animals consisting of soul and body. We shall now make it appear, that the greater part of the ancient fathers were for neither of the two forementioned extremes, either that angels were wholly incorporeal, or that they were wholly corporeal; but rather for the middle hypothesis, that they had bodies, and yet were not bodies, but, as other terrestrial animals, spirits or souls, clothed with ethereal or aërial bodies. And that the generality of the most ancient and learned fathers did not conceive angels to be mere unbodied spirits, is unquestionably evident from hence, because they agreed with the Greek philosophers in that conceit, that evil demons, or devils, were therefore delighted with the blood and nidours of sacrifices, as having their more gross, airy, and vaporous bodies nourished and refreshed with those vapors, which they did, as it were luxuriate and gluttonize in. For thus does Porphyrius write con-

cerning them, in his book De Abstinentia,[1] *οὗτοι οἱ χαίροντες λοιβῇ τε, κνίσσῃ τε, δι' ὧν αὐτῶν τὸ σωματικὸν καὶ πνευματικὸν πιαίνεται· ζῇ γὰρ τοῦτο ἀτμοῖς καὶ ἀναθυμιάμασι·* These are they, who take pleasure in the incense, fumes, and nidours of sacrifices, wherewith their corporeal and spirituous part is as it were pinguefied; for this lives, and is nourished, by vapors and fumigations. And that, before Porphyrius, many other Pagan philosophers had been of the same opinion, appeareth from this of Celsus:[2] *Χρὴ γὰρ ἴσως οὐκ ἀπιστεῖν ἀνδράσι σοφοῖς, οἳ δή φασι, διότι τῶν μὲν περιγείων δαιμόνων τὸ πλεῖστον γενέσει συντετηκὸς, καὶ προσηλωμένον αἵματι καὶ κνίσσῃ,* etc. We ought to give credit to wise men, who affirm, that most of these lower and circumterraneous demons are delighted with geniture, blood, and nidour, and such-like things, and much gratified therewith; though they be not able to do any thing more in way of recompense, than sometimes perhaps to cure the body, or to foretel good and evil fortunes to men and cities.—Upon which account himself, though a zealous Pagan, persuadeth[3] men to moderation in the use of these sacrifices, as principally gratifying the inferior and worser demons only. In like manner Origen frequently insisteth upon the same thing, he affirming, that devils were not only delighted with the idolatry of the Pagans in their sacrifices, but also *ἀπὸ τῶν θυσιῶν ἀναθυμιάμασι καὶ ταῖς ἀπὸ τῶν αἱμάτων καὶ ὁλοκαυτωμάτων ἀποφοραῖς τρέφεσθαι τὰ σώματα φιληδονούντων τοῖς τοιούτοις·* That their very bodies were nourished by the vapors and fumes arising from them, and that these evil demons therefore did as it were deliciate and epicurize in them. And before Origen, most of the ancient fathers, as Justin Martyr, Athenagoras, Tatianus, Tertullian, etc. and also many others after him, endeavor to disparage those material and bloody sacrifices upon the same account, as things, whereby evil demons were principally gratified. We shall only cite one passage to this purpose out of St. Basil,[4] or whoever were the author of that Commentary upon Isaiah, because there is something philosophic in it: *δαίμοσι διὰ τὸ φιλήδονον καὶ ἐμπαθὲς, αἱ θυσίαι φέρουσί τινα ἡδονὴν καὶ χρείαν ἐκθυμιώμεναι, διὰ τῆς καύσεως ἐξατμιζομένου τοῦ αἵματος, καὶ οὕτω διὰ τῆς τοιαύτης λεπτοποιήσεως εἰς τὴν σύστασιν αὐτῶν ἀναλαμβανομένου· ὅλοι γὰρ δι' ὅλων τρέφονται τοῖς ἀτμοῖς, οὐ διὰ μασσήσεως καὶ κοιλίας, ἀλλ' ὡς αἱ τρίχες πάντων ζώων καὶ ὄνυχες, καὶ ὅσα τοιαῦτα εἰς ὅλην ἑαυτῶν τὴν οὐσίαν, τὴν τροφὴν καταδέχεται.* Sacrifices are things of no small pleasure and advantage to demons;

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[1] Lib. ii. sect. xlii. p. 86.

[2] Orig. lib. viii. (p. 417.)

[3] Contra Celsus, lib. vii. p. 334.

[4] Cap. i. (§ 25. p. 396. tom. i oper. Basilii in Append.)

because the blood, being evaporated by fire, and so attenuated, is taken into the compages and substances of their bodies: the whole of which is throughout nourished by vapors, not by eating, and stomachs, or such-like organs, but as the hairs and nails of all animals, and whatsoever other things receive nourishment into their whole substance.—And thus do we see it undeniably manifest, that many of the ancient fathers supposed devils to have bodies; neither can it at all be doubted but that they concluded the same of angels too, these being both of the same kind, and differing but as good and evil men. And though they do not affirm this of good angels, but of devils only, that they were thus delighted and nourished by the fumes and vapors of sacrifices, and that they epicurized in them; yet was not the reason hereof, because they conceived them to be altogether incorporeal, but to have pure etherial or heavenly bodies; it being proper to those gross and vaporous bodies of demons only to be nourished and refreshed after that manner. And now, that all these ancient fathers did not suppose either angels or devils to be altogether corporeal, or to have nothing but body in them, may be concluded from hence, because many of them plainly declared the souls of men to be incorporeal; and therefore it cannot be imagined, that they should so far degrade angels below men, as not to acknowledge them to have any thing at all incorporeal.

But we shall now instance in some few, amongst many of these ancients, who plainly asserted both devils and angels to be spirits incorporate, and not to be mere bodies, but only to have bodies; that is, to consist of soul and body, or corporeal and incorporeal substance joined together. That angels themselves have bodies, is every where declared by St. Austin in his writings;[1] he affirming, that the bodies of good men, after the resurrection, shall be "qualia sunt angelorum corpora," such as are the bodies of angels;—and that they shall be [2]"corpora angelica, in societate angelorum," angelical bodies, fit for society and converse with angels—and declaring the difference betwixt the bodies of angels and of devils in this manner: [3]"Dæmones, antequam transgrederentur, cœlestia corpora gerebant, quæ conversa sint ex pœna in aëream qualitatem, ut jam possint ab igne pati;" That though devils, before the transgression, had celestial bodies; as angels now have, yet might these afterwards, in way of punishment, be changed into aëreal ones, and such as now may suffer by fire.—Moreover, the same St. Austin somewhere[4] calleth good angels by the name of "animæ beatæ

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[1] Psal. lxxxv. [2] Psal. cxlv.

[3] De Gen. ad Lit. lib. iii. cap. x. (§ 15. p. 114. tom. iii.)

[4] De Musica, lib. vi. cap. xvii. § 59. p. 401. tom. i. oper.

atque sanctæ," happy and holy souls.—And though it be true, that in his Retractions[1] he recalleth and correcteth this, yet was this only a scrupulosity in that pious father concerning the mere word, because he no where found in Scripture angels called by the name of souls; it being far from his meaning, even there, to deny them to be incorporeal spirits joined with bodies. And certainly he who every where concludes human souls to be incorporeal, cannot be thought to have supposed angels to have nothing at all but body in them. Again, Claudianus Mammertus,[2] writing against Faustus, who made angels to be mere bodies without souls, or any thing incorporeal, maintaineth, in way of opposition, not that they are mere incorporeal spirits, without bodies (which is the other extreme), but that they consist of corporeal and incorporeal, soul and body joined together; he writing thus of devils: "Diabolus ex duplici diversaque substantia constat; et corporeus est incorporeus:" The devil consisteth of a double and different substance; he is corporeal, and he is also incorporeal.—And again of angels: [3]"Patet beatos angelos, utriusque substantiæ, et incorporeos esse in ea sui parte, qua ipsis visibilis Deus; et in ea itidem parte corporeos, qua hominibus sunt ipsi visibiles." It is manifest, that the blessed angels are of a two-fold substance; that they are incorporeal in that part of theirs, wherein God is visible to them, and again corporeal, in that other part, wherein themselves are visible to men. Moreover, Fulgentius[4] writeth concerning angels in this manner: "Plane ex duplici eos esse substantia asserunt magni et docti viri. Id est, ex spiritu incorporeo, quo a Dei contemplatione nunquam recedunt; et ex corpore, per quod ex tempore hominibus apparent. Corpora vero ætherea, id est, ignea, eos dicunt habere; dæmones vero corpus aëreum." Great and learned men affirm angels to consist of a double substance; that is, of a spirit incorporeal, whereby they contemplate God; and of a body, whereby they are sometimes visible to men: as also, that they have etherial or fiery bodies, but devils aërial.—And perhaps this might be the meaning of Joannes Thessalonicensis, in that dialogue of his, read and approved of in the seventh council, and therefore the meaning of that council itself too, when it is thus declared, *νοερούς μὲν αὐτοῖς ἡ καθολικὴ ἐκκλησία γινώσκει, οὐ μὴν ἀσωμάτους πάντη καὶ ἀοράτους, λεπτοσωμάτους δὲ καὶ ἀερώδεις, ἢ πυρώδεις*, etc. That the catholic church acknowledges angels to be intellectual, but not altogether incorporeal and invisible; but to have certain subtile bodies, either airy or fiery.

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[1] Lib. ii. cap. xi.

[2] De Statu Animæ, lib. iii. cap. vii. p. 178. edit. Barthii.

[3] Lib. iii. [4] Lib. iii. De Trin. (p. 119 oper. edit. Sirmondi.)

—For it being there only denied, that they were altogether incorporeal, one would think the meaning should not be, that they were altogether corporeal, nor indeed could such an opinion be fastened upon the catholic church; but that they were partly incorporeal, and partly corporeal; this being also sufficient in order to that design, which was driven at in that council. However Psellus,[1] who was a curious inquirer into the nature of spirits, declares it not only as his own opinion, but also as agreeable to the sense of the ancient fathers, *ὡς οὐκ ἀσώματον τὸ δαιμόνιόν ἐστι φῦλον, μετὰ σώματος δέ γε·* That the demoniac or angelic kind of beings is not altogether incorporeal, or bodiless, but that they are conjoined with bodies, or have cognate bodies belonging to them.—Who there also further declares the difference betwixt the bodies of good angels and of evil demons, after this manner: [2]*τὸ μὲν γὰρ ἀγγελικὸν, αὐγάς τινας ἐξανίσχον ξένας, τοῖς ἐκτὸς ὀφθαλμοῖς ἐστιν ἀφόρητόν τε καὶ ἀνυπόστατον· τὸ δαιμόνιον δὲ, εἰ μὲν τοιοῦτον δήποτε ἦν, οὐκ οἶδα εἰπεῖν, ἔοικεν δ' οὖν, ἐωσφόρον Ἠσαίου τὸν ἐκπεσόντα κατονομάζοντος· νῦν δὲ ἀλλὰ ζοφῶδες οἷον καὶ ἀμαυρόν ἐστι, καὶ τοῖς ὄμμασι λυπηρὸν, γυμνωθὲν τοῦ συζύγου φωτός· καὶ τὸ μὲν ἀγγελικὸν παντάπασίν ἐστιν ἄϋλον· διὸ καὶ διὰ πάντά ἐστι στερεοῦ διοδύνον καὶ διϊὸν, καὶ τῆς ἡλιακῆς ἀκτῖνος ὂν ἀπαθέστερον· τὴν μὲν γὰρ διὰ σωμάτων διαφανῶν ἰοῦσαν, ἀποστέγει τὰ γεώδη καὶ ἀλαμπῆ ὡς καὶ κλᾶσιν ὑπομένειν, ἅτε δὴ ἔνυλον ἔχουσαν. τῷ δὲ οὐδέν ἐστι πρόσαντες, οἷα μηδεμίαν ἔχοντι πρὸς μηδὲν ἀντίθεσιν. τὰ δὲ δαιμόνια σώματα, κἂν ὑπὸ λεπτότητος ἀφανῆ καθέστηκεν, ἀλλ' ὅμως ἔνυλά πη, καὶ ἐμπαθῆ, καὶ μάλισθ' ὅσα τοὺς ὑπὸ γῆν ὑποδέδυκε τόπους· ταῦτα γὰρ τοσαύτην ἔχει τὴν σύστασιν, ὡς καὶ ἁφαῖς ὑποπίπτειν, καὶ πληττόμενα ὀδυνᾶσθαι, καὶ πυρὶ προσομιλήσαντα καίεσθαι·* The angelical body sending forth rays and splendors, such as would dazzle mortal eyes, and cannot be borne by them; but the demoniac body, though it seemeth to have been once such also, (from Isaiah's calling him, that fell from heaven, Lucifer,) yet is it now dark and obscure, foul and squallid, and grievous to behold, it being deprived of its cognate light and beauty. Again, the angelical body is so devoid of gross matter, that it can pass through any solid thing, it being indeed more impassable than the sun-beams; for though these can permeate pellucid bodies, yet are they hindered by earthy and opake, and refracted by them: whereas the angelical body is such, as that there is nothing so imporous or solid, that can resist or exclude it. But the demoniac bodies, though, by reason of their tenuity, they commonly escape our sight, yet have they, notwithstanding, gross matter in them, and are patible, especially those of them which inhabit

[1] Dialog. de Operationibus Dæmonum, p. 44. [2] Page 33. (p. 48.)

the subterraneous places; for these are of so gross a consistency and solidity, as that they sometimes fall also under touch; and, being stricken, have a sense of pain, and are capable of being burnt with fire.—To which purpose, the Thracian there addeth more afterward from the information of Marcus the monk, a person formerly initiated in the diabolic mysteries, and of great curiosity; [1]*τὸ δαιμόνιον ἄρα πνεῦμα διόλου ὂν κατὰ φύσιν αἰσθητικὸν κατὰ πᾶν ἑαυτοῦ μέρος, ἀμέσως ὁρᾷ τε καὶ ἀκούει, καὶ τὰ τῆς ἁφῆς ὑπομένει πάθη, διαιρούμενον ὀδυνᾶται κατα τῶν σωμάτων τὰ στερεά· ταύτῃ τούτων διενεγκὸν, ὅτι τὰ μὲν ἄλλα τῶν διαιρεθέντων, μόλις ἢ οὐδαμῶς οὐλοῦται, τὸ δὲ διαιρούμενον εὐθὺς συμφύεται, καθάπερ ἀέρος ἢ καὶ ὕδατος μόρια μεπαξύ τινος ἐμπίπτοντα στερεοῦ· ἀλλ' εἰ καὶ θᾶττον ἢ λόγος τουτὶ τὸ πνεῦμα συμφύεται, πλὴν ἀνιᾶται κατ' αὐτὸ τὸ γίνεσθαι τὴν διαίρεσιν·* The demoniac spirit or subtile body, being every part of it capable of sense, does immediately see and hear, and is also obnoxious to the affections of touch; insomuch that being suddenly divided or cut in two, it hath a sense of pain, as the solid bodies of other animals have; it differing from them only in this, that those other bodies, being once discontinued, are not easily consolidated together again; whereas the demoniac body, being divided, is quickly redintegrated by coalescense, as air or water; nevertheless it is not without a sense of pain at that time, when it is thus divided, etc.—Moreover, the same Marcus affirmeth the bodies of demons to be nourished also, though in a different manner from ours; *τρέφονται οἱ μὲν δι' εἰσπνοῆς, ὡς τὸ ἐν ἀρτηρίαις καὶ ἐν νεύροις πνεῦμα· οἱ δὲ δι' ὑγρότητος, ἀλλ' οὐ στόματι καθ' ἡμᾶς, ἀλλ' ὥςπερ σπόγγοι καὶ ὀστρακόδερμα, σπῶντες μὲν τῆς παρακειμένης ὑγρότητος ἔξωθεν·*[2] They are some of them nourished by inspiration, as the spirit contained in the nerves and arteries; others by sucking in the adjacent moisture, not as we do by mouths, but as sponges and testaceous fishes.—And now we may venture to conclude, that this opinion of angels being not mere abstract incorporeal substances, and unbodied minds, but consisting of something incorporeal, and something corporeal, that is, of soul or spirit, and body joined together, is not only more agreeable to reason, but hath also had more suffrages amongst the ancient fathers, and those of greater weight too, than either of those two other extremes, viz. That angels are mere bodies, and have nothing at all incorporeal in them; or else, that they are altogether incorporeal, without any bodily indument or clothing.

Notwithstanding which, this latter opinion hath indeed prevailed most in these latter ages; time being rightly compared to a river, which

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[1] Page 94. (p. 142.) [2] Page 56.

quickly sinks the more weighty and solid things, and bears up only the lighter and more superficial. Though there may be other reasons given for this also; as partly because the Aristotelic philosophy, when generally introduced into Christianity, brought its abstract intelligences along with it; and partly because some spurious Platonists talking so much of their henades and noes, their simple monads and immovable unbodied minds, as the chief of their generated and created gods; probably some Christians might have a mind to vie their angels with them: and, lastly, because angels are not only called in Scripture spirits, but also by several of the ancients said to be incorporeal; whilst this, in the mean time, was meant only either in respect of that incorporeal part, soul or mind, which they supposed to be in them, or else of the tenuity and subtilty of their bodies or vehicles. For this account does Psellus[1] give hereof: *καὶ τοῖς ἡμετέροις καὶ τοῖς θύραθεν, εἰωθός ἐστι, τὰ παχύτερα τῶν σωμάτων σωματώδη λέγειν. ὃ δὲ λεπτομερές ἐστι καὶ τὴν ὄψιν διαφυγάνον καὶ τὴν ἁφὴν ἀσώματον, οὐ μόνον οἱ καθ' ἡμᾶς, ἀλλὰ καὶ πολλοὶ τῶν ἐκτὸς ἀξιοῦσι λέγειν·* It is usual both with Christian writers, and Pagans too, to call the grosser bodies corporeal, and those, which, by reason of their subtilty, avoid both our sight and touch, incorporeal. And before Psellus, Johannes Thessalonicensis, in his dialogue, approved in the seventh council;[2] *εἰ δέ που εὕροις ἀσώματους καλουμένους τοὺς ἀγγέλους ἢ δαίμονας, ἢ ψυχάς, ὡς μὴ ὄντας ἐκ συμμίξεως τῶν ὑλικῶν τεσσάρων στοιχείων, καὶ τοιαῦτα σώματα παχέα καὶ ἀντίτυπα, οἷα ἡμεῖς περικείμεθα, οὕτως αὐτοὺς προσηγόρευσαν·* If you find angels, or demons, or separate souls, called sometimes incorporeal, you must understand this in respect of the tenuity of their bodies only; as not consisting of the grosser elements, nor being so solid and antitypous as those, which we are now imprisoned in. And, before them both, Origen, in the proeme of his Peri Archon, where citing a passage out of an ancient book, intituled, The Doctrine of Peter, wherein our Saviour Christ is said to have told his disciples, that he was not *δαιμόνιον ἀσώματον*, an incorporeal demon—though rejecting the authority of that book, he thus interprets those words: "Non idem sensus ex isto sermone *ἀσωμάτου* indicatur, qui Græcis vel Gentilibus auctoribus ostenditur, quum de incorporea natura a philosophis disputatur. In hoc enim libello, incorporeum dæmonium dixit, pro eo, quod ipse ille quicunque est habitus vel circumscriptio dæmonici corporis, non est similis huic nostro crassiori

[1] Page 30, 33. (p. 47.)

[2] In Actis Concilii vii. Oecum. seu Nicæni ii. Auction. v. p. 293. tom. iv. Concilior. edit. Harduini.

vel visibili corpori; sed secundum sensum, ejus qui composuit illam Scripturam, intelligendum est, quod dixit; non esse tale corpus, quale habent dæmones, quod est naturaliter subtile, et velut aura tenue; et propter hoc vel imputatur a multis, vel dicitur incorporeum; sed habere se corpus solidum et palpabile."—The word ἀσωμάτου, or incorporeal, is not to be taken here in that sense, wherein it is used by the Greek and Gentile writers, when they philosophized concerning the incorporeal nature. But a demon is here said to be incorporeal, because of the disposition of the demoniac body, not like to this gross and visible body of ours. So that the sense is, as if Christ should have said, I have not such a body as the demons have, which is naturally subtile, thin, and soft, as the air, and therefore is either supposed to be by many, or at least called incorporeal; but the body, which I now have, is solid and palpable.—Where we see plainly, that angels, though supposed to have bodies, may, notwithstanding, be called incorporeal, by reason of the tenuity and subtilty of those bodies, comparatively with the grossness and solidity of these our terrestrial bodies. But that indeed which now most of all inclineth some to this persuasion, that angels have nothing at all corporeal hanging about them, is a religious regard to the authority of the third Lateran council, having passed its approbation upon this doctrine; as if the Oecumenical (so called) or second Nicene, wherein the contrary was before owned and allowed, were not of equal force, at least to counterbalance the other.

But though this doctrine of angels, or all created understanding beings superior to men, having a corporeal indument or clothing, does so exactly agree with the old Pythagoric cabala; yet have we reason to think, that it was not therefore merely borrowed or derived from thence by the ancient fathers; but that they were led into it by the Scripture itself. For, first, the historic phenomena of angels in the Scripture are such, as cannot well be otherwise solved, than by supposing them to have bodies; and then not to lay any stress upon those words of the Psalmist,[1] "who maketh his angels spirits, and ministers a flame of fire," (though, with good reason, by the ancient fathers interpreted to this sense) because they may possibly be understood otherwise, as sometime they are by rabbinical commentators; nor to insist upon those passages of St. Paul,[2] where he speaks of the tongues of angels, and of the voice of an archangel, and such-like; there are several other places in Scripture, which seem plainly to confirm this opinion. As, first, that of our Saviour before mentioned to this purpose, Luke 20: 35.

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[1] Psalm 104: 4. [2] 1 Cor. 13: 1. 1 Thess. 4: 16.

"They who shall be accounted worthy to obtain that world, and the resurrection from the dead, neither marry nor are given in marriage, neither can they die any more; for they are equal unto the angels." For were angels utterly devoid of all bodies, then would the souls of good men, in a state of separation, and without any resurrection, be rather equal to angels, than after a resurrection of their bodies. Wherefore the natural meaning of these words seems to be this, (as St. Austin[1] hath interpreted them) that the souls of good men, after the resurrection, shall have "corpora angelica," angelical bodies—and "qualia sunt angelorum corpora," such bodies as those of angels are.—Wherein it is supposed, that angels also have bodies, but of a very different kind from those of ours here. Again, that of St. Jude, where he writeth thus of the devils; "the angels, which kept not their first estate (or rather according to the vulgar Latin, "suum principatum," their own principality) but left their proper habitation (or dwelling-house) hath he reserved in everlasting chains, under darkness, unto the judgment of the great day." In which words it is first implied, that the devils were created by God pure, as well as the other angels, but that they kept not *τὴν ἑαυτῶν ἀρχὴν*, their own principality—that is, their lordly power and dominion over their worse and inferior part, they having also a certain duplicity in their nature, of a better and worser principle, of a superior part, which ought to rule and govern, and of an inferior which ought to be governed: nor is it indeed otherwise easily conceivable, how they should be capable of sinning. And this inferior part in angels seems to have a respect to something that is corporeal or bodily in them also, as well as it hath in men. But then, in the next place, St. Jude addeth, as the immediate result and natural consequence of these angels sinning, that they thereby left or lost *τὸ ἴδιον οἰκητήριον*, suum proprium domicilium—that is, not only their dwelling-place at large, those ethereal countries and heavenly regions above, but also their proper dwelling-house, or immediate mansion; to wit, their heavenly body. Forasmuch as that heavenly body, which good men expect after the resurrection, is thus called by St. Paul,[2] *τὸ οἰκητήριον ἡμῶν τὸ ἐξ οὐρανοῦ*, our habitation or dwelling-house, that is from heaven.—The heavenly body is the proper house or dwelling, clothing or indument, both of angelical and human souls; and this is that, which makes them fit inhabitants for the heavenly regions. This, I say, was the natural consequence of these angels sinning, their leaving or losing their pure and heavenly body, which became thereupon forthwith obscured and incrassated;

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[1] De Gen. ad lit. L. iii. [2] 2 Cor. 5: 1.

the bodies of spirits incorporate always bearing a correspondent purity or impurity to the different disposition of their mind or soul. But then again, in the last place, that, which was thus in part the natural result of their sin, was also, by the just judgment of God, converted into their punishment; for their ethereal bodies being thus changed into gross, aërial, feculant and vaporous ones, themselves were immediately hereupon, as St. Peter in the parallel place expresseth it,[1] *ταρταρωθέντες*, cast down into Tartarus—and there imprisoned or reserved in chains under darkness, until the judgment of the great day. Where it is observable, that the word *ταρταροῦν*, used by St. Peter, is the very same that Apollodorus and other Greek writers frequently make use of in a like case, when they speak of the Titans being cast down from heaven; which seems to have been really nothing else but this fall of angels poetically mythologized. And by Tartarus here, in all probability, is meant this lower caligenous air or atmosphere of the earth, according to that of St. Austin,[2] concerning these angels: "Post peccatum in hanc sunt detrusi caliginem, ubi tamen et aër;" that, after their sin, they were thrust down into the misty darkness of this lower air.—And here are they, as it were, chained and fettered also by that same weight of their gross and heavy bodies, which first sunk them down hither; this not suffering them to reascend up, or return back, to those bright ethereal regions above. And being thus for the present imprisoned in this lower Tartarus, or caligenous air or atmosphere, they are indeed here kept and reserved in custody, unto the judgment of the great day, and general assizes; however they may, notwithstanding, in the meantime, seem to domineer and lord it for a while here. And, lastly, our Saviour's[3] "Go ye cursed into everlasting fire prepared for the devil and his angels," seems to be a clear confirmation of devils being bodied; because, first, to allegorize this fire into nothing but remorse of conscience, would endanger the rendering of other points of our religion uncertain also; but to say, that incorporeal substances, united to bodies can be tormented with fire, is, as much as in us lieth, to expose Christianity, and the Scripture, to the scorn and contempt of all philosophers and philosophic wits. Wherefore Psellus lays no small stress upon this place; [4]*εἰμὶ μὲν παρὰ τῶν τοῦ Σωτῆρος λόγων πεπεισμένος ταῦτα, πυρὶ κολασθήσεσθαι φασκόντων τοὺς δαίμονας· ὅ πῶς οἷον παθεῖν ἀσωμάτους ὄντας; τὸ γὰρ ἀσώματον ἀμήχανον παθεῖν ὑπὸ σώματος· ἀνάγκη γοῦν*

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[1] 2 Pet. 2: 4.

[2] De Gen. ad lit. lib. iii. cap. x. (p. 114. tom. iii. oper.)

[3] Matth. 24: 41. [4] Page 37. (p. 52.)

σώμασιν αὐτοὺς τὴν κόλασιν ὑποδέχεσθαι πεφυκόσι πάσχειν · I am also convinced of this, that demons have bodies, from the words of our Saviour, affirming, that they shall be punished with fire: which how it could be, were they altogether incorporeal? it being impossible for that, which is both itself incorporeal, and vitally ununited to any body, to suffer from a body. Wherefore of necessity it must be granted, by us Christians, that devils shall receive punishment of sense and pain hereafter, in bodies capable of suffering.

Now if angels in general, that is, all created beings superior to men, be substances incorporeal, or souls vitally united to bodies, though not always the same, but sometimes of one kind, and sometimes of another, and never quite separate from all body; it may seem probable from hence, that though there be other incorporeal substances besides the Deity, yet "vita incorporea," a life perfectly incorporeal in the forementioned Origenic sense, or "sine corporeæ adjectionis societate vivere," to live altogether without the society of any corporeal adjection, —is a privilege properly belonging to the holy Trinity only: and consequently, therefore, that human souls, when by death they are divested of these gross earthly bodies, they do not then live and act completely, without the conjunction of any body, and so continue till the resurrection or day of judgment; this being a privilege, which not so much as the angels themselves, and therefore no created finite being, is capable of; the imperfection of whose nature necessarily requires the conjunction of some body with them, to make them up complete: without which, it is unconceivable, how they should either have sense or imagination. And thus doth Origen, consentaneously to his own principles, conclude; [1] *ἡ τῇ ἑαυτῆς φύσει ἀσώματος καὶ ἀόρατος ψυχὴ, ἐν παντὶ σωματικῷ τόπῳ τυγχάνουσα, δέεται σώματος οἰκείου τῇ φύσει τοῦ τόπου ἐκείνου· ὅπερ ὅπου μὲν φορεῖ, ἀπεκδυσαμένη πρότερον ἀναγκαῖον μὲν, περισσὸν δὲ ὡς πρὸς τὰ δεύτερα· ὅπου δὲ ἐπενδυσαμένη ᾧ πρότερον εἶχε, δεομένῳ κρείττονος ἐνδύματος εἰς τοὺς καθαρωτέρους καὶ αἰθερίους καὶ οὐρανίους τόπους*· Our soul, which in its own nature is incorporeal and invisible, in whatsoever corporeal place it existeth, doth always stand in need of a body, suitable to the nature of that place respectively; which body it sometimes beareth, having put off that, which before was necessary, but is now superfluous for the following state; and sometimes again putting on something to what before it had, now standing in need of some better clothing, to fit it for those more pure, ethereal and heavenly places. But in what there follows, we conceive, that Origen's sense having not

[1] Cont. Cels. lib. vii. p. 353.

been rightly understood, his words have been altered and perverted; and that the whole place ought to be read thus: *Καὶ ἐνεδύσατο μὲν ἐπὶ τὴν τῇδε γένεσιν ἐρχομένη, τὸ χρήσιμον πρὸς τὴν ἐν τῇ ὑστέρᾳ τῆς κυούσης, ἕως ἦν ἐν αὐτῇ· ἐνεδύσατο δὲ ὑπ' ἐκεῖνο, ὃ ἦν ἀναγκαῖον τῷ ἐπὶ γῆς μέλοντι διαζῆν· εἶτα πάλιν ὄντος τινὸς σκήνους, καὶ ἐπιγείου οἰκίας ἀναγκαίας που τῷ σκήνει, καταλύεσθαι μέν φασιν οἱ λόγοι τὴν ἐπίγειον οἰκίαν τοῦ σκήνους, τὸ δὲ σκῆνος ἐπενδύσασθαι οἰκίαν ἀχειροποίητον, αἰώνιον ἐν τοῖς οὐρανοῖς· λέγουσι δὲ οἱ τοῦ θεοῦ ἄνθρωποι, τὸ μὲν φθαρτὸν ἐνδύσασθαι αὐτὸ ἀφθαρσίαν·* The sense whereof is this: The soul descending hither into generation, put on first that body, which was useful for it whilst to continue in the womb: and then again afterward such a body, as was necessary for it to live here upon the earth in. Again, it having here a two-fold kind of body, the one which is called *σκῆνος*, by St. Paul, (being a more subtile body, which it had before), the other the superinduced earthly house, necessarily subservient to this *skenos* here; the Scripture oracles affirm, that the earthly house of this *skenos* shall be corrupted or dissolved, but the *skenos* itself, superindue or put on a house not made with hands, eternal in the heavens;" the same declaring, that "the corruptible shall put on incorruption, and the mortal immortality." Where it is plain, that Origen takes that *σκῆνος*, in St. Paul (1 Cor. 5: 1.) for a subtile body, which the soul had before its terrene nativity, and which continues with it after death; but in good men will, at last, superindue, or put on (without death) the clothing of immortality. Neither can there be a better commentary upon this place of Origen, than those Excerpta out of Methodius the martyr, in Photius,[1] though seeming to be vitiated also; where, as we conceive, the sense of Origen[2] and his followers is first contained in those words: *ἕτερον τὸ σκῆνος, καὶ τοῦ σκήνους ἡ οἰκία, καὶ ἕτερον ἡμεῖς ὧν ἐστι τὸ σκῆνος,* That in St. Paul the *τὸ σκῆνος* is one thing, and the earthly house of this *σκῆνος* another thing; and we, that is, our souls, a third thing, distinct from both. And then it is further declared in this that follows: *τῆς ζωῆς καταλυθείσης τῆς ὠκυμόρου τὴν πρὸ τῆς ἀναστάσεως ἕξουσιν οἴκησιν αἱ ψυχαὶ παρὰ τῷ θεῷ, ἕως ἂν ἀνακαινοποιηθεῖσαν ἡμῖν ἄπτωτον ἀναλάβωμεν τὴν οἰκίαν· ὅθεν καὶ*

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[1] Biblioth. Cod. ccxxiv. p. 919.

[2] Thus Origen plainly, in his fifth book, (p. 244.) That there is *διαφορὰ ἐπιγείου οἰκίας, ἐν ᾗ ἐστι τὸ Σκῆνος καταλυομένης, καὶ Σκήνους, ἐν ᾧ οἱ ὄντες δίκαιοι στενάζουσι βαρούμενοι, μὴ ἀπεκδύσασθαι, ἀλλὰ τῷ Σκήνει ἐπενδύσασθαι·* A difference betwixt the earthly house, in which the *Σκῆνος* is, that will be dissolved; and the *Σκῆνος* itself, wherein good men groan, being burdened, not that they would put it off, but put on immortality upon it.

στενάζομεν μὴ θέλοντες τὸ σῶμα ἀπεκδύσασθαι, ἀλλ' ἐπ' αὐτῷ τὴν λοιπὴν ἐπενδύσασθαι ζωήν· τὸ γὰρ οἰκητήριον τὸ ἐξ οὐρανοῦ, ὃ ἐπενδύσασθαι ἐπιθυμοῦμεν, ἡ ἀθανασία· That this short life of our earthly body being destroyed, our soul shall then have, before the resurrection, a dwelling from God, until we shall at last receive it renewed, restored, and so made an incorruptible house. Wherefore in this we groan, desirous not to put off all body, but to put on life or immortality upon the body which we shall then have. For that house which is from heaven, that we desire to put on, is immortality.—Moreover, that the soul is not altogether naked after death, the same Origen endeavors to confirm further from that of our Saviour, concerning the rich man and Lazarus; *ἀλλὰ καὶ ὁ κολαζόμενος πλούσιος, καὶ ὁ ἐν κόλποις Ἀβραὰμ πένης ἀναπαυόμενος, πρὸ τῆς παρουσίας τοῦ σωτῆρος, καὶ πρὸ τῆς συντελείας τοῦ αἰῶνος, καὶ διὰ τοῦτο πρὸ τῆς ἀναστάσεως, διδάσκουσιν ὅτι καὶ νῦν ἐν τῇ ἀπαλλαγῇ σώματι χρῆται ἡ ψυχή·* The rich man punished, and the poor man refreshed in Abraham's bosom, before the coming of our Saviour, and before the end of the world, and therefore before the resurrection, plainly teaches, that even now also after death, the soul useth a body.—He thinketh the same also to be further proved from the visible apparition of Samuel's ghost, *ἀλλὰ καὶ ὁ Σαμουὴλ φαινόμενος, ὡς δῆλόν ἐστιν ὁρατὸς ὢν, παρίστησιν ὅτι σῶμα περιέκειτο.* Samuel also visibly appearing after death, maketh it manifest, that his soul was then clothed with a body. —To which he adds in Photius,[1] *τὸ τῆς ψυχῆς ἅμα τῇ ἀπαλλαγῇ σχῆμα, ὁμοειδὲς τῷ παχεῖ καὶ γηΐνῳ σώματι,* etc. That the exterior form and figure of the soul's body after death doth resemble that of the gross terrestrial body here in this life; all the histories of apparitions making ghosts, or the souls of the dead, to appear in the same form which their bodies had before.—This, therefore, as was observed, is that, which Origen understands by *τὸ σκῆνος* in St. Paul; not this gross terrestrial body, but a certain middle body betwixt it and the heavenly, which the soul after death carries away with it. Now, this opinion of the learned Origen's was never reckoned up by the ancient fathers, or his greatest adversaries, in the catalogue of his errors; nor does Methodius the martyr, who was so great an anti-Origenist, where he mentions this Origenic opinion in Photius, seem to tax it otherwise, than as Platonical, implying the soul to be incorporeal. Methodius himself, on the contrary, contending, not that the soul hath a body conjoined with it after death, as a distinct thing from it, but that itself is a body; *ὁ θεὸς μόνος ἄδεται ἀσώματος ὤν, αἱ δὲ ψυχαὶ ἀπὸ τοῦ δημιουργοῦ καὶ πατρὸς τῶν ὅλων*

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[1] Apud Phot. ubi supra, p. 930.

σώματα νοερὰ ὑπάρχουσαι, εἰς λόγῳ θεωρητὰ μέλη διακεκόσμηνται, ταύτην λαβοῦσαι τὴν διατύπωσιν· ὅθεν καὶ ἐν τῷ ᾅδῃ, καὶ γλῶσσαν, καὶ δάκτυλον, καὶ τὰ ἄλλα μέλη ἱστοροῦνται ἔχειν· οὐχ ὡς σώματος ἑτέρου συνυπάρχοντος αὐταῖς ψυγαῖς ἀειδοῦς· ἀλλ' ὅτι αὐταὶ φύσει αἱ ψυχαὶ παντὸς ἀπογυμνωθεῖσαι περιβλήματος τοιαῦται κατὰ τὴν οὐσίαν ὑπάρχουσι· God alone is praised as incorporeal and invisible; but souls are made by him (who is the father of all things), intellectual bodies, ornamentally branched out (as it were) into members distinguishable by reason, and having the same form and signature with the outward body. Whence it is that in Hades (or hell) we read of a tongue, and a finger, and other members; not as if there then were another invisible body coexisting with these souls, but because the souls themselves are in their own nature (when stripped naked of all clothing), according to their very essence such. We say, therefore, if one of these two opinions must needs be entertained, that either the soul itself is a body, or else that it hath a body after death; the latter of them, which was Origen's, ought certainly much to be preferred before the former, whether held in Tertullian's sense, that all substance, and consequently God himself, is body; or else in that of Methodius, that all created substance is such, God alone being incorporeal.

But we have already showed, that Origen was not singular in this opinion, Irenæus before him having asserted the same thing, that souls after death are adapted to certain bodies (where the word in the Greek probably was *προσάπτονται*), which have the same character with these terrestrial ones; and Philoponus after him, who was no Pagan, but a Christian philosopher, dogmatizing in like manner. We might here add, that Joannes Thessalonicensis, in that dialogue of his, read in the seventh synod,[1] seemeth to have been of the same persuasion also, when he affirmeth of souls, as well as angels and demons, that they were *ὁραθέντες παρὰ πλειόνων αἰσθητῶς πλεονάκις, τῷ εἴδει τῶν οἰκείων αὐτῶν σωμάτων*, often seen by many sensibly, in the form of their own bodies. However, it is a thing which Psellus took for granted, where, speaking of devils, insinuating their temptations into men's souls, by affecting immediately the fantastic spirit, he writeth after this manner:[2] *ὁ λέγων, πόρρωθεν μὲν ὢν, ἰσχνροτέρας δεῖται κραυγῆς, ἀγχοῦ δὲ γενόμενος, εἰς τὸ τοῦ ἀκούοντος οὖς ψιθυρίζων ὑποφωνεῖ· καὶ εἰ ἐνῆν αὐτῷ συνεγγίσαι πνεύματι τῆς ψιχῆς, οὐδενὸς ἂν ἐδεήθη ψόφου, ἀλλ' ἦν ὁ κατὰ βούλησιν λόγος ἀψόφῳ κελεύθῳ πρὸς τὸ δεχόμενον ἐγγινόμενος, ὅ φασι κἂν ταῖς ψυχαῖς*

[1] Vide Concil. edit. Harduini. tom. iv. p. 293, 294.

[2] Pago 94. (p. 72.)

ἐξιούσαις τῶν σωμάτων εἶναι· καὶ γὰρ καὶ ταύτας ἀπλήκτως ὁμιλεῖν ἀλλήλαις. When one man speaks to another from afar off, he must (if he would be heard), make a loud cry or noise; whereas, if he stood near to him, he might softly whisper into his ear. But could he immediately approach to the spirit (or subtile body of the soul), he should not then need so much as to make a whisper, but might silently, and without noise, communicate whatsoever thoughts of his own to him, by motions made thereupon. And this is said to be the way that souls, going out of these bodies, converse together; they communicating their thoughts to one another without any noise. For Psellus[1] here plainly supposeth souls after death to have πνεῦμα, that is, a certain subtile body, adhering to them, by motions upon which they may silently converse with each other. It is true, indeed, that St. Austin, in his twelfth book De Genesi ad Literam, does not himself close with this opinion, of the soul's having a body after death, but much less of its being a body: nevertheless does he seem to leave every man to his own liberty therein, in these words: "Si autem quæritur, dum anima de corpore exierit, utrum ad aliqua loca corporalia feratur, an ad incorporalia corporalibus similia; an vero nec ad ipsa, sed ad illud, quod et corporibus et similitudinibus corporum est excellentius; cito quidem responderim; ad corporalia loca eam vel non ferri nisi cum aliquo corpore, vel non localiter ferri. Jam utrum habeat aliquod corpus, ostendat, qui potest; ego autem non puto. Spiritalem enim arbitror esse, non corporalem; ad spiritalia vero pro meritis fertur, aut ad loca pœnalia similia corporibus." But if it be demanded, when the soul goes out of this body, whether it be carried into any corporeal places, or to incorporeals like to corporeals, or else to neither, but to that, which is more excellent than both bodies, and the likenesses of bodies? the answer is ready; that it cannot be carried to corporeal places, or not locally carried any whither, without a body. Now whether the soul have some body, when it goes out of this body, let them that can shew; but, for my part, I think otherwise. For I suppose the soul to be spiritual, and not corporeal; and that, after death, it is either carried to spiritual things, or else to penal places, like to bodies, such as have been represented to some in ecstacies, etc. —Where St. Austin himself seems to think the punishment of souls, after death, and before the resurrection, to be fantastical, or only in imagination: whereas there could not be then so much as fantastic punishments neither, nor any imagination at all in souls, without a

[1] De Genesi ad Literam, c. xxxii. (p. 239. tom. iii. oper.)

body, if that doctrine of Aristotle's[1] be true, that fancy or imagination is nothing else but a weaker sense; that is, a thing, which results from a complication of soul and body both together. But it is observable, that in the forecited place that, which St. Austin chiefly opposed, was the soul's being a body, as Tertullian, Methodius, and others had asserted; but as for its having a body, he saith only this: "Ostendat qui potest," let him that can shew it; he granting, in the mean time, that the soul cannot be locally carried any whither at all after death, nor indeed be in any place without a body. However, the same St. Austin,[2] as he elewhere condemneth the opinion of those, who would take the fire of hell metaphorically, acknowledging it to be real and corporeal; so does he somewhere think it not improbable, but after death, and before the resurrection, the souls of men may suffer from a certain fire, for the consuming and burning up of their dross: "Post istius sane corporis mortem, donec ad illum veniatur, qui post resurrectionem corporum futurus est damnationis et remunerationis ultimus dies; si hoc temporis intervallo, ejusmodi ignem dicuntur perpeti, duem non sentiant illi, qui non habuerint tales mores et amores in hujus corporis vita, ut eorum ligna, et fœnum, et stipula consummantur; alii vero sentiunt, qui ejusmodi secum ædificia portaverunt, etc. non redargua, quia forsitan verum est." If in this interval of time, betwixt the death of the body, and the resurrection, or day of judgment, the souls of the dead be said to suffer such a fire as can do no execution upon those, who have no wood, hay, nor stubble, to burn up, but shall be felt by such, as have made such buildings or superstructures, etc. I reprehend it not, because perhaps it is true.—The opinion here mentioned, is thus expressed by Origen,[3] in his fifth book against Celsus, which very place St. Austin seems to have had respect to: *οὐ συνιδὼν ὅτι ὥσπερ Ἑλλήνων τισὶν ἔδοξε, τὸ πῦρ καθάρσιον ἐπάγεται τῷ κόσμῳ· εἰκὸς δ' ὅτι καὶ ἑκάστῳ τῶν δεομένων τῆς διὰ τοῦ πυρὸς δίκης καίοντος μὲν καὶ οὐ κατακαίοντος τοὺς μὴ ἔχοντας ὕλην δεομένην ἀναλύεσθαι ὑπ' ἐκείνου τοῦ πυρός· καίοντος δὲ καὶ κατακαίοντος τοὺς ἐν τῇ διὰ τῶν πράξεων καὶ λόγων καὶ νοημάτων τροπικῶς λεγομένῃ οἰκοδομῇ ξύλα, χόρτον, ἢ καλάμην οἰκοδομήσαντας·* Celsus did not understand, that this fire, as well according to the Hebrews and Christians, as to some of the Greeks, will be purgatory to the world; as also to every one of those persons, who stand in need of such punish-

[1] De Anima, lib. iii. cap. ix. p. 53. tom. ii. oper.

[2] De Civ. D. lib. xxi. c. xxvi. (§ iv. p. 490. tom. vii. oper.)

[3] C. Cels. l. v. p. 240.

ment and remedy by fire: which fire can do no execution upon those, who have no combustible matter in them, but will be felt by such, as in the moral structure of their thoughts, words, and actions, have built up wood, hay and stubble.—Now since souls cannot suffer from fire, nor any thing else in way of sense or pain, without being vitally united to some body, we may conclude, that St. Austin, when he wrote this, was not altogether abhorrent from souls having bodies after death.

Hitherto have we declared, how the ancient assertors of incorporeal substance, as unextended, did repel the assaults of Atheists and Corporealists made against it; but especially how they quitted themselves of that absurdity, of the illocality and immobility of finite created spirits, by supposing them always to be vitally united to some bodies, and consequently, by the locality of those their respective bodies, determined to here and there; according to that of Origen:[1] ἡ ψυχὴ ἡμῶν δέεται σώματος, διὰ τὰς τοπικὰς μεταβάσεις, our souls stands in need of a body in order to local motions.—We shall in the next place declare, what grounds of reason there were, which induced those ancients to assert and maintain a thing so repugnant to sense and imagination, and consequently to all vulgar apprehension, as a substance in itself unextended, indistant, and indivisible, or devoid of magnitude and parts. Wherein we shall only represent the sense of these ancient Incorporealists so far as we can, to the best advantage, in order to their vindication. against Atheists and Materialists: ourselves in the mean time not asserting any thing, but leaving every one, that can, to make his own judgment; and so either to close with this, or that other following hypothesis, of extended incorporeals.

Now it is here observable, that it was a thing formerly taken for granted on both sides, as well by the assertors as the deniers of incorporeal substance, that there is but one kind of extension only: and, consequently, that whatsoever hath magnitude and parts, or one thing without another, is not only intellectually and logically, but also really and physically divisible or discerpible, as likewise antitypous and impenetrable; so that it cannot coexist with a body in the same place; from whence it follows, that whatsoever arguments do evince, that there is some other substance besides body, the same do therefore demonstrate, according to the sense of these ancients (as well Corporealists as Incorporealists), that there is something unextended, it being supposed by them, both alike, that whatsoever is extended is body. Nevertheless we shall here principally propound such considerations of theirs, as

[1] C. Cels. l. v. p. 244.

tend directly to prove, that there is something unextendedly incorporeal; and that an unextended deity is no impossible idea; to wit, from hence, because there is something unextended even in our very selves. Where, not to repeat the forementioned ratiocination of Simplicius, that whatsoever can act and reflect upon its whole self, cannot possibly be extended, nor have parts distant from one another; Plotinus[1] first argues after this manner: *τί τοίνυν φήσουσιν, οἱ τὴν ψυχὴν σῶμα εἶναι λέγοντες, πρῶτον μὲν περὶ ἑκάστου μέρους τῆς ψυχῆς τῆς ἐν τῷ αὐτῷ σώματι, πότερον ἕκαστον ψυχὴν, οἵα ἐστὶ καὶ ἡ ὅλη; καὶ πάλιν τοῦ μέρους τὸ μέρος; οὐδὲν ἄρα τὸ μέγεθος συνεβάλλετο τῇ οὐσίᾳ αὐτῆς· καίτοι ἔδει γε ποσοῦ τινος· ἀλλὰ καὶ ὅλον πολλαχῇ, ὅπερ σώμασι παρεῖναι ἀδύνατον, ἐν πλείοσι τὸ οὐτὸ ὅλον εἶναι, καὶ τὸ μέρος ὅπερ τὸ ὅλον ὑπάρχειν· εἰ δὲ ἕκαστον τῶν μερῶν, οὐ ψυχὴν φήσουσιν, ἐξ ἀψύχων ψυχὴ αὐτοῖς ὑπάρξει·* What then will they say, who contend, that the soul is a body (or extended) whether or no will they grant concerning every part of the soul in the same body (as that of it which is in the foot, and that in the hand, and that in the brain, etc.) and again every part of those parts, that each of them is soul, such as the whole? If this be consented to, then it is plain, that magnitude, or such a quantity, would confer nothing at all to the essence of the soul, as it would do were it an extended thing: but the whole would be in many parts or places, which is a thing, that cannot possibly belong to body; that the same whole should be in more, and that a part should be what the whole is. But if they will not grant every part of their extended soul to be soul, then, according to them, must the soul be made up, and compounded of soul-less things.—Which argument is elsewhere thus propounded by him;[2] *εἰ δὲ ἕκαστον ζωὴν ἔχοι, καὶ ἓν ἀρκεῖ· εἰ δὲ μηδενὸς αὐτῶν ζωὴν ἔχοντος ἡ σύνοδος πεποίηκε ζωὴν, ἄτοπον· μᾶλλον δὲ ἀδύνατον συμφόρησιν σωμάτων ζωὴν ἐργάζεσθαι, καὶ νοῦν γεννᾷν τὰ ἀνόητα·* If every one of the parts of this extended soul or mind has life in it, then would any one of them alone be sufficient. But to say, that though none of the parts alone have life in them, yet the conjunction of them altogether maketh life, is absurd; it being impossible, that life and soul should result from a congeries of life-less and soul-less things, or that mind-less things put together should beget mind.—The sum of this argumentation is this; that either every part of extended soul is soul, and of an extended mind, mind; or not. Now, if no part of a soul, as supposed to be extended alone, be soul, or have life and mind in it, then is it certain, that the whole, resulting from all the parts, could have no life nor mind, because nothing can

[1] P. 460. (Enead. 4. lib. vii. cap. v.) [2] En. l. vii. c. ii. (p. 457.)

(casually), come from nothing. It is true, indeed, that corporeal qualities and forms, according to the Atomic physiology, result from a composition and contexture of atoms or parts, each of which, taken alone by themselves, have nothing of that quality or form in them,

> [1] ————Ne ex albis alba rearis;
> Aut ea, quæ nigrant, nigro de semine nata.

You are not to think that white things are made out of white principles, nor black things out of black; but the reason of the difference here is plain, because these qualities and forms are not entities really distinct from the magnitude, figure, site, and motion of parts, but only such a composition of them, as cause different fancies in us; but life and understanding, soul and mind, are entities really distant from magnitude, figure, site and motion of parts: they are neither mere fancies nor syllables of things, but simple and uncompounded realities. But if every supposed part of a soul, be soul, and of a mind, mind, then would all the rest of it besides any one part be superfluous; or indeed every supposed part thereof would be the same with the whole: from whence it follows, that it could not be extended, or have any real parts at all, since no part of an extended thing can possibly be the same with the whole.

Again, the same philosopher endeavors further to prove, that the human soul itself is unextended and indivisible, from its energies and operations, and that as well those of sensation as of intellection. First, therefore, from external sensations, he reasons in this manner: [2]*εἴτε μέλλει αἰσθάνεσθαί τινος ἓν αὐτὸ δεῖ εἶναι, καὶ τῷ αὐτῷ παντὸς ἀντιλαμβάνεσθαι· καὶ εἰ διὰ πολλῶν αἰσθητηρίων πλείω τὰ εἰσιόντα, ἢ πολλαὶ περὶ ἓν ποιότητες, κἂν δι' ἑνὸς ποικίλον, οἷον πρόσωπον· οὐ γὰρ ἄλλο μὲν ῥινὸς ἄλλο δὲ ὀφθαλμῶν, ἀλλὰ ταὐτὸν ὁμοῦ πάντων· καὶ εἰ τὸ μὲν δι' ὀμμάτων τὸ δὲ δι' ἀκοῆς, ἓν τὶ δεῖ εἶναι εἰς ὃ ἅμφω· ἢ πῶς ἂν εἴποι ὅτι ἕτερα ταῦτα, μὴ εἰς τὸ αὐτὸ ὁμοῦ τῶν αἰσθήσεων ἐλθόντων·* That, which perceiveth in us, must of necessity be one thing, and by one and the same indivisible perceive all; and that, whether they be more things, entering through several organs of sense, as the many qualities of substance, or one various and multiform thing, entering through the same organ, as the countenance or picture of a man. For it is not one thing in us, that perceives the nose, another thing the eyes, and another thing the mouth; but it is one and the self-same thing, that perceiveth all. And when one thing enters through the eye, another through the ear, these

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[1] Lucret. ii. ver. 730, 732. [2] Page 461. (cap. vi.)

also must of necessity come all at last to one indivisible, or else they could not be compared together, nor one of them affirmed to be different from another; the several sentiments of them meeting no where together in one. He concludes, therefore, that this one thing in us, that sensibly perceives all things, may be resembled to the centre of a circle, and the several senses to lines drawn from the circumference, which all meet in that one centre. Wherefore, that which perceives and apprehends all things in us, must needs be really one and the very same; that is, unextended and indivisible. Which argument is yet further pursued by him, more particularly thus: If that, which sensibly perceiveth in us be extended, so as to have distant parts one without another: then one of these three things must needs be affirmed, that either every part of this extended substance of the soul perceives a part of the object only, or every part of it the whole object, or else all comes to some one point, which alone perceives both the several parts of the object, and the whole, all the other being but as circumferential lines leading to this centre. Now of the former of these three, Plotinus thus: *μεγέθει ὄντι τούτῳ, συμμερίζοιτο ἄν· ὥστε ἄλλο ἄλλου μέρος, καὶ μηδένα ἡμῶν ὅλου τοῦ αἰσθητοῦ ἀντίληψιν ἔχειν· ὥσπερ ἂν εἰ ἐγὼ μὲν ἄλλου· σὺ δὲ ἄλλου αἴσθοιο·* If the soul be a magnitude, then must it be divided together with the sensible object, so that one part of the soul must perceive one part of the object, and another, another; and nothing in it the whole sensible; just as if I should have the sense of one thing, and you of another. Whereas it is plain by our internal sense, that it is one and the self-same thing, which perceives both the parts and the whole. And of the second, he writeth in this manner: *εἰ δὲ ὁτιοῦν παντὸς αἰσθήσεται· εἰς ἄπειρα διαιρεῖσθαι τοῦ μεγέθους πεφυκότος, ἀπείρους καὶ αἰσθήσεις καθ' ἕκαστον αἰσθητὸν συμβήσεται γίγνεσθαι ἑκάστῳ οἷον τοῦ αὐτοῦ ἀπείρους ἐν τῷ ἡγεμονοῦντι ἡμῶν εἰκόνας·* But if every part of the extended soul perceive the whole sensible object, since magnitude is infinitely divisible, there must be in every man infinite sensations and images of one and the same object.—Whereas we are intimately conscious to ourselves, that we have but only one sensation of one object at the same time. And as for the third and last part of this disjunction, that what sensibly perceives in every one, is but one single point, either mathematical or physical; it is certain, first, that a mathematical point, having neither longitude, latitude, nor profundity, is no body nor substance, but only a notion of our own mind, or a mode of conceiving in us. And then, as for a physical point or minimum, a body so little, that there cannot possibly be any less, Plotinus asserting the infinite divisibility of body, here explodes the thing itself.

However, he further intimates, that if there were any such physical minimum, or absolutely least body or extensum, this could not possibly receive upon it a distinct representation and delineation of all the several parts of a whole visible object at once, as of the eyes, nose, mouth, etc. in a man's face or picture, or of the particularities of an edifice; nor could such a parvitude or atom as this be the cause of all animal motions. And this was one of Aristotle's[1] arguments, whereby he would prove unextended incorporeals, πῶς τῷ ἀμερεῖ τὸ μεριστόν· If the soul were indivisible as a point, how could it perceive that which is divisible?—that is, take notice of all the distinct parts of an extended object, and have a description of the whole of them at once upon itself? The sum of the whole argumentation is this, that if the soul be an extended substance, then must it of necessity be either a physical point or minimum, the least extensum that can possibly be, (if there be any such least, and body or extension be not infinitely divisible), or else it must consist of more such physical points, joined together. As for the former of these, it hath been already declared to be impossible, that one single atom or smallest point of extension, should be able distinctly to perceive all the variety of things; to which might be added, that to suppose every soul to be but one physical minimum, or smallest extensum, is to imply such an essential difference in matter or extension, as that some of the points thereof should be naturally devoid of all life, sense, and understanding, and others again naturally sensitive and rational. Which absurdity, though it should be admitted, yet would it be utterly unconceivable, how there should come to be one such sensitive and rational atom in every man and no more, and how this should constantly remain the same, from infancy to old age, whilst other parts of matter transpire perpetually. But as for the latter, if souls be extended substances, consisting of more points, one without another, all concurring in every sensation; then must every one of those points, either perceive a point and part of the object only, or else the whole. Now, if every point of the extended soul perceive only a point of the object, then is there no one thing in us, that perceives the whole, or which can compare one part with another. But if every point of the extended soul perceive the whole object at once, consisting of many parts, then would there be innumerable perceptions of the same object in every sensation; as many as there are points in the extended soul. And from both these suppositions, it would alike follow, that no man is one single percipient or person, but that there are innumerable distinct per-

1 De Anima, lib. i. cap. iii. p. 10. tom. ii. oper.

cipients and persons in every man. Neither can there be any other supposition made, besides those three forementioned; as that the whole extended soul should perceive both the whole sensible object, and all its several parts, no part of this soul in the mean time having any perception at all by itself; because the whole of an extended being is nothing but all the parts taken together; and if none of those parts have any life, sense, or perception in them, it is impossible that there should be any in the whole. But in very truth, to say, that the whole soul perceiveth all, and no part of it any thing, is to acknowledge it not to be extended, but to be indivisible, which is the thing that Plotinus contends for.

And that philosopher here further insists upon internal sensations also, and that *Συμπάθεια*, or *Ὁμοπάθεια*, that sympathy, or homopathy, which is in all animals to the same purpose: it being one and the same thing in them, which perceives pain, in the most distant extremities of the body, as in the sole of the foot, and in the crown of the head; and which moves one part to succor, and relieve another laboring under it, which could not possibly be by traduction of all to one physical point, as the centre, for divers reasons. [1] *Εἰ τοίνυν κατὰ διάδοσιν οὐχ οἷόντε τὴν αἴσθησιν τοῦ τοιούτου γίγνεσθαι, μὴ δὲ σώματος ὄγκου ὄντος, ἄλλου παθόντος, ἄλλο γνῶσιν ἔχειν (παντὸς γὰρ μεγέθους τὸ μὲν ἄλλο, τὸ δὲ ἄλλο ἐστὶ) δεῖ τοιοῦτον τίθεσθαι τὸ αἰσθανόμενον, οἷον πανταχοῦ αὐτοῦ ἑαυτῷ τὸ αὐτὸ εἶναι· τοῦτο δὲ ἄλλῳ τινὶ τῶν ὄντων ἢ σώματι ποιεῖν προσήκει·* Since therefore these sympathetic senses cannot possibly be made by traduction, at last to one thing; and body being bulky or out-swelling extension, one part thereof suffering, another cannot perceive it (for in all magnitude, this is one thing and that another), it followeth, that what perceives in us, must be every where, and in all the parts of the body, one and the same thing with itself. Which therefore cannot be itself body, but must of necessity be some other entity or substance incorporeal.—The conclusion is, that in men and animals there is one thing indivisibly the same, that comprehendeth the whole outside of them, perceiveth both the parts and the whole of sensible objects, and all transmitted through several senses, sympathizeth with all the distant parts of the body, and acteth entirely upon all. And this is properly called, I myself, not the extended bulk of the body, which is not one, but many substances, but an unextended and indivisible unity, wherein all lines meet and concentre, not as a mathematical point or least *extensum*, but as one self-active, living power, substantial or inside-being, that containeth, holdeth, and connecteth all together.

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[1] Page 462.

Lastly, The forementioned philosopher endeavors yet further to prove the human soul to be unextended and devoid of magnitude, and indivisible, from its rational energies or operations, its *νοητῶν νοήσεις*, and *ἀμεγέθων ἀντιλήψεις*, intellections of intelligibles, and apprehensions of things devoid of magnitude, *πῶς γὰρ μέγεθος ὂν τὸ μὴ μέγεθος νοήσει; καὶ τῷ μεριστῷ τὸ μὴ μεριστόν·* For how could the soul (saith he), if it were a magnitude, understand that, which hath no magnitude? and with that which is divisible, conceive that which is indivisible?—Now, it is certain, that we have notions of many things, which are *ἀφάνταστα*, altogether unimaginable, and therefore have nothing of length, breadth, and thickness in them, as virtue, vice, etc. [1]*ἀμέγεθες δὲ οἶμαι καὶ τὸ καλὸν καὶ τὸ δίκαιον, καὶ ἡ τούτων ἄρα νόησις· ὥστε καὶ προσιόντα καὶ τῷ ἀμερεῖ αὐτῆς ὑποδέξεται, καὶ ἐν αὐτῇ ἐν ἀμερεῖ κείσεται·* Justice and honesty, and the like, are things devoid of magnitude, and therefore must the intellections of them needs be such too. So that the soul must receive these by what is indivisible, and lodge them in that which is divisible.—We have also a notion, not only of mere latitude or breadth, indivisible as to thickness; and of a longitude or a line, indivisible both as to breadth and thickness; but also of a mathematical point, that is every way indivisible, as to length, breadth and thickness. We have a conception of the intention of powers and virtues, wherein there is nothing of extension or magnitude. And indeed all the abstract essences of things, (or the *αὐτοέκαστα*) which are the first objects of intellection, are indivisible: *εἰ δὲ τῶν ἐν ὕλῃ εἰδῶν τὰς νοήσεις φήσουσιν εἶναι, ἀλλὰ χωριζομένων γε γίγνονται τοῦ νοῦ χωρίζοντος, οὐ γὰρ μετὰ σαρκῶν*, etc. And though we apprehend forms, that are in matter too, yet do we apprehend them as separated and abstracted from the same; there being nothing of flesh in our conception of a man, etc.—Nay, the soul conceives extended things themselves, unextendedly and indivisibly; for as the distance of a whole hemisphere is contracted into a narrow compass in the pupil of the eye, so are all distances yet more contracted in the soul itself, and there understood indistantly; for the thought of a mile distance, or of ten thousand miles, or semidiameters of the earth, takes up no more room in the soul, nor stretches it any more, than does the thought of a foot or inch, or indeed of a mathematical point. Were that, which perceiveth in us, a magnitude, then could it not be *ἴσον παντὶ αἰσθητῷ*, equal to every sensible—and alike perceive both lesser and greater magnitudes than itself: but least of all could it perceive such things as have no magni-

[1] Plot. p. 463.

tude at all. And this was the other part of Aristotle's argumentation, to prove the soul and mind to be unextended and indivisible,[1] πῶς γὰρ νοῆσει τὸ ἀμερὲς μεριστῷ; for how could it perceive, that which is indivisible by what is divisible?—he having before demanded, how it could apprehend things divisible, and of a great extension, by a mere point or absolute parvitude. Where the soul, or that which perceives and understands, is, according to Aristotle, neither divisible, as a continued quantity, nor yet indivisible, either as a mathematical, or as a physical point, and absolute parvitude; but as that, which hath in itself no outswelling distance, nor relation to any place, otherwise than as it is vitally united to a body, which (wherever it be), it always sympathizes with and acts upon.

Besides which, these ancient assertors of unextended incorporeals would, in all probability, confirm that opinion from hence, because we cannot only conceive extension without cogitation, and again, cogitation without extension; from whence it may be inferred, that they are entities really distinct and separable from one another, (we having no other rule to judge of the real distinction and separability of things, than from our conceptions), but also are not able to conceive cogitation with extension. We cannot conceive a thought to be of such a certain length, breadth, and thickness, mensurable by inches and feet, and by solid measures. We cannot conceive half, or a third part, or a twentieth part of a thought, much less of the thought of an indivisible thing; neither can we conceive every thought to be of some certain determinate figure, either round or angular; spherical, cubical, or cylindrical, or the like. Whereas, if whatsoever is unextended be nothing, thoughts must either be mere non-entities, or else extended too into length, breadth, and thickness; divisible into parts and mensurable: and also (where finite) of a certain figure. And, consequently, all verities in us (they being but complex axiomatical thoughts), must of necessity be long, broad, and thick, and either spherically, or angularly figurate. And the same must be affirmed of volitions likewise, and appetites or passions, as fear and hope, love and hatred, grief and joy; and of all other things, belonging to cogitative beings (souls and minds), as knowledge and ignorance, wisdom and folly, virtue and vice, justice and injustice, etc. that these are either all of them absolute non-entities, or else extended into three divisions of length, breadth, and profundity, and mensurable not only by inches and feet, but also by solid measures, as pints and quarts; and last of all (where they are finite as in men),

[1] De Anima, lib. i. cap. iii. p. 10. tom. ii. oper.

figurate. But if this be absurd, and these things belonging to soul and mind (though doubtless as great realities at least, as the things which belong to bodies), be unextended, then must the substances of souls and minds themselves be unextended also. Thus Plotinus of mind; *Νοῦς οὐ διαστὰς ἀφ' ἑαυτῷ*, mind is not distant from itself:—and indeed were it so, it could not be one thing (as it is), but many; every conceivable part of distant and unextended substance being a substance by itself. And the same is to be said of the human soul, though it acts upon distant parts of that body, which it is united to, that itself, notwithstanding, is not scattered out into distance, nor dispersed into multiplicity, nor infinitely divisible; because then it would not be one single substance, or monad, but a heap of substances. Soul is no more divisible than life; of which the forementioned philosopher thus: *ἄραγε τὴν ζωὴν μεριεῖς; ἀλλ' εἰ τὸ πᾶν ἦν ζωή, τὸ μέρος ζωὴ οὐκ ἔσται·* Will you divide a life into two? then the whole of it being but a life, the half thereof cannot be a life.—Lastly, if soul and mind, and the things belonging to them, as life and cogitation, understanding and wisdom, etc. be outspread into distance, having one part without another; then can there be no good reason given, why they should not be as well really and physically, as intellectually divisible; and one part of them separable from another: since, as Plotinus, *παντὸς μεγέθους τὸ μὲν ἄλλο, τὸ δὲ ἄλλο·* In all magnitude or extension, this is one thing, and that another. —And least, no Theist ought to deny, but that the divine power could cleave or divide a thought, together with the soul, wherein it is, into many pieces; and remove them to the greatest distances from one another (forasmuch as this implies no manner of contradiction, and whatsoever is conceivable by us, may be done by infinite power), in which case neither of them alone would be soul or mind, life or thought, but all put together make up one entire mind, soul, life, and thought.

Wherefore, the sense of the ancient Incorporealists seems to have been as follows: That there are in nature two kinds of substances specifically differing from one another: the first, *Ὄγκοι*, bulks, or tumors, a mere passive thing; the second, *Δυνάμεις*, self-active powers or virtues, or *φύσις δραστήριος*, the energetic nature. The former of these is nothing else but magnitude or extension, not as an abstract notion of the mind, but as a thing really existing without it. For when it is called *res extensa*, the meaning is not, as if the *res* were one thing, and the extension thereof another, but that it is extension or distance, really existing, or the thing thereof (without the mind) and not the notion. Now, this in the nature of it is nothing but *aliud extra aliud*, one thing without another,—and therefore perfect alterity, disunity, and divisibil-

ity. So that no extensum whatsoever, of any sensible bigness, is truly and really one substance, but a multitude or heap of substances, as many as there are parts, into which it is divisible. Moreover, one part of this magnitude always standing without another, it is an essential property thereof to be antitypous or impenetrable; that is, to jostle or shoulder out all other extended substance from penetrating into it, and coexisting with it, so as to possess and take up the same room and space. One yard of distance, or of length, breadth, and thickness, cannot possibly be added to another, without making the whole extension double to what it was before, since one of them must of necessity stand without the other. One magnitude cannot imbibe or swallow up another, nor can there be any penetration of dimensions. Moreover, magnitude or extension, as such, is mere outside or outwardness; it hath nothing within, no self-active power or virtue; all its activity being either keeping out, or hindering, any other extended thing from penetrating into it: (which yet it doth merely by its being extended, and therefore not so much by any physical efficiency as a logical necessity), or else local motion, to which it is also but passive; no body or extension, as such, being able to move itself, or act upon itself.

Wherefore, were there no other substance in the world besides this magnitude or extension, there could be no motion or action at all in it; no life, cogitation, consciousness; no intellection, appetite, or volition, (which things do yet make up the greatest part of the universe), but all would be a dead heap or lump: nor could any one substance penetrate another, and coexist in the same place with it. From whence it follows, of necessity, that besides this outside bulky extension, and tumorous magnitude, there must be another kind of entity, whose essential attribute or character is life, self-activity, or cogitation. Which first, that is not a mere mode or accident of magnitude and extension, is plain from hence, because cogitation may be as well conceived without extension, as extension without cogitation; whereas no mode of any thing can be conceived without that whereof it is a mode. And since there is unquestionably much more of entity in life and cogitation, than there is in mere extension or magnitude, which is the lowest of all being, and next to nothing; it must needs be imputed to mere delusion and imposture of imagination, that men are so prone to think this extension or magnitude to be only substance, and all other things besides the mere accidents thereof, generable out of it, and corruptible again into it. For though that secondary and participated life (as it is called) in the bodies of animals be indeed a mere accident, and such as may be present or absent without the destruction of its subject; yet can

there be no reason given, why the primary and original life itself should not be as well a substantial thing, as mere extension and magnitude. Again, that extension and life, or cogitation, are not two inadequate conceptions neither, of one and the self-same substance, considered brokenly and by piecemeal; as if either all extension had life and cogitation essentially belonging to it, (as the Hylozoists conclude) or at least all life and cogitation had extension; and, consequently, all souls and minds, and even the Deity itself, were either extended life and cogitation, or living and thinking extension; (there being nothing in nature unextended, but extension the only entity: so that whatsoever is devoid thereof, is *ipso facto*, absolutely nothing:) this, I say, will also appear from hence, because, as hath been already declared, we cannot conceive a life, or mind, or thought, nor any thing at all belonging to a cogitative being, as such, (as wisdom, folly, virtue, vice, etc.) to be extended into length, breadth, and thickness, and to be mensurable by inches, feet, and yards. From whence it may be concluded, that extension, and life or cogitation, are no inadequate conceptions of one and the self-same thing, since they cannot be complicated together into one, but that they are distinct substances from each other. Lives and minds are such tight and compact things in themselves, and have such a self-unity in their nature, as that they cannot be lodged in that, which is wholly scattered out from itself into distance, and dispersed into infinite multiplicity; nor be spread all over the same, as coextended with it. Nor is it conceivable, how all the several parts of an extended magnitude should jointly concur and contribute to the production of one and the same single and indivisible cogitation; or how that whole heap or bundle of things should be one thinker. A thinker is a monad, or one single substance, and not a heap of substances; whereas no body or extended thing is one, but many substances; every conceivable or smallest part thereof being a real substance by itself.

But this will yet further appear, if we consider what kind of action cogitation is. The action of an extended thing, as such, is nothing but local motion, change of distance, or translation from place to place, a mere outside and superficial thing; but it is certain, that cogitation (fancy, intellection, and volition) are no local motions; not the mere fridging up and down of the parts of an extended substance, changing their place and distance; but it is unquestionably an internal energy; that is, such an energy, as is within the very substance or essence of that, which thinketh, or in the inside of it. From which two kinds of energies we may now conclude, that there are also two kinds of entity or substance in nature; the one mere outside, and which hath nothing

within it; the other such a kind of entity, as hath an eternal energy; acteth from itself, and within itself, and upon itself; an inside thing, whose action is within the very essence or substance thereof; it being plain, that the cogitative or thinking nature is such a thing, as hath an essential inside or profundity. Now, this inside of cogitative beings, wherein they thus act or think internally within themselves, cannot have any length, breadth, or thickness in it; because if it had, it would be again a mere outside thing. Wherefore had all cogitative beings (souls and minds) extension and magnitude never so much belonging to them, as some suppose them to have, yet could this, for all that, be nothing but the mere outside of their being; besides which, they must of necessity have also an unextended inside, that hath no outswelling tumor, and is not scattered into distance, nor dispersed into multiplicity, which therefore could not possibly exist a part in a part of the supposed extension, as if one half of a mind or thought were in one half of that extension, and another in another; but must of necessity be all undividedly, both in the whole of it, and in every part. For had every twentieth or hundreth part of this extensum not the whole of a life or mind in it, but only the twentieth or hundredth part thereof, then could none of them have any true life or mind at all, nor consequently the whole have any. Nor indeed is it otherwise conceivable, how a whole quantity of extended substance should be one thing, and have personality, one I myself in it all, were there not one indivisible thing presiding over it, which held it all together, and diffused itself through all. And thus do we see, how this whole in the whole and in every part (do men what they can) will, like a ghost, still haunt them and follow them every where. But now it is impossible, that one and the self-same substance should be both extended and unextended. Wherefore in this hypothesis of extended understanding spirits, having one part without another, there is an undiscerned complication of two distinct substances, extended and unextended, or corporeal and incorporeal, both together; and a confusion of them into one. Where, notwithstanding, we must acknowledge, that there is so much of truth aimed at, as that all finite incorporeal substances are always naturally united to some bodies; so that the whole of these created animals is completed and made up of both these together, an extended inside, and an unextended outside, both of them substances indeed really distinct, but yet vitally united each to other.

The sum of all is, that there are two kinds of substances in nature, the first extension of magnitude, really existing without the mind, which is a thing, that hath no self-unity at all in it, but is infinite alter-

ity and divisibility, as it is also mere outside and outwardness, it having nothing within, nor any other action belonging to it, but only locally to move, when it is moved. The second, life and mind, or the self-active cogitative nature, and inside being, whose action is not local motion, but an internal energy, within the substance or essence of the thinker himself, or in the inside of him; which, therefore, though unextended, yet hath a certain inward recess, βάθος, or essential profundity. And this is a thing, which can act all of it entirely upon either a greater or lesser quantity of extended substance or body, and its several parts, penetrating into it, and coexisting in the same place with it. Wherefore it is not to be looked upon either as a mathematical, or as a physical point, as an absolute parvitude, or the least extensum possible, it having not only such an essential inside, bathos, or profundity in it, wherein it acteth and thinketh within itself, but also a certain amplitude of active power *ad extra*, or a sphere of activity upon body. Upon which account, it was before affirmed by Plotinus, that an unextended incorporeal is a thing bigger than body, because body cannot exist otherwise than a point of it in a point of space; whereas this one and the same indivisible can at once both comprehend a whole extensum within it, and be all of it in every part thereof. And, lastly, all finite incorporeals are always naturally united to some body or other; from both which together is completed and made up in every created understanding being one entire animal, consisting of soul and body, and having something incorporeal, and something corporeal in it, an unextended inside, and an extended outside, by means whereof it is determined to here and there, and capable of moving locally, or changing place.

Thus have we represented the sense of the ancient unextended Incorporealists to the best advantage that we could, in way of answer to the premised atheistic argument against incorporeal substance, and in order to the vindication of them from the contempt of Atheists; and we do affirm, that the forementioned arguments of theirs do evince, that there is some other substance besides body, which therefore, according to the principles of these Atheists themselves, must be acknowledged to be unextended, it being concluded by them, that whatsoever is extended is body. But whether they do also absolutely prove, that there is οὐσία ἀμεγέθης, ἀδιάστατος, ἀμερὴς, and ἀδιαίρετος, a substance devoid of magnitude, indistant, without parts, and indivisible; this we shall leave others to make a judgment of. However, it is certain, that Atheists, who maintain the contrary, must needs assert, that every thought, and whatsoever belongeth to soul, mind, (as knowledge,

virtue, etc.) is not only mentally and mathematically divisible, so that there may be half, a third part, or a quarter of a thought, and the rest, supposed; but also physically separable, or discerpible, together with the soul, wherein it is. They must also deny, that there is any internal energy at all, or any other action besides that outside superficial action of local motion, and consequently make all cogitation nothing but local motion, or translation. And, lastly, they must maintain, that no substance can coexist with any other substance (as soul with body) otherwise than by juxta-position only, and by possessing the pores, or filling up the intervals thereof, as a net with the water.

And this is the first answer to the forementioned atheistic argument against incorporeal substance; That though whatsoever is extended be body, yet every thing is not extended; but that life, or mind and cogitation, are an unextended, indistant, and indivisible nature. But, as we have already intimated, there are other learned assertors of incorporeal substance, who, lest God and spirits, being thus made unextended, should quite vanish into nothing, answer that atheistic argumentation after a different manner, by granting to these Atheists that proposition, that whatsoever is, is extended; and what is unextended, is nothing; but then denying that other of theirs, that whatsoever is extended, is body; they asserting another extension, specifically differing from that of bodies: for, whereas corporeal extension is not only impenetrable, so that no one part thereof can enter into another, but also both mentally and really divisible, one part being in its nature separable from another; they affirm, that there is another incorporeal extension, which is both penetrable, and also indiscerpible, so that no one part thereof can possibly be separated from another, or the whole; and that to such an incorporeal extension as this belongeth life, cogitation, and understanding, the Deity having such an infinite extension, but all created spirits a finite and limited one, which also is in them supposed to be contractable and dilatable. Now it is not our part here to oppose Theists, but Atheists: wherefore we shall leave these two sorts of Incorporealists to dispute it out friendly amongst themselves; and indeed therefore with the more moderation, equanimity, and toleration of dissent mutually, because it seemeth, that some are in a manner fatally inclined to think one way in this controversy, and some another. And whatever the truth of the case be, it must be acknowledged, that this latter hypothesis may be very useful and serviceable to retain some in Theism, who can by no means admit of a Deity, or any thing else, unextended; though, perhaps, there will not be wanting others also, who would go in a middle way betwixt these two, or compound them togeth-

er, by supposing the Deity to be indeed altogether unextended, and all of it every where; but finite incorporeals, or created spirits, to have an unextended inside, a life or mind, diffusing itself into a certain amplitude of outward extension, whereby they are determined to a place, yet so as to be all in every part thereof; which outward extension is therefore not to be accounted body, because penetrable, contractable, and dilatable, and because no one part thereof is separable from the rest, by the rushing or incursion of any corporeal thing upon them. And thus is the Atheist's argument against incorporeal substance answered two manner of ways; first, that there is something unextended; and, secondly, that if there were none, yet must there of necessity be a substance otherwise extended than body is, so as to be neither antitypous nor discerpible. And ourselves would not be understood here dogmatically to assert any thing in this point, save only what all Incorporealists do agree in, to wit, that besides body, which is impenetrably and divisibly extended, there is in nature another substance, that is both penetrable of body and indiscerpible, or which doth not consist of parts separable from one another. And that there is at least such a substance as this, is unquestionably manifest from what hath been already declared.

But the Atheist will, in the next place, give an account of the original of this error (as he calls it) of incorporeal substance, and undertake to show from what mistake it proceeded, which is yet another pretended confutation thereof; namely, that it sprung partly from the abuse of abstract names and notions, men making substances of them; and partly from the scholastic essences, distinct from the things themselves, and said to be eternal. From both which delusions and dotages together the Atheists conceive, that men have been first of all much confirmed in the belief of ghosts and spirits, demons and devils, invisible beings called by several names. Which belief had also another original, men's mistaking their own fancies for realities. The chief of all which affrightful ghosts and spectres, according to these Atheists, is the Deity, the Oberon, or prince of fairies and fancies. But then, whereas men, by their natural reason, could not conceive otherwise of these ghosts and spirits, than that they were a kind of thin, aerial bodies, their understandings have been so enchanted by these abstract names (which are indeed the names of nothing) and those separate essences and quiddities of scholastics, as that they have made incorporeal substances of them; the atheistic conclusion is, that they, who assert an incorporeal Deity, do really but make a scholastic separate essence, or the mere

abstract notion of an accident, a substantial thing, and a ghost or spirit presiding over the whole world.

To which our reply in general first of all is, That all this is nothing but idle romantic fiction; the belief of a Deity, and substance incorporeal, standing upon none of those imaginary foundations. And then, as for that impudent atheistic pretence, that the Deity is nothing but a figment or creature of men's fear and imagination, and therefore the prince of fairies and fancies; this hath been already sufficiently confuted in our answer to the first atheistic argumentation, where we have also over and above showed, that there is not only a natural prolepsis or anticipation of a God in the minds of men, but also, that the belief thereof is supported by the strongest and most substantial reason, his existence being indeed demonstrable, with mathematical evidence, to such as are capable, and not blinded with prejudice, nor enchanted by the witchcraft of vice and wickedness, to the debauching of their understandings. It hath been also showed, that the opinion of other ghosts and spirits, besides the Deity, sprung not merely from fear and fancy neither, as children's bugbears, but from real phenomena; true sensible apparitions, with the histories of them in all ages, without which the belief of such things could never have held up so generally and constantly in the world. As, likewise, that there is no repugnancy at all to reason, but that there may be as well aërial and ethereal, as there are terrestrial animals; and that the dull and earthy stupidity of men's minds is the only thing, which makes them so prone to think, that there is no understanding nature superior to mankind, but that in the world all is dead about us; and to disbelieve the existence of any thing, which themselves cannot either see or feel. Assuredly, the Deity is no fancy, but the greatest reality in the world, and that, without which there could be nothing at all real, it being the only necessary existent; and, consequently, Atheism is either mere sottishness, or else a strange kind of irreligious fanaticism.

We now further add, that the belief of ghosts and spirits incorporeal; and, consequently, of an incorporeal Deity, sprung neither from any ridiculous mistake of the abstract names and notions of mere accidents for substances, nor from the scholastic essences, said to be eternal. For, as for the latter, none of those scholastics ever dreamed, that there was any universal man, or universal horse, existing alone by itself, and separate from all singulars; nor that the abstract metaphysical essences of men, after they were dead, subsisting by themselves, did walk up and down amongst graves, in airy bodies: it being absolutely impossible, that the real essence of any thing should be separa-

ble from the thing itself, or eternal, when that is not so. And were the essences of all things looked upon by these scholastics as substances incorporeal, then must they have made all things (even body itself) to be ghosts, and spirits, and incorporeal; and accidents also (they having their essences too) to be substantial. But in very truth, these scholastic essences, said to be eternal, are nothing but the intelligible essences of things, or their natures as conceivable, and objects of the mind. And, in this sense, it is an acknowledged truth, that the essences of things (as, for example, of a sphere or triangle) are eternal, and such as were never made; because there could not otherwise be eternal verities concerning them. So that the true meaning of these eternal essences is indeed no other than this, that knowledge is eternal; or that there is an eternal Mind, that comprehendeth the intelligible natures and ideas of all things, whether actually existing, or possible only, their necessary relations to one another, and all the immutable verities belonging to them. Wherefore, though these eternal essences themselves be no ghosts nor spirits, nor substances incorporeal, they being nothing but objective entities of the mind, or noemata, and ideas; yet does it plainly follow from the necessary supposition of them (as was before declared) that there is one eternal unmade Mind, and perfect incorporeal Deity, a real and substantial Ghost or Spirit, which comprehending itself, and all the extent of its own power, the possibility of things, and their intelligible natures, together with an exemplar or platform of the whole world, produced the same accordingly.

But our atheistic argumentator yet further urges, that those scholastics and metaphysicians, who, because life or cogitation can be considered alone abstractly, without the consideration of body, therefore conclude it not to be the accident or action of a body, but a substance by itself (and which also, after men are dead, can walk amongst the graves); that these, I say, do so far abuse those abstract names and notions of mere accidents, as plainly to make substances incorporeal of them. To which therefore we reply also, that were the abstract notions of accidents in general made incorporeal substances by those philosophers aimed at, then must they have supposed all the qualities or affections of bodies, such as whiteness and blackness, heat and cold, and the like to have been substances incorporeal also; a thing yet never heard or thought of. But the case is far otherwise as to conscious life or cogitation, though it be an abstract also; because this is no accident of body, as the Atheist (serving his own hypothesis) securely takes it for granted, nor indeed of any thing else, but an essential attribute of another substance, distinct from body (or incorporeal); after the same manner, as

extension or magnitude is the essential attribute of body, and not a mere accident.

And now, having so copiously confuted all the most considerable atheistic grounds, we are necessitated to despatch those that follow, being of lesser moment, with all possible brevity and compendiousness. The four next, which are the fifth, sixth, seventh, and eighth atheistic argumentations, pretend to no more than only this, to disprove a corporeal Deity; or from the supposition, that there is no other substance in the world besides body, to infer the impossibility of a God; that is, of an eternal unmade Mind, the maker and governor of the whole world: all which therefore signify nothing at all to the assertors of a Deity incorporeal, who are the only genuine Theists. Nevertheless, though none but Stoics, and such other Corporealists, as are notwithstanding Theists, be directly concerned in an answer to them, yet shall we, first, so far consider the principles of the atheistic Corporealism, contained in these two heads, the fifth and sixth, as from the absolute impossibility of these hypotheses to demonstrate a necessity of incorporeal substance, from hence a Deity will also follow.

Here, therefore, are there two atheistic hypotheses, founded upon the supposition that all is body: the first, in the way of qualities, generable and corruptible, which we call the Hylopathian; the second, in the way of unqualified atoms, which is the Atomic, Corporealism, and Atheism. The former of these was the most ancient, and the first sciography, or rude delineation of Atheism. For Aristotle[1] tells us, that the most ancient Atheists were those, who supposed matter or body, that is, bulky extension, to be the only substance, and unmade thing, that, out of which all things were made, and into which all things are again resolved; whatsoever is else in the world being nothing but the passions, qualities, and accidents thereof, generable and corruptible, or producible out of nothing, and reducible to nothing again. From whence the necessary consequence is, That there is no eternal unmade life or understanding, or that mind is no god, or principle in the universe, but essentially a creature.

And this Hylopathian Atheism, which supposeth whatsoever is in the universe to be either the substance of matter and bulk, or else the qualities and accidents thereof, generable and corruptible, hath been called also by us Anaximandrian. Though we deny not, but that there might be formerly some difference amongst the Atheists of this kind; nor are we ignorant, that Simplicius and others conceive Anaxi-

[1] Metaphys. lib. ii. cap. iii. p. 264. tom. iv. oper.

mander to have asserted, besides matter, qualities also eternal and unmade, or an homæomery, and similar atomology, just in the same manner as Anaxagoras afterward did, save only that he would not acknowledge any unmade mind or life ; Anaximander supposing all life and understanding whatsoever, all soul and mind, to have risen up and to have been generated from a fortuitous commixture of those similar atoms, or the qualities of heat and cold, moist and dry, and the like, contempered together. And we confess, that there is some probability for this opinion. Notwithstanding which, because there is no absolute certainty thereof, and because all these ancient Atheists agreed in this, that life and understanding are either first and primary, or else secondary qualities of body, generable and corruptible ; therefore did we not think fit to multiply forms of Atheism, but rather to make but one kind of Atheism of all this, calling it indifferently, Hylopathian, or Anaximandrian.

The second atheistic hypothesis is that form of Atheism described under the sixth head, which likewise supposing body to be the only substance, and the principles thereof devoid of life and understanding, does reject all real qualities, according to the vulgar notion of them, and generate all things whatsoever, besides matter, merely from the combinations of magnitudes, figures, sites, and motions, or the contextures of unqualified atoms, life and understanding not excepted ; which, therefore, according to them, being no simple primitive and primordial thing, but secondary, compounded, and derivative, the mere creature of matter and motion, could not possibly be a God, or first principle in the universe. This is that atomic Atheism called Democritical ; Leucippus and Democritus being the first founders thereof. For though there was before them, another atomology, which made unqualified atoms the principles of all bodies, it supposing besides body, substance incorporeal ; yet were these, as Laertius[1] declareth, the first that ever made ἀρχὰς τῶν ὅλων ἀτόμους, senseless atoms, the principles of all things whatsoever, even of life and understanding, soul and mind.

Indeed it cannot be denied, but that from these two things granted, that all is body, and that the principles of body are devoid of all life and understanding, it will follow unavoidably, that there can be no corporeal Deity. Wherefore the Stoics, who professed to acknowledge no other substance besides body, and yet nevertheless had a strong persuasion of the existence of a God, or an eternal unmade Mind, the maker of the whole world, denied that other proposition of the atheistic

[1] Lib. ix. segm. 44. p. 573.

Corporealists, that the principles of all bodies were devoid of life and understanding, they asserting an intellectual fire, eternal and unmade, the maker of the whole mundane system; which postulatum, of a living intellectual body eternal, were it granted to these Stoics, yet could not this their corporeal god, notwithstanding, be absolutely incorruptible, as Origen often inculcateth: [1] *Ὁ Θεὸς τοῖς Στωϊκοῖς ἐστι σῶμα, οὐκ αἰδουμένοις λέγειν αὐτὸν τρεπτὸν, καὶ δ' ὅλων ἀλλοιωτὸν καὶ μεταβλητὸν, καὶ ἁπαξαπλῶς δυνάμενον φθαρῆναι, παρὰ τὸ μηδὲν εἶναι τὸ φθεῖρον αὐτόν·* God to the Stoics is a body, and therefore mutable, alterable, and changeable; and he would indeed be perfectly corruptible, were there any other body to act upon him. Wherefore he is only happy in this, that he wants a corrupter or destroyer.—And thus much was therefore rightly urged by the atheistic argumentator, that no corporeal Deity could be absolutely in its own nature incorruptible, nor otherwise than by accident only immortal, because of its divisibility. For were there any other matter without this world, to make inroads and incursions upon it, or to disunite the parts thereof, the life and unity of the Stoical corporeal god must needs be scattered and destroyed. And therefore of this Stoical god does the same Origen thus further write; *Ὁ τῶν Στωϊκῶν Θεὸς, ἅτε σῶμα τυγχάνων, ὁτὲ μὲν ἡγεμονικὸν ἔχει τὴν ὅλην οὐσίαν, ὅταν· ἡ ἐκπύρωσις ᾖ ὁτὲ δὲ ἐπὶ μέρους γίνεται αὐτῆς, ὅταν ᾖ διακόσμησις· οὐδὲ γὰρ δεδύνηνται οὗτοι τρανῶσαι τὴν φυσικὴν τοῦ θεοῦ ἔννοιαν, ὡς πάντη ἀφθάρτου καὶ ἁπλοῦ, καὶ ἀσυνθέτου, καὶ ἀδιαιρέτου·* The god of the Stoics being a body, hath sometimes the whole for its hegemonic in the conflagration; and sometimes only a part of the mundane matter.—For these men were not able to reach to a clear notion of the Deity, as a being every way incorruptible, simple, uncompounded, and indivisible.—Notwithstanding which, these Stoics were not therefore to be ranked amongst the Atheists, but far to be preferred before them, and accounted only a kind of imperfect Theists.

But we shall now make it evident, that in both these atheistic corporealisms (agreeing in those two things, that body is the only substance, and that the principles of body are not vital), there is an absolute impossibility; not only because, as Aristotle[2] objecteth, they supposed no active principle; but also because their bringing of life and understanding (being real entities) out of dead and senseless matter is also the bringing of something out of nothing. And, indeed, the atomic Atheist is here of the two rather the more absurd and unreasonable,

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[1] Lib. i. c. Cels. p. 17.

[2] Metaphysic. lib. i. cap. iii. p. 265. tom. iv. oper.

forasmuch as he, discarding all real qualities, and that for this very reason, because nothing can come out of nothing, doth himself, notwithstanding, produce life, sense, and understanding (unquestionable realities) out of mere magnitudes, figures, sites, and motions; that is, indeed, out of nothing. Wherefore there being an absolute impossibility of both these atheistic hypotheses (neither of which is able to solve the phenomenon of life and understanding), from that confessed principle of theirs, that matter, as such, hath no life or understanding belonging to it, it follows unavoidably, that there must be some other substance besides body or matter, which is essentially vital and intellectual: *Οὐ γὰρ πάντα χρῆται ἐπακτῷ ζωῇ*, because all things cannot possibly have a peregrine, adventitious, and borrowed life—but something in the universe must needs have life naturally and originally. All life cannot be merely accidental, generable, and corruptible, producible out of nothing, and reducible to nothing again, but there must of necessity be some substantial life, which point (that all life is not a mere accident, but that there is life substantial) hath been of late, with much reason and judgment, insisted upon, and urged by the writer of the Life of Nature. Neither must there be only such a substantial life, as is naturally immortal for the future, but also such as is eternal, and was never made; all other lives and minds whatsoever (none of which could possibly be generated out of matter) being derived from this eternal unmade fountain of life and understanding.

Which thing the hylozoic Atheists being well aware of, namely, that there must of necessity be both substantial and eternal unmade life, but supposing also matter to be the only substance, thought themselves necessitated to attribute to all matter, as such, life and understanding, though not animalish and conscious, but natural only; they conceiving, that, from the modification thereof alone by organization, all other animalish life, not only the sensitive in brutes, but also the rational in men, was derived. But this hylozoic Atheism, thus bringing all conscious and reflexive life or animality, out of a supposed senseless, stupid, and inconscious life of nature in matter, and that merely from a different accidental modification thereof, or contexture of parts, does again plainly bring something out of nothing, which is an absolute impossibility. Moreover, this hylozoic Atheism was long since, and in the first emersion thereof, solidly confuted by the atomic Atheists, after this manner: If matter, as such, had life, perception, and understanding belonging to it, then of necessity must every atom or smallest particle thereof, be a distinct percipient by itself; from whence it will follow, that there could not possibly be any such men and animals as now

are compounded out of them, but every man and animal would be a heap of innumerable percipients, and have innumerable perceptions and intellections; whereas it is plain, that there is but one life and understanding, one soul or mind, one perceiver or thinker, in every one. And to say, that these innumerable particles of matter do all confederate together; that is, to make every man and animal to be a multitude or commonwealth of percipients, and persons, as it were, clubbing together, is a thing so absurd and ridiculous, that one would wonder the hylozoists should not rather choose to recant that their fundamental error of the life of matter, than endeavor to seek shelter and sanctuary for the same under such a pretence. For though voluntary agents and persons may many of them resign up their wills to one, and by that means have all but as it were one artificial will, yet can they not possibly resign up their sense and understanding too, so as to have all but one artificial life, sense, and understanding; much less could this be done by senseless atoms, or particles of matter supposed to be devoid of all consciousness or animality. Besides which, there have been other arguments already suggested, which do sufficiently evince, that sense and understanding cannot possibly belong to matter any way, either originally or secondarily, to which more may be added elsewhere.

And now, from these two things, that life and understanding do not essentially belong to matter as such, and that they cannot be generated out of dead and senseless matter, it is demonstratively certain, that there must be some other substance besides body or matter. However, the Anaximandrian and Democritic Atheists taking it for granted, that the first principles of body are devoid of all life and understanding, must either acknowledge a necessity of some other substance besides body, or else deny the truth of that axiom, so much made use of by themselves, That nothing can come out of nothing. And this was our second undertaking, to show, that from the very principles of the atheistic Corporealism, represented in the fifth and sixth heads, incorporeal substance is against those Atheists themselves demonstrable.

Our third and last was this; That there being undeniably substance incorporeal, the two next following atheistic argumentations, built upon the contrary supposition, are therefore altogether insignificant also, and do no execution at all. The first of which (being the seventh) impugning only such a soul of the world, as is generated out of matter, is not properly directed against Theism neither, but only such a form of Atheism (sometime before mentioned) as indeed cometh nearest to Theism. Which, though concluding all things to have sprung originally from senseless matter, Night and Chaos; yet supposes

things from thence to have ascended gradually to higher and higher perfection; first, inanimate bodies, as the elements, then birds and other brute animals (according to the forementioned Aristophanic tradition, with which agreeth this of Lucretius,[1]

Principio genus alituum, variæque volucres;)

afterward men, and in the last place gods; and that only the animated stars, but Jupiter, or a soul of the world, generated also out of Night and Chaos, as well as all other things. We grant, indeed, that the true and real Theists amongst the ancient Pagans also held the world's animation, and whosoever denied the same were therefore accounted absolute Atheists. But the world's animation, in a larger sense, signifies no more than this, that all things are not dead about us, but that there is a living sentient and understanding nature eternal, that first framed the world, and still presideth over it: and, it is certain, that in this sense all Theists whatsoever must hold the world's animation. But the generality of Pagan Theists held the world's animation also in a stricter sense; as if the world were truly and properly an animal, and therefore a god, completed and made up of soul and body together, as other animals are. Which soul of this great world-animal was to some of them the highest or supreme Deity, but to others only a secondary god, they supposing an abstract mind superior to it. But God's being the soul of the world in this latter Paganic sense, and the world's being an animal or a god, are things absolutely disclaimed and renounced by us. However, this seventh atheistic argument is not directed against the soul of the world in the sense of the Paganic Theists neither (this being, as they think, already confuted), but in the sense of the atheistic Theogonists; not an eternal unmade soul or mind, but a native or generated one only, such as resulted from the disposition of matter, and contexture of atoms, the offspring of Night and Chaos: the Atheists here pretending, after their confutation of the true and genuine Theism, to take away all shadows thereof also, and so to free men from all manner of fear of being obnoxious to any understanding being, superior to themselves. Wherefore we might here omit the confutation of this argument, without any detriment at all to the cause of Theism: nevertheless, because this in general is an atheistic assertion, that there is no life and understanding presiding over the whole world, we shall briefly examine the supposed grounds thereof, which alone will be a sufficient confutation of it. The first of them therefore is this, that

[1] Lib. v. ver. 797.

there is no other substance in the world besides body; the second, that the principles of bodies are devoid of all life and understanding; and the last, that life and understanding are but accidents of bodies resulting from such a composition or contexture of atoms, as produceth soft flesh, blood, and brains, in bodies organized, and of human form. From all which the conclusion is, that there can be no life and understanding in the whole, because it is not of human form, and organized, and hath no blood and brains. But neither is body the only substance, nor are life and understanding accidents resulting from any modification of dead and lifeless matter; nor is blood or brains that, which understandeth in us, but an incorporeal soul or mind, vitally united to a terrestrial organized body; which will then understand with far greater advantage, when it comes to be clothed with a pure, spiritual, and heavenly one. But there is in the universe also a higher kind of intellectual animals, which, though consisting of soul and body likewise, yet have neither flesh nor blood, nor brains, nor parts so organized as ours are. And the most perfect mind and intellect of all is not the soul of any body, but complete in itself, without such vital union and sympathy with matter. We conclude, therefore, that this passage of a modern writer,[1] "We worms cannot conceive, how God can understand without brains," is *vox pecudis*, the language and philosophy rather of worms or brute animals, than of men.

The next, which is the eighth atheistic argument, is briefly this: That whereas the Deity by Theists is generally supposed to be a living being perfectly happy, and immortal or incorruptible; there can be no such living being immortal, and consequently none perfectly happy. Because all living beings whatsoever are concretions of atoms, which as they were at first generated, so are they again liable to death and corruption: life being no simple primitive nature, nor substantial thing, but a mere accidental modification of compounded bodies only, which upon the disunion of their parts, or the disordering of their contexture, vanisheth again into nothing. And there being no life immortal, happiness must needs be a mere significant word, and but a romantic fiction. Where first, this is well, that the Atheists will confess, that according to their principles, there can be no such thing at all as happiness, because no security of future permanency; all life perpetually coming out of nothing, and whirling back into nothing again. But this atheistic argument is likewise founded upon the former error, that body is the only substance, the first principles whereof are devoid of all life

[1] Hobbes.

and understanding; whereas it is certain, that life cannot possibly result from any composition of dead and lifeless things; and therefore must needs be a simple and primitive nature. It is true, indeed, that the participated life in the bodies of animals (which yet is but improperly called life, it being nothing but their being actuated by a living soul) is a mere accidental thing, generable and corruptible; since that body, which is now vitally united to a living soul, may be disunited again from it, and thereby become a dead and lifeless carcass; but the primary or original life itself is substantial, nor can there be any dead carcass of a human soul. That which hath life essentially belonging to the substance of it, must needs be naturally immortal, because no substance can of itself perish, or vanish into nothing. Besides which, there must be also some, not only substantial, but also eternal unmade life, whose existence is necessary, and which is absolutely unannihilable by any thing else; which therefore must needs have perfect security of its own future happiness; and this is an incorporeal Deity. And this is a brief confutation of the eighth atheistic argument.

But the Democritic Atheist proceeds, endeavoring further to disprove a God from the phenomena of motion and cogitation, in the three following argumentations. First, therefore, whereas Theists commonly bring an argument from motion, to prove a God, or first unmoved Mover, the Atheists contend, on the contrary that from the very nature of motion, the impossibility of any such first unmoved Mover is clearly demonstrable. For, it being an axiom of undoubted truth concerning motion, that whatsoever is moved is moved by some other thing; or that nothing can move itself; it follows from thence unavoidably, that there is no *æternum Immobile*, no eternal unmoved Mover; but, on the contrary, that there was *æternum Motum*, an eternal Moved; or, that one thing was moved by another, from eternity infinitely, without any first mover or cause, because, as nothing could move itself, so could nothing ever move another, but what was itself before moved by something else.

To which we reply, That this axiom, whatsoever is moved, is moved by another, and not by itself, was by Aristotle, and those other philosophers, who made so much use thereof, restrained to the local motion of bodies only; that no body, locally moved, was ever moved originally from itself, but from something else. Now it will not at all follow from hence, that therefore *nihil movetur nisi a moto*, that no body was ever moved, but by some other body—that was also before moved by something else; or, that of necessity one body was moved by another

body, and that by another, and so backwards, infinitely, without any first unmoved or self-moving and self-active mover, as the Democritic Atheist fondly conceits; for the motion of bodies might proceed (as unquestionably it did) from something else, which is not body, and was not before moved. Moreover, the Democritic Atheist here also, without any ground, imagines, that were there but one push once given to the world, and no more, this motion would from thenceforward always continue in it, one body still moving another to all eternity. For though this be indeed a part of the Cartesian hypothesis, that, according to the laws of nature, a body moving will as well continue in motion, as a body resting in rest, until that motion be communicated and transferred to some other body; yet is the case different here, where it is supposed, not only one push to have been given to the world at first, but also the same quantity of motion or agitation to be constantly conserved and maintained. But to let this pass, because it is something a subtile point, and not so rightly understood by many of the Cartesians themselves, we say, that it is a thing utterly impossible, that one body should be moved by another infinitely, without any first cause or mover, which was self-active, and that not from the authority of Aristotle[1] only, pronouncing *οὔτε δυνατὸν ὅθεν ἡ ἀρχὴ τῆς κινήσεως ἰέναι εἰς ἄπειρον*, etc. That in the causes of motion, there could not possibly be an infinite progress—but from the reason there subjoined by Aristotle, because *εἴπερ μηδέν ἐστι τὸ πρῶτον, ὅλως αἴτιον οὐδέν ἐστι*, if there were no first unmoved mover, there could be no cause of motion at all.—For were all the motion, that is in the world, a passion from something else, and no first unmoved active mover, then must it be a passion from no agent, or without an action, and consequently proceed from nothing, and either cause itself, or be made without a cause. Now the ground of the Atheist's error here is only from hence, because he taketh it for granted, that there is no other substance besides body, nor any other action but local motion; from whence it comes to pass, that, to him, this proposition, No body can move itself, is one and the same with this, Nothing can act from itself, or be self-active.

And thus is the atheistic pretended demonstration against a God, or first cause, from motion, abundantly confuted; we having made it manifest, that there is no consequence at all in this argument, that because no body can move itself, therefore there can be no first unmoved mover; as also having discovered the ground of the Atheist's error here, their taking it for granted, that there is nothing but body; and,

[1] Physic. Auscult. lib. viii. cap. v. p. 537. tom. i. oper.

lastly, having plainly shewed, that it implies a contradiction there should be action and motion in the world, and yet nothing self-moving or self-active: so that it is demonstratively certain from motion, that there is a first cause, or unmoved mover. We shall now further add, that from the principle acknowledged by the Democritic Atheists themselves, That no body can move itself, it follows also undeniably, that there is some other substance besides body, something incorporeal, which is self-moving and self-active, and was the first unmoved mover of the heavens or world. For if no body from eternity was ever able to move itself, and yet there must of necessity be some active cause of that motion, which is in the world (since it could not cause itself), then is there unquestionably some other substance besides body, which having a power of moving matter, was the first cause of motion, itself being unmoved.

Moreover, it is certain from hence also, that there is another species of action, distinct from local motion, and such as is not *heterokinesy*, but *autokinesy*, or self-activity. For since the local motion of body is essentially *heterokinesy*, not caused by the substance itself moving, but by something else acting upon it, that action, by which local motion is first caused, cannot be itself local motion, but must be autokinesy, or self-activity, that which is not a passion from any other agent, but springs from the immediate agent itself, which species of action is called cogitation. All the local motion, that is in the world, was first caused by some cogitative or thinking being, which not acted upon by any thing without it, nor at all locally moved, but only mentally, is the immoveable mover of the heavens, or vortices. So that cogitation is, in order of nature, before local motion, and incorporeal before corporeal substance, the former having a natural *imperium* upon the latter. And now have we not only confuted the ninth atheistic argument from motion, but also demonstrated against the Democritic Atheists from their own principle, that there is an incorporeal and cogitative substance, the first immoveable mover of the heavens, and vortices; that is, an incorporeal Deity.

But the Democritic Atheist will yet make a further attempt to prove, that there can be nothing self-moving or self-active, and that no thinking being could be a first cause; he laying his foundation in this principle, that nothing taketh its beginning from itself, but from the action of some other agent without it. From whence he would infer, that cogitation itself is heterokinesy, the passion of the thinker, and the action of something without it, no cogitation ever rising up of itself without a cause; and that cogitation is indeed nothing but local motion or me-

chanism and all living understanding beings machines, moved from without; and then make this conclusion, that therefore no understanding being could possibly be a first cause: he further adding also, that no understanding being, as such can be perfectly happy neither, as the Deity is supposed to be, because dependent upon something without it: and this is the tenth atheistic argumentation.

Where we shall first consider that, which the Democritic Atheist makes his fundamental principle, or common notion to disprove all autokinesy, or self-activity by, that nothing taketh beginning from itself, but from the action of some other thing without it. Which axiom, if it be understood of substantial things, then is it indeed acknowledged by us to be unquestionably true, it being the same with this, That no substance, which once was not, could ever possibly cause itself, or bring itself into being; but must take its beginning from the action of something else: but then it will make nothing at all against Theism. As it is likewise true, that no action whatsoever, (and therefore no cogitation) taketh beginning from itself, or causeth itself to be, but is always produced by some substantial agent; but this will no way advantage the Atheist neither. Wherefore, if he would direct his force against Theism, he ought to understand this proposition thus, that no action whatsoever taketh beginning from the immediate agent (which is the subject of it), but from the action of some other thing without it; or, that nothing can move or act otherwise, than as it is moved and acted upon by something else. But this is only to beg the question, or to prove the thing in dispute, identically, that nothing is self-active, because nothing can act from itself. Whereas it is in the mean time undeniably certain, that there could not possibly be any motion or action at all in the universe, were there not something self-active, forasmuch as otherwise all that motion or action would be a passion from nothing, and be made without a cause.

And whereas the Atheists would further prove, that no cogitation taketh its beginning from the thinker, but always from the action of some other thing without it, after this manner; because it is not conceivable, why this cogitation, rather than that, should start up at any time were there not some cause for it, without the thinker: here, in the first place, we freely grant, that our human cogitations are indeed commonly occasioned by the incursions of sensible objects upon us; as also, that the concatenations of those thoughts and phantasms in us, which are distinguished from sensations (whether we be asleep or awake) do many times depend upon corporeal and mechanical causes in the brain. Notwithstanding which, that all our cogitations are ob-

truded and imposed upon us from without; and that there is no transition in our thoughts at any time, but such as had been before in sense (which the Democritic Atheist avers), this is a thing which we absolutely deny. For, had we no mastery at all over our thoughts, but they were all like tennis-balls, bandied and struck upon us, as it were, by rackets from without; then could we not steadily and constantly carry on any designs and purposes of life. But on the contrary, that of Aristotle[1] is most true (as will be elsewhere further proved), that man, and all rational beings, are in some sense ἀρχὴ πράξεων, a principle of actions, subordinate to the Deity; which they could not possibly be, were they not also a principle of cogitations, and had some command over them; but these were all as much determined by causes without, as the motions of the weathercock are. The rational soul is itself an active and bubbling fountain of thoughts; that perpetual and restless desire, which is as natural and essential to us, as our very life, continually raising up and protruding new and new ones in us, which are as it were offered to us. Besides which, we have also a further self-recollective power, and a power of determining and fixing our mind and intention upon some certain objects, and of ranging our thoughts accordingly. But the Atheist is here also to be taught yet a further lesson, that an absolutely perfect mind (such as the Deity is supposed to be), doth not (as Aristotle writeth of it) ὁτὲ μὲν νοεῖν ὁτὲ δὲ οὐ νοεῖν, sometimes understand, and sometimes not understand—it being ignorant of nothing, nor syllogizing about any thing, but comprehending all intelligibles with their relations and verities at once within itself: and its essence and energy being the same. Which notion, if it be above the dull capacity of Atheists, who measure all perfection by their own scantling, this is a thing that we cannot help.

But as for that prodigious paradox of Atheists, that cogitation itself is nothing but local motion or mechanism, we could not have thought it possible, that ever any man should have given entertainment to such a conceit, but that this was rather a mere slander raised upon Atheists; were it not certain from the records of antiquity, that whereas the old religious Atomists did, upon good reason, reduce all corporeal action (as generation, augmentation, and alteration) to local motion, or translation from place to place (there being no other motion besides this conceivable in bodies); the ancient atheizers of that philosophy (Leucippus and Democritus) not contented herewith, did really carry the busi-

[1] Vide lib. iii. ad Nicomach. cap. iii. p. 37. tom. iii. et Magnor. Moral. lib. i. cap. ix. et cap. xii. p. 202, 204.

ness still on further, so as to make cogitation itself also nothing but local motion. As it is also certain, that a modern atheistic pretender to wit hath publicly owned this same conclusion, that mind is nothing else but local motion in the organic parts of man's body. These men have been sometimes indeed a little troubled with the fancy, apparition, or seeming of cogitation that is, the consciousness of it, as knowing not well what to make thereof; but then they put it off again, and satisfy themselves worshipfully with this, that fancy is but fancy, but the reality of cogitation nothing but local motion; as if there were not as much reality in fancy and consciousness, as there is in local motion. That, which inclined these men so much to this opinion, was only because they were sensible and aware of this, that if there were any other action besides local motion admitted, there must needs be some other substance acknowledged besides body. Cartesius indeed undertook to defend brute animals to be nothing else but machines; but then he supposed that there was nothing at all of cogitation in them, and consequently nothing of true animality or life, no more than is an artificial automaton, as a wooden eagle, or the like: nevertheless, this was justly thought to be paradox enough. But that cogitation itself should be local motion, and men nothing but machines; this is such a paradox, as none but either a stupid and besotted, or else an enthusiastic, bigotical, or fanatic Atheist, could possibly give entertainment to. Nor are such men as these fit to be disputed with any more than a machine is.

But whereas the atheistic objector adds also, over and above, in the last place, that no understanding being can be perfectly happy neither, and therefore not a god, because essentially dependent upon something else without it; this is all one as if he should say, that there is no such thing as happiness at all in nature; because it is certain, that without consciousness or understanding nothing can be happy (since it could not have any fruition of itself); and if no understanding being can be happy neither, then must the conclusion needs be that of the Cyrenaics, that εὐδαιμονία ἀνύπαρκτον, happiness is a mere chimera—a fantastic notion or fiction of men's minds: a thing, which hath no existence in nature. These are the men, who afterward argue from interest also against a God and religion: notwithstanding that they confess their own principles to be so far from promising happiness to any, as that they absolutely cut off all hopes thereof. It may be further observed also, in the last place, that there is another of the Atheist's dark mysteries here likewise couched, that there is no scale or ladder of entity and perfection in nature, one above another; the whole universe, from top to bottom, being nothing but one and the same senseless matter, diversely

modified. As also that understanding, as such, rather speaks imperfection; it being but a mere whiffling, evanid, and fantastic thing; so that the most absolutely perfect of all things in the universe is grave, solid, and substantial senseless matter: of which more afterward. And thus is the tenth atheistic argumentation also confuted.

But the Democritic and Epicurean Atheists will make yet a further assault from the nature of knowledge, understanding, after this manner: If the world were made by a God, or an antecedent mind and understanding, having in itself an exemplar or platform thereof, before it was made, then must there be actual knowledge, both in order of nature and time, before things; whereas things, which are the objects of knowledge and understanding, are unquestionably in order of nature before knowledge: this being but the signature of them, and a passion from them. Now, the only things are singular sensibles or bodies. From whence it follows, that mind is the youngest and most creaturely thing in the world; or that the world was before knowledge, and the conception of any mind; and no knowledge or mind before the world as its cause. Which is the eleventh atheistic argumentation.

But we have prevented ourselves here in the answer to this argument (which would make all knowledge, mind, and understanding junior to the world, and the very creature of sensibles), having already fully confuted it; and clearly proved, that singular bodies are not the only things, and objects of the mind, but that it containeth its immediate intelligibles within itself; which intelligibles also are eternal, and that mind is no fantastic image of sensibles, nor the stamp and signature of them, but archetypal to them; the first mind being that of a perfect being, comprehending itself, and the extent of its own omnipotence, or the possibilities of all things. So that knowledge is older than all sensible things; mind senior to the world, and the architect thereof. Wherefore we shall refer the reader, for an answer to this argument, to the preceding volume, where the existence of a God (that is, a mind before the world) is demonstrated also from this very topic, viz. the nature of knowledge and understanding.

We shall in this place only add; that as the Atheists can no way solve the phenomenon of motion, so can they much less that of cogitation, or life and understanding. To make which yet the more evident, we shall briefly represent a syllabus or catalogue of the many atheistic hallucinations or delirations concerning it. As, first, that senseless matter being the only substance, and all things else but accidental modifications thereof; life and mind is all a mere accidental thing, generable and corruptible, producible out of nothing and reducible to

nothing again; and that there is no substantial life or mind any where. In opposition to which, we have before proved, that there must of necessity be some substantial life, and that human souls being lives substantial, and not mere accidental modifications of matter, they are consequently in their own nature immortal, since no substance of itself ever vanisheth into nothing.

Again, the Democritics, and other Atheists conclude, that life and mind are no simple and primitive natures, but secondary and compounded things; they resulting from certain concretions and contextures of matter, and either the commixtures and contemporations of qualities, or else the combinations of those simple elements of magnitude, figure, site, and motion; and so being made up of that, which hath nothing of life or mind in it. For as flesh is not made out of fleshy particles, nor bone out of bony (as Anaxagoras of old dreamed), so may life, as they conceive, be as well made out of lifeless principles, and mind out of that which hath no mind or understanding at all in it: just as syllables pronounceable do result from combinations of letters, some of which are mutes, and cannot by themselves be pronounced at all, others but semi-vocal. And from hence do these Atheists infer, that there could be no eternal unmade life or mind, nor any that is immortal or incorruptible; since upon the dissolution of that compages or contexture of matter, from whence they result, they must needs vanish into nothing. Wherefore according to them, there hath probably sometime heretofore been no life nor understanding at all in the universe, and there may possibly be none again. From whence the conclusion is, that mind and understanding is no god, or principle in the universe; it being essentially factitious, native, and corruptible; or, as they express it in Plato,[1] θνητὸς ἐκ θνητῶν, mortal from mortal things—as also, that the souls of men cannot subsist separately after death, and walk up and down in airy bodies; no more than the form of a house or tree, after the dissolution thereof, can subsist by itself separately, or appear in some other body. But all this foolery of Atheists hath been already confuted, we having before showed, that life and understanding are active powers, vigors, and perfections, that could never possibly result from mere passive bulk, or dead and senseless matter, however modified and compounded; because nothing can come effectively from nothing. Neither is there any consequence at all in this, that because flesh is not made out of fleshy principles, nor bone out of bony, red out of red things, nor green out of green; therefore life and understanding

[1] De Legibus, lib. x. p. 666.

may as well be compounded out of things dead and senseless: because these are no syllables or complexions, as the others are, nor can either the qualities of heat and cold, moist and dry; or else magnitudes, figures, sites, and motions, however combined together, as letters spell them out, and make them up: but they are simple and primitive things. And accordingly it hath been proved, that there must of necessity be some eternal unmade life and mind. For though there be no necessity, that there should be any eternal unmade red, or green, because red and green may be made out of things not red nor green, they, and all other corporeal qualities (so called) being but several contextures of matter, or combinations of magnitudes, figures, sites, and motions, causing those several fancies in us: and though there be no necessity, that there should be eternal motion, because, if there were once no motion at all in matter, but all bodies rested, yet might motion have been produced by a self-moving or self-active principle: and, lastly, though there be no necessity, that there should be eternal unmade matter or body neither, because had there been once no body at all, yet might it be made or produced by a perfect omnipotent or incorporeal being: nevertheless, is there an absolute necessity, that there should be eternal unmade life, and mind, because were there once no life nor mind at all, these could never have been produced out of matter altogether lifeless and mindless. And though the form of a house cannot possibly exist separately from the matter and substance thereof, it being a mere accidental thing, resulting from such a compages of stone, timber, and mortar, yet are human souls and minds no such accidental forms of compounded matter, but active substantial things, that may therefore subsist separately from these bodies, and enliven other bodies of a different contexture. And however some, that are no Atheists, be over prone to conceive life, sense, cogitation, and consciousness, in brutes, to be generated out of dead, senseless, and unthinking matter, (they being disposed thereunto by certain mistaken principles, and ill methods of philosophy) nevertheless is this unquestionably in itself a seed of Atheism; because if any life, cogitation, and consciousness, may be produced out of dead and senseless matter, then can no philosophy hinder, but that all might have been so.

But the Democritic Atheists will yet venture further to deny, that there is any thing in nature self-moving or self-active, but that whatsoever moveth and acteth, was before moved by something else, and made to act thereby; and again, that from some other thing, and so backward infinitely; from whence it would follow, that there is no first in the order of causes, but an endless retroinfinity. But as this is all

one, as to affirm, that there is no such thing at all as life in the world, but that the universe is a compages of dead and stupid matter, so has this infinity in the order of causes been already exploded for an absolute impossibility.

Nevertheless, the Atheists will here advance yet an higher paradox; that all action whatsoever, and therefore cogitation, fancy, and consciousness itself, is really nothing else but local motion, and consequently not only brute-animals, but also men themselves mere machines, which is an equal, either sottishness or impudence, as to assert a triangle to be a square, or a sphere a cube, number to be figure, or any thing else to be any thing: and it is really all one as to affirm, that there is indeed no such thing in ourselves as cogitation; there being no other action in nature, but local motion and mechanism.

Furthermore, the Democritic and Epicurean Atheists universally agree in this, that not only sensations, but also all the cogitations of the mind, are the mere passions of the thinker, and the actions of bodies existing without upon him; though they do not all declare themselves after the same manner herein. For first, the Democritics conclude, that sense is caused by certain grosser corporeal effluvia, streaming from the surfaces of bodies continually, and entering through the nerves; but that all other cogitations of mind and men's either sleeping or waking imaginations proceed from another sort of simulachra, idols, and images of a more fine and subtile contexture, coming into the brain, not through those open tubes or channels of the nerves, but immediately through all the smaller pores of the body: so that, as we never have sense of any thing, but by means of those grosser corporeal images, obtruding themselves upon the nerves, so have we not the least cogitation at any time in our mind neither, which was not caused by those finer corporeal images, and exuvious membranes, or effluvia, rushing upon the brain or contexture of the soul. [1]*Λεύκιππος καὶ Δημόκριτος τὴν Αἴσθησιν καὶ τὴν Νόησιν Εἰδώλων ἔξωθεν προϊόντων· μηδενὶ γὰρ ἐπιβάλλειν μηδετέραν χωρὶς τοῦ προσπίπτοντος.* Leucippus and Democritus determined, that as well Noesis as Aisthesis, mental cogitation as external sensation, was caused by certain corporeal idols, coming from bodies without; since neither sensation nor cogitation could otherwise possibly be produced.—And thus does Laertius[2] also represent the sense of these atheistic philosophers, that the effluvia from bodies called idols were the only causes, *τῶν κατὰ ψυχὴν κινημάτων καὶ βουλημάτων ἑκάστων καὶ ἠθῶν καὶ παθῶν*, of

[1] Plutarch de Placit. Philos. lib. iv. cap. viii. p. 899. tom. ii. oper.

[2] Laertius does not ascribe this opinion to Leucippus, but only to Democritus, lib. ix. segm. 44. p. 573.

all the motions, passions, and affections, and even the very volitions of the soul.—So that as we could not have the least sensation, imagination, nor conception of any thing otherwise than from those corporeal effluvia, rushing upon us from bodies without, and begetting the same in us, at such a time; so neither could we have any passion, appetite, or volition, which we were not in like manner corporeally passive to. And this was the ground of the Democritic fate, or necessity of all human actions, maintained by them, in opposition to the τὸ ἐφ' ἡμῖν, or liberty of will, which cannot be conceived without self-activity, and something of contingency; they supposing human volitions also, as well as all the other cogitations, to be mechanically caused and necessitated from those effluvious images of bodies coming in upon the willers. And, however Epicurus sometime pretended to assert liberty of will against Democritus, yet, forgetting himself, did he also here securely philosophize after the very same manner;[1]

> Nunc age, quæ moveant animum res, accipe paucis;
> Quæ veniunt veniant in mentem, percipe paucis,
> Principio hoc dico rerum simulachra vagari, etc.

But others there were amongst the ancient Atomists, who could not conceive sensations themselves to be thus caused by corporeal effluvia, or exuvious membranes streaming from bodies continually, and that for divers reasons alleged by them; but only by a pressure from them upon the optic nerve, by reason of a tension of the intermedious air, or ether, (being that which is called light;) whereby the distant object is touched and felt, οἷον διὰ βακτηρίας,[2] as it were by a staff. Which hypothesis concerning the corporeal part of sense is indeed much more ingenious, and agreeable to reason, than the former. But the atheizers of this atomology, as they supposed sense to be nothing else, but such a pressure from bodies without; so did they conclude imagination and mental cogitation to be but the relics and remainders of those motions of sense formerly made, and conserved afterwards in the brain (like the tremulous vibrations of a clock or bell, after the striking of the hammer, or the rolling of the waves after that the wind is ceased;) melting, fading, and decaying insensibly by degrees. So that, according to these, knowledge and understanding is nothing but failing and decaying

[1] Lucret. l. iv. p. 358. 360. (ver. 726).

[2] Vide Plutarch. de Placit. Philos. lib. iv. cap. xv. p. 911. tom. ii. oper. et Laert. lib. vii. segm. 157. p. 466.

sense, and all our volitions but mechanic motions, caused from the actions, or trusions of bodies upon us. Now, though it be true, that in sensation there is always a passion antecedent made upon the body of the sentient from without; yet is not sensation itself this very passion, but a perception of that passion: much less can mental conception be said to be the action of bodies without, and the mere passion of the thinker; and least of all volitions such, there being plainly here something ἐφ' ἡμῖν, in our own power,—(by means whereof we become a principle of action, accordingly deserving commendation, or blame), that is, something of self-activity.

Again, according to the Democritic and Epicurean Atheists, all knowledge and understanding is really the same thing with sense; the difference between these two, to some of them, being only this, that what is commonly called sense, is primary and original knowledge, and knowledge but secondary, or fading and decaying sense; but to others, that sense is caused by those more vigorous idols, or effluvia from bodies intromitted through the nerves; but understanding and knowledge by those more weak and thin, umbratile and evanid ones, that penetrate the other smaller pores of the body: so that both ways understanding and knowledge will be but a weaker sense. Now, from this doctrine of the atheistic Atomists, that all conception and cogitation of the mind whatsoever, is nothing else but sense and passion from bodies without, this absurdity first of all follows unavoidably; that there cannot possibly be any error, or false judgment, because it is certain, that all passion is true passion, and all sense or seeming, and appearance, true seeming and appearance. Wherefore, though some sense and passion may be more obscure than other, yet can there be none false, itself being the very essence of truth. And thus Protagoras, one of these atheistic Atomists, having first asserted, that knowledge is nothing else but sense, did thereupon admit this as a necessary consequence, that πᾶσα δόξα ἀληθὴς,[1] every opinion is true; because it is nothing but seeming and appearance, and every seeming and appearance is truly such; and because it is not possible for any one to opine that which is not, or to think otherwise than he suffers.—Wherefore Epicurus, being sensible of this inconvenience, endeavored to dissolve this phenomenon of error and false opinion, or judgment, consistently, with his own principles, after this manner; that though all knowledge be sense, and all sense true, yet may error arise notwithstanding, *exanimi opinatu*,[2] from the

[1] Vide Platon. in Theæteto, p. 118. and Laert. lib. ix. segm. 51, p. 576.

[2] Vide Lucret. l. iv. ver. 464.

opination of the mind, adding something of its own, over and above, to the passion and fancy of sense. But herein he shamefully contradicts himself; for if the mind, in judging and opining, can superadd any thing of its own, over and above to what it suffers, then is it not a mere passive thing, but must needs have a self-active power of its own, and consequently will prove also incorporeal; because no body can act otherwise than it suffers, or is made to act by something else without it. We conclude, therefore, that since there is such a thing as error, or false judgment, all cogitations of the mind cannot be mere passions; but there must be something of self-activity in the soul itself, by means whereof it can give its assent to things not clearly perceived, and so err.

Again, from this atheistic opinion, That all knowledge is nothing else but sense, either primary or secondary, it follows also, that there is no absolute truth or falsehood, and that knowledge is of a private nature, relative and fantastical only, or mere seeming, that is, nothing but opinion; because sense is plainly seeming, phantasy, and appearance; a private thing, and relative to the sentient only. And here also did Protagoras,[1] according to his wonted freedom, admit this consequence, that knowledge being sense, there was no absoluteness at all therein; and that nothing was true otherwise, than *τούτῳ καὶ τινὶ*, to this and to that man so thinking;—that every man did but *τὰ ἑαυτοῦ μόνον δοξάζειν*, opine only his own things;—that *πάντων χρημάτων μέτρον ἄνθρωπος*, every man was the measure of things and truth to himself;—and, lastly, *τὸ φαινόμενον ἑκάστῳ τούτῳ καὶ εἶναι ᾧ φαίνεται*, that whatsoever seemed to every one, was true to him, to whom it seemed.—Neither could Democritus himself, though a man of more discretion than Protagoras, dissemble this consequence from the same principle asserted by him, that understanding is fantastical, and knowledge but opinion; he owning it sometimes before he was aware, as in these words of his:[2] *γιγνώσκειν χρὴ ἄνθρωπον τῷδε τῷ κανόνι, ὅτι αἰτίης ἀπήλλακται·* We ought to know man, according to this rule, that he is such a thing, as hath nothing to do with absolute truth.—And again, *αἰτίῃ* (or *ἑτεῇ*) *οὐδὲν ἴσμεν περὶ οὐδενός, ἀλλ' ἐπιρυσμίη ἑκάστοισιν ἡ δόξις·* We know nothing absolutely concerning any thing; and all our knowledge is opinion.—Agreeably to which, he determined, that men's knowledge was diversified by the temper of their bodies, and the things without them.[3] And Aristotle judiciously observing both these doctrines, That there is no error or false judgment,

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[1] Vide Platon. in Theæteto, p. 116. 119. 122. 126. 129.

[2] Vide Sextum Empiric. lib. vii. advers. Mathematic. seu i. advers. Logicos. § 137. p. 399, 400. [3] Ibid. p. 399.

but every opinion true; and again, That nothing is absolutely true, but relatively only; to be really and fundamentally one and the same, imputeth them both together to Democritus, in these words of his:[1] *οὐδὲν εἶναι ἀληθές· ὅλως δὲ διὰ τὸ ὑπολαμβάνειν φρόνησιν μὲν τὴν αἴσθησιν, τὸ φαινόμενον κατὰ τὴν αἴσθησιν ἐξ ἀνάγκης ἀληθὲς εἶναι·* Democritus held, that there was nothing absolutely true; but because he thought knowledge or understanding to be sense, therefore did he conclude, that whatsoever seemed according to sense, must of necessity be true (not absolutely but relatively), to whom it so seemed.—These gross absurdities did the atheistic Atomists plunge themselves into, whilst they endeavoured to solve the phenomenon of cogitation, mind, or understanding, agreeably to their own hypothesis. And, it is certain, that all of them, Democritus himself not excepted, were but mere blunderers in that atomic physiology, which they so much pretended to, and never rightly understood the same; forasmuch as that, with equal clearness, teaches these two things at once, that sense indeed is fantastical and relative to the sentient; but that there is a higher faculty of understanding and reason in us, which thus discovers the phantastry of sense, and reaches to the absoluteness of truth, or is the criterion thereof.

But the Democritic and Epicurean Atheists will further conclude, that the only things or objects of the mind are singular sensibles, or bodies existing without it; which therefore must needs be, in order of nature, before all knowledge, mind, and understanding whatsoever, this being but a fantastic image or representation of them. From whence they infer, that the corporeal world, and these sensible things, could not possibly be made by any mind or understanding, because essentially junior to them, and the very image and creature of them. Thus does Aristotle observe,[2] concerning both Democritus and Protagoras, that they did *ὑπολαμβάνειν τὰ ὄντα μόνον εἶναι τὰ αἰσθητά*, suppose the only things or objects of the mind to be sensibles; and that this was the reason why they made knowledge to be sense, and therefore relative and fantastical. But we have already proved, that mind and understanding is not the fantastic image of sensibles or bodies, and that it is in its own nature no ectypal, but archetypal and architectonical of all; that it is senior to the world, and all sensible things, it not looking abroad for its objects any where without, but containing them within itself; the first original Mind being an absolutely perfect

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[1] Aristot. Metaphysic. lib. iv. cap. v. p. 312. tom. iv. oper.

[2] Metaphysicor. lib. iv. cap. v. p. 313. tom. iv. oper.

Being, comprehending itself, and the extent of its own omnipotence, or all possibilities of things, together with the best platform of the whole, and producing the same accordingly.

But it being plain that there are, besides singulars, other objects of the mind universal, from whence it seems to follow, that sensibles are not the only things: some modern atheistic wits have therefore invented this further device to maintain the cause, and carry the business on, that universals are nothing else but names or words, by which singular bodies are called; and, consequently, that in all axioms and propositions, sententious affirmations and negations (in which the predicate at least is universal), we do but add or substract, affirm or deny, names of singular bodies; and that reason or syllogism is nothing but the reckoning or computing the consequences of these names or words. Neither do they want the impudence to affirm, that besides those passions or fancies, which we have from things by sense, we know nothing at all of any thing but only the names, by which it is called; than which there cannot be a greater sottishness or madness: for if geometry were nothing but the knowledge of names, by which singular bodies are called, as itself could not deserve that name of a science, so neither could its truths be the same in Greek and in Latin; and geometricians, in all the several distant ages and places of the world, must be supposed to have had the same singular bodies before them, of which they affirmed and denied those universal names.

In the last place, the Epicurean and Anaximandrian Atheists, agreeably to the premised principles, and the tenor of their hypothesis, do both of them endeavor to depreciate and undervalue knowledge or understanding, as a thing, which hath not any higher degree of perfection or entity in it than is in dead and senseless matter; it being, according to them, but a passion from singular bodies existing without, and therefore both junior and inferior to them; a tumult raised in the brain, by motions made upon it from the objects of sense; that which essentially includeth in it dependance upon something else; at best but a thin and evanid image of sensibles, or rather an image of those images of sense, a mere whiffling and fantastic thing; upon which account they conclude it not fit to be attributed to that, which is the first root and source of all things, which therefore is to them no other than grave and solid senseless matter, the only substantial, self-existent, independent thing, and consequently the most perfect and Divine. Life and understanding, soul and mind, are to them no simple and primitive natures, but secondary and derivative, or syllables and complexions of things, which sprung up afterwards, from certain combinations of mag-

nitudes, figures, sites, and motions, or contemperations of qualities, contextures either of similar or dissimilar atoms. And as themselves are juniors to senseless matter and motion, and to those inanimate elements, fire, water, air and earth, the first and most real productions of nature and chance, so are their effects, and the things that belong to them, comparatively with those other real things of nature, but slight, ludicrous, and umbratile, as landscape in picture, compared with the real prospect of high mountains, and low valleys, winding or meandrous rivers, towering steeples, and the shady tops of trees and groves; as they are, accordingly, commonly disparaged under those names of notional and artificial. And thus was the sense of the ancient Atheists represented by Plato;[1] *φασὶ, τὰ μὲν Μέγιστα καὶ Κάλλιστα ἀπεργάζεσθαι Φύσιν καὶ Τύχην, τὰ δὲ Σμικρότερα Τέχνην· ἣν δὴ παρὰ φύσεως λαμβάνουσαν τὴν τῶν μεγάλων καὶ πρώτων γένεσιν ἔργων, πλάττειν καὶ τεκταίνεσθαι πάντα τὰ σμικρότερα, ἃ δὴ τεχνικὰ προσαγορεύομεν·* They say, that the greatest and most excellent things of all were made by senseless nature and chance; but all the smaller and more inconsiderable, by art, mind, and understanding which taken from nature those first and greater things as its ground-work to act upon, doth frame and fabricate all the other lesser things, which are therefore commonly called artificial.—And the mind of these Atheists is there also further declared by that philosopher after this manner: The first, most real, solid and substantial things in the whole world, are those elements, fire, water, air, and earth, made by senseless nature and chance, without any art, mind, or understanding: and next to these the bodies of the sun, moon, and stars, and this terrestrial globe, produced out of the aforesaid inanimate elements, by unknowing nature, or chance likewise, without any art, mind, or God.—The fortuitous concourse of similar or dissimilar atoms, begetting this whole system and compages of heaven and earth: *τέχνην δὲ ὕστερον ἐκ τούτων ὑστέραν γενομένην, αὐτὴν θνητὴν ἐκ θνητῶν ὕστερα γεγεννηκέναι παιδείας τινάς, ἀληθείας οὐ σφόδρα μετεχούσας, ἀλλ' εἴδωλ' ἄττα ξυγγενῆ ἑαυτῶν, οἷον ἡ γραφικὴ καὶ τὰ ἑξῆς·* But that afterwards art or mind, and understanding, being generated also in the last place out of those same senseless and inanimate bodies or elements (it rising up in certain smaller pieces of the universe, and particular concretions of matter called animals), mortal from mortal things, did produce certain other ludicrous things, which partake little of truth and reality, but are mere images, umbrages, and imitations, as picture and landscape, etc. but, above all, those moral differences of just and unjust, honest and

[1] De Leg. l. x. p. 889. (p. 665, 666.)

dishonest, the mere figments of political art, and slight umbratile things, compared with good and evil natural, that consist in nothing, but agreement and disagreement with sense and appetite: *τὰ γὰρ καλὰ, φύσει μὲν ἄλλα, νόμῳ δὲ ἕτερα, τὰ δὲ δίκαια οὐδὲ τοπαράπαν φύσει·* For, as for things good and honest, those, that are such by nature, differ from those, which are such by law; but as for just and unjust, there is by nature no such thing at all.—The upshot and conclusion of all is, that there is no such scale or ladder in nature as Theists and metaphysicians suppose, no degrees of real perfection and entity one above another, as of life and sense above inanimate matter, of reason and understanding above sense; from whence it would be inferred, that the order of things in nature was in way of descent from higher and greater perfection, downward to lesser and lower, which is indeed to introduce a God. And that there is no such scale or ladder of perfection and entity, they endeavour further to prove from hence, because, according to that hypothesis, it would follow, that every the smallest and most contemptible animal that could see the sun, had a higher degree of entity and perfection in it, than the sun itself; a thing ridiculously absurd; or else, according to Cotta's[1] instance; "Idcirco formicam anteponendam esse huic pulcherrimæ urbi, quod in urbe sensus sit nullus, in formica non modo sensus, sed etiam mens, ratio, memoria." That therefore every ant or pismire were far to be preferred before this most beautiful city of Rome; because in the city there is no sense; whereas an ant hath not only sense, but also mind, reason, and memory;—that is, a certain sagacity superior to sense. Wherefore they conclude, that there is no such scale or ladder in nature, no such climbing stairs of entity and perfection, one above another, but that the whole universe is one flat and level, it being indeed all nothing but the same uniform matter, under several forms, dresses, and disguises; or variegated by diversity of accidental modifications; one of which is that of such beings as have fancy in them, commonly called animals; which are but some of sportful or wanton natures, more trimly artificial and finer *gamaieus*, or pretty toys; but by reason of this fancy they have no higher degree of entity and perfection in them, than is in senseless matter: as they will also be all of them quickly transformed again into other seemingly dull, unthinking, and inanimate shapes. Hitherto the sense of Atheists.

But the pretended grounds of this atheistic doctrine (or rather madness), have been already also confuted over and over again. Knowledge and understanding is not a mere passion from the thing known, existing without the knower, because to know and understand, as

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[1] Apud Ciceron. de Natur. Deor. lib. iii. cap. ix. p. 3061. tom. ix. oper.

Anaxagoras[1] of old determined, is κρατεῖν, to master and conquer the thing known, and consequently not merely to suffer from it, or passively to lie under it, this being κρατεῖσθαι to be mastered and conquered by it. The knowledge of universal theorems in sciences is not from the force of the thing known existing without the knower, but from the active power, and exerted vigor or strength of that, which knows. Thus Severinus, Boethius; [2] "Videsne, ut in cognoscendo, cuncta sua potius facultate, quam eorum, quæ cognoscuntur, utantur? Neque id injuria, nam cum omne judicium judicantis actus existat, necesse est, ut suam quisque operam, non ex aliena, sed ex propria potestate perficiat." See you not how all things, in knowing, use their own power and faculty rather than that of the thing known? For since judgment is the action of that which judgeth, every thing must of necessity perform its own action, by its own power, strength, and faculty, and not by that of another.—Sense itself is not a mere passion, or reception of the motion from bodies without the sentient. for if it were so, then would a looking-glass, and other dead things see; but it is a perception of a passion made upon the body of the sentient, and therefore hath something of the soul's own self-activity in it. But understanding, and the knowledge of abstract sciences is neither primary sense, nor yet the fading and decaying remainders of the motions thereof, but a perception of another kind, and more inward than that of sense; not sympathetical, but unpassionate, the noemata of the mind being things distinct from the phantasmata of sense and imagination; which are but a kind of confused cogitations. And though the objects of sense be only singular bodies, existing without the sentient, yet are not these sensibles therefore the only things and cogitables; but there are other objects of science, or intelligibles, which the mind containeth within itself. That dark philosophy of some, tending so directly to Atheism, that there is nothing in the mind or understanding, which was not first in corporeal sense, and derived in way of passion from matter, was both elegantly and solidly confuted by Boethius's[3] philosophic muse after this manner:

Quondam porticus attulit,
Obscuros nimium senes,
Qui sensus et imagines

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[1] Apud Aristot. de Anima, lib. iii. cap. v. p. 48. tom. ii. oper.

[2] Cons. l. v. pro. 4. (lib. v. p. 132.)

[3] Boet. Cons. l. v. M. 4. (p. 132.)

E corporibus extimis,
Credant mentibus imprimi;
Ut quondam celeri stylo
Mos est æquore paginæ
Quæ nullas habeat notas,
Pressas figere literas.
Sed mens si propriis vigens
Nihil motibus explicat,
Sed tantum patiens jacet
Notis subdita corporum,
Cassasque in speculi vicem
Rerum reddit imagines,
Unde hæc sic animis viget,
Cernens omnia notio?
Quæ vis singula prospicit?
Aut quæ cognita dividit?
Quæ divisa recolligit?
Alternumque legens iter,
Nunc summis caput inserit,
Nunc decidit in infima;
Tum sese referens sibi
Veris falsa redarguit?
Hæc est efficiens magis,
Longe causa potentior
Quam quæ materiæ modo
Impressas patitur notas.
Præcedit tamen excitans
Et vires animi movens,
Vivo in corpore passio.
Cum vel lux oculos ferit,
Vel vox auribus instrepit:
Tum mentis vigor excitus,
Quas intus species tenet,
Ad motus similes vocans,
Notis applicat exteris.

It is true indeed, that the *Νοητὸν*, or thing understood, is, in order of nature, before the intellection and conception of it; and from hence was it, that the Pythagoreans and Platonists concluded that *Νοῦς*, mind or intellect, was not the very first and highest thing in the scale of the universe, but that there was another Divine hypostasis, in order of na-

ture before it, called by them Ἓν and Τ' ἀγαθὸν, one and the good—as the Νοητὸν or intelligible thereof. But as those three archical hypostases of the Platonists and Pythagoreans are all of them really but one Θεῖον or Divinity, and the first of those three (superior to that which is properly called by them mind or intellect), is not supposed therefore to be ignorant of itself; so is the first Mind or Understanding no other, than that of a perfect Being, infinitely good, fecund, and powerful, and virtually containing all things; comprehending itself and the extent of its own goodness, fecundity, virtue, and power; that is, all possibilities of things, their relations to one another, and verities; a mind before sense and sensible things. An omnipotent understanding Being, which is itself its own intelligible, is the first Original of all things. Again, that there must of necessity be some other substance besides body or matter, and which, in the scale of nature, is superior to it, is evident from hence, because otherwise there could be no motion at all therein, no body being ever able to move itself. There must be something self-active and hylarchical, something that can act both from itself, and upon matter, as having a natural imperium, or command over it. Cogitation is, in order of nature, before local motion. Life and understanding, soul and mind, are no syllables or complexions of things, secondary and derivative, which might therefore be made out of things devoid of life and understanding; but simple, primitive, and uncompounded natures: they are no qualities or accidental modifications of matter, but substantial things. For which cause souls or minds can no more be generated out of matter, than matter itself can be generated out of something else; and therefore are they both alike (in some sense), principles, naturally ingenerable and incorruptible, though both matter, and all imperfect souls and minds, were at first created by one perfect, omnipotent, understanding Being. Moreover, nothing can be more evident than this, that mind and understanding hath a higher degree of entity or perfection in it, and is a greater reality in nature, than mere senseless matter or bulky extension. And, consequently, the things which belong to souls and minds, to rational and intellectual beings as such, must not have less, but more reality in them, than the things which belong to inanimate bodies. Wherefore, the differences of just and unjust, honest and dishonest, are greater realities in nature, than the differences of hard and soft, hot and cold, moist and dry. He, that does not perceive any higher degree of perfection in a man than in an oyster, nay, than in a clod of earth or lump of ice, in a piece of paste or pie-crust, hath not the reason or understanding of a man in him. There is unquestionably a scale or ladder of nature, and degrees of per-

fection and entity, one above another, as of life, sense, and cogitation, above dead, senseless, and unthinking matter; of reason and understanding above sense, etc. And if the sun be nothing but a mass of fire, or inanimate subtile matter agitated, then hath the most contemptible animal that can see the sun, and hath consciousness and self-enjoyment, a higher degree of entity and perfection in it, than that whole fiery globe; as also than the materials (stone, timber, brick and mortar), of the most stately structure, or city. Notwithstanding which, the sun in other regards, and as its vastly extended light and heat hath so great an influence upon the good of the whole world, plants and animals, may be said to be a far more noble and useful thing in the universe, than any one particular animal whatsoever. Wherefore there being plainly a scale or ladder of entity, the order of things was unquestionably, in way of descent, from higher perfection downward to lower; it being as impossible for a greater perfection to be produced from a lesser, as for something to be caused by nothing. Neither are the steps or degress of this ladder (either upward or downward) infinite; but as the foot, bottom, or lowest round thereof, is stupid and senseless matter, devoid of all life and understanding; so is the head, top, and summity of it a perfect omnipotent Being, comprehending itself, and all possibilities of things. A perfect understanding Being is the beginning and head of the scale of entity; from whence things gradually descend downward; lower and lower, till they end in senseless matter. *Νοῦς πάντων προγενέστατος*, Mind is the oldest of all things,—senior to the elements, and the whole corporeal world; and likewise, according to the same ancient Theists, it is *Κύριος κατὰ φύσιν*, by nature lord over all—or hath a natural imperium and dominion over all, it being the most hegemonical thing. And thus was it also affirmed by Anaxagoras, *Νοῦς βασιλεὺς οὐρανοῦ τε καὶ γῆς*, that Mind is the sovereign King of heaven and earth.

We have now made it evident, that the Epicurean and Anaximandrian Atheists, who derive the original of all things from senseless mater, devoid of all manner of life, can no way solve the phenomenon of cogitation (life and understanding, soul and mind), no more than they can that of local motion. And the reason why we have insisted so much upon this point, is, because these Atheists do not only pretend to solve this phenomenon of cogitation without a God, and so to take away the argument for a Deity from thence, but also to demonstrate the impossibility of its existence, from the very nature of knowledge, mind, and understanding. For if knowledge be, in its own nature, nothing but a passion from singular bodies existing without the know-

er; and if life and understanding, soul and mind, be junior to body, and generated out of senseless matter, then could no mind or understanding Being possibly be a god, that is, a first principle, and the maker of all things. And though modern writers take little or no notice of this, yet did Plato anciently make the very state of the controversy betwixt Theists and Atheists principally to consist in this very thing, viz. Whether life and understanding, soul and mind, were juniors to body, and sprung out of senseless matter, as accidental modifications thereof, or else were substantial things, and in order of nature before it. For after the passages before cited, he thus concludeth: [1] *κινδυνεύει ὁ λέγων ταῦτα, πῦρ καὶ ὕδωρ καὶ γῆν καὶ ἀέρα, πρῶτα ἡγεῖσθαι τῶν πάντων εἶναι, καὶ τὴν φύσιν ὀνομάζειν ταῦτα αὐτά, ψυχὴν δὲ ἐκ τούτων ὕστερον· ἔοικε δὲ οὐ κινδυνεύειν, ἀλλὰ ὄντως σημαίνειν ταῦτα ἡμῖν τῷ λόγῳ. Ἆρ' οὖν πρὸς Διὸς οἷον πηγήν τινα ἀνοήτου δόξης ἀνευρήκαμεν ἀνθρώπων, ὁπόσοι τῶν περὶ φύσεως ἐφήψαντο ζητημάτων·* These men seem to suppose fire, water, air, and earth, to be the very first things in the universe, and the principles of all, calling them only nature; but soul and mind to have sprung up afterwards out of them. Nay, they do not only seem to suppose this, but also in express words declare the same. And thus (by Jupiter) have we discovered the very fountain of that atheistic madness of the ancient physiologers, to wit, their making inanimate bodies senior to soul and mind.—And accordingly that philosopher addresses himself, to the confutation of Atheism, no otherwise than thus, by proving soul not to be junior to senseless body, or inanimate matter, and generated out of it; [2] *ὃ πρῶτον γενέσεως καὶ φθορᾶς αἴτιον ἁπάντων, τοῦτο οὐ πρῶτον, ἀλλὰ ὕστερον ἀπεφήναντο εἶναι γεγονὸς, οἱ τὴν τῶν ἀσεβῶν ψυχὴν ἀπεργασάμενοι λόγοι· ὃ δὲ ὕστερον πρότερον· ὅθεν ἡμαρτήκασι περὶ θεῶν τῆς ὄντως οὐσίας· ψυχὴν ἠγνοηκέναι κινδυνεύουσι μὲν ὀλίγου ξύμπαντες, οἷόν τε ὂν τυγχάνει καὶ δύναμιν ἣν ἔχει· τῶν τε ἄλλων αὐτῆς περὶ καὶ δὴ καὶ γενέσεως, ὡς ἐν πρώτοις ἐστὶ, σωμάτων ἔμπροσθεν πάντων γενομένη, καὶ μεταβολῆς πάσης ἄρχει·* That which is the first cause of the generation and corruption of all things, the atheistic doctrine supposes not to have been first made; but what is indeed the last thing, to be the first. And hence is it, that they err concerning the essence of the gods. For they are ignorant what kind of thing soul is, and what power it hath, as also especially concerning its generation and production, that it was first of all made before body, it being that, which governs the motions, changes, and transformations thereof. But if soul be first in order of nature before body, then must those things, which are cognate to soul, be also

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[1] Pl. l. x. De Leg. (p. 666.) [2] Ibid. p. 667.

before the things which appertain to body; and so mind and understanding, art and law, be before hard and soft, heavy and light; and that, which these Atheists call nature (the motion of inanimate bodies), junior to art and mind, it being governed by the same.—Now that soul is in order of nature before body, this philosopher demonstrates only from the topic or head of motion, because it is impossible that one body should move another infinitely, without any first cause or mover; but there must of necessity be something self-moving and self-active, or which had a power of changing itself, that was the first cause of all local motion in bodies. And this being the very notion of soul, that it is such a thing, as can move or change itself (in which also the essence of life consisteth), he thus inferreth,[1] *ἱκανώτατα δέδεικται ψυχὴ τῶν πάντων πρεσβυτάτη, γενομένη τε ἀρχὴ κινήσεως·* It is therefore sufficiently demonstrated from hence, that soul is the oldest of all things in the corporeal world, it being the principle of all the motion and generation in it.—And his conclusion is,[2] *ὀρθῶς ἄρα εἰρηκότες ἂν ἦμεν ψυχὴν μὲν πρότέραν γεγονέναι σώματος ἡμῖν, σῶμα δὲ δεύτερόν τε καὶ ὕστερον, ψυχῆς ἀρχούσης, ἀρχόμενον κατὰ φύσιν·* It hath been therefore rightly affirmed by us, that soul is older than body, and was made before it, and body younger and junior to soul; soul being that, which ruleth, and body that which is ruled. From whence it follows, that the things of soul also are older than the things of body; and therefore cogitation, intellection, volition, and appetite, in order of nature before length, breadth, and profundity. Now it is evident, that Plato in all this understood, not only the mundane soul, or his third Divine hypostasis, the original of that motion, that is in the heavens and the whole corporeal universe, but also all other particular lives and souls whatsoever, or that whole rank of beings called soul; he supposing it all to have been at first made before the corporeal system, or at least to have been in order of nature senior to it, as superior and more excellent (that which ruleth being superior to that which is ruled), and no soul or life whatsoever, to be generated out of senseless matter.

Wherefore we must needs here condemn that doctrine of some professed Theists and Christians of latter times, who generate all souls, not only the sensitive in brutes, but also the rational in men, out of matter: forasmuch as hereby, not only that argument for the existence of a God, from souls, is quite taken away, and nothing could hinder, but that senseless matter might be the Original of all things, if life and understanding, soul and mind, sprung out of it; but also the Atheist

[1] Ibid. p. 668. [2] Page 669.

will have an advantage to prove the impossibility of a God from hence: because if life and understanding, in their own nature, be factitious and generable out of matter, then are they no substantial things, but accidental only: from whence it will plainly follow, that no mind could possibly be a God, or first cause of all things, it being not so much as able to subsist by itself. Moreover, if mind, as such, be generable, and educible out of nothing, then must it needs be in its own nature corruptible also, and reducible to nothing again; whereas the Deity is both an unmade and incorruptible being. So that there could not possibly be, according to this hypothesis, any other God, than such a Jupiter, or soul of the world, as the atheistic Theogonists acknowledged, that sprung out of Night, Chaos, and Nonentity, and may be again swallowed up into that dark abyss. Senseless matter, therefore, being the only unmade and incorruptible thing, and the fountain of all things, even of life and understanding, it must needs be acknowledged to be the only real Numen.

Neither will the case be much different, as to some others, who, though indeed they do not professedly generate the rational, but only the sensitive soul, both in men and brutes; yet do nevertheless maintain the human soul itself to be but a mere blank, or white sheet of paper, that hath nothing at all in it, but what was scribbled upon it by the objects of sense: and knowledge, or understanding, to be nothing but the result of sense, and so a passion from sensible bodies existing without the knower. For hereby, as they plainly make knowledge and understanding to be in its own nature, junior to sense, and the very creature of sensibles; so do they also imply the rational soul, and mind itself, to be as well generated as the sensitive, wherein it is virtually contained; or to be nothing but a higher modification of matter, agreeably to that Leviathan doctrine, that men differ no otherwise from brute animals, than only in their organization, and the use of speech or words.

In very truth, whoever maintaineth, that any life or soul, any cogitation or consciousness, self-perception and self-activity, can spring out of dead, senseless, and unactive matter, the same can never possibly have any rational assurance, but that his own soul had also a like original, and consequently is mortal and corruptible. For if any life and cogitation can be thus generated, then there is no reason, but that all lives may be so, they being but higher degrees in the same kind; and neither life, nor any thing else, can be in its own nature indifferent, to be either substance or accident, and sometimes one and sometimes the other; but either all life, cogitation and consciousness, is accidental, generable and corruptible, or else none at all.

That, which hath inclined so many to think the sensitive life, at least, to be nothing but a quality, or accident of matter, generable out of it, and corruptible into it, is that strange Protean transformation of matter into so many seemingly unaccountable forms and shapes, together with the scholastic opinion thereupon of real qualities; that is, entities distinct from the substance of body, and its modifications, but yet generable out of it, and corruptible into it; they concluding, that as light and colors, heat and cold, etc. according to those fancies, which we have of them, are real qualities of matter, distinct from its substance and modifications; so may life, sense, and cogitation, be in like manner qualities of matter also, generable and corruptible. But these real qualities of body, in the sense declared, are things, that were long since justly exploded by the ancient Atomists, and expunged out of the catalogue of entities, of whom Laertius[1] hath recorded, that they did ἐκβάλλειν τὰς ποιότητας, quite cashier and banish qualities out of their philosophy—they resolving all corporeal phenomena, and therefore those of heat and cold, light and colors, fire and flame, etc. intelligibly into nothing but the different modifications of extended substance, viz. more or less magnitude of parts, figure, site, motion or rest, (or the combinations of them,) and those different fancies caused in us by them. Indeed there is no other entity, but substance and its modifications. Wherefore the Democritics and Epicureans did most shamefully contradict themselves, when, pretending to reject and explode all those entities of real qualities, themselves nevertheless made life and understanding such real qualities of matter, generable out of it, and corruptible again into it.

There is nothing in body or matter, but magnitude, figure, site, and motion or rest: now it is mathematically certain, that these, however combined together, can never possibly compound, or make up life or cogitation: which therefore cannot be an accident of matter, but must of necessity be a substantial thing. We speak not here of that life (improperly so called) which is, in vulgar speech, attributed to the bodies of men and animals; for it is plainly accidental to a body to be vitally united to a soul, or not. Therefore is this life of the compound corruptible and destroyable, without the destruction of any real entity: there being nothing destroyed, nor lost to the universe, in the deaths of men and animals, as such, but only a disunion, or separation made of those two substances, soul and body, one from another. But we speak here of the original life of the soul itself, that this is substantial, neither

[1] Lib. x. segm. xliv. p. 261.

generable nor corruptible, but only creatable and annihilable by the Deity. And it is strange, that any men should persuade themselves, that that which rules and commands in the bodies of animals, moving them up and down, and hath sense or perception in it, should not be as substantial, as that stupid and senseless matter, that is ruled by it. Neither can matter (which is also but a mere passive thing) efficiently produce soul, any more than soul matter; no finite, imperfect substance being able to produce another substance out of nothing. Much less can such a substance, as hath a lower degree of entity and perfection in it, create that, which hath a higher. There is a scale, or ladder of entities and perfections in the universe, one above another, and the production of things cannot possibly be in way of ascent from lower to higher, but must of necessity be in way of descent from higher to lower. Now to produce any one higher rank of being from the lower, as cogitation from magnitude and body, is plainly to invert this order in the scale of the universe from downwards to upwards, and therefore is t atheistical; and by the same reason, that one higher rank or degree n this scale is thus unnaturally produced from a lower, may all the rest be so produced also. Wherefore we have great reason to stand upon our guard here, and to defend this post against the Atheists; that no life, or cogitation, can either materially or efficiently result from dead and senseless body; or that souls, being all substantial and immaterial things, can neither be generated out of matter, nor corrupted into the same, but only created or annihilated by the Deity.

The grand objection against this substantiality of souls sensitive, as well as rational, is from that consequence, which will be from thence inferred, of their permanent subsistence after death, their perpetuity, or immortality. This seeming very absurd, that the souls of brutes also should be immortal, or subsist after the deaths of the respective animals: but especially to two sorts of men; first, such as scarcely in good earnest believe their own soul's immortality; and secondly, such religionists, as conclude, that if irrational, or sensitive souls subsist after death, then must they needs go presently either into heaven or hell. And R. Cartesius was so sensible of the offensiveness of this opinion, that though he were fully convinced of the necessity of this disjunction, that either brutes have nothing of sense or cogitation at all, or else they must have some other substance in them, besides matter, he chose rather to make them mere senseless machines, than to allow them substantial souls. Wherein, avoiding a lesser absurdity or paradox, he plainly plunged himself into a greater; scarcely any thing being more gener-

ally received, than the sense of brutes. Though in truth all those, who deny the substantiality of sensitive souls, and will have brutes to have nothing but matter in them, ought consequently, according to reason, to do as Cartesius did, deprive them of all sense. But, on the contrary, if it be evident from the phenomena, that brutes are not mere senseless machines or automata, and only like clocks or watches, then ought not popular opinion and vulgar prejudice so far to prevail with us, as to hinder our assent to that, which sound reason and philosophy clearly dictates, that therefore they must have something more than matter in them. Neither ought we, when we clearly conceive any thing to be true, as this, That life and cogitation cannot possibly rise out of dead and senseless matter, to abandon it, or deny our assent thereunto, because we find it attended with some difficulty not easily extricable by us, or cannot free all the consequences thereof from some inconvenience or absurdity, such as seems to be in the permanent subsistence of brutish souls.

For the giving an account of which, notwithstanding, Plato and the ancient Pythagoreans proposed this following hypothesis; That souls, as well sensitive as rational, being all substantial, but not self-existent (because there is but one fountain and principle of all things), were therefore produced or caused by the Deity. But this, not in the generations of the respective animals; it being indecorous, that this Divine, miraculous, creative power should constantly lackey by, and attend upon natural generations; as also incongruous, that souls should be so much juniors to every atom of dust, that is in the whole world; but either all of them from eternity, according to those, who denied the novity of the world; or rather according to others, who asserted the cosmogonia, in the first beginning of the world's creation. Wherefore, it being also natural to souls, as such, to actuate and enliven some body, or to be, as it were, clothed, therewith; these, as soon as created, were immediately invested with certain thin and subtile bodies, or put into light etherial or aërial chariots and vehicles; wherein they subsist, both before their entrance into other gross terrestrial bodies, and after their egress out of them. So that the souls, not only of men, but also of other animals, have sometimes a thicker, and sometimes a thinner indument or clothing. And thus do we understand Boëthius, not only of the rational, but also of the other inferior sensitive souls, in these verses of his;[1]

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[1] De Consolat. Philosoph. lib. iii. p. 69.

Tu causis animas paribus vitasque minores
Provehis, et levibus sublimes curribus aptans,
In cœlum terramque seris.

Where his light chariots, which all lives or souls, at their very first creation by God, are placed in, and in which being wafted, they are both together, as it were, sowed into the gross terrestrial matter, are thin, aërial and etherial bodies. But this is plainly declared by Proclus upon the Timæus, after he had spoken of the souls of demons and men, in this manner ;[1] *καὶ γὰρ πᾶσαν ψυχὴν ἀνάγκη πρὸ τῶν θνητῶν σωμάτων, ἀϊδίοις καί εὐκινήτοις τισὶ χρῆσθαι σώμασιν, ὡς κατ᾽ οὐσίαν ἔχουσαν τό κινεῖν·* And every soul must of necessity have, before these mortal bodies, certain eternal and easily moveable bodies, it being essential to them to move.—There is indeed mention made by the same Proclus, and others, of an opinion of *ἄλογοι δαίμονες*, irrational or brutish demons, or demoniac aërial brutes; of which he sometimes speaks doubtfully, as *εἴπερ γάρ εἰσιν ἄλογοι δαίμονες, ὡς οἱ θεουργοὶ*,[2] If there be any irrational demons, as the Theurgists affirm.—But the dispute, doubt, or controversy here only was, Whether there were any such irrational demons immortal, or no. For thus we learn from these words of Ammonius upon the Porphyrian Isagoge ; *οἱ μὲν γάρ φασιν εἶναί τι δαιμονίων ἀλόγων γένος ἀθάνατον, οἱ δέ φασι καὶ τὸ τοιοῦτον γένος θνητὸν εἶναι·* Some affirm, that there is a certain kind of irrational demons immortal ; but others, that all these irrational or brutish demons are mortal.—Where, by irrational demons immortal, seem to be understood such, as never descend into terrestrial bodies (and these are there disclaimed by Ammonius); but the mortal ones, such as act also upon gross terrestrial bodies, obnoxious to death and corruption. As if Ammonius should have said, There are no other brutish, or irrational demons, than only the souls of such brute animals as are here amongst us, sometimes acting only aërial bodies. Thus, according to the ancient Pythagoric hypothesis, there is neither any new substantial thing now made, which was not before, nor yet any real entity destroyed into nothing ; not only no matter, but also no soul nor life ; God, after the first creation, neither making any new substance, nor yet annihilating any thing made. He then creating nothing, that was not fit to be conserved in being, and which could not be well used and placed in the universe ; and afterward never repenting him of what he had before done. And natural generations and corruptions being nothing but accidental mutations,

[1] L. v. p. 290. [2] L. iv. p. 288.

concretions and secretions, or anagrammatical transpositions of pre- and post-existing things, the same souls and lives being sometimes united to one body, and sometimes to another; sometimes in thicker, and sometimes in thinner clothing; and sometimes in the visible, sometimes in the invisible (they having aërial as well as terrestrial vehicles); and never any soul quite naked of all body. And thus does Proclus complain of some, as spurious Platonists,[1] *οἳ φθείροντες τὸ ὄχημα ἀναγκάζονταί ποτε παντὸς σώματος ἔξω ποιεῖν τὴν ψυχήν*, Who, destroying the thinner vehicles of souls, were therefore necessitated sometimes to leave them in a state of separation from all body, or without any corporeal indument.—Which Cabala, probably derived from the Egyptians by Pythagoras, was before fully represented by us out of Ovid; though that transmigration of human souls there, into ferine bodies, hath not been by all acknowledged, as a genuine part thereof. And the same was likewise insisted upon by Virgil, Georg. l. iv. as also owned and confirmed by Macrobius[2] for a great truth; "Constat secundum veræ rationis assertionem, quam nec Cicero nescit, nec Virgilius ignorat, dicendo,

[3] Nec morti esse locum;——

Constat, inquam, nihil intra vivum mundum perire, sed eorum, quæ interire videntur, solam mutari speciem." It is manifest, according to reason and true philosophy, which neither Cicero nor Virgil were unacquainted with (the latter of these affirming, that there is no place at all left for death); I say, it is manifest, that none of those things, that to us seem to die, do absolutely perish within the living world, but only their forms changed.—

Now, how extravagant soever this hypothesis seems to be, yet is there no question, but that a Pythagorean would endeavor to find some countenance and shelter for it in the Scripture; especially that place, which hath so puzzled and nonplussed interpreters, Rom. viii. 19, etc. "For the earnest expectation of the creature waiteth for the manifestation of the sons of God. For the creature was made subject unto vanity, not willingly, but by reason of him, who hath subjected the same in hope; because the creature itself also shall be delivered from the bondage of corruption, into the glorious liberty of the children of of God. For we know, that the whole creation groaneth, and travaileth in pain together until now. And not only they, but ourselves also,

[1] In Tim. p. 330. [2] Somn. Scip. lib. ii. cap. xii. (p. 161.)

[3] Georg. lib. iv. vers. 221.

which have the first fruits of the Spirit, groan within ourselves, waiting for the adoption, even the redemption of our bodies." Where it is first of all evident, that the κτίσις, creature, or creation spoken of, is not the very same with the τέκνα or υἱοὶ τοῦ Θεοῦ, the children or sons of God—but something distinct from them. Wherefore, in the next place, the Pythagorean will add, that it must of necessity be understood, either of the inanimate creature only, or of the lower animal creation, or else of both these together. Now, though it be readily acknowledged, that there is a prosopopœia here, yet cannot all those expressions, for all that, without difficulty and violence, be understood of the inanimate creation only, or senseless matter; viz. that this hath ἀποκαραδοκίαν, an earnest expectation of some future good to itself; that it is now made subject ματαιότητι, to vanity—frustration and disappointment of desire; and φθορᾷ, to corruption and death—and that οὐχ ἑκοῦσα, not willingly—but reluctantly; and yet ἐπ' ἐλπίδι too, in hope—notwithstanding, of some further good to follow afterward; and that it doth in the mean time συστενάζειν and συνωδίνειν, groan and travel in pain together, till it be at length delivered from "the bondage of corruption into the glorious liberty of the children of God." Moreover, in the generations and corruptions of senseless bodies, as of minerals and vegetables, or when, for example, oil is turned into flame, flame into smoke, water into vapour, vapour into snow or hail, grass into milk, milk into blood and bones, and the like: there is, I say, in all this, no hurt done to any thing, nor any real entity destroyed, all the substance of matter still remaining entirely the same, without the least diminution, and only accidental transformations thereof made: All this is really nothing, but local motion; and there is no more toil nor labor to an inanimate body in motion, than in rest; it being altogether as natural for a body to be moved by something else, as of itself to rest. It is all nothing, but change of figure, distance, site, and magnitude of parts, causing several sensations, fancies, and apparitions in us. And they, who would have the meaning of this place to be, That all such-like mutations, and alternate vicissitudes in inanimate bodies, shall at length quite cease; these groaning in the mean time, and travailing in pain to be delivered from the toilsome labor of such restless motion, and to be at ease and quiet; by taking away all motion thus, out of a fond regard to the ease and quiet of senseless matter, they would thereby, *ipso facto*, petrify the whole corporeal universe, and consequently the bodies of good men also after the resurrection, and congeal all into rocky marble or adamant. And as vain is that other conceit of some, that the whole terrestrial globe shall at last be vitrified, or turned into transpa-

rent crystal, as if it also groaned in the mean time for this. For whatsoever change shall be made of the world in the new heaven and the new earth to come, it is reasonable to think, that it will not be made for the sake of the senseless matter, or the inanimate bodies themselves, to which all is alike; but only for the sake of men and animals, the living spectators and inhabitants thereof, that it may be fitter, both for their use and delight. Neither indeed can these words, for the creature "itself shall be delivered from the bondage of corruption into the glorious liberty of the children of God," be understood of any other, than animals; forasmuch as this liberty of the children of God, here meant, is their being clothed, instead of mortal, with immortal bodies; of which no other creatures are capable, but only such as consist of soul and body. And that πᾶσα κτίσις, that whole creation—which is said afterward to groan and travail in pain together, may be well understood of all that of the creation, which can groan, or be sensible of evil or misery. Wherefore, the Pythagorean would interpret this place of the lower animal creation only, which is sensible of good and evil; that as this was unwillingly, or against its own inclination (after the fall of man, or lapse of souls) made subject to vanity, and the bondage of corruption, pain, misery, and death, in those gross terrestrial bodies; in the manifestation of the sons of God, when they, instead of these mortal bodies, shall be clothed with celestial and immortal ones, then shall this creature also have its certain share in the felicity of that glorious time, and partake in some measure of such a liberty, by being freed in like manner from these their gross terrestrial bodies, and now living only in thin aërial and immortal ones; and so a period put to all their miseries and calamities by him, who made not death, neither hath pleasure in the destruction of the living, but created whatsoever liveth to this end, that it might have its being, and enjoy itself. But however thus much is certain, that brute animals, in this place, cannot be quite excluded; because the πᾶσα κτίσις, the whole creation—will not suffer that: and therefore a Pythagorist would conclude it a warrantable inference from this text of Scripture, that that whole rank in the creation of irrational and brutish animals below men shall not be utterly annihilated in the consummation of things, or future renovation of the world, quite stripped of all this furniture, men being then left alone in it: but that there shall be a continuation of this species or rank of being. And not only so neither; as if there should still be a constant succession of such alternate generations and corruptions, productions or births, and deaths of brute animals, to all eternity; but also, that the individuals themselves shall continue the same, forasmuch as otherwise there would

be none at all delivered from the bondage of corruption. And lastly, that these very souls of brutes, which at this time groan and travail in pain, shall themselves be made partakers of that liberty of the children of God; since otherwise they should be with child, or parturient of nothing; groaning not for themselves, but others. But enough of this Pythagoric hypothesis, which, supposing all manner of souls, sensitive as well as rational, to be substantial things, and therefore to have a permanency after death, in their distinct natures, allows them certain thin aërial ochemata, or vehicles, to subsist in, when these gross terrestrial ones shall fail them.

But let these aërial vehicles of the souls of brutes go for a whimsey, or mere figment; nor let them be allowed to act or enliven any other than terrestrial bodies only, by means whereof they must needs be, immediately after death, quite destitute of all body; they subsisting nevertheless, and not vanishing into nothing, because they are not mere accidents, but substantial things; we say, that in this case, though the substances of them remain, yet must they needs continue in a state of insensibility and inactivity, unless perhaps they be again afterward united to some other terrestrial bodies. Because, though intellection be the energy of the rational soul alone, without the concurrence of body, yet is the energy of the sensitive, always conjoined with it; sense being as Aristotle [1] hath rightly determined, a complication of soul and body together, as weaving is of the weaver and weaving instruments. Wherefore we say, that if the irrational and sensitive souls in brutes, being substantial things also, be after death quite destitute of all body, then can they neither have sense of any thing, nor act upon any thing, but must continue for so long a time, in a state of insensibility and inactivity. Which is a thing therefore to be thought the less impossible, because no man can be certain, that his own soul in sleep, lethargies, and apoplexies, etc. hath always an uninterrupted consciousness of itself; and that it was never without thoughts, even in the mother's womb. However, there is little reason to doubt, but that the sensitive souls of such animals, as lie dead or asleep all the winter, and revive or awake again, at the approaching warmth of summer, do for that time continue in a state of inactivity and insensibility. Upon which account, though these souls of brutes may be said in one sense to be immortal, because the substance of them, and the root of life in them, still remains; yet may they, in another sense, be said also to be mortal, as having the exercise of that life, for a time at least, quite suspended.

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[1] De Anima, lib. ii. cap. vi. p. 27. tom. ii. oper.

From whence it appears, that there is no reason at all for that fear and suspicion of some, that if the souls of brutes be substantial, and continue in being after death, they must therefore needs go either to heaven or hell. But as for that supposed possibility of their awakening again afterward, in some other terrestrial bodies, this seemeth to be no more, than what is found by daily experience in the course of nature, when the silk-worm, and other worms, dying, are transformed into butterflies. For there is little reason to doubt, but that the same soul, which before acted the body of the silk-worm, doth afterward act that of the butterfly: upon which account it is, that this hath been made by Christian theologers an emblem of the resurrection.

Hitherto have we declared two several opinions, concerning the substantial souls of brutes supposed therefore to have a permanent subsistence after death; one of Plato's and the Pythagoreans', that when they are divested of these gross terrestrial bodies, they live, and have a sense of themselves, in thin aërial ones; the other of such, as exploding these aërial vehicles of brutes, and allowing them none but terrestrial bodies, affirm the substances of them, surviving death, to continue in a state of inactivity and insensibility, sleep, silence, or stupor. But now, to say, the truth, there is no absolute necessity that these souls of brutes, because substantial, should therefore have a permanent subsistence after death to all eternity; because, though it be true, that no substance once created by God will of itself ever vanish into nothing, yet it is true also, that whatsoever was created by God out of nothing, may possibly by him be annihilated and reduced to nothing again. Wherefore, when it is said, that the immortality of the human soul is demonstrable by natural reason, the meaning hereof is no more than this, that its substantiality is so demonstrable; from whence it follows, that it will naturally no more perish or vanish into nothing, than the substance of matter itself: and not that it is impossible either for it, or matter, by the Divine power to be annihilated. Wherefore the assurance that we have of our own souls' immortality, must depend upon something else besides their substantiality, namely, a faith also in the Divine Goodness, that he will conserve in being, or not annihilate, all such substances created by him, whose permanent subsistence is neither inconsistent with his own attributes, nor the good of the universe, as this of rational souls unquestionably is not; they having both morality and liberty of will, and thereby being capable of rewards and punishments, and consequently fit objects for the Divine justice to display itself upon. But, for aught we can be certain, the case may be otherwise as to the souls of brute animals, devoid both of morality and liber-

ty of will, and therefore uncapable of reward and punishment; that though they will not naturally of themselves vanish into nothing, yet, having been created by God in the generations of the respective animals, and had some enjoyment of themselves for a time, they may by him again be as well annihilated in their deaths and corruptions; and if this be absolutely the best, then doubtless is it so. And to this seemeth agreeable the opinion of Porphyrius, [1] amongst the philosophers, when he affirmed every irrational power or soul to be resolved into the life of the whole; that is retracted and resumed into the Deity, and so annihilated as to its creaturely nature: though possibly there may be another interpretation of that philosopher's meaning here, viz. that all the sensitive souls of brutes are really but one and the same mundane soul, as it were, outflowing and variously displaying itself, and acting upon all the several parts of matter, that are capable to receive it, but at their deaths retiring again back into itself. But we have sufficiently retunded the force of that objection against the ingenerability of all souls, and the substantiality of those brutes also, from their consequent permanence after death; we having showed, that, notwithstanding this their substantiality, there is no absolute necessity of their perpetuity after death, and permanency to all eternity, or else, that if they do continue to subsist (God annihilating no substance), unless they have aërial vehicles to act, they must remain in a state of inactivity and insensibility, silence or sleep.

Now therefore, if no souls, no life, nor cogitation, could possibly be ever generated out of dead and senseless matter, they being not mere accidents, but substantial things, which must in this case have come from nothing; then, either all souls existed of themselves from eternity, or else there must of necessity be some eternal unmade life and mind, from whence all the other lives and minds were derived. And that this was the doctrine of the ancient Theists, That no soul or mind, no life or understanding, was ever generated out of matter, but all produced by the Deity, the sole fountain of life and understanding, might be here proved, were it needful, at large, by sundry testimonies; but it may sufficiently appear from those verses of Virgil, first in his sixth Æneid, where, after he had spoken of God, as a spirit and mind diffused throughout the whole world, he addeth,

[2] Inde hominum pecudumque genus, vitæque volantum,
Et quæ marmoreo fert monstra sub æquore pontus,

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[1] Vide Sententias ad Intelligibilia ducentes, par. i. § xxii. p. 227. § xxiv. p. 228. et alias.

[2] Verse 728.

That from thence are the lives of all men and beasts, birds flying in the air, and monsters swimming in the sea.—And again in his Georgics, where, after these words,

> [1] ———Deum namque ire per omnes
> Terrasque, tractusque maris, cœlumque profundum,

That God passeth through all tracts of earths, seas, and heavens,—he subjoineth,

> Hinc pecudes, armenta, viros, genus omne ferarum,
> Quemque sibi tenues nascentem arcessere vitas.
> Scilicet huc reddi deinde, et resoluta referri,
> Omnia, nec morti esse locum.

And from hence, not only men, but also all manner of brute animals and beasts, when produced into this world, do every one derive their lives or souls, as also at their deaths they render the same back again to him, in whose hand or custody they remain undestroyed; so that there is no place any where in the world left for death.—This was therefore undoubtedly the genuine doctrine of the ancient Theists, however some of late have deviated and swerved from it; that no life was generated out of matter, but all created by the Deity, or derived from it, the sole fountain of lives and souls.

And it is a truth so evident, that life being substantial, and not a mere accidental thing generated and corrupted, there must therefore of necessity be some eternal unmade life and mind, from whence all other lives and minds are derived, that the Hylozoic Atheists themselves (in this far wiser than the Atomics) were fully convinced thereof; nevertheless being strongly possessed with that atheistic prejudice, that there is no other substance besides body, they attribute this first original unmade life and understanding to all matter as such (but without animal consciousness) as an essential part thereof, or inadequate conception of it. From which fundamental life of nature in matter, modified by organization, they fancy the lives of all animals and men to have proceeded. So that though the modificated lives of animals and men, as such, according to them, be accidental things, generated and corrupted, produced out of nothing, and reduced to nothing again; yet this fundamental life of matter, which is the basis, upon which they stand, being substantial, is also eternal and incorruptible. These Hylozoists therefore, to avoid a Deity, suppose every atom of senseless

[1] Lib. iv. verse 221.

matter to have been, from all eternity, infallibly omniscient, that is, to know all things without either error or ignorance, and to have a knowledge before sense, and underived from sensibles (quite contrary to the doctrine of the atomic Atheists, who make all knowledge, sense, or the product thereof), though without any animal consciousness and self-perception.

But, as nothing can be more prodigiously absurd, than thus to attribute infallible omniscience to every atom of matter; so is it also directly contradictious to suppose perfect knowledge, wisdom, or understanding, without any consciousness or self-perception, consciousness being essential to cogitation: as also, that the substantial and fundamental life in men and other animals should never perish, and yet notwithstanding their souls and personalities in death utterly vanish into nothing. Moreover, this hypothesis can never possibly solve the phenomenon of men and animals neither; not only because no organization or modification of matter whatsoever could ever produce consciousness and self-perception in what was before inconscious; but also because every smallest atom thereof being supposed to be a percipient by itself, and to have a perfect life and understanding of its own, there must be in every one man and animal, not one, but a heap or commonwealth of innumerable percipients. Lastly, whereas these hylozoic Atheists make every atom of matter omniscient, but nothing at all omnipotent, or assert perfect knowledge, without any perfect power, a knowledge without sense, and underived from sensibles; we demand of them, where the intelligibles or objects of this knowledge are? and whence the ideas thereof are derived? For since they proceed not in a way of passion from sensibles existing without, nor could result from those atoms neither, as comprehending themselves, they must needs come from nothing, and many of them, at least, be the conceptions of nothing. There cannot possibly be any other original, by the wit of man devised, of knowledge and understanding, than from an absolutely perfect and omnipotent Being, comprehending itself, and the extent of its own infinite power, or all possibilities of things, that is, all intelligibles. But there can be but one such omnipotent Being, and therefore no more than one original, and eternal unmade mind, from whence all the other minds are derived. Wherefore this hylozoic Atheism is nothing but the breaking and crumbling of the simple Deity, one perfect understanding Being, into matter, and all the several atoms of it.

And now have we made it manifest, that these Atheists are so far from being able to disprove a God from this topic of cogitation, knowledge, or understanding, that they cannot possibly solve the phenome-

non thereof, without a God; it indeed affording invincible arguments of his existence. For, first, if no life or cogitation, soul or mind, can possibly spring out of matter or body, devoid of life and understanding, and which is nothing but a thing extended into length, breadth, and thickness; then is it so far from being true, that all life and understanding is junior to senseless matter, and the offspring thereof, that of necessity either all lives and souls were self-existent from eternity, or else there must be one perfect unmade life and mind, from whence all other imperfect ones were derived: there must be an eternal knowledge before sense and sensibles; which is that that hath printed the stamps and signatures of itself, upon the matter of the whole world. Indeed nothing can be more certain than this, that all knowledge and understanding in ourselves is not a mere passion from singular sensibles or bodies existing without us, as the forementioned Atheists also conclude; (from whence they would again infer, that knowledge, as such, is in its own nature junior to sensibles, and the mere creature of them, and consequently no creator;) there being nothing, which comes to us from the objects of sense without, but only local motion and pressure, and there being other objects of the mind, besides singular sensibles; not only all universals, but also such intelligibles, as never were, nor can be in sense. Now, if our human knowledge and understanding be not a passion from things existing without us; then can it have no other original than in way of participation, from a perfect mind, the mind of an infinitely fecund and powerful Being, comprehending itself, and in itself all things; all the possibilities of things before they were made, their respects, and the verities belonging to them. So that a perfect omnipotent Being, together with the possibilities of things contained in it, is the first *Νοητὸν*, intelligible, or object of mind and understanding, by which all other singulars are understood. And were there no such perfect, infinitely fecund, and powerful Being, there there could have been no mind or understanding at all. As also, were there no perfect mind, viz. that of an omnipotent Being comprehending itself, and all possibilities of things virtually contained in it: all the knowledge, and intelligible ideas of our imperfect minds, must needs have sprung from nothing. And thus is the existence of a God again demonstrated from that phenomenon of knowledge or understanding.

Having quite routed and vanquished the Atheists' main body, we shall now blow away the remainder of their weaker and scattered forces, viz. their objections against Providence, their queries, and their

arguments from interest, with a breath or two. Their first objection is against Providence, as to the fabric of the world, from the faultiness of the mundane system, intellectually considered, and in order to ends; "Quia tanta stat prædita culpa;"[1] That because it is so ill-made,—therefore it could not be made by a God. Where the Atheist takes it for granted, that whosoever asserts a God, or a perfect mind, to be the original of all things, does therefore *ipso facto* suppose all things to be well made, and as they should be. And this doubtless was the sense of all the ancient Theologers, however some modern Theists deviate therefrom; these concluding the perfection of the Deity not at all to consist in goodness, but in power and arbitrary will only. As if to have a will determined by a rule or reason of good, were the virtue of weak, impotent, and obnoxious beings only, or of such as have a superior over them to give law to them, that is, of creatures; but the prerogative of a being irresistibly powerful, to have a will absolutely indifferent to all things, and undetermined by any thing but itself, or to will nothing because it is good, but to make its own arbitrary or contingent and fortuitous determination the sole reason of all its actions, nay, the very rule or measure of goodness, justice, and wisdom itself. And this is supposed by them to be the liberty, sovereignty, and dominion of the Deity. Wherefore such Theists as these would think themselves altogether unconcerned in these atheistic objections against Providence, or in defending the fabric of the world, as faultless, they being as ready as the Atheists themselves, to acknowledge, that the world might really have been much better made than it now is; only that it must be said to be well, because so made, but pretending nevertheless, that this is no impeachment at all of the existence of a God, "Quia Deus non tenetur ad optimum," because God is no way bound or obliged to the best;—he being indeed, according to them, nothing but arbitrary will omnipotent. But what do these Theists here else, than whilst they deny the fortuitous motion of senseless matter to be the first original of all things, themselves in the meantime enthrone fortuitousness and contingency in the will of an omnipotent Being, and there give it an absolute sovereignty and dominion over all? So that the controversy betwixt the Atheists and these Theists seems to be no other than this, whether senseless matter fortuitously moved, or a fortuitous will omnipotent, such as is altogether undetermined by goodness, justice, and wisdom, be the sovereign Numen, and original of all things. Certainly we mortals could have little better ground for our

[1] Lucret. lib. i. vers. 183.

faith and hope, in such an omnipotent arbitrary will as this, than we could have in the motions of senseless atoms furiously agitated, or of a rapid whirlwind. Nay, one would think, that of the two it should be more desirable to be under the empire of senseless atoms, fortuitously moved, than of a will altogether undetermined by goodness, justice, and wisdom, armed with omnipotence; because the former could harbor no hurtful or mischievous designs against any, as the latter might. But this irrational will, altogether undetermined by goodness, justice, and wisdom, is so far from being the highest liberty, sovereignty, and dominion, the greatest perfection, and the divinest thing of all, that it is indeed nothing else but weakness and impotency itself, or brutish folly and madness. And therefore those ancients, who affirmed, that Mind was Lord over all, and the supreme King of heaven and earth, held at the same time, that Good was the sovereign monarch of the universe, Good reigning in Mind, and together with it, because Mind is that, which orders all things for the sake of Good; and whatsoever doth otherwise, was, according to them, not *Νοῦς*, but *Ἄνοια*, not Mens, but Dementia, and consequently no god. And thus does Celsus in Origen declare the nature of God, [1]*οὐ γὰρ τῆς πλημμελοῦς ὀρέξεως, οὐδὲ τῆς πεπλανημένης ἀκοσμίας, ἀλλὰ τῆς ὀρθῆς καὶ δικαίας φύσεως Θεός ἐστιν ἀρχηγέτης.* God is not the president or head of irregular and irrational lust or appetite, and of loose erratic disorderliness, but of the just and righteous nature. And though this were there misapplied by him against the Christian doctrine of the resurrection (not understood), yet is the passage highly approved by Origen; he adding further, in confirmation thereof, and that as the general sense of Christians too, [2]*φαμὲν ὅτι οὐ δύναται αἰσχρὰ ὁ Θεός, ἐπεὶ ἔσται ὁ Θεὸς δυνάμενος μὴ εἶναι Θεός, εἰ γὰρ αἰσχρόν τι δρᾷ ὁ Θεός, οὐκ ἔστι Θεός.* We Christians (who hold the resurrection) say as well as you, that God can do nothing, which is in itself evil, inept, or absurd; no more than he is able not to be God. For if God do any evil, he is no God.—And again,[3] *οὐδὲν μὴ πρέπον ἑαυτῷ ὁ Θεὸς βούλεται, ἀναιρετικὸν, τυγχάνον τοῦ εἶναι αὐτὸν Θεὸν,*[4] God willeth nothing unbecoming himself, or what is truly indecorous; forasmuch as this is inconsistent with his Godship.—And to the same purpose Plotinus,[5] *ποιεῖ τὸ Θεῖον ὡς πέφυκε, πέφυκε δὲ κατὰ τὴν αὐτοῦ οὐσίαν,*

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[1] Page 240. [2] Page 246. [3] Page 247.

[4] So likewise, p. 247, *ἀλλὰ καὶ καθ' ἡμᾶς οὐδὲν οἷός τε παράλογον οὔτε παρ' ἑαυτὸν ἐργάσασθαί ἐστιν ὁ Θεός.* According to us also, God can do nothing, that is absurd, or besides reason.

[5] Page 265. (Libro de Provid. Ennead. iii. Lib. ii. cap. xiii.)

ἢ τὸ καλὸν ἐν ταῖς ἐνεργείαις αὐτοῦ καὶ τὸ δίκαιον συνεκφέρει, εἰ γὰρ μὴ ἐκεῖ ταῦτα, ποῦ ἂν εἴη. The Deity acteth according to its own nature and essence; and its nature and essence displayeth goodness and justice: for if these things be not there, where should they else be found?—And again, elsewhere, [1]Θεὸς ὅπερ ἔχρην εἶναι, οὐ τοίνυν αὕτω συνέβη, ἀλλ' ἔδει οὕτω· τὸ δ' ἔδει τοῦτο, ἀρχὴ τῶν ὅσα ἔδει. God is essentially that, which ought to be; and therefore he did not happen to be such as he is: and this first *ought to be* is the principle of all things whatsoever, that ought to be.—Wherefore the Deity is not to be conceived, as mere arbitrariness, humor, or irrational will and appetite omnipotent (which would indeed be but omnipotent chance), but as an overflowing fountain of love and goodness, justly and wisely dispensing itself, and omnipotently reaching all things. The will of God is goodness, justice, and wisdom; or decorousness, fitness, and ought itself, willing; so that the Τὸ Βέλτιστον, that, which is absolutely the best, is νόμος ἀπαράβατος, an indispensable law to it, because its very essence.—God is μέτρον πάντων, an impartial balance,—lying even, equal and indifferent to all things, and weighing out heaven and earth, and all the things therein, in the most just and exact proportions, and not a grain too much or too little of any thing. Nor is the Deity therefore bound or obliged to do the best, in any way of servility (as men fondly imagine this to be contrary to his liberty), much less by the law and command of any superior (which is a contradiction), but only by the perfection of its own nature, which it cannot possibly deviate from, no more than ungod itself. In conclusion, therefore, we acknowlege the Atheist's argument to be thus far good; that if there be a God, then of necessity must all things be well made, and as they should be; *et vice versa.* But no Atheist will ever be able to prove, that either the whole system of the world could have been better made, or that so much as any one thing therein is made ineptly.

There are indeed many things in the frame of nature, which we cannot reach to the reasons of, they being made by a knowledge far superior and transcendent to that of ours, and our experience and ratiocination but slowly discovering the intrigues and contrivances of Providence therein; witness the circulation of the blood, the milky and lymphatic vessels, and other things (without which the mechanic structure of the bodies of animals cannot be understood), all but so lately brought to light; wherefore we must not conclude, that whatsoever we cannot find out the reason of, or the use, that it serveth to, is therefore ineptly

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[1] Page 473. (Ennead. vi. lib. viii. cap. ix.)

made. We shall give one instance of this; the *intestinum cæcum*, in the bodies of men and other animals, seems, at first sight, to be but a mere botch or bungle of nature, and an odd impertinent appendix; neither do we know that any anatomist or physiologer hath given a rational account thereof, or discovered its use: and yet there being a valve at the entrance of it, these two both together are a most artificial contrivance of nature, and of great advantage for animals, to hinder the regurgitation of the fæces upward towards the ventricle.

The first atheistic instance of the faultiness of things, in the frame of nature, is from the constitution of the heavens, and the disposition of the equator and ecliptic, intersecting each other in an angle of three-and-twenty degrees and upwards; whereby, as they pretend, the terrestrial globe is rendered much more uninhabitable than otherwise it might be.[1] But this is built upon a false supposition of the ancients, that the torrid zone, or all between the tropics, was utterly uninhabitable by reason of the extremity of heat. And it is certain, that there is nothing, which doth more demonstrate a Providence than this very thing, it being the most convenient site or disposition, that could be devised, as will appear, if the inconveniences of other dispositions be considered, especially these three; first, If the axes of those circles should be parallel, and their plains coincident; secondly, If they should intersect each other in right angles; and thirdly (which is a middle betwixt both), If they should cut one another in an angle of forty-five degrees. For it is evident, that each of these dispositions would be attended with far greater inconveniences to the terrestrial inhabitants, in respect of the length of days and nights, heat and cold. And that these two circles should continue thus, to keep the same angular intersection, when physical and mechanic causes would bring them nearer together; this is a farther eviction of a Providence also.

In the next place, the Atheist supposes, that, according to the general persuasion of Theists, the world and all things therein were created only for the sake of man,[2] he thinking to make some advantage for his cause from hence. But this seemeth, at first, to have been an opinion only of some straight-laced Stoics, though afterward indeed recommended to others also, by their own self-love, their over-weaning and puffy conceit of themselves. And so fleas and lice, had they understanding, might conclude the bodies of other greater animals, and men also, to have been made only for them. But the whole was not properly made for any part, but the parts for the whole, and the whole

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[1] Vide Lucret. lib. v. vers. 201. [2] Id. lib. ii. vers. 174, 175.

for the Maker thereof. And yet may the things of this lower world be well said to have been made principally (though not only) for man. For we ought not to monopolize the Divine goodness to ourselves,[1] there being other animals superior to us, that are not altogether unconcerned neither in this visible creation; and it being reasonable to think, that even the lower animals likewise, and whatsoever hath conscious life, was made partly also, to enjoy itself. But Atheists can be no fit judges of worlds being made well or ill, either in general, or respectively to mankind, they having no standing measure for well and ill, without a God and morality, nor any true knowledge of themselves, and what their own good or evil consisteth in. That was at first but a froward speech of some sullen discontented persons, when things falling not out agreeably to their own private, selfish, and partial appetites, they would revenge themselves, by railing upon nature (that is, Providence), and calling her a stepmother only to mankind, whilst she was a fond, partial, and indulgent mother to other animals;[2] and though this be elegantly set off by Lucretius,[3] yet is there nothing but poetic flourish in it all, without any philosophic truth; the advantages of mankind being so notoriously conspicuous above those of brutes.

But as for evils in general, from whence the Atheist would conclude the God of the Theist to be either impotent or envious; it hath been already declared, that the true original of them is from the necessity of imperfect beings, and the incompossibility of things; but that the Divine art and skill most of all appeareth in bonifying these evils, and making them, like discords in music, to contribute to the harmony of the whole, and the good of particular persons.

Moreover, a great part of those evils, which men are afflicted with, is not from the reality of things, but only from their own fancy and opinions, according to that of the moralist,[4] *Ταράσσει τοὺς ἀνθρώπους οὐ τὰ πράγματα, ἀλλὰ τὰ περὶ τῶν πραγμάτων δόγματα.* It is not things themselves, that disturb men, but only their own opinions concerning things.—And therefore it being much in our own power to be freed from these, Providence is not to be blamed upon the account of them. Pain is many times nearly linked with pleasure, according to that Socratic fable,[5] That when God could not reconcile their contrary na-

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[1] Thus Plato, *μέρος μὴν ἕνεκα ὅλου, καὶ οὐχ ὅλον μέρους ἕνεκα.* De Legibus, p. 903.

[2] Vide Plin. Hist. Natur. Proem. lib. vii. [3] Lib. v. vers. 223.

[4] Epictet. in Enchiridio, cap. v. Vide etiam M. Antoninum, lib. iv. § 3. p. 97. et lib. v. § xix. p. 159.

[5] Apud Platon. in Phædone, p. 376.

tures (as he would) he tied them head and tail together. And good men know, that pain is not the evil of the man, but only of the part so affected (as Socrates also) *Τὸ ἀλγοῦν ἐν τῷ σκέλει μένει*, It goes no further than the leg where it is.—But this is many times very serviceable to free us from the greater evils of the mind; upon which all our happiness dependeth. To the Atheists, who acknowledge no *malum culpæ*, no evil of fault (turpitude, or dishonesty), death is the greatest and most tragical of all evils. But though this, according their forlorn hypothesis, be nothing less than an absolute extinction of life; yet, according to the doctrine of the genuine Theists, which makes all souls substantial, no life of itself (without Divine annihilation) will ever quite vanish into nothing, any more than the substance of matter doth. And the ancient Pythagoreans and Platonists have been here so kind, even to the souls of brutes also, as that they might not be left in a state of inactivity and insensibility after death, as to bestow upon them certain subtile bodies, which they may then continue to act in. Nor can we think otherwise, but that Aristotle, from this fountain derived that doctrine of his in his second book, De Gen. An. c. 3.[1] where, after he had declared the sensitive soul to be inseparable from body, he addeth, *πάσης οὖν ψυχῆς δύναμις ἑτέρου σώματος ἔοικε κεκοινωνηκέναι καὶ θειοτέρου τῶν καλουμένων στοιχείων· ὡς δὲ διαφέρουσι τιμιότητι αἱ ψυχαὶ καὶ ἀτιμίᾳ ἀλλήλων, οὕτω καὶ ἡ τοιαύτη διαφέρει φύσις·* All souls therefore seem to have another body, and diviner than that of the elements; and as themselves differ in dignity and nobility, so do these bodies of theirs differ from one another.—And afterward calling this subtile body *πνεῦμα*, or a spirit, he affirmeth it to be, *ἀνάλογον τῷ τῶν ἄστρων στοιχείῳ*, analogous to the element of the stars.—Only as Galen, and St. Austin, and others, have conceived, Aristotle deviated here from the Pythagoreans in this, that he supposed the sensitive soul itself to be really nothing else, but this very subtile and star-like body, and not a distinct substance from it, using it only as a vehicle. Nevertheless, he there plainly affirmeth the mind or rational soul to be really distinct from the body, and to come into it from without pre-existing; and consequently should acknowledge also its after-immortality. But whatsoever Aristotle's judgment were (which is not very material) it is certain, that dying to the rational or human soul is nothing but a withdrawing into the tyring-house, and putting off the clothing of this terrestrial body. So that it will still continue after death, to live to God, whether in a body, or without it. Though according to Plato's express doctrine, the soul is

[1] Page 618. tom. ii. oper.

never quite naked of all body, he writing thus; [1] ἀεὶ ψυχὴ ἐπιτεταγμένη σώματι, τότε μὲν ἄλλῳ τότε δὲ ἄλλῳ· the soul is always conjoined with a body, but sometimes of one kind, and sometimes of another—which many Christian doctors also, as is before declared, have thought highly probable. However, our Christian faith assures us, that the souls of good men shall at length be clothed with spiritual and heavenly bodies, such as are, in Aristotle's language, ἀνάλογα τῷ τῶν ἄστρων στοιχείῳ, analogous to the element of the stars.—Which Christian resurrection, therefore, to life and immortality, is far from being, as Celsus[2] reproached it, σκωλήκων ἐλπὶς, the mere hope of worms.—And thus much shall suffice, in way of confutation, of the first atheistic objection against Providence, which is the twelfth argumentation propounded in the second chapter.

The thirteenth atheistic argument, or second objection against Providence, is from the seeming confusion of human affairs; that all things fall alike to all; the innocent and the nocent, the pious and the impious, the religious and the profane: nay, that in many times the worser causes and men prevail against the better, as is intimated in that passage of the poet,[3] though in the person of a Theist,

Victrix causa Deo placuit, sed victa Catoni;

And that the unjust and ungodly often flow in all kind of prosperity, whilst the innocent and devout worshippers of the Deity, all their lives long, conflict with adversity. Whereas, were there a God and providence, as they conceive, profane and irreligious persons would be presently thunderstruck from heaven, or otherwise made remarkable objects of Divine vengeance, as also the pious miraculously protected and rescued from evil and harms.

Now we grant indeed, that this consideration hath too much puzzled and staggered weak minds in all ages. Because [4] "sentence against an evil work is not executed speedily, therefore is the heart of the sons of men fully set within them to do evil." And the Psalmist himself[5] was sometime much perplexed with this phenomenon, the prosperity of the ungodly, who "set their mouths against heaven, and whose tongue walketh through the earth;" so that he was tempted to think, "he had cleansed his heart in vain, and washed his hands in innocency;" (till at length, entering into the sanctuary of God, his

[1] De Leg. x. p. 903. (p. 672.)

[2] Apud Origin. contra Celsum, lib. v. p. 240.

[3] Lucan. lib. i. vers. 131. [4] Eccles. 8: 11. [5] Psal. lxxiii.

mind became illuminated, and his soul fixed in a firm trust and confidence upon Divine Providence; "Whom have I in heaven but thee," etc. "My flesh and my heart faileth, but God is the strength of my heart, and my portion for ever.") For, as some will from hence be apt to infer, That there is no God at all, but that blind chance and fortune steer all, ("the fool hath said in his heart, There is no God;"[1]) so will others conclude, That though there be a God, yet he either does not know things done here below, ("how does God know? and is there knowledge in the Most High?"[2]) or else will not so far humble himself, or disturb his own ease and quiet, as to concern himself in our low human affairs.[3]

First of all therefore, we here say, that it is altogether unreasonable to require, that Divine Providence should miraculously interpose upon every turn in punishing the ungodly, and preserving the pious, and thus perpetually interrupt the course of nature (which would look but like a botch or bungle, and a violent business), but rather carry things on ἀψόφῳ κελεύθῳ, in a still and silent path, and show his art and skill in making things of themselves fairly unwind, and clear up at last into a satisfactory close. Passion and self-interest is blind, or short-sighted; but that, which steers the whole world, is no fond, pettish, impatient, and passionate thing, but an impartial, disinterested, and uncaptivated nature. Nevertheless, it is certain, that sometimes we have not wanted instances, in cases extraordinary, of a Θεὸς ἀπὸ μηχανῆς, God appearing, as it were, miraculously upon the stage,—and manifesting himself in taking immediate vengeance upon notorious malefactors, or delivering his faithful servants from imminent dangers or evils threatened; as the same is often done also by a secret and undiscerned over ruling of the things of nature. But it must be granted, that it is not always thus, but the periods of Divine Providence here in this world are commonly longer, and the evolutions thereof slower; according to that of Euripides,[4] which yet has a tang of profaneness in the expression,

Μέλλει τὸ Θεῖον δ' ἐστὶ τοιαῦτον φύσει,

The Deity is slow or dilatory, and this is the nature of it. For it is not from slackness and remissness in the Deity, but either from his patience and long-suffering, he willing, that men should repent, or else to teach

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[1] Psal. 14: 1. [2] Psal. 72: 2.

[3] Thus did some in Plato from hence conclude, εἶναι μὲν Θεοὺς, τῶν δὲ ἀνθρωπίνων ἀμελεῖν πραγμάτων· De Leg. x. (p. 664.)

[4] In Oreste, vers. 420.

us patience by his example (as Plutarch[1] suggesteth), or that all things may be carried on with more pomp and solemnity; or lastly, for other particular reasons, as Plutarch[2] ventures to assign one, why it might not be expedient for Dionysius the tyrant, though so profane and irreligious a person, to have been cut off suddenly. But wicked and ungodly persons oftentimes fail not to be met withal at last, and at the long-run, here in this life, and either in themselves or posterity, to be notoriously branded with the marks of Divine displeasure: according to that of the poet,[3] "Raro antecedentem scelestum," etc. It is seldom, that wickedness altogether escapes punishment, though it come slowly after, limping with a lame foot;—and those proverbial speeches amongst the Pagans,[4]

> Ὀψὲ θεῶν ἀλεοῦσι μύλοι, ἀλεοῦσι δὲ λεπτά.
>
> Mills of the gods do slowly wind,
> But they at length to powder grind.

and, "Divine justice steals on softly with woollen feet, but strikes at last with iron hands."

Nevertheless we cannot say that it is always thus neither, but that wicked persons may possibly sometimes have an uninterrupted prosperity here in this life, and no visible marks of Divine displeasure upon them: but, as the generously virtuous will not envy them upon this account, nor repine at their own condition, they knowing that[5] οὐδὲν κακὸν τῷ ἀγαθῷ οὐδ' αὖ τῷ φαύλῳ ἀγαθὸν, There is neither any thing truly evil to the good, nor good to the evil;—so are they so far from being staggered herewith in their belief of a God and providence, that they are rather the more confirmed in their persuasions of a future immortality and judgment after death, when all things shall be set straight and right, and rewards and punishments impartially dispensed. That of Plutarch[6] therefore is most true here, εἷς οὖν ὁ λόγος ὁ τοῦ Θεοῦ τὴν πρόνοιαν ἅμα καὶ τὴν διαμονὴν τῆς ἀνθρωπίνης ψυχῆς βεβαιῶν, καὶ θάτερον οὐκ ἔστιν ἀπολιπεῖν ἀναιροῦντα θάτερον, That there is a necessary connexion betwixt those two things, Divine Providence, and the perma-

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[1] De sera Numinis Vindicta, tom. ii. oper. p. 550.

[2] Ibid. p. 557. [3] Horat. Odar. lib. iii. od. ii.

[4] Vide Plutarch, ubi supra, p. 548.

[5] Vide Platon. in Apolog. Socratis, p. 369. et de Republic. lib. x. p. 518.

[6] Ubi supra, p. 560.

nence or immortality of human souls, one and the same reason confirming them both; neither can one of these be taken alone without the other.—But they, who, because judgment is not presently executed upon the ungodly, blame the management of things as faulty, and Providence as defective, are like such spectators of a dramatic poem, as when wicked or injurious persons are brought upon the stage, for awhile swaggering and triumphing, impatiently cry out against the dramatist, and presently condemn the plot; whereas, if they would but expect the winding up of things, and stay till the last close, they should then see them come off with shame and sufficient punishment.[1] The evolution of the world, as Plotinus calls it,[2] is ἀληθέστερον ποίημα, a truer poem;—and we men histrionical actors upon the stage, who, notwithstanding, insert something of our own into the poem too: but God Almighty is that skilful dramatist, who always connecteth that of ours, which went before, with what of his follows after, into good coherent sense, and will at last make it appear, that a thread of exact justice did run through all, and that rewards and punishments are measured out in geometrical proportion.

Lastly, It is in itself fit, that there should be somewhere a doubtful and cloudy state of things, for the better exercise of virtue and faith. For, as there could have been no Hercules, had there not been monsters to subdue; so, were there no such difficulties to encounter with, no puzzles and entanglements of things, no temptations and trials to assault us, virtue would grow languid, and that excellent grace of faith want due occasion and objects to exercise itself upon. Here have we therefore such a state of things, and this world is, as it were, a stage erected for the more difficult part of virtue to act upon, and where we are to live by faith and not by sight; that faith, which is "the substance of things to be hoped for, and the evidence of things not seen;" a belief in the goodness, power, and wisdom of God, when all things are dark and cloudy round about us. "The just shall live by his faith."

We have now sufficiently confuted the second atheistic objection also, against Providence, as to the conduct and economy of human affairs. Nevertheless this is a large field, and much more might be said in defence of Providence, both as to these and other instances, had we room here to expatiate in. Wherefore for a supplement of what remains, we shall refer the reader to the writings of others, who have professedly undertaken apologies for Providence, both as to the fabric and economy

[1] Vide Plutarch, ubi supra, p. 554.

[2] Ennead. iii. lib. ii. cap. xvi. p. 267. oper.

of the world; but especially the learned and ingenious author[1] of the Divine Dialogues. Only we shall here add some few considerations, not so much for the confutation of Atheists, as for the better satisfaction of such religionists, who, too easily concluding, that all things might have been much better than they are, are therefore apt to call in question the Divine attribute of goodness in its full extent, which yet is the only foundation of our Christian faith.

First therefore we say, that in judging of the works of God, we ought not to consider the parts of the world alone by themselves; and then, because we could fancy much finer things, thereupon blame the Maker of the whole. As if one should attend only to this earth, which is but the lowest and most dreggy part of the universe; or blame plants because they have not sense; brutes, because they have not reason; men, because they are not demons or angels; and angels, because they are not gods, or want Divine perfection. Upon which account, God should either have made nothing at all, since there can be nothing besides himself absolutely perfect, or else nothing but the higher rank of angelical beings, free from mortality, and all those other evils, that attend mankind, or such fine things as Epicurus's Gods were feigned to be, living in certain delicious regions,[2] where there was neither blustering winds, nor any lowering clouds, nor nipping frosts, nor scorching heat, nor night, nor shadow, but the calm and unclouded ether, always smiling with gentle serenity, whereas were there but one kind of thing (the best) thus made, there could have been no music nor harmony at all in the world, for want of variety. But we ought, in the first place, to consider the whole, whether that be not the best, that could be made, having all that belongeth to it; and then the parts in reference to the whole, whether they be not, in their several degrees and ranks, congruous and agreeable thereunto. But this is a thing, which hath been so well insisted upon by Plotinus, that we cannot speak better to it, than in his words: [3] *Ὅλον γὰρ τὶ ἐποίησε πάγκαλον, καὶ αὔταρκες, καὶ φίλον αὐτῷ, καὶ τοῖς μέρεσι τοῖς αὐτοῦ, τοῖς τε κυριωτέροις καὶ τοῖς ἐλάττοσιν ὡσαύτως προσφόροις· ὁ τοίνυν ἐκ τῶν μερῶν τὸ ὅλον αἰτιώμενος, ἄτοπος ἂν εἴη τῆς αἰτίας· τά τε γὰρ μέρη πρὸς αὐτὸ τὸ ὅλον δεῖ σκοπεῖν εἰ σύμφωνα καὶ ἁρμόττοντα ἐκείνῳ, καὶ τὸ ὅλον σκοπούμενον, μὴ πρὸς μέρη ἄττα μικρὰ βλέπειν· τοῦτο γὰρ οὐ τὸν κόσμον αἰτιωμένου ἀλλά τινα τῶν αὐτοῦ χωρὶς λαβόντα, οἷον εἰ, καὶ τὰ ἑξῆς·* God made the whole most beautiful, entire, complete, and sufficient; all agreeing friendly with itself and its parts; both the

[1] Dr. Henry More. [2] Vide Lucret. lib. iii. ver. 19.

[3] Page 256. (Lib. ii. de Providentia, Ennead. iii. lib. ii. cap. iii.)

nobler and the meaner of them being alike congruous thereunto. Whosoever, therefore, from the parts thereof, will blame the whole, is an absurd and unjust censurer. For we ought to consider the parts, not alone by themselves, but in reference to the whole, whether they be harmonious and agreeable to the same. Otherwise we shall not blame the universe, but some of its parts only taken by themselves; as if one should blame the hair or toes of a man, taking no notice at all of his Divine visage and countenance; or omitting all other animals, one should attend only to the most contemptible of them; or, lastly, overlooking all other men, consider only the most deformed Thersites. But that, which God made, was the whole as one thing; which he that attends to may hear it speaking to him after this manner: 'God Almighty hath made me, and from thence came I, perfect and complete, and standing in need of nothing, because in me are contained all things; plants, and animals, and good souls, and men happy with virtue, and innumerable demons, and many gods. Nor is the earth alone in me adorned with all manner of plants, and a variety of animals; or does the power of soul extend at most no further than to the seas; as if the whole air, and ether, and heaven, in the mean time, were quite devoid of soul, and altogether unadorned with living inhabitants. Moreover, all things in me desire good, and every thing reaches to it according to its power and nature. For the whole depends upon that first and highest Good, the gods themselves, who reign in my several parts, and all animals, and plants, and whatsoever seems to be inanimate in me. For some things in me partake only of being, some of life also, some of sense, some of reason, and some of intellect above reason. But no man ought to require equal things from unequal; nor that the finger should see, but the eye; it being enough for the finger to be a finger, and to perform its own office.'—And again, afterwards, *ὥσπερ τεχνίτης οὐ πάντα τὰ ἐν τῷ ζώῳ ὀφθαλμοὺς ποιεῖ, οὕτως οὐδ' ὁ λόγος πάντα θεοὺς ἐργάζεται· ἀλλὰ τὰ μὲν θεοὺς, τὰ δὲ δαίμονας δευτέραν φύσιν, εἶτα ἀνθρώπους, καὶ ζῶα ἐφεξῆς, οὐ φθόνῳ· ἀλλὰ λόγῳ ποικιλίαν νοερὰν ἔχοντι· ἡμεῖς δὲ ὥσπερ οἱ ἄπειροι γραφικῆς τέχνης αἰτιῶνται, ὡς οὐ καλὰ τὰ χρώματα πανταχοῦ, ὁ δ' ἄρα τὰ προσήκοντα ἀπέδωκεν ἑκάστῳ τόπῳ· ἢ εἴ τις δρᾶμα μέμφοιτο, ὅτι μη πάντες ἥρωες ἐν αὐτῷ, καὶ τὰ ἑξῆς·* As an artificer would not make all things in an animal to be eyes; so neither has the Divine *Λόγος*, or spermatic reason of the world, made all things gods; but some gods, and some demons, and some men, and some lower animals; not out of envy, but to display its own variety and fecundity. But we are like unskilful spectators of a picture, who condemn the limner, because he hath not put bright colours every where; whereas he had suited his

colours to every part respectively, giving to each such as belonged to it. Or else are we like those, who would blame a comedy or tragedy, because they were not all kings or heroes, that acted in it, but some servants and rustic clowns introduced also, talking after their rude fashion. Whereas the dramatic poem would neither be complete, nor elegant and delightful, were all those worser parts taken out of it.

Again, We cannot certainly conclude, that the works of God and his creation do not transcend those narrow limits, which vulgar opinion and imagination sets them, that commonly terminates the universe, but a little above the clouds, or at most supposes the fixed stars, being all fastened in one solid sphere, to be the utmost wall, or arched roof, and rolling circumference thereof. Much less ought we, upon such groundless suppositions, to infer, that the world might therefore have been made much better than it is, because it might have been much more roomy and capacious. We explode the atheistic infinity of distant worlds; nor can we admit that Cartesian, seemingly more modest, indefinite extension of one corporeal universe, which yet really, according to that philosopher's meaning, hath *nullos fines*, no bounds nor limits at all. For we persuade ourselves, that the corporeal world is as uncapable of a positive infinity of magnitude, as it is of time; there being no magnitude so great,but that more still might be added to it. Nevertheless, as we cannot possibly imagine the sun to be a quarter, or an hundredth part so big as we know it to be; so much more may the whole corporeal universe far transcend those narrow bounds, which our imagination would circumscribe it. The new celestial phenomena, and the late improvements of astronomy and philosophy made thereupon, render it so probable, that even this dull earth of ours is a planet, and the sun a fixed star in the centre of that vortex, wherein it moves, that, many have shrewdly suspected, that there are other habitable globes, besides this earth of ours, (which may be sailed round about in a year or two) as also more suns, with their respective planets, than one. However, the distance of all the fixed stars from us being so vast, that the diameter of the great orb makes no discernible parallax in the site of them; from whence it is also probable, that the other fixed stars are likewise vastly distant from one another: this, I say, widens the corporeal universe to us, and makes those "flammantia mœnia mundi," as Lucretius calls[1] them those flaming walls of the world, to fly away before us. Now, it is not reasonable to think, that all this immense vastness should lie waste, desert, and uninhabited, and have nothing in it that

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Lib. i. ver. 73, 74.

could praise the Creator thereof, save only this one small spot of earth. "In my father's house (saith our Saviour) are many mansions." And Baruch, (chapter iii. appointed by our church to be read publicly) "Oh Israel, how great is the house of God, and how large is the place of his possession? Great and hath no end, high and unmeasurable." Which yet we understand not of an absolute infinity, but only such an immense vastness, as far transcends vulgar opinion and imagination.

We shall add but one thing more, that, to make a right judgment of the ways of Providence, and the justice thereof, as to the economy of mankind, we must look both forwards and backwards, or besides the present, not only upon the future, but also, the past time. Which rule is likewise thus set down by Plotinus; [1] *οὐδ' ἐκεῖνον ἀπωβλητέον τὸν λόγον, ὃς οὐ πρὸς τὸ παρὸν ἑκάστοτε φησὶ βλέπειν· ἀλλὰ πρὸς τὰς πρόσθεν περιόδους, καὶ αὖ το μέλλον·* Neither is that doctrine of the ancients to be neglected, that, to give an account of Providence, we ought to look back, upon former periods, as well as forward to what is future. — Indeed he, and those other philosophers, who were religious, understood this so, as to conclude a pre-existent state of all particular souls, wherein they were at first created by God pure, but by the abuse of their own liberty degenerated, to be a necessary hypothesis, for the solving that phenomenon of the depraved state of mankind in general here in this life. And not only so, but they endeavoured in like manner to give an account also of those different conditions of particular persons as to morality, from their infancy, and their other different fates here, deriving them all *ἐκ τῶν προβεβιωμένον*, from their several demeanors heretofore in a pre-existent state. — And there have not wanted Christian doctors, who have complied with these philosophers in both. But our common Christianity only agrees thus far, as to suppose a kind of imputative pre-existence in Adam, in whom all were created pure, and so consequently involved in his after miscarriage, to solve the pravity of human nature; upon which account we are all said to be *φύσει τέκνα ὀργῆς*, [2] by nature the children of wrath. — But as for the different conditions of persons, and their several fates, more disadvantageous to some than others,[3] this indeed the generality of Christian doctors have been content to resolve only into an occult, but just Providence. And thus does Origen[4] himself some times modestly pass it over, as in his third book against Celsus, *πολλοῖς καὶ τὰ τῆς ἀνατροφῆς τοιούτως γεγένηται, ὡς μηδὲ*

[1] P. 246. [Ennead. iii. lib. ii. cap xiii.] [2] Ephes. 2: 3.

[3] Thus Hierocles, *οὐκ ἀμελεῖται ὁ ἀγαθὸς νῦν γινόμενος, κἂν παλαιῶν μεν ιμάτων ἐφέλκηται στίγματα*, 157. [4] P. 134.

φαντασίαν ἐπιτραπῆναι τῶν κρειττόνων λαβεῖν· ἀλλ' ἀεὶ καὶ ἐκ πρώτης ἡλικίας ἤτοι ἐν παιδικοῖς εἶναι ἀκολάστων ἀνδρῶν, ἢ δεσποτῶν, ἢ ἐν ἄλλῃ τινὶ κωλυούσῃ τὴν ψυχὴν ἀναβλέπειν κακοδαιμονίᾳ· τὰς δὲ περὶ τούτων αἰτίας πάντως μὲν εἰκὸς εἶναι, ἐν τοῖς τῆς προνοίας λόγοις· πίπτειν δὲ αὐτάς εἰς ανθρώπους οὐκ εὐχερές· It happeneth to many, so to have been brought up from their very childhood, as that, by one means or other, they could have no opportunity at all of thinking of the better things, etc. And it is very probable, that there are causes of these things in the reasons of Providence, though they do not easily fall under human notice.

But there is yet a third atheistic objection against Providence behind, That it is impossible any one Being should animadvert and order all things in the distant places of the world at once; and, were this possible, yet would such infinite negotiosity be very uneasy and distractious to it, and altogether inconsistent with happiness. Nor would a Being, irresistibly powerful, concern itself in the good or welfare of any thing else, it standing in need of nothing, and all benevolence and good-will arising from indigency, and imbecility. Wherefore such a Being would wholly be taken up in the enjoyment of itself, and its own happiness, utterly regardless of all other things.

To which the reply is, first, That though ourselves, and all created beings, have but a finite animadversion, and narrow sphere of activity; yet does it not therefore follow, that the case must be the same with the Deity, supposed to be a Being infinitely perfect, *ἀπειροδύναμος*, that hath no manner of defect—either of knowledge or power in it. But this is a mere *idolum specus*, an idol of the cave or den—men measuring the Deity by their own scantling and narrowness. And, indeed, were there nothing at all but what we ourselves could fully comprehend, there could be no God. Were the sun an animal, and had life coextended with its rays and light, it would see and perceive every atom of matter, that its outstretched beams reached to, and touched. Now all created beings are themselves, in some sense, but the rays of the Deity, which therefore cannot but feel and sensibly perceive all these its own effluxes and emanations. Men themselves can order and manage affairs in several distant places at once, without any disturbance; and we have innumerable notions of things in our mind, that lie there easily together, without crowding one another, or causing any distraction to us.[1]

Nevertheless, the minds of weak mortals may here be somewhat eased and helped, by considering what hath been before suggested;

[1] Vide Xenophontem de Memorabilib. Socratis, lib. i. p. 575.

that there is no necessity God Almighty should *αὐτουργεῖν ἅπαντα*, do all things himself immediately and drudgingly—but he may have his inferior ministers and executioners under him, to discharge him of that supposed encumberment. As, first of all an artificial plastic nature, which, without knowledge and animal consciousness, disposes the matter of the universe according to the platform or idea of a perfect mind, and forms the bodies of animals. And this was one reason, why we did before insist so much upon this artificial, regular, and methodical nature, namely, that Divine Providence might be excluded from having an influence upon all things in this lower world, as resulting only from the fortuitous motion of senseless matter, unguided by any mind; nor yet the Deity be supposed to do every thing itself immediately and miraculously, without the subservient ministry of any natural causes, which would seem to us mortals, to be not only a violent, but also an operose, cumbersome, and moliminous business. And thus did Plato[1] acknowledge, that there were *ἔμφρονος φύσεως αἰτίαι αἷς ὑπηρετούσαις χρῆται ὁ Θεός*· certain causes of a prudent, that is, artificial and orderly nature, which God makes use of, as subservient to himself in the mundane economy.—Besides which, those instincts also impressed upon animals, and which they are passive to, directing them to act for ends either not understood, or not attending to by them, in order to their own good and the good of the universe, are another part of that Divine Fate, which, inserted into things themselves, is the servant and executioner of Providence. Above all which, there are yet other knowing and understanding ministers of the Deity, as its eyes and hands; demoniac or angelic beings, appointed to preside over mankind, all mundane affairs, and the things of nature; they having their several distinct offices and provinces assigned them. Of which also Plato thus; [2] *τούτοις εἰσὶν ἄρχοντες προστεταγμένοι ἑκάστοις, ἐπὶ τὸ σμικρότατον ἀεὶ πάθης καὶ πράξεως*· There are certain rulers or presidents appointed by the supreme God who governs the whole world, over all the several things and parts therein, even to the smallest distribution of them.—All which inferior causes are constantly overlooked and supervised by the watchful eye of God Almighty himself, who may also sometimes extraordinarily interpose.

We need not, therefore, restrain and confine Divine Providence to a few greater things only, as some do, that we may thereby consult the ease of the Deity, and its freedom from distraction; but may and ought

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[1] In Timæo, § xxxvi. p. 256.

[2] P. 903. (De Legibus, lib. x. p. 671.)

to extend it to all things whatsoever, small as well as great. And, indeed, the great things of the world cannot well be ordered neither, without some regard to the small and little: [1]οὐδὲ γὰρ ἄνευ σμικρῶν τοὺς μεγάλους φασὶν οἱ λιθολόγοι λίθους εὖ κεῖσθαι· as architects affirm, that great stones cannot be well placed together in a building without little. —Neither can generals of armies, nor governors of families, nor masters of ships, nor mechanic artificers, discharge their several functions, and do their works respectively as they ought, did they not mind small things also, as well as the great. Μὴ τοίνυν (saith the forementioned philosopher)[2] τόνγε Θεὸν ἀξιώσομέν ποτε θνητῶν δημιουργῶν φαυλότερον, οὗ τὰ προσήκοντα αὐτοῖς ἔργα, ὅσῳπερ ἂν ἀμείνους ὦσι, τόσῳ ἀκριβέστερα καὶ τελεώτερα μίᾳ τέχνῃ σμικρὰ καὶ μεγάλα ἀπεργάζονται· Let us not therefore make God Almighty inferior to mortal opificers, who, by one and the same art, can order small things as well as great; and so suppose him to be supine and negligent.—Nevertheless, the chief concernment and employment of Divine Providence in the world is the economy of souls, or government of rational beings, which is by Plato contracted into this compendium; [3]οὐδὲν ἄλλο ἔργον τῷ πεττευτῇ λείπεται πλὴν μετατιθέναι τὸ μὲν ἄμεινον γινόμενον ἦθος εἰς βελτιω τόπον χεῖρον δὲ εἰς τὸν χείρονα, etc. There is no other work left for the supreme Governor of all, than only to translate better souls into better places and conditions, and worser into worser—or, as he after addeth, to dispose of every one in the world in such a manner, as might best render νικῶσαν ἀρετὴν, ἡττωμένην δὲ κακίαν, virtue victorious, and triumphant over vice.—And thus may the slow and imperfect wits of mortals be satisfied, that Providence to the Deity is no moliminous, laborious, and distractious thing.

But that there is no higher spring of life in rational animals, than contracted self-love, and that all good-will and benevolence arises only from indigency and imbecility, and that no being whatsoever is concerned in the welfare of any other thing, but only what itself stands in need of; and, lastly, therefore, that what is irresistibly powerful, and needs nothing, would have no manner of benevolence, nor concern itself in the good and welfare of any thing whatsoever; this is but another idol of the Atheists' den, and only argues their bad nature, low-sunk minds, and gross immorality. And the same is to be said also of that other maxim of theirs,[4] That what is perfectly happy would have nothing at all to do, but only enjoy its own ease and quiet: whereas there is nothing more troublesome to ourselves than this ἀπραξέα, this

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[1] Plato de Legib. lib. x. p. 671. [2] Ibid. [3] P. 903. (p. 672.)

[4] Vide Diogen. Laert. lib. x. Segm. 139. p. 661.

having nothing to do—and the activity of the Deity, or a perfect being, is altogether as easy to it as its essence.

The atheistic queries come next to be answered; which, being but three, are naturally to be disposed in this order: First, If there were a God, or perfect Being, who therefore was sufficiently happy in the enjoyment of himself, why would he go about to make a world? Secondly, If he must needs make a world, why did he not make it sooner? this late production thereof looking, as if he had but newly awaked out of sleep throughout infinite past ages, or else had in length of time contracted a satiety of his solitude. Thirdly and lastly, What tools or instruments? what machines or engines had he? Or how could he move the matter of the whole world, especially if incorporeal? because then he would run through all things, and could not lay hold nor fasten upon any thing.

To the first therefore we say, That the reason, why God made the world, was from his own overflowing and communicative goodness, that there might be other beings also happy, besides him, and enjoy themselves. Nor does this at all clash with God's making of the world for his own glory and honor: though Plotinus[1] were so shy of that, *γελοῖον ἵνα τιμῶται, καὶ μεταφερόντων ἀπὸ τῶν ἀγαλματοποιῶν τῶν ἐνταῦθα*, it is ridiculous to say that God made the world, that he might be honored; this being to transfer the affections of human artificers and statuaries upon him.—But the chief reason of his saying so was, because that philosopher conceived the world to have proceeded, not so much from the will of the Deity, as the necessity of its nature. Though this be true also, that God did not make the world merely to ostentate his skill and power, but to communicate his goodness, which is chiefly and properly his glory, as the light and splendor of the sun is the glory of it. But the Atheist demands, what hurt had it been for us never to have been made? and the answer is easy, We should then never have enjoyed any good, or been capable of happiness; and had there been no rational creatures at all made, it must have been either from impotent sterility in the Deity, or else from an invidious, narrow, and contracted selfishness, or want of benignity, and communicative goodness; both which are inconsistent with a perfect Being. But the argument may be thus retorted upon these Atheists; What hurt would it be for us to cease to be, or become nothing? And why then are these Atheists, as well as others, so unwilling to die?

But then in the next place they urge: Why was not the world made

[1] Libro contra Gnosticos, Ennead. ii. lib. ix. cap. iv. p. 202.

sooner, since this goodness of God was without date, and from everlasting? But this question may be taken in two different senses; either, Why was not the world from eternity, as God and his goodness are eternal? or else, secondly, If the world could not be from eternity, yet, notwithstanding, why was it not sooner, but so lately made? In both which queries the atomic Atheists take it for granted, that the system of the world was not from eternity, but had a beginning. Now we say, that the reason, why the world was not made from eternity, was not from any defect of goodness in the Divine will, but because there is an absolute impossibility in the thing itself; or because the necessity and incapacity of such an imperfect being hindered. For we must confess, that, for our parts, we are prone to believe, that could the world have been from eternity, it should certainly have been so. And just thus does Philoponus, in his confutation of Proclus's arguments for the world's eternity, declare himself, and no otherwise: [1]*Καὶ ἡμεῖς ἄρα μὴ εἶναι τὸν κόσμον ἀΐδιον ὑποτιθέμενοι, οὔτε τὸ εἶναι τὸν Θεὸν ἀεὶ ἀγαθὸν ἀφαιρούμεθα, οὔτε ἀσθένειαν τῆς δημιουργικῆς αὐτοῦ κατηγορροῦμεν δυνάμεως· ἀλλὰ μὴ δύνασθαι ἀεὶ εἶναι τὸν κόσμον δι' αὐτὴν τὴν τοῦ γενομένου φύσιν ὑποτιθέμεθα·* Ourselves also supposing the world not to have been eternal, do neither ascribe this to any defect either of goodness or of power in the Deity, but only to the impossibility of the thing itself.—Where, in the following words, he gives a two-fold account of this impossibility of the world's eternity; *ὅτι τε τὸ ἄπειρον κατ' ἐνέργειαν ὑποστῆναι, ᾗ διεξίτητον εἶναι ἦν ἀδύνατον καὶ ὅτι συναΐδιον εἶναι τῷ ποιοῦντι τὸ γινόμενον φύσιν οὐκ ἔχει·* First, because there can be nothing actually infinite, and yet run through, as all the past duration of the world hath been; and, secondly, because that, which is made, or brought into being by another, as a distinct thing from it, cannot be coeternal with its maker.—Where it is probable that Philoponus, being a Christian, designed not to oppose the eternal generation of the Son of God, but only to assert that nothing, which was properly made or created by God, and nothing, which was not itself God, could be from eternity, or without beginning. And now we see, how those atheistic exceptions against the novity of the Divine creation, as if God must therefore either have slept from eternity, or else have at length contracted a satiety of his former solitude, and the like, do of themselves quite vanish into nothing. But then, as to the second sense of the question, Why the world, though it could not possibly be from eternity, yet was no sooner, but so lately made? we say, that this is an absurd question;

[1] Page 4. (Edit. Trincavell.)

both because time was made together with the world, and there was no sooner or later before time; and also because whatsoever had a beginning, must of necessity be once but a day old. Wherefore the world could not possibly have been so made by God in time, as not to be once but five or six thousand years old, and no more; as now it is.

And as for the third and last query; How God could move and command the matter of the whole world, especially if incorporeal? we reply, first, that all other things being derived from God, as their only fountain and original, and essentially depending on him, who, by his absolute power also, could annihilate whatsoever he created; he must needs have a despotic power over all; and every thing whatsoever be naturally subject and obsequious to him. And since no body can possibly move itself, that, which first moved matter, must of necessity be incorporeal; nor could it by local motion, as one body moves another, or as engines and machines move by trusion or pulsion, they being before moved, but must do it by another kind of action, such as is not local motion, nor heterokinesy, but autokinesy; that is, by cogitation. Wherefore, that conceit of the Atheists, that an incorporeal Deity could not possibly move the matter of the world, because it would run through it, and could not fasten or lay hold thereupon, is absurd, because this moves matter not mechanically but vitally, and by cogitation only. And that a cogitative being, as such, hath a natural imperium over matter, and power of moving it, without any engines or machines, is unquestionably certain, even from our own souls; which move our bodies, and command them every way, merely by will and thought. And a perfect mind presiding over the matter of the whole world, could much more irresistibly, and with infinitely more ease, move the whole corporeal universe, merely by will and cogitation, than we can our bodies.

The last head of atheistic argumentation is from interest. And, first, the Atheists would persuade, that it is the interest of mankind in general, and of every particular person, that there should be no God, that is, no Being infinitely powerful, that hath no law, but its own will; and therefore may punish whom he pleases eternally after death.

To which our first reply is, that if there be a God, and souls be immortal, then is it not any man's thinking otherwise that will alter the case, nor afford the Atheists any relief against those two imagined evils of theirs. For things are sullen, and will be as they are, whatever we think them, or wish them to be; and men will at last discover their error, when perhaps it may be too late. Wishing is no proving; and therefore this atheistic argument from interest is no argument at all

against the existence of a God, it being nothing but the ignorant wish and vain desire of besotted Atheists.

In the next place, this wish of Atheists is altogether founded upon a mistaken notion of God Almighty too, that he is nothing but arbitrary will omnipotent; which indeed is not the most desirable thing. But as it hath been often declared, the will of God, is the will of goodness, justice, and wisdom itself omnipotent. His will is not mere will, such as hath no other reason besides itself; but it is law, equity, and chancery; it is the τὸ δέον, or Ought itself—decreeing, willing and acting. Neither does God punish any out of a delight in punishment, or in the evil and suffering of the persons punished; but to those, who are not ἀνίατοι, altogether incurable, δίκη ἰατρεία, his punishment is physic—in order to their recovery and amendment; so that the source and fountain thereof is goodness to the persons themselves punished. But to such as are incurable, the punishment inflicted on them is intended for the good of the whole. So that this attribute of justice in God doth not at all clash with the attribute of goodness, it being but a branch thereof, or particular modification of the same. Goodness and justice in God are always complicated together; neither his goodness being fondness, nor his justice cruelty; but he being both good in punishing, and just in rewarding and dispensing benefits. Wherefore, it can be the interest of none, that there should be no God nor immortality, unless perhaps of such desperately and incurably wicked persons, who abandoning their true interest of being good, having thereupon no other interest now left them, than not to be, or become nothing.

To be without a God, is to be without hope in the world; for Atheists can have neither faith, nor hope, in senseless matter, and the fortuitous motions thereof. And though an understanding being have never so much enjoyment of itself for the present, yet could it not possibly be happy, without immortality, and security of the future continuance thereof. But the Atheists conclude, that there is nothing immortal, and that all life perisheth and vanisheth into nothing; and consequently also, that εὐδαιμονία ἀνύπαρκτον, happiness is a thing that hath no existence in nature, a mere figment and chimera, or idle wish and vain dream of mortals. Wherefore it cannot be the interest of mankind, that this hypothesis should be true, which thus plainly cuts off all hope from men, and leaves them in an utter impossibility of being ever happy.

God is such a being, as if he could be supposed not to be, there is nothing, which any, who are not desperately engaged in wickedness, no, not Atheists themselves, could possibly more wish for or desire.

To believe a God, is to believe the existence of all possible good and perfection in the universe; it is to believe, that things are as they should be, and that the world is so well framed and governed, as that the whole system thereof could not possibly have been better. For peccability arises from the necessity of imperfect free-willed beings, left to themselves, and therefore could not by omnipotence itself have been excluded; and though sin actual might perhaps have been kept out by force and violence, yet, all things computed, it was doubtless most for the good of the whole, that it should not be thus forcibly hindered. There is nothing, which cannot be hoped for, by a good man, from the Deity; whatsoever happiness his being is capable of, and such things, as "eye hath not seen, nor ear heard, nor can now enter into the heart of man to conceive." Infinite hopes lie before us, from the existence of a Being infinitely good and powerful, and our own souls' immortality; and nothing can hinder or obstruct these hopes, but our own wickedness of life. To believe a God, and do well, are two the most hopeful, cheerful, and comfortable things, that possibly can be. And to this purpose is that of Linus,[1]

Ἔλπεσθαι χρὴ πάντ᾽, ἐπεὶ οὐκ ἔστ᾽ οὐδὲν Ἄελπτον·
Ῥᾴδια πάντα Θεῷ τελέσαι, καὶ ἀνήνυτον οὐδέν.

Wherefore, as for Democritus and Epicurus, whose encomiums the Atheists here so loudly sing forth, we say, that however they have made so great a noise in the world, and have been so much cried up of late, yet were they really no better than a couple of infatuated sophists, or witty fools, and debauchers of mankind.

And now come we to the last atheistic argumentation, wherein they endeavor to recommend their doctrine to civil sovereigns, and to persuade them, that Theism or religion is absolutely inconsistent with their interest; their reasons for which are these three following. First, because the civil sovereign reigns only in fear; and therefore, if there be any power and fear greater than the power and fear of the Leviathan, civil authority can signify little. Secondly, because sovereignty is in its own nature absolutely indivisible, and must be either infinite, or none at all; so that Divine laws (natural and revealed) superior to it, circumscribing it, would consequently destroy it. Wherefore religion and Theism must of necessity be displaced, and removed out of the way, to make room for the Leviathan to roll and tumble in. Thirdly and lastly, private judgment of good and evil, just, and unjust, is also

[1] Apud Jamblichum de Vita Pythagor. cap. xxvii. p. 117, 118.

contradictious to the very being of a body politic; which is one artificial man, made up of many natural men united under one head, having one common reason, judgment, and will, ruling over the whole. But conscience, which religion introduceth, is private judgment of good and evil, just, and unjust, and therefore altogether inconsistent with true politics; that can admit of no private consciences, but only one public conscience of the law.

In way of answer to the first of which, we must here briefly unravel the atheistic ethics and politics. The foundation whereof is first laid in the villanizing of human nature; as that, which has not so much as any the least seeds, either of politicalness or ethicalness at all in it; nothing of equity and philanthropy (there being no other charity or benevolence any where, according to them, save what resulteth from fear, imbecility, and indigency); nothing of public and common concern, but all private and selfish; appetite and utility, or the desires of sensual pleasure, and honour, dominion, and precellency before others, being the only measures of good in nature. So that there can be nothing naturally just or unjust, nothing in itself sinful or unlawful, but every man by nature hath *jus ad omnia*, a right to every thing—whatsoever his appetite inclineth him unto, or himself judgeth profitable; even to other men's bodies and lives. "Si occidere cupis, jus habes;" if thou desirest to kill, thou hast then naturally a right thereunto;—that is, a liberty to kill without any sin or injustice. For *jus* and *lex*, or *justitia*, right and law, or justice, in the language of these atheistic politicians, are directly contrary to one another; their right being a belluine liberty, not made, or left by justice, but such as is founded in a supposition of its absolute nonexistence. Should therefore a son not only murder his own parents who had tenderly brought him up, but also exquisitely torture them, taking pleasure in beholding their rueful looks, and hearing their lamentable shrieks and outcries, there would be nothing of sin or injustice at all in this, nor in any thing else; because justice is no nature, but a mere factitious and artificial thing, made only by men and civil laws. And, according to these men's apprehensions, nature has been very kind and indulgent to mankind herein, that it hath thus brought us into the world, without any fetters or shackles upon us, free from all duty and obligation, justice and morality, these being to them nothing but restraints and hinderances of true liberty. From all which it follows, that nature absolutely dissociates and segregates men from one another, by reason of the inconsistency of those appetites of theirs, that are all carried out only to private good, and consequently, that every man is, by nature, in a state of war and hostility against every man.

In the next place, therefore, these atheistic politicians further add, that though this their state of nature, which is a liberty from all justice and obligation, and a lawless, loose, or belluine right to every thing, be in itself absolutely the best; yet nevertheless by reason of men's imbecility, and the equality of their strengths, and inconsistency of their appetites, it proves by accident the worst; this war with every one making men's right or liberty to every thing indeed a right or liberty to nothing; they having no security of their lives, much less of the comfortable enjoyment of them. For as it is not possible, that all men should have dominion (which were indeed a most desirable thing, according to these principles), so the generality must needs be sensible of more evil in such a state of liberty with an universal war against all, than of good. Wherefore, when men had been a good while hewing, and slashing, and justling against one another, they became at length all weary hereof, and conceived it necessary by art to help the defect of their own power here, and to choose a lesser evil for the avoiding of a greater; that is, to make a voluntary abatement of this their infinite right, and to submit to terms of equality with one another, in order to a sociable and peaceable cohabitation: and not only so, but also for the security of all, that others should observe such rules as well as themselves, to put their necks under the yoke of a common coercive power, whose will, being the will of them all, should be the very rule, and law, and measure of justice to them.

Here therefore these atheistic politicians, as they first of all slander human nature, and make a villain of it: so do they, in the next place, reproach justice and civil sovereignty also, making it to be nothing but an ignoble and dastardly brat of fear; or else a lesser evil submitted to merely out of necessity, for the avoiding of a greater evil, that of war with every one, by reason of men's natural imbecility. So that, according to this hypothesis, justice and civil government are plainly things not good in themselves, nor desirable (they being a hinderance of liberty, and nothing but shackles and fetters), but by accident only, as necessary evils: and thus do these politicians themselves sometimes distinguish betwixt good and just, that "bonum amatur per se, justum per accidens;" good is that, which is loved for itself, but just by accident.—From whence it follows unavoidably, that all men must of necessity be *ἄκοντες δίκαιοι*, unwillingly just,—or not with a full and perfect, but mixed will only; just being a thing that is not sincerely good, but such as hath a great dash or dose of evil blended with it. And this was the old atheistic generation of justice, and of a body politic, civil society, and sovereignty. For though a modern writer affirm

this hypothesis (which he looks upon as the only true scheme of politics) to be a new invention, as the circulation of the blood, and no older than the book De Cive, yet is it certain, that it was the commonly received doctrine of the atheistic politicians and philosophers before Plato's time; who represents their sense concerning the original justice and civil society in this manner: [1] *ὃ πρῶτον ἔφην ἐρεῖν, περὶ τούτου ἄκουε, τί τε ὂν τυγχάνει καὶ ὅθεν γέγονε δικαιοσύνη· πεφυκέναι γὰρ δή φασι, τὸ μὲν ἀδικεῖν ἀγαθόν, τὸ δὲ ἀδικεῖσθαι κακόν· πλέονι δὲ κακῷ ὑπερβάλλειν τὸ ἀδικεῖσθαι, ἢ ἀγαθῷ τὸ ἀδικεῖν· ὥστε ἐπειδὰν ἀλλήλους ἀδικῶσί τε καὶ ἀδικῶνται, καὶ ἀμφοτέρων γεύωνται, τοῖς μὴ δυναμένοις τὸ μὲν ἐκφεύγειν, τὸ δὲ αἱρεῖν, δοκεῖ λυσιτελεῖν ξυνθέσθαι ἀλλήλοις, μήτ' ἀδικεῖν, μήτ' ἀδικεῖσθαι· καὶ ἐντεῦθεν δὴ ἄρξασθαι νόμους τίθεσθαι, καὶ ὀνομάσαι τὸ ὑπὸ τοῦ νόμου ἐπίταγμα νόμιμόν τε καὶ δίκαιον·* I am to declare first what justice is, according to the sense of these philosophers, and from whence it was generated. They say, therefore, that by nature, lawless liberty, and to do that which is now called injustice and injury to other men, is good; but to suffer it from others, is evil. But of the two there is more of evil in suffering it, than of good in doing it: whereupon when men had clashed a good while, doing and suffering injury, the greater part, who by reason of their imbecility were not able to take the former without the latter, at length compounded the business amongst themselves, and agreed together by pacts and covenants, neither to do nor suffer injury, but to submit to rules of equality, and make laws by compact in order to their peaceable cohabitation, they calling that, which was required in those laws, by the name of just.—And then is it added: *καὶ εἶναι ταύτην γένεσίν τε καὶ οὐσίαν δικαιοσύνης, μεταξὺ οὖσαν τοῦ μὲν ἀρίστου ὄντος, ἐὰν ἀδικῶν μὴ διδῷ δίκην, τοῦ δὲ κακίστου, ἐὰν ἀδικούμενος τιμωρεῖσθαι ἀδύνατος ᾖ· τὸ δὲ δίκαιον ἐν μέσῳ ὂν τούτων ἀμφοτέρων, ἀγαπᾶσθαι, οὐχ ὡς ἀγαθὸν, ἀλλ' ὡς ἀῤῥωστίᾳ τοῦ ἀδικεῖν τιμώμενον·* And this is, according to these philosophers, the generation and essence of justice, as a certain middle thing betwixt the best and the worst. The best, to exercise a lawless liberty of doing whatsoever one please to other men without suffering any inconvenience from it; and the worst to suffer evil from others without being able to revenge it. Justice, therefore, being a middle thing betwixt both these, is loved, not as that which is good in itself, but only by reason of men's imbecility, and their inability to do injustice. Forasmuch as he, that had sufficient power, would never enter into such compacts, and submit to equality and subjection. As for example, if a man had Gyges's magical ring, that he could do

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[1] De Rep. lib. ii. p. 358, 359. (P. 442. edit. Ficini.)

whatsoever he listed, and not be seen or taken notice of by any, such an one would certainly never enter into covenants, nor submit to laws of equality and subjection.—Agreeably whereunto, it hath been concluded also by some of these old atheistic philosophers, that justice was ἀλλότριον ἀγαθὸν, not properly and directly one's own good, the good of him that is just, but another man's good, partly of the fellow-citizens, but chiefly of the ruler, whose vassal he is.—And it is well known, that after Plato's time, this hypothesis concerning justice, that it was a mere factitious thing, and sprung only from men's fear and imbecility, as a lesser evil, was much insisted on by Epicurus also.

But let us in the next place see, how our modern atheistic philosophers and politicians will manage and carry on this hypothesis, so as to consociate men by art into a body politic, that are naturally dissociated from one another, as also make justice and obligation artificial, when there is none in nature. First of all, therefore, these artificial justice-makers, city-makers, and authority-makers, tell us, that though men have an infinite right by nature, yet may they alienate this right, or part thereof, from themselves, and either simply renounce it, or transfer the same upon some other person; by means whereof it will become unlawful for themselves, afterwards, to make use thereof. Thus a late writer,[1] men "may by signs declare, Velle se non licitum sibi amplius fore, certum aliquid facere, quod jure antea fecisse poterant; That it is their will, it shall no longer be lawful for them, to do something, which before they had a right to do;" and this is called by him, a simple renunciation of right. And, further, saith he, they "may declare again, Velle se non licitum sibi amplius fore alicui resistere, etc. That it is their will, it shall be no longer lawful for them, to resist this or that particular person, whom before they might lawfully have resisted;" and this is called a translation of right. But if there be nothing in its own nature unlawful, then cannot this be unlawful for a man afterwards, to make use of such liberty, as he had before in words renounced or abandoned. Nor can any man, by his mere will, make any thing unlawful to him, which was not so in itself; but only to suspend the exercise of so much of his liberty as he thought good. But, however, could a man by his will oblige himself, or make any thing unlawful to him, there would be nothing got by this, because then might he, by his will, disoblige himself again, and make the same lawful as before. For what is made merely will, may be destroyed by will. Wherefore, these politicians will yet urge the business further, and tell us, that no man can be

[1] Hobbes, Elem. de Cive, cap. ii. sect. iv.

obliged but by his own act, and that the essence of injustice is nothing else but *dati repetitio*,[1] the taking away of that, which one had before given. To which we again reply, that were a man naturally unobliged to any thing, then could he no way be obliged to stand to his own act, so that it should be really unjust and unlawful for him, at any time, upon second thoughts, voluntarily to undo, what he had before voluntarily done. But the Atheists here plainly render injustice a mere ludicrous thing, when they tell us,[2] that it is nothing but such an absurdity in life, as it is in disputation, when a man denies a proposition, that he had before granted; which is no real evil in him as a man, but only a thing called an absurdity, as a disputant. That is, injustice is no absolute evil of the man; but only a relative incongruity in him, as a citizen. As when a man speaking Latin, observes not the laws of grammar, this is a kind of injustice in him, as a Latinist or grammarian; so when one, who lives in civil society, observes not the laws and conditions thereof, this is, as it were, the false Latin of a citizen, and nothing else. According to which notion of injustice, there is no such real evil or hurt in it, as can any way withstand the force of appetite and private utility, and oblige men to civil obedience, when it is contrary to the same. But these political jugglers and enchanters will here cast yet a further mist before men's eyes with their pacts and covenants. For men by their covenants, say they unquestionably oblige themselves, and make things unjust and unlawful to them, that were not so before. Wherefore, injustice is again defined by them, and that with more speciousness, to be the breach of covenants. But though it be true, that if there be natural justice, covenants will oblige; yet, upon the contrary supposition, that there is nothing naturally unjust, this cannot be unjust neither, to break covenants. Covenants, without natural justice, are nothing but mere words and breath (as indeed these atheistic politicians themselves, agreeably to their own hypothesis, call them); and therefore can they have no force to oblige. Wherefore, these justice-makers are themselves at last necessitated to fly to laws of nature, and to pretend this to be a law of nature, that men should stand to their pacts and covenants. Which is plainly to contradict their main fundamental principle, that by nature nothing is unjust or unlawful: for, if it be so, then can there be no laws of nature; and if there be laws of nature, then must there be something naturally unjust and unlawful. So that this is not to make justice, but clearly to unmake their own hypothesis, and to suppose justice to have been already made by nature, or to be in nature; which is a gross absurdity in disputation, to affirm what one had before denied. But these their

[1] Id. Ibid. cap. iii. sect. 3. [2] Id. ibid.

laws of nature are indeed nothing but juggling equivocation, and a mere mockery; themselves again acknowledging them to be no laws, because law is nothing but the word of him who hath command over others; but only conclusions or theorems concerning what conduces to the conservation and defence of themselves, upon the principle of fear; that is, indeed the laws of their own timorous and cowardly complexion: for they who have courage and generosity in them, according to this hypothesis, would never submit to such sneaking terms of equality and subjection, but venture for dominion; and resolve either to win the saddle, or lose the horse. Here therefore do our atheistic politicians plainly dance round in a circle; they first deriving the obligation of civil laws, from that of covenants, and then that of covenants from the laws of nature; and, lastly, the obligation both of these laws of nature, and of covenants themselves, again, from the law, command, and sanction, of the civil sovereign; without which neither of them would at all oblige. And thus is it manifest, how vain the attempts of these politicians are, to make justice artificially, when there is no such thing naturally (which is indeed no less than to make something out of nothing); and by art to consociate into bodies politic those whom nature had dissociated from one another; a thing as impossible, as to tie knots in the wind or water; or to build up a stately palace or castle out of sand. Indeed the ligaments, by which these politicians would tie the members of their huge Leviathan, or artificial man, together, are not so good as cobwebs; they being really nothing but mere will and words; for if authority and sovereignty be made only by will and words, then is it plain, that by will and words they may be unmade again at pleasure.

Neither indeed are these atheistic politicians themselves altogether unaware hereof, that this their artificial justice and obligation can be no firm vinculum of a body politic, to consociate those together, and unite them into one, who are naturally dissociated and divided from one another; they acknowledging, that "covenants without the sword, being but words and breath, are of no strength to hold the members of their Leviathan, or body politic, together." Wherefore, they plainly betake themselves at length from art to force and power, and make their civil sovereign really to reign only in fear.[1] And this must needs be their meaning, when they so constantly declare all obligation, just and unjust, to be derived only from law; they by law there understanding a command directed to such as by reason of their imbecility are not able to resist: so that the will and command of the more powerful obliges by the fear of punishment threatened.[2] Now, if the only real ob-

[1] Hobbes, Leviathan, cap. xvi. [2] Id. Element. de Cive, cap. xv. § 5.

ligation to obey civil laws be from the fear of punishment, then could no man be obliged to hazard his life for the safety of his prince and country; and they, who could reasonably promise themselves impunity, would be altogether disobliged, and consequently might justly break any laws for their own advantage. An asssertion so extravagant, that these confounded politicians themselves are ashamed plainly to own it, and therefore disguise it what they can by equivocation; themselves sometimes also confessing so much of truth, that "pœna non obligat, sed obligatum tenet,"[1] punishment does not oblige, but only hold those to their duty, who were before obliged.—Furthermore, what is made by power and force only, may be unmade by power and force again. If civil sovereigns reign only in the fear of their own sword, then is that right of theirs, so much talked of, indeed nothing else but might and authority, force; and consequently successful and prosperous rebellion, and whatsoever can be done by power, will be *ipso facto* thereby justified. Lastly, were civil sovereigns, and bodies politic, mere violent and contra-natural things, then would they all quickly vanish into nothing, because nature will prevail against force and violence; whereas men constantly every where fall into political order, and the corruption of one form of government is but the generation of another.

Wherefore, since it is plain, that sovereignty and bodies politic can neither be merely artificial nor yet violent things, there must of necessity be some natural bond or vinculum to hold them together, such as may both really oblige subjects to obey the lawful commands of sovereigns, and sovereigns in commanding to seek the good and welfare of their subjects; whom these atheistic politicians (by their infinite and belluine right) quite discharge from any such thing. Which bond or vinculum can be no other than natural justice; and something of a common and public, of a cementing and conglutinating nature, in all rational beings; the original of both which is from the Deity. The right and authority of God himself is founded in justice; and of this is the civil sovereignty also a certain participation. It is not the mere creature of the people, and of men's wills, and therefore annihilable again by their wills at pleasure; but hath a stamp of Divinity upon it, as may partly appear from hence, because that *jus vitæ et necis*, that power of life and death—which civil sovereigns have, was never lodged in singulars, before civil society; and therefore could not be conferred by them. Had not God and nature made a city; were there not a natural conciliation of all rational creatures, and subjection of them to the Deity, as their head (which is Cicero's,[2] "una civitas deorum atque

[1] Id. ibid. c. xiv. § 2.

[2] De Nat. Deor. l. ii. c. lxii. p. 3043. tom. ix. oper.

hominum," one city of gods and men)—had not God made ἄρχειν καὶ ἄρχεσθαι, ruling and being ruled—superiority and subjection, with their respective duty and obligation; men could neither by art, or political enchantment, nor yet by force, have made any firm cities or polities. The civil sovereign is no Leviathan, no beast, but a God ("I have said, Ye are gods"[2]): he reigns not in mere brutish force and fear, but in natural justice and conscience, and in the right and authority of God himself. Nevertheless, we deny not, but that there is need of force and fear too, to constrain those to obedience, to whom the conscience of duty proveth ineffectual. Nor is the fear of the civil sovereign's own sword alone sufficient for this neither, unassisted by religion, and the fear of an invisible Being omnipotent, who seeth all things, and can punish secret as well as open transgressors, both in this life and after death. Which is a thing so confessedly true, that Atheists have therefore pretended religion to have been at first a mere political figment. We conclude, therefore, that the civil sovereign reigneth not, merely in the fear of his own power and sword; but first in the justice and authority, and then in the power and fear also of God Almighty. And thus much for the first atheistic pretence, from the interest of civil sovereigns.

To their second, that sovereignty is essentially infinite, and therefore altogether inconsistent with religion, that would limit and confine it, we reply; that the right and authority of civil sovereigns is not, as these our atheistic politicians ignorantly suppose, a mere belluine liberty, but it is a right essentially founded in the being of natural justice, as hath been declared. For authority of commanding is such a right, as supposes obligation in others to obey, without which it could be nothing but mere will and force. But none can be obliged in duty to obey, but by natural justice; commands, as such, not creating obligation, but presupposing it. For, if persons were not before obliged to obey, no commands would signify any thing to them. Wherefore, the first original obligation is not from will, but nature. Did obligation to the things of natural justice, as many suppose, arise from the will and positive command of God, only by reason of punishments threatened, and rewards promised; the consequence of this would be, that no man was good and just, but only by accident, and for the sake of something else; whereas the goodness of justice or righteousness is intrinsical to the thing itself, and this is that which obligeth (and not any thing foreign to it), it being a different species of good from that of appetite, and private utility, which every man may dispense withal. Now there can

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[2] Psalm lxxxii. 6.

be no more infinite justice, than there can be an infinite rule, or an infinite measure. Justice is essentially a determinate thing; and therefore can there not be an infinite *jus*, right or authority. If there be any thing in its own nature just and obliging, or such as ought to be done; then must there of necessity be something unjust, or unlawful, which therefore cannot be obligingly commanded by any authority whatsoever. Neither ought this to be thought any impeachment of civil authority, it extending universally to all, even to that of the Deity itself. The right and authority of God himself, who is the supreme sovereign of the universe, is also in like manner bounded and circumscribed by justice. God's will is ruled by his justice, and not his justice ruled by his will; and therefore God himself cannot command, what is in its own nature unjust. And thus have we made it evident, that infinite right and authority of doing and commanding any thing without exception, so that the arbitrary will of the commander should be the very rule of justice itself to others, and consequently might oblige to any thing, is an absolute contradiction, and a nonentity; it supposing nothing to be in its own nature just or unjust; which if there were not, there could be no obligation nor authority at all. Wherefore the Atheists, who would flatter civil sovereigns with this infinite right, as if their will ought to be the very rule of justice and conscience, and upon that pretence prejudice them against religion, do as ill deserve of them, as of religion hereby; they indeed absolutely divesting them of all right and authority, and leaving them nothing, but mere brutish force and belluine liberty. And could civil sovereigns utterly demolish and destroy conscience and religion in the minds of men (which yet is an absolute impossibility), they thinking thereby to make elbow-room for themselves, they would certainly bury themselves also in the ruins of them. Nevertheless, thus much is true; that they, in whom the sovereign legislative power of every polity is lodged (whether single persons, or assemblies); they, who make civil laws, and can reverse them at pleasure, though they may unquestionably sin against God, in making unjust laws, yet can they not sin politically or civilly, as violators or transgressors of those laws cancelled and reversed by them, they being superior to them. Nor is this all; but these sovereign legislative powers may be said to be absolute also in another sense, as being ἀνυπεύθυνοι, unjudicable,—or uncensurable by any human court; because, if they were so obnoxious, then would that court or power, which had a right to judge and censure them, be superior to them; which is contrary to the hypothesis. And then, if this power were again judicable by some other, there must either be an infinite progress, or endless cir-

culation (a thing not only absurd, but also utterly inconsistent with government and property; because, there being no ultimate judgment unappealable from, there could never be any final determination of controversies); or else at last, all must be devolved to the multitude of singulars, which would be a dissolution of the body politic, and a state of anarchy. And thus have we fully confuted the second atheistic pretence also, for the "inconsistency of religion with civil sovereignty."

Their third and last follows; "That private judgment of good and evil is contradictious to civil sovereignty, and a body politic, this being one artificial man, that must be all governed by one reason and will." But conscience is private judgment of good and evil, lawful and unlawful, etc. To which we reply, that it is not religion, but on the contrary, the principles of these atheistic politicians, that unavoidably introduce private judgment of good and evil, such as is absolutely inconsistent with civil sovereignty; there being, according to them, nothing in nature of a public or common good, nothing of duty or obligation, but all private appetite and utility, of which also every man is judge for himself. For if this were so, then, whenever any man judged it most for his private utility to disobey laws, rebel against sovereigns, nay, to poison or stab them, he would be unquestionably bound by nature, and the reason of his own good, as the highest law, to do the same. Neither, can these atheistic politicians be ever able to bring men out of this state of private good, judgment and will, which is natural to them, by any artificial tricks and devices, or mere enchantments of words, as artificial justice, and an artificial man, and a common person and will, and a public conscience, and the like. Nay, it is observable, that themselves are necessitated, by the tenor of these their principles, casuistically to allow such private judgment, and will, as is altogether inconsistent with civil sovereignty; as, that any man may lawfully resist in defence of his own life; and that they, who have once rebelled, may afterwards justly defend themselves by force. Nor indeed can this private judgment of men, according to their appetite and utility, be possibly otherwise taken away, than by natural justice, which is a thing not of a private but of a public and common nature; and by conscience, that obligeth to obey all the lawful commands of civil sovereigns, though contrary to men's appetites and private interest. Wherefore conscience also is, in itself, not of a private and partial, but of a public and common nature; it respecting Divine laws, impartial justice and equity, and the good of the whole, when clashing with our own selfish good, and private utility. This is the only thing that can naturally consociate mankind together, lay a foundation for bodies politic, and take away that private will and judgment, according to men's appetite and

utility, which is inconsistent with the same; agreeably to that of Plato's,[1] *Τὸ κοινὸν συνδεῖ, τὸ ἴδιον διασπᾷ*, that, which is of a common and public nature, unites; but that, which is of a private, segregates and dissociates.—It is true indeed, that particular persons must make a judgment in conscience for themselves (a public conscience being nonsense and ridiculous), and that they may also err therein: yet is not the rule neither, by which conscience judgeth, private; nor itself unaccountable, unless in such mistaken fanatics, as professedly follow private impulses; but either the natural and eternal laws of God, or else his revealed will, things more public than the civil laws of any couutry, and of which others also may judge. Nevertheless, we deny not, but that evil persons may, and do sometimes make a pretence of conscience and religion, in order to sedition and rebellion, as the best things may be abused; but this is not the fault of religion, but only of the men; conscience obliging, though first to obey God, yet, in subordination to him, the laws of civil sovereigns also. To conclude, conscience and religion oblige subjects actively to obey all the lawful commands of civil sovereigns, or legislative powers, though contrary to their own private appetite, interest, and utility; but when these same sovereign legislative powers command unlawful things, conscience, though it here obliges to obey God, rather than man, yet does it, notwithstanding, oblige not to resist. Rom. xiii. "Whosoever resisteth the power, resisteth the ordinance of God, and they that resist shall receive to themselves damnation." And Matt. xxvi. "All they, that take the sword, shall perish with the sword." Here is "the patience and the faith of the saints." And thus does religion "give unto Cæsar the thing that are Cæsar's," as well as "unto God the things that are God's."

And now, having fully confuted all the atheistic grounds, we confidently conclude, that the first original of all things was neither stupid and senseless matter fortuitously moved, nor a blind and nescient, but orderly and methodical plastic nature; nor a living matter, having perception or understanding natural, without animal sense or consciousness; nor yet did every thing exist of itself necessarily from eternity, without a cause. But there is one only necessary existent, the Cause of all other things; and this an absolutely perfect Being, infinitely good, wise, and powerful; who hath made all, that was fit to be made, and according to the best wisdom, and exerciseth an exact providence over all: whose name ought to be hallowed, and separated from all other things; To whom be all honor, and glory, and worship, for ever and ever. Amen.

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[1] De Legib. lib. ix. p. 660.

TREATISE

CONCERNING

ETERNAL AND IMMUTABLE MORALITY.

PREFACE

BY EDWARD, LORD BISHOP OF DURHAM.

The author of the following Treatise was the very learned Dr. Ralph Cudworth, whose name is so well known to them that are acquainted with the best authors, as to render it needless to say more in behalf of this piece, than that it was composed by the same person, that wrote the *True Intellectual System of the Universe*. This author, being early prepared with a nice skill in most of the learned languages, and having joined to a clear and solid judgment an indefatigable application to study, began soon to form vast designs for the service of religion; and in subserviency thereto to reduce his large treasure of learning to proper heads or subjects, which he proposed one time or other to improve into complete discourses.

He lived in an age, when the disputes concerning Liberty and Necessity, mingling with the political schemes of the leaders of opposite parties, helped to cause strong convulsions in the state, and to spread no less fatal an influence upon the principles and manners of the generality of people. For debauchery, skepticism and infidelity, as he complains,[1] flourished in his time, and grew up, in his opinion, from the doctrine of the fatal necessity of all actions and events, as from its proper root.[2] Such a belief, upon whatsoever grounds or principles maintained, as he conceived, did serve the design of Atheism and undermine Christianity and all religion; as taking away all guilt and blame, punishments and rewards; and plainly rendering a day of judgment ridiculous. And he thought it evident, that some in those days pursued those notions, in order to that end.

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[1] Epistle Dedicatory, before his Intellectual System.

[2] Preface to the Intellectual System.

These sentiments disposed him to bend much of his study this way, and to read over all the ancient philosophers and moralists, which he did with great accuracy. He then set himself to gather and answer all the ancient and modern arguments, for the necessity of all actions, which had been maintained by several persons, upon very different grounds. And many of his collections of this kind still remain, as so many monuments of his copious reading, judgment and industry.

He accordingly distinguished three sorts of Fatality, that he might treat of each apart. First, *Natural* or *Material*, which excluding God out of the scheme, and supposing senseless matter necessarily moved, to be the first principle and cause of all things, is truly and properly the atheistical fate. This he found defended by Epicurus of old, and to refute him and the other assertors of the atomic material necessity, he published his learned and unanswerable book, which he entitled the Intellectual System of the Universe.

Secondly, *Theologic* or *Divine* Fate, which indeed allows in words the existence of that perfect intellectual Being, distinct from matter, whom we call God; yet affirming that God irrespectively decrees and determines all things, evil as well as good, doth in effect make all actions alike necessary to us. In consequence whereof, God's will is not regulated by his essential and immutable goodness and justice: God is a mere arbitrary will omnipotent: and in respect to us, moral good and evil are positive things, and not so in their own nature, that is, things are good or bad because they are commanded or forbidden, and that which is now good might have been bad, and bad good, if the pure will of God at first had not determined them to be what they are at present.

Thirdly, the *Stoical* Fate, which constrains also the natural and moral actions of the universe, and makes necessity to be so intrinsical to the nature of every thing, as that no being or action could possibly be otherwise than it is. For all things, according to this notion, depend in a chain of causes all in themselves necessary, from the first principle of Being, who pre-ordered every event before it fell out, so as to leave no room to liberty or contingency any where in the world.

These two last hypotheses of Fatalism were but lightly touched in his Intellectual System, because he intended to give them a more particular and more ample consideration: however, ill health, a short life, or other reasons we know not, hindered him from finishing what the world earnestly expected, and no one that survived him was able to supply.

It is probable, that foreseeing the length of the work, and some of the hinderances, that afterwards fell out to retard and defeat it, he thought it best to contract his undertaking, and to treat in smaller volumes of those points that he judged to be most material and principal in this controversy.

In this view he drew up the book, with which the world is now presented, wherein he proves the falseness of the consequences with respect to natural justice and morality in God, which are deducible from the principles of those that maintain the second sort of fate, denominated by him Theologic. And thus it may be reckoned to be a sequel in part, of his first book against Material fate. Had it come abroad as early as it was written, it had served for a proper antidote to the poison in some of Mr. Hobbes's and other's writings, who revived in that age the exploded opinions of Protagoras and other ancient Greeks, and took away the essential and eternal discrimination of moral good and evil, of just and unjust, and made them all arbitrary productions of divine or human will.

Against the ancient and modern patrons of this doctrine no one hath written better than Dr. Cudworth. His book is indeed a demonstration of the truth of the contrary opinion; and is drawn up with that beauty, clearness and strength, as must delight as well as convince the reader, if I may judge of the affection of others, from the effect it had on me. It will certainly give a just idea of the writer's good sense, as well as vast learning.

We are not certain that this Treatise is quite so perfect as the author designed it: but it appears from the Manuscript that he transcribed the best part of it with his own hand, as if it was speedily to have been sent to the press.

His death following not long after, this, with several other manuscripts were locked up from the sight of the world for many years, and at last came into the hands of his grandson Francis Cudworth

Masham, Esq., one of the Masters in Chancery, whose temper is too beneficent and communicative to deprive the public any longer of a work that promises much benefit to it.

It is well known, that the loose principles, with regard to morality, that are opposed in this book, are defended by too many in our time. It is hoped also that the new controversies springing up, that have some relation to this subject, may be cleared and shortened by the reasons herein proposed. However that be, a book of sound sense and true learning is, at all times, in fashion ; and if any the least good shall follow, as there may much good from the publication of it ; or if even the memory of so great a man in all parts of learning divine and human, who was an honor to Emanuel College, where he was educated, and to Christ's College, where he afterwards presided, and indeed to the whole University of Cambridge, which he adorned, shall by these means be revived and perpetuated, it cannot be said to be published unseasonably.

E. DURESME.

TREATISE, ETC.

BOOK I.

CHAPTER I.

As the vulgar generally look no higher for the original of moral good and evil, just and unjust, than the codes and pandects, the tables and laws of their country and religion: so there have not wanted pretended philosophers in all ages who have asserted nothing to be good and evil, just and unjust, *φύσει καὶ ἀκινήτως*, naturally and immutably; but that all these things were positive, arbitrary and factitious only, *θετικὰ, νομιμὰ, ψηφισματώδη*. Such Plato mentions in his tenth book De Legibus, who maintained, *Τὰ δίκαια οὐδ᾽ εἶναι τὸ παράπαν φύσει, ἀλλ᾽ ἀμφισβητοῦντας διατελεῖν ἀλλήλοις καὶ μετατιθεμένους ἀεὶ ταῦτα· ἃ δ᾽ ἂν μετάθανται καὶ ὅταν, τότε κύρια ἕκαστα εἶναι γιγνόμενα τέχνῃ καὶ τοῖς νόμοις, ἀλλ᾽ οὐ δή τινι φύσει·* That nothing at all was naturally just, but men changing their opinions concerning them perpetually sometimes made one thing just, sometimes another; but whatsoever is decreed and constituted, that for the time is valid, being made so by arts and laws, but not by any nature of its own. And again in his Theætetus, *Ἐν τοῖς δικαίοις καὶ ἀδίκοις, καὶ ὁσίοις καὶ ἀνοσίοις, ἐθέλουσιν ἰσχυρίζεσθαι ὡς οὐκ ἐστὶ φύσει αὐτῶν οὐδὲν οὐσίαν ἑαυτοῦ ἔχον, ἀλλὰ τὸ κοινῇ δόξαν τοῦτο γίνεται ἀληθὲς τότε ὅταν δόξῃ καὶ ὅσον ἂν δοκῇ χρόνον· καὶ ὅσοι δὲ μὴ παντάπασι τοῦ Πρωταγόρου λόγον λέγουσιν ὧδε πῶς τὴν σοφίαν ἄγουσι·* As to things just and unjust, holy and unholy, not only the Protagoreans (of whom we shall treat afterward) but many other philosophers also confidently affirm, that none of these things have in nature any essence of their own, but whatsoever is decreed by the authority of the city, that is truly such when it is so decreed, and for so long time, viz. just or unjust, holy or unholy. And Aristotle more than once takes notice of this opinion in his Ethics. [1] *Τὰ δὲ καλὰ καὶ τὰ δίκαια περὶ ὧν ἡ Πολιτικὴ σκοπεῖται, τοσαύτην ἔχει διαφορὰν καὶ πλάνην ὥστε δοκεῖν νόμῳ μόνον εἶναι, φύσει δὲ μή·*

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[1] Arist. Eth. Nicom. lib. i. cap. i.

Things honest and just, which politics are conversant about, have so great a variety and uncertainty in them, that they seem to be only by law and not by nature. And afterwards,[1] after he had divided *τὸ δίκαιον πωλιτικὸν*, that which is politically just into *φυσικὸν*, i. e. natural, *τὸ πανταχοῦ τὴν αὐτὴν ἔχον δύναμιν*, which has every where the same force, and *νομιμὸν*, *Ὃ ἐξ ἀρχῆς οὐθὲν διαφέρει οὕτως ἢ ἄλλως· ὅταν δὲ θῶνται, διαφέρει*, i. e. legal, which before there be a law made, is indifferent, but when once the law is made, is determined to be just or unjust. Which legal, just and unjust, (as he afterwards expresses it) are *ὅμοια τοῖς μέτροις οἰνηροῖς καὶ σιτηροῖς*, like to wine and wheat measures, as pints and bushels, which are not every where of equal bigness, being commonly lesser with those that sell, and greater with those that buy. Then he adds, *Δοκεῖ δὲ ἐνίοις πάντα εἶναι τοιαῦτα, ὅτι τὸ μὲν φύσει ἀκίνητον καὶ πανταχοῦ τὴν αὐτὴν ἔχει δύναμιν, ὥσπερ τὸ πῦρ καὶ ἐνθάδε καὶ ἐν Πέρσαις καίει. Τὰ δὲ δίκαια κινούμενα ὁρῶσι·* Some there are that think that there is no other just or unjust, but what is made by law and men, because that which is natural is immutable, and hath every where the same force, as fire burns alike here and in Persia; but they see that jura and justa, rights and just things are every where different.

2. The philosophers particularly noted for this opinion in Plato, are Protagoras in his Theætetus, Polus and Callicles in his Gorgias, Thrasymachus, and Glauco in his Politics, but Diogenes Laertius tells us of some others, as of Archelaus, Socrates's master, that held *τὸ δίκαιον εἶναι καὶ τὸ αἰσχρὸν οὐ φύσει ἀλλὰ νόμῳ*, that just and dishonest are not so by nature, but by law; and (as I conceive) Democritus; for after he had set down his opinion concerning happiness, or the chief end, he adds this as a part of the Democritical philosophy, *ποιητὰ νομιμὰ εἶναι*, which I understand thus, that things accounted just or unjust, are all factitious or artificial things, not natural; nothing being real or natural but atoms and vacuum, as the following words are, *φύσει δὲ ἄτομα καὶ κενόν*. The same is noted by Diogenes also concerning Aristippus, Plato's contemporary, that he asserted, *μηδὲν εἶναι φύσει δίκαιον ἢ αἰσχρὸν, ἀλλὰ νόμῳ καὶ ἔθει·* That nothing was good or evil otherwise than by law or custom. And Plutarch, in the Life of Alexander, tells us of Anaxarchus, that was Aristole's equal, that when Alexander repenting, sadly lamented the death of Clitus, whom he had rashly slain, he read this lecture of philosophy to him to comfort him, *Πᾶν τὸ πραχθὲν ὑπὸ τοῦ κρατοῦντος, δίκαιον εἶναι·* That whatsoever is done by the supreme power, is *ipso facto* just. And Pyrrho, the Etiensic philoso-

[1] Arist. Eth. Nicom. lib. v. cap. x.

pher, and father of the Skeptics, that was Anaxarchus's scholar, seems to have been dogmatical in nothing else but this, *Οὔτε καλὸν οὔτε αἰσχρὸν, οὔτε δίκαιον οὔτε ἄδικον, καὶ ὁμοίως ἐπὶ πάντων μηδὲν εἶναι τῇ ἀληθείᾳ, νόμῳ δὲ καὶ ἔθει πάντα τοὺς ἀνθρώπους πράττειν·* That there is nothing good or shameful, just or unjust, and so likewise as to all things, that there is nothing so in truth, but that men do all things according to law and custom.—

3. After these succeeded Epicurus, the reviver of the Democritical philosophy, the frame of whose principles must needs lead him to deny justice and injustice to be natural things; and therefore he determines that they arise wholly from mutual pacts, and covenants of men made for their own convenience and utility, and laws resulting from thence. *Ὅσα τῶν ζώων μὴ ἠδύνατο συνθήκας ποιεῖσθαι τὰς ὑπὲρ τοῦ, μὴ βλάπτειν, ἀλλὰ μηδὲ βλάπτεσθαι, πρὸς ταῦτα οὐθέν ἐστι οὐδὲ δίκαιον οὐδὲ ἄδικον. ὡσαύτως δὲ καὶ τῶν ἐθνῶν ὅσα μὴ ἠδύνατο ἢ ἐβούλετο τὰς συνθήκας ποιεῖσθαι τὰς ὑπὲρ τοῦ μὴ βλάπτειν μηδὲ βλάπτεσθαι· οὐκ ἦν τὶ καθ' ἑαυτὸ δικαιοσύνη, ἀλλὰ ἐν ταῖς μετὰ ἀλλήλων συντροφαῖς, καθ' ὁπηλίκους δήποτε ἀεὶ τόπους συνθήκη τις ὑπὲρ τοῦ μὴ βλάπτειν ἢ βλάπτεσθαι·* Those living creatures that could not make mutual covenants together not to hurt or to be hurt by one another, could not for this cause have any such thing as just or unjust amongst them. And there is the same reason for those nations that either will not, or cannot make such mutual compacts not to hurt one another. For there is no such thing as justice by itself, but only in the mutual congresses of men, wheresoever they have entered into covenant not to hurt one another.—The late compiler of the Epicurean system expresses this philosopher's meaning after this manner: [1]Sunt quidam qui existimant ea quæ justa sunt, esse secundum propriam invariatamque naturam justa, et leges non ista justa facere, sed duntaxat præscribere juxta eam quam habent naturam; verum res non ita se habet. There are some that think that those things that are just, are just according to their proper, unvaried nature, and that the laws do not make them just, but only prescribe according to that nature which they have. But the thing is not so.—

After Epicurus, Carneades, the author of the new academy, as Lactantius testifieth, was also a zealous assertor of the same doctrine.

4. And since in this latter age the physiological hypotheses of Democritus and Epicurus have been revived, and successfully applied to the solving of some of the phenomena of the visible world, there have not wanted those that have endeavored to vent also those other paradox-

[1] Gassendus Syntagm.

es of the same philosophers, viz. that there is no incorporeal substance, nor any natural difference of good and evil, just and unjust; and to recommend the same under a show of wisdom, as the deep and profound mysteries of the atomical or corpuscular philosophy. As if senseless matter and atoms were the original of all things, according to that song of old Silenus in the poet:[1]

> Namque canebat uti magnum per inane coacta
> Semina terrarumque animæque marisque fuissent,
> Et liquidi simul ignis; ut his exordia primis
> Omnia, et ipse tener mundi concreverit orbis.

> He sung the secret seeds of nature's frame;
> How seas, and earth, and air, and active flame,
> Fell through the mighty void, and in their fall
> Were blindly gathered in this goodly ball.

Of this sort is that late writer of Ethics and Politics, who asserts: Doctrinas de justo et injusto, bono et malo, præter leges in unaquaque civitate constitutas, authenticas esse nullas: et utrum aliqua actio justa vel injusta, bona vel mala futura sit, a nemine inquirendum esse præterquam ab iis ad quos legum suarum interpretationem civitas demandaverit. That there are no authentic doctrines concerning just and unjust, good and evil, except the laws which are established in every city: and that it concerns none to inquire whether an action shall be reputed just or unjust, good or evil, except such only whom the community have appointed to be the interpreters of their laws.—

And again: [2]Ad civitatem pertinet etiam Christianam, quid sit justitia, quid injustitia, sive peccatum contra justitiam, determinare. Even a christian government hath power to determine what is righteous, and what is the transgression of it.—

And he gives us the same over again in English:[3] In the state of nature nothing can be unjust; the notions of right and wrong, justice and injustice have there no place; where there is no common power, there is no law; where no law, no transgression. [4]No law can be unjust. Nay, temperance is no more φύσει, naturally, according to this civil (or rather uncivil) philosopher, than justice. [5]Sensuality in that sense in which it is condemned, hath no place till there be laws.

5. But whatsoever was the true meaning of these philosophers, that

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[1] Virg. Eclog. vi. [2] Hobbes de Cive, p. 343. [3] Leviathan, p. 63.
[4] Ibid. p. 182. [5] Ibid. p. 25.

affirm justice and injustice to be only by law and not by nature (of which I shall discourse afterwards,) certain it is, that divers modern theologers do not only seriously, but zealously contend in like manner, that there is nothing absolutely, intrinsically and naturally good and evil, just and unjust, antecedently to any positive command or prohibition of God; but that the arbitrary will and pleasure of God, (that is, an omnipotent Being devoid of all essential and natural justice) by its commands and prohibitions, is the first and only rule and measure thereof. Whence it follows unavoidably, that nothing can be imagined so grossly wicked, or so foully unjust or dishonest, but if it were supposed to be commanded by this omnipotent deity, must needs upon that hypothesis forthwith become holy, just and righteous. For though the ancient fathers of the christian church were very abhorrent from this doctrine, (as shall he showed hereafter) yet it crept up afterward in the scholastic age, Ockham being among the first that maintained: Nullum actum malum esse nisi quatenus a Deo prohibitum, et qui non possit fieri bonus si a Deo præcipiatur; et e converso. That there is no act evil but as it is prohibited by God, and which cannot be made good if it be commanded by God. And so on the other hand as to good.—And herein Petrus Alliacus and Andreas de Novo Castro, with others, quickly followed him.

But this doctrine hath been since chiefly promoted and advanced by such as think nothing so essential to the Deity, as uncontrollable power and arbitrary will, and therefore that God could not be God if there should be any thing evil in its own nature which he could not do; and who impute such dark counsels and dismal actions unto God, as cannot be justified otherwise than by saying, that whatsoever God can be supposed to do or will, will be for that reason good or just, because he wills it.

Now the necessary and unavoidable consequences of this opinion are such as these: Amare Deum φύσει esse ἀδιάφορον, et moraliter bonum solum modo quia a Deo jubetur: prohibere Dei amorem vel præcipere Dei odium, non pugnare cum Dei natura, sed tantum cum voluntate libera. Non repugnare juri divino naturali præcipere peccata. Deum posse imperare blasphemiam, perjurium, mendacium, etc. Deum posse præcipere contrarium ut omnibus Præceptis decalogi, ita potissimum primo, secundo, tertio. Sanctitatem non esse conformitatem cum natura Dei; Deum posse hominem obligare ad impossibile; Deum nullam habere naturalem inclinationem in bonum creaturarum; Deum jure posse creaturam insontem æternis cruciatibus damnare. That to love God is by nature an indifferent thing, and is morally good only,

because it is commanded by God: that to prohibit the love of God, or command the hatred of God, is not inconsistent with the nature of God, but only with his free will; that it is not inconsistent with the natural equity of God to command blasphemy, perjury, lying, etc.; that God may command what is contrary, as to all the precepts of the Decalogue, so especially to the first, second, third; that holiness is not a conformity with the nature of God; that God may oblige man to what is impossible; that God hath no natural inclination to the good of the creatures; that God can justly doom an innocent creature to eternal torment.—All which propositions, with others of like kind are word for word asserted by some late authors. Though I think not fit to mention the names of any of them in this place, excepting only one, Joannes Szydlovius, who in a book[1] published at Franeker, hath professedly avowed and maintained the grossest of them. And yet neither he, nor the rest are to be thought any more blame-worthy herein, than many others, that holding the same premises have either dissembled, or disowned those conclusions which unavoidably follow therefrom. But rather to be commended for their openness, simplicity and ingenuity, in representing their opinion nakedly to the world, such as indeed it is, without any veil or mask.

Wherefore since there are so many, both philosophers and theologers, that seemingly and verbally acknowledge such things as moral good and evil, just and unjust, that contend notwithstanding that these are not *φύσει*, by nature, but *θέσει*, institution, and that there is nothing naturally or immutably just or unjust; I shall from hence fetch the rise of this ethical discourse or inquiry *περὶ τῶν ἀγαθῶν καὶ κακῶν, δικαίων καὶ ἀδίκων, καλῶν καὶ αἰσχρῶν*, concerning things good and evil, just and unjust, laudable and shameful;—(for so I find these words frequently used as synonymous in Plato, and other ancient authors,) demonstrating in the first place, that if there be any thing at all good or evil, just or unjust, there must of necessity be *δίκαιον φυσικὸν καὶ ἀκίνητον*, something naturally and immutably good and just.—And from thence I shall proceed afterward to show what this *δίκαιον φυσικὸν ἀκίνητον καὶ ἀιώνιον*, natural, immutable, and eternal justice is, with the branches and species of it.

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[1] Vindiciæ quæstionum aliquot difficilium.

CHAP. II.

1. Wherefore in the first place, it is a thing which we shall very easily demonstrate, that moral good and evil, just and unjust, honest and dishonest (if they be not mere names without any signification, or names for nothing else, but willed and commanded, but have a reality in respect of the persons obliged to do and avoid them) cannot possibly be arbitrary things, made by will without nature; because it is universally true, that things are what they are, not by will but by nature. As for example, things are white by whiteness, and black by blackness, triangular by triangularity, and round by rotundity, like by likeness, and equal by equality, that is, by such certain natures of their own. Neither can omnipotence itself (to speak with reverence) by mere will make a thing white or black without whiteness or blackness; that is, without such certain natures, whether we consider them as qualities in the objects without us according to the peripatetical philosophy, or as certain dispositions of parts in respect of magnitude, figure, site and motion, which beget those sensations or phantasms of white and black in us. Or, to instance in geometrical figures, omnipotence itself cannot by mere will make a body triangular, without having the nature and properties of a triangle in it; that is, without having three angles equal to two right ones, nor circular without the nature of a circle; that is, without having a circumference equidistant every where from the centre or middle point. Or lastly, to instance in things relative only; omnipotent will cannot make things like or equal to one another, without the natures of likeness and equality. The reason whereof is plain, because all these things imply a manifest contradiction; that things should be what they are not. And this is a truth fundamentally necessary to all knowledge, that contradictories cannot be true; for otherwise, nothing would be certainly true or false. Now things may as well be made white or black by mere will, without whiteness or blackness, equal and unequal, without equality and inequality, as morally good and evil, just and unjust, honest and dishonest, debita and illicita, by mere will, without any nature of goodness, justice, honesty. For though the will of God be the supreme efficient cause of all things, and can produce into being or existence, or reduce into nothing what it pleaseth, yet it is not the formal cause of any thing besides itself, as the schoolmen have determined, in these words: Deum ipsum non posse supplere locum causæ formalis; That God himself cannot supply the place of a formal cause.—And therefore it cannot supply the formal

cause, or nature of justice or injustice, honesty or dishonesty. Now all that we have hitherto said amounts to no more than this, that it is impossible any thing should be by will only, that is, without a nature or entity, or that the nature and essence of any thing should be arbitrary.

2. And since a thing cannot be made any thing by mere will without a being or nature, every thing must be necessarily and immutably determined by its own nature, and the nature of things be that which it is, and nothing else. For though the will and power of God have an absolute, infinite and unlimited command upon the existences of all created things to make them to be, or not to be at pleasure; yet when things exist, they are what they are, this or that, absolutely or relatively, not by will or arbitrary command, but by the necessity of their own nature. There is no such thing as an arbitrarious essence, mode or relation, that may be made indifferently any thing at pleasure: for an arbitrarious essence is a being without a nature, a contradiction, and therefore a nonentity. Wherefore the natures of justice and injustice cannot be arbitrarious things, that may be applicable by will indifferently to any actions or dispositions whatsoever. For the modes of all subsistent beings, and the relations of things to one another, are immutably and necessarily what they are, and not arbitrary, being not by will but by nature.

3. Now the necessary consequence of that which we have hitherto said is this, That it is so far from being true, that all moral good and evil, just and unjust are mere arbitrary and factitious things, that are created wholly by will; that (if we would speak properly) we must needs say that nothing is morally good or evil, just or unjust by mere will without nature, because every thing is what it is by nature, and not by will. For though it will be objected here, that when God, or civil powers command a thing to be done, that was not before debitum or illicitum, obligatory or unlawful, the thing willed or commanded doth forthwith become Δίον or debitum, obligatory, that which ought to be done by creatures and subjects respectively; in which the nature of moral good or evil is commonly conceived to consist. And therefore if all good and evil, just and unjust be not the creatures of mere will (as many assert) yet at least positive things must needs owe all their morality, their good and evil to mere will without nature: yet notwithstanding, if we well consider it, we shall find that even in positive commands themselves, mere will doth not make the thing commanded just or debitum, obligatory, or beget and create any obligation to obedience; but that it is natural justice or equity, which gives to one the right or authority of commanding, and begets in another duty and obligation to

obedience. Therefore it is observable, that laws and commands do not run thus, to will that this or that thing shall become justum or injustum, debitum or illicitum, just or unjust, obligatory, or unlawful; or that men shall be obliged or bound to obey; but only to require that something be done or not done, or otherwise to menace punishment to the transgressors thereof. For it was never heard of, that any one founded all his authority of commanding others, and others obligation or duty to obey his commands, in a law of his own making, that men should be required, obliged, or bound to obey him. Wherefore since the thing willed in all laws is not that men should be bound or obliged to obey; this thing cannot be the product of the mere will of the commander, but it must proceed from something else; namely, the right or authority of the commander, which is founded in natural justice and equity, and an antecedent obligation to obedience in the subjects; which things are not made by laws, but pre-supposed before all laws to make them valid: And if it should be imagined, that any one should make a positive law to require that others should be obliged, or bound to obey him, every one would think such a law ridiculous and absurd; for if they were obliged before, then this law would be in vain, and to no purpose; and if they were not before obliged, then they could not be obliged by any positive law, because they were not previously bound to obey such a person's commands: so that obligation to obey all positive laws is older than all laws, and previous or antecedent to them. Neither is it a thing that is arbitrarily made by will, or can be the object of command, but that which either is or is not by nature. And if this were not morally good and just in its own nature before any positive command of God, that God should be obeyed by his creatures, the bare will of God himself could not beget an obligation upon any to do what he willed and commanded, because the natures of things do not depend upon will, being not *Γιγνόμενα* but *ὄντα*, things that are arbitrarily made, but things that are. To conclude therefore, even in positive laws and commands it is not mere will that obligeth, but the natures of good and evil, just and unjust, really existing in the world.

4. Wherefore that common distinction betwixt things, *Φύσει καὶ θέσει*, things naturally and positively good and evil, or (as others express it) betwixt things that are therefore commanded because they are good and just, and things that are therefore good and just, because they are commanded, stands in need of a right explication, that we be not led into a mistake thereby, as if the obligation to do those thetical and positive things did arise wholly from will without nature: whereas it is not the mere will and pleasure of him that commandeth, that

obligeth to do positive things commanded, but the intellectual nature of him that is commanded. Wherefore the difference of these things lies wholly in this, that there are some things which the intellectual nature obligeth to per se, of itself, and directly, absolutely and perpetually, and these things are called φύσει, naturally good and evil; other things there are which the same intellectual nature obligeth to by accident only, and hypothetically, upon condition of some voluntary action either of our own or some other persons, by means whereof those things which were in their own nature indifferent, falling under something that is absolutely good or evil, and thereby acquiring a new relation to the intellectual Nature, do for the time become debita or illicita, such things as ought to be done or omitted, being made such not by will but by nature. As for example, to keep faith and perform covenants, is that which natural justice obligeth to absolutely; therefore ex hypothesi, upon the supposition, that any one maketh a promise, which is a voluntary act of his own, to do something which he was not before obliged to by natural justice, upon the intervention of this voluntary act of his own, that indifferent thing promised falling now under something absolutely good, and becoming the matter of promise and covenant, standeth for the present in a new relation to the rational nature of the promiser, and becometh for the time a thing which ought to be done by him, or which he is obliged to do. Not as if the mere will or words and breath of him that covenanteth had any power to change the moral natures of things, or any ethical virtue of obliging; but because natural justice and equity obligeth to keep faith and perform covenants. In like manner natural justice, that is, the rational or intellectual nature, obligeth not only to obey God, but also civil powers, that have lawful authority of commanding, and to observe political order amongst men; and therefore if God or civil powers command any thing to be done that is not unlawful in itself; upon the intervention of this voluntary act of theirs, those things that were before indifferent, become by accident for the time debita, obligatory, such things as ought to be done by us, not for their own sakes, but for the sake of that which natural justice absolutely obligeth to.

And these are the things that are commonly called θέσει, positively, good and evil, just or unjust, such as though they are adiaphorous or indifferent in themselves, yet natural justice obligeth to accidentally ex hypothesi, on supposition, of the voluntary action of some other person rightly qualified in commanding, whereby they fall into something absolutely good. Which things are not made Good or debita, due, by the mere will or pleasure of the commander, but by that natural justice

which gives him right and authority of commanding, and obligeth others to obey him; without which natural justice, neither covenants nor commands could possibly oblige any one. For the will of another doth no more oblige in commands, than our own will in promises and covenants. To conclude therefore, things called naturally good and debita, due, are such things as the Intellectual nature obliges to immediately, absolutely and perpetually, and upon no condition of any voluntary action that may be done or omitted intervening; but those things that are called positively good and debita, due, are such as natural justice or the intellectual nature obligeth to accidentally and hypothetically, upon condition of some voluntary act of another person invested with lawful authority in commanding.

And that it is not the mere will of the commander, that makes these positive things to oblige or become debita, due, but the Nature of things; appears evidently from hence, because it is not the volition of every one that obligeth, but of a person rightly qualified and invested with lawful authority; and because the liberty of commanding is circumscribed within certain bounds and limits, so that if any commander go beyond the sphere and bounds that nature sets him, which are indifferent things, his commands will not at all oblige.

5. But if we would speak yet more accurately and precisely, we might rather say, that no positive commands whatsoever do make any thing morally good and evil, just and unjust, which nature had not made such before. For indifferent things commanded, considered materially in themselves, remain still what they were before in their own nature, that is, indifferent, because (*Τὸ φύσει ἀκίνητον*, as Aristotle speaks) will cannot change nature. And those things that are *φύσει ἀδιάφορα*, by nature indifferent, must needs be as immutably so, as those things that are *φύσει δίκαια* or *ἄδικα*, *καλὰ* or *αἰσχρὰ*, by nature just or unjust, honest or shameful.—But all the moral goodness, justice and virtue that is exercised in obeying positive commands, and doing such things as are *θέσει* positive only, and to be done for no other cause but because they are commanded, or in respect to political order, consisteth not in the materiality of the actions themselves, but in that formality of yielding obedience to the commands of lawful authority in them. Just as when a man covenanteth or promiseth to do an indifferent thing which by natural justice he was not bound to do, the virtue of doing it consisteth not in the materiality of the action promised, but in the formality of keeping faith and performing covenants. Wherefore in positive commands, the will of the commander doth not create any new moral entity, but only diversely modifies and determines that general

duty or obligation of natural justice to obey lawful authority and keep oaths and covenants, as our own will in promising doth but produce several modifications of keeping faith. And therefore there are no new δίκαια, justa or debita, things just or due made by either of them, besides what was alway φύσει, by nature such, to keep our own promises, and obey the lawful commands of others.

6. We see then that it is so far from being true, that all moral good and evil, just and unjust (if they be any thing) are made by mere will and arbitrary commands (as many conceive) that it is not possible that any command of God or man should oblige otherwise than by virtue of that which is φύσει δίκαιον, naturally just. And though particular promises and commands be made by will, yet it is not will but nature that obligeth to the doing of things promised and commanded, or makes them debita, such things as ought to be done. For mere will cannot change the moral nature of actions, nor the nature of intellectual beings. And therefore if there were no natural justice, that is, if the rational or intellectual nature in itself were indetermined and unobliged to any thing, and so destitute of all morality, it were not possible that any thing should be made morally good or evil, debitum or illicitum, obligatory or unlawful, or that any moral obligation should be begotten by any will or command whatsoever.

CHAP. III.

1. But some there are that will still contend, that though it should be granted that moral good and evil, just and unjust do not depend upon any created will, yet notwithstanding they must needs depend upon the arbitrary will of God, because the natures and essences of all things, and consequently all verities and falsities, depend upon the same. For if the natures and essences of things should not depend upon the will of God, it would follow from hence, that something that was not God was independent upon God.

2. And this is plainly asserted by that ingenious philosopher Renatus Des Cartes, who in his answer to the sixth objector against his metaphysical meditations, writes thus: Repugnat Dei voluntatem non fuisse ab æterno indifferentem ad omnia quæ facta sunt aut unquam fient, quia nullum bonum vel malum, nullum credendum vel faciendum vel omittendum fingi potest, cujus idea in intellectu divino prius fuerit, quam ejus voluntas se determinarit ad efficiendum ut id tale esset. Ne-

que id loquor de prioritate temporis, sed ne quidem prius fuit ordine, vel natura, vel ratione ratiocinata ut vocant, ita scilicet ut ista boni idea impulerit Deum ad unum potius quam aliud eligendum. Nempe exempli causa, non ideo voluit creare mundum in tempore, quia vidit sic melius fore quam si creasset ab æterno, nec voluit tres angulos trianguli æquales esse duobus rectis, quia cognovit aliter fieri non posse, etc. Sed contra, quia voluit mundum creare in tempore, ideo sic melius est quam si creatus fuisset ab æterno; et quia voluit tres angules trianguli necessario equales esse duobus rectis, idirco jam hoc verum est, et fieri aliter non potest; atque ita de reliquis. Et ita summa indifferentia in Deo summum est ejus omnipotentiæ argumentum. It is a contradiction to say, that the will of God was not from eternity indifferent to all things which are or ever shall be done; because no good or evil, nothing to be believed or done or omitted, can be fixed upon, the idea whereof was in the divine intellect before that his will determined itself to effect that such a thing should be. Neither do I speak this concerning priority of time, but even there was nothing prior in order or by nature, or reason as they call it, so as that that idea of good inclined God to choose one thing rather than another. As for example sake, he would therefore create the world in time, because that he saw that it would be better so than if he had created it from eternity; neither willed he that the three angles of a triangle should be equal to two right angles, because he knew that it could not be otherwise. But on the contrary, because he would create the world in time, therefore it is better than if he had created it from eternity; and because he would that the three angles of a triangle should necessarily he equal to two right angles, therefore this is true and can be no otherwise; and so of other things. And thus the greatest indifference in God is the greatest argument of his Omnipotence.—

And again afterward, p. 162: Attendenti ad Dei immensitatem manifestum est, nihil omnino esse posse quod ab ipso non pendeat, non modo nihil subsistens, sed etiam nullum ordinem, nullam legem, nullamve rationem veri et boni. To him that considers the immensity of God it is manifest, that there can be nothing at all which doth not depend upon him, not only nothing subsisting, but also no order, no law, no reason of truth and goodness.—

And when he was again urged by the sixth objector, Nunquid Deus potuerit efficere ut nature Trianguli non fuerit? et qua ratione amabo potuisset ab æterno facere ut non fuisset verum bis quatuor esse octo? Could not God cause that the nature of a triangle should not be such? and how, I pray thee, could he from eternity cause that it should not

be true, that twice four are eight?—He confesseth ingenuously that those things were not intelligible to us; but yet notwithstanding they must be so, because Nihil in ullo genere entis esse potest, quod a Deo non pendeat. Nothing in any sort of being can be, which doth not depend upon God. Which doctrine of Cartesius is greedily swallowed down by some servile followers of his that have lately written De prima philosophia, of the old philosophy.

3. Perhaps some may make a question for all this, whether Cartesius were any more in earnest in this, than when he elsewhere goes about to defend the doctrine of transubstantiation by the principles of his new philosophy, because in his meditations upon the old philosophy (where it is probable he would set down the genuine sense of his own mind more undisguisedly, before he was assaulted by these objectors, and thereby forced to turn himself into several shapes) he affirmeth that the essences of things were eternal and immutable; but being afterward urged by Gassendus with this inconvenience, that then something would be eternal and immutable besides God, and so independent upon God, he doth in a manner unsay it again, and betakes himself to this pitiful evasion, Quemadmodum poetæ fingunt a jove quidem fata fuisse condita, sed postquam condita fuere, ipsum se iis fervandis obstrinxisse; ita ego non puto essentias rerum, mathematicasque ullas veritates quæ de ipsis cognosci possunt, esse independentes a Deo; sed puto nihilomius, quia Deus sic voluit, quia sic disposuit, ipsa esse immutabiles et æternas; As the poets feign that the fates were indeed fixed by Jupiter, but that when they were fixed, he had obliged himself to the preserving of them; so I do not think that the essences of things, and those mathematical truths which can be known of them, are independent on God; but I think nevertheless that because God so willed, and so ordered, therefore they are immutable and eternal;—which is plainly to make them in their own nature mutable. But whether Cartesius were in jest or earnest in this business, it matters not, for his bare authority ought to be no more valued by us than the authority of Aristotle and other ancient philosophers was by him, whom he so freely dissents from.

4. For though the names of things may be changed by any one at pleasure, as that a square may be called a circle, or a cube a sphere; yet that the nature of a square should not be necessarily what it is, but be arbitrarily convertible into the nature of a circle, and so the essences of a circle into the essence of a sphere, or that the self-same body, which is perfectly cubical, without any physical alteration made in it, should by this metaphysical way of transformation of essences, by mere will

and command be made spherical or cylindrical; this doth most plainly imply a contradiction, and the compossibility of contradictions destroys all knowledge and the definite natures, rationes, or notions of things. Nay, that which implies a contradiction is a non-entity, and therefore cannot be the object of divine power. And the reason is the same for all other things, as just and unjust; for every thing is what it is immutably by the necessity of its own nature; neither is it any derogation at all from the power of God to say, that he cannot make a thing to be that which it is not. Then there might be no such thing as knowledge in God himself. God might will that there should be no such thing as knowledge.

5. And as to the being or not being of particular essences, as that God might if he pleased, have willed that there should be no such thing as a triangle or circle, and therefore nothing demonstrable or knowable of either of them; which is likewise asserted by Cartesius, and those that make the essences of things dependent upon an arbitrary will in God. This is all one as if one should say, that God could have willed, if he had pleased, that neither his own power nor knowledge should be infinite.

6. Now it is certain, that if the natures and essences of all things, as to their being such or such, do depend upon a will of God that is essentially arbitrary, there can be no such thing as science or demonstration, nor the truth of any mathematical or metaphysical proposition be known any otherwise, than by some revelation of the will of God concerning it, and by a certain enthusiastic or fanatic faith and persuasion thereupon, that God would have such a thing to be true or false at such a time, or for so long. And so nothing would be true or false, φύσει but θέσει, naturally but positively only, all truth and science being mere arbitrarious things. Truth and falsehood would be only names. Neither would there be any more certainty in the knowledge of God himself, since it must wholly depend upon the mutability of a will in him essentially indifferent and undetermined; and if we would speak properly according to this hypothesis, God himself would not know or be wise by knowledge or by wisdom, but by will.

7. Wherefore as for that argument, that unless the essences of things and all verities and falsities depend upon the arbitrary will of God, there would be something that was not God, independent upon God; if it be well considered, it will prove a mere mormo or bugbear, and nothing so terrible and formidable as Cartesius seemed to think it. For there is no other genuine consequence deducible from this asser-

tion, that the essences and verities of things are independent upon the will of God, but that there is an eternal and immutable wisdom in the mind of God, and thence participated by created beings independent upon the will of God. Now the wisdom of God is as much God as the will of God; and whether of these two things in God, that is, will or wisdom, should depend upon the other, will be best determined from the several natures of them. For wisdom in itself hath the nature of a rule and measure, it being a most determinate and inflexible thing; but will being not only a blind and dark thing, as considered in itself, but also indefinite and indeterminate, hath therefore the nature of a thing regulable and measurable. Wherefore it is the perfection of will as such, to be guided and determined by wisdom and truth; but to make wisdom, knowledge and truth, to be arbitrarily determined by will, and to be regulated by such a *κανὼν μολύβδινος*, plumbean and flexible rule as that is, is quite to destroy the nature of it; for science or knowledge is *κατάληψις τοῦ ὄντος*, the comprehension of that which necessarily is, and there can be nothing more contradictious than truth or falsehood arbitrary. Now all the knowledge and wisdom that is in creatures, whether angels or men, is nothing else but a participation of that one eternal, immutable and uncreated wisdom of God, or several signatures of that one archetypal seal, or like so many multiplied reflections of one and the same face, made in several glasses, whereof some are clearer, some obscurer, some standing nearer, some further off.

8. Moreover, it was the opinion of the wisest of the philosophers, (as we shall show afterward) that there is also in the scale of being a nature of goodness superior to wisdom, which therefore measures and determines the wisdom of God, as his wisdom measures and determines his will, and which the ancient cabalists were wont to call כתר, a crown, as being the top or crown of the Deity, of which more afterward. Wherefore although some novelists make a contracted idea of God, consisting of nothing else but will and power; yet his nature is better expressed by some in this mystical or enigmatical representation of an infinite circle, whose inmost centre is simple goodness, the radii, rays and expanded area, plat thereof, all-comprehending and immutable wisdom, the exterior periphery or interminate circumference, omnipotent will or activity, by which every thing without God is brought forth into existence. Wherefore the will and power of God have no imperium ad intra, command inwardly either upon the wisdom and knowlege of God, or upon the ethical and moral disposition of his nature, which is his essential goodness; but the sphere of its activity is

extra Deum, without God, where it hath an absolute command upon the existences of things; and is always free, though not always indifferent, since it is its greatest perfection to be determined by infinite wisdom and infinite goodness. But this is to anticipate what according to the laws of method should follow afterward in another place.

BOOK II.

CHAPTER I.

1. Now the Demonstrative strength of our cause lying plainly in this, that it is not possible that any thing should be without a nature, and the natures or essences of all things being immutable, therefore upon supposition that there is any thing really just or unjust, debitum or illicitum, due or unlawful, there must of necessity be something so both naturally and immutably, which no law, decree, will nor custom can alter. There have not wanted some among the old philosophers, that rather than they would acknowledge any thing immutably just or unjust, would not stick to shake the very foundations of all things, and to deny that there was any immutable nature or essence of any thing, and by consequence any absolute certainty of truth or knowledge; maintaining this strange paradox, that both all being and knowledge was fantastical and relative only, and therefore that nothing was good or evil, just or unjust, true or false, white or black, absolutely and immutably, but relatively to every private person's humor or opinion.

2. The principal assertor of this extravagant opinion was Protagoras the Abderite, who, as Plato instructs us in his Theætetus, held, *οὐδὲν εἶναι ἓν αὐτὸ καθ᾽ αὑτὸ ἀλλὰ τινὶ ἀεὶ γίγνεσθαι· τὸ δ᾽ εἶναι πανταχόθεν ἐξαιρετέον·* That nothing was any thing in itself absolutely, but was always made so to something else, and essence or being was to be removed from every thing.—In which position of his there seems to be these two things asserted: First, that all things were in perpetual motion, and nothing had any esse, but fieri, being, but a possibility to be, which the said Protagoras thus expressed: *Ἐκ δὲ δὴ φορᾶς τε καὶ κινήσεως καὶ κράσεως πρὸς ἄλληλα γίγνεται, ἃ δὴ φαμὲν εἶναι οὔκ ὀρθῶς προσαγορεύοντες·* All things are made by motion and mixture of things together, and therefore are not rightly said to be; for nothing is, but every thing is always made.—Secondly, That nothing is made absolutely, but only relatively to something else. *Εἴτε τις εἶναί τι ὀνομάζει, τινὶ εἶναι, ἢ τινός, ἢ πρός τι, ῥητέον αὐτῷ, εἴτε γίγνεσθαι· αὐτὸ δὲ ἐφ᾽ αὑτοῦ τι ἢ ὂν ἢ γιγνόμενον, οὔτε αὐτῷ λεκτέον οὔτ᾽ ἄλλου λέγοντος ἀποδεκτέον·* If any one say that

any thing either is or is made, he must say that it is so to something, or in respect of some body, for we cannot affirm that any thing either is or is made absolutely in itself, but relatively to something else.

Now from hence proceeded those known aphorisms of his, recorded both in Plato and Aristotle, *Τὰ φαινόμενα ἑκάστῳ ταῦτα καὶ εἶναι τούτῳ ᾧ φαίνεται·* That those things which appear to every one, are to him to whom they appear.—And again, *Πᾶσα φαντασία ἐστὶν ἀληθὴς·* That every fancy or opinion of every body was true.—And again, *Πάντων χρημάτων μέτρον ἄνθρωπον εἶναι, τῶν μὲν ὄντων ὡς ἔστι, τῶν δὲ μὴ ὄντων ὡς οὐκ ἔστιν·* That man is the measure of all things whether existing or not existing.—Which sentence seemed so pretty and argute to him, that he placed it in the very front of his book, as Plato tells us; and indeed it compriseth in it all the singularity of his philosophy, the true meaning thereof being this; not only that man taken generally is the measure of all things, (which in some sense might be affirmed, that our humane faculties are the measure of all things unto us) but also that *πᾶς ἄνθρωπος*, every individual man is the measure of all being and truth respectively to himself; for so the following words in Plato explain it: *Ὀυκοῦν οὕτως, πως λέγεις ὡς οἷα μὲν ἕκαστα ἐμοὶ φαίνεται, τοιαῦτα μὲν ἐστιν ἐμοί· οἷα δὲ σοι, τοιαῦτα ἂν σοί· ἄνθρωπος δὲ σύ τε κἀγώ·* Your meaning (saith Socrates) is this, that as every thing appears to me, such it is to me; and as it appears to you, such it is to you, both of us being alike men.—Wherefore it is elsewhere expressed after this manner: *Μέτρον ἕκαστον ἡμῶν εἶναι τῶν τε ὄντων καὶ μή·* That every man is the measure of what is and is not, that is, to himself, and *Μέτρον εἶναι αὐτῷ ἕκαστον αὐτοῦ σοφίας·* That every man is the measure of his own wisdom to himself.—Sextus Empiricus gives a short account of this Protagorean philosophy in a few words thus: *Τίθησι τὰ φαινόμενα ἑκάστῳ, καὶ οὕτως εἰσάγει τὸ πρός τι·* He asserts that, which seems to every one, to be, and so makes all things relative.—Now this was an higher strain of madness than the Pyrrhonian skepticism, which was not so extravagant as to affirm, that all things were fantastical and relative only; but that we could not affirm what things absolutely were in their own nature, but only what they seemed to us.

3. But that all this was chiefly intended as a battery or assault against morality, and principally levelled by Protagoras against the absolute and immutable natures of good and evil, just and unjust, appeareth also from sundry passages of that learned dialogue called Theætetus. [1]*Λέγε τοίνυν πάλιν εἰ σοὶ ἀρέσκει τὸ μήτι εἶναι, ἀλλὰ γίγνεσθαι αἰεὶ*

[1] Ed. Serrani, p. 157.

ἀγαθὸν καὶ καλὸν· Tell me therefore, dost though in good earnest think that nothing is good or honest, but is always made so?—And afterwards Protagoras affirms: [1]Οἷά γ' ἂν ἑκάστῃ πόλει δίκαια καὶ καλὰ δοκῇ, ταῦτα καὶ εἶναι αὐτῇ, ἕως ἂν αὐτὰ νομίζῃ· That whatsoever things seem to be good and just to every city or commonwealth, the same are so to that city or commonwealth so long as they seem so.—Again, [2]Καλὰ μὲν καὶ αἰσχρὰ, δίκαια καὶ ἄδικα, καὶ ὅσια καὶ μὴ, οἷα ἂν ἑκάστη πόλις οἰηθεῖσα θῆται νόμιμα ἑαυτῇ, ταῦτα καὶ εἶναι τῇ ἀληθείᾳ ἑκάστῃ καὶ ἐν τούτοις μὲν οὐδὲν σοφώτερον οὔτε ἰδιώτην ἰδιώτου, οὔτε πόλιν πόλεως εἶναι· Whatsoever things any city thinketh doth decree to be honest or dishonest, just or unjust, holy or unholy, those things are really or truly such to that city; and in such things as these no one private person or city is wiser than another, because οὐκ ἔστι φύσει αὐτῶν οὐδὲν οὐσίαν ἑαυτου ἔχον· none of these things have any nature or essence of their own, being merely fantastical and relative.—Lastly, to name no more places, [3]Οἰκοῦν ἐνταῦθά που ἦμεν τοῦ λόγου ἐν ᾧ ἔφαμεν τοὺς τὴν φερομένην οὐσίαν λέγοντας, καὶ τὸ αἰεὶ δοκοῦν ἑκάστῳ, τοῦτο καὶ εἶναι τούτῳ ᾧ δοκεῖ, ἐν μὲν τοῖς ἄλλοις ἐθέλειν δὴ διϊσχυριζεσθαι, καὶ οὐκ ἥκιστα περὶ τὰ δίκαια ὡς παντὸς μᾶλλον, ἃ ἂν θῆται πόλις δόξαντα αὐτῇ, ταῦτα καὶ ἔστι δίκαια τιθεμένη ἕωσπερ ἂν κέηται· The thing that we were about to show was this, that they which made the natures and essences of all things, flowing and mutable, and which held that what seemed to every body, was that to whom it so seemed, as they do maintain this concerning all other things, so concerning nothing more than just and unjust, as being unquestionably true of these, that whatsoever any city thinks to be good and just, and decrees them such, these things are so to that city, so long as they are so decreed.—

CHAP. II.

1. Wherefore, since in order to the taking away of the immutable natures of good and evil, just and unjust, and the moral differences of human actions, there was so strange an attempt made by these philosophers to overthrow the absolute essences and truths of all things; let us in the next place consider what pretences, or grounds they could possibly have for maintaining so wild a paradox as this is.

First, therefore, it is evident from Plato's writings, that Protagoras laid his foundation in the Heraclitical philosophy, at that time in great

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[1] Ibid. p. 167. [2] Ibid. p. 172. [3] Ibid. p. 177.

vogue and request in the world, which did *φερομένην οὐσίαν εἰσάγειν*, as that philosopher writes, bring in a floating and moveable essence, and maintained *οὐδὲν ἑστάναι, πάντα δὲ κινεῖσθαι·* That nothing stood, but all things moved and flowed.—An opinion which most of the ancients were inclining to, as appears from the poets, who made *πάντα ἔκγονα ῥοῆς τε καὶ κινήσεως*, all things to be the offspring of flux and motion;—insomuch that Homer himself (as Plato observes) deriving the pedigree of the Gods, made the Ocean their father, and Tethys their mother. *Ὠκεανόν τε θεῶν γένεσιν, καὶ μητέρα Τήθυν.*

And there were not any philosophers of note, besides Parmenides and Melissus, that opposed it, who also run into another extreme; and therefore the former of these Plato facetiously calls *τοὺς ῥέοντας*, the flowing philosophers, the latter *στασιώτας*, the standers. Now the true meaning of this Heraclitical philosophy was plainly this; that there is no other being in the world besides individual body or matter, and no such thing as *εἴδη*, standing intelligible forms, that is, no intellectual being; which matter or corporeal being as it is liable to motion and mutation because of its divisibility, every part of it being separable from another; so by the mutation that we find in all corporeal things, we may reasonably conclude, that it is throughout perpetually moved and agitated by streams and subtle matter passing the pores of all bodies; whence it was that they affirmed *οἷον ῥεύματα κινεῖσθαι τὰ πάντα*, that all things flowed like a stream;—and that there was no stability either of essence or knowledge any where to be found. For that Cratylus and Heraclitus endeavored to destroy the certainty of all science from this principle, is evident in that they maintained that contradictories might be true concerning the same thing, and at the same time. And indeed if there were no other being in the world but individual matter, and all knowledge proceeded from the impresses of that matter, that being always agitated, it is not conceivable how there could be any stability of knowledge any more than of essence found in this rapid whirlpool of corporeal things; nay, nor how there should be any such thing as knowledge at all. Wherefore according to this Heraclitical philosophy, Protagoras in the first place concluded *ὅτι ἐπιστήμη οὐκ ἄλλο τι ἐστὶν ἢ αἴσθησις·* That knowledge is nothing else but sense.—For as Plato writes: *Εἰς ταὐτὸν σύμπεπτωκε οἷον ῥέυματα κινεῖσθαι τὰ πάντα, καὶ αἴσθησιν ἐπιστήμην γίγνεσθαι·* These two assertions come all to one, that all things flow like a stream, and that knowledge and sense are one and the self-same thing.

2. But Protagoras went further, and made a superstructure upon this Heraclitical philosophy out of the old Atomical or Phenician phi

losophy, which clearly asserted, that all those sensible qualities, as they are called, of heat and cold, light and colors, sounds, odors and sapours, formally considered, are not things really and absolutely existing without us, but only passions, sensations and phantasms in us, occasioned by certain local motions made upon the organs of sense from the objects without us, and so indeed but relative and fantastical things. And thus Protagoras made up his business complete from this mixture of the Heraclitical and atomical philosophy together; for taking it for granted according to Heraclitus's doctrine, that knowledge is nothing else but sense, and according to the Phenician or Atomical philosophy, that the sensible qualities are not things really and absolutely existing without us, but appearances or sensations in us, he concluded *πάντα τὰ νοητὰ καὶ αἰσθητά·* all sensible and intelligible things—not to be absolute essences, but things merely relative, fantastical and imaginary.

CHAP. III.

1. Now that this Atomical, Corpuscular or Mechanical philosophy, that solves all the phenomena of the corporeal world by those intelligible principles of magnitude, figure, site and motion, and thereby makes sensible things intelligible, banishing away those unintelligible corporeal forms and sensible qualities, was known to Protagoras, who lived not only before Plato and Aristotle, but also before Democritus himself, as Plutarch testifies, (though he abused it, in grounding so strange a paradox upon it) I shall make it undeniably evident from several testimonies out of Plato's Theætetus; for besides that passage afore-mentioned, [1] *Ἐκ δὲ δὴ φορᾶς τε καὶ κινήσεως καὶ κράσεως πρὸς ἄλληλα γίγνεται πάντα·* That all things are made by local motion and mixture with one another,—and what follows after, [2] *Τὸ μὲν εἶναι δοκοῦν καὶ τὸ γίγνεσθαι κίνησις παρέχει·* That motion is that which makes every thing to seem to be, or to be generated,—he plainly describes the nature of colors according to this very hypothesis, [3] *ΣΩ. ὑπόλαβε τοίνυν ὦ ἄριστε οὐτωσὶ κατὰ τὰ ὄμματα πρῶτον. ὃ δὴ καλεῖς χρῶμα λευκὸν, μὴ εἶναι αὐτὸ ἕτερόν τι ἔξω τῶν σῶν ὀμμάτων, μηδ' ἐν τοῖς ὄμμασι· μηδέ τιν' αὐτῶ χώραν ἀποτάξῃς. ἤδη γὰρ ἂν μένοι, καὶ οὐκ ἂν ἐν τῇ γενέσει γίνοιτο. Θέαιτ. Ἀλλὰ πῶς; Σω. Ἑπώμεθα τῷ ἄρτι λόγῳ, μηδέν αὐτὸ καθ' αὑτὸ ἓν ὂν τιθέντες, καὶ ἡμῖν οὕτω μέλαντε καὶ*

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[1] Plato's Theætetus, p. 152. [2] Ibid. p. 153. [3] Ibid. p. 158.

λευκὸν καὶ ὁτιοῦν ἄλλο χρῶμα ἐκ τῆς προσβολῆς τῶν ὀμμάτων πρὸς τὴν προσήκουσαν φορὰν φανεῖται γεγεννημένον. καὶ ὃ δὴ ἕκαστοι εἶναι φαμὲν χρῶμα, οὔτε τὸ ὀροσβάλλον, οὔτε τὸ προσβαλλόμενόν ἐστι, ἀλλὰ μεταξύ τι ἑκάστῳ ἴδιον γεγονός· The sense wherefore is this, let us begin first with the eyes or sight: that which is called a white colour, is not any real quality existing either without the eyes or in the eyes; for then it would not consist only in motion and generation: but taking it for granted that no sensible thing is such absolutely in itself, we must say that a white and black colour, and every other colour is generated by certain motions made and impressed upon the eye, and every colour is neither that which makes the impression, nor that which receiveth it; (that is, neither any thing in the eye nor in the object absolutely) but a certain middle thing between them both, which can be nothing else but a passion or sensation in us.—Elsewhere in that dialogue he proves this assertion, that colours and the like sensible things are no real and absolute qualities either in the sentient or in the object, because the same object seems to have different qualities to different persons, as *Πνέοντος ἀνέμου τοῦ ἀυτοῦ ὁ μὲν ἡμῶν ῥιγοῖ, ὁ δὶ οὔ. καὶ ὁ μὲν ἠρέμα, ὁ δὲ σφόδρα·* The same wind blowing seems cold to one and warm to another; and the same wine which to one in health seems sweet, will to the same person appear bitter and distasteful if he be sick.—Whence he concluded that heat and cold, sweet and bitter, were not things really and absolutely existing in the objects without, but relative things, being passions or sensations that may be diversified by the different tempers and complexions of the body.

2. Afterward, p. 156, we have the sum of this atomical or mechanical philosophy, more copiously and fully set down after this manner, *Ἀρχὴ δὲ ἐξ ἧς καὶ ἃ νῦν δὴ ἐλέγομεν πάντα ἤρτηται, ἥδε αὐτῶν. Ὡς τὸ πᾶν κίνησις ἦν, καὶ ἄλλο παρὰ τοῦτο οὐδέν. Ἐστὶ δε κινήσεως δύο εἴδη, πλήθει μὲ ἄπειρον ἑκάτερον, δύναμιν δὲ τὸ μὲ ποιεῖν ἔχον, τὸ δὲ πάσχειν. Ἐκ δὲ τῆς τούτων ὁμιλίας τε καὶ τρίψεως πρὸς ἄλληλα, γίγνεται ἔκγονα, πλήθει μὲ ἄπειρα, δίδυμα δέ. τὸ μὲν αἰσθητὸν, τὸ δὲ αἴσθησις, ἀεὶ συνεκπίπτουσα καὶ γεννωμένη μετὰ τοῦ αἰσθητοῦ. Αἱ μὲν οὖν αἰσθήσεις τὰ τοιάδε ἡμῖν ἔχουσιν ὀνόματα, ὄψεις τε καὶ ἀκοαί καὶ ὀσφρήσεις, καὶ ψυξεις τε καὶ κάυσεις, καὶ ἡδοναί γε δὲ καὶ λυπὰι καὶ ἐπιθυμίαι καὶ φόβοι κεκλημεναί. Καὶ ἄλλαι ἀπέραντοι μὲ αἱ ἀνώνυμαι, παμπληθεῖς δὲ αἱ ὠνομασμέναι. Τὸ δὲ ἂυ αἰσθητὸν γένος τούτων ἑκάσταις ὁμόγονον. Ὄψεσι μὲν παντοδαπᾶις χρώματα παντοδαπά· ἀκοαῖς δὲ ὡσαύτως φωναὶ, καὶ ταῖς ἄλλαις αἰσθήσεσι τὰ ἄλλα αἰσθητὰ ξυγγενῆ γιγνόμενα.——ἐν φορᾷ αὐτῶν ἡ κίνησις πέφυκεν. Ἐπειδὰν οὖν ὄμμα καὶ ἄλλό τι τῶν τούτῳ συμμέτρων πλεσιάσαν γεννήσῃ τὴν λευκότητά τε καὶ αἴσθησιν αὐτῇ ξύμφυτον, ἃ οὐκ ἂν ποτὲ ἐγένετο, ἑκατέρου ἐκείνων πρὸς*

ἄλλο ἐλθόντος, τότε δὴ μεταξὺ φερομένων [τῆς μὲν ὄψεως πρὸς τῶν ὀφθαλμῶν, τῆς δὲ λευκότητος πρὸς τοῦ συναποτίκτοντος τὸ χρῶμα] ὁ μὲν ὀφθαλμὸς ἄρα ὄψεως ἔμπλεως ἐγένετο, καὶ ὁρᾷ δὴ τότε, καὶ ἐγενετο οὔτι ὄψις, ἀλλὰ ὀφθαλμὸς ὁρῶν. τὸ δὲ συγγεννῆσαν τὸ χρῶμα, λευκότητος περιεπλήσθη, καὶ ἐγενετο οὐ λευκότης αὖ, ἀλλὰ λευκὸν εἴτε ξύλον εἴτε λίθος εἴτε ὁτιοῦν συνέβη χρῶμα χρωσθῆναι τῷ τοιούτῳ χρώματι. Καὶ τἆλλα δὴ οὕτω σκληρὸν καὶ θερμὸν, καὶ πάντα τὸν αὐτὸν τρόπον ὑποληπτέον, αὐτὸ μὲν καθ᾽ αὑτὸ μηδὲν εἶναι, ὃ δὴ καὶ τότε ἐλέγομεν, ἐν δὲ τῇ προς ἄλληλα ὁμιλίᾳ πάντα γίγνεσθαι καὶ παντοῖα ἀπὸ τῆς κινήσεως· The beginning upon which all things depend is this; that the whole world is motion, and nothing else besides. Now of motion there are two kinds, each of which containeth innumerable branches under it; but the power of one is action, of the other, passion. From the mutual congress and contrition of both which together, are begotten innumerable offsprings, which may all be reduced to these two general heads, whereof the one the sensible, the other sense, which is always joined together with the sensible. The senses have such names as these, sight, hearing, tasting, touching, pleasures, pains, desires, fears, and others innumerable without names, but many that have names. The sensible kind doth answer and correspond to every one of these; to the sight all manner of colours, to the hearing sounds, and to the other senses other sensibles, that are of kin to them.—When therefore the eye, and some other thing analogous to it, meet together, they beget whiteness, and a certain sense proportionable thereunto, neither of which would have been made, if either of these had not met with the other. Then these things being carried respectively, sight to the eyes, and whiteness to the object, which did actively beget it, the eye becomes full of sight, and sees, and is not made sight in the abstract, but an eye seeing; and that which did congenerate the colour, is fitted with whiteness, and is made, not whiteness in the abstract, but a thing white, whether wood or stone. The same is to be conceived of all other sensible things, as hard and hot, and the like, that nothing is by itself absolutely any of these things, but they are all made from a mutual congress of the outward object and the sense, by means of motion.—

3. Here we see it plainly asserted, that the whole world is made by nothing else but the motion of particles, by means of which all things are generated and corrupted; neither did Protagoras acknowledge any other motion but local, as is plainly intimated: and that all these sensible qualities which we take notice of by the several senses, as colours, sounds, sapours, odours, and the like, are not things really existing without us, but passions or sensations in us, caused by several local motions upon the organs of sense. Which, if that be not sufficient that I have

already alleged, is yet more plainly expressed after this manner, p. 182: *Μέμνησαι γὰρ ὅτι οὕτως ἐλέγομεν, ἓν μηδὲν αὐτὸ καθ' αὑτὸ εἶναι, μηδ' αὖ τὸ ποιοῦν ἢ πάσχον, ἀλλ' ἐξ ἀμφοτέρων πρὸς ἄλληλα συγγιγνομένων ταῖς αἰσθήσεσι, καὶ τὰ αἰσθητὰ ἀποτικτόντων, τὰ μὲν ποία ἄττα γίγνεσθαι, τὰ δὲ αἰσθανόμενα·* Nothing is absolutely any one thing by itself, neither the agent nor the patient, but from both of these meeting together, are generated at once both the senses and the sensible things.—

4. These passages which I have cited are so clear and evident, that they cannot possibly be capable of any other sense than what I have expressed; and therefore those two Latin interpreters, Ficinus and Serranus, that lived before the restitution of this mechanical philosophy, and therefore understood it not, yet expounded them after the same manner. The first thus: Color neque oculorum aspectus est, neque corporum motus, sed ex aspectu motuque medium quiddam resultans: id est, talis circa oculos passio. Colour is neither the sight of the eyes, nor the motion of bodies, but a certain middle thing resulting from the sight and motion, that is, such a passion about the eyes.—The other in this manner: Ex varia aspicientis *διαθέσει*, variaque adeo intermedii sensilis schesi, colores varios et videri et fieri, ita tamen ut omnia sint *φαντασικά*, nec nisi in animo subsistant, vario autem motus congressu varientur; quod de omnibus sensibus constituendum est. That from the different disposition of the beholder, and so the different affection of the intermediate sensible organ, the various colours are both made and seen, but so as that they are all phantastical, nor have any subsistence but in the mind, are varied by the different congress of motion, which is to be concluded concerning all the senses.—Only Protagoras, in order to his skeptical design, made these sensible things not only relative to animals in general, but also to individuals, because it is impossible to demonstrate, as he urges, that all brute beasts, nay, that any two men have the very same phantasms or ideas of red or green, these being idiopathies, and because experience shows, that not only the gratefulness and ungratefulness of tastes and smells, but also that heat and cold are relative to individuals.

CHAP. IV.

1. Wherefore we have made it evident, that that very mechanical or atomical philosophy, that hath been lately restored by Cartesius and Gassendus, as to the main substance of it, was not only elder than

Epicurus, but also than Plato, and Aristotle, nay, than Democritus and Leucippus also, the commonly reputed fathers of it. And therefore we have no reason to discredit the report of Posidonius the stoic, who as Strabo tells us, affirmed this atomical philosophy to have been ancienter than the times of the Trojan war, and first to have been brought into Greece out of Phenicia. [1] If we may believe Posidonius the stoic, the doctrine of Atoms is ancienter than the times of the Trojan war, and was first invented and delivered by one Moschus a Sidonian, or rather a Phenician, as *Ἐι δεῖ πιστεῦσαι τῷ Ποσιδονίῳ, τὸ περὶ τῶν ἀτόμων δόγμα παλαιὸν ἐστίν, ἀνδρὸς Σιδονίου Μόσχου πρὸ τῶν Τροϊκῶν χρόνων γεγονότος·* Sextus Empiricus cites the testimony of Posidonius. [2] Democritus and Epicurus invented the doctrine of atoms, unless we make that physiology to be ancienter, and derive it, as Posidonius the stoic doth, from one Moschus, a Phenician. *Δημόκριτος δὲ καὶ Ἐπίκουρος ἀτόμους, εἰ μήτι ἀρχαιοτέραν ταύτην θητέον τὴν δόξαν, καὶ ὡς ἔλεγεν ὁ Στωϊκὸς Ποσειδόνιος, ἀπὸ Μόσχου τινος ἀνδρὸς φοίνικος καταγομένην·* And since it is certain from what we have showed, that neither Epicurus nor yet Democritus were the first inventors of this physiology, this testimony of Posidonius the stoic ought in reason to be admitted by us.—

2. Now what can be more probable than that this Moschus the Phenician, that Posidonius speaks of, is the very same person with that Moschus the physiologer, that Jamblichus mentions in the life of Pythagoras, where he affirms, that Pythagoras living some time at Sidon in Phenicia, conversed with the Prophets that were the successors of Mochus the physiologer, and was instructed by them. *Τοῖς τε Μώχου τοῦ φυσιολόγου προφήταις ἀπογόνοις καὶ τοῖς ἄλλοις καί φοινικικοῖς ἱεροφάνταις·* He conversed with the prophets that were the successors of Mochus and other Phenician priests. And what can be more certain than that both Mochus and Moschus, the Phenician and philosopher, was no other than Moses the Jewish lawgiver, as Arcerius rightly guesses, *Μόσχου* legendum videtur, nisi quis *Μώχου* vel *Μωσέως* legere malit, It seems that it ought to be read Moschus, unless any had rather read it Mochus or Moses.—Wherefore according to the ancient tradition, Moschus or Moses the Phenician being the first author of the atomical philosophy, it ought to be called neither Epicurean nor Democritical, but Moschical or Mosaical.

3. It must be acknowledged, that neither of these two famous and renowned philosophers, Plato and Aristotle, had the good hap to be rightly and thoroughly instructed in this ancient Phenician and Moschi-

[1] Lib. 16. edit. Casaub. p. 757. [2] Advers. Mathemat. p. 367.

cal or Mosaical philosophy; Protagoras so much abusing it to skepticism, and the taking away of the natural discrimination of good and evil, might probably beget a prejudice in Plato against it, though he doth not confute the physiological part of it in all his Theætetus, where good occasion was offered him; And yet in his Timæus he hath a little smattering of it, where he endeavors to resolve the differences of the four elements, fire, air, water, earth, into the different geometrical figures of their insensible parts, making the small particles of the earth to be cubical, by reason of their solidity and immobility, but of the fire, pyramidal.[1] *Τὸ ἔχον ὀλιγίστας βάσεις εὐκινητότατον ἀνάγκη πεφυκέναι, τμητικώτατόν τε ὀξύτατον ὂν πάντη πάντων·* It is reasonable that the figure which hath the smallest basis, should be attributed to that body which is most moving, cutting and piercing.—And that he doth not mean mystically in this, but physically, appears from his own explication of it concerning the insensible parts,[2] *Πάντα οὖν δεῖ ταῦτα διανοεῖσθαι σμικρὰ οὕτως ὡς καθ' ἓν ἕκαστον μὲν τοῦ γένους ἑκάστου διὰ σμικρότητα οὐδὲν ὁρώμενον ὑφ' ἡμῶν, συναθροισθέντων δὲ πολλῶν τοὺς ὄγκους αὐτῶν ὁρᾶσθαι·* These cubes and pyramids in the earth and the fire can only be perceived by the mind and understanding, since the single particles alone are not sensible, but only the aggregation of many of them together.

4. But Aristotle plainly rejects it. Jacobus Carpentarius, in his notes upon Alcinous, treating of the nature of universals, writes thus. Quidam universalia non omnino quidem tollunt, sed ea tantum esse volunt quando intelliguntur, nihil vero haberi in natura quod mentis notioni respondeat: quod mihi sane perinde est ac si dicerent colores nihil actu esse, sed tales effici quando reipsa videntur. Quæ etiam opinio suos habuit assertores, sed ab Aristotele est damnata. Some do not altogether deny universals, but will have it that they only are when they are understood, but that there is nothing in nature which answers to the notion of the mind. Which to me indeed is the same thing as if they should say that colours are not in their nature actually any thing, but are made such when they are in very deed seen. Which opinion also hath had its assertors, but is condemned by Aristotle.—This opinion, that colours are not actually existent according to those very ideas that we have of them before vision, is the arcanum, mystery of the old Atomical or Mosaical philosophy, which Carpentarius understood not; which makes them not qualities absolutely existing without us, but passions and sensations in us. And indeed this philosophy is condemned by Aristotle, in his third book de anima, of the soul, c. ii.

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[1] Pag. 55. ser. edit. [2] Ibid. page 56.

and that as the received doctrine of the ancient physiologists before his time. *Οἱ πρότεροι φυσιολόγοι τοῦτο οὐ καλῶς ἔλεγον, οἰδὲν οἰόμενοι οὔτε λευκὸν οὔτε μέλαν ἄνευ ὄψεως, οἴδε Χυμὸν ἄνευ γέυσεως·* The former physiologists, saith he, were (generally) mistaken in this, in that they thought blackness and whiteness were no absolute qualities without the sight, nor sweet and sour without taste.—Again, he endeavors to confute the same philosophy which resolves those sensible qualities into figures, site and motion of particles; not only attributing it to Democritus, but also making it the most generally received physiology before his time. *Δημόκριτος καὶ οἱ πλεῖστοι τῶν φυσιολόγων ἀτοπώτατόν τι ποιοῦσι· πάντα γὰρ τὰ αἰσθητὰ ἁπτὰ ποιοῦσι. Καί τοι εἰ καὶ τοῦτο οὕτως ἔχει, δῆλον ὅτι καὶ τῶν ἄλλων αἰσθήσεων ἑκάστη ἁφή τις ἔστι· τοῦτο δὲ ὅτι ἔστι ἀδύνατον, οὐ χαλεπὸν συνιδεῖν. Ἔτι δὲ τοῖς κοινοῖς τῶν αἰσθήσεων πασῶν χρῶνται ὡς ἰδίοις. Μέγεθος γὰρ καὶ σχῆμα, καὶ τὸ τραχὺ καὶ τὸ λεῖον, ἔτι δὲ τὸ ὀξὺ καὶ τὸ ἀμβλὺ τὸ ἐν τοῖς ὄγκοις κοινὰ τῶν αἰσθήσεων ἐστί, εἰ δὲ μὴ πασῶν, ἀλλὰ ὄψεώς γε καὶ ἁφῆς. οἱ δὲ τὰ ἴδια ἐνταῦθα ἀνάγουσιν ὥσπερ Δημόκριτος. Τὸ γὰρ λευκὸν καὶ τὸ μέλαν, τὸ μὲν τραχὺ φησὶν εἶναι τὸ δὲ λεῖον. Εἰς δὲ τὰ σχήματα ἀνάγει τοὺς Χυμοὺς, καίτοι ἢ οὐδημιᾶς ἢ μᾶλλον τῆς ὄψεως τὰ κοινὰ γνωρίζειν·* Democritus and most of the physiologers commit a great absurdity in this, in that they make all sense to be touch; which is a thing at first sight plainly impossible. Moreover, they do not distinguish betwixt the objects common to all the senses, and those which are proper and peculiar to the several senses apart. For magnitude and figure, roughness and smoothness, sharpness and bluntness, which belong to bulk, are common to all the senses; or if not to all, yet to sight and touch. Whereas our sense is deceived concerning these common objects, but it is never deceived concerning the proper objects of the several senses, as the sight is not deceived about colours, nor the hearing about sounds.—But most of the ancient physiologists refer these proper objects to the common sensilia; as Democritus, who, as for white and black, makes one of them to consist in scabrities, roughness and ruggedness, the other in smoothness and evenness of parts. He also reduceth sapours to figures, though it belong chiefly to sight to take cognizance of figures and magnitude, and the like: whereas according to this philosophy, the sense of touch would be the most critical of them. Aristotle there concludes this discourse, with two general arguments against that philosophy (that made the sensible qualities to be properly sensations in us, and nothing else in the objects without us but magnitude, figure, site of parts and motion) in this manner, *Ἔτι τὰ μὲν αἰσθητὰ πάντα ἔχει ἐναντίωσιν, οἷον ἐν χρώματι τῷ μέλανι τὸ λευκὸν, καὶ ἐν χυμοῖς τὸ γλυκὺ τῷ πικρῷ, σχῆμα δὲ σχήματι οὐ δοκεῖ εἶναι ἐναντίον. τίνι γὰρ τῶν πολυγώνων τὸ περι-*

φερὲς ἐναντίον; Ἔτι ἀπείρων ὄντων τῶν σχημάτων, ἀναγκαῖον καὶ τοὺς χυμοὺς εἶναι ἀπείρους· That there is contrariety in qualities, but not in figures; and that the variety of figures being infinite, tastes, colours, and the rest would be so likewise.—Which arguments, though they be handsome and ingenious (that is, Aristotelical) to prove that there are such entities as qualities visible, tangible, tastable, and the like, really existing in the objects without us; yet as they will not counterbalance the weight of those other arguments that militate on the contrary side, so they will without any difficulty be answered by the assertors of this Novantique philosophy.

5. But after Plato's and Aristotle's time, this old physiology was again revived by Epicurus, but so blended with immorality and impiety, as that it soon sunk again, there being nothing left of all those voluminous treatises of Epicurus concerning it, saving what is preserved in Diogenes Laertius, nor no other system thereof transmitted to posterity but what is comprised in the poem of Lucretius Carus. So that the world was generally seized with a deep and profound oblivion of this physiology, there being only some obscure footsteps and dark intimations of it now and then found in the writings of some learned authors. As when Sextus tells us that some of the stoics held, *Τὰ αἰσθητὰ εἶναι πρὸς τί·* that sensitive things were relative to animals, and depended upon our sensation;—and *Τὰ πάθη μόνα καταλαμβάνεσθαι·* That not the things themselves were comprehended by sense, but only our passions from them:—And when the Pyrrhonian skeptics themselves affirmed, *πάντα εἶναι πρὸς τί, τουτέστι πρὸς τὸ κρίνον, ὅτι πρὸς τόδε τὸ ζῶον καὶ τόνδε τὸν ἄνθρωπον, καὶ τήνδε τὴν αἴσθησιν ἕκαστον φάινεται·* That all things are relative, that is, to that which judges of them, and every thing appears to be according to sense.—

And when Plotinus makes a doubt whether sensible things did really exist in the objects without us, or were only passions within us,[1] *Ἐπεὶ καὶ τὰ ἐπὶ τῆς αἰσθήσεως, ἃ δὲ δοκεῖ πίστιν ἔχειν ἐναργεστάτην, ἀπιστεῖται μήποτε οὐκ ἐν τοῖς ὑποκρινομένοις, ἀλλ' ἐν τοῖς πάθεσιν ἔχῃ τὴν δοκοῦσαν ὑπόστασιν, καὶ νοῦ δεῖ ἢ διανόιας τῶν κρινόντων·* It may be well doubted concerning sensible things themselves, that we seem to have the greatest assurance of, whether they really exist in the objects without us, or whether they be passions in us.—

6. But in this last age it hath been so successfully restored by the writings of some learned authors, and the truth thereof so convincingly evinced by many other experiments besides that of the glassy prism

[1] Enn. 5. lib. 5.

and rainbow, that there is little doubt left concerning it. And indeed unless this philosophy be acknowledged to be true, we must of necessity affirm, that the sensible and corporeal world is altogether unintelligible. For as Timæus Locrus long ago observed, that τὰ αἰσθητά, sensible things could not be apprehended any otherwise than αἰσθήσει καὶ νόθῳ λογισμῷ· by sense and a certain kind of spurious reason, so it is most certainly true that we cannot possibly have any clear and intelligible ideas of heat and cold, light and colors, as such qualities really existing in the objects of sense without us, but as passions and sensations in ourselves we may. Wherefore unless we will assert that these lower sensible things are ἀκατάληπτα, utterly incomprehensible to our understanding, whilst it is able clearly to comprehend things of a higher nature, we must conclude this old Atomical, Moschical or Mosaical philosophy to be true.

CHAP. V.

1. But though this old Atomical philosophy be most solidly and substantially true, the paradoxes that Protagoras and others endeavored to ground upon it, are not only ridiculously absurd and contradictious in themselves, but also altogether inconsequent from the same.

For as for those assertions, that whatsoever seems is, and that every fancy is true; though they seem ridiculously absurd, yet those two learned philosophers Plato and Aristotle vouchsafe them a serious confutation. Plato from hence, in his Theætetus, because that the fancies of them that dream would be as true and real as the sensations of those that are awake; and that all men would be alike wise, and the opinions of the most illiterate idiots in geometry as true as any geometrical theorems, and all predictions of future things alike true. And that in the actions of human life, it would be indifferent what any man did in order to any end, and so all deliberation and consultation cease.

But Aristotle, in his Metaphysics, with some mixture of facetiousness also writes after this manner: Τοῖς ὑπὸ τὴν ὄψιν ὑποβάλλουσι τὸν δάκτυλον καὶ ποιοῦσιν ἐκ τοῦ ἑνὸς φαίνεσθαι δύο, δύο εἶναι διὰ τὸ φαίνεσθαι ταῦτα, καὶ πάλιν ἕν· τοῖς γὰρ μὴ κινοῦσι τὴν ὄψιν ἓν φαίνεται τὸ ἕν· To those that put their finger under their sight or between their eyes, it will be both two and one.—But Sextus Empiricus bestows more subtilty upon it than either of them; Εἰ πᾶσα φαντασία ἐστὶν ἀληθής, καὶ τὸ μὴ πᾶσαν φαντασίαν εἶναι ἀληθῆ, κατὰ φαντασίαν ὑφιστάμενον ἔσται ἀληθές·

καὶ οὕτω τὸ πᾶσαν φαντασίαν εἶναι ἀληθῆ γενήσεται ψεῦδος· If every fancy be true, then when one fancies that every fancy is not true, that must be true also, and so then this proposition that every fancy is true will be false.—

2. Whereas the meaning of these assertions, that whatsoever seems is, and every fancy is true, was no other than this, that nothing was absolutely true at all, but that all truth and knowledge were but seeming, fantastical and relative things. And because one seeming or appearance is as true as another, therefore they were all equally true, that is to say, none of them true at all. This Aristotle elsewhere rightly apprehended, Ὁ λέγων ἅπαντα τὰ φαινόμενα εἶναι ἀληθῆ, ἅπαντα ποιεῖ τὰ ὄντα πρός τι· He that saith that all things that appear are true, makes all beings to be relative.

But if nothing be absolutely true, but only relatively to him that thinks so, then this very opinion of Protagoras, that nothing was absolutely true, and that man was the measure of all things, was not itself absolutely true, but only seemingly and relatively to Protagoras: Whereas this is asserted for an absolute truth by him, that nothing is absolutely true.

And what a ridiculous folly was this in one that would be accounted a philosopher, to take a great deal of pains in writing a large volume, and to endeavor industriously to convince the world, that nothing was absolutely, but only relatively and fantastically true. Since it must needs follow from thence, that this very thing itself was not absolutely true, but only relatively to those that thought so; and the contrary altogether as true to those that thought otherwise. For it would no more concern the world to know that this was relatively and fantastically true to Protagoras that nothing was absolutely true, than to know what Protagoras dreamt of the last night. For since according to him Αὐτὸς τὰ αὑτοῦ ἕκαστος μόνα δοξάζει· that every man does but think his own truths, it cannot concern any man to know another's opinions any more than his dreams.—And therefore Protagoras had done more wisely if he had spared his pains, and kept those private relative truths of his own, that is, his dream or imagination wholly to himself.

But by his industrious endeavoring to convince the world of this, that nothing was absolutely true, but only relatively, he plainly confuted his own doctrine, in asserting that this was absolutely true, that nothing was absolutely true, which is a manifest contradiction. There need be the less pains taken in confuting skepticism and fanaticism, since it always so easily confutes itself.

3. For if nothing be absolutely true, then not so much as this could

be absolutely true, that it seemed to Protagoras that nothing was absolutely true. And it could only seem to seem to be true. Nay, it could not be absolutely true, that Protagoras, to whom all truth seemed to be relative had any real existence, much less that there are any objects without, from whence the impressions or motions are made upon our senses; or that there is any such thing as magnitude, motion, figure and site of parts, or *Τὴν ὕλην ῥευστὴν εἶναι, καὶ τοὺς λόγους τῶν φαινομένων πάντων ἐν αὐτῇ ὑποκεῖσθαι·* that matter is floating, and that the reasons of all appearances are founded therein; which things, as Plato and Sextus tell us, were dogmatically affirmed by Protagoras.

CHAP. VI.

1. Again, as this skepticism or fantasticism of Protagoras is most absurd and contradictious in itself, so there is not any foundation for it at all in the old Atomical philosophy, but contrariwise, nothing doth more effectually and demonstratively overthrow both these assertions that knowledge is sense, and that all truth and knowledge is but fantastical and relative, than this Atomical philosophy doth.

For first, since no sense can judge of itself, or its own appearances, much less make any judgment of the appearances belonging to another sense for *Ἃ δὶ ἑτέρας δυνάμεως αἰσθάνη, ἀδύνατον δὶ ἄλλης τούτων αἰσθέσθαι, οἷον ἃ δὶ ἀκοῆς, δὶ ὄψεως· ἢ ἃ δὶ ὄψεως, δὶ ἀκοῆς·* those things which are perceived by one of our powers, it is impossible to perceive them by another, as the objects of hearing by sight, or the objects of sight by hearing, and the like.

The sight cannot judge of sounds which belong to the hearing, nor the hearing of light and colors; wherefore that which judges of all the senses and their several objects, cannot be itself any sense, but something of a superior nature.

2. Moreover, that which judges that the appearances of all the senses have something fantastical in them, cannot possibly be itself fantastical, but it must be something which hath a power of judging what really and absolutely is or is not. This being not a relative, but an absolute truth, that sensible appearances have something fantastical in them. Neither could Protagoras ever have arrived to the knowledge of this truth, if he had not had some faculty in him superior to sense, that judgeth of what is and is not absolutely.

Now this same rational faculty, that discovers, according to the

Atomical philosophy, that there is something in our sensations that is merely fantastical and relative, doth assure us also not only that there are absolutely and really such passions, affections and seemings in us, but that they that do sentire, perceive, have an absolute and real entity. For though it should be supposed that our senses did deceive us in all their representations, and that there were no sun, no moon, no earth, that we had no hands, no feet, no body, as by sense we seem to have, yet reason tells us that of necessity that must be something, to whom these things seem to be, because nothing can seem to that that is not; this being an absolute and immutable truth, Nihili nullam esse neque actionem neque passionem: That of nothing there is not any either action or passion whatsoever;—but also that when we are awake and use our senses, there are corporeal objects really existing without us, which make those sensible impressions upon us, and that those corporeal objects have absolutely and really as many correspondent varieties in them in respect of magnitude, figure, site and motion, as there are varieties of sensible ideas and phantasms that we take notice of by them. For Protagoras himself, according to the old Atomical philosophy, acknowledges that local motion, magnitude, figure and site of parts, absolutely are in corporeal things themselves; only that color and such other things are relative. Therefore all being and truth according to Protagoras himself, is not fantastical and relative, but there is some absolute.

3. Wherefore the proper and genuine result of this old Atomical philosophy, which is the triumph of reason over sense, is nothing else but this, that sense alone is not the criterion or judge of what does really and absolutely exist without us, but that there is a higher and superior intellectual faculty in us that judges of our senses, which discovers what is fallacious and fantastical in them, and pronounces what absolutely is and is not. And Democritus, who did more thoroughly and perfectly understand this Atomical philosophy than Protagoras, makes this to be the proper result and consequence of it, the invalidating the judgment of sense concerning bodies themselves, and the asserting a higher faculty of reason in us to determine what is absolutely true and false; which is worth the noting. For so Sextus the philosopher writes concerning Democritus: *Δημόκριτος δὲ ἀναιρεῖ τὰ φαινόμενα ταῖς αἰσθήσεσιν, καὶ τούτων λέγει μηδὲν φαίνεσθαι κατὰ ἀλήθειαν, ἀλλὰ μόνον κατὰ δόξαν· ἀληθὲς δὲ ἐν τοῖς οὖσιν ὑπάρχειν τὸ ἀτόμους εἶναι καὶ κενόν·* Democritus doth discredit sense, attributing not truth to it, but only appearance, and that really nothing exists in the corporeal world but atoms and vacuum. And Democritus's own words concerning it are

these : *Νόμῳ γλυκὺ καὶ νόμῳ πικρὸν, νόμῳ θερμὸν καὶ νόμῳ ψυχρὸν, νόμῳ χροία· ἐτεῇ δὲ ἄτομα καὶ κενόν·* Sweet and bitter, hot and cold, colors, and the like, are by law and opinion, atoms and vacuum really. That which is supposed and fancied to be are sensibles ; but these are not according to truth, only atoms and vacuum.—Sextus Empiricus likewise in another place writes thus concerning Democritus, *Ἐν δὲ τοῖς κανόσι δύο φησὶν εἶναι γνώσεις, τὴν μὲν διὰ τῶν αἰσθήσεων, τὴν δὲ διὰ τῆς διανοίας, ὧν τὴν μὲν διὰ τῆς διανοίας γνῶσιν κατάγει προσμαρτυρῶν αὐτῇ τὸ πιστὸν εἰς ἀληθείας κρίσιν, τὴν δὲ διὰ τῶν αἰσθήσεων σκοτίην ὀνομάζει, ἀφαιρούμενος αὐτῆς τὸ πρὸς διάγνωσιν τοῦ ἀληθοῦς ἀπλανεί λέγει δὲ κατὰ λέξιν. Γνώμης δὲ δύο εἰσὶν Ιδέαι, ἡ μὲν γνησίη, ἡ δὲ σκοτίη. Καὶ σκοτίης μὲν τὰ δὲ σύμπαντα Ὄψις, Ἀκοὴ, Ὀδμὴ, Γεῦσις, ψαῦσις· ἡ δὲ γνησίη ἀποκεκρυμμένη δὲ ταύτης·* Democritus in his canons saith that there are two kinds of knowledge, the one by the senses, the other by the mind ; of which that by the mind he calls knowledge, accounting it that which may be trusted for the judgment of truth ; that by the senses, he calleth dark and obscure, denying it to have any certainty as to the knowledge of truth. His own words are these : Of knowledge there are two kinds, the one genuine, the other dark and obscure ; to the dark kind of knowledge are referred seeing, hearing, smelling, tasting, touching ; but the genuine knowledge is more hidden and recondite than this.

Now this concerning Democritus I note the rather more carefully, because Epicurus afterward dotingly fumbling about the same philosophy, made sense to be the only criterion of truth and falsehood, and consequently abused this old Atomical philosophy to Atheism and immorality ; whereas if rightly understood it is the most impregnable bulwark against both ; for this philosophy discovering that the ideas of sense are fantastical, must needs suppose another principle in us superior to sense, which judges what is absolutely and not fantastically or relatively only true or false.

BOOK III.

CHAPTER I.

1. Now although what I have already said may possibly seem a sufficient confutation of Protagoras's objection against the immutable and absolute natures or essences of all things, from that very Atomical physiology which he appeals to, which, if rightly understood, is the most compliable with true metaphysics, and the most subservient to it of any; yet notwithstanding I think it very proper to the business which I have in hand, to launch out further into this argument, to show the different natures of sense and intellection or knowledge, not only that I may thereby the more fully confute this skepticism, or rather fanaticism of Protagoras, and also assert the immutable natures or essences of things, but also for other purposes, which I shall give an account of in the close of this discourse, and I hope then to make it appear that this was no impertinent digression.

2. I shall begin with sense, to show what it is, and that it is not knowledge.

First, therefore, it is acknowledged by all, that sense is passion. And there is in all sensation, without dispute, first, a passion in the body of the sentient, which bodily passion is nothing else but local motion impressed upon the nerves from the objects without, and thence propagated and communicated to the brain, where all sensation is made. For there is no other action of one body upon another, nor other change or mutation of bodies conceivable or intelligible besides local motion; which motion in that body which moves another, is called action, in that which is moved by another, passion. And therefore when a corporeal object very remotely distant is perceived by us, since it is by some passion made upon our body, there must of necessity be a continued propagation of some local motion or pressure from thence unto the organs of our sense, or nerves, and so unto the brain. As when we see many fixed stars sparkling in a clear night, though they be all of them so many thousand semidiameters of the earth distant from us, yet it must of necessity be granted, that there are local mo-

tions or pressures from them, which we call the light of them, propagated continuedly or uninterruptedly through the fluid heavens unto our optic nerves, or else we could not see them. And that motion or pressure by which we see all other opaque bodies, is nothing but the Ἀντέρεισμα, pushing against each other of the etherial globus, globulous particles, striving to move outward from the centre of the vortex resisted or rejected from the solid superficies of them; in the same manner as we feel things at a distance in the dark, by the resistency which they make upon the further end of the staff that we hold in our hands. And when we hear the sound of a bell or cannon a great way off, the tremulous vibrations of the air, like the circlings of the water, when a stone is flung into it, are from thence continually propagated to our ears or acoustic nerves, the undulations still growing the wider and weaker, the further they go.

3. But forasmuch as sense is not mere local motion impressed from one body upon another, or a body's bare reaction or resistance to that motion of another body, as some have fondly conceited, but a cogitation, recognition or vital perception and consciousness of these motions or passions of the body, therefore there must of necessity be another kind of passion also in the soul or principle of life, which is vitally united to the body, to make up sensation. Which passion notwithstanding is of a different kind or species from the former: for the soul, that is a cogitative being, is supposed to be such a thing as can penetrate a body, and therefore cannot be conceived to be locally moved by the local motion of the body. For we see that light which pervades the air, though it be a corporeal motion, yet it is not moved or shaken by the agitations of the air, because it is in a body far more subtle than the air, that runs through the spongy pores of it. Wherefore the soul, though it be conceived to be an extended substance, yet being penetrative of body, not by filling up the pores of it, but by coexisting in the same space with it, cannot be locally moved by the motions of it.

Neither is this passion of the soul in sensation a mere naked passion or suffering; because it is a cogitation or perception which hath something of active vigor in it. For those ideas of heat, light, and colors, and other sensible things, being not qualities really existing in the bodies without us, as the Atomical philosophy instructs us, and therefore not passively stamped or imprinted upon the soul from without in the same manner that a signature is upon a piece of wax, must needs arise partly from some inward vital energy of the soul itself, being phantasms of the soul, or several modes of cogitation or perception in it. For which cause some of the Platonists would not allow sensations to

be passions in the soul, but only παθῶν γνώσεις, active knowledges of the passions of the body.

4. But, as I said before, sense is a passion in the soul also, viz. such a passion as a vital and cogitative being is capable of, because we find by experience that it is not elicited from the soul itself, but obtruded upon it from without; so that the soul cannot choose but have such sensations, cogitations or affections in it, when such or such external objects are presented to the outward senses. The soul receiving its information from without, by sympathizing with the passions of its own body concerning what individual bodies exist round about it, and the general modes of them; which no innate reason of its own could possibly discover to it. And therefore the soul being necessarily determined to exert such cogitations within itself, when such local motions are impressed upon the body which she is vitally united to, these sensations are certain kinds of passive energies of the soul. For the soul and body by reason of that vital union which is betwixt them, making up one compositum, compound or animal, do of necessity mutually suffer from each other, the body being variously moved by the soul, and the soul again variously affected from the body, or the motions which are made upon it. Neither doth the soul suffer indifferently from any body, but all sense arises from that natural sympathy or compassion which the soul hath with that individual body with which it is vitally united. And had not the soul such a passive principle in it, it could not possibly be vitally united to any body, neither could there be any such thing as an animal or living creature.

Moreover, these sensitive cogitations, as we shall show afterward, do plainly differ, in the mode of them, from those pure cogitations that are the actions of the soul itself; there being a vast difference between the senses of hunger and thirst, and mere volitions in the soul to eat and drink, as likewise betwixt that grief and sadness that arises from some ill tidings told and understood by the mind, (though there be something of corporeal passion consequent or concomitant here also) and betwixt a sense of pain when the body is hurt. And in like manner in those other sensations of light and colors, heat and cold, the soul doth not merely know or understand the figure and motions of those corporeal particles, but hath certain confused affections and phantasms within itself by reason of them. From whence it is evident that these sensitive cogitations are not pure actions springing from the soul itself, but compassions with the body. And therefore that opinion of the Platonists is no way to be admitted, that sensations are not passions, but παθῶν γνώσεις, knowledges of the passions, as if they were free and sin-

cere actions of the soul, or released and unpassionate knowledges in it of the passions of the body.

5. Wherefore sensations formally considered are certain passions or affections in the soul fatally connected with some local motions in the body, whereby the soul perceiveth something else besides those immediate corporeal motions in the nerves, spirits or brain. For though the soul do only sympathize with the motions of its own body, yet by sense it doth not take immediate cognizance of those very motions themselves, in the brain, spirits and nerves, perceiving them as they are in themselves, but it is secretly instructed by nature to take notice of some other things thereby that may concern the body.

For, first, the soul is sometimes so affected by reason of those local motions of the blood and heart communicated by the nerves unto the brain, as that it perceives something within itself, viz. certain pathemata, passions of joy or pleasantness, dullness and sadness, or constritation, irascible and concupiscible inclinations, when we know no rational cause for them within ourselves, and therefore they could not spring from the soul itself.

Again, the soul is sometimes so affected by motions communicated from the nerves that belong to the stomach and œsophagus, windpipe, as that it perceives or takes notice of hunger or thirst in those parts of the body, and the like may be said of the other pains or pleasures, pruriences and titillations of the body, which the soul perceives as things existing in some certain parts of the body itself; when the nerves are in a certain way moved.

Lastly, the soul is frequently so affected by the motions of those five other conjugations of nerves, as that by natural instinct it takes notice of some corporeal things existing without our bodies, whence that motion upon the nerves comes, as light, colors, sounds, heat and cold, hardness, softness, gravity, levity, odors, sapours. The objects being many times remotely distant from us; though it does not perceive them in the same manner as they absolutely exist without us.

Now though all these three kinds mentioned be equally passions and sensations in the soul, yet the use of speech hath appropriated the denomination of passions only to the former, and styled the two latter by the name of sensations, the first of them being commonly called internal corporeal senses, the second external. Wherefore corporeal senses in general may be thus defined, to be affections in the soul caused by certain local motions made upon some parts of the body, by reason of the vital sympathy betwixt the soul and body, whereby the soul seems to perceive corporeal things existing without itself, either in its own body, or else at a distance from it.

CHAP. II.

1. Wherefore, sense being a passion in the soul, or a compassion with its own body, which it is vitally united to, that is diversified according to the difference both of local motions and of bodily organs through which those motions are conveyed; there being a necessary and fatal connection between certain motions in some parts of the enlivened body, and certain affections or sympathies in the soul, which Democritus seems to intimate in those words, *νόμῳ ψυχρὸν, νόμῳ θερμὸν*· by law a thing is cold, or by law hot,—that hot and cold, and the like, were passions or phantasms fatally connected with certain local motions in the body. Sense is a kind of dull confused and stupid perception obtruded upon the soul from without, whereby it perceives the alterations and motions within its own body, and takes cognizance of individual bodies existing round about it, but doth not clearly comprehend what they are, nor penetrate into the nature of them, it being intended by nature, *πρὸς χρείαν, οὐ πρὸς γνῶσιν*, as Plotinus speaks, not so properly for knowledge, as for the use of the body. For the soul suffering under that which it perceives by way of passion, cannot master or conquer it, that is to say, know or understand it. For so Anaxagoras in Aristotle very fitly expresses the nature of knowledge and intellection under the notion of *κρατεῖν*, conquering: [1] *Ἀνάγκη ἄρα, ἐπεὶ πάντα νοεῖ, ἀμιγῆ εἶναι τὸν νοῦν, ὥσπερ φησὶν Ἀναξαγόρας, ἵνα κρατῇ, τοῦτο δὲ ἐστιν ἵνα γνωρίζῃ*· Wherefore it is necessary, since the mind understands all things, that it should be free from mixture and passion, for this end, as Anaxagoras speaks, that it may be able to master and conquer its objects, that is to say, to know or understand them.—In like manner Plotinus, in his Book of Sense and Memory,[2] makes *πάσχειν*, to suffer, and *κρατεῖσθαι*, to be conquered, all one, as also *γινώσκειν* and *κρατεῖν*, to know and to conquer; for which cause he concludes that that which suffers doth not know: *πάσχειν ἀλλ' οὐ γινώσκειν τὸ ἐγγὺς ποιοῦμεν, ὅτι κρατῖν δέδοται, ἀλλ' οὐ κρατεῖσθαι*· That which we make to suffer, eo nomine, in saying so we make it not to know, because to know is to conquer, and not to be mastered or conquered.—Sense, that suffers from external objects, lies as it were prostrate under them, and is over-

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[1] Arist. De Anima, lib. iii. cap. iv.

[2] Plot. De Sensu et Memoria, cap. ii.

come by them: Wherefore no sense judges either of its own passion, or of the passion of any other sense, but judgment or knowledge is the active energy of an unpassionate power in the soul.

2. And for this cause Aristotle himself tells us, that the soul is a heterogeneous thing, and hath μόρια several parts in it of a very different nature from one another. First, a higher and active part, which he calls τὸ χωριστὸν and ἀπαθὲς, that which acts separately from the matter, and is impossible, and this is τὸ νοητικὸν, that which knows and understands;—the other a lower, passive or sympathetical part which suffers from without, and acts in conjunction with the body, and this is τὸ αἰσθητικὸν, that to which sensation belongs. — So that knowledge and intellection are the clear, serene and unpassionate perceptions of the higher part of the soul which acts alone, by and from itself. Sensations are the energies of that lower, passive and sympathetical part, whereby the soul is vitally united to the body, and cleaving to it, makes up one animal with it. Or else they may be said to be the cogitations of the whole compositum, compound, or animal, which is the reason that they are so cloudy and confounded, because they arise from the very crasis, mixture and confusion of the soul and body as it were blended together.

3. For though the soul be a distinct substance, and of a different nature from the body, yet notwithstanding in every animal it is intimately conjoined with the body, and cleaves to it in such a manner, as that both together compound and make up one thing. And therefore it is not present with it only as a mariner with a ship, that is, merely locally, or knowingly and unpassionately present, they still continuing two distinct things; but it is vitally united to it, and passionately present with it. And therefore when the body is hurt, the soul doth not unpassionately know or understand it, as when a mariner knows that a ship hath sprung a leak, or when a man is informed that his neighbor's house is set on fire; but it feels a strong and vehement pain, and hath a dolorous sense or perception of it, as being one thing with it. So in like manner when the body wants either meat or drink, the soul doth not unpassionately know this as an indifferent by-stander, and therefore rationally only will or desire meat and drink for it, but it feels a passionate sense of hunger and thirst in itself, as being intimately concerned in the business. Now the same is true also in those other sensations, in which the animal seems to be less concerned, as of light and color, heat and cold, sounds and odors, that they are not simple knowledges or intellections of that part of the soul which acts alone by itself, but they are the perceptions of that which is vitally united with the

body, and sympathizing with the motions and passions of it, makes up compositum, one compound with it. Wherefore though all cogitations be formally in the soul, and not in the body, yet these sensitive cogitations being in the soul no otherwise than as vitally united to the body, they are not so properly the cogitations of the soul, as of τὸ μικτὸν, the mixed, or συναμφότερον, both together, as Plotinus calls it, the compound of soul and body, or, as that philosopher will have it, of the body and a certain vivificating light, imparted from the soul to it. And therefore, as he observeth out of Aristotle, Ὥσπερ ἄτοπον τὴν ψυχὴν ὑφαίνειν, as it is absurd to say the soul weaves, (or indeed the body either, weaving being a mixt action of the man and weaving instruments) so it is absurd to say that the soul alone doth concupiscere, covet, dolere or sentire, grieve or perceive; these things proceeding from the compound or the coalescence of soul and body together; being not pure mental, but corporeal cogitations of the soul, as it vitally informs the body, and is passionately united to it.

4. Sense therefore is a certain kind of drowsy and somnolent perception of that passive part of the soul, which is as it were asleep in the body, and acts concretely with it. So Plotinus expresses it: [1]Τὸ τῆς αἰσθήσεως ψυχῆς ἐστιν εὐδούσης· ὅσον γὰρ ἐν σώματι ψυχῆς, τοῦτο εὕδει· Sense is of that part of the soul that sleeps, for that of the soul that is immersed into the body, is as it were asleep.—It is an energy arising from the body, and a certain kind of drowsy or sleeping life of the soul blended together with it. The perceptions of which compositum or animæ semisomnis, compound, or of the soul as it were half asleep and half awake,—are confused, indistinct, turbid and encumbered cogitations, very different from the energies of the noetical part, that acts alone, without sympathy with the body, which are free, clear, serene, satisfactory and awakened cogitations, that is to say, knowledges.

And that these cogitations of the passive part of the soul called sensations, are not knowledges or intellections, is evident by experience also, not only in the senses of hunger and thirst, pain and corporeal titillation, but also in all those other perceptions of light and colors, heat and cold, sounds, odors, and sapours. For if they were knowledges or intellections, then all men would rest satisfied in the sensible ideas or phantasms of them, and never inquire any further, at least when the stroke or impression made upon sense were strong and vigorous, as when we see the clear light of the meridian sun, or hear the loud noise of thunder, whereas the one doth but dazzle our eyes, the

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[1] Enn. iii. lib. vi.

other deafens our ears, but neither enlighten nor inform our understandings. Whereas, on the contrary, the minds of men are restlessly inquisitive after some further intellectual comprehension of all these things that we perceive by our several senses. Neither is this true of the vulgar only, but it is very observable, that the most acute philosophers in all ages have complained of their ignorance of these things; and indeed have confessed themselves more puzzled and at a loss about these sensible things, than those abstract immaterial things which are remote from bodily sense. Luminis et colorum essentiæ sunt intellectui tam obscuræ, quam sunt ipsa visui manifesta. The essences of light and colors (saith Scaliger) are as dark to the understanding, as they themselves are open to the sight.—Nay, undoubtedly so long as we consider these things no otherwise than sense represents them, that is, as really existing in the objects without us, they are and must needs be eternally unintelligible. Now when all men naturally inquire, what these things are, what is light, and what are colors, the meaning hereof is nothing else but this, that men would fain know or comprehend them by something of their own which is native and domestic, not foreign to them, some active exertion or anticipation of their own minds, as I shall show afterwards.

Wherefore though sense be adequate and sufficient for that end which nature hath designed it to, viz. to give advertisement of corporeal things existing without us, and their motions for the use and concernment of the body, and such general intimations of the modes of them, as may give the understanding sufficient hints by its own sagacity to find out their natures, and invent intelligible hypotheses to solve those appearances by; (for otherwise reason alone without sense could not acquaint us with individual existent things without us, or assure us of the existence of any thing besides God, who is the only necessarily existent Being;) yet notwithstanding sense, as sense, is not knowledge or intellection; which I shall still make further appear by these following more particular considerations.

CHAP. III.

1. For, first, sense only suffering and receiving from without, and having no active principle of its own, to take acquaintance with what it receives, it must needs be a stranger to that which is altogether adven-

titious to it, and therefore cannot know or understand it. For to know or understand a thing, is nothing else but by some inward anticipation of the mind, that is native and domestic, and so familiar to it, to take acquaintance with it; of which I shall speak more afterward.

2. Sense is but the offering or presenting of some object to the mind, to give it an occasion to exercise its own inward activity upon. Which two things being many times nearly conjoined together in time, though they be very different in nature from one another, yet they are vulgarly mistaken for one and the same thing, as if it were all nothing but mere sensation or passion from the body. Whereas sense itself is but the passive perception of some individual material forms, but to know or understand, is actively to comprehend a thing by some abstract, free and universal ratio's, reasonings, from whence the mind, quasi desuper spectans concepta forma quæ subsunt dijudicat, as it were looking down (as Boetius expresseth it) upon the individuals below it, views and understands them.—But sense which lies flat and grovelling in the individuals, and is stupidly fixed in the material form, is not able to rise up or ascend to an abstract universal notion. For which cause it never affirms or denies any thing of its object, because (as Aristotle observes) in all affirmation, and negation at least, the predicate is always universal. The eye which is placed in a level with the sea, and touches the surface of it, cannot take any large prospect upon the sea, much less see the whole amplitude of it. But an eye elevated to a higher station, and from thence looking down, may comprehensively view the whole sea at once, or at least so much of it as is within our horizon. The abstract universal rationes, reasons, are that higher station of the mind, from whence looking down upon individual things, it hath a commanding view of them, and as it were a priori comprehends or knows them.

But sense, which either lies in the same level with that particular material object which it perceives, or rather under it and beneath it, cannot emerge to any knowledge or truth concerning it.

3. Sense is but a slight and superficial perception of the outside and accidentals of a corporeal substance, it doth not penetrate into the profundity or inward essence of it. For a body may be changed as to all the several senses, and remain really the same that it was before. Wherefore though men are commonly said to know things when they see and feel them, yet in truth by their bodily senses they perceive nothing but their outsides and external induments. Just as when a man looking down out of a window into the streets, is said to perceive men walking in the streets, when indeed he perceives nothing but hats and

clothes, under which, for aught he knows, there may be Dædalean statues moving up and down. Neither is this spoken only in respect of that defect of sight (to omit the other senses) which is a little relieved by microscopical glasses, that it cannot perceive the figures and contextures of those minute particles out of which bodies are compounded, nor penetrate beyond the superficies into their corporeal profundity; for though our sight were so much the more than Lycean, that it could discover the very pores in glass through which the light passes, as Aristotle complains it cannot; nay, though it could discern the particular globuli, globulous particles, in the motion of which light consisteth, and the triangular spaces between them through which the smallest and most subtile striated matter passes; yet notwithstanding it would not reach to the essential profundity either of body, or sphericalness, or triangularity, which nothing but the subtle acies, sharpness, of the mind can penetrate into; so as to comprehend the immutable ratio, reason, of any of them. And therefore it is rightly pronounced by that excellent restorer of the old Atomical and Moschical philosophy, Ipsamet corpora non proprie a sensibus vel ab imaginandi facultate, sed solo intellectu percipi, nec ex eo percipi quod tangantur aut videantur, sed tantum ex eo quod intelligantur. That even bodies themselves are not properly perceived by the senses, or by the imagination, but by the understanding alone; nor are therefore perceived because they are touched or seen, but only because they are understood.—

4. The essence of nothing is reached unto by the senses looking outward, but by the mind's looking inward into itself. That which wholly looks abroad outward upon its object, is not one with that which it perceives, but is at a distance from it, and therefore cannot know and comprehend it; but knowledge and intellection doth not merely prospicere, look out upon a thing at distance, but makes an inward reflection upon the thing it knows, and according to the etymon of the word, intellectus, the intellect doth in interioribus legere, read inward characters written within itself, and intellectually comprehend its object within itself, and is the same with it. For though this may be conceived to be true of individual things known (although the mind understands them also under abstract notions of its own) yet, at least in Aristotle's sense, it is unquestionably true, Ἐπὶ τῶν ἄνευ ὕλης τὸ αὐτό ἐστι τὸ νοῦν καὶ τὸ νοούμενον· In abstract things themselves, which are the primary objects of science, the intellect and the thing known are really one and the same. For those ideas or objects of intellection are nothing else but modifications of the mind itself. But Αἴσθησις τοῦ ἔξω· Sense is of that which is without, sense wholly gazes and gads

abroad, and therefore doth not know and comprehend its object, because it is different from it. *Αἴσθησις γραμμὴ, νοῦς κύκλος·* Sense is a line, the mind is a circle.—Sense is like a line which is the flux of a point running out from itself, but intellect like a circle that keeps within itself.

5. Sense apprehends individual bodies without, by something derived from them, and so a posteriori, *ὕστεραι οὖσαι αἰσθήσεις εἰκόνες εἰσι·* The senses being last, are the images of the things.—The sensible ideas of things are but umbratile and evanid images of the sensible things, like shadows projected from them; but knowledge is a comprehension of a thing proleptically, and as it were a priori. But now to lay aside metaphysics, and speak plainly, all that which comes from the individual object of sense from without, (as we have already declared) is nothing at all but local motion or pressure, when an enlivened body is jogged or thrust upon by some other body without. But to receive or feel a jog, knock or thrust from without made upon the body which the soul is united to, this is not to know, no not so much as what local motion is, much less to all other things. For knowledge is not a knock or thrust from without, but it consisteth in the awakening and exciting of the inward active powers of the mind.

6. This point which I have hitherto insisted upon concerning the shallowness, dulness and bluntness of sense, in that it cannot penetrate to the essences of things, is very ingeniously and philosophically handled by Plato, in his Theætetus; where he demonstrates against Protagoras, that science is not sense, but that there is another power in the soul besides that of sense or passion, to which science, knowledge and intellection is to be referred after this manner. First, Socrates obtains this from Theætetus, that sense is when the soul, by or through several organs of the body, takes cognizance of several corporeal things without. And, secondly, that one sense or organical perception cannot take cognizance of the object of another; as sight cannot see sounds, nor the hearing hear light and colors. And therefore where we think of the objects of several senses comparing them together, and considering of some things common to them all, this cannot be sense or organical perception; because one sense cannot consider the object of another sense. *Εἴ τι ἄρα περὶ ἀμφοτέρων διανοῇ, οὐκ ὂν διάγε τοῦ ἑτέρου ὀργάνου αἰσθάνοι ἄν·* If any thing concerns both, it cannot perceive it by either organ.—As when we consider sound and color together at once, and attribute several things to them in common; as first of all, essence. And then that in each of them is identity with itself, and diversity to the other, that both of them are two, and each of

them one; that they are not like, but unlike to one another; what sense or organ is there by which the soul perceives all these things, viz. essence and non-essence, identity, diversity, unity, duality, similitude, dissimilitude, things common both to sound and color? Surely it cannot be neither by the senses of sight or of hearing, because these cannot consider one another's objects. Neither can we find any other organ in the body by which the soul may passively take cognizance of all these things, and consider the objects of both those other senses of sight and hearing. Whereby he makes Theætetus confess, that these things the soul doth not organically perceive by any sense, but by itself alone without any bodily organ. And therefore, *Τὰ μὲ αὐτὴν δὶ αὐτῆς ψυχὴν ἐπισκοπεῖν, τὰ δὲ διὰ τῶν τοῦ σώματος δυνάμεων·* Some things the soul perceives by itself, or by its own active power,—as essence, similitude, dissimilitude, identity, alterity, good and evil, honest and dishonest. Other things it perceives by and through the organs of the body; as for example, by the sense of touch the soul perceives nothing but the hardness of that which is hard, and the softness of that which is soft, and the like. But essence, and what hardness and softness is, and their contrariety to one another; and again, the essence of contrariety itself, the soul alone by itself discoursing endeavors to judge of. Wherefore there is this difference between those things that come into the soul by the passions of the body, and those things that arise from the ratiocinative power of the soul itself: *Τὰ μὲν εὐθὺ γενομένοις πάρεστι φύσει αἰσθάνεσθαι ἀνθρώποις τε καὶ θηρίοις, ὅσα διὰ τοῦ σώματος παθήματα ἐπὶ τὴν ψυχὴν τείνει· τὰ δὲ περὶ τούτων ἀναλογίσματα πρός τε οὐσίαν καὶ ὠφέλειαν μόγις καὶ ἐν χρόνῳ διὰ πολλῶν πραγμάτων καὶ παιδείας παραγίγνεται, οἷς ἂν καὶ παραγίγνηται·* That both men and beasts do naturally perceive as soon as they be born those things that come into the soul by the passions of the body. But ratiocinations concerning these things as to the natures and essences of them, and their utilities, are slowly by labor and help of institution attained unto.—Now that which doth not reach to the essence of any thing, cannot reach to truth or knowledge. Wherefore he concludes, *Ἐν μὲν ἄρα τοῖς παθήμασιν οὐκ ἔστιν ἐπιστήμη, ἐν δὲ τῷ περὶ ἐκείνων συλλογισμῷ· οἰσίας γὰρ καὶ ἀληθείας ἐνταῦθα μὲν ὡς ἔοικε δυνατὸν ἅψασθαι, ἐκεῖ δ' ἀδύνατον·* That there is no knowledge or science in passions, but in the discourse of the mind upon them; for in this latter way it is possible to reach to the essence and truth of things, but impossible in the former.—And that we ought not *Ζητεῖν ἐπιστήμην ἐν αἰσθήσει τὸ παράπαν, ἀλλ' ἐν ἐκείνῳ τῷ ὀνόματι ὅτι ποτ' ἔχει ἡ ψυχή, ὅταν αὐτὴ καθ' αὑτὴν πραγματεύηται περὶ τὰ ὄντα·* To seek knowledge any more in sense, but in that of the soul, whatsoever it be called, which doth alone by itself contemplate things that are.

CHAP. IV.

1. But I have still something more to add concerning this argument before I dismiss it. Wherefore in the next place I shall make it further appear, that sense is not science or intellection, because the soul by sense doth not perceive the things themselves, or the absolute natures of them, but only her own passions from them. This Sextus the philosopher took notice of: [1] *Αἱ αἰσθήσεις τὰ ἐκτὸς ὑποκείμενα οὐ καταλαμβάνουσι, μόνα δὲ εἰ ἄρα τὰ ἑαυτῶν πάθη·* The senses do not reach to the objects that are placed without, but to their own passions alone.—And this is that which Protagoras so much insisted on, that *τὰ αἰσθητα*, all our sensible ideas of light and colors, sounds, odors, sapours, heat and cold, and the like, are not absolute but relative things. For neither is *αἰσθήσις*, sensation, any thing of the soul considered absolutely in itself, it being no pure and sincere cogitation of the soul alone, neither is *τὸ αἰσθητὸν*, the sensible idea, any absolute quality of the object without, but both these (viz. *αἰσθήσις* and *αἰσθητὸν*, sense and sensible) are certain middle things begotten betwixt the agent and the patient, and resulting from the activity of the object without, and the passion of the mind within, and severally respecting each of them. Or, as he expressed it, *Ἐκ τῆς τούτων ὁμιλίας τε καὶ τρίψεως πρὸς ἄλληλα γίγνεται τὸ μὲν αἰσθητὸν, ἡ δὲ αἴσθησις, ἀεὶ συνεκπίπτουσα καὶ γεννωμένη μετὰ τοῦ αἰσθητοῦ·* From the congress or collision of these two together are generated at once both sense and the sensible; for the sensible (formally considered, according to that idea that we have of it) hath no existence before sensation, but is begotten with it.—And therefore, *Ὃ δὴ ἕκαστον εἶναι φαμὲν χρῶμα οὔτε προσβάλλον οὔτε τὸ προσβαλλόμενόν ἐστι, ἀλλὰ μεταξύ τι·* color, and the rest, is neither any thing really existing in the object without, nor yet any thing in the soul itself, but a middle thing betwixt both, that is, a passion.—Which is the very same with that which Aristotle imputes to the ancient physiologers as a paradox, that black and white were not without the sight.

The truth of which is so evident in some instances, that none can possibly gainsay it. For when the body is either pricked with a needle or wounded with a sword, no man can imagine that those pains that result from thence were such real and absolute qualities existing in the needle or sword before our sensation, but that they are our own pas-

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[1] Pyrr. Hyp. lib. ii. cap. vii.

sions, and so relative things to us, or perceptions of the motions of the needle or sword relatively to the enlivened body, and as they are hurtful to it. And the same is vulgarly acknowledged in those colors that are therefore called fantastical, as in the Iris, rainbow, and the prism, whereas in reality all colors are as fantastical as the colors of the rainbow, and the colors of the rainbow as real as any other. And it is likewise true of the other proper objects of the several senses. For as Sextus the philosopher observes, *Οὐ τὸ αὐτὸ ἔστι τὸ μέλι τῷ γλυκάζεσθαί με, καὶ τὸ ἀψίνθιον τῷ πικράζεσθαι·* Honey is not the same thing with my being sweetened, nor wormwood the same with my having sense of bitterness.—That which we know by sense concerning honey and wormwood, is only that our taste is so affected from them; but what absolute mode or disposition of parts in them causes these different sensations in us, belongs to some other faculty of the soul to discover. And hence it comes to pass, that though the natures or essences of things be simple, yet one and the same thing perceived by our several senses begets several passions and phantasms in us. Flame, which is nothing but a violent agitation of the small particles of a body by the rapid subtle matter; the same motion communicated to the eye or optic nerves begets one kind of sensible idea or phantasm called light, but to the nerves of touch another quite different from it called heat; therefore neither light nor heat, according to those sensible ideas that we have of them, are really and absolutely the flame without, which is but one kind of motion or agitation of matter, but only fantastically and relatively, the one to our sight, the other to our touch. And hence it proceeds also that sensations are diversified from the same thing to several individuals of the same kind, and to the same individual at several times, by reason of some difference in the idiosyncrasy or proper temperament of the body, as (to omit the instance of those that are icterical) appears plainly in the degrees of heat and cold, the gratefulness or ungratefulness of several tastes and odors to several individuals, or to the same considered both in sickness and in health; which things could not be, if all sensible ideas were absolute qualities in the thing itself, and so taken notice of by sense. And it is worth the while to see how Protagoras philosophized about this latter instance; improving it to this purpose: *Ὅταν οἶνον πίνω ὑγιαίνων, ἡδὺς μοὶ καὶ γλυκύς. Ἐγέννησε γὰρ δὴ τότε ποιοῦν καὶ τὸ πάσχον γλυκύτητά τε καὶ αἰσθήσιν ἅμα φερόμενα ἀμφότερα. Καὶ ἡ μὲν αἰσθήσις πρὸς τοῦ πάσχοντος οὖσα αἰσθανομένην τὴν γλῶσσαν ἀπειργάσατο. Ἡ δὲ γλυκύτης πρὸς τοῦ οἴνου περὶ αὐτὸν φερομένη γλυκὺν τὸν οἶνον τῇ ὑγιαινούσῃ γλώσσῃ καὶ εἶναι καὶ φαίνεσθαι. Ὅταν δὲ ἀσθενοῦντα ἀλλότι ἤ πρῶτον μὲν τῇ ἀληθείᾳ, οὐ τὸν αὐτὸν ἔλαβεν, ἀνομοίῳ*

γὰρ δὴ προσῆλθε. Ἕτερα δὴ αὖ ἐγεννησάτην ὅτε τοιοῦτος, καὶ ἡ τοῦ οἴνου πόσις περὶ μὲν τὴν γλῶτταν αἴσθησιν πικρότατος, περὶ δὲ τὸν οἶνον γιγνομένην καὶ φερομένην πικρότητα· When I drink wine, being in health, it appears pleasant and sweet. For the agent and the patient betwixt them beget both sense and sweetness, severally respecting the agent and the patient. For sense respecting the patient, makes and denominates the tongue sentient, and sweetness respecting the agent (that is, the wine) makes and denominates that sweet, not absolutely but respectively to the tongue of one that is in health. But when the patient is altered by sickness, and becomes different from what it was, then it receives quite another taste than formerly, for it comes to a very different patient. Quite different things are produced by the person and the drinking of the wine; respecting the tongue a sense of bitterness, and as to the wine its being made and denominated bitter.—

Wherefore since by sense the soul doth not perceive corporeal objects, as they are truly, really and absolutely in themselves, but under some fantastical representations and disguises, sense cannot be knowledge, which comprehends a thing as it is. And indeed if the soul had no other power in it but only this of passion or sensation (as Protagoras supposed) then there could be no such thing at all as any absolute truth or knowledge. But that hypothesis of his, as we have already showed, plainly contradicts and confutes itself. For that which pronounces that our sensible ideas of things are fantastical and relative, must needs be something in us superior to sense, that is, not relative or fantastical, but that judges what really and absolutely is and is not.

2. But to strike this business home, I shall in the last place further observe, that sense cannot be knowledge, nor the certainty of all things ultimately resolvable into sense, as many men besides Protagoras conceive, for this reason, because the nature of sense consists in nothing else but mere seeming or appearance. This was intimated before in that definition that we gave of sense, that it is ἐν τῷ δοκεῖν, or ἐν τῷ φαίνεσθαι, a passion or affection in the soul, whereby it seems to perceive some corporeal things existing. That is, sense is when the soul is so affected, as if there were such a corporeal thing existing. So that all the reality that is necessarily required to sense, is only this, that there be really a passion in the soul, or that the soul be really so affected, as if there were such a thing; that is, that it have really such a seeming or appearance, but not that the thing really be, as it appears. For as to a thing's being such or such, its having such a mode or quality, we have already demonstrated by reason, that in this respect, most of our sensible ideas are fantastical things. And the same may be evinced and

made evident also by sense itself; for it is as true and real a sensation, when a man looking upon a staff that is partly in the air, and partly in the water, sees it crooked (though it be really straight) as when he looks upon it all in the air, and sees it straight as really it is; for we are as really affected, and there is as much a seeming in one as in the other. And innumerable instances might be given in this kind, to prove that as to things being such or such, there is no other truth or reality necessarily required in sensation, but only that of appearance.

But this is not all, for I shall observe in the next place that there is not so much as the reality of being or existence of the object necessarily required to sensation; but there may be a true sensation, though there be no object at all really existing without the soul. A known and approved instance whereof we have in those that, after they had their arms and legs cut off, have been sensible, when they were awake, of a strong and violent pain in their fingers and toes, though really they had no such members. And we have all constant experience of the same in our dreams, which are as true sensations, as those which we have when we are awake, and when the objects are really existent without us. Because the soul is as really affected, and hath as lively images, ideas and phantasms of sensible things as existent then, as when we are awake, and many times is really sensible of violent and exquisite pain, which is a real sense, though it be but a fantastical thing; and immediately vanishes away upon our awakening. Because there was nothing really in the body, that by the motions of the nerves could beget a real pain.

3. Now the reason of this, that the soul may be passively affected in this manner, when there is no object at all really existing without it; is from hence. Because by sense the soul doth not suffer immediately from the objects themselves, but only from its own body, by reason of that natural and vital sympathy which it hath with it, neither doth it suffer from its own body in every part of it, or from the outward organs of sense immediately; as from the eye when we see, the tongue when we taste, or the exterior parts of the body when we feel, but only in the brain, or from the motions of the spirits there. But so as that it doth not take immediate cognizance of those very motions immediately as they are in themselves, but by the secret instinct of nature doth by means of them take cognizance of those corporeal things existing without us, from whence the original of the motion comes. As for example, of the stars that are so vastly distant, when we look upon the heavens. Whence it comes to pass, that if that body from which the soul immediately suffers, and that is the spirits in the brain, be so moved, as it

would be moved by the nerves when any outward objects present make their several impressions upon the organs of sense, the soul must needs have the same passions, affections and sensations in it, as if the objects were really existing without. Now this may come to pass either by the fortuitous motions or agitations of the spirits themselves, casually falling into the same figurations, that the motions of the nerves would impress upon them from some outward objects; or else by the spirits rushing against certain prints, traces or marks in the brain, made by former sensations when we were awake, whereby their motions are determined. Or, lastly, by the fantastical power of the soul itself, which as it suffers from the body, so it can likewise act upon it; and according to our customary actions, or inward affections, inclinations or desires, may move the spirits variously, and beget divers phantasms in us.

And that dreams are many times thus begotten or excited by the fantastical power of the soul itself, is evident from the orderly connection and coherence of imaginations, which many times are continued in a long chain or series; with the fiction of interlocutory discourses and dialogues, consisting of apt answers and replies made interchangeably to one another, and contain such things as never were before printed upon the brain in such a series or order; which therefore could not proceed either from the fortuitous dancings or subsultations of the spirits, or from the determination of their motion, by antecedent prints or traces made by former sensations in the substance of the brain.

4. And the dreams that we have in our sleep, are really the same kind of things with those imaginations that we have many times when we are awake, when the fancy, being not commanded or determined by the will, roves, and wanders, and runs at random; and spins out a long thread or concatenated series of imaginations or phantasms of corporeal things, quite different from those things which our outward senses at the same time take notice of. And some persons there are to whom these waking dreams are very ordinary and familiar.

And there is little doubt to be made but if a man should suddenly fall asleep in the midst of one of these waking dreams, when his fancy is roving and spinning out such a long series of imaginations, those very imaginations and phantasms would, ipso facto, of course, become dreams, and run on, and appear not as phantasms or imaginations only of things feigned or nonexistent, but as perceptions of things really existent, that is, as sensations.

Whereas these imaginations that we have of individual corporeal things when we are awake, and our outward senses employed upon their several objects, do not seem to be sensations of things really exist-

ing and present, as our dreams do, but to be certain faint, evanid, shadowy and umbratile things, in comparison of those sensations which we have at the same time with them when we are awake, that is, not as things existent without us, but as our own cogitations. The reason whereof is, because though they be both of the same kind, yet those motions of the spirits which are caused by the nerves, from the objects without when we are awake, being more vigorous, durable, constant and prevalent, do naturally obscure or extinguish those other weaker phantasms or imaginations which we have at the same time. And reason interposing, brings in its verdict for those stronger phantasms also whose objects are durable and permanent, by means whereof the latter only seem to be real sensations, the former counterfeit and fictitious imaginations; or mere picture and landscape in the soul. And this Aristotle long ago observed in this manner: *Μεθ' ἡμέραν ἐκκρούονται, ἐνεργουσῶν τῶν αἰσθήσεων καὶ τῆς διανοίας, καὶ ἀφανίζονται ὥσπερ παρὰ πολὺ πῦρ ἔλαττον, καὶ λύπαι καὶ ἡδοναὶ μικραὶ παρὰ μεγάλας, παυσαμένων δὲ ἐπιπολάζει καὶ τὰ μικρά·* In the day they are shut out and disappear, the senses and understanding working, as the lesser fire is made to disappear by the greater; and small griefs and pleasures by great ones. But when we are at rest in our beds, the least phantasms make impressions upon us.—In the day time, and when we are awake, those more fleeting fancies and imaginations, which proceed not from the motions of the nerves, caused by the objects without, must needs yield and give place, as being baffled and confuted by those stronger, more durable and lasting motions that come from the nerves, caused by permanent objects, reason also carrying it clearly for the latter, by means whereof the former cannot appear as real things or sensations. But when we are asleep, the same phantasms and imaginations are more strong, vivid and lively; because the nerves are relaxated, there are often no motions transmitted by them from the outward objects into the brain, to confound those motions of the spirits within, and distract the soul's attention to them; just as the same loudness of a voice in a still evening will be heard a great deal further and clearer, than in the day-time when the air is agitated with many contrary motions crossing and confounding one another. But now there are no other motions of the spirits, besides these which cause dreams to compare with them; and disgrace them, or put them out of countenance; and as it were, by their louder noise and clamors, so to possess the animadversive part of the soul, that the weaker murmurs of the other cannot obtain to be heard, as it is when we are awake, or in the day-time. And therefore in sleep the mind naturally admits those phantasms as sensations, there appearing none other to contradict that verdict.

5. Wherefore, phantasms and sensible ideas are really or materially the same thing, which Aristotle intimates, affirming that φαντασία is αἴσθησίς τις ἀσθενής· that fancy is a weak kind of sense, and φαντάσματα are οἷον αἰσθήματα· phantasms are as sensations;—for both phantasms and sensations are passions or sufferings in the soul from the body. And yet notwithstanding every phantasm doth not seem to be a corporeal thing really existing without the soul, as a αἴσθημα, sensation, doth. Wherefore there are two cases in which a phantasm doth not seems to be αἴσθημα, a sensation. First, when a phantasm is raised or excited purposely and voluntarily, by the mere imperium, command, or empire of our own will; as by experience we find it often is. For it is in our power to fancy what corporeal thing or person (formerly known to us) we please, though it be absent from us. Nay, and to compound such things as we never saw before; as a golden mountain, a centaur, a chimæra. Now in this case, when the soul is conscious to itself, that these phantasms are arbitrarily raised by it, or by its own activity, it cannot look upon them as sensations, or things really existing without itself, but only as evanid images, pictures and adumbrations of things within itself. And such phantasms as these do usually accompany most of our other cogitations. Wherefore φαντάσματα, phantasms do not seem to be αἰσθήματα, sensations or perceptions of things as really existing without the soul, when they are voluntary, or when the soul is inwardly conscious that they are raised up by its own activity.

Secondly, neither doth every involuntary phantasm, or such as the soul is not conscious to itself to have purposely excited or raised up within itself, seem to be αἴσθημα, a sensation or perception of a thing, as existing without us; for there may be straggling phantasms, which come into the mind we know not how; and bubble up of themselves, which yet the soul may distinguish from αἰσθήματα, sensations, or perceptions of things, as existing really without it; because of some other phantasms at the same time in the soul, whose vigors and lustre do cloud and eclipse them. For when there are phantasms of several kinds at the same time in the soul, or such as arise from different motions of the spirits, the soul silently comparing both together, naturally looks upon the more vigorous, strong and permanent of those phantasms only as real existences; but the more faint, flitting, and transitory, as imaginary things. Now there are two kinds of involuntary phantasms, as I have already intimated, in the soul, when we are awake. One that proceeds from such motions of the spirits as are caused by the nerves moved from the objects without. Another that proceeds

from the spirits of the brain, otherwise moved than by the nerves. And therefore in vigilia, when we are awake, and have phantasms of both these kinds together in the soul, those phantasms that arise from the motions of the nerves caused by the objects without, appearing very different from those other phantasms that arise from the spirits otherwise moved than by the nerves, both in respect of their vigor and constancy, do therefore to all such persons, as are not distempered either in body or in mind, naturally seem to be real, or things existing without the soul, but the latter imaginary. Whereas in sleep, when the nerves being relaxated, communicate no motion to the spirits, the very same phantasms (there being now no other and stronger to compare with them and discredit or disgrace them) do naturally appear to the soul as sensations of things really existing without the soul.

6. Now the truth of this matter doth evidently appear from hence, in that by reason of some disease either of body or mind, men's spirits may be so furiously, violently or strongly agitated, that those phantoms which do not arise from the motion of the nerves, being most prevalent and predominant, even when they are awake, may become, αἰσθήματα, sensations and appearances of things as really existing without the soul; that men may confidently believe they hear, see and feel those things that are not, and be imposed upon in all their senses. Which is a thing that frequently happens, not only in phrenetical, maniac and hypochondriacal persons, of which there are many instances recorded, but also in others possessed with strong passions of fear, love, and the like. Wherefore as sense, that is, the phantasms that arise from the motion communicated to the spirits of the brain by the nerves, do ordinarily baffle and confute imaginations and fancy; that is, those phantasms that arise from the spirits, otherwise moved than by the nerves, so likewise imaginations growing wild, rampant and exorbitant, may in the same manner baffle and confute all our senses.

7. Which exorbitancy of fancy or imagination prevailing over sense, or those phantasms which arise from the motion communicated to the brain from the objects without by the nerves, may either proceed originally from some disease in the body, whereby the animal spirits being furiously heated and agitated, may be carried with so great a force and career, as that the motions caused from the objects by the nerves being weakened, may yield and give place to them, and their phantasms be in a manner silent, vanquished and obliterated by them; those stronger phantasms that arise from the agitation of the spirits themselves, possessing the place of them, the affection or animadversion of the soul being always won by those phantasms that make the loudest

noise, or have the greatest vigor. Or else the same thing may proceed originally from some disease or distemper in the soul itself. When the lower, irrational and passive part of the soul (in which the concupiscible and irascible affections are seated) and so by consequence, the fantastic power of the soul (the same power that begets in us those waking dreams before mentioned) grows excessively and exorbitantly predominant, insomuch that it doth not only weaken and extinguish the noetical powers, which are always proportionably debilitated as this is invigorated, but also prevent the power of sense itself, the immoderate activity of the fancy not permitting the soul to suffer from, or be passive to, the action of the objects upon it, nor quietly to receive the impressions of them, without ruffling and confounding them. And this is that sad and lamentable condition that the soul of man is liable and obnoxious to, by its over much indulgence to that passive and irrational and corporeal part in which the affections, appetites and desires are seated; a condition which, if it continue always, is worse than death itself, or perfect annihilation. To have not only reason degraded and dethroned, but even sense itself perverted or extinguished, and in the room thereof boisterous phantasms protruded from the irrational appetites, passions and affections (now grown monstrous and enormous) to become the very sensations of it, by means whereof it is easy to conceive that the Divine nemesis, vengeance, may make the soul its own tormentor, though there were no other hell without it, not only by representing most loathsome and affrightful, dismal and tragical scenes of things to itself, but also by cruciating itself with exquisite and sensible pains. And the serious consideration hereof should make us very careful how we let the reins loose to that passive irrational part of our soul, which knows no bounds nor measures, lest thereby we unawares precipitate and plunge ourselves headlong into the most sad and deplorable condition that is imaginable.

8. I shall not discourse here, of that power also which evil genii, spirits, may possibly have upon those that have either mancipated themselves unto them, or otherwise forfeited that ordinary protection which divine providence commonly affordeth to all, by acting immediately upon the spirits of the brain, and thereby endeavor to give an accout of those phenomena of wizards and witches vulgarly talked of, their seeming transportations in the air, nocturnal conventicles and junketings, and other such like things, as seem plainly contradictious and unreconcilable to philosophy. But we have already said enough to prove that sense is nothing but seeming and appearance. And therefore we can have no certainty by sense alone either concerning

the absolute natures of individual corporeal things without us, nor indeed of their existence; but all the assurance that we have thereof arises from reason and intellect judging of the phantasms and appearances of sense, and determining in which of them there is an absolute reality, and which of them are but merely relative or fantastical.

BOOK IV.

CHAPTER I.

1. Having hitherto showed that sense or passion from corporeal things existent without the soul, is not intellection or knowledge, so that bodies themselves are not known or understood by sense; it must needs follow from hence, that knowledge is an inward and active energy of the mind itself, and the displaying of its own innate vigor from within, whereby it doth conquer, κρατεῖν, master and command its objects, and so begets a clear, serene, victorious, and satisfactory sense within itself.

Wherefore though it be vulgarly conceived that knowledge arises from the force of the thing known, acting upon that which knows from without; yet contrariwise it is most certain, to use Boetius's expression: Id quod scitur, non ex sua vi, sed ex comprehendentis vi et facultate sciri vel cognosci. That intellection and knowledge do not arise from the force and activity of the thing known from without, upon that which knows, but from the inward power, vigor and activity of the mind that knows actively, comprehending the object within itself, and subduing and prevailing over it.—So that knowledge is not a passion from any thing without the mind, but an active exertion of the inward strength, vigor and power of the mind, displaying itself from within; and the intelligible forms by which things are understood or known, are not stamps or impressions passively printed upon the soul from without, but ideas vitally protended or actively exerted from within itself.

2. A thing which is merely passive from without, and doth only receive foreign and adventitious forms, cannot possibly know, understand or judge of that which it receives, but must needs be a stranger to it, having nothing within itself to know it by. The mind cannot know any thing, but by something of its own, that is native, domestic and familiar to it. When in a great throng or crowd of people, a man looking round about, meets with innumerable strange faces, that he never saw before in all his life, and at last chances to espy the face of one old

friend or acquaintance, which he had not seen or thought of many years before; he would be said in this case to have known that one, and only that one face in all that company, because he had no inward, previous or anticipated form of any other face, that he looked upon, in his mind; but as soon as ever he beheld that one face, immediately there revived and started forth a former anticipated form or idea of it treasured up in his mind, that, as it were taking acquaintance with that newly received form, made him know it or remember it. So when foreign, strange and adventitious forms are exhibited to the mind by sense, the soul cannot otherwise know or understand them, but by something domestic of its own, some active anticipation or prolepsis within itself, that occasionally reviving and meeting with it, makes it know it, or take acquaintance with it. And this is the only true and allowable sense of that old assertion, that knowledge is reminiscence, not that it is the remembrance of something which the soul had some time before actually known in a pre-existent state; but because it is the mind's comprehending of things by some inward anticipations of its own, something native and domestic to it, or something actively exerted from within itself.

And thus Plotinus argues, when he endeavors to prove that the immediate *τὰ νοητά*, objects of knowledge and intellection, are not things without the mind acting upon it at a distance, but contained and comprehended within the mind itself. *Πῶς δὲ καὶ γνώσεται ὅτι ἀντελάβετο ὄντως, πῶς δὲ ὅτι ἀγαθὸν τοῦτο ἢ ὅτι καλὸν ἢ δίκαιον; Ἕκαστον γὰρ τούτων ἄλλο αὐτοῦ, καὶ οὐκ ἐν αὐτῷ αἱ τῆς κρίσεως ἀρχαὶ αἷς πιστεύσει ἀλλὰ καὶ αὗται ἔξω καὶ ἡ ἀλήθεια ἐκεῖ·* Otherwise how should the mind know or judge when it had really apprehended any thing, that this is good, that honest or just, these things being all strangers to the mind, and coming into it from without. So that the mind could not have any principles of judgment within itself in this case, but these would be without it, and then the truth must needs be without it also.—

3. If intellection and knowledge were mere passion from without, or the bare reception of extraneous and adventitious forms, then no reason could be given at all why a mirror or looking-glass should not understand; whereas it cannot so much as sensibly perceive those images which it receives and reflects to us. And therefore sense of itself, as was before intimated, is not a mere passion, but a passive perception of the soul, which hath something of vital energy in it, because it is a cogitation; to which vital energy of the soul those sensible ideas of light, colors, heat and the like, owe all their entity. Much less therefore can intellection be a pure passion. But if intellection

and knowledge were a mere passive perception of the soul from without and nothing but sense, or the result of it, then what reason could be given, why brute animals, that have all the same senses that men have, and some of them more acute, should not have intellection also, and be as capable of logic, mathematics and metaphysics, and have the same notions of morality, of a deity and religion that men have? Wherefore it must of necessity be granted, that besides passion from corporeal things, or the passive perception of sense, there is in the souls of men another more active principle or vis cognoscendarum rerum innata, an innate cognoscitive power, whereby they are enabled to understand or judge of what is received from without by sense. And some, that would otherwise make the soul as naked a thing as is possible, are forced to acknowledge thus much. And hereby they grant all that we contend for and they deny, though considering not in the mean time what they say. For this innate cognoscitive power in the soul, can be nothing else but a power of raising intelligible ideas and conceptions of things from within itself. For it is not possible that any knowledge should be without an objective idea or conception of something known included in it, or that *νόησις*, the intellection, should be in one faculty, and *νόημα*, the conception, in another, one in the intellect, and the other in the fancy. That knowledge should be actively produced from within, and the conception or objective idea passively received from without, that the mind should exert an act of knowledge or intellection without an object, or upon an object without itself, and not comprehended by it, that the idea of the thing known should not be comprehended in the knowledge of it. Whereas, as Aristotle himself hath observed, *Τὸ αὐτὸ ἔστιν ἡ κατ' ἐνέργειαν ἐπιστήμη τῷ πράγματι·* Actual knowledge is in reality the same with the thing known, or the idea of it, and therefore inseparable from it. It being nothing but the mind's being conscious of some intelligible idea within itself.

4. And therefore, whereas the only objects of sense are individual corporeal things existing without the mind, which the soul perceives by looking out from itself upon that from which it suffers, not actively comprehended within itself. The primary and immediate objects of intellection and knowledge, are not things existing without the mind, but the ideas of the mind itself actively exerted, that is, the intelligible rationes, reasons of things. *Νόησις οὐ τοῦ ἔξω ὥσπερ ἡ αἴσθησις·* The intellection is not of what is without, as sense is.—And *Ὅτι οὐκ ἔξω τοῦ νοῦ τὰ νοητά·* The immediate objects of intellection are not without the mind that understands.—They are assertions that Plotinus at large demonstrates. And Aristotle frequently asserts the same, *Ἐπὶ τῶν ἄνευ*

ὕλης τὸ αὐτό ἐστι τὸ νοοῦν καὶ τὸ νοούμενον· ἡ γὰρ ἐπιστήμη ἡ θεωρητικὴ καὶ τὸ ἐπιστητὸν τὸ αὐτό ἐστι· In abstracted things that which understands and that which is understood are the same; for the theoretical science and the scibile, knowable or object of knowledge are all one.—And Ὅλως ὁ νοῦς ὁ κατ' ἐνέργειαν τὰ πράγματα νοῶν· The mind altogether is that which understands things;—these being all but several modifications of intellect. For as hard and soft, hot and cold, and the like corporeal qualities, are but several modifications of matter, so the several objective ideas of the mind in scientifical speculation, are but several modifications of the mind knowing. Wherefore individual things existing without the soul, are but secondary objects of knowledge and intellection, which the mind understands not by looking out from itself as sense doth, but by reflecting inwardly upon itself, and comprehending them under those intelligible ideas or rationes, reasonings, of its own, which it protrudes from within itself; so that the mind or intellect may well be called (though in another sense than Protagoras meant it) τὸ μέτρον πάντων, the measure of all things.

5. For the soul having an innate cognoscitive power universally, (which is nothing but a power of raising objective ideas within itself, and intelligible rationes, reasons, of any thing) it must needs be granted that it hath a potential omniformity in it. Which is not only asserted by the Platonists, that the soul is πάντα νοερῶς, all things intellectually, but also by Aristotle himself: Τὴν ψυχὴν εἶναι τὰ ὄντα πῶς πάντα· That the soul is in a manner all things.—The mind being a kind of notional or representative world, as it were a diaphanous and crystalline sphere, in which the ideas and images of all things existing in the real universe may be reflected or represented. For as the mind of God which is the archetypal intellect, is that whereby he always actually comprehends himself, and his own fecundity, or the extent of his own infinite goodness and power; that is, the possibility of all things; so all created intellects being certain ectypal models, or derivative compendiums of the same; although they have not the actual ideas of all things, much less are the images or sculptures of all the several species of existent things fixed and engraven in a dead manner upon them; yet they have them all virtually and potentially comprehended in that one vis cognitrix, cognoscitive power, of the soul, which is a potential omniformity, whereby it is enabled as occasion serves and outward objects invite, gradually and successively to unfold and display itself in a a vital manner, by framing intelligible ideas or conceptions within itself of whatsoever hath any entity or cogitability. As the spermatic or plastic power doth virtually contain within itself, the forms of all the

several organical parts of animals, and displays them gradually and successively, framing an eye here and an ear there.

6. Now because intellection and knowledge are not passion from without, but an active exertion of the mind from within itself, hence it comes to pass, as Aristotle hath observed, that the mind by knowing that which is *σφόδρα νοητὸν*, exceedingly intelligible, the most radiant and illustrious truths, is not debilitated thereby or overpowered, as sense is in perceiving that which is *σφόδρα αἰσθητὸν*, exceedingly sensible, as the brightness of the sun; but contrariwise the more invigorated thereby, and the better enabled to comprehend lesser and smaller truths; because though sense is passive and organical, yet knowledge is inorganical and an active power and strength of the mind, which the more it is exerted, is the more thereby invigorated and enlarged.

From hence likewise it is, as the same Aristotle hath observed, *Ἀκριβεστέραν ἐπιστήμην τῆς ἐπιστήμης, τὴν μὴ καθ' ὑποκειμένου τῆς καθ' ὑποκειμένου, οἷον ἀριθμητικὴν τῆς ἁρμονικῆς·* That those knowledges which are more abstract and remote from matter, are more accurate, intelligible and demonstrable,—than those which are conversant about concrete and material things, as arithmetic than harmonics, which are numbers concrete with sounds; and so likewise geometry than astronomy, or the mixed mathematics; whereas if all knowledge did arise from corporeal things by way of sense and passion, it must needs be contrariwise true, that the more concrete and sensible things were, the more knowable they would be. Moreover, from hence it is also, as experience tells us, that scientifical knowledge is best acquired by the soul's abstraction from the outward objects of sense, and retiring into itself, that so it may the better attend to its own inward notions and ideas. And therefore it is many times observed, that over-much reading and hearing of other men's discourses, though learned and elaborate, doth not only distract the mind, but also debilitates the intellectual powers, and makes the mind passive and sluggish, by calling it too much outwards. For which cause that wise philosopher Socrates altogether shunned that dictating and dogmatical way of teaching used by the sophisters of that age, and chose rather an aporetical and obstetricious method; because knowledge was not to be poured into the soul like liquor, but rather to be invited and gently drawn forth from it; nor the mind so much to be filled therewith from without, like a vessel, as to be kindled and awakened. Lastly, from hence is that strange parturiency that is often observed in the mind, when it is solicitously set upon the investigation of some truth, whereby it doth endeavor, by ru-

minating and revolving within itself as it were to conceive it within itself, parturire, to bring it forth out of its own womb; by which it is evident, that the mind is naturally conscious of its own active fecundity, and also that it hath a criterion within itself, which will enable it to know when it hath found that which it sought.

7. Wherefore it is evident from what we have declared, that there are two kinds of perceptive cogitations in the soul; the one passive, when the soul perceives by suffering from its body, and the objects without; the other active, when it perceives by exerting its own native vigor from within itself. The passive perceptions of the soul have two several names given unto them; for when the soul, by sympathizing with the body, seems to perceive corporeal things, as present and really existing without it, then they are called αἰσθήματα, sensations. But when the passive affections of the soul are looked upon not as things really existing without the mind, but only as pictures of sensible things in the mind, or more crass or corporeal cogitations, then they are called φαντάσματα, phantasms, or imaginations. But these φαντάσματα and αἰσθήματα, phantasms and sensations, being really the same things, as we said before, both of them being passions or affections in the soul, caused by some local motions in the body, and the difference between them being only accidental, insomuch that φαντάσματα, phantasms, may be changed into αἰσθήματα, sensations, and sometimes also αἰσθήματα, sensations, into φαντάσματα, phantasms, therefore all these passive perceptions of the soul may be called in general, φαντάσματα, phantasms. But the active perceptions which rise from the mind itself without the body, are commonly called νοήματα, conceptions of the mind; and so we have the two species of perceptive cogitations; the one φαντάσματα, phantasms, and the other νοήματα, conceptions of the mind.

8. Now all our perceptive cogitations are not φαντάσματα, phantasms, as many contend, but that there is another species of perceptive cogitations distinct from them, arising from the active vigor of the mind itself, which we therefore call νοήματα, conceptions of the mind, is demonstrably evident from hence; because phantasms are nothing else but sensible ideas, images or pictures of outward objects, such as are caused in the soul by sense; whence it follows, that nothing is φανταστὸν, the object of fancy, but what is also αἰσθητὸν, the object of sense, nothing can be fancied by the soul, but what is perceptible by sense. But there are many objects of our mind, which we can neither see, hear, feel, smell nor taste, and which did never enter into it by any sense; and therefore we can have no sensible pictures or ideas of them,

drawn by the pencil of that inward limner or painter which borrows all his colors from sense, which we call fancy; and if we reflect on our own cogitations of these things, we shall sensibly perceive that they are not fantastical, but noematical. As for example, justice, equity, duty and obligation, cogitation, opinion, intellection, volition, memory, verity, falsity, cause, effect, genus, species, nullity, contingency, possibility, impossibility, and innumerable more such there are that will occur to any one that shall turn over the vocabularies of any language, none of which can have any sensible picture drawn by the pencil of the fancy. And there are many whole propositions likewise, in which there is not any one word or notion that we can have any genuine phantasm of, much less can fancy reach to an apprehension of the necessity of the connexion of the terms. As for example, nihil potest esse et non esse eodem tempore, nothing can be and not be at the same time.—What proper and genuine phantasms can any perceive in his mind either of nihil, nothing, or potest, can, or esse, be, or et, and, or non esse, not be, or eodem, at the same, or tempore, time.

9. Neither was it asserted by Aristotle, as some have taken for granted, that all our perceptive cogitations are phantasms, but contrariwise, that there are *νοήματα*, conceptions of the mind, which are distinct things from *φαντάσματα*, phantasms, only that the latter were always individual companions of the former. This appears from those words of his, [1]*Νοήματα τινὶ δοίσει τοῦ μὴ φαντάσματα εἶναι, ἢ οὐδε ταῦτα φαντάσματα, ἀλλ᾽ οὐκ ἄνευ φαντασμάτων·* The conceptions of the mind somewhat differ from phantasms, they are not phantasms, but neither are they without phantasms.—Where he inclines to this, that the *νοήματα*, conceptions of the mind, are not *φαντάσματα*, phantasms, but that they have phantasms always joined with them. So again afterward he asks, *Εἰ τὸ νοεῖν φαντασία, ἢ μὴ ἄνευ φαντασίας·* Whether intellection be fancy, or rather a different thing from fancy, but such as never goes without it.—Which indeed he affirms in other places, that the mind doth never *νοεῖν*, conceive, without a phantasm. Now this is true of sensible and corporeal things, that we never understand them, but we have also some confused phantasms or other of them in our mind, and yet besides the *φαντάσματα*, the mind exerts *νοήματα*, conceptions, also upon them, or else it could not understand them, phantasms being but imperfect, incomplete, and superficial cogitations, which sometimes go before, and invite or call in the mean while the perceptions of the mind, and sometimes follow and attend upon the *νοήματα*, conceptions

[1] De Anima, lib. iii. c.

of the mind, as the shadow upon the substance, but never comprehend the thing. And indeed as we ourselves consist of soul and body naturally united together, so are the cogitations that we have of corporeal things usually both noematical and phantasmatical together, the one being as it were the soul, and the other the body of them. For when a geometrician considers a triangle, being about to demonstrate that it hath three angles equal to two right angles, no doubt he will have the phantasmatical picture of some triangle in his mind; and yet notwithstanding he hath also a noematical perception or intellectual idea of it too, as appears from hence, because every express picture of a triangle must of necessity be either obtuseangular or rectangular, or acutangular, but that which in his mind is the subject of this propositition thought on, is the ratio, reason, of a triangle undetermined to any of these species. And the like might be observed also of the word angles in the same proposition. In like manner, whenever we think of a phantasmatical, universal, or universalised phantasm, or a thing which we have no clear intellection of; as for example, of the nature of a rose in general, there is a complication of something noematical, and something phantasmatical together; for φαντάσματα, phantasms, in themselves alone, as well as αἰσθήματα, sensations, are always individual things. And by a rose considered thus universally and phantasmatically, we mean a thing which so affects our sense in respect of figure and color.

10. But as for those other objects of cogitation, which we affirmed before to be in themselves neither αἰσθητὰ, the objects of sense, nor φανταστὰ, the objects of fancy, but only νοητὰ, things understood, and therefore can have no natural and genuine phantasms properly belonging to them; yet it is true, notwithstanding that the fantastic power of the soul, which would never willingly be altogether idle or quite excluded, will busily intend itself here also. And therefore many times, when the intellect or mind above is exercised in abstracted intellections and contemplations, the fancy will at the same time busily employ itself below, in making some kind of apish imitations, counterfeit iconisms, symbolical adumbrations and resemblances of those intellectual cogitations of sensible and corporeal things. And hence it comes to pass, that in speech, metaphors and allegories do so exceedingly please, because they highly gratify this fantastical power of passive and corporeal cogitation in the soul, and seem thereby also something to raise and refresh the mind itself, otherwise lazy and ready to faint and be tired by over-long abstracted cogitations, by taking its old companion the body to go along with it, as it were to rest upon, and by afford-

ing to it certain crass, palpable, and corporeal images, to incorporate those abstracted cogitations in, that it may be able thereby to see those still more silent and subtle notions of its own, sensibly reflected to itself from the corporeal glass of the fancy.

Sometimes also there are other spurious phantasms that do little or nothing symbolize with the noetical cogitations, that yet are arbitrarily or customarily annected to them, merely because the phantastic power would not stand wholly idle and unemployed; so that when the mind thinks of such an intelligible idea, the fancy will presently hold forth such a customary phantasm before it, *ὥσπερ οἱ ἐν τοῖς μνημονικοῖς τιθέμενοι καὶ εἰδωλοποιοῦντες*, as those that use artificial memory, make certain phantasms at pleasure to signify certain cogitations.

But lastly, rather than the fancy shall quite stand out and do just nothing at all, it will sometimes exercise itself (especially in speech) in raising phantasms of the very sounds and names, by which the notions of the mind are signified respectively. So that it is very true both that there are active *νοήματα*, cogitations of the mind distinct from *φαντάσματα*, phantasms; and such of which there can be no natural and genuine phantasms or sensible pictures; and yet according to Aristotle's opinion, that frequently those *νοήματα*, conceptions of the mind (at least in the vulgar, that are little accustomed to abstracted cogitation) have some kind of spurious and counterfeit, or verbal and nominal phantasms joined with and accompanying of them.

11. As that opinion, that the *νοήματα*, conceptions of the mind and intelligible ideas or rationes, reasons of the mind should be raised out of the *φαντάσματα*, phantasms, by the strange chymistry of intellectus agens, an agent intelligence; this as it is founded on a mistake of Aristotle's meaning ,who never dreamed of any such a chimerical intellectus agens, agent intelligence, as appears from the Greek interpreters that best understod him; so it is very like to that other opinion called peripatetical, that asserts the eduction of immaterial forms out of the power of matter; and as both of them arise from the same sottishness of mind that would make stupid and senseless matter the original source of all things; so there is the same impossibility in both, that perfection should be raised out of imperfection, and that vigour, activity and awakened energy, should ascend and emerge out of dull, sluggish, and drowsy passion. But indeed this opinion attributes as much activity to the mind, if at least the agent intelligence be a part of it as ours doth; as he would attribute as much activity to the sun, that should say the sun had a power of educing light out of night or the dark air, as he that should say the sun had a power of exerting light out of his own body.

The former being but an improper way of expressing the same thing, which is properly signified in the latter way.

But that other opinion, that asserts that the abstract and universal rationes, reasons, of things, as distinct from phantasms, are nothing else but mere names without any signification, is so ridiculously false, that it deserves no confutation at all.

CHAP. II.

1. That there are some ideas of the mind which were not stamped or imprinted upon it from the sensible objects without, and therefore must needs arise from the innate vigour and activity of the mind itself, is evident, in that there are, first, ideas of such things as neither are affections of bodies, nor could be imprinted or conveyed by any local motions, nor can be pictured at all by the fancy in any sensible colours; such are the ideas of wisdom, folly, prudence, imprudence, knowledge, ignorance, verity, falsity, virtue, vice, honesty, dishonesty, justice, injustice, volition, cogitation, nay, of sense itself, which is a species of cogitation, and which is not perceptible by any sense; and many other such like notions as include something of cogitation in them, or refer to cogitative beings only; which ideas must needs spring from the active power and innate fecundity of the mind itself, because the corporeal objects of sense can imprint no such things upon it. Secondly, in that there are many relative notions and ideas, attributed as well to corporeal as incorporeal things that proceed wholly from the activity of the mind comparing one thing with another. Such as are cause, effect, means, end, order, proportion, similitude, dissimilitude, equality, inequality, aptitude, inaptitude, symmetry, asymmetry, whole and part, genus and species, and the like.

2. But that which imposes upon men's judgments here, so as to make them think, that these are all passive impressions made upon the soul by the objects of sense, is nothing else but this; because the notions both of those relative ideas, and also of those other immaterial things, (as virtue, wisdom, the soul, God) are most commonly excited and awakened occasionally from the appulse of outward objects knocking at the doors of our senses. And these men not distinguishing betwixt the outward occasion or invitation of those cogitations, and the immediate active or productive cause of them, impute them therefore

all alike, as well these intelligible as the other sensible ideas, or phantasms, to the efficiency or activity of the outward objects upon us. Wherefore that we may the better understand how far the passion of sense reaches, and where the activity of the mind begins, we will compare these three things together;—first, a mirror, looking-glass, or crystal globe; secondly, a living eye, that is, a seeing or perceptive mirror or looking-glass; thirdly, a mind or intellect superadded to this living eye or seeing mirror.

3. First therefore, when the same objects are equally exposed or held before a crystal globe or looking-glass, and a living eye; there are all the same impressions made upon the crystal globe, that there are upon the living eye; which appears from hence, because the eye looking upon the crystal globe or mirror, will see all the same images reflected to itself from thence, that it perceived before immediately from the objects themselves. The motion and pressure of the ethereal globuli, globulous particles, in which the nature of light is conceived to consist, from every opaque object, bearing alike every way upon that which resists, and therefore as much upon the mirror as the eye. So that there is every jot as much corporeal passion in the mirror or crystal globe, as in the glassy part of the living eye; for, as we said before, the corporeal part of the eye is indeed nothing else but a mirror or looking-glass. And yet notwithstanding, the mirror or crystal globe doth not see or perceive any thing as the eye doth. From whence we learn, first, that things are never perceived merely by their own force and activity upon the percipient, but by the innate force, power and ability of that which perceives. And therefore, secondly, that sense itself is not a mere corporeal passion; but a perception of the bodily passions proceeding from some power and ability supposed to reside in a sensitive soul, vitally united to that respective body. Which perception, though it have something of energy in it, as being a cogitation; yet it is rightly called a passion of the soul, because it is not a clear intellective or cognoscitive perception of the motions of the body, but a passive or sympathetical perception only. Whereby, according to nature's instinct, it hath several seemings or appearances begotten in it of those resisting objects without it at a distance, in respect of color, magnitude, figure and local motion; by reason of the difference of those rectilinear motions communicated from them by the intermediate globuli, globulous particles, and impressed upon the optic nerves.

Wherefore the living eye immediately perceives nothing but these corporeal passions which are made equally upon it, and the mirror or crystal globe alike, by the motion of that intermediate or subtle body

which causeth light; which corporeal passions being also passively perceived by that vital principle called the sensitive power residing in the eye, all passion from the outward object there ceaseth, and goes no further. But that power of the soul that next followeth, which is the third thing that we mentioned before, the intellect, begins immediately to exert and display its activity upon the object passively perceived by sense.

4. But the better to illustrate the business in hand, let us again suppose some ingenious piece of mechanism, or artificial automaton; as for example, an horologe or watch, at once held before the mirror or crystal globe, as also exposed to the particular view of the living or sentient eye, both in the outside and interior fabric of it; so that as every part in it is reflected from the mirror, so it may be consciously perceived also by the sentient eye, in a particular successive view. Now the sentient eye will be conscious or perceptive of nothing in all this, but only its being variously affected, from different colors, figures, protuberancies, cavities, sculptures, local motions, one after another, all the same things which were impressed on the crystal globe or mirror, and reflected from it, there being no difference at all betwixt the one and the other, but that the eye was conscious or perceptive of what it suffered, but the mirror not. But now the mind or intellect being superadded to this sentient eye, and exerting its active and more comprehensive power upon all that which was reflected from the mirror, and passively perceived by the sentient eye, as it doth actually and intellectually comprehend the same things over again, which sense had perceived before in another manner (of which we must speak afterward) so it proceeds further, and compares all the several parts of this ingenious machine or self-mover one with another, taking notice, first, of the spring, as the original and cause of all the motion in it; of the chain or string, by the mediation of which that motion is communicated to the fusee; of the balance that reciprocating moderates the motion of the several wheels, some greater, some lesser, propagating the motion from one to another; of the horary circle divided into equal parts; and, lastly, of the index, moving round about the circle, through equal space in equal time, all these in their several scheses, relations, to one another and the whole. Whereupon the intellect, besides figure, color, magnitude and motions, raises and excites within itself the intelligible ideas of cause, effect, means, end, priority and posteriority, equality and inequality, order and proportion, symmetry and asymmetry, aptitude and inaptitude, sign and thing signified, whole and part, in a manner all the logical and relative notions that are. Whereas the sentient eye

by which this whole mechanism was represented to the intellect, perceived none of all these things; neither cause nor effect, nor equality nor irregularity, nor order nor proportions, nor symmetry nor asymmetry, nor sign nor thing signified, nor whole nor part; since there is no color nor figure in any of these things. And if the sentient eye could dispute with the mind or intellect, it would confidently avow and maintain, that there were no such entities as those in this automaton, self-moving machine, and that the understanding was abused and deceived in those apprehensions. Since all that was impressed from the object was, by the sentient eye, faithfully transmitted to it, and the intellect received all its intelligence or information from it. And to make its cause good, sense would appeal to the mirror or crystal globe standing by, in which there were no images of any of those invisible ideas or logical notions reflected. Wherefore since sense doth freely conceive and ingenuously own, that none of these ideas are passively and phantasmatically stamped upon it from the objects without; be they what they will, real or not real, certain it is that they are the objects of the intellect, and they must of necessity be raised in it by its own innate vigor and activity.

5. Indeed though it should be granted, that the scheses, relations, of cause and effect, whole and parts, and the like, were mere notions of the mind and modes of conceiving in us, that only signify what things are relatively to intellect; yet it would not follow from hence, that they had no reality at all, but were absolute nonentities; because intellect being a real thing, and that which indeed hath more of entity in it than matter or body, the modifications of intellect must needs be as real things as the modifications of matter; and therefore cause and effect, whole and part, symmetry and asymmetry, and all the other logical notions would have as much reality in them as hard and soft, moist and dry, hot and cold, which, though but modifications of matter, are looked upon as very real things; and such intellectuals as were relative to intellect be as real, as those sensible phantasms which are relative to sense. But this must not be granted, that the modes of conception in the understanding, (where all truth is) are disagreeable to the reality of the things conceived by them; and so being unconformable, are therefore false. Wherefore that these scheses, relations, are not (though sense doth not perceive them) mere notions or figments of the mind, without any fundamental reality in the things themselves without us, corresponding to them, appears from hence, because art and wisdom are most real things, which beget real effects of the greatest moment and consequence in nature and human life of any thing; and yet

they are conversant about nothing else but only the relations, proportions, aptitudes of things to one another, and to certain ends. Now if these were all mere figments, and nothing but logical notions or entia rationis, beings of reason, then there could be no such realities produced out of them. Nay, then art and wisdom themselves must needs be figments and fancies, and likewise it would be indifferent whatever a man did in order to any end or effect; and all men (as Protagoras held) would be really alike wise and skilful. Then there would be no other extrinsical causality of any effect but that of efficiency, force or power; which, in corporeal things, is nothing else but local motion. And no such thing as the causality of skill and art (that which is commonly called the exemplary cause) distinct from force, power, and blind impetuosity. Nay, then virtue, justice, honesty, must of necessity be figments also, because moral good and evil are schetical and relative things; and which is more yet, external convenience and inconvenience, utility and inutility themselves, be nothing else but fancies also.

6. But though the verdict and testimony of sense ought to be admitted as authentic in this particular, as to what is or is not passively impressed upon us from without, because it is not possible that any thing should be impressed upon the intellect from sensible things, but it must needs pass through the medium of sense, and so be transmitted thereby unto the understanding, which cannot be, unless sense be conscious thereof; yet notwithstanding, sense is not at all to be heard, as to the reality or non reality of these relative ideas, it being no competent judge in that controversy. Because since the knowledge of things doth not arise from the activity, energy and radiation of the objects without upon us, passively received by sense, but from the active and comprehensive energy or activity of the mind itself, as we have already observed, In cognoscendo cuncta, sua potius facultate quam rerum quæ cognoscuntur uti. Cum enim omne judicium judicantis actus existat, necesse est ut suam quisque operam non ex aliena, sed ex propria facultate perficiat. That in knowing all things, it rather useth its own power, than that of the things which are known. For since all judgment is the act of him that judgeth, it must needs be that every one perform his own work, not by the power of another, but by his own faculty,—as the afore-commended Boetius expresseth it. We ought not to conclude that those relative ideas are therefore mere figments or modes of conceiving in us, because sense is not conscious of any such things passively impressed upon it from without, and because that lower and narrow faculty comprehends them not; but rather acquiesce in the

sentiment of that larger and more comprehensive faculty the intellect, that judges of things by exerting its own active power upon them.

7. Wherefore, if we well consider it, we shall find that not only the beauty and pulchritude, but also the strength and ability of natural and corporeal things themselves, depend upon these relations and proportions of one thing to another. For what is pulchritude in visible objects, or harmony in sounds, but the proportion, symmetry and commensuration of figures and sounds to one another, whereby infinity is measured and determined, and multiplicity and variety vanquished and triumphed over by unity, and by that means they become grateful and pleasing objects to the ear and eye of intellectual auditors and spectators, there being as it were certain ludicrous irritations and symbolical resemblances of art and wisdom, nay, and virtue too (as we shall show afterward) that is, of intellectuality in general appearing in them, whereby the mind beholds as it were its own face and image reflected to itself from a corporeal glass.

But because many will be ready to say here, that beauty is nothing but a fancy neither, and therefore cannot argue any reality in these schetical things; I add that even the strength and ability of corporeal things themselves depends upon the mutual scheses, relations, and proportions of one thing to another. And this all men will be sensible of as something. And the truth hereof evidently appears from the mechanical powers. Nay, the health and strength of the body of animals, arises from the configuration of the organical parts, and the fit contemporation of humors and the insensible parts with one another; so that if this harmonical crasis, temperature, of the whole body be disturbed and put out of tune, weakness and languor, languishing, will immediately seize upon it. Nay, doth not all the strength, as well as the comeliness and beauty of an army, consist in order? And therefore if we should suppose some subtle sophister, and popular orator, sent from the quarters of an enemy into a vast, numerous and puissant army, that should insinuate into the common soldiers so far, as generally to persuade them, that order was nothing but a mere fancy or logical notion; a thing craftily devised by their commanders, merely to keep them in subjection, that they might the better tyrannize over them, and rule them as they please; insomuch that they should all at length altogether neglect their ranks and files, and put themselves wholly into disorder and confusion, and in this fashion prepare themselves to encounter their approaching enemy, would they not hereby be betrayed to certain ruin, though the enemy should be but a small handful of men, but well ordered and well commanded? For order is that

which makes things junctis viribus, with united forces, to conspire all to one end, whereby the whole hath the force and ability of all the several particular strengths conjoined and united into one.

8. Therefore I say, in the next place, returning to our former instance of an automaton, or horologe, that though those several relative ideas of cause, effect, symmetry, proportion, order, whole and part, and the like, considered formally as *νοήματα*, conceptions of the mind, be only in the intellect itself (as the ideas and conceptions of all other things likewise are;) yet notwithstanding the intellect doth not forge or falsify any thing in apprehending of them, in that material automaton, self-mover, represented to it by sense, because all the several scheses, relations, are fundamentally and really in the same, though they could not be stamped upon sense materially, and received passively from it. And therefore that the true nature, formal ratio, reason, essence and idea of this automaton, self-mover, watch or horologe, is really compounded and made up of those several scheses, relations, as ingredients into it, so that it cannot possibly be understood without them; though sense could not reach to the comprehension of any one of them, much less of this whole logical system or compages, collection of them. It being impossible that the nature of automaton, a self-mover, horologe or watch, should be otherwise understood than by the comprehension of these relative ideas; and by such a logical, unitive, comprehensive power and activity, as can frame out of them one idea of the whole. For an horologe or watch is not mere silver or gold, brass and steel, any way jumbled, mingled or confounded together, but it is such an apt and proportionable disposition of certain quantities of those several materials into several parts of such certain figures, contemperated together, as may harmoniously conspire to make up one equal and uniform motion, which running as it were parallel with the motion of time, and passing round the horary circle, and being measured in that horary circle, may also measure out and distinguish the quantity of that silent and successive flux, which, like a still and deep river, carries down all things along with it indiscernibly, and without any noise; and which, in its progressive motion, treads so lightly and softly, that it leaves no traces, prints or footsteps at all behind it.

9. Wherefore the eye of sense, though it be fixed never so much upon the material outside of this automaton, self-mover, yet it never comprehends the formal nature of it within itself, as it is totum, a whole, made up of several parts, united not so much by corporeal contact or continuity, as by their relative conspiration to one certain end. Sense being like one of those narrow telescopes, by which the eye

looking upon the moon, can never view it all at once, and see the site and configuration of all the several mountains and valleys, and seas in it, and have one comprehensive idea of the whole; but taking it in the piecemeal part after part, leaves the intelligent spectator afterwards to compile and make up one entire draught or map of stenography out of all those several particular or partial views.

So that if we will speak properly, we cannot say that the eye sees any machina, machine, or automaton, self-mover, for it is but variously affected from the material part of it, perceiving several passions in itself from the several colors and figures of it, it being so far from comprehending the formal ratio, reason, of it, as it is a totum, whole, made up of several parts, according to several scheses, relations, and proportions contributing thereto, that it cannot reach to any one relative idea, neither doth bare fancy go any further than sense. Or else the difference between intellect and sense may be resembled by the difference betwixt the sense of sight and touch. For touch groping, perceives but as it were a point at once, the eye comprehends the whole superficies. Sense sees particular things absolutely, intellect compares them according to those relations they have to one another, has a comprehensive idea of a totum, whole, made up of several parts as one thing. And therefore the form, ratio, reason, or intelligible idea of an automaton, self-mover, or horologe, was never stamped or impressed upon the soul from without, but upon occasion of the sensible idea excited and exerted from the inward active and comprehensive power of the intellect itself.

10. There are many other such ideas of the mind, of certain totums, wholes made up of several corporeal parts, which, though sometimes locally discontinued, yet are joined together by scheses, relations, and habitudes to one another (founded in some actions of them, as they are cogitative beings) and by order all conspiring into one thing; which, though they are altogether imperceptible by sense, and therefore were never stamped or impressed upon the mind from the objects without; yet, notwithstanding, are not mere figments or entia rationis, beings of reason, but things of the greatest reality, founded in certain actions or thinking and cogitative beings; which are altogether imperceptible by sense, and therefore could not possibly be outwardly stamped upon the mind; as for example, a polity or commonwealth, called an artificial man, which is a company of many united together by consent or contract under one government, to be regulated by some certain laws as it were by one will for the good of the whole; where, though the eye may see the particular persons, (or at least their out-

sides) that are the respective members thereof, yet it can neither see the bond which unites them together, which is nothing but relation, nor comprehend the totum, whole, that is made up of them, that is, a polity or commonwealth, according to the formal nature of it, which is an idea that proceeds merely from the unitive power and activity of the mind itself.

In a word, all the ideas of things called artificial or mechanical, contain something in them that never came from sense, nor was ever stamped upon the soul from the objects without, which, though it be not merely notional or imaginary, but really belongs to the nature of that thing, yet it is no otherwise than intellectually comprehended. As for example, an house or palace is not only stone, brick, mortar, timber, iron, glass, heaped together; but the very essence and formal ratio, reason, of it is made up of relative or schetical notions, it being a certain disposition of those several materials into a totum, whole, or compages, collection, consisting of several parts, rooms, stairs, passages, doors, chimnies, windows, convenient for habitation, and fit for the several uses of men; in which there is the logic of whole and parts, order, proportion, symmetry, aptitude, concinnity, all complicated with wood, stone, iron and glass, as it were informing and adorning the rude and confused mass of matter, and making it both beautiful and serviceable. And therefore for this cause, no man that is in his wits will say, that a stately and royal palace hath therefore less reality, entity, and substantiality in it, than an heap of rubbish confusedly cast together; because, forsooth, the idea of it partly consists of logical notions, which are thought to be mere imaginary things; whereas the totum, whole, is all solid matter without this notional form. For this logical form, which is the passive stamp or print of intellectuality in it, the first archetypes contained in the idea or skill of the architect, and thence introduced into the rude matter, successively with much pains and labor, is the only thing that distinguishes it from mere dirt and rubbish, and gives it the essence of an house or palace. And it hath therefore the more of entity in it, because it partakes of art or intellectuality. But the eye or sense of a brute, though it have as much passively impressed upon it from without, as the soul of a man hath, when it looks upon the most royal and magnificent palace, if it should see all the inside also as well as the outside, could not comprehend from thence the formal idea and nature of an house or palace, which nothing but an active intellectual principle can reach unto.

11. Neither is this true of such things only as are commonly called artificial, but also of natural compounded things, such as plants and

animals are. And indeed if we consider things philosophically, we shall not find any such essential difference as is commonly supposed, betwixt things called artificial and natural. For there is a nature in all artificial things, and again, an artifice in all compounded natural things. Plants and animals being nothing else but artificial mechanisms, the latter of which especially are contrived with infinitely more wit, variety and curiosity than any mechanisms or automata, self-movers, that were ever yet produced by human art. Wherefore the true form of an animal, if we attend only to the mechanism of the body (for we must acknowledge something else not only in men but also in brutes, if they have any cogitation besides mechanism, which is a substance of another nature, or a cogitative being united to the body) is an idea that includes many relative and logical notions in it, and therefore could never be stamped upon the soul by sense. For sense only takes notice of several colors and figures either in the outside or the inside of any animals, but doth not sum them up into one totum, whole. But the idea of it, as collected into one mechanical automaton, self-mover, consisting of many organical parts fitly proportioned together, and all harmoniously conspiring to one end, to make it every way a fit habitation for a cogitative substance to reside in, in respect of nutrition, local motion, sense, and all other functions of life. Such an idea, I say, that hath something of logic in it, is only conceivable by the unitive, active and comprehensive power of the intellect.

The same is to be affirmed of that huge and vast automaton, which some will have to be an animal likewise, the visible world or material universe, commonly called κόσμος, cosmos or mundus, the world, from the beauty of it. Whether we mean thereby that one single vortex, to which our planetary earth belongs, or a system of as many vortices, as we see fixed stars in the heavens, their central suns and circumferential planets moving round about them respectively. Now sense looking round about, and making many particular views, sees now one fixed star, and then another; now the moon, then the sun; here a mountain, there a valley; at one time a river, at another a sea, particular vegetables and animals one after another. But it cannot sum up or unite all together, nor rise to any comprehensive idea of the whole at once, as it is one or many mechanical automatons, self-movers, most curiously and artificially framed of innumerable parts; in which there are all manner of logical scheses, relations, possible offered to the mind, but all so fitly proportioned with such admirable symmetries and correspondencies in respect of one another and the whole, that they perfectly conspire into one most orderly and harmonious form.

Hitherto therefore we have seen, that the relative ideas that we have in our mind, are not passions impressed upon the soul from the objects without; but arise from the innate activity of the mind itself; and therefore because the essences or ideas of all compounded corporeal things themselves, whether artificial or natural; that is, whether made by the artifice of men or nature, always necessarily include these logical scheses, relations, in them, we have demonstratively proved from thence, that no corporeal compounded thing whatsoever is understood by sense, nor the idea of it passively stamped upon the mind, from the objects without, but comprehended only by the large unitive power of the intellect, and exerted from the innate activity thereof.

12. But the case is still clearer concerning those other ideas before mentioned, of the several modes of cogitative beings, or such as involve or include some relation to them; that these are not by the passive impresses from the outward objects by sense; although they are often occasionally invited and drawn forth by them. Which we shall illustrate by the former instance of an artificial automaton, self-mover, exhibited first to the view of sense, and afterward actively comprehended by the understanding. After the mind hath framed a clear idea of this automaton, self-mover, within itself, the end or design whereof is to measure the equal motion either of the sun and heavens, or earth, (according to different astronomical hypotheses) by the equal motions of this automaton, self-mover, and so to distinguish or mark out to us the quantities of that silent and undiscerned flux of time; and when it hath considered how aptly conducible every part of this mechanism is to that design, and how there is neither the least redundancy nor deficiency in any thing in order thereunto, and of the beauty and elegancy of the fabric, making a further and more inward reflection upon the same, it plainly perceives this accurate contrivance to be but a passive print or stamp of some active and living art and skill upon it: wherefore the ideas of art and skill are upon this occasion naturally exerted from it; neither doth it rest in considering of art and skill abstractedly, but because these are modes of an existent cogitative being, it thinks presently of some particular intelligent being, the artificer or author of this curious fabric, and looking further into it, finds his name also engraven in legible characters upon the same, whereupon he forthwith pronounces the sound of it. Whereas the living eye, that is, sense alone in its antecedent view, as it could not espy any logical scheses, relations, or notions there, so neither can it perceive any ideas of art or skill in it, they having neither figure nor color in them, nor of author and artificer, any more than it could see the sound of the artificer's name in the engraven sculptures or characters of it; for the

eye could see no more than was represented in or reflected from the crystal globe or mirror. Wherefore the ideas of art and skill, author and artificer were not passively imprinted upon the intellect from the material automaton, self-mover, but only occasionally invited from the mind itself, as the figures of the engraven letters did not passively impress the sound of the artificer's name upon him, but only occasion him to exert it from his own activity.

13. Just in the same manner it happens many times in the contemplation of that great automaton, self-mover, of the material universe, which is the *Θεοῦ τέχνασμα*, artifice of God, the artifice of the best mechanist, though there be no more passively impressed upon us from it, than there is upon the diaphanous air, or liquid ether contiguous to all solid bodies by local motion, of which only sensitive beings have a conscious perception; yet there is a wonderful scene of various thoughts and motions raised in the mind thereupon, which are only occasionally invited by those stamps and impressions made from the material fabric, and its various furniture without, but owe their true original and efficiency to nothing else but the innate vigor and activity of the mind itself. Some of which we have already instanced in, the ideas of those relative scheses, considerations of corporeal things themselves and their parts to one another; by means of which the intellect rises up to that comprehensive view of the natures of particular corporeal things, and the universal mundane system within itself all at once; which sense perceiving only by little and little, and taking in as it were point after point, cannot sum up its partial perceptions into the entire idea of any one totum, whole. But the intellect doth not rest here, but upon occasion of those corporeal things thus comprehended in themselves, naturally rises higher to the framing and exciting of certain ideas from within itself, of other things not existing in those sensible objects, but absolutely incorporeal. For being ravished with the contemplation of this admirable mechanism and artificial contrivance of the material universe, forthwith it naturally conceives it to be nothing else but the passive stamp, print and signature of some living art and wisdom; as the pattern, archetype and seal of it, and so excites from within itself an idea of that Divine art and wisdom. Nay, considering further, how all things in this great mundane machine or animal (as the ancients would have it) are contrived, not only for the beauty of the whole, but also for the good of every part in it, that is endued with life and sense, it exerts another idea, viz. of goodness and benignity from within itself, besides that of art and wisdom, as the queen regent and empress of art, whereby art is employed, regulated and determined; now both these

things, whereof the first is art, wisdom and knowledge; the second, goodness, benignity and morality, being looked upon as modes of some intellectual being or mind in which they exist, it from hence presently makes up an idea of God, as the author or architect of this great and boundless machine; A mind infinitely good and wise; and so as it were resounds and re-echoes back the great Creator's name, which from those visible characters impressed upon the material universe, had pierced loudly into its ears, but in such an indiscernible manner, that sense listening never so attentively, could not perceive the least murmur, or whisper of it. And this is the most natural scale by which the intellectual mind in the contemplation of corporeal things ascends to God; from the passive prints and signatures of that one art and wisdom that appears in the universe, by taking notice from thence of the exemplary or archetypal cause, one infinite and eternal mind setting his seal upon all. For as he that hears a consort of musicians playing a lesson, consisting of six or eight several parts, all conspiring to make up one harmony; will immediately conclude, that there was some other cause of that harmony besides those several particular efficients, that struck the several instruments; for every one of them could be but a cause of his own part which he played: but the unity of the whole harmony, into which all the several parts conspire, must needs proceed from the art and musical skill of some one mind, the exemplary and archetypal cause of that vocal harmony, which was but a passive print or stamp of it: so though the atheist might possibly persuade himself, that every particular creature was the first author or efficient of that part which it played in the universe, by a certain innate power of its own; yet all the parts of the mundane system conspiring into one perfect harmony, there must of necessity be some one universal mind, the archetypal and exemplary cause thereof containing the plot of the whole mundane music, as one entire thing, made up of so many several parts within himself.

14. But that oftentimes there is more taken notice of and perceived by the mind, both in the sensible objects themselves, and by occasion of them, than was impressed from them, or passively received by sense; which therefore must needs proceed from some inward active principle in that which perceives, I shall make it further appear by some other instances.

For, first, let a brute and a man at the same time be made spectators of one and the same artificial statue, picture or landscape; here the brute will passively receive all that is impressed from the outward object upon sense by local motion, as well as the man, all the several

colors and figures of it: And yet the man will presently perceive something in this statue or picture, which the brute takes no notice of at all, viz: beauty and pulchritude, and symmetry, besides the liveliness of the effigies and portraiture. The eye of the brute being every jot as good a glass or mirror, and perhaps endued with a more perspicacious sense or power of passive perception, than that of a man.

Or again, let both a man and a brute at the same time hear the same musical airs, the brute will only be sensible of noise and sounds; but the man will also perceive harmony in them, and be very much delighted with it; nay, even enthusiastically transported by it. Wherefore the brute perceiving all the sounds, as well as the man, but nothing of the harmony, the difference must needs arise from some inward active principle or anticipation in the man, which the brute hath not.

And indeed the reason is the same both in visibles and audibles; for the sense of a man, by reason of its vicinity and neighborhood to reason and intellectuality, lodged in the same soul with it, must needs be colored with some tincture of it; or have some passive impresses of of the same upon it: and therefore when it finds or meets with insensible objects any foot-steps or resemblances thereof, any thing that hath cognation with intellectuality; as proportion, symmetry and order have, being the passive stamps and impresses of art and skill (which are intellectual things) upon matter, it must needs be highly gratified with the same. But the soul of a brute having no intellectual anticipations in it, but barely suffering from the corporeal objects without, can have no sense of any thing but what their activity impresseth upon it.

Nay, further, the man will also espy some symbolical resemblances of morality, of virtue and vice in the variously proportioned sounds and airs; for there are *Ἠθικαί* ethical (as Aristotle hath observed) as well as *ἐνθουσιαστικαί ἁρμονίαι*, enthusiastical harmonies, as the physiognomists in like manner observe signatures of morality in the countenances of men and their pictures, which it is yet less possible that a brute should be sensible of; these differences arising, not from the absolute nature of the objects without, or their bare impression which they make; but the different analogy which they have to some inward and active anticipations which they meet withal in the percipient. For the man hath certain moral anticipations and signatures stamped inwardly upon his soul, which makes him presently to take notice of whatsoever symbolizes with it in corporeal things; but the brute hath none.

15. And this will still further appear, if we again compare the judgment of some excellent artists in painting and music with that of an

ordinary vulgar person, that hath not any acquired skill in either faculty. For the skilful and expert limner will observe many elegancies and curiosities of art, and be highly pleased with several strokes and shadows in a picture, where a common eye can discern nothing at all; and a musical artist hearing a consort of exact musicians playing some excellent composure of many parts, will be exceedingly ravished with many harmonical airs and touches, that a vulgar ear will be utterly insensible of. Nay, such an one perhaps would be more pleased with the streperous noise of a single fiddle, or the rustical music of the country-bagpipes, or the dull humming of a jew's trump, than the fullest and most exquisitely composed harmony.

And the reason is the same with what was before suggested, because the artists of either kind have many inward anticipations of skill and art in their minds; which being awakened by those passive impressions of the same skill or art in the outward objects that strike upon their senses, there arises immediately an inward grateful sense and sympathy from the correspondence and analogy that is betwixt them; art and skill in the mind of the musical hearer, finding *Συγγενές τί*, something akin to itself in those harmonious airs, some foot-steps and resemblances of itself gratefully closing with them. Of which vital sympathy, there is vulgarily thought to be some resemblance in nature; when, upon the striking of a string in one viol, another string, that is in unison to a distant viol, will dance and leap; and that not from any mechanical cause (as some conceive) passively only, but from a vital and active principle in nature, which is affected with concord and harmony. Now there is yet a pulchritude of another kind; a more interior symmetry and harmony in the relations, proportions, aptitudes and correspondences of things to one another in the great mundane system, or vital machine of the universe, which is all musically and harmonically composed; for which cause the ancients made Pan, that is, nature to play upon an harp; but sense, which only passively perceives particular outward objects, doth here, like the brute, hear nothing but mere noise and sound and clatter, but no music or harmony at all; having no active principle and anticipation within itself to comprehend it by, and correspond or vitally sympathize with it; whereas the mind of a rational and intellectual being will be ravished and enthusiastically transported in the contemplation of it; and, of its own accord, dance to this pipe of Pan, nature's intellectual music and harmony.

16. But I shall yet further illustrate this business, that the mind

may actively comprehend more in the outward objects of sense, and by occasion of them, than is passively received and impressed from them, by another instance. Suppose a learned written or printed volume, held before the eye of a brute-creature or illiterate person; either of them will passively receive all that is impressed upon sense from those delineations; to whom there will be nothing but several scrawls or lines of ink drawn upon white paper. But if a man that hath inward anticipations of learning in him, look upon them, he will immediately have another comprehension of them than that of sense, and a strange scene of thoughts presently represented to his mind from them; he will see heaven, earth, sun, moon and stars, comets, meteors, elements, in those inky delineations; he will read profound theorems of philosophy, geometry, astronomy in them; learn a great deal of new knowledge from them that he never understood before, and thereby justly admire the wisdom of the composer of them: not that all this was passively stamped upon his soul by sense from those characters; for sense, as I said before, can perceive nothing here but inky scrawls, and the intelligent reader will many times correct his copy, finding erratas in it; but because his mind was before furnished with certain inward anticipations, that such characters signify the elements of certain sounds, those sounds, certain notions or cogitations of the mind; and because he hath an active power of exciting any such cogitations with himself, he reads in those sensible delineations, the passive stamps or prints of another man's wisdom or knowledge upon them, and also learns knowledge and instruction from them, not as infused into his mind from those sensible characters, but by reason of those hints and significations thereby proposed to it, accidentally kindled, awakened and excited in it: for all but the phantasms of black inky strokes and figures, arises from the inward activity of his own mind: wherefore this instance in itself shews, how the activity of the mind may comprehend more in and from sensible objects, than is passively imprinted by them upon sense.

But now, in the room of this artificial book in volumes, let us substitute the book of nature, the whole visible and material universe, printed all over with the passive characters and impressions of divine wisdom and goodness, but legible only to an intellectual eye; for to the sense both of man and brute, there appears nothing else in it but as in the other, so many inky scrawls, i. e. nothing but figures and colors; but the mind or intellect, which hath an inward and active participation of the same Divine Wisdom that made it; and being printed all over with the same archetypal seal, upon occasion of those sensible delineations represented to it, and taking notice of whatsoever is cognate

to it, exerting its own inward activity from thence, will not have only a wonderful scene and large prospect of other thoughts laid open before it, and variety of knowledge, logical, mathematical, metaphysical, moral, displayed; but also clearly read the divine wisdom and goodness, in every page of this great volume, as it were written in large and legible characters.

BOOK IV.

CHAP. III.

1. We have hitherto showed, that there are many ideas of the mind, which though the cogitations of them be often occasionally invited from the motion or appulse of sensible objects without made upon our bodies; yet notwithstanding the ideas themselves could not possibly be stamped or impressed upon the soul from them, because sense takes no cognizance at all of any such things in those corporeal objects, and therefore they must needs arise from the innate vigour and activity of the mind itself. Such as are, first the relative ideas of the several scheses or respects which are betwixt corporeal things themselves compared with one another. Which relative ideas being not comprehended by sense, and yet notwithstanding, the natures of all compounded corporeal things, whether artificial or natural, that is, whether made by the artifice of men or nature, consisting of them, we have demonstratively proved from thence, that the natures of no compounded corporeal things can possibly be known or comprehended by sense. And again, the ideas of cogitative beings, and the several modes of them, together with all such notions as involve some respect or relation to them. For although these also be often occasionally invited and elicited by the objects of sense, when the mind, in the contemplation of them by its own active strength, perceives the signatures of art, counsels, contrivance, wisdom, nay, and goodness also, (all which are modes of cogitative beings) printed upon them; yet they cannot owe their being or efficiency to the activity of those outward objects, but merely to the activity of the mind itself.

I should now proceed to show, that even those simple corporeal things themselves, which by sense we have a passive perception of, in individual bodies without us, are also known and understood by the active power of the mind exerting its own intelligible ideas upon them.

2. That sensation is not knowledge of those corporeal things that we sensibly perceive, we have before largely showed; and indeed it sufficiently appears from hence, because upon the seeing of light and

colors, though never so clearly, the feeling of heat and cold smartly, the hearing of loud sounds and noises, we naturally inquire further, what this light and colors, heat and cold, and sounds are, which is an undoubted acknowledgement that we have not a clear and satisfactory comprehension of those things which make so strong a stroke and impression upon our senses; and therefore the mind desires to master and conquer them by its own active strength and power, and to comprehend them by some ideas of its own, which are not foreign, but native, domestic and intrinsical to it.

Now if sense itself be not knowledge, much less can any secondary or derivative result from sense be knowledge; for this would be a more obscure, shadowy and evanid thing than sense itself is. As when the image of a man's face, received in a mirror or looking-glass, is reflected from thence into a second mirror, and so forward into a third; still the further it goes, the more obscure, confused and imperfect it grows, till at last it becomes altogether imperceptible. Or as in the circlings and undulations of water, caused by the falling of a stone into it, that are successively propagated from one to another; the further and wider they go, the waves are still the less, slower and weaker, till at length they become quite undiscernible. Or as a secondary echo, that is, the echo of an echo, falls as much short of the primary echo in proportion, as that doth of the original voice. Or, lastly, if we could suppose a shadow to cast a shadow, this secondary shadow, or projection of a shadow, would fall as much short of the primary shadow, as that did of the substance itself. So if the knowledge of corporeal things were but a secondary and derivative result from sense, (though it cannot be conceived that the passion of sense should ray upon the intellect, so as to beget a secondary passion there, any more than one shadow should cast another) then knowledge would be much a weaker perception of them than sense itself is, and nothing but as it were the secondary reflection of an image, or the remote circlings and undulations of the fluid water, or the mere echo of the echo of an original voice: or, lastly, nothing but the shadow of the shadow of a substance. Whereas it is far more real, substantial and satisfactory, more penetrative and comprehensive perception than sense is, reaching to the very inward essence of the things perceived. And therefore it must of necessity proceed from the active power of the mind itself, exerting its own intelligible ideas upon that which is passively perceived, and so comprehending it by something of its own that is native and domestic to it. So that besides the *αἰσθήματα* sensations, or *φαντάσματα* phantasms, the sensible ideas of corporeal things passively impressed upon us from without,

there must be also νοήματα conceptions, or intelligible ideas of them actively exerted from the mind itself; or otherwise they could never be understood.

3. Wherefore, that we may the better illustrate this business, let us suppose some individual body; as for example, a white or black triangular superficies, or a solid tetrahedrum four-square included all within a triangular superficies, exposed first to the view of sense or a living eye; and then afterward considered by the intellect, that we may see the difference betwixt the passive perception of it by sense, and the active comprehension of it by the understanding. Now sense, that is a living eye or mirror, as soon as ever it is converted toward this object, will here passively perceive an appearance of an individual thing, as existing without it, white and triangular, without any distinction concretely and confusedly together; and it will perceive no more than this, though it dwell never so long upon this object; for it perceives no more than is impressed upon it; and here the passion of sense ends and goes no further. But the mind or intellect residing in the same soul that hath a power of sensation also, then beginning to make a judgment upon that which is thus passively perceived, exerts its own innate vigor and activity, and displays itself gradually after this manner. For, first, with its subtile divisive power, it will analyze and resolve this concrete phantasmatical totum, whole, and take notice of several distinct intellectual objects in it. For considering that every white or black thing is not necessarily triangular, nor every triangular thing white or black, it finds here two distinct intellectual objects; the one white, the other triangular: And then again, because that which is nothing can have no affections, it concludes, that here is something as a common substratum, subject, to both these affections or modifications, which it calls a corporeal substance; which being one and the same thing, is here both white and triangular. Wherefore it finds at least three distinct objects of intellectual cogitation, corporeal substance, white, and triangular, all individual. But then reflecting again upon these several objects, and that it may further inquire into the natures and essences of them, it now bids adieu to sense and singularity; and taking an higher flight, considers them all universally and abstractly from individuating circumstances and matter. That is, it no more seeks the knowledge and comprehension of these things without itself, from whence it hath already passively perceived them by sense; but revolving within itself upon its own inward notions and active anticipations (which must needs be universal) it looks for some domestic ideas of its own to understand these general natures by, that so from

thence with a descending view it may comprehend under them those individuals that now affect the sense.

4. First therefore, for corporeal substance in general, which is the substratum, subject, both of color and figure, not to pursue any long and tedious processes, it quickly concludes the essence of it to be this; a thing extended impenetrably, or which hath impenetrable longitude, latitude and profundity. And because it is not here considered merely as a notion or objective cogitation, but as a thing actually existing without the mind, therefore it exerts another ratio, notion, of existence or singularity also; which added to the former, makes it up a thing that hath impenetrable extension existing. Now none of these ideas, neither of essence nor existence, nor thing, nor substance, nor something nor nothing; nor impenetrability nor extension, nor longitude, latitude and profundity, were impressed or stamped upon the mind, either from this individual, or any other sensible object; for they can neither be seen nor perceived by any corporeal sense; but are merely excited from the innate activity of the mind itself, that same power by which the mind is enabled to conceive of nihil, nothing, as well as aliquid, something. And certain it is that the idea of nothing was never impressed from any thing. And if the essence of body, or corporeal substance itself, be only comprehended and understood by the active ideas of the mind, (for sense here perceived no such thing, but only was affected from the exterior induments thereof, color and figure) then the several modes of it, such as whiteness and triangularity, which are but certain modes of an extended substance, must needs be understood in like manner, not by passive ideas and phantasms, but the nomatical or intelligible ideas of the mind.

5. Wherefore in the next place, as for white color or whiteness, here is a plain and palpable difference betwixt sense and intellection; betwixt the φάντασμα, phantasm, and νόημα, conception, betwixt a sensible and intelligible idea; for the sense or phantasm of white, that we have from the individual object, is no clear comprehension of any essence or intelligible ratio, notion; but only a passion or affection in the soul, caused by some local motions communicated to the brain from the object without, that is, a drowsy, confused and imperfect perceptive cogitation. But now the awakened mind or intellect revolving its own inward ideas, and being not able to comprehend any such mode or quality in extended substance, as this sensible idea of white is, formally considered; for this very reason, boldly and confidently concludes that this is no real quality in that body itself absolutely considered, because no such thing is intelligible by it; in which opinion, it is con-

firmed by sense itself, in that the lower ends of the rainbow that reach to the earth do not stain or dye any thing with the several colors of it; and that the same drops of dew or rain to eyes at several distances, have all those several colors of the rainbow in them, and none at all. And by other experiments it appears that these things are only passions or affections in the sentient itself, caused by some peculiar modification of the superficies of that material object in respect of the figure, site and disposition of its insensible parts, whereby the light or intermediate globuli, globulous particles, are in a peculiar manner reflected upon the eye, and that probably the difference betwixt a white and a black object consists in this, that in one the small particles are polite and solid, and therefore vividly reflect the lighter globuli, globulous particles; but in the other being differently disposed, the light, as a ball flung against a heap of sand, is not so smartly reflected from it, but as it were sinks into it, and its motion is stifled and smothered in the caverns of it. Wherefore the intelligible idea of a white color is this, that it is a certain passion or sense in the soul, caused by a peculiar modification of the object without, in respect of the disposition of its insensible parts, whereby the light or globuli, globulous particles, are more smartly and vividly reflected upon the eye; which is another kind of comprehension of it, than the sensible idea or phantasm of white is, which is no intelligible idea, but a cogitative passion; that is, another species of cogitation, as an half awakened perception. Neither are these intelligible ideas of passion and sense impressed upon the soul from the sensible objects without; for the eye sees neither passion nor sense, but they are actively exerted from the mind itself, and therefore mastered and conquered, and comprehended by it.

6. I now proceed to the last intellectual object comprehended in this individual body, which is triangularity, or some one particular species of a triangle; as for example, an equilateral, or a rectangular triangle; for there can be no individual triangle but must be of one determinate species or another.

Now because the phantasm of such a triangle doth not only bear a resemblance of the outward material object, which the phantasms of colors and the like do not, but also of the true intelligible idea of a triangle itself; and because when men think never so abstractly and mathematically of a triangle, they have commonly some rude phantasm or picture of it before them in their imagination, therefore many confidently persuade themselves, that there is no other idea of a triangle or other figure, beside the bare phantasm or sensible idea impressed upon the soul from some individual object without; that is, no active

noematical idea inwardly exerted from the mind itself. Which indeed is all one as to say, that there is no intellection or knowledge of a triangle at all; forasmuch as neither sense nor fancy, which are but superficial, imperfect and incomplete perceptive cogitations, reach to the comprehension of the ratio, notion, or essence of any thing. Wherefore now to make the contrary appear, we will again view this material triangle, tetrahedrum, or four square, before our eyes, making a nearer approach to it; and upon this second contemplation of it, we plainly observe much inequality in the superficies, unevenness and inequality in the lines, and bluntness in the angles. From whence it evidently appears that that idea that we had in our minds of a perfect triangle, as a plain superficies terminated by three straight lines joined together in three triangles, ending in so many points, was not impressed upon our soul from this individual object, it being different from it, and far more exact and perfect than that is. And therefore it must needs be granted that it was but occasionally or accidentally invited and drawn forth from the mind, upon the sight of it, just in the same manner as when a man looks upon certain lines drawn with ink upon a piece of paper something resembling the face of a man, his mind doth not fix and stay itself in the consideration of those inky lines; but presently upon this occasion excites within itself the idea of a man's face. Or when a man walking in the gallery where there are divers pictures hung upon the wall, chances among them to espy the picture of a friend or acquaintance of his, which, though perhaps far from an exact resemblance, yet notwithstanding makes him presently to excite the idea of his friend in his imagination. Neither of which things could possibly be, if there had not been a previous and pre-existent idea of a man's face, or such a certain friend in his mind before; for otherwise a man in this case could think of nothing but just that that was impressed upon him by sense, the figures of those inky delineations, and those several strokes and shadows of the pictures. In like manner, when we look upon the rude, imperfect and irregular figures of some corporeal things, the mind upon this occasion excites from within itself the ideas of a perfect triangle, square, circle, pyramid, cube, sphere, and the like, whose essences are so indivisible, that they are not capable of the least additions, detraction or variation without the destruction of them, because there was some rude and bungling resemblance of these regular figures in those material objects that we look upon, of which probably the maker had the ideas in his mind. And the mind naturally delights more to think of simple and regular, than of compounded and irregular figures.

7. But if any one should here object and say, that it doth not follow from hence, that that more perfect idea which now I have of a triangle in my mind, the accuracy whereof this present visible idea before my eyes doth not reach unto, was actively excited from the mind itself; because it might be some time formerly impressed, from some other individual triangle which I had elsewhere seen; just in the same manner as when I looked upon a picture, that idea of a man's face in general, or of that particular friend, that was occasionally excited thereby, was not any innate idea, or an idea that sprung wholly from the activity of the mind, but was formerly impressed upon the soul, from individual sensible objects now remembered or called to mind. I say, that this cannot possibly be true, because there never was any material or sensible straight line, triangle, circle, that we saw in all our lives, that was mathematically exact, but even sense itself, at least by the help of microscopes, might plainly discover much unevenness, ruggedness, flexuosity, angulosity, irregularity and deformity in them, as will appear to any one that shall make a triangle upon the most accurate lines that the wit or art of man can make; and therefore no material line could stamp or impress upon the soul in a mere passive way those exact ideas that we now have of a triangle or of a straight line, which is the shortest possible between two points, or a circle that is every where equidistant from an individual centre, etc. And if it should be again replied, that notwithstanding there being many such lines and circles as common sense cannot discern the least irregularity in them, howsoever they would be in the mean time really irregular to a perfect and Lyncean sight; yet, according to their appearance, might impress those ideas that we have of a straight line or circle; I answer, that this cannot be neither, there being a vast difference betwixt the confused indistinction of sense and fancy, by reason of their bluntness and imperfection, and the express accuracy, preciseness and indivisibility of those intelligible ideas that we have of a straight line, circle, triangle, tetrahedrum, four-square, and other geometrical figures; and therefore that imperfect, confused indistinction of sense, could never impress any such accurate ideas upon the mind, but only occasion the mind actively to exert them from within itself.

8. Nay, though it should be granted, that there were material lines mathematically exact, perfect triangles, squares, pyramids, cubes, spheres, and the like, such as geometry supposes, as no doubt but the Divine power can make such in fitting matter; yet sense could not at all reach to the discerning of the mathematical accuracy of these things, no more than it doth to the absolute equality of any quantities; as of

lines, superficies, bodies, angles, which is found determined only by the understanding, in that materia intelligibilis, intelligible matter, which geometry is conversant about. So that sense could not be able to determine, what triangle and what tetrahedrum, four-square, was mathematically exact, and what not. From whence it is demonstrably evident, that neither the ratio, notion, of perfect equality, nor the perfect mathematical ideas of figures, triangle, square, circle, pyramid, cube, sphere, etc., were impressed upon the soul from without by sense; sense not at all reaching to the discernment of them.

9. But, lastly, if there were material lines, triangles, pyramids, perfectly and mechanically exact; yet that which made them such, and thereby to differ from other irregular lines, imperfect triangles and cubes, could be nothing else but a conformity to an antecedent intellectual idea in the mind, as the rule and exemplar of them; for otherwise an irregular line and an imperfect triangle, pyramid, cube, are as perfectly that that they are, as the other is: only they are not agreeable to those anticipated and pre-conceived ideas of regular lines and figures actively exerted in the mind or intellect, which the mind naturally formeth to itself, and delighteth to exercise itself upon them, as the proper object of art and science, which the other irregular figures are not. Wherefore whenever a man looking upon material objects judges of the figures of them, and says this is a straight line, this is a perfect triangle, that a perfect circle, but those are neither perfect triangles nor circles; it is plain that here are two several ideas of these lines and figures; the one outwardly impressed from those individual material objects from without upon the sense of the beholder; the other actively exerted from his inward mind or intellect. Which latter busy anticipation of it is the rule, pattern and exemplar, whereby he judges of these sensible ideas or phantasms. For otherwise, if there were no inward anticipations or mental ideas, the spectator would not judge at all, but only suffer; and every irregular and imperfect triangle being as perfectly that which it is, as the most perfect triangle, the mind now having no inward pattern of its own before it, to distinguish and put a difference, would not say one of them was more imperfect than another; but only comparing them with one another, would say that this individual figure was not perfectly like to that; upon which account the perfect triangle would be as imperfectly the imperfect triangle, as the imperfect was the perfect.

10. Wherefore, as I said before, this is just in the same manner, as when a man looks upon the picture of an absent friend or familiar acquaintance, and presently judges of it, he hath plainly two several

ideas in his mind at the same time; one outwardly impressed from the present picture, the other pre-existent in his mind before; by one of which, as the pattern or exemplar, he makes a judgment upon the other, and finds many faults in it; saying, that here both the ideas were foreign and adventitious, the pre-existent idea having been some time formerly impressed from an outward material object, and thence retained in the memory or fancy; but in the other case, when a man looking upon a material triangle, square, circle, cube, sphere, in which there are some palpable irregularities; which he judges of by comparing them with some inward pre-existent ideas that he hath in his mind of a perfect individual triangle, square, circle, cube; and also conceives some dislike and displeasure at the disconformity of the one to the other. The pre-existent ideas here were no foreign or adventitious things, but native and domestic to him, nor at any time formerly passively received from any material objects without, but actively exerted from the mind itself. And I think there is no doubt to be made but if a perfect adult man, that was immediately framed out of the earth, having a newly created soul infused, as the protoplast had, should look upon two several kinds of objects at the same time, whereof one was a perfect circle or sphere, equilateral triangle, tetrahedrum, four-square, square or cube; the other having some resemblances of the same, had notwithstanding apparent irregularity in some parts of them; but that at first sight, he would be more pleased with the one than with the other; which could not be, unless he had some native or active idea of his own within himself, to compare them both with, to which one was more conformable than the other. For there could be no such thing as pulchritude and deformity in material objects, if there were no active power in the soul of framing ideas of regular, proportionate and symmetrical figures within itself, by which it might put a difference between outward objects, and make a judgment of them; but that it only received stamps and impressions from without, for then it must needs be equally or indifferently affected with all alike, and not more pleased or displeased with one than with another. Now the judgment that men have of pulchritude and deformity in sensible things, is not merely artificial, from institution or instruction, or of taught things, but such as springs originally from nature itself.

11. But that there is an intelligible idea of a triangle inwardly exerted from the mind itself, distinct from the phantasm or sensible idea that is outwardly impressed from the material object, will yet further appear from that which follows; for the mind reflecting further upon that idea which it hath of a triangle, considers first the generical na-

ture of it, that it is a plain figure, and that a plain figure is the termination of a plain superficies; which superficies is nothing else but mere latitude without profundity; for plain figures are no otherwise conceived by geometricians. Now it is certain that this idea of a superficies, which geometricians have, was never imprinted upon their minds by sense from any material objects; there being no such thing any where existing without the mind, as latitude without profundity. And therefore it must needs arise from the activity of the mind itself. And the idea of a plain superficies, that is, such a superficies as to all whose parts a straight line may be accommodated, as well as the idea of a straight line, must needs be actively excited from the mind also. Again, it considers the difference betwixt a triangle and other plain figures, that it is included in and terminated by three straight lines joined together in three points; which straight lines being the extremities of a superficies, are mere longitude without either profundity or latitude; and which points being the extremities of those lines, have neither longitude, latitude, nor profundity in them. Which mathematical ideas, in like manner, of a line without latitude and profundity, and a point without longitude, latitude and profundity, were never impressed upon Euclid, or any other geometrician from without, as is evident without further proof. Moreover, this intelligible idea of a triangle, as it includes some numerical considerations in it, which sense hath no idea of, perceiving only one and one and one; so therein sides and angles are relatively considered also to one another; nay, the very notion of an angle, and the quantity thereof, is a relative thing, as Proclus hath observed, and therefore not impressed by sense.

Again the mind considering the idea of its own, as it can find out the several properties of a triangle by mere cogitation, without any thing of sense; as that the greater side always subtends the greater angle, nay, and that the three angles are always equal to two right angles (as we shall show afterwards) so it also, by its own strength is able to find out all the species that are possible in a plain triangle, in respect of the differences both of sides and angles. As in respect of the sides, that it is either equilateral or isosceles, even-legged, or scalenum, having unequal sides; of the angles, that it is a rectangulum, straight cornered, or amblygonium, blunt cornered, or ὀξυγώνιον, sharp cornered, triangle, and that there can be no individual triangle but must of necessity belong to one of the three species of either sort. So that this is not gathered from sense, but exerted from the active power of the mind.

12. The mind can clearly understand a triangle in general, without determining its thought to any particular species, and yet there can be

no distinct phantasm of any such thing; for every distinct phantasm or sensible picture of a triangle must of necessity be either equilateral or equicrural, or inequilateral, scalenum, uneven-legged. And so as we in like manner clearly understand in our minds, chiliogonum, a thing with a thousand corners, or myriogonum, one with ten thousand corners, though we cannot possibly have a distinct phantasm of either of them. But for those particular species of triangles which we may have distinct phantasms of, this doth not at all hinder but that we have, notwithstanding, intelligible ideas of the same besides, actively exerted from the mind itself. And so there is a φάντασμα, phantasm, and a νόημα, conception, at the same time concurring together, an active and a passive cogitation. The νόημα, conception, or intelligible idea being as it were embodied in the phantasm, which alone in itself is but an incomplete perceptive cogitation of the soul half awakened, and doth not comprehend the indivisible and immutable ratio, notion, or essence of any thing.

Which thing to those that cannot better understand it by what we have already declared, might be illustrated in this manner; when an astronomer, thinking of the sun, demonstrates that it is one hundred and sixty times bigger than the globe of the earth, he hath all the while a phantasm or imagination of the sun in his mind, but as ὥσπερ πεδιαίου, a circle of a foot diameter; nay, he cannot for his life have a true phantasm of any such magnitude which contains the bigness of the earth so many times, nor indeed fancy the earth an hundredth part so big as it is. Now, as the astronomer hath an intelligible idea of the magnitude of the sun very different from the phantasm of the same, so in like manner have we intelligible ideas of corporeal things, when we understand them, besides the phantasms of them. The phantasm being as it were involucrum, the crasser indument, or corporeal vehicle of the νόημα, intelligible idea of the mind.

13. Hitherto, by the instance of an individual and material triangle, we have showed how the soul, in understanding corporeal things, doth not merely suffer from without the body, but actively exert intelligible ideas of its own, and from within itself. Now I observe that it is so far from being true, that all our objective cogitations or ideas are corporeal effluxes or radiation from corporeal things without, or impressed upon the soul from them in a gross corporeal manner, as a signature or stamp is imprinted by a seal upon a piece of wax or clay; that (as I have before hinted) this is not true sometimes of the sensible ideas themselves. For all perception whatsoever is a vital energy, and not a mere dead passion; and as the Atomical philosophy instructs us,

there is nothing communicated in sensation from the material objects without, but only certain local motions, that are propagated from them by the nerves into the brain; which motions cannot propagate themselves corporeally upon the soul also, because it penetrates and runs through all the parts of its own body. But the soul, by reason of that vital and magical union which is between it and the body, sympathizing with the several motions of it in the brain, doth thereupon exert sensible ideas or phantasms within itself, whereby it perceives or takes notice of objects distant from the brain, either within or without the body. Many of which sentiments and phantasms have no similitude at all, either with those local motions made in the brain, or with the objects without; such as are the sentiments of pain, pleasure, and titillation, hunger, thirst, heat and cold, sweet and bitter, light and colors, etc. Wherefore the truth is, that sense, if we well consider it, is but a kind of loquela, speech, (if I may so call it) nature as it were talking to us in the sensible objects without, by certain motions as signs from thence communicated to the brain. For, as speech when men talk to one another, they do but make certain motions in the air, which cannot impress their thoughts upon one another in a passive manner; but it being first consented to and agreed upon, that such certain sounds shall signify such ideas and cogitations, he that hears those sounds in discourse, doth not fix his thoughts upon the sounds themselves, but presently exerts from within himself such ideas and cogitations as those sounds by consent signify, though there be no similitude at all betwixt those sounds and thoughts. Just in the same manner nature doth as it were talk to us in the outward objects of sense, and import various sentiments, ideas, phantasms, and cogitations, not by stamping or impressing them passively upon the soul from without, but only by certain local motions from them, as it were dumb signs made in the brain; it having been first constituted and appointed by nature's law, that such local motions shall signify such sensible ideas and phantasms, though there be no similitude at all betwixt them; for what similitude can there be betwixt any local motions and the senses of pain or hunger, and the like, as there is no similitude betwixt many words and sounds, and the thoughts which they signify. But the soul, as by a certain secret instinct, et tanquam ex compacto, and as it were by compact, understanding nature's language, as soon as these local motions are made in the brain, doth not fix its attentions immediately upon those motions themselves, as we do not use to do in discourse upon mere sounds, but presently exerts such sensible ideas, phantasms and cogitations, as nature hath made them to be signs of, whereby it perceives and takes cogni-

zance of many other things both in its own body, and without it, at a distance from it, in order to the good and conservation of it. Wherefore there are two kinds of perceptive powers in the soul, one below another; the first is that which belongs to the inferior part of the soul, whereby it sympathizes with the body, which is determined by the several motions and pressures that are made upon that from corporeal things without to several sensitive and fantastical energies, whereby it hath a slight and superficial perception of individual corporeal things, and as it were of the outsides of them, but doth not reach to the comprehension of the essence or indivisible and immutable ratio, notion, of any thing. The second perceptive power is that of the soul itself, or that superior, interior noetical part of it which is ἀπαθὴς, ἀσυμπαθὴς, free from passion or sympathy, free and disentangled from all that magical sympathy with the body. Which acting alone by itself, exerts from within the intelligible ideas of things, virtually contained in its own cognoscitive power, that are universal and abstract rationes, notions, from which, tanquam desuper spectans, as it were looking downward, it comprehends individual things. Now because these latter, which are pure active energies of the soul, are many times exerted upon occasion of those other passive or sympathetical perceptions of individual things anteceding; it is therefore conceived by many, that they are nothing else but thin and evanid images of those sensible ideas, and therefore that all intellection and knowledge ascends from sense, and intellection is nothing but the improvement or result of sense. Yet notwithstanding it is most certainly true, that they proceed from a quite different power of the soul, whereby it actively protrudes its own immediate objects from within itself, and comprehends individuals without it, not passively or consequentially, but as it were proleptically, and not with an ascending, but with a descending perception; whereby the mind first reflecting upon itself, and its own ideas virtually contained in its own omniform cognoscitive power, and thence descending downward comprehends individual things under them. So that knowledge doth not begin in individuals, but ends in them. And therefore they are but the secondary objects of intellection, the soul taking its first rise from within itself, and so by its own inward cognoscitive power comprehending things without it. Else how should God have knowledge? And if we know as God knows, then do we know or gain knowledge by universals. In which sense (though not in that other of Protagoras) the soul may be truly said to be the measure of all things.

Now I say, if the very sensible ideas and phantasms themselves, be not mere stamps or impressions from individual things without in a cor-

poreal manner impressed upon the soul, but active, though sympathetical energies of the soul itself. It is much more impossible that the universal and abstract intelligible ideas of the mind, or essences of things, should be mere stamps or signatures impressed upon the soul, as upon a dead thing in a gross corporeal manner.

14. Wherefore here is a double error committed by vulgar philosophers; first, that they make the sensible ideas and phantasms to be totally impressed from without in a gross corporeal manner upon the soul, as it were upon a dead thing; and, secondly, that then they suppose the intelligible ideas, the abstract and universal notions of the mind, to be made out of these sensible ideas and phantasms thus impressed from without in a corporeal manner likewise by abstraction or separation of the individuating circumstances, as it were by the hewing off certain chips from them, or by hammering, beating or anvilling of them out into thin intelligible ideas; as if solid and massy gold should be beaten out into thin leaf-gold. To which purpose they have ingeniously contrived and set up an intellectus agens, active understanding, like a smith or carpenter, with his shop or forge in the brain, furnished with all necessary tools and instruments for such a work. Where I would only demand of these philosophers, whether this their so expert faber, smith or architect, intellectus agens, the active understanding, when he goes about his work, doth know what he is to do with these phantasms before-hand, what he is to make of them, and unto what shape to bring them? If he do not, he must needs be a bungling workman; but if he do, he is prevented in his design and undertaking, his work being done already to his hand; for he must needs have the intelligible idea of that which he knows or understands already within himself; and therefore now to what purpose should he use his tools, and go about to hew and hammer and anvil out these phantasms into thin and subtle intelligible ideas, merely to make that which he hath already, and which was native and domestic to him?

But this opinion is founded in no less a mistake of Aristotle's text concerning the intellectus agens, active understanding, who never dreamt of any such as these men imagine, if we may believe the Greek scholiasts, that best understood him; than it is of the text of nature; as if not only those phantasms, but also the intelligible ideas themselves, were gross and corporeal things impressed from matter; whereas even the first of these are passive energies of the soul itself, fatally united to some local motions in the body, and concurrently produced with them, by reason of that magical union betwixt the soul and body; but the other are the pure and active energies of the mind itself, as free from

corporeal sympathy. Neither can these latter be made out of the former by any abstraction or separation, no nor by any depinxation or chemical distillation or sublimation neither; for it is a thing utterly impossible that vigor, activity and awakened energy, as intellections are, should be raised out of dull, sluggish and drowsy passion or sympathy. And this opinion is but like that other of the same philosopher's concerning the eduction or raising of substantial and immaterial forms out of the passive matter, both of them proceeding from one and the same sottishness of mind that induces them to think that dull, stupid and senseless matter, is the first original source of all activity and perfection, all form and pulchritude, all wisdom and knowledge in the world.

And things being rightly considered, this opinion doth in truth and reality, attribute as much activity to the soul, that saith it hath a power of raising or educing of intelligible ideas or universal and abstract rationes, notions, out of phantasms, as that other that affirms it hath a power of exerting them from itself; as it would attribute as much activity to the sun to say that he had a power of raising or educing light or the day out of night and darkness, as to say that he had a power of exerting it out of his own body.

15. Wherefore others of this kind of philosophers, that will not acknowledge any immaterial substance, that hath any active power of its own in it, or any thing in the soul besides impression from corporeal objects without, have found out another device, and that is this, plainly to deny that there are any universal notions, ideas or rationes, reasons, in the mind at all; but that those things which are called universal, are nothing else but names applied to several individuals. Which opinion, as it was formerly held by those that were therefore called nominales, nominalists; so it hath been lately revived and taken up by some of these strenuous impugners of immaterial and incorporeal substances. There is nothing in the world (saith a late author) universal, but names; for the things named are every one of them individual and singular. Now indeed this is true, and nobody denies it, of things existing without the mind; but this author's meaning herein is to deny all universal conceptus, conceptions, and rationes, reasonings, of the mind, as appears by his larger explication of the same opinion elsewhere: [1]Est nomen hoc universale non rei alicujus existentis in rerum natura, neque ideæ sive phantasmatis alicujus in animo formati, sed alicujus semper vocis sive nominis nomen, ita ut cum dicatur animal vel

[1] Elect. Philos.

saxum, vel spectrum, vel aliud quicquam esse universale, intelligendum sit tantum voces eas animal, saxum, esse nomina universalia, id est nomina pluribus rebus communia, et respondentes ipsis in animo conceptus sunt, singularium animalium vel aliarum rerum imagines et phantasmata. Ideoque non est opus ad vim universalis intelligendam alia facultate quam imaginativa, qua recordamur voces ejusmodi modo unam rem, modo aliam in animo excitasse. This universal is the name, not of any thing existing in the nature of things, nor of any idea or phantasm formed in the mind, but always the name of some word or name; so that when an animal, or a stone, or a spectre, or any thing else is said to be universal, it is to be understood only that those words animal, stone, are universal names, that is, names common to more things; and the conceptions answering to them in the mind, are the images and phantasms of singular animals or other things. And therefore to understand the meaning of an universal, there is no need of any other faculty than that of imagination, whereby we are minded that words of that sort have sometimes excited one thing, sometimes another in our mind.—That is, there are no other ideas in the mind but only phantasms of individual corporeal things. Only there are universal names, which are applied in common to more individuals than one; but there is no other object of the mind or cogitation but only singular and individual things existing without the soul. Wherefore this author consentaneously hereunto defines understanding to be nothing else but conception caused by speech; and therefore if speech be peculiar to man, then is understanding peculiar to him also. This mysterious notion is insisted upon and explained likewise by the third objector against Cartesius's metaphysics, after this manner: Quid jam dicimus si forte ratiocinatio nihil aliud sit quam copulatio et concatenatio nominum sive appellationum per verbum hoc est. Unde colligimus ratione nihil omnino de natura rerum sed de eorum appellationibus, nimirum utrum copulemus rerum nomina secundum pacta vel non. Si hoc fit, sicut esse potest, ratiocinatio dependebit a nominibus, nomina ab imaginatione, et imaginatio ab organorum corporeorum motu, et sic mens nihil aliud erit præterquam motus in partibus quibusdam corporis organici. Now what do we say, if perhaps reasoning be nothing else but the coupling and chaining together of names or appellations, by these words, it is. Whence we gather nothing at all by reason concerning the nature of things, but concerning their appellations; to wit, whether we join the names of things according to agreements or not. If this be so, as it may be, reasoning will depend upon names, names upon the imagination, and the imagination upon the motion of the bodily or-

gans; and so the mind will be nothing else but a motion in some parts of the body.—According to which philosophy, reason and science do not superadd any thing to sense, or reach any further in the knowledge of the nature of things, but only in making use of common names to express several individuals by at once.

16. Wherefore, although there be already enough said to prove, that in the understanding of individual corporeal things, besides sense and the sensible phantasms from them, there are also intelligible ideas and universal rationes, notions, exerted from the mind itself, by which alone they are comprehended: yet still to make this business clearer, and also to demonstrate, that the knowledge of universal axiomatical truth, and scientifical theorems is a thing which doth not passively result from sense, but from the actual strength and vigor of the intellect itself comprehending its own intelligible ideas, we will here propose that one geometrical theorem concerning a triangle; that it hath three angles equal to two right angles; and consider what the subject of it is, ἐπιστημονικῶς, scientifically comprehended.

First therefore, if there be no other object of the mind in knowledge but sensible individuals existing without us, then the subject of this theorem, when Euclid wrought it, was only some individual bodies by him compared together. Nay, Euclid himself did not carry this knowledge about with him in his mind, neither was he master of it any longer than he held those individual bodies in his hands, or looked upon them with his eyes; and if so, it could not signify any thing at all, to any other person which either then or now had not the same individual bodies to compare, that Euclid had. Whereas it is plain, that the subject of this theorem, whatsoever it be, is such a thing as every geometrician, though in never such distant places and times, hath the very same always ready at his hand, without the least imaginable difference. And they all pronounce concerning the same thing. Which could not possibly otherwise be, unless it were some universal ratio, notion, and intelligible idea of the mind.

17. Again, secondly, no individual or material thing is the subject of this theorem, as sense takes cognizance of it, that is, the matter, and color, and figure and magnitude, all concretely together. For the same individual matter may presently be made quadrangular or circular, but only precisely in respect of the figure; and of that also no otherwise than as it is conformable to the indivisible and immutable ratio, notion, or idea of a triangle, comprehended in the mind as the exemplar of it. Now, as we have showed already, there is no material triangle any where to be found that is mathematically exact and accurate, neither is

the individual form of a material triangle immutable. And if there were any mathematically exact, our sense could be no κριτήριον, criterion, or rule to judge of it, nor discern when any thing were indivisibly such, nor judge of the absolute and mathematical equality of the three material angles of it, with two other angular superficies. Wherefore the subjects of this geometrical theorem are no sensible individual bodies, but the rationes, notions, and ideæ, ideas, of the mind itself, in which alone mathematical accuracy is to be found, and the exact equality of one thing to another certainly and infallibly known.

18. Nay, if we should suppose that there were some individual material triangles and angles, absolutely and mathematically exact; and that our sense did infallibly perceive the indivisible points of them; or that we had an infallible pair of compasses, whose cuspides, tops, were mathematical points, whereby we could measure the several angles of the triangle and right angle in a perfect circle, accurately divided into infinite parts; or else cutting off those several angles of the triangle, and laying them together upon an absolute plane, we should thus mechanically find them equal to the two material right angles; this would not amount to the knowledge of this truth, that a triangle, as such, hath of necessity three angles equal to two right angles; we thus considering them only as material individuals, and things existing without the mind by corporeal sense. For though we had now found that these individual material triangles were equal to those two individual material right angles; yet looking no further than sense determined to individuals, we could not tell certainly that it was so with all individual triangles, much less understand any necessity of its being so, or attain to any thing of the διότι, reason, of it, in which alone true science consisteth. And this Aristotle hath observed very pertinently to our purpose: [1]*Οὐδὲ δι᾽ αἰσθήσεώς ἐστιν ἐπίστασθαι, ἀλλ᾽ αἰσθάνεσθαι γε· ἀναγκαῖον τὸ δὲ τί καὶ ποῦ καὶ νῦν· τὸ δὲ καθόλου καὶ ἐπὶ πᾶσιν ἀδύνατον αἰσθάνεσθαι· οὐ γὰρ τόδε, οὐδὲ νῦν, οὐ γὰρ ἦν καθόλου. Τὸ γὰρ ἀεὶ καὶ πανταχοῦ καθόλου φάμεν εἶναι.* [2]*Ἐπεὶ οὖν αἱ μὲν ἀποδείξεις καθόλου, ταῦτα δὲ οὐκ ἐστὶν αἰσθάνεσθαι, φανερὸν ὅτι οὐδὲ ἐπίστασθαι δι᾽ αἰσθήσεώς ἐστιν.* [3]*Ἀλλὰ δῆλον ὅτι καὶ εἰ ἦν αἰσθάνεσθαι ὅτι τὸ τρίγωνον δυσὶν ὀρθαῖς ἴσας ἔχει τὰς γωνίας, ἐζητοῦμεν ἂν ἀπόδειξιν, καὶ οὐ (ὡς φασί τινες) ἠπιστάμεθα. Αἰσθάνεσθαι μὲν γὰρ ἀνάγκη καθ᾽ ἕκαστον, ἡ δὲ ἐπιστήμη τὰ τοῦ καθόλου γνωρίζειν ἐστὶ·* Neither is it necessary to understand by sense, but to perceive; but this regards a particular thing and manner, and the present time. But it is impossible to perceive by sense what relates to ev-

[1] Post. Anal. lib. i. cap. xxv.

ery thing, and in all respects; for *this* and *now* relate to an universal; for of an universal we say, that it is *always* and *every where*. Since then demonstrations are of an universal, it is plain that there is no knowledge of the universal theorems of geometry by sense. For it is manifest, that if we could perceive by sense that the three angles of a triangle were equal to two right angles, yet should we not rest satisfied in this, as having therefore a sufficient knowledge of it (as some say;) but would seek further after a demonstration hereof; sense reaching only to singulars, but knowledge to universals.—The mind would not be satisfied herewith, but would still further require a demonstration of it; which demonstrations are not of individuals perceived by sense, but only of the universal rationes, notions, comprehended in the mind; knowledge, as I said before, being a descending comprehension of a thing from the universal ideas of the mind, and not an ascending perception of them from individuals by sense.

19. Wherefore the apodictical knowledge of this truth is no otherwise to be attained than by the mind's ascending above sense, and elevating itself from individuals to the comprehension of the universal rationes, notions, and ideas of things within itself, making the object of its inquiry and contemplation, not this nor that material individual triangle without itself, but the indivisible and immutable notion of a triangle. And thus it finds several ways that a triangle, as such, must of necessity have its three angles equal to two right angles.

For, first, if one will consider any triangle, as made out of a parallelogram (though this be the more compounded figure) divided by a diagonal line into two equal triangles, it is plain in every parallelogram there are four angles equal to four right angles, because when a straight line cuts two parallel lines, the two interior angles must of necessity be equivalent to two right angles, one of them being the complement of the other to a semicircle. But when the parallelogram is divided into two equal triangles by a diagonal line, the quantity of the three angles in each must of necesity be half the quantity of the four angles in the parallelogram.



Or, if a man will consider the genesis, formation of a plain triangle in this manner; first, by a straight line cutting two parallel lines, and then one of these parallels moving upon its centre in the straight line out of its parallelism, and inclining towards the other line, if it move never so little out of its parallelism towards the other parallel, the continuation of it must needs cut the other line, and make a triangle.



And so much as the interior angle, which with the other opposite, made up two right angles, so much is the third angle; and therefore all three make up two right angles.

20. Now here is a gross error of the vulgar to imagine, because geometricians demonstrating such theorems, commonly make use of such sensible schemes or diagrams, that therefore the knowledge of this truth doth result from sense, or that the geometricians themselves have no other ideas in their minds of straight lines, parallels, right, acute and obtuse angles, triangles, equality of angles, than what are impressed upon their fancy from these schemes. Whereas these are only made use of to entertain the fancy in the mean time, whilst the mind being intent upon the demonstration, actively exerts other intelligible ideas of these things from within itself, and from thence comprehends the apodictical necessity of the theorem. Neither is the true and proper knowledge of one theorem or universal and necessary truth, either in geometry or metaphysics, passively impressed upon the soul from individuals existing without, or the result of mere sense, but it proceeds from the active strength and vigor of the mind, comprehending the intelligible ideas and universal rationes, notions, of things within itself.

21. Wherefore we conclude, that the immediate objects of geometrical science, properly so called, are not individual bodies or superficies, but the intelligible and universal ideas of a triangle, square, circle, pyramid, cube, sphere, actively exerted from the mind, and comprehended in it. For the mind doth not seek its objects of knowledge abroad without itself, but must needs actively comprehend them within itself. Which also, as we shall show in the following chapter, are immutable things, and always the same.

BOOK IV.

CHAP. IV.

1. No individual material thing is always necessarily the same with itself, but mutable and changeable. And our sensible perceptions of them, are nothing but passions or affections in the soul from some local motions in our body caused by them; which passions also are a kind of motions in the soul, whereby we do not comprehend the immutable ratio or essence of any thing. But intellection and knowledge are the active comprehension of something that is fixed and immutable, and hath always a necessary identity with itself. For that which is not one steady and immutable thing, cannot as such, be an object of intellection or knowledge, neither can the mind fix itself upon it; for it must needs mock and delude the understanding, perpetually gliding and rolling away from it, when it endeavors to grasp or comprehend it. Neither can it be the basis or subject of any scientifical theorem or proposition; for how can any thing be certainly, constantly and immutably affirmed of that which is no one certain thing, nor always immutably the same with itself. Whence it plainly follows, that the immediate objects of intellection and knowledge, cannot be these individual material things as such, which our senses are passively affected from, but must of necessity be something else.

2. For which cause those flowing philosophers before mentioned, Heraclitus, Cratylus, and Protagoras, that maintained, that there were no other beings that could be the objects of cogitation besides these individual material things, which they supposed always to flow, and never to stand still; did consentaneously to this hypothesis of theirs assert; that there was no knowledge but sense, and no certain or immutable comprehension of any thing. For that this assertion of theirs was grounded merely upon this hypothesis, that there was no other being or object of the mind besides individual material things, as such; which they signified after this manner, by saying, that all things flowed, for these material things do so; Aristotle plainly instructs us in his Metaphysics:

[1]*Αἴτιον δὲ τῆς δόξης τούτοις ὅτι περὶ τῶν ὄντων μὲν τὴν ἀλήθειαν ἐσκόπουν· τὰ δ' ὄντα ὑπέλαβον εἶναι τὰ αἰσθητὰ μόνον. Ἐν δὲ τούτοις, πολλή ἡ τοῦ ἀορίστου φύσις ἐνυπάρχει.——Ἔτι δὲ πᾶσαν ὁρῶντες ταύτην κινουμένην τὴν φύσιν, κατὰ δὲ τοῦ μεταβάλλοντος, οὐδὲν ἀληθευόμενον, περί γε τὸ πάντως πάντη μεταβάλλων, οὐκ ἐνδέχεσθαι ἀληθεύειν.*

Ἐκ γὰρ ταύτης τῆς ὑπολήψεως ἐξήνθησεν ἡ ἀκροτάτη δόξα τῶν εἰρημένων, ἡ τῶν φασκόντων ἡρακλειτίζειν, καὶ οἵαν Κρατύλος εἶχεν, ὃς τὸ τελευταῖον οὐδὲν ᾤετο δεῖν λέγειν, ἀλλὰ τὸν δάκτυλον ἐκίνει μόνον, καὶ Ἡρακλείτῳ ἐπετίμα εἰπόντι δὶς τῷ αὐτῷ ποταμῷ οὐκ ἐμβῆναι. Αὐτὸς γὰρ ᾤετο οὐδ' ἅπαξ· The ground of this opinion, which denied all certain and immutable knowledge, was from hence: because truth and knowledge refer to beings or entities, and they supposed that there were no other beings besides these individual sensibles only. In which there is very much of undeterminateness——And which they perceived to be liable to perpetual motion or mutation. Now concerning that which always changes, nothing can be affirmed as constantly and immutably true. And from this supposition sprung the highest sect of those which are called Heraclitical philosophers, and those that follow Cratylus, who at last came to this, that he only moved his finger, but thought that nothing at all ought to be affirmed; and reprehended Heraclitus for saying, that one cannot twice enter into the same river, because he thought that one could not so much as once do it;—that is, that no material thing remained one moment the same.

3. Wherefore if there be any such thing as intellection, science, and knowledge, distinct from external sense, and any immutable truths, then there must of necessity be some other kind of beings or entities, besides these individual material things, as the immediate objects or subjects of them, such things as do not flow, but *ἀεὶ ταῦτα καὶ ὡσαύτως ἔχοντα*, always remain immutably the same, or *μόνιμα καὶ μίαν ἀεὶ φύσιν ἔχοντα*, permanent, and having always the same nature, as Plato expresseth these immediate objects of knowledge; or else, in Aristotle's language, *ἀκίνητος οὐσία*, an immutable essence. Who therefore confutes both these sects of philosophers, whereof one was extremely metaphysical, that made all things to stand still; whom, I confess, I understand not; the other too grossly material, and addicted to sense, that made nothing to stand still, but all things to flow; after this manner: *Φανερὸν ὅτι οὐδ' οἱ πάντα ἠρεμεῖν λέγοντες ἀληθῆ λέγουσιν, οὐδ' οἱ πάντα κινεῖσθαι. Εἰ μὲν γὰρ ἠρεμεῖ πάντα, ἀεὶ ταῦτα ἀληθῆ καὶ ψευδῆ ἔσται· φαίνεται δὲ τοῦτο μεταβάλλον· ὁ γὰρ λέγων πότε αὐτὸς οὐκ ἦν, καὶ*

[1] Arist. Metaph. lib. iv. cap. v.

πάλιν οὐκ ἔσται. Εἰ δὲ πάντα κινεῖται, οὐθὲν ἔσται ἀληθὲς, πάντα ἄρα ψευδῆ· It is manifest, that neither they speak truly who affirm all things to rest, nor they that affirm all things to move. For if all things rest, then the same things would always be true and false; which is not so, because he that affirms this, once was not, and again will not be. But if all things move, then nothing can be true, and therefore all things will be false.—And both he and Plato compounded that controversy thus; by acknowledging two sorts of entities, the one mutable, or subject to flux and motion, such as are especially individual corporeal things; the other immutable, that always rest or stand still, which are the proper objects of certain, constant, and immutable knowledge, that therefore cannot be mere nothings, non-entities.

Which latter kind of being, that is, the ἀκίνητος οὐσία, immutable essence, as a distinct thing from individual sensibles, Aristotle plainly asserts against Heraclitus, and those other flowing philosophers, in these words; ἔτι δὲ ἀξιώσομεν αὐτοὺς ὑπολαμβάνειν καὶ ἄλλην οὐσίαν εἶναι τῶν ὄντων, ᾗ οὔτε κίνησις ὑπάρχει οὔτε φθορὰ οὔτε γένεσις τὸ παράπαν· We would have these philosophers to know, that besides sensible things, that are always mutable, there is another kind of being or entity of such things as are neither subject to motion, corruption, nor generation. And elsewhere he tells us, that this ἀκίνητος οὐσία, immovable essence, is the object of theoretical knowledge, of the first philosophy, and of the pure mathematics.

4. Now these immutable entities are the universal rationes, or intelligible natures and essences of all things, which some compare to unities, but Aristotle to numbers; which formally considered, are indivisible: saith he, εἰσί πως ἀριθμοὶ αἱ οὐσίαι, the essences of things are like to numbers;—because if but the least thing be added to any number, or subtracted from it, the number is destroyed.

And these are the objects of all certain knowledge. As for example, the objects of geometry are not any individual material triangles, squares, circles, pyramids, cubes, spheres, and the like; which because they are always mutable, nothing can be immutably affirmed of them; but they are those indivisible and unchangeable rationes of a triangle, square, circle; which are ever the same to all geometricians, in all ages and places, of which such immutable theorems as these are demonstrated, as that a triangle has necessarily three angles equal to two right angles.

But if any one demand here, where this ἀκίνητος οὐσία, these immutable entities do exist? I answer, first, that as they are considered formally, they do not properly exist in the individuals without us, as if

they were from them imprinted upon the understanding, which some have taken to be Aristotle's opinion; because no individual material thing is either universal or immutable. And if these things were only lodged in the individual sensibles, then they would be unavoidably obnoxious to the fluctuating waves of the same reciprocating euripus, in which all individual material things are perpetually whirled. But because they perish not together with them, it is a certain argument that they exist independently upon them. Neither in the next place, do they exist somewhere else apart from the individual sensibles, and without the mind, which is that opinion that Aristotle justly condemns, but either unjustly or unskilfully attributes to Plato. For if the mind looked abroad for its objects wholly without itself, then all its knowledge would be nothing but sense and passion.—For to know a thing is nothing else but to comprehend it by some inward ideas that are domestic to the mind, and actively exerted from it. Wherefore these intelligible ideas or essences of things, those forms by which we understand all things, exist no where but in the mind itself; for it was very well determined long ago by Socrates, in Plato's Parmenides, that these things are nothing else but noemata: *Τῶν εἰδῶν ἕκαστον τούτων νόημα, καὶ οὐδυμοῦ αὐτῷ προσήκει ἐγγίνεσθαι ἄλλοτι ἢ ἐν ψυχῇ·* "These species or ideas are all of them nothing but noemata, or notions that exist no where but in the soul itself." Wherefore to say that there are immutable natures and essences, and rationes of things, distinct from the individuals that exist without us, is all one as if one should say, that there is in the universe above the orb of matter and body, another superior orb of intellectual being, that comprehends its own immediate objects, that is, the immutable rationes and ideas of things within itself, by which it understands and knows all things without itself.

And yet notwithstanding though these things exist only in the mind, they are not therefore mere figments of the understanding: for if the subjects of all scientifical theorems were nothing but figments, then all truth and knowledge that is built upon them would be a mere fictitious thing; and if truth itself and the intellectual nature be fictitious things, then what can be real or solid in the world? But it is evident, that though the mind thinks of these things at pleasure, yet they are not arbitrarily framed by the mind, but have certain, determinate, and immutable natures of their own, which are independent upon the mind, and which are not blown away into nothing at the pleasure of some being that arbitrarily made them.

But we all naturally conceive that those things have not only an

eternal, but also a necessary existence, so that they could not ever but be, such, and so many as they are, and can never possibly perish or cease to be, but are absolutely undestroyable.

5. Which is a thing frequently acknowledged in the writings of both those famous philosophers, Plato and Aristotle.—The former of them calling those things, *Τὰ μὴ γιγνόμενα, ἀλλ' ἀεὶ ὄντα·* Things that were never made, but always are,—and *Μήτε γιγνόμενα μήτε ἀπολλύμενα.* Things that were never made, nor can be destroyed,—*Τὰ ἀγέννητα καὶ ἀνώλεθρα·* Things ingenerable and unperishable;—Quæ Plato negat gigni sed semper esse (as Tully expresseth it) et ratione et intelligentia contineri. And Philo, the platonical Jew, calls the *τὰ Νοητὰ*, which are the same things we speak of *ἀναγκαιότατα οὐσίαι*, the most necessary essences, that is, such things as could not but be, and cannot possibly not be. And Aristotle himself calls the rationes of things in his metaphysics, not only *χωριστὰ* and *ἀκίνητα*, things separate from matter and immutable, but also *ἀΐδια*, or eternal; and in his ethics likewise, he calls geometrical truths *ἀΐδια*, eternal things,[1] *Περὶ τῶν ἀϊδίων οὐδεὶς βουλεύεται, οἷον περὶ τῆς διαμέτρου καὶ τῆς πλευρᾶς ὅτι ἀσύμμετροι·* where he makes the geometrical truth concerning the incommensurability betwixt the diameter and the side of a square, to be an eternal thing.—Elsewhere he tells us, that *Οὐ τῶν φθαρτῶν εἶναι ἐπιστήμην·* Science, properly so called, is not of things corruptible and contingent, but of things necessary, incorruptible and eternal. Which immutable and eternal objects of science, in the place before quoted, he describes thus: *Οὐσίαν τῶν ὄντων ᾗ οὔτε κίνησις ὑπάρχει, οὔτε φθορὰ, οὔτε γένεσις τὸ παράπαν·* Such a kind of entity of things as has neither motion nor generation, nor corruption,—that is, such things as were never made, and can never be destroyed. To which, he saith, the mind is necessarily determined. For science or knowledge has nothing either of fiction or of arbitrariness in it, but is *Κατάληψις τοῦ ὄντος·* the comprehension of that which immutably is.—

6. Moreover, these things have a constant being, when our particular created minds do not actually think of them, and therefore they are immutable in another sense likewise, not only because they are indivisibly the same when we think of them, but also because they have a constant and never-failing entity; and always are, whether our particular minds think of them or not. For the intelligible natures and essences of a triangle, square, circle, pyramid, cube, sphere, etc. and all the necessary geometrical verities belonging to these several figures, were not the creatures of Archimedes, Euclid, or Pythagoras,

[1] l. 3. c. 5.

or any other inventors of geometry; nor did then first begin to be; but all these rationes and verities had a real and actual entity before, and would continue still, though all the geometricians in the world were quite extinct, and no man knew them or thought of them. Nay, though all the material world were quite swept away, and also all particular created minds annihilated together with it; yet there is no doubt but the intelligible natures or essences of all geometrical figures, and the necessary verities belonging to them, would notwithstanding remain safe and sound. Wherefore these things had a being also before the material world and all particular intellects were created. For it is not at all conceivable, that ever there was a time when there was no intelligible nature of a triangle, nor any such thing cogitable at all, and when it was not yet actually true that a triangle has three angles equal to two right angles, but that these things were afterward arbitrarily made and brought into being out of an antecedent nothing or non-entity; so that the being of them bore some certain date, and had a youngness in them, and so by the same reason might wax old, and decay again; which notion he often harps upon, when he speaks of the *Εἴδη*, or forms of things, as when he says, *Τοῦ σφᾶιραν εἶναι οὐκ ἔστι γένεσις·* there is no generation of the essence of a sphere,—that is, it is a thing that is not made; but always is: and elsewhere he pronounces universally of the *Εἴδη*, *Ἄνευ γενέσεως καὶ φθορᾶς ὅλως εἶναι τὰ εἴδη·* The forms of material things are without generation and corruption,—and *Τὸ εἶδος οὐθεις ποιεῖ, οὐδὲ γεννᾶται·* That none makes the form of any thing, for it is never generated.—Divers have censured Aristotle in some of such passages too much to confound physics and metaphysics together; for indeed these things are not true in a physical, but only in a metaphysical sense. That is, *Τὰ νοητὰ*, the immediate objects of intellection and science, are eternal, necessarily existent, and incorruptible.

7. Now the plain meaning of all this is nothing else, but that there is an eternal wisdom and knowledge in the world, necessarily existing, which was never made, and can never cease to be or be destroyed; or, which is all one, that there is an infinite eternal mind necessarily existing, that actually comprehends himself, the possibility of all things, and the verities clinging to them. In a word, that there is a God, or an omnipotent and omniscient being, necessarily existing, who therefore cannot destroy his own being or nature, that is, his infinite power and wisdom.

For since the rationes, intelligible essences, and verities of things, as we observed before out of Plato, are nothing but noemata, that is, objective notions or knowledges, which are things that cannot exist

alone, but together with that actual knowledge in which they are comprehended, they are the modifications of some mind or intellect.—It is all one to affirm, that there are eternal rationes, essences of things, and verities necessarily existing, and to say that there is an infinite, omnipotent and eternal mind, necessarily existing, that always actually comprehendeth himself, the essences of all things, and their verities; or, rather, which is the rationes, essences, and verities of all things; for the rationes and essences of things are not dead things, like so many statues, images or pictures hung up somewhere by themselves alone in a world: neither are truths mere sentences and propositions written down with ink upon a book, but they are living things, and nothing but modifications of mind or intellect; and therefore the first intellect is essentially and archetypally all rationes and verities, and all particular created intellects are but derivative participations of it, that are printed by it with the same ectypal signatures upon them.

And we may undoubtedly conclude, that it is a thing altogether as certain, that there is an infinite and eternal mind, [that is, a God] necessarily existing in the world, as that there ever was the ration or intelligible essence of a triangle, or circle, of unity and duality; and that it was ever actually true, that a triangle hath three angles equal to two right angles; or that æqualia addita æqualibus efficiunt æqualia: or the like.

8. Neither does this hinder or contradict the truth of this assertion, that many that doubt concerning the existence of a God, yet notwithstanding confidently believe the necessary eternity of these things; and persuade themselves, that though there were no mind nor intellect, and so no God in the world; nay, though there was no matter neither, and no substantial entity at all, yet notwithstanding these rationes and verities of things would necessarily be as they are.

9. For there is an absolute impossibility in this assertion, that these essences of things and verities should be, though there were no substantial entity or no mind existing. For these things themselves must of necessity be either substances, or modifications of substance.—For what is neither substance nor modification of a substance, is a pure non entity.—And if they be modifications of substance, they cannot possibly exist without that substance whose modifications they are—which must either be matter or mind, but they are not the modifications of matter as such, because they are universal and immutable; therefore they are the modifications of some mind or intellect; so that these cannot be eternal without an eternal mind.

And these men do but deceive themselves in the hypothetical as-

sertion, that there would have been these rationes and universal verities, though there had never been a God or intellect; neither considering what the nature of God is, whose existence they would question or doubt of, nor what those rationes and verities, are, which they would make so necessarily existent, by means whereof they do at once assert and question the same thing: for that which begets so strong a persuasion in their minds, that the rationes of things and universal verities are so necessarily eternal, though they do not perceive it, is nothing else but an inward invincible prepossession of the necessary existence of God, or an infinite eternal omnipotent and omniscient mind, (that always actually comprehends himself, and the extent of his own power, or the ideas of all possible things) so deeply radicated and infixed in their minds, as that they cannot possibly quit themselves of it, though they endeavor it never so much, but it will unawares adhere to them, even when they force themselves to suppose the non-existence of God as a person, whose idea they do not clearly comprehend: That is, the force of nature is so strong in them as to make them acknowledge the thing, when they deny the word. So that the true meaning of this phenomenon is nothing else but this, that God is a being so necessarily existent, that though men will suppose the non-existence of him, and deny the name, yet notwithstanding they cannot but confute themselves, and confess the thing.

10. Nay, it is clearly and mathematically demonstrable from what we have already proved, that there is some eternal mind: for as it is unquestionably certain, that something in the world was eternal, merely from hence, because there is being, which could not spring out of nothing; and therefore if there were no God, matter of necessity must be eternal: so because there is mind and understanding, and actual knowledge in the world, and these things could not spring out of matter, wisdom and knowledge must needs be eternal things, and there must be of necessity some eternal mind.

For, ex hypothesi, that once there had been no knowledge, no intelligible rationes or essences of things, no mind or intellect in the world, it would have been absolutely impossible that ever there should have been any such thing, because it could neither spring out of nothing, nor which is all one, out of senseless and unknown matter.

11. Now because every thing that is imperfect must needs depend upon something that is perfect in the same kind, our particular imperfect understandings, which do not always actually contain the rationes of things and their verities in them, which are many times ignorant, doubting, erring, and slowly proceed by discourse and ratiocina-

tion from one thing to another, must needs be derivative participations of a perfect, infinite and eternal intellect, in which is the rationes of all things, and all universal verities are always actually comprehended. Which consideration is so obvious and unavoidable, that Aristotle himself could not miss of it—for he tells us, that since our understandings are but *Δυνάμει πάντα·* potentially all things,—that is, have not an actual but potential omniformity only, there must of necessity be in rerum natura, another intellect that is actually all knowledge, and is the same to our understandings *Οἷον ἡ τέχνη πρὸς τὴν ὕλην·* that active art is to passive matter,—and *Οἷον τὸ φῶς·* that the light is to our eyes,—and which does not *Ὁτὲ μὲν νοεῖν, ὁτὲ δὲ οὐ νοεῖν·* sometimes understand, and sometimes not understand, as it were sometimes awake, and sometimes asleep,—but is always eternal, *Κατ' ἐγέργειαν ἐπίστημα·* actual knowledge.—A sun that never sets, an eye that never winks—wherefore though all our knowledges be not stamped or impressed upon our souls from the matter; they are all, as it were, *εσφραγίσματα*, ectypal prints, and *ἐκμάγματα*, derivative signatures from one archetypal intellect, that is essentially the rationes of all things and all verities.

12. And from hence it comes to pass, that all understandings are not only constantly furnished with forms and ideas to conceive all things by, and thereby enabled to understand all the clear conceptions of one another, being printed all over at once with the seeds of universal knowledge, but also have exactly the same ideas of the same things; whereas if these things were impressed upon our souls from the matter without, all men would not be readily furnished with ideas to conceive all things by at every time, it being merely casual and contingent what things occur to men's several senses; neither could their ideas be exactly alike to one another, because no individual objects are so; and therefore when one spoke of one thing, another would mean another. Much less could men so promptly and expeditely exert them upon all occasions, if they were dead forms passively received only, and not all virtually contained in some one active and vital principle that had a potential omniformity in it.

Wherefore, as Themistius observes, men could not possibly confer and discourse together in that manner as they do, presently perceiving one another's meaning, and having the very same conceptions of things in their minds, *Εἰ μή τις ἦν εἷς νοῦς οὐ πάντες ἐκοινωνοῦμεν·* if all did not partake of one and the same intellect.—Neither could one so readily teach, and another learn, *Εἰ μὴ ταὐτὸν ἦν τὸ νόημα τοῦ διδάσκοντος καὶ τοῦ μανθάνοντος·* if there were not the same ectypal stamps of things in the mind both of the teacher and the learner.—

13. Moreover, from hence also it comes to pass that truths, though they be in never so many several and distant minds apprehending them, yet they are not broken, multiplied, or diversified thereby; but they are one and the same individual truths in them all. So that it is but one truth and knowledge that is in all the understandings in the world. Just as when a thousand eyes look upon the sun at once, they all see the same individual object. Or as when a great crowd or throng of people hear one and the same orator speaking to them all, it is one and the same voice that is in the several ears of all those several auditors; so in like manner, when innumerable created understandings direct themselves to the contemplation of the same universal and immutable truths, they do all of them but as it were listen to one and the same original voice of the eternal wisdom that is never silent; and the several conceptions of those truths in their minds are but like several echos of the same verba mentis of the divine intellect resounding in them.

14. From what we have already declared, it is evident, that wisdom, knowledge, and understanding, are eternal and self-subsistent things, superior to matter and all sensible beings, and independent upon them. Which mystery is thus acknowledged both in Christianity and Platonism, in that wisdom and intellect are made the eternal and first begotten offspring of the first original goodness, the fountain of all things, [1] The Lord possessed me in the beginning of his way, before his works of old. I was set up from everlasting, from the beginning 'ere ever the earth was, etc.

And indeed that opinion, that knowledge, wisdom, and understanding, is in its own nature posterior to sensible and material things, and doth result out of them, or proceed only from the radiation and activity of the matter on that which understands, is nothing else but downright atheism. For if this were not true, that wisdom, knowledge, and intellection were in its own nature posterior to sensible and corporeal things, as being nothing but the stamp or impress of them, then it must needs follow that this corporeal world was not made or framed by any antecedent wisdom or knowledge, but that it sprang up of itself from blind, fortuitous, and giddy motions of eternal atoms; from whence all that knowledge that is in the world did afterward result. Which is all one as to say that there is no God at all.

But if any will here pretend, that there is indeed a knowledge in God antecedent to all corporeal being, and therefore no passion but a thing independent upon matter and self-originated; but yet, notwith-

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[1] Prov. 8 : 22.

standing, the knowledge of all created understandings is not a thing immediately derived from thence, but only taken up at the rebound or second-hand from sensible and corporeal things: this is just as if one should say, that there is indeed a brightness or lucidity in the sun, but yet notwithstanding the light which is in the air, is not derived from that light which is in the body of the sun, but springs immediately out of the power of the dark air; which being a thing apparently absurd, it may be presumed that this assertion is nothing but a verbal and pretended acknowledgement of a God, that has an antecedent and an independent knowledge, made by such as really deny the same; for otherwise, to what purpose should they so violently and distortly pervert the natural order and dependency of things in the universe, and cut off that cognation and connexion which is betwixt things imperfect and things perfect of the same kind, betwixt created minds and the increated mind, which is the intellectual scale or ladder by which we climb up to God, if they did really believe and acknowledge any such thing. But he that can believe that all human knowledge, wisdom, and prudence, has no other source and original than the radiations and impresses of the dark matter, and the fortuitous and tumultuous jumblings thereof; it is justly to be suspected, that he is too near akin to those ancient theologues that Aristotle speaks of, *Οἱ ἐκ νυκτὸς πάντα γεννῶντες·* that fetched the original of God and all things out of night,—or the dark chaos of matter; that held there is no God at all, or that blind and senseless matter and chance are the only original of all things.

CHAP. V.

We formerly showed that the perception of external sense, as such, is a mere relative and phantastical thing: there being nothing absolutely true and real in it, but only this, that the soul hath such a passion, affection, phantasm, appearance, or seeming in it. But sense being but an idiopathy, we cannot be absolutely certain by it, that every other person or animal has the same passion or affection or phantasm in it from the same corporeal object that we ourselves have. *Ἦ σὺ διϊσχυρίσαιο ἂν ὡς οἷόν σοι φαίνεται ἕκαστον χρῶμα τοιοῦτον καὶ ὁτωοῦν ζώῳ; Θεαιτ. μὰ Δί᾽ οὐκ ἔγωγε· Σωκ. τί δ᾽ ἄλλῳ ἀνθρώπῳ ἆρ᾽ ὅμοιον καὶ σοὶ φαίνεται ὅτι οὖν ἔχεις τοῦτο ἰσχυρῶς ἢ πολὺ μᾶλλον ὅτι οὐδέ σοι αὐτῷ ταυτὸν, διὰ τὸ μηδέποτε ὁμοίως αὐτὸν σεαυτῷ ἔχειν·* Are you certain that every other animal has the same sense or phantasm of every color that you have,

(saith Socrates, according to Protagoras his sense)—nay, that every other man has the same. Or, lastly, can you be so much as sure that yourself shall always have the same phantasm from the same object, when you are not always the same with yourself?—and passions are diversified by the *ἰδιοσυγκρασία* of the patient.—Wherefore we cannot be sure merely by the passions of sense, what the absolute nature of a corporeal object is without us, our perception being only relative to our selves, and our several organs and bodily crasis.

Nay, we cannot be sure that there is any object at all before us, when we have a phantasm of sensation of something. Forasmuch as not only in our dreams, but also when we are awake, we have phantasms and sensations in us of things that have no reality.

The reason of all which is, because by external sense we do but suffer from corporeal things existing without, and so do not comprehend the nature of the thing as it is absolutely in itself, but only our own passion from it. Neither is our sense a passion immediately from the thing itself that is perceived, for then it would not be altogether so uncertain as it is, but only from certain local motions in that body which the soul is vitally united to, by the mediation whereof it perceives other things at a distance, which local motions and passions may be produced when there are no such objects.

So that if there were no other perceptive power or faculty distinct from external sense, all our perceptions would be merely relative, seeming, and phantastical, and not reach to the absolute and certain truth of any thing; and every one would but, as Protagoras expounds it, *Τὰ ἴδια μόνον δοξάζειν·* think his own private and relative thoughts truths,—and all our cogitations being nothing but appearances, would be indifferently alike true phantasms, and one as another.

2. But we have since also demonstrated, that there is another perceptive power in the soul superior to outward sense, and of a distinct nature from it, which is the power of knowing or understanding, that is an active exertion from the mind itself. And therefore has this grand pre-eminence above sense, that it is no idiopathy, not a mere private, a relative, seeming, and phantastical thing; but the comprehension of that which absolutely is and is not.

For whereas the *τὰ αἰσθητὰ*, objects of external sense, are nothing but individual corporeal things existing without us, from which by sense we receive only idols, images and passions; by reason of which, as Plotinus observes, *Τὸ γιγνωσκόμενον δι' αἰσθήσεως, τοῦ πράγματος εἴδωλόν ἐστι, καὶ οὐκ αὐτὸ τὸ πρᾶγμα ἡ αἴσθησις λαμβάνει· μένει γὰρ ἐκεῖνο ἔξω·* that which is known by sense, is but an image of that individual body

existing without, which sense suffers from; but the object of sense is a being not inwardly comprehended, but remaining without—and *διὰ τοῦτο ἐν ταῖς αἰσθήσεσιν οὐκ ἔστιν ἀλήθεια ἀλλὰ δόξα, ὅτι παραδεχομένη καὶ διὰ τοῦτο δόξα οὖσα ἄλλο παραδέχεται, ἄλλου ὄντος ἐκείνου ἐξ οὗ τοῦτο ὃ παραδέχεται ἔχει·* for this cause, the truth of the thing is not in sense, but only opinion.

Yet the *τὰ νοητά*, the proper and immediate objects of science, rightly so called, and intellection, being the intelligible essences of things and their necessary verities, that exist no where but in the mind itself; the understanding by its active power is fully master of them, and comprehends *αὐτὰ τὰ πράγματα, καὶ οὐκ εἴδωλα μόνον*, not idols or images of them, but the very things themselves,—within itself; *ὁ νοῦς τὰ νοητὰ γινώσκων οὐκ ἕτερα ὄντα γινώσκει*, knowledge is not the perception of things abroad without the mind,—but is the mind's comprehending itself. Otherwise, as the same philosopher adds, *Θεωρήσει αὐτὰ οὐκ ἔχων αὐτά, εἴδωλα δ' αὐτῶν——τὸ τοίνυν ἀληθινὸν οὐκ ἔχων, εἴδωλα δέ τοῦ ἀληθοῦς παρ' αὐτῷ λαβών, τὰ ψευδῆ ἕξει, καὶ οὐδὲν ἀληθές·* the mind in considering things, will not apprehend the things themselves, but only their images, etc.—

Wherefore it is most true, as Aristotle often observeth, *Ὁ νοῦς ὁ κατ' ἐνέργειαν τὰ πράγματα νοῶν·* that the knowledge of any scientifical theorem is one and the self-same thing with the thing known; *Τὸ αὐτό ἐστι τὸ νοῦν καὶ τὸ νοούμενον·* that which knows, and that which is known, are really the same thing.—*Ἡ ἐπιστήμη ἡ θεωρητικὴ καὶ τὸ ἐπιστητὸν τὸ αὐτό ἐστι·* the knowledge of any metaphysical or mathematical truth is the very thing,—*Τὸ αὐτό ἐστιν ἡ κατ' ἐνέργειαν ἐπιστήμη τῷ πράγματι·* or truth itself known, and not any passion from it, or image and picture of it.—And though the same philosopher writes elsewhere, that *αἴσθησις* is *τὰ αἰσθητά*, and *νόησις τὰ νοητά·* sense is the same with sensible things, and understanding the same with the things understood;—yet the difference betwixt those two is very great, for the *τὰ αἰσθητά*, sensible things really exist without, and sense has only a passive and phantasmatical representation of them; but the *τὰ νοητά*, intellectual conceptions, properly so called, the primary objects of science and intellection, that is, the *τὰ χωριστὰ ἀΐδια καὶ ἀκίνητα*, separate eternal and immutable rationes of things,—exist no where but in the mind itself, being its own ideas: for the soul is, as Aristotle speaks, *τόπος εἰδῶν·* the place of forms and ideas, and they have no other entity at all but only in being known or understood. And by and through these inward ideas of the mind itself, which are its primary objects, does it know and un-

derstand all external individual things, which are the secondary objects of knowledge only.

3. Moreover, that the intellection and knowing perception of the soul is not relative and phantastical as the sensitive, is evident from hence, because it is liable to falsehood, which it could not be, if it had not a power of comprehending absolute truth.

For external sense, for this very reason, is not capable of falsehood, because as such, it does not comprehend the absolute truth of any thing; being only φαντασία, a phantasm or appearance, and all appearances as such are alike true.

So in like manner, if the noetical perceptions of the soul were only phantastical, and did not extend to the comprehension of the absolute truth of things, then every opinion would of necessity be alike true, neither could there be any absolute falsehood in any, because πᾶσα φαντασία ἐστιν ἀληθής, every fancy is true, that is, every fancy is a fancy or an appearance, and nothing more is required to it; for absolute truth belongs not to the nature of it. But it is evident to all that are not sunk and degenerated below men into brutish sottishness, that there are false opinions: whence it follows undeniably, that the noetical knowledge and intellective power extends to the absolute truth of things. So that whatever theoretical universal proposition in geometry or metaphysics is true to one mind, the same is absolutely true in itself, and therefore true to all minds whatsoever throughout the whole world, that clearly understand it.

4. Wherefore the immediate objects of knowledge, which are the intelligible essences of things, and their relations to one another or verities, exist no where but in minds; yet notwithstanding they are not figments of the mind, because then every opinion or cogitation would be alike true, that is, a true figment, having no other truth but relative to that particular mind whose figment it is. But these things have an absolute and immutable nature in themselves, and their mutual respects to one another are alike immutable. And therefore those opinions and cogitations of the mind, which are not conformable to the immutable reality of those objective ideas have an absolute falsehood in them. As for example, the nature of a triangle is an immutable thing, and this is demonstrable of it, as immutably and necessarily true, that it hath three angles equal to two right ones: neither can any man's opinion or thinking make it otherwise: for it is a false opinion, unless it be agreeable to the immutable nature of a triangle. So likewise the plain regular geometrical solids, as such, have an immutable nature or essence: and it is demonstrable of them, that there are five such bodies,

and that there can be no more: and any opinion to the contrary will be an absolute falsehood. Wherefore every opinion or thinking is not knowledge, but only a right opinion: and therefore knowledge is not relative, πρὸς τὸ κρίνον, as sense is. Truth is the most unbending and uncompliable, the most necessary, firm, immutable, and adamantine thing in the world.

4. Moreover, because these intelligible essences of things, as before was observed, are like unities indivisible; so that if the least be added to them, or detracted from them, they are not the same, but something else; whenever the same things are rightly understood by any minds, they must of necessity have all the same truths belonging to them every where. Nay, these truths are not at all multiplied, as we observed before, by the multiplicity of minds that apprehend them; but are one and the same individual truths in those several minds: for as much as wisdom, truth, and knowledge are but one and the same eternal original light shining in all created understandings.

To conclude therefore; whenever any theoretical proposition is rightly understood by any one particular mind whatsoever, and wheresoever it be, the truth of it is no private thing, nor relative to that particular mind only, but it is ἀληθὲς καθολικὸν· a catholic and universal truth,—as the Stoics speak, throughout the whole world; nay, it would not fail to be a truth throughout infinite worlds, if there were so many, to all such minds as should rightly understand it.

5. But probably it may be here demanded, how a man shall know when his conceptions are conformed to the absolute and immutable natures or essences of things, and their unchangeable relations to one another? Since the immediate objects of intellection exist in the mind itself, we must not go about to look for the criterion of truth without ourselves, by consulting individual sensibles, as the exemplars of our ideas, and measuring our conceptions by them. And how is it possible to know by measuring of sensible squares, that the diameter of every square is incommensurable with the sides? Nay, as was observed before, the necessary truth of no geometrical theorem can ever be examined, proved, or determined by sensible things mechanically. And though the eternal divine intellect be the archetypal rule of truth, we cannot consult that neither, to see whether our conceptions be commensurate with it. I answer therefore, that the criterion of true knowledge is not to be looked for any where abroad without our own minds, neither in the height above, nor in the depth beneath, but only in our knowledge and conceptions themselves. For the entity of all theoretical truth is nothing else but clear intelligibility, and whatever is clear-

ly conceived, is an entity and a truth; but that which is false, Divine power itself cannot make it to be clearly and distinctly understood, because falsehood is a non-entity, and a clear conception is an entity: and omnipotence itself cannot make a non-entity to be an entity.

Wherefore no man ever was or can be deceived in taking that for an epistemonical truth which he clearly and distinctly apprehends, but only in assenting to things not clearly apprehended by him, which is the only true original of all error.

6. But there is another opinion that seems to have gained the countenance of some very learned philosophers, which differs but a little from the Protagorean doctrine; though for my part I conceive it not to be an opinion, but only a certain scheme of modesty and humility, which they thought decorous to take upon themselves, that they might not seem to arrogate too much either to themselves, or to their excellent performances, by not so much as pretending to demonstrate any thing to be absolutely true, but only hypothetically, or upon supposition that our faculties are rightly made.

For if we cannot otherwise possibly be certain of the truth of any thing, but only ex hypothesi, that our faculties are rightly made, of which none can have any certain assurance but only he that made them, then all created minds whatsoever must of necessity be condemned to an eternal scepsis. Neither ought they ever to assent to any thing as certainly true, since all their truth and knowledge as such, is but relative to their faculties arbitrarily made, that may possibly be false, and their clearest, constant apprehensions nothing but perpetual delusions.

Wherefore according to this doctrine, we having no absolute certainty of the first principles of all our knowledge as that, quod cogitat, est. Æqualia addita æqualibus efficiunt æqualia. Omnis numerus est vel par vel impar, we can neither be sure of any mathematical nor metaphysical truth, nor of the existence of God nor of ourselves.

For whereas some would endeavor to prove the truth of their intellectual faculties from hence, because there is a God whose nature also is such, as that he cannot deceive. It is plain that this is nothing but a circle, and makes no progress at all, forasmuch as all the certainty which they have of the existence of God, and of his nature, depends wholly upon the arbitrary make of their faculties; which, for aught they know, may be false. Nay, according to this doctrine, no man can certainly know that there is any absolute truth in the world at all; because it is nothing but his faculties which makes him think there is,

which possibly may be false. Wherefore upon this supposition, all created knowledge, as such, is a mere fantastical thing.

Now this is very strange to assert, that God cannot make a creature which shall be able certainly to know either the existence of God, or of himself; or whether there be any absolute truth or no.

7. It is evident that this opinion plainly supposes that intellectual faculties may be so made, as clearly and distinctly to understand that to be true which is absolutely false, and impossible (for unless they did acknowledge that we do clearly understand some things, they could not undertake so much as hypothetically to demonstrate any thing) as for example, that the whole is not greater than one of its parts, or that the three angles of a triangle are never equal to two right angles.

Now we have already demonstrated, that a falsehood can never be clearly conceived or apprehended to be true, because a falsehood is a mere non-entity; and whatsoever is clearly conceived or understood, is an entity; but a non-entity can never become an entity. Nay, the true knowledge or science which exists no where but in the mind itself, has no other entity at all besides intelligibility; and therefore whatsoever is clearly intelligible, is absolutely true. Hence it comes to pass, that both philosophers and divines have without scruple measured the Divine omnipotence itself, and the possibility of things, by their own clear intellections concerning them; and so pronounce that God himself cannot make contradictions to be true at the same time; whereas it were an high and unpardonable presumption thus to venture to measure the Divine omnipotence, if there were not an absolute certainty of the truth of clear intellections, as being nothing else but the immutable wisdom of God participated and imparted to us. And if it be absolutely impossible even to omnipotence, that contradictories should be true together, then omnipotence itself cannot make any such faculties as shall clearly understand that which is false to be true, since the essence of falsehood consists in nothing else but non-intelligibility.

But if they will say that it is not impossible that contradictions should be true, because our faculties, which make us think so, may be false and deceive us in every thing, the necessary consequence from hence will be, that it is possible that there may be no certain knowledge at all, because if contradictories may be true, then nothing can be certainly affirmed or denied of any thing.

8. Wherefore, be our faculties what they will, and let them be supposed to be made how you will, yet notwithstanding whatsoever is clearly understood and conceived, has an objective entity in it, and

must of necessity be true. For a clear conception cannot be nothing. And though intellectual faculties may be made obscure more or less, yet it is not possible that they should ever be made false, so as clearly to apprehend whatsoever is true to be false, and what is false to be true.

So that if there were a world of men created either in the moon or elsewhere, that should affirm the contradictories to all the theorems in geometry; forasmuch as we certainly know that we clearly understand them to be true, and that falsehood can never be clearly understood, we ought not in the least to question from hence whether our faculties or theirs were made true, or to suspect that truth and knowledge were such whiffling things, as that they merely depended upon an arbitrary make of faculties; but conclude without any controversy, that this was but a bedlam world of mad, frantic and distracted souls, that had no clear apprehensions of any thing, and either by mere chance or humor happened to assent to every thing that was false as true.

9. But yet if any one will still pertinaciously urge, that it is nothing but our faculties which instruct us thus, that every clear conception is an entity, and that the entity of truth is nothing but clear intelligibilty; that contradictions cannot be true, or if they could, then there were no possibility of any certain knowledge; that all this is from our faculties, but that still our faculties themselves may be false; nay, it is not reasonable to think that the intellectual faculties of any creatures should be absolutely infallible in any thing, because this seems to be the peculiar privilege and sole prerogative of the Deity.

I answer, that this is the thing we contend for, that the ultimate resolution of theoretical truth, and the only κριτήριον, criterion, of it, is in the clearness of the apprehensions themselves, and not in any supposed blind, and unaccountable make of faculties. So that the certainty of clear apprehensions is not to be derived from the contingent truth of faculties, but the goodness of faculties is only to be tried by the clearness and distinctness of apprehensions. For be these faculties what they will, clear intellectual conceptions must of necessity be truths, because they are real entities. And to suppose that faculties may be so made, as to beget clear apprehensions of things that are not, as if knowledge were an arbitrary fictitious thing, is much like that opinion of some, that all the new celestial phenomena, as of the jovial planets, and the mountains in the moon, and the like, are no real things; but that the clear diaphanous crystal of the telescopes may be so artificially cut, ground and polished, as to make all those, and any other phenomena, clearly to appear to sense, when there is no such thing. Nay, it is more absurd, and ridiculous to imagine, that that more than crystalline

pellucid intellectual faculty, by which we perceive the truth of things, can be arbitrarily so made or polished, as to represent any non-entities whatsoever, as clear and real objects of intellection.

10. Nay, to make the certainty of all truth and knowledge, not to be determined by the clearness of apprehensions themselves, but a supposed unaccountable truth and rectitude of faculties, and so by the uncertainty thereof, quite to baffle all our clearest intellections, is quite to pervert the nature of knowledge, which is *κατάληψις τοῦ ὄντος*, the comprehension of that which absolutely is; which is not terminated in the *τὸ φαινόμενον*, appearance only, as sense is, but in that *τὸ ὄν*, which is, and whose evidence and certainty is no extrinsical, adventitious, and borrowed thing, but native and intrinsical to itself.

For if knowledge have no inward *κριτήριον* of its own, but the certainty of all truth and knowledge depend upon an arbitrary peculiar make of faculties, which is not a thing knowable in itself, neither can there be any assurance of it given but what is extrinsical by testimony and revelation (inartificial arguments), there will be no such thing as knowledge, but all will be mere credulity and belief.

11. It is a fond imagination for any to suppose that it is derogatory to the glory of God, to bestow or import any such gift upon his creatures as knowledge is, which hath an intrinsical evidence within itself, or that creatures should have a certainty of the first principles, which all men are conscious that they do so clearly understand, that they cannot doubt of them, as that nihili nulla est affectio. Æqualia addita æqualibus efficient æqualia; without which they can know nothing at all; though they be notwithstanding ignorant, doubting, and erring in many things, and slowly proceed in their ratiocinations from one thing to another; whereas on the contrary, it is plainly derogatory to it to suppose that God cannot make any creature, that can possibly have any certain knowledge of God's own existence, or any thing more than a bare credulity of the same.

12. Wherefore since it cannot be denied but every clear apprehension is an entity, and the essence of truth is nothing but clear intelligibility, those philosophers must lay the stress of their cause here, that intellectual faculties may be so made, as that men can never certainly tell when they have clear apprehensions, but may think they have them, when they have not.

And it cannot be denied but that men are oftentimes deceived, and think they clearly comprehend what they do not; but it does not follow from hence, because men sometimes think they clearly comprehend what they do not, that therefore they can never be certain that

they do clearly comprehend any thing; which is just as if we should argue, that because in our dreams we think we have clear sensations, we cannot therefore be ever sure, when we are awake, that we see things that really are.

I shall conclude this discourse with that of Origen against Celsus. *Μόνον τῶν ὄντων βέβαιον ἐπίστημα·* Science and knowledge is the only firm thing in the world,—without a participation of which communicated to them from God, all creatures would be mere ludibria and vanity.

CHAP. VI.

1. We have now abundantly confuted the Protagorean philosophy, which, that it might be sure to destroy the immutable natures of just and unjust, would destroy all science or knowledge, and make it relative and fantastical. Having showed that this tenet is not only most absurd and contradictious in itself, but also manifestly repugnant to that very Atomical physiology, on which Protagoras endeavored to found it, and, than which nothing can more effectually confute and destroy it: and also largely demonstrated, that though sense be indeed a mere relative and phantastical perception, as Protagoras thus far rightly supposed; yet notwithstanding there is a superior power of intellection and knowledge of a different nature from sense, which is not terminated *ἐν τῷ φαινομένῳ*, in mere seeming and appearance only, but *ἐν τῷ ὄντι*, in the truth and reality of things, and reaches to the comprehension of that which really and absolutely is, whose objects are the eternal and immutable essences and natures of things, and their unchangeable relations to one another.

2. To prevent all mistake, I shall again remember, what I have before intimated, that where it is affirmed that the essences of all things are eternal and immutable; which doctrine the theological schools have constantly avouched, this is only to be understood of the intelligible essences and rationes of things, as they are the objects of the mind. And that there neither is nor can be any other meaning of it, than this, that there is an eternal knowledge and wisdom, or an eternal mind or intellect, which comprehends within itself the steady and immutable rationes, of all things and their verities, from which all particular intellects are derived, and on which they do depend. But not that the consti-

tutive essences of all individual created things were eternal and uncreated, as if God in creating of the world, did nothing else, but as some sarcastically express it, sartoris instar rerum essentias vestire existentia, only clothed the eternal, increated, and antecedent essences of things with a new outside garment of existence, and not created the whole of them. And as if the constitutive essences of things could exist apart separately from the things themselves, which absurd conceit Aristotle frequently and no less deservedly chastises.

3. Wherefore the result of all that we have hitherto said is this, that the intelligible natures and essences of things are neither arbitrary nor fantastical, that is, neither alterable by any will whatsoever, nor changeable by opinion; and therefore every thing is necessarily and immutably to science and knowledge what it is, whether absolutely, or relatively, to all minds and intellects in the world. So that if moral good and evil, just and unjust, signify any reality, either absolute or relative, in the things so denominated, as they must have some certain natures, which are the actions or souls of men, they are neither alterable by mere will nor opinion.

Upon which ground that wise philosopher Plato, in his Minos, determines that νόμος, a law, is not δόγμα πόλεως, any arbitrary decree of a city or supreme governors; because there may be unjust decrees, which therefore are no laws, but τοῦ ὄντος ἐξεύρεσις, the invention of that which is, or which is absolutely or immutably just, in its own nature. Though it be very true also, that the arbitrary constitutions of those that have lawful authority of commanding, when they are not materially unjust, are laws also in a secondary sense, by virtue of that natural and immutable justice or law that requires political order to be observed.

4. But I have not taken all this pains only to confute skepticism or fantasticism, or merely to defend and corroborate our argument for the immutable natures of just and unjust; but also for some other weighty purposes that are very much conducing to the business that we have in hand. And first of all, that the soul is not a mere rasa tabula, a naked and passive thing, which has no innate furniture or activity of its own, nor any thing at all in it, but what was impressed upon it without; for if it were so, then there could not possibly be any such thing as moral good and evil, just and unjust; forasmuch as these differences do not arise merely from the outward objects, or from the impresses which they make upon us by sense, there being no such thing in them; in which sense it is truly affirmed by the author of the Leviathan, (page 24), that there is no common rule of good and evil to be taken from the nature

of the objects themselves,—that is, either considered absolutely in themselves, or relatively to external sense only, but according to some other interior analogy which things have to a certain inward determination in the soul itself, from whence the foundation of all this difference must needs arise, as I shall show afterwards; not that the anticipations of morality spring merely from intellectual forms and notional ideas of the mind, or from certain rules or propositions, arbitrarily printed upon the soul as upon a book, but from some other more inward and vital principle, in intellectual beings, as such, whereby they have a natural determination in them to do some things, and to avoid others, which could not be, if they were mere naked passive things. Wherefore since the nature of morality cannot be understood, without some knowledge of the nature of the soul, I thought it seasonable and requisite here to take this occasion offered, and to prepare the way to our following discourse, by showing in general, that the soul is not a mere passive and receptive thing, which hath no innate active principle of its own, because upon this hypothesis there could be no such thing as morality.

5. Again, I have the rather insisted upon this argument also, because that which makes men so inclinable to think that justice, honesty and morality are but thin, airy and fantastical things, that have little or no entity or reality in them besides sensuality, is a certain opinion in philosophy which doth usually accompany it, that matter and body are the first original and source of all things: that there is no incorporeal substance superior to matter, and independent upon it. And therefore that sensible things are the only real and substantial things in nature; but souls and minds springing secondarily out of body, that intellectuality and morality which belong unto them, are but thin and evanid shadows of sensible and corporeal things, and not natural, but artificial and factitious things that do as it were border upon the confines of non-entity.

6. This is a thing excellently well observed by Plato, and therefore I shall set down his words at large concerning it. *Λέγουσί που τινὲς ὡς πάντα ἐστι τὰ πράγματα τὰ μὲν φύσει, τὰ δὲ τέχνῃ, τὰ δὲ διὰ τύχην. Εοἴκε δὲ φασὶ, τὰ μὲν μέγιστα αὐτῶν καὶ κάλλιστα ἀπεργάζεσθαι φύσιν καὶ τύχην, τὰ δὲ σμικρότερα τέχνην· ἣν δὲ παρὰ φύσεως λαμβάνουσαν τὴν τῶν μεγάλων καὶ πρώτων γένεσιν ἔργων πλάττειν καὶ τεκταίνεσθαι πάντα τὰ σμικρότερα, ἃ δὴ τεχνικὰ πάντες προσαγορεύομεν. Ὧδ᾽ ἔτι σαφέστερον ἐρῶ. Πῦρ καὶ ὕδωρ καὶ γῆν καὶ ἀέρα φύσει πάντα εἶναι καὶ τύχῃ φασὶ, τέχνῃ δὲ οὐδὲν τούτων· καὶ τὰ μετὰ ταῦτα αὖ σώματα γῆς τε καὶ ἡλίου καὶ σελήνης ἄστρων τε περὶ, διὰ τούτων γεγονέναι παντελῶς ὄντων ἀψύχων. Τύχῃ δὲ φερόμενα τῇ τῆς δυνάμεως ἕκαστα ἑκάστων, ᾗ ξυμπέπτωκεν ἁρμόττοντα οἰκείως πῶς θερμὰ ψυ-*

χροῖς, ἢ ξηρὰ πρὸς ὑγρὰ, καὶ μαλακὰ πρὸς σκλῆρα· καὶ πάντα ὁπόσα τῇ τῶν ἐναντίων κράσει κατὰ τύχην ἐξ ἀνάγκης συνεκεράσθη. Ταύτῃ καὶ κατὰ ταῦτα οὕτω γεγεννηκέναι τόν τε οὐρανὸν ὅλον καὶ πάντα ὁπόσα κατ᾽ οὔρανον· καὶ ζῶα αὖ καὶ φυτὰ ξύμπαντα ὡρῶν πασῶν ἐκ τούτων γενομένων· οὐ διὰ νοῦν φασὶν, οὐδὲ διά τινα θεὸν, οὐδὲ δια τέχνην, ἀλλὰ ὃ λέγομεν φύσει καὶ τύχῃ. Τέχνην δὲ ὕστερον ἐκ τούτων ὑστεραν γενομένην αὐτὴν θνητὴν ἐκ θνητῶν, ὕστερα γεγεννηκέναι παιδείας τινὰς, ἀληθείας οὐ σφόδρη μετεχούσας, ἀλλ᾽ εἴδωλα ἄττα συνγγενῆ ἑαυτῶν· οἷα ἡ γραφὴ γεννᾷ καὶ Μουσικὴ, καὶ ὅσαι ταύταις εἰσὶ συνέριθοι τέχναι· οὕτω δὲ καὶ τὴν νομοθεσίαν πᾶσαν οὐ φύσει, τέχνῃ δὲ, ἧς οὐκ ἀληθεῖς· εἶναι τὰς θέσεις· These men making this distribution of things, that all things that are, are either by nature, or art, or chance, they imagine that the greatest and most excellent things that are in the world, are to be attributed to nature and chance; which working upon those greater things which are made by nature, does form and fabricate certain smaller things afterward, which we commonly call artificial things. To speak more plainly, fire, water, air, and earth, they attribute wholly to nature and chance, but not to any art or wisdom; in like manner those bodies of the earth, the sun, moon and stars, they will have to be made out of them fortuitously agitated; and so by chance causing both divers systems and compages of things: thus they would have the whole heavens made, and all the earth and animals, and all the seasons of the year, not by any mind intellect, or God, not by any art or wisdom, but all by blind nature and chance. But art and mind afterwards springing up out of these, to have begotten certain ludicrous things, which have little truth and reality in them, but are like images in a glass, such as picture and music produces. Wherefore these men attribute all ethics, politics, morality, and laws, not to nature, but to art, whose productions are not real and substantial.—

7. Now this philosopher, that he may evince that ethics, politics and morality are as real and substantial things, and as truly natural as those things which belong to matter, he endeavors to show that souls and minds do not spring secondarily out of matter and body, but that they are real things in nature, superior and antecedent to body and matter. His words are these: Ψυχὴν ὦ ἑταῖρε ἠγνοηκέναι κινδυνέυουσι μὲν ὀλίγου ξύμπαντες, οἷόν τε ὂν τυγχάνει καὶ δύναμιν ἣν ἔχει, τῶν τε ἄλλων αὐτῆς πέρι, καὶ δὴ καὶ γενεσεως ὡς ἐν πρώτοις ἐστι σωμάτων ἔμπροσθεν πάντων γενομένη, καὶ μεταβολῆς τε αὐτῶν καὶ μετακοσμήσεως ἁπάσης ἄρχη παντὸς μᾶλλον· These men are all ignorant concerning the nature of mind and soul, as in other regards, so especially in respect of its original, as it is in order of nature before matter and body, and does not result out of it; but does command it, govern it, and rule it.

And I have in like manner in this antecedent discourse, endeavored to show that wisdom, knowledge, mind and intellect, are no thin shadows or images of corporeal and sensible things, nor do result secondarily out of matter and body, and from the activity and impressions thereof; but have an independent and self-subsistent being, which in order of nature, is before body; all particular created minds being but derivative participations of one infinite eternal mind, which is antecedent to all corporeal things.

8. Now from hence it naturally follows, that those things which belong to mind and intellect, such as morality, ethics, politics and laws are, which Plato calls, *νοῦ γεννήματα οὐχ ἧττον φύσει εἶναι ἢ φύσεως·* The offspring and productions of mind, are no less to be accounted natural things, or real and substantial, than those things which belong to stupid and senseless matter:—for since mind and intellect are first in order of nature before matter and body, those things which belong to the mind must needs be in order of nature before those things which belong to the body. *Ἄρα οὖν ἐξ ἀνάγκης τὰ ψυχῆς συγγενῆ πρότερα ἂν εἴη γεγονότα τῶν σώματι προσηκόντων, οὔσης ταύτης πρεσβυτέρας ἢ σώματος, νοῦς καὶ τέχνη καὶ νόμος καὶ τρόπος καὶ ἤθη σκληρῶν καὶ μαλακῶν, βαρέων καὶ κούφων, μηκοῦς σωμάτων καὶ πλάτους πρότερα·* Wherefore mind and intellect, art and law, ethics and morality are first in order of nature, before hard and soft, light and heavy, long and broad, which belong to body;—and therefore more real and substantial things. For since mind and intellect are a higher, more real and substantial thing than senseless body and matter, and what hath far the more vigor, activity and entity in it, modifications of mind and intellect, such as justice and morality, must of necessity be more real and substantial things, than the modifications of mere senseless matter, such as hard and soft, thick and thin, hot and cold, and the like are. And therefore that grave philosopher excellently well concludes, *τὰ μεγάλα καὶ πρῶτα ἔργα καὶ πράξεις τέχνης ἂν γίγνοιτο ὄντα ἐν πρώτοις, τὰ δὲ φύσει καὶ φύσις (ἣν οὐκ ὀρθῶς ἐπονομάζουσιν) αὐτο τοῦτο, ὕστερα καὶ ἀρχόμενα ἂν ἐκ τέχνης εἴη καὶ νοῦ·* that the greatest and first works and actions are of art or of mind, which were before body; but those things which are said to be by nature (in which they abuse the word nature, appropriating it only to senseless and inanimate matter) are afterwards, being governed by mind and art.—

9. Wherefore I thought our former discourse seasonable to confute the dullness and grossness of those philosophasters that make corporeal things existing without the soul, to be the only solid and substantial things, and make their grossest external senses the only judges of reality of things, *οἱ οὐδὲν ἄλλο οἰόμενοι εἶναι ἢ οὗ ἂν δύνωνται ἅπτεσθαι χε-*

ροῖν λαβέσθαι· and so conclude nothing is or has any reality but what they can grasp in their hands, or have some gross or palpable sense of.—

Whereas notwithstanding it is most true that those corporeal qualities, which they think to be such real things existing in bodies without them, are for the most part fantastic and imaginary things, and have no more reality than the colors of the rainbow; and, as Plotinus expresseth it, καὶ οὐκ ἐν τοῖς ὑποκειμένοις, ἀλλ' ἐν τοῖς πάθεσιν ἔχει τὴν ὑπόστασιν· have no reality at all in the objects without us, but only a seeming kind of entity in our own fancies;—and therefore are not absolutely any thing in themselves, but only relative to animals. So that they do in a manner mock us, when we conceive of them as things really existing without us, being nothing but our own shadows, and the vital passive energies of our own souls.

Though it was not the intention of God or nature to abuse us herein, but a most wise contrivance thus to beautify and adorn the visible and material world, to add lustre or embellishment to it, that it might have charms, relishes and allurements in it, to gratify our appetites; whereas otherwise really in itself, the whole corporeal world in its naked hue, is nothing else but a heap of dust or atoms, of several figures and magnitudes, variously agitated up and down; so that these things, which we look upon as such real things without us, are not properly the modifications of bodies themselves, but several modifications, passions and affections of our souls.

10. Neither, are these passive and sympathetical energies of the soul, when it acts confusedly with the body and the pleasures resulting from them, such real and substantial things as those that arise from the pure noetical energies of the soul itself intellectually and morally; for since the mind and intellect is in itself a more real and substantial thing, and fuller of entity than matter and body, those things which are νοῦ γεννήματα, the pure offspring of the mind, and sprout from the soul itself, must needs be more real and substantial than those things which blossom from the body, or from the soul enfeebled by it, and slumbering in it.

11. Wherefore that philosopher professing and understanding to confute atheists, and to show, τοὺς λόγων ἁπτομένους ἀσεβῶν μηδὲ εὖ τοῖς λόγοις ἀλλ' ἐξμοαρτημένως χρᾶσθαι· That all atheists, though they pretend to wit never so much, are but bunglers at reason, and sorry philosophers, he, not without cause, fetches his discourse from hence, that ὅτι ὁ πρῶτον γενέσεως καὶ φθορᾶς ἄιτιον ἁπάντων, τοῦτο οὐ πρῶτον ἀλλ' ὕστερον ἀπεφήναντο εἶναι γεγονὸς οἱ τὴν τῶν ἀσεβῶν ψυχὴν ἀπεργασάμενοι λόγοι, ὁ δὲ ὕστερον πρότερον, ὅθεν ἡμαρτήκασι περὶ θεῶν τῆς ὄντως οὐσίας· They

that thus infect men's minds with impiety and atheism, make that which is the first cause of all generation and corruption, to be the last thing in the universe, and that which is the last to be the first: from hence proceeds their error concerning the being of God;—that is, they make mind and soul to be the last thing, and body and matter to be the first.

This therefore is the only course and method which this philosopher proceeds in to confute the atheists; to show, *ψυχὴν μὲν προτέραν γεγονέναι σώματος, σῶμα δὲ δεύτερόν τε καὶ ὕστερον, ψυχῆς ἀρχούσης ἀρχόμενον κατὰ φύσιν·* that mind and soul, in the order of the universe, are before body, and not posterior to it; mind and soul being that which rules in the universe, and body that which is ruled and ordered by it.—And there is no phenomenon in the world but may be solved from this hypothesis.

Now this he demonstrates, even from local motion, because body and matter has no self-moving power, and therefore it is moved and determined in its motion by a higher principle, a soul or mind; which argument is further improved by the author of that excellent philosophical treatise, book II. chap. 11.

12. Now, for the self-same cause, I have endeavored to demonstrate in the foregoing discourse, that knowledge and intellection cannot possibly spring from sense, nor the radiation or impresses of matter and body upon that which knows, but from an active power of the mind, as a thing antecedent to matter, and independent upon it, whereby it is enabled from within itself to exert intelligible ideas of all things.

13. Lastly, I have insisted the rather so largely upon this argument, for this further reason also, because it is not possible that there should be any such thing as morality, unless there be a God, that is, an infinite eternal mind that is the first original and source of all things, whose nature is the first rule and exemplar of morality; for otherwise it is not conceivable, whence any such thing should be derived to particular intellectual beings. Now there can be no such thing as God, if stupid and senseless matter be the first original of all things; and if all being and perfection that is found in the world, may spring up and arise out of the dark womb of unthinking matter; but if knowledge and understanding, if soul, mind and wisdom may result and emerge out of it, then doubtless every thing that appears in the world may; and so night, matter, and chaos, must needs be the first and only original of all things.

14. Wherefore Plato, as I have already intimated, taking notice of the opinion of divers pretenders to philosophy, *πῦρ καὶ ὕδωρ καὶ γῆν, καὶ ἀέρα πρῶτα ἡγεῖσθαι τῶν πάντων εἶναι καὶ τὴν φύσιν ὀνομάζειν ταῦτα αὐτά,*

ψυχὴν δὲ ἐκ τούτων ὕστερον· that fire, water, air and earth, are the first beings of all, to which senseless and inanimate things they appropriate the title of nature: but that soul did spring up afterward out of these as a secondary thing,—and as a mere shadow of them, he immediately adds concerning it, *οἷον πήγην τινα ἀνοήτου δόξης ἀνευρήκαμεν ἄνθρωπον ὁπόσον πώποτε τῶν περὶ φύσεως ἐφήψαντο ζητημάτων·* we have here found and discovered the true fountain of all that atheistical madness that possesses most of those that deal in physiology or questions of natural philosophy,—viz. that they are all possessed with this sottishness, that matter and body is the first original of all things; and therefore it is observed by the same author, that the same persons that held all things were derived from body, blind nature and chance, did both deny the existence of God, and which is consentaneous thereunto, asserted, that justice and morality have no nature or entity at all, saying, they were nothing but passion from corporeal things, without the sentient or the renitence, or the reaction made upon local motion in a body duly mixed and tempered: that is, if soul and mind, knowledge and wisdom may thus arise from the contemplation of mere senseless matter, and radiation or impression that is the mere local motion of corporeal objects without, then, as we said before, there cannot possibly be the least shadow of argument left to prove a deity by; since not only the souls of men, but also all that wisdom, counsel and contrivance that appears in the frame of the whole visible world, might first arise in like manner from the mere casual concourse and contemperation of the whole matter; either in those particular bodies of the sun and stars, or else in the whole system and compages of the material world itself.

15. Wherefore we have not only showed that all intellection and knowledge does not emerge or emane out of sense, but also that sense itself is not a mere passion or reception of corporeal impresses without, but that it is an active energy and vigor, though sympathetical in the sentient. And it is no more possible that this should arise out of senseless matter and atoms, by reason of any particular contemperation or contexture of them in respect of figure, site and motion, than that which all atheists stoutly deny, that something should arise out of nothing.

And here we can never sufficiently applaud that ancient atomical philosophy, so successfully revived of late by Cartesius, in that it shows distinctly what matter is, and what it can amount unto, namely, nothing else but what may be produced from mere magnitude, figure, site, local motion and rest; from whence it is demonstrably evident and mathematically certain, that no cogitation can possibly arise out of the

power of matter; whereas that other philosophy which brings in a dark unintelligible matter that is nothing and every thing, out of whose potentiality not only innumerable qualities, but also substantial forms and sensitive souls, (and therefore why not rational also, since all reason emerges out of sense) may be educed, must of necessity perpetually brood and hatch Atheism. Whereas we cannot but extremely admire that monstrous dotage and sottishness of Epicurus, and some other spurious pretenders to this atomical philosophy, that notwithstanding they acknowledge nothing else in matter besides magnitude, figure, site and motion, yet would make not only the power of sensation, but also of intellection and ratiocination, and therefore all human souls, to arise from the mere contexture of corporeal atoms, and utterly explode all incorporeal substances; than which two assertions nothing can be more contradictious. And this is far more absurd, to make reason and intellection to arise from magnitude, figure and motion, than to attribute those unintelligible qualities to matter which they explode.

THE

TRUE NOTION OF THE LORD'S SUPPER.

INTRODUCTION.

All great errors have ever been intermingled with some truth. And indeed, if Falsehood should appear alone unto the world, in her own true shape and native deformity, she would be so black and horrid that no man would look upon her; and therefore she hath always had an art to wrap up herself in a garment of light, by which means she passed freely disguised and undiscerned. This was elegantly signified in the fable thus: Truth at first presented herself to the world, and went about to seek entertainment; but when she found none, being of a generous nature, that loves not to obtrude herself upon unworthy spirits, she resolved to leave earth, and take her flight for heaven. But as she was going up, she chanced, Elijah-like, to let her mantle fall; and Falsehood, waiting for such an opportunity, snatched it up presently, and ever since goes about disguised in Truth's attire.

Pure falsehood is pure nonentity and could not subsist alone by itself; wherefore it always twines up together about some truth, παραφυάδος εἰκὸς, as Athenagoras the christian philosopher speaks, like an ivy, that grows upon some wall, twining herself into it with wanton and flattering embraces, till at length destroyed and pulled down that which held it up. There is always some truth which gives being to every error: [1] "Est quædam veritatis anima, quæ corpus omnium errorum agitat et informat." There is ever some soul of truth, which doth secretly spirit and enliven the dead and unwieldy lump of all errors,—without which it could not move nor stir. Though sometimes it would require a very curious artist, in the midst of all error's deformities, to descry the defaced lineaments of that truth which first it did resemble; as Plutarch[2] spake sometime of those Egyptian fables of Isis and Osiris,

[1] In Orat. de Resurrect. Mort. [2] Lib. de Iside et Osiride.

that they had ἀμυδράς τινας ἐμφάσεις τῆς ἀληθείας, certain weak appearances and glimmerings of truth—but so as that they needed δεινοῦ ἰχνηλάτου, some notable diviner—to discover them.

And this I think is the case of that grand error of the Papists concerning the Lord's supper being a sacrifice; which perhaps at first did rise by degeneration from a primitive truth, whereof the very obliquity of this error yet may bear some dark and obscure intimation. Which will best appear, when we have first discovered the true notion of the Lord's supper;[1] whence we shall be able at once to convince the error of this popish tenet, and withal to give a just account of the first rise of it. "Rectum index sui et obliqui."

CHAP. I.

That it was a custom among the Jews and Heathens, to feast upon things sacrificed; and that the custom of the Christians, in partaking of the body and blood of Christ once sacrificed upon the cross, in the Lord's supper, is analogical hereunto.

The right notion of that christian feast, called the Lord's supper, in which we eat and drink the body and blood of Christ, that was once offered up to God for us, is to be derived (if I mistake not) from analogy to that ancient rite among the Jews, of feasting upon things sacrificed, and eating of those things, which they had offered up to God.

For the better conceiving whereof, we must first consider a little, how many kinds of Jewish sacrifices there were, and the nature of them. Which, although they are very well divided, according to the received opinion, into four, עולה, חטאה, אשם, שלמים, the burnt-offering, the sin-offering, the trespass-offering, and the peace-offering—yet perhaps I may make a more notional division of them, for our use, into these three species.

First, such as were wholly offered up to God, and burnt upon the altar: which were the holocausts, or burnt-offerings.

Secondly, such wherein besides something offered up to God upon the altar, the priests had also a part to eat of. And these[2] are also subdivided into the sin-offerings and the trespass-offerings.

[1] See chap. v.

[2] Concerning the difference between these two, see Petit in his Variæ Lectiones.

Thirdly, such, as in which, besides something offered up to God, and a portion bestowed on the priests, the owners themselves had a share likewise. And these were called שלמים, or peace-offerings,—which contained in them, as the Jewish doctors speak, תלק לשם וחלק רבהן יחלק לכעל, a portion for God,—and the priests and the owners also; and thence they use to give the etymon of the Hebrew word *shelamim.* בי זת הזבח שרוס ביניהם because these sacrifices brought peace to the altar, the priests, and the owners, in that every one of these had a share in them.

Now, for the first of these, although (perhaps to signify some special mystery concerning Christ) they were themselves wholly offered up to God, and burnt upon the altar; yet they had ever peace-offerings regularly annexed to them, when they were not קרבנית ציבור, offerings for the whole congregation—but for any particular person; that so the owners might at the same time, when they offered up to God, feast also upon the sacrifices.

And for the second, although the owners themselves did not eat of them, the reason was, because they were not perfectly reconciled to God, being for the present in a state of guilt, which they made atonement for in these sacrifices; yet they did it by the priests, who were their mediators unto God, and, as their proxies, did eat of the sacrifices for them.

But in the peace-offerings, because such as brought them had no uncleanness upon them, (Lev. 7: 20) and so were perfectly reconciled to God, and in covenant with him, therefore they were in their own persons to eat of those sacrifices, which they had offered unto God as a federal rite between God and them; which we shall explain at large hereafter.

So then the eating of the sacrifices was a due and proper appendix unto all sacrifices, one way or other, and either by the priests, or themselves, when the person that offered was capable thereof. Wherefore we shall find in the Scripture, that eating of the sacrifices is brought in continually as a rite belonging to sacrifice in general. Which we will now show in divers instances.

Exod. 39: 15. God commands the Jews, that when they came into the land of Canaan, they should destroy the altars and images, and all the monuments of idolatry among those heathens thus; "lest thou make a covenant with the inhabitants of the land, and they go a whoring after their gods, and one call thee, and thou *eat* of his sacrifice;" which indeed afterward came to pass, Num. 25: 2, "They called the people to the sacrifice of their gods, and the people did *eat*, and bow

down to their gods;" or as it is cited in Psal. 106: 28, "They joined themselves unto Baal-peor, and *ate* the sacrifice of the dead."

When Jethro, Moses's father-in-law, came to him (Exod. 18: 12) "he took a burnt-offering and sacrifices for God; and Aaron came, and all the elders of Israel, *to eat bread* before the Lord:" by sacrifices there are meant peace-offerings, as Aben-Ezra and the Targum well expound it, which, we said before, were regularly joined with burnt-offerings.

So Exod. xxxii. When the Israelites worshipped the golden calf, the text saith, that "Aaron built an altar before it, and made a proclamation, saying, to-morrow is a *feast* unto the Lord:" (see how the altar and the feast were a-kin to one another:) "And they rose up early in the morning, and offered burnt-offerings, and brought peace-offerings, and the people *sat down to eat and drink.*" Which passage St. Paul makes use of, being about to dehort the Corinthians from eating things sacrificed to idols, 1 Cor. x. "Neither be ye idolaters as some of them were, as it is written, The people *sat down to eat and drink:*" for this was no common eating, but the eating of those sacrifices which had been offered up to the golden calf.

1 Sam. 1: 3. It is said of Elkanah, that "he went up out of his city yearly to worship and to sacrifice to the Lord of hosts in Shiloh: and when the time was come, that he offered, he gave to Penninah his wife, and to all her sons and daughters, *portions;* and unto Hannah he gave a double *portion;*" that is, portions to eat of those sacrifices that had been offered up to God, as R. David Kimchi notes. And in the ninth chapter of the same book, when Saul was seeking Samuel, going towards the city he met some maidens, that told him Samuel was come to the city, for there was a sacrifice for the people that day in the high place: "As soon (say they) as you come into the city, you shall find him before he go up to the high place *to eat;* for the people will not *eat* until he come, because he doth bless the sacrifice." Where, though the word *bamah* properly signifies a high place, or place of sacrifice, whence the Greek word βῶμος is thought to be derived; yet it is here rendered by the Targum, as often elsewhere, בית אסחרותא, *domus accubitus*, a house of feasting;—because feasting and sacrificing were such general concomitants of one another.

So again, in the sixteenth chapter, Samuel went to Bethlehem to anoint David: "I am come (saith he) to sacrifice to the Lord; sanctify yourselves, and come with me to the sacrifice." But when he understood, that Jesse's youngest son was absent, he saith to Jesse, (v. xi.) "Send and fetch him, for we will not *sit down* until he come."

So I understand that of the Sichemites, according to the judgment of the Jewish doctors, Judg. 9: 27. "They went into the house of their god, and did *eat* and *drink*, and cursed Abimelech;" that is, they went into the house of their god to sacrifice, and did eat and drink of the sacrifice: which perhaps was the reason of the name, by which they called their god, whom they thus worshipped, *Berith*, which signifies a covenant, because they worshipped him by this federal rite of eating of his sacrifices; of which more hereafter.

Thus likewise the Hebrew scholiasts expound that in the sixteenth chapter of the same book, verse 23, concerning the Philistines when they had put out Samson's eyes; "They met together to offer a great sacrifice unto Dagon their god, and to *rejoice;*" that is, in feasting upon the sacrifices.

Hence it is, that the idolatry of the Jews, in worshipping other gods, is so often described synecdochically under the notion of feasting: Is. 57: 7. "Upon a lofty and high mountain hast thou *set thy bed*, and thither wentest thou up to offer sacrifice." [1]For in those ancient times they were not wont to sit at feasts, but lie down on beds or couches. (Ezek. xxiii.) "You sent for men from far, Sabeans from the wilderness (i. e. idolatrous priests from Arabia), and lo they came, for whom thou didst wash thyself, and satest upon a stately bed, with a table prepared before thee." (Amos 2: 8.) "They laid themselves down upon clothes laid to pledge by every altar;" i. e. laid themselves down to eat of the sacrifice, that was offered on the altar. And, in Ezek. 18: 11, eating upon the mountains seems to be put for sacrificing upon the mountains, because it was a constant appendix to it. "He that hath not done any of these things, but hath even eaten upon the mountains," כטוריא פלח לטעותא, i. e. hath worshipped idols upon the mountains; —so the Targum renders it. Lastly, St. Paul makes eating of the sacrifice a general appendix to the altar, (Heb. 12: 10.) "We have an altar whereof they have no right to eat that serve the tabernacle."

I will observe this one thing more, because it is commonly understood, that all the while the Jews were in the wilderness, they were to eat no meat at all at their private tables but that whereof they had first sacrificed to God at the tabernacle. For this is clearly the meaning of that place, Lev. 17: 4, 5, "Whatsoever man there be of the house of Israel, that killeth a lamb, or a goat, or an ox, within the camp, or without the camp, and bringeth it not to the door of the tabernacle, to offer an offering to the Lord, blood shall be imputed to him." And so

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[1] Of Saba, see Salmasius in Plinianis Exercitat. p. 497, et 500.

Nachmonides there glosses, according to the mind of the ancient rabbins, הנה מתחלה צוה שכל מה שהם אוכלים שלמים, i. e. Behold, God commanded at first, that all, which the Israelites did eat, should be peace-offerings.—Which command was afterward dispensed with, when they came into the land, and their dwellings were become remote from the tabernacle, so that they could not come up every day to sacrifice. Deut. 12: 12, "If the place, which the Lord thy God hath chosen be too far from thee; then thou shalt kill of the herd and of the flock, and thou shalt eat within thy gates whatsoever thy soul lusteth after." Only now there were, instead thereof, three constant and set times appointed in the year, in which every male was to come up and see God at his tabernacle, and eat and drink before him; and the sacrifice, that was then offered, was wont to be called by them, עולת דאיה, a sacrifice of seeing.

Thus I have sufficiently declared the Jewish rite of joining feasting with sacrificing; and it will not be now amiss, if we add, as a *mantissa* to that discourse, something of the custom of the Heathens also in the like kind, the rather because we may make some use of it afterward. And it was so general amongst them in their idolatrous sacrifices, that Isaac Abarbanel, a learned Jew, observed it in Pirush Hattorah: בזמים קדמונים כל מי שהוא עושה עבודת אלילים מוד היהעושה עליה מכרה. In those ancient times, whosoever sacrificed to idols, made a feast upon the sacrifice.—And the original of it amongst them was so ancient, that it is ascribed by their own authors to Prometheus, as Salmasius, in his Solino-Plinian Exercitations, notes, [1] "Hunc sacrificii morem a Prometheo originem duxisse volunt, quo partem hostiæ in ignem conjicere soliti sunt, partem ad suum victum abuti." Which Prometheus, although, according to Eusebius's Chronicon, and our ordinary chronologers, his time would fall near about the 3028th year of the Julian period, which was long after Noah; yet it is certain, that he lived much sooner, near about Noah's time, in that he is made to be the son of Japhet, which was Noah's son, from whom the Europeans descended, (Gen. 10: 5) called therefore by the poet *Iäpeti genus*.[2] For there is no great heed to be given to the chronology of human writers concerning this age of the world, which Censorinus from Varro calls *Μυθικὸν*, the fabulous time or age.—Although I rather subscribe to the judgment of the learned Vossius, that this Prometheus was no

[1] Page 129, a.

[2] Note that איי הגוים the islands of the nations—is commonly used in Scripture as a proper name to express Europe by. Lib. i. de. Idol.

other than Noah himself, the father of Japhet, and not his son, because the other things do so well agree to him; and we may easily allow the heathens such a mistake as that is, in a matter of so remote antiquity: and then, if this be true, the whole world received this rite of feasting upon sacrifice, at first, together with that of sacrifice, at the same time. Instances of this custom are so frequent and obvious in heathen authors, that Homer alone were able to furnish us sufficiently.

In the *α* of the Iliads, he brings in a description of a hecatomb-sacrifice, which Agamemnon prepared for Apollo by his priest Chryses, and a feast that followed immediately after it. In *β* the same Agamemnon offers up an ox to Jupiter and inviteth divers of the Grecian captains to partake of it. In *γ* of the Odyssees, Nestor makes a magnificent sacrifice to Neptune of eighty-two bullocks, with a feast upon it, on the shore. In *ϑ* Alcinous offers up a bullock unto Jupiter, and then immediately follows,

———————*Δαίνυντ' ἐρικυδέα δαῖτα*
Τερπόμενοι————————————

Plato, in his second De Legibus, acknowledges these feasts under the name of *Ἑορταὶ μετὰ θεῖον,* feasts after divine worship—offered up to the gods. Among the Latins, that of Lycus in Plautus's Pœnulus belongs to this purpose;

Convivas volo
Reperire vobis commodos, qui una sient,
Interibi attulerint exta.

And that of Gelasimus in Stichus;

Jamne exta cocta sunt? quot aginis fecerat?

After this manner he, in Virgil's Eclogues, invites his friend,

Cum faciam vitula pro frugibus, ipse venito.

And thus Evander entertains Æneas, in the eighth Æneid,

Tum lecti juvenes certatim, aræque sacerdos,
Viscera tosta ferunt taurorum.——

Plutarch somewhere observes it as a strange and uncouth rite, in the worship of the goddess Hecate, that they which offered sacrifice unto her, did not partake of it. And the same author reports of Cati-

line and his conspirators, ὅτι καταθύσαντες ἄνθρωπον ἐγεύσαντο τῶν σαρκῶν, that sacrificing a man, they did all eat somewhat of the flesh—using this religious rite as a bond to confirm them together in their treachery. But Strabo tells us of a strange kind of worship used by the Persians in their sacrifices, where no part of the flesh was offered up to the gods, but all eaten up by those that brought it, and their guests: they supposing, in the mean while, that whilst they did eat of the flesh, their god, which they worshipped, had the soul of the sacrifice that was killed in honour to him. The author's own words are these in his fifteenth book: μερίσαντος δὲ τοῦ Μάγου τὰ κρέα τοῦ ὑφηγουμένου τὴν ἱερουργίαν, ἁπιᾶσι διελόμενοι, τοῖς θεοῖς οὐδὲν ἀπονείμαντες μέρος. Τῆς γὰρ ΨΥΧΗΣ φασι τοῦ ἱερείου δεῖσθαι τὸν θεὸν, ἄλλου δὲ οὐδενός. Ὅμως δὲ τοῦ ἐπίπλου τι μικρὸν τιφέασιν, ὡς λέγουσί τινες, ἐπὶ τὸ πῦρ——Sua quisque accepta abeant, nulla parte diis relata; dicunt enim Deum nihil velle præter hostiæ animam: quidam tamen (ut fertur) omenti partem igni imponunt.

From this custom of the heathens of feasting upon sacrifices arose that famous controversy among the Christians in the primitive times, sometimes disputed in the New Testament, whether it were lawful ΕΣΘΙΈΙΝ ΕΙΔΩΛΟΘΥΤΑ, to eat things sacrificed to idols.

These Gentile feasts upon the sacrifices were usually kept in the temple, where the sacrifice was offered; as may be gathered from that passage of Herodotus in Clio, where, speaking of Cleobus and Bithene, and what happened to them after that prayer, which their mother put up to the gods for them, ὡς ἔθυσαν (saith he) καὶ εὐωχήθησαν, κατακοιμηθέντες ἐν αὐτῷ τῷ ἱερῷ, etc. As soon as they had sacrificed and feasted, lying down to sleep in the same temple, they died there, and never rose more. But it is very apparent from that of St. Paul, 1 Cor. 8: 10, "If any man see thee, which hast knowledge, sit at meat," ἐν εἰδωλείῳ, that is, not, as Erasmus translates it, "in epulo simulachrorum," but as Beza, and from him our interpreters, in the idol's temple; for so both the the Syriac metaphrast expounds it, ܒܒܝܬ ܐܝܕܘܠܐ, and the Arabic في بيت اصنام in the house of idols.

If any thing were left, when these feasts were ended, they were wont to carry portions of them home to their friends: so that learned scholiast upon Aristophanes in Plutus tells us, οἱ γὰρ ἐκ θυσίας ἰόντες, ἔφερον ἐξ αὐτῆς τῆς θυσίας τοῖς οἰκείοις κατὰ νόμον τινά. Whence Petit, in that excellent collection of Attic laws, inserted this for one, viz. "that they that go home from a sacrifice should carry part of it to their

friends." And that Greek comedian himself alludeth there to it in these words.

> ——————*Τοῦτο δὲ τὸ κρεάδιον*
> *Τῶν ἔνδοθέν τις εἰσενεγκάτω λαβών.*

Theocritus in his Bucoliastes doth express it fully;

> ——————*Καὶ τὺ δὲ θύσας*
> *Ταῖς νύμφαις, Μόρσωνι καλὸν κρέας αὐτίκα πέμψον.*

And Plautus in Miles;

> ——————— Sacrificant?
> Dant inde partem majorem mihi quam fibi.

These portions, which they carried home, were called commonly by the Greeks *μερίδες*, and in the Umbrian language, as Festus tells us, *strobula*. Theophrastus in his characters uses the word *τόμοι* in this sense, *Καὶ θύοντας καὶ ἀναλίσκοντας ἥκων Τόμον ἀπαιτήσων*, i. e. ad sacrificantes et epula concelebrantes accedit, ut inde portionem auferat.

And because they thought they did receive some blessings from the gods with it, therefore it was sometimes called *ὑγίεια*, as we find in Hesychius upon that word *ὑγίεια· ἄλφιτα οἴνῳ καὶ ἐλαίῳ πεφυραμένα, καὶ πᾶν τὸ ἐκ θεοῦ φερόμενον, εἴτε μύρον, εἴτε θάλλος, ἢ ὑγίεια.*

But otherwise, if there were any thing yet remaining, it belonged to the priests, as we learn from that scholiast, which we have already commended, upon Vespæ, *νόμος ἦν, τὰ ὑπολειπόμενα τῆς θυσίας τοὺς ἱερέας λαμβάνειν·* i. e. It was an ancient law among the Athenians, that the priests should have the remainder.—Which is not only to be understood of the skin and such-like parts, but of the flesh of the sacrifice itself; as we learn from St. Austin in his exposition upon Rom. ii. who tells us also, that these relics were sometimes sold for them in the market; whence that speech of St. Paul, 1 Cor. 10: 25, "Whatsoever is sold in the shambles eat, asking no question for conscience' sake."

I will shut up all with this one observation more, That as we said of the Jews, that in the wilderness they did eat no meat, but of that which they had first sacrificed; in like manner the heathens were wont to sacrifice before all their feasts: whence it is, that Athenæus observes, feasts among the ancient heathens were ever accounted sacred and religious things. And thus we must understand that speech of St. Paul in the twenty-seventh verse of the forenamed chapter, "If any one, that believes not, invite you, and you be disposed to go; whatsoever is

set before you eat, asking no question for conscience' sake." Nay, it was accounted a profane thing amongst them, to eat any meat at their private tables, whereof they had not first sacrificed to their gods; as appeareth by the Greek proverb, ἄθυτα ἐσθίειν, used by Anacreon and others as a brand of a notorious wicked man, viz. One that would eat meat whereof he had not sacrificed.

Now having thus shown, that both amongst the Jews under the law, and the Gentiles in their pagan worship (for paganism is nothing but judaism degenerate), it was ever a solemn rite to join feasting with sacrifice, and to EAT of those things which had been offered up; the very concinnity and harmony of the thing itself leads me to conceive, that that christian feast under the gospel, called THE LORD'S SUPPER, is the very same thing, and bears the same notion, in respect of the true christian sacrifice of Christ upon the cross, that those did to the Jewish and heathenish sacrifices; and so is "EPULUM SACRIFICIALE," a sacrificial feast—I mean, a feast upon sacrifice; or, "EPULUM EX OBLATIS," a feast upon things offered up to God.—Only this difference arising in the parallel, that because those legal sacrifices were but types and shadows of the true christian sacrifice, they were often repeated and renewed, as well as the feasts, which were made upon them: but now the true christian sacrifice being come, and offered up once for all, never to be repeated, we have therefore no more typical sacrifices left amongst us, but only the feasts upon the true sacrifice still symbolically continued, and often repeated, in reference to that ONE GREAT SACRIFICE, which is always as present in God's sight, and efficacious, as if it were but now offered up for us.

CHAP. II.

An objection taken from the Passover answered. Proved that the Passover was a true sacrifice, and the paschal feast a feast upon a sacrifice, from Scripture, and Jewish authors.

But methinks I hear it objected to me, that the true notion of the Lord's supper is to be derived rather from the passover among the Jews; it being the common opinion of divines, that the Jews had but two sacraments, viz. circumcision and the passover, that answer to those two amongst us, baptism and the Lord's supper: but the Jewish passover had no relation to a sacrifice, being nothing else but a mere FEAST;

and therefore from analogy to the Jewish we cannot make the Lord's supper to be "EPULUM SACRIFICIALE," a feast upon sacrifice.

To which I answer, first, That I know not what warrant there is for that divinity so confidently imposed upon us by some, that the Jews had but two sacraments, circumcision and the Passover; and that it should thence follow by inevitable consequence, that the Lord's supper must ἀντιστοιχεῖν, answer only to the Jewish passover. Sure I am, the Jews had many more. For not to instance that of St. Paul, [1] "Our fathers were all BAPTIZED unto Moses in the cloud, and in the sea," like our christian baptism; "and did all EAT the same spiritual meat (viz. the manna), and did all DRINK the same spiritual drink" (viz. the water of the rock that followed them), like the bread and wine in the christian Lord's supper: nor to examine all the other sacramental ceremonies, which they had, that were almost as many sacraments as ceremonies. These feasts upon the sacrifices, which we have all this while insisted on, were nothing else but true and proper [2] sacraments joined with sacrifices.

But, secondly, I will grant, that the Jewish passover hath a special resemblance to the christian LORD'S SUPPER, although upon other grounds; for I say, undoubtedly the passover was a true and proper sacrifice, and therefore the paschal feast a feast upon a sacrifice: so that this shall still advance and improve our former notion.

For the better conceiving whereof, we must understand, that besides those four general kinds of sacrifices among the Jews beforementioned, the burnt-offering, the sin-offering, the trespass-offering, and the peace-offering; there were some other peculiar kinds of sacrifices, as the masters tell us, viz. these three, בכורים, ומעשר, ופסח, the firstlings of cattle, and the tenth, and the passover. And the reason why these, in the distribution of sacrifices, are thus distinguished by them from all the other general kinds of sacrifices, is thus given by the famous Maimonides upon the Misna of the Talmud, in Massecheth Zebachim, the 6th chapter, לפי שאיתן האדכע פעמים רבות יתחייב היחיר בכל אחד מהם לפי שנוי העניינים והצוכור חייכים בהם בומנים ואלו אינם כן; Because those four forenamed were such kind of sacrifices, as that a private person was often bound to each of them in several cases, and the whole congregation in several reasons; but these three were

[1] 1 Cor. x.

[2] See Cloppenburg in Schola Sacrif. and of the right notion of the Sacrament see Vossius in Thes. Theolog.

not of that nature, being peculiarly restrained to one case or season. Now these three kinds of peculiar sacrifices were in their nature all nearest of kin to the peace-offerings, and are therefore called by the Jewish doctors ודמים לשלמים, like to peace-offerings,—because they were not only killed in the same place, being all קודשימקל ים, light holy things,—and had the אימודום, or inward parts—thereof, to be burnt likewise upon the altar; but also, in that part of them was to be eaten by the owners. Insomuch that the Talmudists put many cases in which a lamb, that was set apart for a passover, and could not be offered in that notion, was to be turned into a peace-offering, as that which was near of kin to it.

But yet these masters tell us, there were three precise differences betwen the *pascha* and the ordinary peace-offering, בסמיבה ונסכים ותנופת חזה ושוק. First, in that there was no laying on of hands upon the passover in the killing of it; for this was no where commanded, as in all the peace-offerings. Secondly, that there was no *mincah* or meat-offering, nor *libamen* or drink-offering, to be joined with it (for so they use to include both in the word Nesachim). Thirdly, that there was no waving of the breast and shoulder for the priests' portion; the reason whereof was, because the priests were bound always to have passover-offerings of their own, as it is expressed Ezra vi. and so needed not any wave-offering.

But that the passovers were, in other respects, of the same nature with the peace-offerings, and therefore true and proper sacrifices, because it is a thing generally not so well understood, and therefore opposed by divers, I shall labor the more fully to convince it. I say, that the passovers were always brought to the tabernacle or the temple, and there presented and offered up to God by the priest, as all sacrifices were; that the blood of them was there sprinkled upon the altar, of which the Hebrew doctors well observe,[1] עקר, הזבח בהויית הדם The very essence of a sacrifice is in sprinkling of the blood;—and also that the Imurim (as they call them), that is, the fat and kidneys, were burnt upon the altar: all this I shall endeavor to demonstrate.

Only first I must premise this, that when I say the passover was brought to the tabernacle, and offered by the priests, I do not mean, that the priests were always bound to kill the passovers: for I grant, that the people were wont to kill their own passovers; and so I find it expressly in the Misna of the Talmud, Massech. Zebach, cap. v. sect. 6. שחט ישראל וקבל הכוהן, All Israel killed the passover, and the

[1] Maimon. in Korban Pesach. c. ii.

priests received the blood.—Which Talmudical expression alludes to that place, Exod. 12: 6, "The whole assembly of the congregation of Israel shall kill it in the evening;" where this seems to be commanded by God. And the practice consonant hereunto, I find intimated at least in Scripture, in Hezekiah's passover, 2 Chron. 30: 17, "There were many in the congregation, that were not sanctified; therefore the Levites had the charge of killing the passover for every one that was not clean, to sanctify it unto the Lord." Where R. Solomon writeth thus: אל תתמה למה לא שחטו בעלים עצמם, Wonder not, why the owners themselves did not kill them, for it followeth, that many in the congregation had not sanctified themselves; therefore the Levites were appointed in their place to sanctify the work unto the Lord.—And R. D. Kimchi to the same purpose: "Though many of them did eat the passover in uncleanness, it being a case of necessity, in that they had no time to purify themselves; yet for them to come into the court, and kill the passovers, this was not needful, when it might be done as well by the Levites." And therefore the same is to be thought likewise of the priests and Levites killing the passover, (Ezra vi.) because the people returning newly from captivity were not yet purified, as it is there also partly intimated.

But this doth not at all hinder our proceeding, or evince the passover not to be a sacrifice: for it is a great mistake in most of our learned writers, to think, that the killing of every sacrifice was proper to the priest; whereas indeed there was no such matter; but as we have already granted, that the people commonly killed their own passovers, so we will affirm, that they did the same concerning any of the other sacrifices. Lev. 1: 4, 5, it is said concerning the burnt-offering, "If any man bring a burnt-offering to the Lord, he shall lay his hand upon the head of the burnt-offering, AND HE SHALL KILL the bullock before the Lord, and the priests, Aaron's sons, shall take the blood." So concerning the peace-offerings, chap. 3: 2, "He shall lay his hand on the head of his offering, and KILL it at the door of the tabernacle of the congregation:" and concerning the sin-offering, chap. 4: 24, He shall lay his hand on the head of the goat, and KILL it at the place where they kill the burnt-offering before the Lord." We see then what incompetent judges our own authors are in Jewish customs and antiquities. The Jewish doctors and antiquaries (which are so much contemned by some of our magisterial dictators in all learning) would have taught us here another lesson. For thus Maimonides, in Biath Hammik. speaks to this point, שחוטת קורשים כשרה בודים אפילו קודשי קודשים בין קורשי יחיר ובין קורשי ציבור, שנא ושחט את בן הבקר that is, the kil-

ling of the holy things may lawfully be done by strangers, yea, of the most holy things, whether they be the holy things of a private person, or of the whole congregation: as it is said, Lev. i, "And he shall kill the bullock; and the priests, Aaron's sons, shall take the blood." The same is avouched again afterward, by the same author, in Maaseh Korban, chap. v.

But if any one would therefore fain know, what were properly the priests' actions about the sacrifice, which might not be done lawfully by any stranger, the same Jewish authors have a trite rule amongst them concerning it: מקבלה ואילך מצות כהונה, the receiving of the blood, and all the other parts, that were to be offered up, and all that followeth after that, belongeth to the priests' office.—And Isaac Abarbanel will teach us more particularly, in his comment on Leviticus, that there were five things to be done by the owners of the sacrifice that brought it, and five things by the priest that offered it. The first five were, laying on of hands, killing, slaying, cutting up, and washing of the inwards; the other five were, the receiving of the blood in a vessel, the sprinkling of it upon the altar, the putting[1] of fire upon the altar, the ordering of the wood upon the fire, and the ordering of the pieces upon the wood. Hence it is, that upon the forequoted place of the Misna (which I brought to show, that the people did kill the passovers), Rabbi Obadiah of Bartenora thus glosseth, שחט ישראל אם ידצה שהשחיטה בישרה בזרום בכל הקרבנות, i. e. The people of Israel might all kill the passovers themselves, if they pleased, because the KILLING OF ANY SACRIFICE might be done lawfully by strangers; but the priests received the blood.

Now, I come to prove what I have undertaken. And, first, that the passover was always brought to the tabernacle or the temple, and there offered unto God as the other sacrifices were, is clear enough from Deut. 16: 5, "Thou shalt not sacrifice the passover within any of the gates which the Lord thy God giveth thee; but at the place which the Lord thy God chooseth to place his name in, there thou shalt sacrifice." And that this is to be understood not of Jerusalem in general, but of the tabernacle or temple, appears, both because the same expressions are used of the other sacrifices, Deut. 12: 5, 6, 11, 14, where it is clearly meant, that they were to be brought to the temple; and because it is certain, that every thing that was killed amongst the Jews, was either to be killed at the door of the tabernacle of the congregation, or else might be killed indifferently in any part of the whole land.

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[1] Of this vide Magistrorum Placita.

Let us now see, how the Jewish doctors comment upon this place, men better skilled in these rites than our own authors are, R. MOSES BEN MAIMON, in Halachah Pesach, cap. i. אין שוחטין את הפסח, etc. They kill not the passover but in the court, as the rest of the holy things; yea, in the time when high places were permitted, they sacrificed not the passover in a private high place; for it is said, Deut. xvi. "Thou mayest not sacrifice the passover in any of thy gates." We have learnt, that this is a prohibition to kill the passover in any private high place, although it be in a time when high places are permitted.—From which excellent gloss of theirs, it appeareth, that there was more preciseness in bringing of the passover to the place where God's name was put, and offering it at the tabernacle or the temple, than any of the other sacrifices. And this was the reason, as was before intimated out of KIMCHI, why in Hezekiah's passover the Levites had the charge of killing, because the passovers were to be killed in the court of the temple, whither the people being unclean could not enter; for otherwise, if it had been done without the court, they might as well have killed their own passovers as have eaten them. And this may be further confirmed, in that the passover is called a *korban:* (Numb. 9: 7,) "When certain men were defiled by a dead body, that they could not keep the passover, they came to Moses, and said, Wherefore are we kept back, that we may not OFFER an OFFERING to the Lord in his appointed season?" And again, ver. xiii. "If any one be clean, and forbeareth to keep the passover, even that soul shall be cut off, because he brought not an OFFERING (or a KORBAN) to the Lord in his appointed season." Nothing was called an OFFERING, or a KORBAN, but that which was brought and offered up to God at the tabernacle or temple where his name was put.

That the blood of the passovers was to be sprinkled by the priest, and fat only to be burnt upon the altar, although this must needs follow from the former, yet I prove it more particularly thus: (Exod. 23: 18,) "Thou shalt not offer the blood of my sacrifice with leavened bread; neither shall the fat of my feast remain until the morning." For by the general consent of the Jewish scholiasts, and all those Christian interpreters that I have seen, this place is to be understood only of the passover; and therefore ONKELOS, that famous Chaldee paraphrast, for דם זבחי the blood of my sacrifice—made no question but it read דם פסחי the blood of my passover.—But it appears undoubtedly from a parallel place in the 34th chapter of the same book, ver. 23, 25, 26, where those 17, 18, and 19th verses of the 23d chapter are again repeated: "Thrice in the year shall all your men-children appear before

the Lord.—Thou shalt not offer the blood of my sacrifice with leaven, neither shall the sacrifice of the feast of the passover be left unto the morning. The first of the first-fruits of thy land thou shalt bring into the house of the Lord thy God. Thou shalt not seethe a kid in its mother's milk." Here what was wanting in the former is supplied; "Neither shall the sacrifice of the feast of the PASSOVER be left unto the morning." And I have set down the whole context with it, because it will be needful, for the better clearing of it, to consider its coherence with other verses, which is the very same in both chapters; and Isaac Abarbanel hath set it down excellently in this manner.

First, therefore, saith he, when God had spoken of the Jews appearing thrice before him every year, viz. at the feast of the passover or of unleavened bread, the feast of weeks or Pentecost, the feast of tabernacles or in-gathering, ביון שהגיד שלשת החגים החם נתן בכל אחד מהם משפט מיוחד, i. e. When he had spoken of these three feasts, he subjoins immediately, some rule concerning every one of them in particular:—First, for the passover, in those words, "Thou shalt not offer the blood of my sacrifice with leaven, neither shall the sacrifice of the feast of the passover be left until the morning:" Secondly, for the feast of Pentecost, in those, "The first of the first-fruits of the land thou shalt bring into the house of the Lord thy God:" Thirdly, for the feast of tabernacles or in-gathering; "Thou shalt not seethe a kid in his mother's milk;" which words, for want of this light of the context, were never yet sufficiently explained by any of our interpreters. And the thread of this coherence alone led Abarbanel very near the true meaning of them, ere he was aware: היותר נראה בזה שהיה ממעשה עובדי עבודת אלילים בזמן קבוציהם לעשות כן רל לבשל הגדוים בחלב בזמן אסיפת התבואות לחשבם שבזה יתדצו לאלהיהם, i. e. It seems most probable, that this command was occasioned from a custom among the idolatrous heathens, that at the time of their gathering in of fruits, they were wont to boil a kid in the dam's milk, thinking, that by this means, they were made acceptable to their gods, and did procure a blessing by it.—To confirm which gloss, he tells us of a custom somewhat like to this, used in his time in some parts of Spain.

But because Abarbanel doth not tell his tale so handsomely as he should, I will help him out a little from an ancient Karraite, whose comment I have seen upon the Pentateuch, MS. (for the monuments of these Karraite Jews were never yet printed, and are very rarely seen in these European parts), and it is thus: "It was a custom of the ancient heathens, when they had gathered in all their fruits, to take a kid, and boil it in the dam's milk, and then דרך בשפה, in a magical way, to go

about and besprinkle with it all their trees and fields, and gardens and orchards; thinking, by this means, they should make them fructify, and bring forth fruit again more abundantly the following year." Wherefore, God forbid his people, the Jews, at the time of their in-gathering, to use any such superstitious or idolatrous rite. And I produce this the rather, because Abarbanel, towards the end of his comment on this place, mentions a gloss of some KARRAITISH author upon it, although it be altogether unlike to this, which we have here related. וחבמי הקראים כתבו בטעם לא תבשל גוי שלא תתעדב חפדה עם העקרים Scribunt sapientes Karræorum, Ne coquas hœdum in lacte matris suæ, hoc est, Ne commisceatur germen cum radicibus.

But to return. As from the coherence of the whole context thus cleared, it is manifest, that this verse in both places is to be understood only of the passover; so it may be further confirmed from the Talmudists, who ever expound it in this sense, as appears by the Misna in Zebachin, chapter the sixth: השוחט את הפסח על החמץ עובד בלא תעשה He that killeth the passover with leaven, sinneth against a negative command—(which is more amongst the Jews than to sin against a positive), viz. that in these places already quoted, "Thou shalt not offer the blood of my sacrifice with leaven;" from whence they collected, as Maimonides tells us, that they were to put away leaven the fourteenth day, a day before the killing of the passover. Nay, this place cannot possibly be understood in any other sense, as of sacrifices in general, because leaven was sometimes commanded with sacrifices, as Lev. 7: 13.

But that the blood of the passovers was sprinkled, may be demonstrated further, not only from that of Hezekiah's passover, 2 Chron. 30: 16, "The priests sprinkled the blood, which they received from the hand of the Levites; for there were many in the congregation that were not sanctified; therefore the Levites had the charge of killing the passovers;" but also from Josiah's, chap. 35: 11, which can no ways be evaded; "They (that is), the Levites, killed the passover, and the priests sprinkled the blood from their hands, and the Levites flayed them." Now the sprinkling of the blood is the essence of a sacrifice, as before we noted from the Jewish doctors. And therefore the passover must needs be a sacrifice: ὅπερ ἔδει δεῖξαι.

For a confirmation of all this, I will describe punctually the whole manner of the PASCHAL SACRIFICE from the Misna of the Jewish Talmud, a monument of such antiquity, as cannot be distrusted in these rites. Nothing (say they) was killed before the morning sacrifice; and after the evening sacrifice, nothing but the passover. The evening

sacrifice was usually killed between the eighth and ninth hour (that is, half an hour after two in the afternoon), and offered between the ninth and tenth (that is, half an hour after three). But in the evening of the passover, the daily sacrifice was killed an hour sooner; and after that began the killing of the passover, which was to be done between the two evenings; whereof the first began at noon, from the sun's declination towards the west, the second at sun-set. Yet the *pascha* might be killed before the daily sacrifice, if there were but one to stir the blood, and keep it from coagulating, till the blood of the daily sacrifice were sprinkled; for that was always to be sprinkled first. The passovers were always killed by three several companies. When the court was once full, they shut the doors, and the priests stood all in their ranks, with round vessels in their hands, to receive the blood; those that were of gold, in a rank by themselves, and those that were of silver; all without bottoms, lest they should be set somewhere on the ground, and the blood congeal in them. And they killed the passovers, as the peace-offerings, in any part of the court, because they were קודשים קלים, the less holy things;—as קודשי קודשים, the holy of holies,—were always to be killed at the north side of the altar. The priests then took the blood, and gave it from one to another, till it came to him that stood next the altar; and he sprinkled it all at once towards the bottom of the altar, which was a square of thirty-two cubits, save that the south-east horn had no bottom. After the blood was sprinkled, the lamb was flayed, and cut up, the *imurim*, or inwards, taken out and laid upon the altar; then the owner took up the lamb, with the skin of it, and carried it to his own home. The first company having ended, then the second came in, and afterward the third; and for every company they began a new HALLEL, and sang all the while the passovers were killing; and when they had finished the *hallel*, they sang it over a second time; and when they had gone over it a second time, they began it a third time; although it was never known, that the third time they sang out the *hallel* quite, or came any further than אהבתי[1] before the priests had done.

But because, besides these Talmudistic Jews, there is another sect of KARRAITES, mentioned before (that reject all Talmudical traditions, which are not grounded upon Scripture), though little known amongst us, yet famous in the orient; I will produce one testimony of theirs

[1] אהבתי I love the Lord, etc. is the beginning of Psalm cxvi. being part of the *hallel* or hymn sung at that time, which began at Ps. cxiii. and reached to the end of Ps. cxviii.

also from an ancient manuscript, that so it may appear we have the full consent of all Jewish antiquity for this opinion. The author's name to me is uncertain, because the papers have lost both their beginning and end. But they contain in them divers large and complete discourses upon several arguments in the Karraite way, as about the Jewish year, the sabbath, the passover, etc. Concerning the passover, he divides his discourses into several chapters, whereof the title of one is this, במקום הקרבת הפסח ואכילתו, concerning the place where the passover was to be offered and eaten;—where he thus begins: דע שהקרבת הפסח חוא במקום המובחר בכתוב לא תיכל לזבוח את הפסח באחד שעריך ומקום שחיטתו בעזרה ושפיכת דמו אל יסוד המזבח ואימודיו היו נקטדום במובח, i. e. Know, that the offering of the passover was always in the place which God had chosen (to put his name there), as it is written,—"Thou shalt not sacrifice the passover within any of thy gates; and the place of the killing of the passover was in the court called Hesra, and the blood of it was poured out towards the bottom of the altar, and the *imurim* or inward parts of it were burnt upon the altar, etc.

Hence it was, that when Cestius once demanded what the number of the Jews was that resorted to Jerusalem, at the time of their solemn feasts, the priests made answer, and told him exactly how many lambs and kids were sacrificed at the passover, *εἰκοσίπεντε μυριάδες, πρόσδε πεντακισχίλια ἑξακόσια*, twenty-five myriads five thousand and six hundred;—which they could not have done, had not they sacrificed them at the temple.

But what need have we of any more dispute? When the passover was first kept in Egypt, were not the paschal lambs there killed in a sacrificial and expiatory way, when the blood thereof was to be sprinkled upon the houses, for God to look upon, and so pass over them? It is true, they were killed in every private house; but the reason of that was, because there were then priests in every family, viz. the [1] first-born, which were afterward redeemed, when the children of Israel gave up the whole tribe of Levi to God for his service. Such priests as these were those whom Moses sent to sacrifice, Exod. 24: 5, called there *young men;* "Moses sent young men of the children of Israel, which offered burnt-offerings, and sacrificed peace-offerings to the Lord;" where Onkelos the Chaldee paraphrast reads it ישלח ית בוכרי, he sent the first-born:—to which agreeth the Arabic translation of R.

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[1] Vide claris. Seldenum de Succes. in Pontificat. Hebræor. l. i. c. i. et de Succes. ad Leges Heb. l. i. c. v.

Saadiah, and the Persian of Tawasius, as Mr. Selden notes, whom I cannot without honor mention, as the glory of our nation for oriental learning.

And was not the killing of the passover a special type of the death of Christ, the true sacrifice of the world? Give me leave to note one thing to this purpose, upon the credit of Justin Martyr, in his dialogue with Trypho, that in the ancient Hebrew copies of the Bible, there was in the book of Ezra a speech of his, which he made before the passover, expounding the mystery thereof concerning Christ; which, because it favored the Christians, was timely expunged by the Jews. The speech was this: *Καὶ εἶπεν Ἐσδρὰς τῷ λαῷ, τοῦτο τὸ πάσχα ὁ Σωτὴρ ἡμῶν καὶ ἡ καταφυγὴ ἡμῶν. Καὶ ἐὰν διανοηθῆτε, καὶ ἀναβῇ ὑμῶν ἐπὶ τὴν καρδίαν, ὅτι μέλλομεν αὐτὸν ταπεινοῦν ἐν σημείῳ, καὶ μετὰ ταῦτα ἐλπίσωμεν ἐπ οὐτὸν, οὐ μὴ ἐρημωθῇ ὁ τόπος οὗτος εἰς τὸν ἅπαντα χρόνον, λέγει ὁ θεὸς τῶν δυνάμεων. Ἐὰν δὲ μὴ πιστεῦσητε αὐτῷ, μηδὲ εἰσακούσητε τοῦ κηρύγματος αὐτοῦ, ἔσεσθε ἐπίχαρμα τοῖς ἔθνεσι.* i. e. Et dixit Esdras populo, Hoc pascha Salvator noster et perfugium nostrum. Et si in animum induxeritis, et in cor vestrum ascenderit, quod humiliaturi eum simus in signo, et postea speraturi in eum, non desolabitur locus iste in omne tempus, dicit Deus exercituum. Sin in eum, non credideritis, neque audieritis annunciationem ejus, deridiculum eritis gentibus.—Remarkable it is, if it be true; and the author deserves the better credit in it, because he was a Samaritan, and therefore might be the better skilled in Jewish writings. But however, I am sure the apostle tells us, not only that the passover was a type of Christ, in respect of his death, but also that the proper notion of the paschal feast was to be a feast upon sacrifice, in those words, 1 Cor, 5: 7, 8, "Christ our passover is sacrificed for us; therefore let us keep the feast (that is, the paschal feast upon this sacrificed Christ) with the unleavened bread of sincerity and truth." Where, alluding to that common Jewish custom of feasting upon sacrifices, of which we have before spoken, he implies, that the paschal supper was a feast of the same nature, a sacrificial feast.

CHAP. III.

An answer to some objections against the passover's being a sacrifice: and the controversy about the day upon which the Jews kept the passover about the time of our Saviour's death discussed. Proved against Scaliger, and others of that opinion, that no translation of feasts from one Feria to another were then in use.

But yet we will not dissemble, what there is of any moment, either in antiquity or reason, against our own opinion, ere we let this discourse pass, but subject all to an impartial view.

And first, the authority of Philo, who, in his third book De Vita Mosis, speaks thus concerning the passover: *Ἐν ᾗ οὐχ οἱ μὲν ἰδιῶται προσάγουσι τῷ βωμῷ τὰ ἱερεῖα, θύουσι δ' οἱ ἱερεῖς· ἀλλὰ νόμου προστάξει σύμπαν τὸ ἔθνος ἱερᾶται, τῶν κατὰ μέρος ἑκάστου τὰς ὑπὲρ αὐτῶν θυσίας ἀνάγοντες τότε καὶ χειρουργοῦντες. Ὁ μὲν οὖν ἄλλος ἅπας λεὼς ἐγεγήθει καὶ φαιδρὸς ἦν, ἑκάστου νομίζοντος ἱερωσύνῃ τετιμῆσθαι·* i. e. In qua non ut alias plebeii homines victimas adducunt ad altare mactandas a sacerdotibus, sed jubente lege tota gens sacrificat, dum pro se quisque mactat hostiam suis manibus. Tunc universus populus exultabat, unoquoque existimante se sacerdotii dignitate honoratum.—And again, in his book De Decalogo: *Ἐν ᾗ θύουσι πανδημεὶ αὐτῶν ἕκαστος, τοὺς ἱερεῖς αὐτῶν οὐκ ἀναμένοντες, ἱερωσύνην τοῦ νόμου χαρισαμένου τῷ ἔθνει παντὶ, μίαν ἡμέραν ἐξαίρετον ἀνὰ πᾶν ἔτος, εἰς αὐτουργίαν θυσιῶν.* Quando populariter singuli sacrificant, non exspectatis sacerdotibus, ipsi permissu legis fungentes sacerdotio, quotannis per unum diem destinatum huic negotio.

But to this we answer, that Philo doth not here deny the passover to be a sacrifice, but confirm it rather, in that he calls it often, here and elsewhere, *θυσία*, and saith, that they did *ἀνάγειν*, bring it to the altar,—and that the people did *ἱερᾶσθαι*, sacrifice;—and doth only distinguish this paschal sacrifice from all the other sacrifices in this, that here, according to his opinion, every one of the people was *ἱερωσύνῃ τετιμημένος*, honored with the priestly office,—and that the law did *ἱερωσύνην παντὶ τῷ ἔθνει χαρίζεσθαι*, make every one a priest for that time, to offer up their own passover.—But moreover, it is well known, that Philo,[1] though he were a Jew by nation, yet was very ignorant of Jewish customs, having been born and bred up at Alexandria: and we have a specimen of his mistakes here, in that he seems to make this

[1] Scalig E. lench. Trihær. cap. xxv. circa finem. Item in Emend. Temp. de Cyclo Judæorum Karraim. et Hug. Grotius in Matt. xxvi.

difference between the passover and the other sacrifices, that they were only killed by the priest, but the people themselves killed their own passovers, *νόμου προστάξει*, and *νόμου χαρισαμένου*, according to the law; —where he means doubtless that, in Exod. 12: 16, "the whole assembly of the congregation of Israel shall kill it." For this is that *solenne delirium* of our late authors also, which we have chastised before. But, if he mean moreover, that the people did not only kill their passovers, but do all other priestly offices concerning them, when he says they were *ἱερωσύνῃ τετιμημένοι*: this, as it hath no ground from Scripture (and, I think, will hardly find a patron now to defend it), so it doth not prejudice our opinion of the passover's being a sacrifice, but still much confirm it.

Secondly, it may seem to some a kind of impossibility to conceive, how so many sacrifices, as there must be at every passover, could all be offered upon one altar, since there were no more by the law permitted.

To which, nevertheless, I need not answer any thing but this; that there was nothing but the fat and some of the inwards burnt upon the altar; and that the bigness of the altar was greater than perhaps is ordinarily conceived: for under the second temple, the area thereof, upon the top, was a square of twenty-eight cubits, as the Talmudists constantly relate; to which Josephus also agreeth very near, if the difference of those cubits, which he useth, be allowed. Only they may please to learn from the instance of Josiah's passover, which was said to be so great, that [1] "there was no passover like to that kept in Israel, from the days of Samuel the prophet, unto that time," that this was possible to be done; for it either is or must be confessed, that then they were all offered upon the altar.

But, lastly, we must confess ingenuously, that there is one great difficulty yet behind, concerning our Saviour's last passover, which, according to the general consent of our best divines, critics, and chronologers, was kept a day before the Jews kept their passover: whether therefore his paschal lamb, which he with his apostles did then eat, were first sacrificed at the temple; and how could that be?

Where, not to engage ourselves any more than needs we must, in that nice and perplexed but famous controversy, concerning the time of the Jewish passover about our Saviour's death; it will not be amiss, first to take notice, that the Latin church ever maintained the contrary opinion against the Greeks, viz. that the Jews kept the passover on the

[1] 2 Chron. xxxv.

same night which our Saviour did: and though it be true, that of later times most of our best learned authors have quitted that opinion of the Latins, and closed altogether with the Greeks, as Paulus Burgensis, Munster, Scaliger, and Casaubon; yet, notwithstanding, our countryman, Mr. Broughton (understanding, perhaps, better than they did, that the Jewish passover was a true and proper sacrifice, and first, according to God's command, was to be offered up to God, before feasted on), espied a difficulty here concerning our Saviour's passover (which they took no notice of), that could not easily be solved; and therefore, he thought good *scindere nodum*, as Alexander did, to cut the knot which he could not loose,—and absolutely to deny, that the Jewish passover, and our Saviour's, were then celebrated on two several nights. And he is of late seconded by Johannes Cloppenburg, a Belgic divine (in an epistle written upon this argument to Ludovicus De Dieu), insisting upon the very same ground, because the paschal lamb, which Christ with his disciples did eat, could not have been sacrificed at the temple, unless it had been at the same time when the Jewish passover was solemnly celebrated. His words to this purpose, expressing fully Mr. Broughton's sense, are these: "Non potuit mactari agnus paschalis extra templum Hierosolymitanum: In templo mactari non potuit citra generalem populi consensum: Quare neque dies mactationis potuit anticipari." It follows, "Vel ergo dicendum Christum comedisse agnum non mactatum in templo, atque hoc facto (quod absit) legem violasse; (juxta legem enim agnus privatim comedendus e templo deferendus domi erat in ædes privatas, post igne absumtam in templo adipem, et sanguinem delatum ad altare); vel Judæos eodem tempore cum Christo pascha celebrasse."

But I must confess, although I am as much addicted to that hypothesis of the passover's being a sacrifice, and as tender of it as Mr. Broughton could be, or any body else; yet I cannot but yield myself captive to truth, on which side soever it presents itself, and though it be *εἰς καθαίρεσιν τῶν ἰδίων* (as Aristotle saith a philosopher should do), to the destruction of our own phenomena.

And indeed those two places especially, brought out of St. John's gospel, to prove that the Jews kept their passover the day after our Saviour did his, seem to me to be unanswerable, nor any way cured by those *σοφὰ φάρμακα*, which are applied to them.

The first is chap. 19: 14, where, the next day after Christ had kept his passover with his disciples, when Pilate delivered him up to the Jews to be crucified, it is said, that it was then *παρασκευὴ τοῦ Πάσχα*, the preparation of the passover; where they tell us, that by the prepa-

ration of the passover is meant the preparation of the sabbath, on which the second day of the passover fell. But, *En jecur criticum!* as Scaliger sometimes cries out; and what a far-fetched conceit is this!

The second is that in chap. 18: 28, When Jesus was led into Pilate's judgment-hall, early in the morning, it is said, that the Jews themselves went not into the judgment-hall, lest they should be defiled, but that they might eat the passover. Here we are told, that by eating the passover is meant the eating of the *chagigah*, that was killed the day before with the passover, whereof something, perhaps, remained till the day following. And this gloss is little better than the former; for, although they appeal to that place in Deut. 16: 2, to prove, that the *chagigah* was sometimes called by the name of *passover*, which indeed, if our English translation were authentic, would make something for them; "Thou shalt therefore sacrifice the passover unto the Lord thy God of the flock and the herd," as if there had been a passover of oxen, as well as of sheep; yet in the Hebrew the words run thus, וזבחת פסח ליהוה אלהיך צאן ובקר, which, according to a several punctuation, and a several supplying of something that must be understood, may be expounded several ways; any of which is far better than that which our English translators have unhappily pitched upon.

Onkelos, in his paraphrase (which seldom merits that name, being indeed commonly nothing but a rigid version, reads it thus, ותבום פסחא קדם יהוה אלהיך מן בני ענא ונכסת קדשיא מן תורי, i. e. And thou shalt sacrifice the passover before the Lord thy God of the sons of the flock, and the peace-offerings (thereof) of oxen;—which interpretation is followed by R. Solomon and Aben-Ezra, צאן לחיוב הפסח ובקר לשלמים, i. e. sheep for the passover, and oxen for the peace-offerings, or the *chagigah*.—And it may be confirmed from that of Josiah's passover, 2 Chron. 35: 7, "Josiah gave to the people, of the flock, lambs and kids, all for the passover-offerings, to the number of thirty thousand, and three thousand bullocks:" where the bullocks, or the herd, are divided from the passover-offerings, because they served for the peace-offerings, or the *chagigah*, as appeareth from v. 13, "They roasted the passovers with fire, according to the ordinance; but the OTHER HOLY OFFERINGS (that is, the peace-offerings, or *chagigah*) sod they in pots, and cauldrons, and pans." Nachmanides hath another interpretation of it to this purpose, יצוה בפסח והוא השה שהזביד כבד וצאן ובקר אלים ועזים ובני בקר לחוג חגיגה, i. e. He commandeth here the passover, which was a lamb, as he had said before—(making the pause there); and צאן ובקר, the flock and the herd, or the sheep and the kids, and the young bullocks, for the *chagigah*;—giving other

instances, in which the conjunctive particle *vau*, which he doth here supply, is in like manner to be understood.

And this exposition is rather approved than the former, not only by Abarbanel, but also by the Karraite, which I have before commended; who quoting one R. Aaron for the author of it, doth express it thus: ויהיה מאמר וזבחת מושך עצמו ואחר עמו וזבחת פסח ליהוה אלהיך יזבחת צאן ובקר במו ולא למדתי חכמה ודעת קישים אדע, i. e. The word וזבחת (Thou shalt sacrifice) is to be repeated ἀπὸ κοινοῦ before *the flock and the herd*, thus,—And thou shalt sacrifice the passover to the Lord thy God, and thou shalt sacrifice sheep and oxen, or the flock and the herd; as in like manner, Prov. 30: 3, the particle (לא *not*) is to be repeated ἀπὸ κοινοῦ from the former part of the verse.—So that it cannot hence be proved, that the peace offerings, offered with the passover, were ever called by the name of passover.

There is another place in the same evangelist, that hath not been observed by any one, to this purpose, which, if it were rightly understood, would be as clear a testimony as any of the rest. And it is in the 19th chapter, verse 31, ἦν γὰρ μεγάλη ἡ ἡμέρα ἐκείνη τοῦ Σαββάτου, for that sabbath-day was a great day.—*Μεγάλη ἡμέρα*, in the Greek of the Hellenists, is used for the first, or the last day of every solemn feast, in which there was a holy convocation to the Lord. This appeareth from Is. 1: 13: "Your new-moons and sabbaths, the calling of assemblies (which was the first and last day of the feast), I cannot away with:" which the Septuagint render thus, *Τὰς Νουμηνίας ὑμῶν καὶ τὰ Σάββατα, καὶ τὰς μεγάλας ἡμέρας*, Your new-moons and sabbaths, and your *great days*.—For the last day of the feast we have it used by our evangelist, chap. vii. ver. 27. "In the last day, the *great day* of the feast, *ἡμέρᾳ τῇ μεγάλῃ τῆς ἑορτῆς*; and doubtless by the same evangelist for the first day of the feast, in this place; and therefore the Jews did not eat their passover till the night before, which was the same night our Saviour was crucified.

Which may be strengthened further by this argument; that if the Jews had celebrated their Passover the same night which our Saviour did his, it is certain, they would never have gone about immediately with swords and staves to have apprehended him, and then have brought him to the high-priest's hall, and afterward have arraigned him at Pilate's judgment seat, and lastly have crucified him; all the same day. For the first day of unleavened bread was, by the law, a holy convocation to the Lord, on which it was not lawful to do any work; and we know the Jews were rigid enough in observing these legal ceremonies.

If then it must be granted, that our Saviour, with his disciples, kept the Passover the night before the vulgar Jews did celebrate it, our next work is to show, how it might be probable, that our Saviour's passover was first sacrificed at the temple.

And here, perhaps, I might run for shelter to that story in Suidas, upon the word *Ἰησοῦς*, that Christ was enrolled into the number of the two-and-twenty legal priests, that served at the altar, from the pretended confession of an ancient Jew in Justinian's time; and then he might possibly sacrifice his own passover at the temple, though the Jews had not solemnized theirs till the day after; but that I hold this to be a mere fable, and that not only ridiculous but impious.

Or I might take up the opinion of the Greeks, that Christ did not keep a true legal Passover, but a feast of unleavened bread in imitation of it; or, as the learned Hugh Grotius[1] (who hath lately asserted this opinion) expresseth it, not *Πάσχα θύσιμον*, but *μνημονευτικὸν*, such as the Jews at this day keep, because the temple being down, their sacrifices are all ceased. But this opinion hath been exploded by most of our late authors; and indeed I can no way satisfy myself in it, and therefore will not acquiesce in this answer.

But before we are able to give a true account of this query, we must search a little deeper into the true ground of this difference between our Saviour's Passover and the Jews'.

The common opinion is, that the Jews in our Saviour's time were wont to translate their festivals from one *Feria* to another upon several occasions; as, whenever two festivals were immediately to follow one another, to join them into one; and therefore, when any fell upon the sixth *Feria*, to put it over to the next *Feria* or the sabbath, to avoid the concurrence of two sabbaths together; in the same manner as the Jews use to do in their calendar at this day, where they have several rules to this purpose, expressed by abbreviatures, thus, *Adu*, *Badu*, *Gahaz*, *Zabad*, *Agu*; whereof each letter is a numeral for some *Feria*. The rule for the Passover is בדו, *Badu*; that is, that it should not be kept on the second, fourth, or sixth *Feria*. (There is an extract of a Rabbinical decree to this purpose, under the name of R. Eliezer, in Munster upon Matt. chap. xxvi.) And therefore, at this time, when our Saviour was crucified, the Passover falling upon the sixth *Feria*, or Friday, was, say they, by the Jews translated, according to this rule, to the next *Feria*, and kept on Saturday, or the sabbath; but our Saviour, not regarding these traditions, observed that day precisely which

[1] In Annot. ad Matt. cap. xxvi.

was commanded in the law, ἐν ᾗ ἔδει θύεσθαι τὸ πάσχα, (Luke 22: 7.) that is, as they expound it, "upon which the Passover *ought* to have been killed:" which was Friday, the day before.

But, under favor, I conceive, that all these decrees, together with that *ratiocinium*, or calendar, to which they do belong, were not then in use in our Saviour's time (although it be so confidently averred by the incomparable Joseph Scaliger), but long since invented by the Jews. Which I shall make appear;

First, In that the ancient Jews, about and since our Saviour's time, often solemnized as well the Passovers, as the other feasts, upon the *Ferias* next before and after the sabbaths, and those other *Ferias*, which have been made rejectitious since by that calendar. In the Talmudical title Succoth, chapter the last, we read of יום טוב הסמוך לשבת בין לפניה בין לאחריה that is, a feast going immediately before, or following immediately after, the sabbath.—And in Betzah, chap. i. יום טוב חל להיות אחד, and שחל להיות ערב שבת שבת, a feast, that falls to be on the evening of the sabbath, or the day after the sabbath. —In Chagigah, the second chapter, עצרת שחל להיות בערב שבת; which is to the same purpose with the former. More particularly concerning the Passover Pesachim, chap. vii. sect. 10. "Ossa, nervi, et omne residuum agni paschalis, cremantor sexto decimo: si is dies *sabbatum*, decimo septimo." From this and divers like places of the Talmud, Aben Ezra on Lev. 23: 4, observes, בסשנה גם בתלמוד ראי יות שהיה פשח בבדו, There be divers instances in the Misna and the Gemara of the Passovers being kept in *badu*,—that is, on those days, which were made rejectitious in the late calendar, the second, fourth, and sixth *Feria*. Therefore, these translations were not in use when the doctors of the Misna and Gemara lived.

Secondly, in that the Jews ever while the temple stood, observed their new moons and feasts, according to the φάσις or appearance—of the moon, and therefore had no calendar for their rule to sanctify their feasts by, but they were then sanctified by the heavens, as the Misna speaks. This is so clearly delivered by R. Moses Ben Maimon, in that excellent Halachah, entitled, *Kiddush Hacchodesh*, that I wonder so many learned men, that are well skilled in those authors, should miss of it. For having spoken of the rules of observing the φάσις, he then adds, that these were never made use of since the Sanhedrin ceased in the land of Israel, after the destruction of the temple; since which time they have used a calendar, calculated according to the middle motion of the moon. ודבר זה הל כה למשה מסינו הוא שבזמן שיש סנהדרין קובעין עלפי הראייה ובזמן שאין שם סנהדרין קיבעין עלפי

החשבון חזה שאנו משתבים בו היום ואין נזקקין לראיה אלא פעמים שהיה יום שקיבעין בחשבון זה הואיום הראייה או קידם לו ביום או אחריו ביום: Et hæc erat traditio Mosis in monte Sinai, quod omni tempore, quo duraret Sanhedrin, constituerent Neomenias juxta φάσιν· hoc vero tempore, quo jam cessavit Sanhedrin, constituerent secundum calculum hunc astronomicum, quo nos hodie utimur: nec ullo modo jam ad φάσιν nos astringimus, cum sæpe contingat, ut dies, legitimus secundum nostrum calculum vel concurrat cum lunari φάσει, vel antevortat eam unica die, vel etiam subsequatur.—And again, a little after, most punctually; מאימתי התחילו כל ישראל להשוב בחשוב בחשכון זה מסוף חכמי תלמוד בעת שחרבה ארץ ישראל ולא נשאר בית דין קבוע אבל בימי משנה וכן בימי חכמי תלמוד עד ימי אביי ורבא על קבועת ארץ ישראל היו סנמכין: Quando primum cœperunt omnes Israelitæ computare, secundum hunc calculum? A fine doctorum Talmudicorum, quando jam desolata erat terra Israel, neque erat consistorium aut synedrium, quod determinaret: nam per omnes dies doctorum Misnæ et doctorum Gemaræ, usque ad Abæum et Rabbæum, acquiescebant omnes Judæi in sanctione terræ Israelis.—And those rules forementioned of not keeping the several feasts upon such and such *Ferias* were made together with this calendar, as the same author there also avoucheth: אין קיבעין בהשבון זה בימי אוו לפי שהחשבון זה הוא לקבוע הירחוה שמש בהלובה אטעעו לא במקום אטתי לפיבך עשו יום קביעה ויום דחייה, i. e. In this account they never constituted the new-moon of Tisri upon Adu, because this account was made according to the conjunction of the sun and moon in the middle motion; therefore, now they constituted some legitimate and other rejectitious days, which they could not do before, when the new-moon (and therefore all the other feasts) was determined according to the φάσις.

But the Talmud was not completely finished till about the five hundredth year of the Christian era; therefore this Jewish calendar, and these rules concerning the translation of feasts, were not in being till about that time, and so could be no reason of this difference between the time, in which our Saviour solemnized the Passover, and the other Jews.

For further confirmation hereof, we may observe, that the Karraites, which have rejected the fond traditions of the Pharisees, retain still the ancient custom of reckoning their new-moons ἀπὸ τῆς φάσεως, as Scaliger[1] himself hath well observed: though in this he were mistaken, that

[1] Emen. Temp. p. 149, 150.

he thought they had assumed it of late, merely out of hatred to the other Jews, whereas they have kept it in a constant succession from antiquity, and hold it still as necessary by Divine right. אסנם הוא שבל ישדאל מודים בה שמזמן המלבות (saith my author) מההעתקה היי טקרשים החרשים בראיית הידח: ועור מהקש כח הדכוד ערע העגין ממלת חדש יורע שהוא חרוש הדבד והוא חרוש ירחבבל חדש. This is confessed by all Israel, that from the time of the kingdom they were ever wont to consecrate the new-moons by the φάσις· and the very etymon of the word *chodesh* implies so much, for it signifies the renewing of something; so that it is denominated from the change of the moon, or phasis, as the epocha and beginning of it.—And this is one of the great controversies to this day between those two sects of the Jews, the יקראם or Karræi,—and רבנים, or Rabbanæi;—which is grown at length to such a height, that the Karraites, deciphering the conditions of those witnesses, whose testimonies might be accounted valid for the φάσις, make this for one, that they should no way belong to the sect of Rabbinists: which perhaps to observe in the author's own words would not be unpleasant τοῖς φιλαρχαίοις καὶ φιλολόγοις. התנאי השני שלא יהיה הליק בדעתו בקריש החדש מדעת חבמינו וחבה מזת הצד ראוי לקבל ערות חישמעלים מפני שהם חילבים אחדי רעת חבמיני בעגיני הראייה ובריב הזמנים אנו שוים עמהם ואין ראוי לקבל לנו עדות חרבנים מפני שהם חלוקים ממנני ביח ואע פ שאחינו ובשרנו חם אמנם בזח מדו ועצבו את רוח קרשו, i. e. A second condition is, that they be not such, as hold an opinion concerning the sanctification of the new-moon different from the opinion of our wise men concerning the phasis, and in most of their appointed times they agree with us. But we may not receive the testimony of any one that is of the sect of the Rabbins, because they are divided from us in this; and although they be our brethren and our flesh, yet herein they have rebelled and grieved his Holy Spirit.

Having thus disproved the common and received opinion, and removed the false ground of this difference of time between our Saviour's passover and the Jews, we come, in the next place, to lay down the true, which must be derived from that way of reckoning the months, and of determining the ראש החדש, the head or beginning of the month,—which was in use in our Saviour's time, which (as we have shewed already in general) was by the φάσις· so it will be expedient to describe the whole manner of it more particularly from authentic authors.[1]

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[1] Talmud Babyl. in Rosh Hashanah, et Maimon. in Kiddish Hachod.

In the great or outer court of the temple, there was a house called Beth-Jazek, where the senate sat all the thirtieth day of every month, to receive the witnesses of the moon's appearance, and to examine them. And here they always had a feast provided for the entertainment of those that came, to encourage men to come the more willingly. In ancient times they did admit of strangers, and receive their testimony, if it were approved upon examination. But when the heretics (that is, the Christians) afterward grew up, by whom (they say) they were sometimes deluded, they began to grow shy, and to admit of none but such as were approved of to be of the Jews' religion. If there came approved witnesses upon the thirtieth day of the φάσις seen, then the chief man of the senate stood up and pronounced *Mekuddash*, it is sanctified;—and the people standing by caught the word from him, and cried out *Mekuddash*, *Mekuddash*. Whereupon there was notice presently given to all the country; which was done at first by torches from mountain to mountain, till at length the Christians (they say) abused them in that kind also with false fires; wherefore they were fain to send messengers from place to place over the whole land, to give intelligence of the new-moon. But if, when the consistory had sat all the thirtieth day, there came no approved witnesses of the φάσις, then they made an intercalation of one day in the former month, and decreed the following one-and-thirtieth day to be the calends. And yet, notwithstanding, if after the fourth or fifth day there should come some witnesses from afar, that testified they had seen the φάσις in its due time, nay, though they came towards the end of the month (אפילו באו בסוף החדש) the senate, when they had used all means by affrighting them from that testimony, that so, if it were possible, they might decline a new consecration (after they had already made an *embolism* in the former month) if the witnesses remained constant, were then bound to alter the beginning of the month, and reckon it a day sooner, to wit, from the thirtieth day.

Here we see the true ground of the difference of a day, that might arise continually about the calends of the month, and so consequently about any of the other feasts, which did all depend on them; viz. between the true time of the moon's φάσις, upon the thirtieth day, and that of the senate's decree, a day after. For since it appears out of their own monuments, how unwilling they were, having once made a consecration of the *neomenia*, to alter it again; it may be probably conceived, that, in those degenerated times, the senate might many times refuse to accept the testimony of undoubted witnesses: and then, it seems, they had such a canon as this, בית דין שקדשו את החודש בין שנים בין

מוטעים הגה זה מקודש וחייבון חבל לתקן המועים על היום אעפי שזה יורעשטעו, that whatsoever time the senate should conclude of for the calends of the month, though it were certain they were in the wrong, yet all were bound to order their feasts according to it:—Which I cannot think was approved of by our Saviour, and most pious Jews. And, therefore, I conceive it most probable, that this was the very case between our Saviour's passover and the Jews, in that he followed the true φάσις, confirmed by sufficient and assured witnesses; but the other Jews superstitiously observed the pertinacious decree of the senate of Sanhedrin, which was for the day after.

And now, at last, we are come again to the acme of the question that was first propounded, How our Saviour's passover, notwithstanding all this, might be sacrificed the day before those of the other Jews were.

To which I answer, that upon this ground, not only our Saviour and his apostles, but also divers others of the most religious Jews, kept the passover upon the fifteenth day from the true φάσις of the moon, and not from the senate's decree,[1] which I may confirm from the testimony of Epiphanius, that reports there was, at this time, θόρυβος, a tumult and contention, amongst the Jews about the passover; and so we may easily persuade those other evangelists, that intimate Christ's passover to have been solemnized, when many others kept it, to agree with St. John, who assures us, that it was also by divers Jews kept the day after. Now, it was a custom among the Jews, in such doubtful cases as these, which oftentimes fell out, to permit the feasts to be solemnized, or passovers killed, on two several days together. Maimonides affirmeth, that, in the remoter parts of the land of Israel, they always solemnized the feast of the new-moons two days together; nay, in Jerusalem itself, where the senate sat, they kept the new-moon of Tisri, which was the beginning of the year, twice, lest they should be mistaken in it. In the Talmud we have an instance of the passover's being kept two days together, because the new-moon was doubtful, in Gemarah Rosh Hashanah, cap. i. Hence the Karraites, who still keep the ancient custom of observing the moon's φάσις, retain it as a rule to this day, לעשות שני ימים מספק, observare duos dies propter dubium.—Nay, the Rabbinical Jews themselves, since they have changed the phasis for the synod or conjunction of the moon in the middle motion, in imitation hereof, still observe to keep the passover two days together, *iisdem ceremoniis*, as the learned author of the Jewish Syna-

[1] In Panario Hær. ii.

gogue reports; and Scaliger himself, not only of that, but also of the other feasts, "Judæi post institutionem hodierni computi eandem solennitatem celebrant biduo, propterea quod mensem incipiant a medio motu lunæ: itaque מספק מחברות המארים propter dubium conjunctionis luminarium, Pascha celebrant 15, et 16, Nisan, Pentecosten 6, et 7, Sivan, Scenopegia 15, et 16, Tisri; idque vocant יום טוב שני של גליות, Festum secundum exsiliorum.

Now then we see, that nothing hinders, but that the passover might be a sacrifice. And thus we have hitherto cleared the way.

CHAP. IV.

Demonstrated, that the Lord's supper in the Christian church, in reference to the true sacrifice of Christ, is a parallel to the feasts upon sacrifices both in the Jewish religion and heathenish superstition.

But lest we should seem all this while to set up fancies of our own, and then sport with them, we come now to demonstrate and evince, that the Lord's supper, in the proper notion of it, is *epulum ex oblatis*, or a *feast upon sacrifice;* in the same manner with the feasts upon the Jewish sacrifices under the law, and the feasts upon *ΕΙΔΩΛΟΘΥΤΑ*, (things offered to idols) among the heathens: and that from a place of Scripture, where all these three shall be compared together, and made exact parallels to one another.

1 Corinth. Chap. x.

14. Wherefore, my dearly beloved, flee from idolatry.

15. I speak as to wise men, judge ye what I say.

16. The cup of blessing, which we bless, is it not the communion of the blood of Christ? The bread, which we break, is it not the communion of the body of Christ?

18. Behold Israel after the flesh; are not they which eat of the sacrifices partakers of the altar?

20. Now I say, that the things, which the Gentiles sacrifice, they sacrifice to devils, and not to God; and I would not, that ye should have fellowship with devils.

21. Ye cannot drink the cup of the Lord and the cup of devils; ye cannot be partakers of the Lord's table, and the table of devils.

Where the apostle's scope being to convince the Corinthians of the unlawfulness of eating things sacrificed to idols, he doth it in this manner: showing, that though an idol were truly nothing, and things sacrificed to idols were physically nothing, as different from other meats, (as, it seems, they argued, and St. Paul confesses, v. 19,) yet morally and circumstantially, to eat of things sacrificed to idols in the idol's temple, was to consent with the sacrifices, and to be guilty of them.

Which he doth illustrate, first, from a parallel rite in christian religion; where the eating and drinking of the body and blood of Christ, offered up to God upon the cross for us in the Lord's supper, is a real communication in his death and sacrifice: v. 16, "The cup of blessing, which we bless, is it not the communion of the blood of Christ? The bread, which we break, is it not the communion of the body of Christ?"

Secondly, from another parallel of the same rite among the Jews; where always they, that ate of the sacrifices, were accounted partakers of the altar, that is, of the sacrifice offered up upon the altar, v. 18, "Behold Israel after the flesh; are not they which eat of the sacrifices partakers of the altar?" "In veteri lege quicunque admittebantur ad edendum de hostiis oblatis, censebantur ipsius sacrificii, tanquam pro ipsis oblati, fieri participes, et per illud sanctificari;" as a late commentator fully expresses it.

Therefore, as to eat the body and blood of Christ in the Lord's supper, is to be made partaker of his sacrifice offered up to God for us; as to eat of the Jewish sacrifices under the law, was to partake in the legal sacrifices themselves: so to eat of things offered up in sacrifice to idols, was to be made partakers of the idol-sacrifices, and therefore was unlawful.

For the things which the Gentiles sacrifice, they sacrifice to devils; but Christ's body and blood were offered up in sacrifice unto God, and therefore they could not partake of both together, the sacrifice of the true God, and the sacrifice of devils. "Ye cannot drink the cup of the Lord, and the cup of devils; ye cannot be partakers of the Lord's table, and the table of devils." St. Paul's argument here must needs suppose a perfect analogy between these three, and that they are all parallels to one another; or else it hath no strength. Wherefore I conclude from hence, that the *Lord's supper* is the same among Christians, in respect of the Christian sacrifice, that among the Jews the feasts upon the legal sacrifices were, and among the Gentiles the feasts upon the idol sacrifices; and therefore *epulum sacrificiale*, or *epulum ex oblatis*. *ΟΠΕΡ ΕΔΕΙ ΔΕΙΞΑΙ.*

CHAP. V.

The result of the former discourse; that the Lord's supper is not a sacrifice, but a feast upon a sacrifice.

THUS having declared and demonstrated the true notion of the Lord's supper, we see then how that theological controversy, which hath cost so many disputes, whether the Lord's supper be a sacrifice, is already decided: for it is not *sacrificium*, but *epulum* ἐΚ ΤΗΣ ΘΥΣΙΑΣ, not *a sacrifice*, but a feast upon sacrifice;—or else, in other words, not *oblatio sacrificii*, but, as Tertullian excellently speaks, *participatio sacrificii*, not the offering of something up to God upon an altar, but the eating of something which comes from God's altar,—and is set upon our tables. Neither was it ever known amongst the Jews or heathens, that those tables upon which they did eat their sacrifices, should be called by the name of altars. St. Paul, speaking of the feasts upon the idol-sacrifices, calls the places upon which they were eaten, "the table of devils," because the devil's meat was eaten on them; not the altars of devils: and yet doubtless he spake according to the true propriety of speech, and in those technical words, that were then in use amongst them. And, therefore, keeping the same analogy, he must needs call the communion-table by the name of the Lord's table, i. e. the table upon which God's meat is eaten; not his altar, upon which it is offered. It is true, an altar is nothing but a table; but it is a table upon which *God* himself eats, consuming the sacrifices by his holy fire: but when the same meat is given from *God* unto *us* to eat of, the relation being changed, the place on which *we* eat is nothing but a table.

And because it is not enough in any discourse, as Aristotle well observeth in his Ethics, to confute an error, unless we can also show τὸ αἴτιον τοῦ ψεύδους, the cause of that error;—having thus discovered the true notion of the Lord's supper, we may easily discern from hence also, how that mistake grew up, and that by the degeneration of this truth. There is a sacrifice in the Lord's supper symbolically, but not there as offered up to God, but feasted on by us; and so not a sacrifice, but a sacrificial feast; which began too soon to be misunderstood.

CHAP. VI.

The further improvement of that general notion, how the Lord's supper is a federal rite between God and us, at large: concluded with a memorable story out of Maimonides and Nachmanides.

I SHOULD now come to make some further improvement of this general notion of the Lord's supper, by showing what these feasts upon the sacrifice did signify under the law; and then applying the same in a more perfect manner to the Lord's supper under the gospel, being warranted thereunto by that analogy, which is between them. But because there may be divers glosses and interpretations of these feasts upon the sacrifices, which are obvious to every common understanding, we will decline them all, and pitch only upon one, which is not so vulgarly understood; and it is this, that the eating of God's sacrifice was a *federal rite* between God and those that offered them; according to the custom of the ancients, and especially in those oriental parts, to confirm and ratify their covenants by eating and drinking together.

Thus when Isaac made a covenant with Abimelech the king of Gerar, the text saith,[1] "He made him and those that were with him a feast, and they did eat and drink, and rose up betimes in the morning, and sware to one another."

When Laban made a covenant with Jacob, Gen. 31: 44, "Now, therefore, come (saith Laban) let us make a covenant, I and thou, and let it be for a witness between me and thee:" then it follows in the text, "They took up stones, and made a heap, and did eat there upon the heap; and Laban called it *Jegar-sahadutha,*" in his Chaldee tongue, but Jacob (in the Hebrew language) *Galeed,* i. e. a heap of witness; implying, that those stones, upon which they had eaten and drank together, should be a witness against either of them that should first violate that covenant. R. Moses Bar Nachman, in his comment, thus glosseth upon this place, אכלו שם מעט לזכרון שהוא דרך באים בברית לאכול שניהם מלחם אחד לחברה זלאהבה ואהרי ביאם בשבועה ובברית זבח ועשה להם כרה גרולה, i. e. They did eat there a little upon the heap for a memorial; because it was the manner of those that enter into covenant, to eat both together of the same bread, as a symbol of love and friendship. And Isaac Abrabanel much to the purpose, היה מנהג ביניהם שהאוכלים להם על שלחן אחד יחשבו ראחים נאמנים,

[1] Genesis xxvi.

i. e. It was an ancient custom amongst them, that they, which did eat bread together upon the same table, should be accounted ever afterward as entire brethren.—And in this sense he conceiveth that place, Lamentations v. 6, may be expounded; "We have given the hand to the Egyptians and to the Assyrians by fulness of bread," i. e. We have made a covenant with them.

Joshua 9: 14. When the Gibeonites came to the Israelites, and desired them to make a league with them, it is said, "The men of Israel took of their victuals, and asked not counsel of the mouth of the Lord;" that is, they made a covenant with them, as Kimchi learnedly expounds it, לקשו מצירים ואכלו ממנו בברית ברו שיבטחי בחם, Acceperunt de viatico ipsorum, et comederunt cum illis per modum fœderis.—For so it follows afterward in the text, "And Joshua made peace with them."

Hence also was that emphatical expression, Psalm 41: 9, spoken literally by David of Achitophel, "Mine own familiar friend, that did eat of my bread, hath lifted up the heel against me;" but seeming prophetically to glance at Judas, that dipping with Christ in the same dish betrayed him. The singular emphasis of which speech, we, that are unacquainted with this custom of the oriental nations, cannot easily perceive; neither can we any where better learn it, than from that passage of Celsus in Origen, who carping at that history of Judas's betraying Christ in the gospel, as an incredible thing, made, in the meanwhile, an excellent comment upon this prophecy, when he little thought of it. *Ὅτι ἀνθρώπῳ μὲν ὁ κοινωνήσας τραπέζης οὐκ ἂν αὐτῷ ἐπιβουλεύσειεν, πολλῷ πλέον ὁ θεῷ συνευωχηθεὶς οὐκ ἂν αὐτῷ ἐπίβουλος ἐγίνετο*, i. e. Si homini nemo insidiaretur ejusdem mensæ particeps, multo minus Deo;—And Origen's reply to him, which shows, that though this were an unusual thing, yet it sometimes came to pass, is very pregnant also for our purpose: *Τίς γὰρ οὐκ οἶδεν ὅτι πολλοὶ κοινωνήσαντες ἁλῶν καὶ τραπέζης ἐπεβούλευσαν τοῖς συνεστίοις; καὶ πλήρης ἐστὶν ἡ Ἑλλήνων καὶ Βαρβάρων ἱστορία τοιούτων παραδειγμάτων. Καὶ ὀνειδίζων γε ὁ Πάριος Ἰαμβοτοιὸς τὸν Λυκάμβαντα μετὰ ἅλας καὶ τράπεζαν συνθήκας ἀθετήσαντα, φησὶ πρὸς αὐτόν, Ὅρκον δὲ ἐνοσφίσθης μέγαν, ἅλας τε καὶ τράπεζαν·* i. e. Quis ignorat multos ad communionem salis et mensæ adhibitos insidiatos tamen suis contubernalibus? Plena est historia tam Græcorum quam Barbarorum exemplis ejusmodi. Et Parius ille Iamborum scriptor, exprobrans Lycambæ violatum fœdus quod sal et mensa conciliaverat, sic eum alloquitur, sacramentum irritasti magnum, salem atque mensam.—All which makes manifest, what a heinous offence it was accounted anciently to be guilty of the breach of a covenant, which had been confirmed by eating and drinking together.

In the seventh verse of Obadiah, that prophet speaks to Edom in this manner: "All the men of thy confederacy have brought thee to the border; the men, that were at peace with thee, have deceived thee; they, that eat thy bread, have laid a wound under thee."

In the New Testament, that place, John 4: 9, is well observed by Heinsius, in his Aristarchus, to carry this notion, "How is it that thou, being a Jew, askest drink of me, being a woman of Samaria?" "Suavissime dictum (saith that forenamed critic) ex eorum more, qui, cum peregrini essent, aut alieno fuissent animo, animis conciliandis cibum mutuo ac potum alter alterius gustabant."

Wherefore, I think from all these instances I may conclude, that this is the true etymon of that Hebrew word ברית, which signifies a covenant,—or any federal communion betwixt parties, from ברה, commedere,—because it was the constant custom of the Hebrews and oriental nations to establish covenants by eating and drinking together; as hath been showed.

And as the Jews, so likewise did the heathens in the same manner, use to ratify their covenants between parties, by eating together. Lucian in Toxaris reports it of the Scythians, that when any one was injured, and could not revenge himself, the manner was, that he should kill an ox, and cut it into small pieces; which being boiled, he was to sit down by them with his hands behind him (which was a gesture of earnest supplication amongst them), and then whosoever was minded to help him, came, and did eat a piece of his flesh, and so with this ceremony promised to assist him. And this was accounted a covenant of mutual defence between them; whence that Greek proverb, Ἐπὶ βύρσης ἐκαθέζετο, In tergore bovis desedit,—of which Erasmus in his Adages.

Herodotus reporteth of the Persians, that they made their leagues and covenants at feasts; and of the Nasamones, a people of Lybia, that they composed peace by stretching out a cup full of wine to each other, and pledging one another in it. Alexander ab Alexandro relates this of the Thracians and Egyptians, that "e cornibus boum (quæ veteribus poculorum loco erant) vina sibi invicem proprinantes, id firmissimum contracti fœderis vinculum esse putabant." Curtius reporteth of the Macedonians, "quod patrio ritu fœdus, quod sanctissimum vellent haberi, sic inibant, ut panem gladio divisum uterque libaret."

And therefore Alexander, when he fell in love with Roxana, commanded bread forthwith to be brought before him; which when he had divided with his sword, and they had both tasted together of, he took her presently to himself as his wife. And there remaineth a custom to

this day something like this, at weddings, in many countries, that when the bridegroom and bride are come from church, they have a piece of cake brought them, which when the bridegroom hath tasted, he gives it to the bride to taste of likewise, in token of a covenant between them, the Germans still use to conclude bargains, and ratify friendship between parties, by drinking together, as appeareth by that phrase which they have, den Friden trinchen, Pacem bibere.

In like manner, I say, the eating of sacrifices, which were God's meat, was a federal rite between God and those that did partake of them, and signified there was a covenant of friendship between him and them.

For the better conceiving whereof, we must observe, that sacrifices, beside the nature of expiation, had the notion of feasts, which God himself did, as it were, feed upon. Which I explain thus: When God had brought the children of Israel out of Egypt, resolving to manifest himself in a peculiar manner present among them, he thought good to dwell amongst them in a visible and external manner; and therefore, while they were in the wilderness, and sojourned in tents, he would have a tent or tabernacle built, to sojourn with them also. This mystery of the tabernacle was fully understood by the learned Nachmanides, who in few words, but pregnant, thus expresseth it, עקר החפץ במשכן הוא מקום מנוחת השכינה; and again, סור המשכן הוא שיהוה הבביד אשר טבן על הד סיני שוכן עליו: that is, the mystery of the tabernacle was this, that it was to be a place for the Shechinah, or habitation of Divinity to be fixed in:—and this, no doubt as a special type of God's future dwelling in Christ's human nature, which was the *true Schechinah.* But, when the Jews were come into their land, and had there built them houses, God intended to have fixed a dwelling-house also; and therefore his moveable tabernacle was to be turned into a standing temple. Whence, by imitation, came all those temples among the heathens, which they apprehended as so many places of peculiar residence or habitation for their deities, next the heavens, to dwell in; as appears by that of Silius, amongst many others,

> ———Tarpeie Pater, qui templa secundam
> Incolis a cœlo sedem.———

Now the tabernacle or temple being thus as a house for God to dwell in visibly, to make up the notion of dwelling or habitation complete, there must be all things suitable to a house belonging to it. Hence, in the holy place, there must be a table and a candlestick, because this

was the ordinary furniture of a room; as the forecommended Nachmanides observes, סמך השלחן והמנורה שהם כל ים במוהו ויודו על עניך המשכן, i. e. He addeth a table and a candlestick, because these suit the notion of dwelling-house.—The table must have its dishes, and spoons, and bowls, and covers, belonging to it, though they were never used, and always be furnished with bread upon it. The candlestick must have its lamps continually burning.

Hence also there must be a continual fire kept in this house of God's upon the altar, as the *focus* of it: to which notion, I conceive, the prophet Isaiah doth allude, chap. xxxi. ver. 9, אשר אור לו בציון ותנור בירושלים, which I would thus translate, qui habet ignem suum in Sion, et focum suum in Jerusalem.

And besides all this, to carry the notion still further, there must be some constant meat and provision brought into this house, which was done in the sacrifices, that were partly consumed by fire upon God's own altar, and partly eaten by the priests, which were God's family, and therefore to be maintained by him. That, which was consumed upon God's altar, was accounted *God's mess*, as appeareth from the first chapter of Malachi,[1] where the altar is called *God's table*, and the sacrifice upon it, *God's meat;* "Ye say, the table of God is polluted, and the fruit thereof, his meat, is contemptible." And often in the law the sacrifice is called God's לחם, that is, his bread or food.—Whence, in that learned Hebrew book Cozri, the king Haber objects to the Jew Cozar against his religion, that it seemed to place corporeity in God, in making him to feed upon the flesh of beasts in these sacrifices. To which the Jewish doctor answers cabalistically in this manner; that as, in men, corporeal meat is a means to unite and continue the soul (which is a spirit) to a body; so, in the land of Israel, the blood of beasts offered up in sacrifice had an attractive power to draw down Divinity, and unite it to the Jews. And methinks this may be a little further convinced from that passage in the 50th Psalm, "If I were hungry, I would not tell thee; for the world is mine, and the fulness thereof. Will I eat the flesh of bulls, or drink the blood of goats?" For though it be here denied, that God did really feed upon the sacrifices, yet it is implied there was some such allusive signification in them.

Wherefore it is further observable, that beside the flesh of the beast offered up in sacrifice, there was a *mincah*, or meat-offering, made of flour and oil, and a *libamen*, or drink-offering, that was always joined

[1] Verse 12.

with the daily sacrifice, as the bread and drink, which were to go along with God's meat.

It was also strictly commanded that there should be salt in every sacrifice and oblation, because all meat is unsavoury without salt; as R. Moses Bar Nachman hath here also well observed, מפני שאינו דרך להיות לחם השם טפל מבלי מלח, i. e. Because it was not honorable, that God's meat should be unsavoury, without salt.

Lastly, all these things were to be consumed on the altar only by the holy fire, that came down from heaven, because they were God's portion, and therefore to be eaten or consumed by himself in an extraordinary manner. And this the devil sometime imitated, in some sacrifices offered up to him. For so I understand that passage of Pindar in his Olympiacs, Ode vii. speaking of the Rhodians, that when they had prepared, and were come to offer sacrifice to Jupiter, they had by chance forgotten to bring fire with them: but Jupiter being conscious of their good intentions, rained down upon them *a golden shower* (as I understand it), *a shower* of fire; a pure imitation of the sacred story. Take it in that elegant poet's own words:—

Καί τοι γὰρ αἰθούσας ἔχοντες
Σπέρμ᾽ ἀνέβαν φλογὸς οὔ,
Τεῦξαν δ᾽ ΑΠΓΡΟΙΣ ΙΕΡΟΓΣ·
Ἅλσος ἐν ἀκροπόλει· κείνοισι μὲν ξαν-
θὰν ἀγαγὼν νεφέλαν,
Πολὺν ὕσε χρυσόν.

That is, according to Benedictus's metaphrase, "Etenim Rhodii ascenderunt, quamvis non habentes ardentis semen ignis. Verum dum instruunt sacrificiis igni carentibus aram in arce, illis quidem flavam adducens nebulam, multum pluit [Jupiter] aurum."

And Solinus reports it of the Vulcanian hill in Sicily, that they which offered sacrifice upon it never put fire to it, but expected it should be kindled from heaven. His words, according to Salmasius's edition, are these; "Nec longe inde Collis Vulcanius, in quo qui divinæ rei operantur, ligna vitea super aras struunt; nec ignis adponitur in hanc congeriem. Cum prosicias intulerunt, si adest Deus, si sacrum probatur, sarmenta, licet viridia, sponte concipiunt, et nullo inflagrante halitu, ab ipso numine fit accendium. Ibi epulantes adludit flamma, quæ, flexuosis excessibus vagabunda, quem contigerit non adurit; nec aliud est quam imago nuncia perfecti rite Voti." The place is very remarkable; and where he says thus, "epulantes adludit flamma," he

alludeth to that custom of feasting on the sacrifices, which was before explained.

I will add to all this the words of a late learned author, that sometime stumbled unawares upon this very notion which we are now about, and yet expressed it happily in this manner; "Deus ad suam cum populo Judæorum familiaritatem significandam, sibi ab illo carnes, sanguinem atque fruges in *altari* atque *mensa* offerri voluit, ut ostenderet se quasi *communem* in illo populo habere *mensam*, esse illius *convivam* perpetuum, atque ita familiariter cum illis habitare."

And as it was thus among the Hebrews, so it seems, that sacrifices had the notion of feasts likewise among the ancient Persians, that worshipped the fire, of whom Maximus Tyrius thus relateth, *Ὅτι ἐπιφορροῦντες πυρὶ τροφὴν ἐπιλέγουσι, Πῦρ, δέσποτα, ἔσθιε,* i. e. bringing in the sacrifices to the fire, which was their god, they were wont to say, "Ignis, Domine, comede."

The sacrifices then being God's feasts, they that did partake of them must needs be his *convæ*, and in a manner *eat* and *drink* with him.

And that this did bear the notion of a federal rite in the Scripture account, I prove from that place, Lev. 2: 13, "Thou shalt not suffer the *salt of the covenant* of thy God to be lacking; with all thine offerings thou shalt offer salt." Where the salt, that was to be cast upon all the sacrifices, is called *the salt of the covenant*, to signify, that as men did use to make covenants by eating and drinking together, where salt is a necessary appendix; so God by these sacrifices, and the feasts upon them, did ratify and confirm his covenant with those that did partake of them, inasmuch as they did in a manner *eat* and *drink* with him.

For salt was ever accounted amongst the ancients a most necessary concomitant of feasts, and condiment of all meats. כל סעודה שאין מליח בה אינה סעידה, saith the Jewish proverb in Beracoth, "Omne convivium, in quo non est salitum, non est convivium." And therefore because covenants and reconciliations were made by eating and drinking, where salt was always used, salt itself was accounted among the ancients *amicitiæ symbolum*. *Ἅλες καὶ τράπεζα*, sal et mensa—was used proverbially among the Greeks to express friendship by; *Ἅλας καὶ τράπεζαν παραβαίνειν*, in the words of Origen before quoted out of Archilocus, "sal et mensam transgredi,"—was to violate the most sacred league of friendship. Æschines, in his oration De Perperam Habita Legatione, hath a passage very pertinent to this purpose; *Τοὺς γὰρ τῆς πόλεως ἅλας καὶ δημοσίαν τράπεζαν περὶ πλείστου δεῖ ποιεῖσθαι*, Etenim civitatis sales et communem mensam ait se plurimi facere debere.—Thus I understand that symbol of Pythagoras, *τὸν ἅλα παρατίθεσθαι*, (by Eras-

nus's leave) for friendship and hospitality. There is a pregnant instance of this very phrase in the Scripture, (Ezra 4: 14,) where our translators read it thus, "Because we have maintenance from the king's palace:" but the words in the Chaldee run after this manner, כען כל־קבל די־מלח היכלא מלחנא , i. e. quod sale palatii salivimus—"Because we have eaten of the king's salt [that is, because we have engaged ourselves in a covenant of friendship to him, by eating of meat], therefore it is not meet for us to see the king's dishonor." That proverb mentioned in Tully makes to this purpose, "Multos modios salis simul edendos esse, ut amicitiæ munus completum sit:" which was, because that federal symbol had been so often abused. Nay, hence there remaineth a superstitious custom amongst us and other nations to this day, to count the overturning of the salt upon the table ominous, as betiding some evil to him towards whom it falls: "Quia amoris et amicitiæ symbolum." And by this time I think I have given a sufficient comment upon מלח הברית , the salt of the covenant in the text.

Only I must not forget, that as in God's sacrifices there was ever salt to be used, so the like was generally observed in the Heathen sacrifices; as that one place out of Pliny, amongst many, shall sufficiently testify: "Maxima salis authoritas e sacris veterum intellegitur, apud quos nulla sacra sine mola salsa conficiebatur." And the reason of it also is thus given by that famous scholiast upon Iliad *ά. διότι οἱ ἅλες φιλίας σύμβολον*, because salt is a symbol of friendship;—which is the same with that reason given by God, why he would always have salt in his sacrifices, because it was מלח הברית , that is "sal symbolum fœderis," as before was shown. And this phrase, being thus explained, will clearly expound that other phrase, about which critics have labored so much in vain, where the same words are used, but inverted, and a covenant is called a covenant of salt, as salt is here called the salt of the covenant, (Numb. 18: 19, and 2 Chron. 13: 5,) viz. because covenants were established by eating and drinking together, where salt was a necessary appendix.

Now therefore, that we may return: As the legal sacrifices, with the feasts upon those sacrifices, were *federal rites* between God and men; in like manner, I say, the Lord's supper under the gospel, which we have already proved to be *epulum sacrificiale*, a feast upon sacrifice, must needs be *epulum fœderale*, a feast of amity and friendship—between God and men; where, by eating and drinking at God's own table, and of his meat, we are taken into a sacred covenant, and inviolable league of friendship with him.

Which I will confirm from that forecommended place, whence I

have already proved, that the Lord's supper is a feast upon sacrifice. For there the apostle thus dehorts the Corinthians from eating of the feasts upon idol-sacrifices, which are a parallel to the feast upon the christian sacrifice in the Lord's supper, because this was to have fellowship and federal communion with devils: the things that the Gentiles sacrifice, they sacrifice to devils, and not to God, "and I would not, brethren, that ye should have *fellowship* (or *communion*, κοινωνίαν) with devils." Where the comment of St. Chrysostom is excellent to our purpose: *Εἰ γὰρ ἐπ' ἀνθρώπων τὸ κοινωνεῖν ἁλῶν καὶ τραπέζης φιλίας ἀφορμὴ καὶ σύμβολον γίνεται, ἐγχωρεῖ καὶ ἐπὶ Δαιμόνων τοῦτο συμβῆναι.* that is, If among men to communicate of bread and salt be a token and symbol of friendship, it must carry the same notion between men and devils in the idol-feasts.—If therefore to eat the sacrifice of devils be to have federal communion with those devils to whom it was offered; then to eat the sacrifice of Christ, once offered up to God in the Lord's supper, is to have federal communion with God.

There is an excellent story in Maimonides's Moreh Nevochim, concerning an ancient custom of the Zabii of feasting together with their gods in this federal way, which will much illustrate this notion: for, going about to give the reason, why the eating of blood was forbidden in the law, he fetches it from the idolatrous use of it then in Moses's time among the Zabii; according to his principles, who thought the reason of all the ceremonial precepts was to be fetched from some such accidental grounds, because those laws were not *primæ* but *secundæ intentionis* in God. "Multarum legum rationes et causæ (saith he) mihi innotuerunt ex cognitione fidei, rituum, et cultus Zabiorum."

By these Zabii he means the ancient Chaldeans; the word in the original Arabic, according to the copy of Joseph Scaliger, being thus written, صبيين "A Vento Apeliote sic dicti (as he[1] observes), quasi dicas Orientales." And that book, which Maimonides so often quoteth concerning that nation, their rites and religion, is still extant among the Mahumetan Arabians, as the same Scaliger avoucheth. The story then is this, according to the Hebrew translation of Rabbi Abben Tibbon, lib. 3. cap. 46. רע כיהדם הוא טמא מאד בעיני הצאבה ועם כל זה היו או בלים אותו מפני שהיו חושבים שהוא מזון השדים וכשאכל אותו מי שאכלו כבד השתתף עם השדים ויבואיהו ויוריעוהו העתידות כמו שידמו החמון ממעשי השדים; i. e. Licet sanguis impurus et immundus admodum fuerit, in oculis Zabiorum, tamen ab illis comestus fuerit, eo quod existimarunt *cibum hunc esse dæmonum*, et quod is, qui eum come-

[1] In Epist. 62. ad Isaacum Casaubonum.

dit, hoc ratione *communicationem* aliquam cum dæmonibus haberet, ita ut familiariter cum illo conversentur, et futura ei aperiant.—But because others of them did abhor the eating of blood, as a thing repugnant unto nature, they performed this service in a little different manmer. והיו שס אנשים שהיה קאה בעיניהם אכילת הדם כי הוא דבר שומאם הו טכע האדם והיו שוהטים בהמה ומקכלים דמו בכלי או בחפידה ואוכלים בשר השתוטת ההיא סביב דמה היו מדמ ין במעשה זה שהשדום יאכלו הדם אשד הוא מזונם והם יאכלו הבשר ובזה תהיה האהבה והאהוה והרעית בהם בעבוד שאבלו כלם על שלחן אחד ובמושב אחד ויבאו להם שדום ההם לפי מחשבתם בחלום יוגידו להם העתודות ויועילו להם; i. e. Mactantes bestiam aliquam, sanguinem in circulo sedentes comedebant; imaginantes sibi in hoc opere, ipsis *carnem comedentibus*, Dæmones *illum sanguinem comedere*, et hunc esse *ipsorum cibum*, hocque medio *amicitiam*, *fraternitatem* et *familiaritatem* inter ipsos contrahi, quia omnes in una mensa edunt, uno consessu accumbunt.

As for the former part of this story, I find it also in Rabbi Moses Bar Nachman upon Deut. 12: 23, where he goes about to give the reason why blood was forbidden in the law, as Maimonides did, although, in the first place, he saith, it was because blood served in the sacrifices for expiation, otherwise than Maimonides (for there was a great controversy between these two doctors about the nature of sacrifices): but yet, in the second place also, he brings in this, also, because it was used superstitiously by the heathens in the worship of their idol-gods. והיתה העבודה היא באכילה מן הדם בי חיו מבעים חדם לשדים והם אובלים עלהו וממנו כאילו חם קדואים לשדים לאבול על שלחן השדום חהם ומת הברים עמהם——והנח חיו מתנבאים בו ומגידים עתידות i. e. They performed their superstitious worship, by eating of blood in this manner; they gathered together blood for the devils their idol-gods, and then they came themselves, and did eat of that blood with them, as being the devil's *guests*, and *invited to eat* at the *table* of devils; and so were joined in federal society with them. And by this kind of communion with devils, they were able to prophesy, and foretel things to come.

TWO SERMONS.

SERMON I.

PREACHED BEFORE THE HONORABLE HOUSE OF COMMONS AT WESTMINSTER, MARCH 31, 1647.

Εὐσέβει, ὦ τέκνον· ὁ γὰρ Εὐσεβῶν ἄκρως Χριστιανίζει.

TO THE HONORABLE

HOUSE OF COMMONS.

THE scope of this sermon, which not long since exercised your patience, worthy senators, was not to contend for this or that opinion, but only to persuade men to the life of Christ, as the pith and kernel of all religion; without which, I may boldly say, all the several forms of religion, though we please ourselves never so much in them, are but so many several dreams. And those many opinions about religion, that are every where so eagerly contended for on all sides, where this doth not lie at the bottom, are but so many shadows fighting with one another: so that I may well say of the true Christian, that is indeed possessed of the life of Christianity, in opposition to all those that are but lightly tinctured with the opinions of it, in the language of the poet:

Οἷος πέπνυται, τοὶ δ' ὡς σκιαὶ ἀΐσσουσι.

Wherefore I could not think any thing else, either more necessary for Christians in general, or more seasonable at this time, than to stir them up to the real establishment of the righteousness of God in their hearts, and that participation of the Divine nature, which the apostle speaketh of. That so they might not content themselves with mere fancies and conceits of Christ, without the spirit of Christ really dwelling in them, and Christ himself inwardly formed in their hearts; nor satisfy themselves with the mere holding of right and orthodox opinions, as they conceive, whilst they are utterly devoid within of that Divine life, which Christ came to kindle in men's souls; and therefore are so apt to spend all their zeal upon a violent obtruding of their own opinions

and apprehensions upon others, which cannot give entertainment to them: which, besides its repugnancy to the doctrine and example of Christ himself, is like to be the bellows, that will blow a fire of discord and contention in Christian commonwealths; whilst in the mean time, these hungry and starved opinions devour all the life and substance of religion, as the lean kine in Pharaoh's dream did eat up the fat. Nor, lastly, please themselves only in the violent opposing of other men's superstitions, according to the genius of the present times, without substituting in the room of them an inward principle of spirit and life in their own souls. For I fear many of us, that pull down idols in churches, may set them up in our hearts; and whilst we quarrel with painted glass, make no scruple at all of entertaining many foul lusts in our souls, and committing continual idolatry with them.

This, in general, was the design of this following discourse, which you were pleased, noble senators, not only to express your good acceptance of, but also to give a real signification of your great undeserved favor to the author of it. Who therefore cannot but, as the least expression of his thankfulness, humbly devote it to you; presenting it here again to your eye in the same form in which it was delivered to your ear. Desirous of nothing more, than that it might be some way useful to you, to kindle in you the life and heat of that which is endeavored here to be described upon paper; that you may express it, both in your private conversations, and likewise in all your public employments for the commonwealth. That you may, by your kindly influence, effectually encourage all goodness; and by virtue of your power and authority (to use the phrase of Solomon) "scatter away all evil with your eye," as the sun by his beams scattereth the mists and vapors. That from you "judgment may run down like waters, and righteousness like a mighty stream," to refresh this whole land, that thirsteth after them: which, whilst you distribute them plentifully to others, will bestow both strength and honor to yourselves. For justice and righteousness are the establishment of every throne, of all civil power and authority; and if these should once forsake it, though there be lions to support it, it could not stand long. These, together with a good peace well settled in a commonwealth, are all the outward felicity we can expect, till that happy time come, which the prophet foretelleth, and is therefore more than a Platonical idea; when "the wolf shall dwell with the lamb, and the leopard shall lie down with the kid, and the calf, and the young lion, and the fatling together, and a little child lead them:" when "the sucking child shall play on the hole of the asp, and the weaned child shall put his hand on the cockatrice den:" when

"they shall not hurt nor destroy in all God's holy mountain; for the earth shall be full of the knowledge of the Lord, as the waters cover the sea."

I have but one word more; if you please to give me leave; that after your care for the advancement of religion, and the public good of the commonwealth, you would think it worthy of you to promote ingenious learning, and cast a favorable influence upon it. I mean, not that only which furnisheth the pulpit, which you seem to be very regardful of; but that, which is more remote from such popular use, in the several kinds of it, which yet are all of them both very subservient to religion, and useful to the commonwealth. There is indeed a *ψευδοπαιδεία*, as the philosopher tells us, a bastardly kind of literature, and a *ψευδώνυμος γνῶσις*, as the apostle instructeth us, a knowledge falsely so called; which deserve not to be pleaded for. But the noble and generous improvement of our understanding faculty, in the true contemplation of the wisdom, goodness, and other attributes of God, in this great fabric of the universe, cannot easily be disparaged, without a blemish cast upon the Maker of it. Doubtless, we may as well enjoy that which God hath communicated of himself to the creatures, by this larger faculty of our understandings, as by those narrow and low faculties of our senses; and yet nobody counts it to be unlawful to hear a lesson played upon the lute, or to smell at a rose. And these raised improvements of our natural understandings may be as well subservient and subordinate to a Divine light in our minds, as the natural use of these outward creatures here below to the life of God in our hearts. Nay, all true knowledge doth of itself naturally tend to God, who is the fountain of it; and would ever be raising of our souls up upon its wings thither, did not we *κατέχειν ἐν ἀδικίᾳ*, detain it, and hold it down, in unrighteousness, as the apostle speaketh. All philosophy to a wise man, to a truly sanctified mind, as he in Plutarch speaketh, is but *ὕλη τῆς Θεολογίας*, matter for Divinity to work upon. Religion is the queen of all those inward endowments of the soul; and all pure natural knowledge, all virgin and undeflowered arts and sciences, are her handmaids, that rise up, and call her blessed. I need not tell you how much the skill of tongues and languages, besides the excellent use of all philology in general, conduceth to the right understanding of the letter of sacred writings, on which the spiritual notions must be built; for none can possibly be ignorant of that, which have but once heard of a translation of the Bible. The apostle exhorteth private Christians to "whatsoever things are lovely, whatsoever things are of good report, if there be any virtue, if there be any praise, to think on those things:" and therefore

it may well become you, noble gentlemen, in your public sphere to encourage so noble a thing as knowledge is, which will reflect so much lustre and honor back again upon yourselves. That God would direct you in all your counsels, and still bless you, and prosper you in all your sincere endeavors for the public good, is the hearty prayer of,

Your most humble Servant,

RALPH CUDWORTH.

SERMON I.

And hereby we do know, that we know him, if we keep his commandments.—He that saith, I know him, and keepeth not his commandments, is a liar, and the truth is not in him.—1 John 2: 3, 4.

We have much inquiry concerning knowledge in these latter times. The sons of Adam are now as busy as ever himself was about the tree of knowledge of good and evil, shaking the boughs of it, and scrambling for the fruit; whilst, I fear, many are too unmindful of the tree of life. And though there be now no cherubims with their flaming swords to fright men off from it; yet the way, that leads to it, seems to be so solitary and untrodden as if there were but few that had any mind to taste the fruit of it. There be many, that speak of new glimpses and discoveries of truth, of dawnings of gospel light; and no question but God hath reserved much of this for the very evening and sun-set of the world; for in the latter days knowledge shall be increased: but yet I wish we could in the meantime see that day to dawn, which the apostle speaks of, and that "day-star to arise in men's hearts." I wish, whilst we talk of light, and dispute about truth, we could walk more as "children of the light." Whereas, if St. John's rule be good here in the text, that no man truly knows Christ, but he that keepeth his commandments; it is much to be suspected, that many of us, who pretend to light, have a thick and gloomy darkness within, overspreading our souls.

There be now many large volumes and discourses written concerning Christ, thousands of controversies discussed, infinite problems determined concerning his Divinity, humanity, union of both together, and what not; so that our bookish Christians, that have all their religion in writings and papers, think they are now completely furnished with all kinds of knowledge concerning Christ; and when they see all their leaves lying about them, they think they have a goodly stock of knowledge and truth, and cannot possibly miss of the way to heaven; as if religion were nothing but a little book-craft, a mere paper-skill.

But if St. John's rule here be good, we must not judge of our knowing of Christ by our skill in books and papers, but by our keeping of his commandments. And that, I fear, will discover many of us

(notwithstanding all this light which we boast of round about us) to have nothing but Egyptian darkness within our hearts.

The vulgar sort think, that they know Christ enough out of their creeds, and catechisms, and confessions of faith; and if they have but a little acquainted themselves with these, and like parrots conned the words of them, they doubt not, but they are sufficiently instructed in all the mysteries of the kingdom of heaven. Many of the more learned, if they can but wrangle and dispute about Christ, imagine themselves to be grown great proficients in the school of Christ.

The greatest part of the world, whether learned or unlearned, think, that there is no need of purging and purifying of their hearts for the right knowledge of Christ and his gospel: but though their lives be never so wicked, their hearts never so foul within, yet they may know Christ sufficiently out of their treatises and discourses, out of their mere systems and bodies of divinity; which I deny not to be useful in a subordinate way; although our Saviour prescribes his disciples another method to come to the right knowledge of divine truths, by doing of God's will. "He that will do my Father's will (saith he), shall know of the doctrine, whether it be of God." He is a true Christian indeed, not he that is only book-taught, but he, that is God-taught; he, that hath an unction from the Holy One (as our Apostle calleth it) that teacheth him all things; he, that hath the Spirit of Christ within him, that searcheth out the deep things of God: "for as no man knoweth the things of a man, save the spirit of a man, which is in him; even so the things of God knoweth no man, but the Spirit of God."

Ink and paper can never make us Christians, can never beget a new nature, a living principle in us; can never form Christ, or any true notions of spiritual things, in our hearts. The gospel, that new law, which Christ delivered to the world, it is not merely a dead letter without us, but a quickening spirit within us. Cold theorems and maxims, dry and jejune disputes, lean syllogistical reasonings, could never yet of themselves beget the least glimpse of true heavenly light, the least sap of saving knowledge in any heart. All this is but the groping of the poor dark spirit of man after truth, to find it out with his own endeavors, and feel it with his own cold and benumbed hands. Words and syllables, which are but dead things, cannot possibly convey the living notions of heavenly truths to us. The secret mysteries of a divine life, of a new nature, of Christ formed in our hearts, they cannot be written or spoken, language and expressions cannot reach them; neither can they be ever truly understood, except the soul itself be kindled from within, and awakened into the life of them. A painter, that

would draw a rose, though he may flourish some likeness of it in figure and color, yet he can never paint the scent and fragrancy; of if he would draw a flame, he cannot put a constant heat into his colors; he cannot make his pencil drop a sound, as the echo in the epigram mocks at him;

———Si vis similem pingere, pinge sonum.

All the skill of cunning artizans and mechanics cannot put a principle of life into a statue of their own making. Neither are we able to enclose in words and letters the life, soul, and essence, of any spiritual truths, and as it were, to incorporate it in them.

Some philosophers have determined that ἀρετὴ is not διδακτὸν, virtue cannot be taught by any certain rules or precepts. Men and books may propound some direction to us, that may set us in such a way of life and practice, as in which we shall at last find it within ourselves, and be experimentally acquainted with it; but they cannot teach it us like a mechanic art or trade. No, surely, "there is a spirit in man; and the inspiration of the Almighty giveth understanding." But we shall not meet with this spirit any where but in the way of obedience: the knowledge of Christ, and the keeping of his commandments, must always go together, and be mutual causes of one another.

"Hereby we know, that we know him, if we keep his commandments."

"He that saith, I know him, and keepeth not his commandments, is a liar, and the truth is not in him."

I come now unto these words themselves, which are so pregnant, that I shall not need to force out any thing at all from them: I shall therefore only take notice of some few observations which drop from them of their own accord, and then conclude with some application of them to ourselves.

I. First, then, If this be the right way and method of discovering our knowledge of Christ, by our keeping his commandments; then we may safely draw conclusions concerning our state and condition from the conformity of our lives to the will of Christ.

Would we know, whether we know Christ aright, let us consider whether the life of Christ be in us. "Qui non habet vitiam Christi, Christum non habet:" He that hath not the life of Christ in him, he hath nothing but the name, nothing but a fancy of Christ, he hath not the substance of him. He that builds his house upon this foundation, not an airy notion of Christ swimming in his brain, but Christ really dwelling and living in his heart, as our Saviour himself witnesseth, he

"buildeth his house upon a rock;" and when the floods come, and the winds blow, and the rain descends, and beats upon it, it shall stand impregnably. But he that builds all his comfort upon an ungrounded persuasion, that God from all eternity hath loved him, and absolutely decreed him to life and happiness, and seeketh not for God really dwelling in his soul; he builds his house upon a quicksand, and it shall suddenly sink and be swallowed up: "his hope shall be cut off, and his trust shall be a spider's web; he shall lean upon his house, but it shall not stand; he shall hold it fast, but it shall not endure."

We are no where commanded to pry into these secrets, but the wholesome counsel and advice given us is this, "to make our calling and election sure." We have no warrant in Scripture to peep into these hidden rolls and volumes of eternity, and to make it our first thing that we do, when we come to Christ, to spell out our names in the stars, and to persuade ourselves, that we are certainly elected to everlasting happiness, before we see the image of God, in righteousness and true holiness, shaped in our hearts. God's everlasting decree is too dazzling and bright an object for us at first to set our eye upon. It is far easier and safer for us to look upon the rays of his goodness and holiness, as they are reflected in our hearts, and there to read the mild and gentle characters of God's love to us, in our love to him, and our hearty compliance with his heavenly will; as it is safer for us, if we would see the sun, to look upon it here below in a pail of water, than to cast up our daring eyes upon the body of the sun itself, which is too radiant and scorching for us. The best assurance that one can have of his interest in God, is doubtless the conformity of his soul to him. Those divine purposes, whatsoever they be, are altogether unsearchaable and unknowable by us: they lie wrapped up in everlasting darkness, and covered in a deep abyss: Who is able to fathom the bottom of them?

Let us not therefore make this our first attempt towards God and religion, to persuade ourselves strongly of these everlasting decrees: for if at our first flight we aim so high, we shall haply but scorch our wings, and be struck back with lightning, as those giants of old were, that would needs attempt to assault heaven. And it is indeed a most gigantic essay to thrust ourselves so boldly into the lap of heaven; it is a prank of Nimrod, of a mighty hunter, thus rudely to deal with God, and to force heaven and happiness before his face, whether he will or no. The way to obtain a good assurance indeed of our title to heaven, is not to clamber up to it by a ladder of our own ungrounded persuasions, but to dig as low as hell by humility and self-denial in our own

hearts: and though this may seem to be the furthest way about, yet it is indeed the nearest and safest way to it. We must ἀναβαίνειν κάτω, and καταβαίνειν ἄνω, as the Greek epigram speaks, ascend downward, and descend upward, if we would indeed come to heaven, or get any true persuasion of our title to it.

The most gallant and triumphant confidence of a Christian riseth safely and surely on this low foundation, that lies deeper underground, and there stands firmly and steadfastly. When our heart is once turned into a conformity with the word of God, when we feel our will perfectly to concur with his will, we shall then presently perceive a spirit of adoption within ourselves, teaching us to cry, Abba, Father. We shall not then care for peeping into those hidden records of eternity, to see whether our names be written there in golden characters; no, we shall find a copy of God's thoughts concerning us written in our own breasts. There we may read the characters of his favor to us; there we may feel an inward sense of his love to us, flowing out of our hearty and unfeigned love to him. And we shall be more undoubtedly persuaded of it, than if any of those winged watchmen above, that are privy to heaven's secrets, should come and tell us, that they saw our names enrolled in those volumes of eternity. Whereas, on the contrary, though we strive to persuade ourselves never so confidently, that God from all eternity hath loved us, and elected us to life and happiness; if we do yet, in the mean time, entertain any iniquity within our hearts, and willingly close with any lust; do what we can, we shall find many a cold qualm every now and then seizing upon us at approaching dangers; and when death itself shall grimly look us in the face, we shall feel our hearts even to die within us, and our spirits quite faint away, though we strive to raise them and recover them never so much with the strong waters and *aquavitæ* of our ungrounded presumptions. The least inward lust willingly continued will be like a worm, fretting the gourd of our jolly confidence and presumptuous persuasion of God's love, and always gnawing at the root of it; and though we strive to keep it alive, and continually besprinkle it with some dews of our own, yet it will be always dying and withering in our bosoms. But a good conscience within will be always better to a Christian, than "health to his navel, or marrow to his bones;" it will be an everlasting cordial to his heart; it will be softer to him than a bed of down, and he may sleep securely upon it in the midst of raging and tempestuous seas, when the winds bluster, and the waves beat round about him. A good conscience is the best looking-glass of heaven, in which the soul may see God's thoughts and purposes concerning it, as so many

shining stars reflected to it. "Hereby we know Christ, hereby we know, that Christ loves us, if we keep his commandments."

II. Secondly, if hereby only we know, that we know Christ, by our keeping his commandments, then the knowledge of Christ doth not consist merely in a few barren notions, in a form of certain dry and sapless opinions.

Christ came not into the world to fill our heads with mere speculations, to kindle a fire of wrangling and contentious dispute amongst us, and to warm our spirits against one another with nothing but angry and peevish debates; whilst in the mean time our hearts remain all ice within towards God, and have not the least spark of true heavenly fire to melt and thaw them. Christ came not to possess our brains only with some cold opinions, that send down nothing but a freezing and benumbing influence upon our hearts. Christ was *vitæ magister*, not *scholæ:* and he is the best Christian, whose heart beats with the purest pulse towards heaven; not he, whose head spinneth out the finest cobwebs.

He that endeavors really to mortify his lusts, and to comply with that truth in his life, which his conscience is convinced of, is nearer a Christian, though he never heard of Christ, than he, that believes all the vulgar articles of the Christian faith, and plainly denieth Christ in his life.

Surely the way to heaven, that Christ hath taught us, is plain and easy, if we have but honest hearts: we need not many criticisms, many school distinctions, to come to a right understanding of it. Surely Christ came not to ensnare us and entangle us with captious niceties, or to puzzle our heads with deep speculations, and lead us through hard and craggy notions into the kingdom of heaven. I persuade myself, that no man shall ever be kept out of heaven for not comprehending mysteries, that were beyond the reach of his shallow understanding, if he had but an honest and good heart, that was ready to comply with Christ's commandments. "Say not in thy heart, Who shall ascend into heaven?" that is, with high speculations, to bring down Christ from thence; or, "Who shall descend into the abyss beneath?" that is, with deep searching thoughts to fetch up Christ from thence: but lo, "the word is nigh thee, even in thy mouth, and in thy heart."

But I wish it were not the distemper of our times, to scare and fright men only with opinions, and make men only solicitous about the entertainment of this and that speculation, which will not render them any thing the better in their lives, or the liker unto God; whilst in the mean time there is no such care taken about keeping of Christ's com-

mandments, and being renewed in our minds according to the image of God in righteousness and true holiness. We say, "Lo, here is Christ," and, "Lo, there is Christ," in these and these opinions; whereas, in truth, Christ is neither here, nor there, nor any where, but where the Spirit of Christ, where the life of Christ is.

Do we not now-a-days open and lock up heaven with the private key of this and that opinion of our own, according to our several fancies, as we please? And if any one observe Christ's commandments never so sincerely, and serve God with faith and a pure conscience, that yet haply skills not of some contended-for opinions, some darling notions, he hath not the right *shibboleth*, he hath not the true watchword, he must not pass the guards into heaven. Do we not make this and that opinion, this and that outward form, to be the wedding-garment, and boldly sentence those to outer darkness, that are not invested therewith? Whereas, every true Christian finds the least dram of hearty affection towards God to be more cordial and sovereign to his soul, than all the speculative notions and opinions in the world; and though he study also to inform his understanding aright, and free his mind from all error and misapprehensions, yet it is nothing but the life of Christ deeply rooted in his heart, which is the chemical elixir, that he feeds upon. Had he "all faith, that he could remove mountains" (as St. Paul speaks), had he "all knowledge, all tongues and languages;" yet he prizeth one dram of love beyond them all. He accounteth him, that feedeth upon mere notions in religion, to be but an airy and cameleon-like Christian. He findeth himself now otherwise rooted and centred in God, that when he did before merely contemplate and gaze upon him; he tasteth and relisheth God within himself; he hath *quendam saporem Dei*, a certain savor of him;—whereas before he did but rove and guess at random at him. He feeleth himself safely anchored in God, and will not be dissuaded from it, though perhaps he skill not many of those subtilties, which others make the *alpha* and *omega* of their religion. Neither is he scared with those childish affrightments, with which some would force their private conceits upon him; he is above the superstitious dreading of mere speculative opinions, as well as the superstitious reverence of outward ceremonies; he cares not so much for subtilty, as for soundness and health of mind. And, indeed, as it was well spoken by a noble philosopher, ἄνευ ἀρετῆς Θεὸς ὄνομα μόνον, that without purity and virtue, God is nothing but an empty name;—so it is as true here, that without obedience to Christ's commandments, without the life of Christ dwelling in us,

whatsoever opinion we entertain of him, Christ is but only named by us, he is not known.

I speak not here against a free and ingenuous inquiry into all truth according to our several abilities and opportunities; I plead not for the captivating and enthralling of our judgments to the dictates of men: I do not disparage the natural improvement of our understanding faculties by true knowledge, which is so noble and gallant a perfection of the mind: but the thing, which I aim against, is, the dispiriting of the life and vigor of our religion by dry speculations, and making it nothing but a mere dead skeleton of opinions, a few dry bones, without any flesh and sinews, tied up together, and the misplacing of all our zeal upon an eager prosecution of these, which should be spent to better purpose upon other objects.

Knowledge indeed is a thing far more excellent than riches, outward pleasures, worldly dignities, or any thing else in the world besides holiness, and the conformity of our wills to the will of God; but yet our happiness consisteth not in it, but in a certain Divine temper and constitution of soul, which is far above it.

But it is a piece of that corruption, that runneth through human nature, that we naturally prize truth more than goodness, knowledge more than holiness. We think it a gallant thing to be fluttering up to heaven with our wings of knowledge and speculation; whereas, the highest mystery of Divine life here, and of perfect happiness hereafter, consisteth in nothing but mere obedience to the divine will. Happiness is nothing but that inward sweet delight, that will arise from the harmonious agreement between our wills and God's will.

There is nothing contrary to God in the whole world, nothing that fights against him, but self-will. This is the strong castle that we all keep garrisoned against heaven in every one of our hearts, which God continually layeth siege unto; and it must be conquered and demolished, before we can conquer heaven. It was by reason of this self-will, that Adam fell in paradise; that those glorious angels, those morning-stars, kept not their first station, but dropped down from heaven like falling stars, and sunk into this condition of bitterness, anxiety, and wretchedness, in which now they are. They all entangled themselves with the length of their own wings, they would needs will more and otherwise than God would will in them; and, going about to make their wills wider, and to enlarge them into greater amplitude, the more they struggled, they found themselves the faster pinioned, and crowded up into narrowness and servility; insomuch, that now they are not able

to use any wings at all, but, inheriting the serpent's curse, can only creep with their bellies upon the earth. Now, our only way to recover God and happiness again is, not to soar up with our understandings, but to destroy this self-will of ours; and then we shall find our wings to grow again, our plumes fairly spread, and ourselves raised aloft into the free air of perfect liberty, which is perfect happiness.

There is nothing in the whole world able to do us good or hurt, but God and our own will: neither riches nor poverty, nor disgrace nor honor, nor life nor death, nor angels nor devils; but willing or not willing, as we ought. Should hell itself cast all its fiery darts against us, if our will be right, if it be informed by the Divine will, they can do us no hurt; we have then (if I may so speak), an enchanted shield, that is impenetrable, and will bear off all. God will not hurt us, and hell cannot hurt us, if we will nothing but what God wills. Nay, then we are acted by God himself, and the whole Divinity floweth in upon us; and when we have cashiered this self-will of ours, which did but shackle and confine our souls, our wills shall then become truly free, being widened and enlarged to the extent of God's own will. Hereby we know, that we know Christ indeed, not by our speculative opinions concerning him, but by our keeping of his commandments.

III. Thirdly, If hereby we are to judge, whether we truly know Christ, by our keeping of his commandments; so that he that saith he knoweth him, and keepeth not his commandments, is a liar: then this was not the plot and design of the gospel, to give the world an indulgence to sin, upon what pretence soever.

Though we are too prone to make such misconstructions of it; as if God had intended nothing else in it, but to dandle our corrupt nature, and contrive a smooth and easy way for us to come to happiness, without the toilsome labor of subduing our lusts and sinful affections: or, as if the gospel were nothing else but a declaration to the world, of God's engaging his affections from all eternity on some particular persons in such a manner, as that he would resolve to love them, and dearly embrace them, though he never made them partakers of his image in righteousness and true holiness; and though they should remain under the power of all their lusts, yet they should still continue his beloved ones, and he would, notwithstanding, at last, bring them undoubtedly into heaven. Which is nothing else but to make the God that we worship, the God of the New Testament, προσωπολήπτης, an accepter of persons,—and one, that should encourage that in the world which is diametrically opposite to God's own life and being.

And, indeed, nothing is more ordinary than for us to shape out such

monstrous and deformed notions of God unto ourselves, by looking upon him through the colored medium of our own corrupt hearts, and having the eye of our soul tinctured by the suffusions of our own lusts. And therefore because we mortals can fondly love and hate, and sometimes hug the very vices of those to whom our affections are engaged, and kiss their very deformities; we are so ready to shape out a Deity like unto ourselves, and to fashion out such a God as will, in Christ at least, hug the very wickedness of the world, and in those that be once his own, by I know not what fond affection, appropriated to himself, connive at their very sins, so that they shall not make the least breach betwixt himself and them. Some there are, that question, whether of the two be the worse idolatry, and of the deeper stain, for a man to make a god out of a piece of wood, and fall down unto it and worship it, and say, Deliver me, for thou art my God, as it is expressed in the prophet Isaiah; or to set up such an idol-god of our own imaginations as this is, fashioned out according to the similitude of our own fondness and wickedness: and when we should paint out God with the liveliest colors that we can possibly borrow from any created being, with the purest perfections that we can abstract from them; to draw him out thus with the black coal of our own corrupt hearts, and to make the very blots and blurs of our own souls to be the letters which we spell out his name by. Thus do we, that are children of the night, make black and ugly representations of God unto ourselves, as the Ethiopians were wont to do, copying him out according to our own likeness, and setting up that unto ourselves for a god; which we love most dearly in ourselves, that is, our lusts. But there is no such god as this any where in the world, but only in some men's false imaginations, who know not, all this while, that they look upon themselves instead of God, and make an idol of themselves, which they worship and adore for him; being so full of themselves, that whatsoever they see round about them, even God himself, they color with their own tincture; like him, that Aristotle speaks of, that wheresoever he went, and whatsoever he looked upon, he saw still his own face, as in a glass, represented to him. And therefore it is no wonder, if men seem naturally more devoutly affected toward such an imaginary god, as we have now described, than to the true real God, clothed with his own real attributes; since it is nothing but an image of themselves, which, Narcissus-like, they fall in love with: no wonder if they kiss and dandle such a baby-god as this, which, like little children, they have dressed out of the clouts of their own fond fancies, according to their own likeness, of purpose that they might play and sport with it.

But God will ever dwell in spotless light, howsoever we paint and disfigure him below; he will still be circled about with his own rays of unstained and immaculate glory. And though the gospel be not God as he is in his own brightness, but God veiled and masked to us, God in a state of humiliation, and condescent, as the sun in a rainbow; yet it is nothing else but a clear and unspotted mirror of Divine holiness, goodness, purity; in which attributes lie the very life and essence of God himself. The gospel is nothing else but God descending into the world in our form, and conversing with us in our likeness; that he might allure and draw us up to God, and make us partakers of his Divine form. *Θεὸς γέγονεν ἄνθρωπος* (as Athanasius speaks) *ἵνα ἡμᾶς ἐν ἑαυτῷ θεοποίησῃ*, God was therefore incarnated and made man, that he might deify us;—that is (as St. Peter expresseth it), make us partakers of the Divine nature. Now, I say, the very proper character and essential tincture of God himself is nothing else but goodness. Nay, I may be bold to add, that God is therefore God, because he is the highest and most perfect good; and good is not therefore good, because God out of an arbitrary will of his would have it so. Whatsoever God doth in the world, he doth it as suitable to the highest goodness; the idea and fairest copy of which is his own essence.

Virtue and holiness in creatures, as Plato well discourseth in his Euthyphro, are not therefore good, because God loveth them, and will have them be accounted such; but rather God therefore loveth them, because they are in themselves simply good. Some of our own authors go a little further yet, and tell us, that God doth not fondly love himself, because he is himself, but therefore he loveth himself, because he is the highest and most absolute goodness; so that if there could be any thing in the world better than God, God would love that better than himself: but because he is essentially the most perfect good, therefore he cannot but love his own goodness infinitely above all other things. And it is another mistake, which sometimes we have of God, by shaping him out according to the model of ourselves, when we make him nothing but a blind, dark, impetuous self-will running through the world; such as we ourselves are furiously acted with, that have not the balance of absolute goodness to poise and settle us.

That I may therefore come nearer to the thing in hand; God, who is absolute goodness, cannot love any of his creatures, and take pleasure in them, without bestowing a communication of his goodness and likeness upon them. God cannot make a gospel to promise men life and happiness hereafter, without being regenerated, and made partakers of his holiness. As soon may heaven and hell be reconciled

together, and lovingly shake hands with one another, as God can be fondly indulgent to any sin, in whomsoever it be. As soon may light and darkness be espoused together, and midnight be married to noon-day, as God can be joined in a league of friendship to any wicked soul.

The great design of God in the gospel is to clear up this mist of sin and corruption, which we are here surrounded with, and to bring up his creatures out of the shadow of death to the region of light above, the land of truth and holiness. The great mystery of the gospel is to establish a godlike frame and disposition of spirit, which consists in righteousness and true holiness, in the hearts of men. And Christ, who is the great and mighty Saviour, came on purpose into the world, not only to save us from fire and brimstone, but also to save us from our sins. Christ hath therefore made an expiation of our sins by his death upon the cross, that we, being thus delivered out of the hands of these our greatest enemies, might serve God without fear, in holiness and righteousness before him all the days of our life. This "grace of God, that bringeth salvation," hath therefore "appeared unto all men, in the gospel, that it might teach us to deny ungodliness and worldly lusts, and that we should live soberly, righteously and godlily in this present world; looking for that blessed hope, and glorious appearing of the great God and our Saviour Jesus Christ, who gave himself for us, that he might redeem us from all iniquity, and purify to himself a peculiar people, zealous of good works." "These things I write unto you (saith our apostle a little before my text) that you sin not;" therein expressing the end of the whole gospel, which is, not only to cover sin by spreading the purple robe of Christ's death and sufferings over it, whilst it still remaineth in us with all its filth and noisomeness unremoved; but also to convey a powerful and mighty spirit of holiness, to cleanse us and free us from it. And this is a greater grace of God to us, than the former, which still go both together in the gospel; besides the free remission and pardon of sin in the blood of Christ, the delivering of us from the power of sin, by the Spirit of Christ dwelling in our hearts.

Christ came not into the world only to cast a mantle over us, and hide all our filthy sores from God's avenging eye, with his merits and righteousness; but he came likewise to be a chirurgeon and physician of souls, to free us from the filth and corruption of them: which is more grievous and burdensome, more noisome to a true Christian, than the guilt of sin itself.

Should a poor wretched and diseased creature, that is full of sores

and ulcers, be covered all over with purple, or clothed with scarlet, he would take but little contentment in it, whilst his sores and wounds remain upon him; and he had much rather be arrayed in rags, so he might obtain but soundness and health within. The gospel is a true Bethesda, a pool of grace, where such poor, lame and infirm creatures as we are, upon the moving of God's Spirit in it, may descend down, not only to wash our skin and outside, but also to be cured of our diseases within. And whatever the world thinks, there is a powerful Spirit, that moves upon these waters, the waters of the gospel, spreading its gentle, healing, quickening wings over our souls. The gospel is not like Abana and Pharphar, those common rivers of Damascus, that could only cleanse the outside; but is a true Jordan, in which such leprous Naamans as we all are, "may wash and be clean." "Blessed indeed are they, whose iniquities are forgiven, and whose sins are covered: Blessed is the man to whom the Lord will not impute sin;" but yet rather blessed are they, whose sins are like a morning cloud, and quite taken away from them. Blessed, thrice "blessed are they, that hunger and thirst after righteousness, for they shall be satisfied: blessed are the pure in heart, for they shall see God."

Our Saviour Christ came (as John the Baptist tells us) "with a fan in his hand, that he might thoroughly purge his floor, and gather his wheat into his garner: but the chaff he will burn up with unquenchable fire." He came (as the prophet Malachi speaks) "like a refiner's fire, and like fuller's soap; to sit as a refiner and purifier of silver, and to purify all the sons of Levi, and purge them as gold and silver, that they may offer unto the Lord an offering in righteousness."

Christ came not only to write Holiness to the Lord upon Aaron's forehead, and to put his urim and thummim upon his breast-plate; but, "This is the covenant, saith the Lord, that I will make with them in those days; I will put my law in their inward parts, and write it in their hearts; and then I will be their God, and they shall be my people." They shall be all kings and priests unto me. "God sent his own Son (saith St. Paul) in the likeness of sinful flesh, and by a sacrifice for sin condemned sin in the flesh; that the righteousness of the law might be fulfilled in us, who walk not after the flesh, but after the Spirit."

The first Adam, as the Scripture tells us, brought in a real defilement, which, like a noisome leprosy, hath overspread all mankind; and therefore the second Adam must not only fill the world with a conceit of holiness, and mere imaginary righteousness: but he must really convey such an immortal seed of grace into the hearts of believers as may

prevail still more and more in them, till it have at last quite wrought out that poison of the serpent.

Christ, that was nothing but Divinity dwelling in a tabernacle of flesh, and God himself immediately acting a human nature, came into the world to kindle here that Divine life amongst men, which is certainly dearer unto God, than any thing else whatsoever in the world; and to propagate this celestial fire from one heart still unto another, until the end of the world. Neither is he, nor was he, ever absent from this spark of his Divinity kindled amongst men, wheresoever it be, though he seem bodily to be withdrawn from us. He is the standing, constant, inexhausted fountain of this Divine light and heat, that still toucheth every soul that is enlivened by it, with an outstretched ray, and freely lends his beams, and disperseth his influence to all, from the beginning of the world to the end of it. "We receive of his fulness grace for grace;" as all the stars in heaven are said to light their candles at the sun's flame. For though his body be withdrawn from us, yet, by the lively and virtual contact of his Spirit, he is always kindling, cheering, quickening, warming, and enlivening hearts. Nay, this Divine life, begun and kindled in any heart, wheresoever it be, is something of God in flesh, and, in a sober and qualified sense, Divinity incarnate; and all particular Christians, that are really possessed of it, so many mystical Christs.

And, God forbid, that God's own life and nature, here in the world, should be forlorn, forsaken, and abandoned, of God himself. Certainly, wherever it is, though never so little, like a sweet, young, tender babe, once born in any heart, when it crieth unto God the father of it, with pitiful and bemoaning looks imploring his compassion, it cannot choose but move his fatherly bowels, and make them yearn, and turn towards it, and, by strong sympathy, draw his compassionate arm to help and relieve it. Never was any tender infant so dear to those bowels that begat it, as an infant new-born Christ, formed in the heart of any true believer, to God the father of it. Shall the children of this world, the sons of darkness, be moved with such tender affection and compassion towards the fruit of their bodies, their own natural offspring? and shall God, who is the father of lights, the fountain of all goodness, be moved with no compassion towards his true spiritual offspring, and have no regard to those sweet babes of light, engendered by his own beams in men's hearts, that, in their lovely countenances, bear the resemblance of his own face, and call him their father? Shall he see them lie fainting, and gasping, and dying here in the world, for want of nothing to preserve and keep them, but an influence from him,

who first gave them life and breath? No, hear the language of God's heart, hear the sounding of his bowels towards them: "Is it Ephraim, my dear son? is it that pleasant child? Since I spake of him, I do earnestly remember him; my bowels, my bowels are troubled for him; I will surely have mercy upon him, saith the Lord." If those expressions of goodness and tender affection here, among the creatures, be but drops of that full ocean that is in God; how can we then imagine, that this father of our spirits should have so little regard to his own dear offspring, I do not say our souls, but that, which is the very life and soul of our souls, the life of God in us (which is nothing else but God's own self communicated to us, his own Son born in our hearts), as that he should suffer it to be cruelly murdered in its infancy by our sins, and, like young Hercules, in its very cradle to be strangled by those filthy vipers? that he should see him crucified by wicked lusts, nailed fast to the cross by invincible corruptions, pierced and gored on every side with the poisonous spears of the devil's temptations, and at last to give up the ghost: and yet his tender heart not at all relent, nor be all this while impassionated with so sad a spectacle? Surely, we cannot think he hath such an adamantine breast, such a flinty nature, as this is.

What then? must we say, that though indeed he be willing, yet he is not able to rescue his crucified and tormented Son now bleeding upon the cross; to take him down from thence, and save him; then must sin be more powerful than God; that weak, crazy and sickly thing, more strong than the Rock of ages; and the devil, the prince of darkness, more mighty than the God of light. No, surely; there is a weakness and impotency in all evil, but a masculine strength and vigor in all goodness; and therefore, doubtless, the highest good, the πρῶτον ἀγαθὸν, as the philosopher calls it, is the strongest thing in the world. "Nil potentius summo Bono." God's power, displayed in the world, is nothing but his goodness strongly reaching all things from height to depth, from the highest heaven to the lowest hell; and irresistibly imparting itself to every thing, according to those several degrees, in which it is capable of it.

Have the fiends of darkness then, those poor forlorn spirits, that are fettered and chained up in the chains of their own wickedness, any strength to withstand the force of infinite goodness, which is infinite power? or do they not rather skulk in holes of darkness, and fly, like bats and owls, before the approaching beams of this Sun of Righteousness? Is God powerful to kill and to destroy, to damn and to torment? and is he not powerful to save? Nay, it is the sweetest flower in all

the garland of his attributes, it is the richest diadem in his crown of glory, that he is *mighty to save*:—and this is far more magnificent for him, than to be styled *mighty to destroy*. For that, except it be in a way of justice, speaks no power at all, but mere impotency; for the root of all power is goodness.

Or must we say, lastly, that God indeed is able to rescue us out of the power of sin and Satan, when we sigh and groan towards him; but yet sometimes, to exercise his absolute authority, his uncontrollable dominion, he delights rather in plunging wretched souls down into infernal night and everlasting darkness? What shall we then make the God of the whole world? Nothing but a cruel and dreadful *Erinnys*, with curled fiery snakes about his head, and firebrands in his hands, thus governing the world? Surely this will make us either secretly to think, that there is no God at all in the world, if he must needs be such; or else to wish heartily there were none. But, doubtless, God will at last confute all these our misapprehensions of him; he will unmask our hypocritical pretences, and clearly cast the shame of all our sinful deficiencies upon ourselves, and vindicate his own glory from receiving the least stain or blemish by them. In the mean time, let us know, that the gospel now requireth far more of us than ever the law did; for it requireth a new creature, a Divine nature, Christ formed in us: but yet withal it bestoweth a quickening spirit, an enlivening power, to enable us to express that which is required of us. Whosoever therefore truly knows Christ, the same also keepeth Christ's commandments. But "he that saith, I know him, and keepeth not his commandments, is a liar, and the truth is not in him."

I have now done with the first part of my discourse, concerning those observations, which arise naturally from the words, and offer themselves to us. I shall, in the next place, proceed to make some general application of them all together.

Now, therefore, I beseech you, let us consider, whether or no we know Christ indeed: not by our acquaintance with systems and models of divinity, not by our skill in books and papers, but by our keeping of Christ's commandments. All the books and writings, which we converse with, they can but represent spiritual objects to our understandings; which yet we can never see in their own true figure, color and proportion, until we have a Divine light within, to irradiate and shine upon them. Though there be never such excellent truths concerning Christ and his gospel set down in words and letters, yet they will be but unknown characters to us, until we have a willing Spirit within us, that can decipher them; until the same Spirit, by se-

cret whispers in our hearts, do comment upon them, which did at first indite them. There be many, that understand the Greek and Hebrew of the Scripture, the original languages in which the text was written, that never understood the language of the Spirit.

There is a *caro* and a *spiritus*, a flesh and a spirit, a body and a soul in all the writings of the Scriptures. It is but the flesh and body of Divine truths, that is printed upon paper; which many moths of books and libraries do only feed upon; many walking skeletons of knowledge, that bury and entomb truths in the living sepulchres of their souls, do only converse with; such as never did any thing else, but pick at the mere bark and rind of truths, and crack the shells of them. But there is a soul and spirit of Divine truths that could never yet be congealed into ink, that could never be blotted upon paper; which, by a secret traduction and conveyance, passeth from one soul into another, being able to dwell or lodge nowhere, but in a spiritual being, in a living thing, because itself is nothing but life and spirit. Neither can it, where indeed it is, express itself sufficiently in words and sounds, but it will best declare and speak itself in actions; as the old manner of writing among the Egyptians was, not by words, but things. The life of Divine truths is better expressed in actions, than in words, because actions are more living things than words: words are nothing but dead resemblances and pictures of those truths, which live and breathe in actions; and "the kingdom of God (as the apostle speaking) consisteth not in word," but in life and power. *Τὰ πρόβατα οὐ χόρτον φέροντα τοῖς ποίμεσιν ἐποδεικνύει πόσον ἔφαγεν* (saith the moral philosopher) *ἀλλὰ τὴν νομὴν ἔσω πέψαντα ἔριον ἔξω φέρει καὶ γάλα·* Sheep do not come and bring their fodder to their Shepherd, and show him how much they eat; but inwardly concocting and digesting it, they make it appear by the fleece which they wear upon their backs, and by the milk which they give.—And let not us Christians affect only to talk and dispute of Christ, and so measure our knowledge of him by our words; but let us show *ἀπὸ τῶν θεωρημάτων πεφθέντων τὰ ἔργα*, our knowledge concocted into our lives and actions; and then let us really manifest that we are Christ's sheep indeed, that we are his disciples, by that fleece of holiness which we wear, and by the fruits that we daily yield in our lives and conversations: for "herein (saith Christ) is my father glorified, that ye bear much fruit; so shall ye be my disciples."

Let us not, I beseech you, judge of our knowing Christ by our own ungrounded persuasions, that Christ from all eternity hath loved us, and given himself particularly for us, without the conformity of our

lives to Christ's commandments, without the real partaking of the image of Christ in our hearts. The great mystery of the gospel doth not lie only in Christ without us (though we must know also what he hath done for us); but the very pith and kernel of it consists in Christ inwardly formed in our hearts.

Nothing is truly ours but what lives in our spirits. Salvation itself cannot save us as long as it is only without us, no more than health can cure us, and make us sound, when it is not within us, but somewhere at a distance from us; no more than arts and sciences, whilst they lie only in books and papers without us, can make us learned. The gospel, though it be a sovereign and medicinal thing itself, yet the mere knowing and believing of the history of it will do us no good; we can receive no virtue from it, till it be inwardly digested and concocted into our souls; till it be made ours, and become a living thing in our hearts. The gospel, if it be only without us, cannot save us, no more than that physician's bill could cure the ignorant patient of his disease, who, when it was commended to him, took the paper only, and put it up in his pocket, but never drank the potion that was described in it.

All that Christ did for us in the flesh, when he was here upon earth, from his lying in a manger, when he was born in Bethlehem, to his bleeding upon the cross on Golgotha, it will not save us from our sins, unless Christ by his Spirit dwell in us. It will not avail us to believe, that he was born of a virgin, unless the power of the Most High overshadow our hearts, and beget him there likewise. It will not profit us to believe, that he died upon the cross for us, unless we be baptized into his death by the mortification of all our lusts; unless the old man of sin be crucified in our hearts. Christ indeed hath made an expiation for our sins upon his cross, and the blood of Christ is the only sovereign balsam to free us from the guilt of them: but yet, besides the sprinkling of the blood of Christ upon us, we must be made partakers also of his spirit. Christ came into the world, as well to redeem us from the power and bondage of our sins, as to free us from the guilt of them. "You know (saith St. John) that he was manifested to take away our sins: whosoever therefore abideth in him, sinneth not; whosoever sinneth, hath not seen him nor known him." Lo the end of Christ's coming into the world! Lo a design worthy of God manifested in the flesh!

Christ did not take all those pains to lay aside his robes of glory, and come down hither into the world, to enter into a virgin's womb, to be born in our human shape, and to be laid a poor crying infant in a manger, and having no form or comeliness at all upon him, to take upon him the

form of a servant, to undergo a reproachful and ignominious life, and at last to be abandoned to a shameful death, a death upon the cross; I say, he did not do all this merely to bring in a notion into the world, without producing any real substantial effect at all; without the changing, mending, and reforming of the world; so that men should still be as wicked as they were before, and as much under the power of the prince of darkness, only they should not be thought so; they should still remain as full of all the filthy sores of sin and corruption as before, only they should be accounted whole. Shall God come down from heaven, and pitch a tabernacle amongst men? Shall he undertake such a huge design, and make so great a noise of doing something, which, when it is all summed up, shall not at last amount to a reality? Surely Christ did not undergo all this to so little purpose; he would not take all this pains for us, that he might be able at last to put into our hands nothing but a blank. He "was with child," he "was in pain and travail;" and hath "he brought forth nothing but wind? hath he been delivered of the east wind?" Is that great design, that was so long carried in the womb of eternity, now proved abortive, or else nothing but a mere windy birth? No surely: the end of the gospel is life and perfection; it is a divine nature; it is a godlike frame and disposition of spirit; it is to make us partakers of the image of God in righteousness and true holiness, without which salvation itself were but a notion.

Christ came into the world to make an expiation and atonement for our sins; but the end of this was, that we might eschew sin; that we might forsake all ungodliness and worldly lusts. The gospel declares pardon of sin to those that are heavy laden with it and willing to be disburdened, to this end, that it might quicken and enliven us to new obedience. Whereas otherwise the guilt of sin might have detained us in horror and despair, and so have kept us still more strongly under the power of it, in sad and dismal apprehensions of God's wrath provoked against us, and inevitably falling on us: but Christ hath now appeared like a day-star, with most cheerful beams; nay, he is the Sun of Righteousness himself, which hath risen upon the world with his healing wings, with his exhilarating light, that he might chase away all those black despairing thoughts from us. But Christ did not rise that we should play, and sport, and wantonize with his light; but that we should do "the work of the day" in it; that we should walk εὐσχημόνως (as the apostle speaketh) not in our night-clothes of sinful deformity, but clad all over with the comely garments of light. The gospel is not big with the child of a fancy, of a mere conceit of righteousness without

us, hanging at distance over us, whilst our hearts within are nothing but cages of unclean birds, and like houses continually haunted with devils, nay, the very rendezvous of those fiends of darkness.

Holiness is the best thing that God himself can bestow upon us, either in this world, or the world to come. True evangelical holiness, that is, Christ formed in the hearts of believers, is the very cream and quintessence of the gospel. And were our hearts sound within, were there not many thick and dark fumes, that did arise from thence, and cloud our understandings, we could not easily conceive the substance of heaven itself to be any thing else but holiness, freed from those encumbrances, that did ever clog it and accloy it here; neither should we wish for any other heaven besides this. But many of us are like those children, whose stomachs are so vitiated by some disease, that they think ashes, coal, mud wall, or any such trash, to be more pleasant than the most wholesome food: such sickly and distempered appetites have we about these spiritual things, that hanker after I know not what vain shows of happiness, whilst in the mean time we neglect that, which is the only true food of our souls, that is able to nourish them up to everlasting life.

Grace is holiness militant, holiness encumbered with many enemies and difficulties, which it still fights against, and manfully quits itself of; and glory is nothing else but holiness triumphant, holiness with a palm of victory in her hand, and a crown upon her head: "Deus ipse cum omni sua bonitate, quatenus extra me est, non facit me beatum, sed quatenus in me est:" God himself cannot make me happy, if he be only without me, and unless he give in a participation of himself, and his own likeness into my soul.—Happiness is nothing but the releasing and unfettering of our souls from all these narrow, scant, and particular good things; and the espousing of them to be the highest and most universal good, which is not this or that particular good, but goodness itself: and this is the same thing, that we call holiness. Which, because we ourselves are so little acquainted with (being for the most part ever courting a mere shadow of it), therefore we have such low, abject, and beggarly conceits thereof; whereas it is in itself the most noble, heroical and generous thing in the world. For I mean by holiness nothing else but God stamped and printed upon the soul. And we may please ourselves with what conceits we will; but so long as we are void of this, we do but dream of heaven, and I know not what fond paradise; we do but blow up and down an airy bubble of our own fancies, which riseth out of the froth of our own vain hearts; we do but court a painted heaven, and woo happiness in a picture,

whilst in the mean time a true and real hell will suck in our souls into it, and soon make us sensible of a solid woe and substantial misery.

Divine wisdom hath so ordered the frame of the whole universe, as that every thing should have a certain proper place, that should be a receptacle for it. Hell is the sink of all sin and wickedness. The strong magic of nature pulls and draws every thing continually to that place, which is suitable to it, and to which it doth belong; so all these heavy bodies press downwards towards the centre of our earth, being drawn in by it: in like manner hell, wheresoever it is, will by strong sympathy pull in all sin, and magnetically draw it to itself: as true holiness is always breathing upwards, and fluttering towards heaven, striving to embosom itself with God; and it will at last undoubtedly be conjoined with him; no dismal shades of darkness can possibly stop it in its course, or bear it back.

Ὡς αἰεὶ τὸ ὅμοιον ἄγει θεὸς εἰς τὸ ὅμοιον.

Nay, we do but deceive ourselves with name: hell is nothing but the orb of sin and wickedness, or else that hemisphere of darkness, in which all evil moves; and heaven is the opposite hemisphere of light, or else, if you please, the bright orb of truth, holiness and goodness: and we do actually in this life instate ourselves in the possession of one or other of them. Take sin and disobedience out of hell, and it will presently clear up into light, tranquillity, serenity, and shine out into a heaven. Every true saint carrieth his heaven about with him in his own heart; and hell, that is without, can have no power over him. He might safely wade through hell itself, and, like the three children, pass through the midst of that fiery furnace, and yet not at all be scorched with the flames of it: he might walk through the valley of the shadow of death, and yet fear no evil.

Sin is the only thing in the world that is contrary to God. God is light, and that is darkness: God is beauty, and that is ugliness and deformity. All sin is direct rebellion against God; and with what notions soever we sugar it, and sweeten it, yet God can never smile upon it, he will never make a truce with it. God declares open war against sin, and bids defiance to it; for it is a professed enemy to God's own life and being. God, which is infinite goodness, cannot but hate sin, which is purely evil. And though sin be in itself but a poor, impotent and crazy thing, nothing but straitness, poverty, and nonentity, so that of itself it is most the wretched and miserable thing in the world, and needeth no further punishment besides itself; yet divine vengeance beats it

off still further and further from God, and, wheresoever it is, will be sure to scourge it and lash it continually. God and sin can never agree together.

That I may therefore yet come nearer to ourselves: This is the message, that I have now to declare unto you, that "God is light, and in him is no darkness at all. If we say, that we have fellowship with him, and walk in darkness, we lie, and do not the truth." Christ and the gospel are light, and there is no darkness at all in them: if you say, that you know Christ and his gospel, and yet keep not Christ's commandments, but dearly hug your private darling corruptions, you are liars, and the truth is not in you; you have no acquaintance with the God of light, nor the gospel of light. If any of you say, that you know Christ, and have an interest in him, and yet (as I fear too many do) still nourish ambition, pride, vain-glory, within your breasts, harbor malice, revengefulness, and cruel hatred to your neighbors in your hearts, eagerly scramble after this worldly pelf, and make the strength of your parts and endeavors serve that blind mammon, the god of this world; if you wallow and tumble in the filthy puddle of fleshly pleasures, or if you aim only at yourselves in your lives, and make yourself the compass by which you sail, and the star by which you steer your course, looking at nothing higher or more noble than yourselves; deceive not yourselves, you have neither seen Christ, nor known him: you are deeply incorporated (if I may so speak) with the spirit of this world, and have no true sympathy with God and Christ, no fellowship at all with them.

And, I beseech you, let us consider; Be there not many of us, that pretend much to Christ, that are plainly in our lives as proud, ambitious, vain-glorious as any others? Be there not many of us, that are as much under the power of unruly passions, as cruel, revengeful, malicious, censorious as others? that have our minds as deeply engaged in the world, and as much envassalled to riches, gain, profit, those great admired deities of the sons of men, and their souls as much overwhelmed and sunk with the cares of this life? Do not many of us as much give ourselves to the pleasures of the flesh, and though not without regrets of conscience, yet ever now and then secretly soak ourselves in them? Be there not many of us, that have as deep a share likewise in injustice and oppression, in vexing the fatherless and the widows? I wish it may not prove some of our cases at that last day, to use such pleas as these unto Christ in our behalf: Lord, I have prophesied in thy name; I have preached many a zealous sermon for thee; I have kept many a long fast; I have been very active for thy cause in church, in state;

nay, I never made any question, but that my name was written in thy book of life: when yet, alas! we shall receive no other return from Christ but this: "I know you not; depart from me, ye workers of iniquity." I am sure there be too many of us, that have long pretended to Christ, which make little or no progress in true Christianity, that is, holiness of life; that ever hang hovering in a twilight of grace, and never seriously put ourselves forward into clear day light, but esteem that glimmering *crepusculum* which we are in, and like that faint twilight better than broad open day: whereas "the path of the just (as the wise man speaks) is as the shining light, that shineth more and more unto the perfect day." I am sure there be many of us, that are perpetual dwarfs in our spiritual stature, like those silly women (that St. Paul speaks of) laden with sins, and led away with divers lusts, that are "ever learning, and never able to come to the knowledge of the truth;" that are not now one jot taller in Christianity, than we were many years ago, but have still a sickly, crazy, and unsound a temper of soul as we had long before.

Indeed, we seem to do something; we are always moving and lifting at the stone of corruption, that lies upon our hearts, but yet we never stir it notwithstanding, or at least never roll it off from us. We are sometimes a little troubled with the guilt of our sins, and then we think we must thrust our lusts out of our hearts; but afterwards we sprinkle ourselves over with I know not what holy water, and so are contented to let them still abide quietly within us. We do every day truly confess the same sins, and pray against them; and yet still commit them as much as ever, and lie as deeply under the power of them. We have the same water to pump out in every prayer, and still we let the same leak in again upon us. We make a great deal of noise, and raise a great deal of dust with our feet; but we do not move from off the ground, on which we stood, we do not go forward at all: or if we do sometimes make a little progress, we quickly lose again the ground which we had gained; like those upper planets in the heaven, which (as the astronomers tell us) sometimes move forwards, sometimes quite backwards, and sometimes perfectly stand still; have their stations and retrogradations, as well as their direct motions. As if religion were nothing else but a dancing up and down upon the same piece of ground, and making several motions and friskings on it; and not a sober journeying and travelling onwards toward some certain place. We do and undo; we do "Penelopes telam texere;" we weave sometimes a web of holiness, but then we let our lusts come, and undo and unravel all again. Like Sisyphus in the fable, we roll up a mighty stone with

much ado, sweating and tugging up the hill; and then we let it go, and tumble down again unto the bottom; and this is our constant work. Like those Danaides, which the poets speak of, we are always filling water into a sieve, by our prayers, duties, and performances, which still runs out as fast as we pour it in.

What is it, that thus cheats us, and gulls us of our religion? that makes thus constantly to tread the same ring and circle of duties, where we make no progress at all forwards, and the further we go, are still never the nearer to our journey's end? What is it, that thus starves our religion, and makes it look like those kine in Pharaoh's dream, ill-favoured and lean-fleshed, that it hath no color in its face, no blood in its veins, no life nor heat at all in its members? What is it, that doth thus be-dwarf us in our Christianity? What low, sordid, unworthy principles do we act by, that thus hinder our growth, and make us stand at a stay, and keep us always at the very porch and entrance where we first began? Is it a sleepy, sluggish conceit, that it is enough for us if we be but once in a state of grace, if we have but once stepped over the threshold; we need not take so great pains to travel any further? or is it another damping, choaking, stifling opinion, that Christ hath done all for us already without us, and nothing need more be done within us? no matter how wicked we be in ourselves, for we have holiness without us; no matter how sickly and diseased our souls be within, for they have health without them. Why may we not as well be satisfied and contented to have happiness without us too to all eternity, and so ourselves for ever continue miserable? "Little children, let no man deceive you; he that doth righteousness is righteous, even as he is righteous: but he that committeth sin is of the devil." I shall therefore exhort you in the wholesome words of St. Peter; "Give all diligence to add to your faith, virtue; and to virtue, knowledge; to knowledge temperance; and to temperance, patience; to patience, godliness; and to godliness, brotherly-kindness; and to brotherly-kindness, charity: For if these things be in you and abound, they make you, that ye shall neither be barren nor unfruitful in the knowledge of our Lord Jesus Christ." The apostle still goes on, and I cannot leave him yet: "But he that lacketh these things is blind, and cannot see far off, and hath forgotten, that he was once purged from his old sins. Wherefore the rather, brethren, give diligence to make your calling and election sure; for if ye do these things, ye shall never fall." Let us not only talk and dispute of Christ, but let us indeed put on the Lord Jesus Christ. Having those great and precious promises, which he hath given us, let us strive to be made partakers of the divine

nature, escaping the corruption that is in the world through lust; and being begotten again to a lively hope of enjoying Christ hereafter, let us purify ourselves, as he is pure.

Let us really declare that we know Christ, that we are his disciples, by our keeping of his commandments; and, amongst the rest, that commandment especially, which our Saviour Christ himself commendeth to his disciples in a peculiar manner; "This is my commandment, that ye love one another, as I have loved you:" and again, "These things I command you, that you love one another. Let us follow peace with all men, and holiness, without which no man shall see God. Let us put on, as the elect of God, holy and beloved, bowels of mercies, kindness, humbleness of mind, meekness, long-suffering, forbearing one another, and forgiving one another, if any man have a quarrel against any, even as Christ forgave us: and above all these things let us put on charity, which is the bond of perfectness. Let us in meekness instruct those that oppose themselves, if God peradventure will give them repentance to the acknowledging of the truth; that they may recover themselves out of the snares of the devil, that are taken captive by him at his will. Beloved, let us love another; for love is of God, and whosoever loveth is born of God, and knoweth God."

O divine love! the sweet harmony of souls! the music of angels! the joy of God's own heart! the very darling of his bosom! the source of true happiness! the pure quintessence of heaven! that which reconciles the jarring principles of the world, and makes them all chime together! that which melts men's hearts into one another! See how St. Paul describes it, and it cannot choose but enamour your affections towards it: "Love envieth not, it is not puffed up, it doth not behave itself unseemly, seeketh not her own, is not easily provoked, thinketh no evil, rejoiceth not in iniquity; beareth all things, believeth all things, hopeth all things, endureth all things." I may add, in a word, it is the best-natured thing, the best complexioned thing in the world. Let us express this sweet harmonious affection in these jarring times: that so, if it be possible, we may tune the world into better music. Especially in matters of religion, let us strive with all meekness to instruct and convince one another. Let us endeavor to promote the gospel of peace, the dove-like gospel, with a dove-like spirit. This was the way, by which the gospel at first was propagated in the world: Christ did not cry, nor lift up his voice in the streets; a bruised reed he did not break, and the smoking flax he did not quench; and yet he brought "forth judgment unto victory." He whispered the gospel to us from mount Sion, in a still voice; and yet the sound thereof went out quickly throughout

all the earth. The gospel at first came down upon the world gently and softly like the dew upon Gideon's fleece; and yet it quickly soaked quite through it: and, doubtless, this is still the most effectual way to promote it further. Sweetness and ingenuity will more command men's minds than passion, sourness and severity; as the soft pillow sooner breaks the flint, than the hardest marble. Let us ἀληθεύειν ἐν ἀγάπῃ, follow truth in love—and of the two, indeed, be contented rather to miss of the conveying of a speculative truth, than to part with love. When we would convince men of any error by the strength of truth, let us withal pour the sweet balm of love upon their heads. Truth and love are two the most powerful things in the world; and when they both go together, they cannot easily be withstood. The golden beams of truth and the silken cords of love, twisted together, will draw men on with a sweet violence, whether they will or no.

Let us take heed we do not sometimes call that zeal for God and his gospel, which is nothing else but our own tempestuous and stormy passion. True zeal is a sweet, heavenly and gentle flame, which maketh us active for God, but always within the sphere of love. It never calls for fire from heaven to consume those that differ a little from us in their apprehensions. It is like that kind of lightning (which the philosophers speak of) that melts the sword within, but singeth not the scabbard: it strives to save the soul, but hurteth not the body. True zeal is a loving thing, and makes us always active to edification, and not to destruction. If we keep the fire of zeal within the chimney, in its own proper place, it never doth any hurt; it only warmeth, quickeneth and enliveneth us: but if once we let it break out, and catch hold of the thatch of our flesh, and kindle our corrupt nature, and set the house of our body on fire, it is no longer zeal, it is no heavenly fire, it is a most destructive and devouring thing. True zeal is an *ignis lambens*, a soft and gentle flame, that will not scorch one's hand; it is no predatory or voracious thing: but carnal and fleshly zeal is like the spirit of gunpowder set on fire, that tears and blows up all that stands before it. True zeal is like the vital heat in us, that we live upon, which we never feel to be angry or troublesome; but though it gently feed upon the radical oil within us, that sweet balsam of our natural moisture, yet it lives lovingly with it, and maintains that, by which it is fed: but that other furious and distempered zeal is nothing else but a fever in the soul. To conclude, we may learn what kind of zeal it is that we should make use of in promoting the gospel, by an emblem of God's own, given us in the Scripture, those fiery tongues, that, upon the day of Pentecost, sat upon the apostles, which sure were harmless

flames, for we cannot read that they did any hurt, or that they did so much as singe a hair of their heads.

I will therefore shut up this with that of the apostle; "Let us keep the unity of the Spirit in the bond of peace." Let this soft and silken knot of love tie our hearts together; though our heads and apprehensions cannot meet, as indeed they never will, but always stand at some distance off from one another. Our zeal, if it be heavenly, if it be true vestal fire kindled from above, will not delight to tarry here below, burning up straw and stubble and such combustible things, and sending up nothing but gross and earthy fumes to heaven; but it will rise up, and return back pure as it came down, and will be ever striving to carry up men's hearts to God along with it. It will be only occupied about the promoting of those things, which are unquestionably good; and when it moves in the irascible way, it will quarrel with nothing but sin. Here let our zeal busy and exercise itself, every one of us beginning first at our own hearts. Let us be more zealous than ever we have yet been in fighting against our lusts, in pulling down these strong holds of sin and Satan in our hearts. Here let us exercise all our courage and resolution, our manhood and magnanimity.

Let us trust in the almighty arm of our God, and doubt not but he will as well deliver us from the power of sin in our hearts, as preserve us from the wrath to come. Let us go out against these uncircumcised Philistines, I mean our lusts, not with shield or spear, not in any confidence of our own strength, but in the name of the Lord of hosts; and we shall prevail, we shall overcome our lusts: "for greater is he that is in us, than he that is in them.—The eternal God is our refuge, and underneath are everlasting arms; he shall thrust out these enemies from before us; and he shall say, destroy them." We shall enter the true Canaan, the good land of promise, "that floweth with milk and honey," the land of truth and holiness. "Wherefore take unto you the whole armour of God, that you may be able to withstand. Let your loins be girt about with truth; have on the breast-plate of righteousness; and let your feet be shod with the preparation of the gospel of peace. Above all take the shield of faith, whereby ye shall be able to quench all the fiery darts of the wicked; and take the helmet of salvation, and the sword of the Spirit, which is the word of God." And lastly, be sure of this, that ye "be strong only in the Lord, and in the power of his might."

There be some, that dishearten us in this spiritual warfare, and would make us let our weapons fall out of our hands, by working in us a despair of victory. There be some evil spies, that weaken the hands

and hearts of the children of Israel, and bring an ill report upon that land, that we are to conquer, telling of nothing but strange giants, the sons of Anak, there, that we shall never to able to overcome. "The Amalekites (say they) dwell in the south, the Hittites, Jebusites, Amorites in the mountains, and the Canaanites by the sea-coast;" huge armies of tall invincible lusts: "we shall never be able to go against this people;" we shall never be able to prevail against our corruptions. Hearken not unto them, I beseech you, but hear what Caleb and Joshua say; "Let us go up at once and possess it, for we are able to overcome them;" not by our own strength, but by the power of the Lord of hosts. There are indeed sons of Anak there, there are mighty giant-like lusts, that we are to grapple with; nay, there are principalities and powers too, that we are to oppose: but the great Michael, the captain of the Lord's host, is with us; he commands in chief for us, and we need not be dismayed. "Understand therefore this day, that the Lord thy God is he, which goeth before thee as a consuming fire; he shall destroy these enemies, and bring them down before thy face." If thou wilt be faithful to him, and put thy trust in him, as the fire consumeth the stubble, and as the flame burneth up the chaff, so will he destroy thy lusts in thee: their root shall be rottenness, and their blossom shall go up as the dust.

But let us take heed, that we be not discouraged, and before we begin to fight, despair of victory: but to believe and hope well in the power of our God and his strength, will be half a conquest. Let us not think holiness in the hearts of men here in the world is a forlorn, forsaken, and outcast thing from God, that he hath no regard of holiness; wherever it is, though never so small, if it be but hearty and sincere, it can no more be cut off and discontinued from God, than a sunbeam here upon earth can be broken off from its intercourse with the sun, and be left alone amidst the mire and dirt of this world. The sun may as well discard its own rays, and banish them from itself into some region of darkness far remote from it, where they shall have no dependence at all upon it, as God can forsake and abandon holiness in the world, and leave it a poor orphan thing, that shall have no influence at all from him to preserve and keep it. Holiness is something of God, wherever it is; it is an efflux from him, that always hangs upon him, and lives in him: as the sun-beams, although they gild this lower world, and spread their golden wings over us, yet they are not so much here, where they shine, as in the sun, from whence they flow. God cannot draw a curtain betwixt himself and holiness, which is nothing but the splendour and shining of himself; he cannot hide

his face from it, he cannot desert it in the world. He that is once born of God, shall overcome the world, and the prince of this world too, by the power of God in him. Holiness is no solitary neglected thing; it hath stronger confederacies, greater alliances, than sin and wickedness. It is in league with God and the universe; the whole creation smiles upon it: there is something of God in it, and therefore it must needs be a victorious and triumphant thing.

Wickedness is a weak, cowardly and guilty thing, a fearful and trembling shadow. It is the child of ignorance and darkness; it is afraid of light, and cannot possibly withstand the power of it, nor endure the sight of its glittering armour. It is allianced to none but wretched, forlorn and apostate spirits, that do what they can to support their own weak and tottering kingdom of darkness, but are only strong in weakness and impotency. The whole polity and commonwealth of devils is not so powerful as one child of light, one babe in Christ; they are not able to quench the least smoking flax, to extinguish one spark of grace. Darkness is not able to make resistance against light, but ever, as it comes, flies before it. But if wickedness invite the society of devils to it (as we learn by the sad experience of these present times, in many examples of those, that were possessed with malice, revengefulness and lust), so that those cursed fiends do most readily apply themselves to it, and offer their service to feed it and encourage it, because it is their own life and nature, their own kingdom of darkness, which they strive to enlarge and to spread the dominions of; shall we then think, that holiness, which is so nearly allied unto God, hath no good genius at all in the world to attend upon it, to help it and encourage it? Shall not the kingdom of light be as true to its own interest, and as vigilant for the enlarging of itself, as the kingdom of darkness? Holiness is never alone in the world, but God is always with it, and his loving Spirit doth ever associate and join itself to it. He, that sent it into the world, is with it as Christ speaketh of himself; "The Father hath not left me alone, because I do always those things that please him." Holiness is the life of God, which he cannot but feed and maintain wheresoever it is: and as devils are always active to encourage evil, so we cannot imagine, but that the heavenly host of blessed angels above are busily employed in the promoting of that, which they love best, that which is dearest to God, whom they serve, the life and nature of God. "There is joy in heaven at the conversion of one sinner;" heaven takes notice of it; there is a choir of angels, that sweetly sings the epithalamium of a soul divorced from sin and Satan, and espoused unto Christ. What therefore the wise man speaks concerning wisdom,

I shall apply to holiness: "Take fast hold of holiness, let her not go, keep her, for she is thy life: keep thy heart with all diligence, for out of it are the issues of life," and of death too. Let nothing be esteemed of greater consequence and concernment to thee than what thou doest and actest, how thou livest. Nothing without us can make us either happy or miserable; nothing can either defile us, or hurt us, but what goeth out from us, what springeth and bubbleth up out of our own hearts. We have dreadful apprehensions of the flames of hell without us; we tremble, and are afraid, when we hear of fire and brimstone; whilst in the mean time we securely nourish within our own hearts a true and living hell,

——————et cæco carpimur igni:

The dark fire of our lusts consumeth our bowels within, and miserably scorcheth our souls, and we are not troubled at it. We do not perceive how hell steals upon us whilst we live here. And as for heaven, we only gaze abroad, expecting that it should come in to us from without, but never look for the beginnings of it to arise within, in our own hearts.

But lest there should yet haply remain any prejudice against that, which I have all this while heartily commended to you, true holiness, and the keeping of Christ's commandments, as if it were a legal and a servile thing, that would subject us to a state of bondage, I must here needs add a word or two, either for the prevention or removal of it. I do not therefore mean by holiness, the mere performance of outward duties of religion, coldly acted over as a task; nor our habitual prayings, hearings, fastings, multiplied one upon another (though these be all good, as subservient to a higher end); but I mean an inward soul and principle of divine life, that spiriteth all these that enliveneth and quickeneth the dead carcass of all outward performances whatsoever. I do not here urge the "dead law of outward works," which indeed, if it be alone, subjects us to a "state of bondage;" but the inward law of the gospel, the "law of the Spirit of life," than which nothing can be more free and ingenuous: for it doth not act us by principles without us, but is an inward self-moving principle living in our hearts.

The first, though it work us into some outward conformity to God's commandments, and so hath a good effect upon the world; yet we are all this while but like dead instruments of music, that sound sweetly and harmoniously, when they are only struck and played upon from without by the musician's hand, who hath the theory and law of music living within himself.

But the second, the living law of the gospel, the "law of the Spirit

of life" within us, is as if the soul of music should incorporate itself with the instrument, and live in the strings, and make them of their own accord, without any touch or impulse from without, dance up and down, and warble out their harmonies.

They, that are acted only by an outward law, are but like *neurospasts*, or those little puppets, that skip nimbly up and down, and seem to be full of quick and sprightly motion; whereas they are all the while moved artificially by certain wires and strings from without, and not by any principle of motion from themselves within: or else like clocks and watches, that go pretty regularly for a while, but are moved by weights and plummets, or some other artificial springs, that must be ever now and then wound up, or else they cease.

But they, that are acted by the new law of the gospel, by the "law of the Spirit," they have an inward principle of life in them, that from the centre of itself, puts forth itself freely and constantly into all obedience to the will of Christ. This new law of the gospel is a kind of musical soul, informing the dead organs of our hearts, that makes them of their own accord delight to act harmoniously according to the rule of God's word.

The law, that I speak of, is a law of love, which is the most powerful law in the world; and yet it freeth us in a manner from all law without us, because it maketh us to become a law unto ourselves. The more it prevaileth in us, the more it eateth up and devoureth all other laws without us; just as Aaron's living rod did swallow up those rods of the magicians, that were made only to counterfeit a little life.

Quis legem det amantibus?
Major lex amor est sibi.

Love is at once a freedom from all law, a state of purest liberty; and yet a law too of the most constraining and indispensable necessity.

The worst law in the world is the "law of sin, which is in our members;" which keeps us in a condition of most absolute slavery, when we are wholly under the tyrannical commands of our lusts: this is a cruel Pharaoh indeed, that sets his hard task-masters over us, and maketh us wretchedly drudge in mire and clay.

The law of the letter without us, sets us in a condition of little more liberty, by restraining us from many outward acts of sin; but yet it doth not disenthral us from the power of sin in our hearts.

But the "law of the spirit of life," the gospel law of love, it puts us into a condition of most pure love and perfect liberty; and whosoever

really entertains this law, he hath "thrust out Hagar" quite, he hath "cast out the bond-woman and her children;" from henceforth Sarah, the free-woman, shall live for ever with him, and she shall be to him a mother of many children; her seed shall be "as the sand of the sea-shore for number," and "as the stars of heaven." Here is evangelical liberty, here is gospel freedom, when "the law of the Spirit of life in Christ Jesus hath made us free from the law of sin and death;" when we have a liberty from sin, and not a liberty to sin: for our dear Lord and Master hath told us, that "whosoever committeth sin, is the servant of it."

He that lies under the power and vassalage of his base lusts, and yet talks of gospel freedom, he is but like a poor condemned prisoner, that in his sleep dreams of being set at liberty, and of walking up and down wheresoever he pleaseth, whilst his legs are all the while locked fast in fetters and irons. To please ourselves with a notion of gospel liberty, whilst we have not a gospel principle of holiness within us, to free us from the power of sin, is nothing else but to gild over our bonds and fetters, and to fancy ourselves to be in a golden cage. There is a straitness, slavery, and narrowness in sin: sin crowds and crumples up our souls, which if they were freely spread abroad, would be as wide and as large as the whole universe.

No man is truly free, but he that hath his will enlarged to the extent of God's own will, by loving whatsoever God loves, and nothing else. Such an one doth not fondly hug this and that particular created good thing, and envassal himself unto it; but he loveth every thing that is lovely, beginning at God, and descending down to all his creatures, according to the several degrees of perfection in them. He enjoys a boundless liberty, and a boundless sweetness, according to his boundless love. He enclaspeth the whole world within his outstretched arms; his soul is as wide as the whole universe, as big as "yesterday, to day, and forever." Whosoever is once acquainted with this disposition of spirit, he never desires any thing else, he loves the life of God in himself dearer than his own life. To conclude this, therefore; if we love Christ, and keep his commandments, his commandments will not be grievous to us; his yoke will be easy, and his burden light: it will not put us into a state of bondage, but of perfect liberty. For it is most true of evangelical obedience, what the wise man speaketh of wisdom, "her ways are ways of pleasantness, and all her paths are peace: she is a tree of life to those that lay hold upon her, and happy are all they that retain her."

I will now shut up all with one or two considerations, to persuade you further to the keeping of Christ's commandments.

First, from the desire, which we all have of knowledge. If we would indeed know divine truths, the only way to come to this is by keeping of Christ's commandments. The grossness of our apprehensions in spiritual things, and our many mistakes, that we have about them, proceed from nothing but those dull and foggy steams, which rise up from our foul hearts, and becloud our understandings. If we did but heartily comply with Christ's commandments, and purge our hearts from all gross and sensual affections, we should not then look about for truth wholly without ourselves, and enslave ourselves to the dictates of this and that teacher, and hang upon the lips of men; but we should find the great eternal God inwardly teaching our souls, and continually instructing us more and more in the mysteries of his will; and "out of our bellies should flow rivers of living waters." Nothing puts a stop and hindrance to the passage of truth in the world, but the carnality of our hearts, the corruption of our lives.

It is not wrangling disputes, and syllogistical reasonings, that are the mighty pillars, that underprop truth in the world: if we would but underset it with the holiness of our hearts and lives, it should never fail. Truth is a prevailing and conquering thing, and would quickly overcome the world, did not the earthiness of our dispositions, and the darkness of our false hearts hinder it. Our Saviour Christ, bids the blind man wash off the clay that was upon his eyes in the pool of Siloam, and then he should see clearly; intimating this to us, that it is the earthiness of men's affections, that darkens the eye of their understandings in spiritual things. Truth is always ready and near at hand, if our eyes were not closed up with mud, that we could but open them to look upon it. Truth always waits upon our souls, and offers itself freely to us, as the sun offers its beams to every eye, that will but open, and let them shine in upon it. If we could but purge our hearts from that filth and defilement, which hangeth about them, there would be no doubt at all of truth's prevailing in the world. For truth is great, and stronger than all things: all the earth calleth upon truth, and the heaven blesseth it; all works shade and tremble at it. The truth endureth, and is always strong; it liveth and conquereth for evermore. She is the strength, kingdom, power, and majesty of all ages. Blessed be the God of truth.

Secondly, if we desire a true reformation, as some would be thought to do; let us begin here in reforming our hearts and lives, in keeping Christ's commandments. All outward forms and models of reformation, though they be never so good in their kind, yet they are of little

worth to us without this inward reformation of the heart. Tin, or lead, or any other baser metal, if it be cast into never so good a mould, and made up into never so elegant a figure, yet it is but tin or lead still; it is the same metal, that it was before. If adulterate silver, that hath much alloy or dross in it, have never so current a stamp put upon it, yet it will not pass notwithstanding, when the touchstone trieth it. We must be reformed within, with a spirit of fire, and a spirit of burning, to purge us from the dross and corruption of our hearts, and refine us as gold and silver; and then we shall be reformed truly, and not before. When this once comes to pass, then shall Christ be set upon his throne indeed, then "the glory of the Lord shall overflow the land;" then we shall be a people acceptable unto him, and as mount Sion, which he dearly loved.

SERMON II.

But thanks be to God, which giveth us the victory through our Lord Jesus Christ.—1 Cor. 15: 5—7.

Χριστιανισμός ἐστι τῆς Θείας φύσεως μίμησις.

S. GREGORY NYSSEN.

Christ's resurrection, which the apostle treateth of in the former part of this chapter, is one of the main and principle articles of our Christian faith: for though Christ by his death upon the cross made a propitiatory sacrifice for the world, yet it was his resurrection only, which did manifest his death to be effectual and available for that end, and did evidence its acceptation with God. For if the grave had detained Christ, and held him prisoner, this would have been an argument, that the debt, for which he was committed to that dark dungeon, was not yet paid, nor satisfaction made; for "if Christ be not raised (saith the apostle[1]) your faith is in vain, ye are yet in your sins." But now death and the grave having delivered up Christ out of their custody, his resurrection is an undoubted argument, that they had no more to lay to his charge, as he was a surety and undertaker for mankind; but the debt which was owing to the law and Divine justice, was in the court of heaven fully acquitted and discharged. For Christ was delivered for our sins, and rose again for our justification.[2]

And though Christ's other miracles ought to have conciliated belief to his doctrine from the Jews; yet his resurrection from the dead (foretold by himself, and really accomplished) added to all the rest, was a most undoubted and unquestionable confirmation of his prophetical ministry. For if it were supposed (as the Jews of old, and the Talmudists of later times, maliciously calumniated our Saviour Christ,) that a mere wizard or magician should have appeared, and not only have done many miracles by Beelzebub and the powers of darkness, but also have foretold, that after he had been put to death, he should rise again, and have given this as a further sign to confirm his prophe-

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[1] Verse 17. [2] Rom. iv.

cy, as our Saviour did, Matt. 12: 39, it could never be conceived, that Divine Providence should suffer such an impostor miraculously to rise again, in so remarkable a manner, and so often to appear before the eyes of so many spectators, and at last visibly to ascend up to heaven. Because this would have been *tentatio invincibilis* to mankind; it being not imaginable, what greater assurance heaven itself could give, to confirm and seal a prophet, and persuade the world, that what he did was by the finger of God, and not by magical imposture, than this is. And therefore it is observable, that though a good while after our Saviour's time, when the Jews had now forfeited that peculiar Providence that watched over them, a certain counterfeit Messias, one David El-Roy, was permitted to do several strange and miraculous things by magic and witchcraft, if the Jewish relations be true; yet, when he gave this for a sign to the Persian king, to prove himself the Messias, that after he was beheaded by him, he should rise again, he plainly discovered his imposture, to the great disappointment of the deluded Jews, who (as Maimonides writes) in vain expected his resurrection a good while after.[1]

Moreover, if Christ had not risen again after death, the world would not have had sufficient ground to trust and believe in him as a Saviour. St. Austin reckoned it as great a miracle as any that Christ ever did upon earth, that the world should be brought off to believe in a crucified Saviour. For to worship התלוי, as the Jews by way of disgrace call our Saviour, or τὸν ἀνασκολοπιζόμενον in Lucian's language, one that was hanged, for a God, and to believe in him, could not but seem a monstrous and prodigious thing, both to Jews and Gentiles; and certainly it would never have been brought to pass, had there not been unquestionable assurance given of Christ's resurrection from the dead. For who would be so sottish as to believe in a dead Saviour, and to expect help and assistance from him that had not been able to help himself, and therefore had given no proof that he was able to help others? nay, from him, that, to all human appearance had now no being at all? Upon which account the Psalmist upbraids the sottish heathen, that "they ate the sacrifices of the dead." Psal. cvi. Wherefore it is observable, in the gospel, that when Christ was now dead, and buried in his sepulchre, the hope and expectation of his disciples, who had formerly believed in him, lay, as it were, entombed in the same sepulchre with him. And then the two disciples, that went to Emmaus, could only say, [2]"We trusted, that this had been he, which should have re-

[1] In Iggereth Teman. [2] Luke xxiv.

deemed Israel." But afterwards, when they were able upon good grounds to affirm, that *Κύριος ἀληθῶς ἀνέστη*, the Lord was risen indeed, —then their faith revived anew, and mounted up higher than ever, and grew triumphant in them.

Again, there was another excellent design in Christ's resurrection from the dead, which the apostle pursues largely also in this chapter; viz. To give the world assurance of a life after death, and a blessed immortality to be enjoyed by all true believers and followers of Christ. Christ, by his resurrection, hath "abolished death, and brought life and immortality to light," as the apostle speaks, (2 Tim. 1: 10.) or, as the church sings in that Divine anthem, "After he had overcome the sharpness of death, he opened the kingdom of heaven to all believers." The reasons of philosophy, that prove the soul's immortality, though firm and demonstrative in themselves, yet they are so thin and subtile to vulgar apprehensions, that they glide away through them, and leave no such palpable impressions on them, as can be able sufficiently to bear up against that heavy weight of gross infidelity, that continually sinks down the minds of men to a distrust of such high things, as be above the reach of sense. Neither are these considerations any longer of force, than men can actually attend to the strength and coherence of the demonstration; and when that actual attention (which is operose and difficult) is taken off, then the truth itself, like a spectre or apparition, suddenly vanishes away, and men question themselves afterwards whether there were any such thing, or no. Such thin and evanid things are philosophical speculations about the high mysteries of faith and religion. But Christ's raising of the self-same body which was laid in the sepulchre, and afterwards appearing in it often to his disciples, gave such evident assurance of the soul's immortality and life after death, as must needs strike more strongly upon vulgar minds, and make more palpable impressions upon them, and be always of more present and ready use, than any philosophical reasons and demonstrations.

And the Scripture is herein very harmonious, and agreeable to itself, both in the Old and New Testament; for, as in the one, it makes the original of death's entrance into the world to be the sin and disobedience of the first Adam, who was *ἄνθρωπος ἐκ γῆς, χοϊκὸς*, of the the earth, earthy;—so in the other it attributes the recovery of life and immortality to the meritorious obedience of the second Adam, that was *ὁ Κύριος ἐξ οὐρανοῦ, ἐπουράνιος*, the Lord from heaven, heavenly—who by his death vanquished and destroyed death. For as Samson, who was a type of our Saviour, when he was besieged by the Philistines in

the city Gaza (Judges xvi.) rose up at midnight, and pulled up the gates of the city, and the posts, and laying them upon his shoulders, carried them up to the top of the hill; in like manner, Christ our Lord, when he was environed and encompassed by death, after he had been awhile detained under the custody thereof, he ascended victoriously out of the power of the grave, and carried the gates of hell and death upon his shoulders along with him triumphantly into heaven; he slighted and dismantled that mighty garrison, whose walls were stronger than brass, and gates harder than adamant, that it should be no longer a prison, with doors and bars to shut up those that believe in him, but an open and free passage, and a broad highway to life and immortality. He is "the resurrection and the life," (John 11: 25.) and "he that believeth in him, though he were dead, yet shall he live." For, he that liveth, and was dead, and is alive for evermore, even he hath the keys of hell and of death. Rev. 1: 18.

But that which I chiefly aim at, at this time, concerning Jesus's resurrection and ascension into heaven, is this: That by and by after it he was made Lord and Christ, King and Saviour, and Sovereign of his church. Not but that Christ's humanity was always hypostatically united to the Divinity; but because the economical kingdom of Christ, as mediator, according to the Scripture calculation, seems not to commence till after the state of humiliation was, and so begins its epocha from Christ's resurrection, or his exaltation to sit at God's right hand in heaven. (Acts 2: 36.) "Let all the house of Israel know assuredly, that God hath made that same Jesus, whom ye have crucified, both Lord and Christ." (Acts 5: 31.) "Jesus whom ye slew and hanged on a tree, him hath God exalted on his right hand to be a prince and a Saviour," etc. (Philip. 2: 9.) "Who humbled himself and became obedient to the death of the cross; wherefore God hath highly exalted him, and given him a name above every name, that at the name of Jesus every knee shall bow, etc. and that every tongue shall confess, that Jesus Christ is Lord, to the glory of God the Father." And that article of our creed, concerning Christ's sitting at God's right hand in heaven, signifies thus much unto us; that Christ, after his resurrection and ascension into heaven, hath all power given him both in heaven and in earth, all things being made subject to him, [1]excepting him only that hath put all things under him. He being, for the comfort of his church and members here upon earth, according to his humanity, made God's vicegerent, and seated in his Father's throne; and having

[1] 1 Cor. 15: 27.

a mediatorious kingdom bestowed upon him, that shall continue, [1]"till he hath put down all authority and all power, and hath subdued all enemies under his feet;" and then hath delivered up this economical kingdom to God the Father, [2]"that God may be all in all."

And this is an unspeakable consolation, that Christian religion affords to us, and a most gracious condescension of the all-wise God; that forasmuch as we, who dwell in these houses of clay, are so far removed from the pure and abstracted Deity, and so infinitely disproportioned unto it, that there should be such a contrivance as this set on foot, that we should have one of our own flesh and blood, that was in all things tempted like unto us, and had experience of all our difficulties and calamities; who demonstrated his infinite love to us in laying down his life for us, and therefore we cannot doubt, but hath a most tender sympathy and fellow-feeling with us in all our infirmities; I say, that we should have such a one exalted to God's right hand, and invested with all authority and power both in heaven and earth, that he might administer all things for the good of his church and members, and supply them in all their wants and necessities. Which consideration must needs be far more comfortable, cheering, and reviving, to every true Christian, than it was to the sons of Jacob, when they went down to Egypt to buy corn and provision for their necessities, to think, that Joseph their brother was made lord of all the land.

And yet, notwithstanding, this is wholly eluded and evacuated by those high-flown spiritualists of these latter times, that slight and reject the letter of the New Testament, as a mean and carnal thing, and will acknowledge no other death and resurrection of Christ, no other ascension and sitting at God's right hand; nay, no other day of judgment, nor resurrection of the body, but what is mystical and allegorical; whereby they do not only impudently slur the gospel, according to the history and the letter, in making it no better than a romantical legend, or a mere Æsopic fable, that contains a good ἐπιμύθιον, or moral under it; but also plainly defeat the counsel of God against themselves and mankind, by antiquating Christianity, and bringing in instead thereof old Paganism again, disguised under a few canting phrases of Scripture language. For though Moses had a veil over his face, though there were many obscure umbrages and allegories in the law (the children of Israel being then not able to bear the brightness of that evangelical truth that shined under them); yet now, under the gospel, [3]"we do all with open face behold, as in a glass, the glory of the Lord" nakedly

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[1] Verse 24. [2] Verse 28. [3] 2 Cor. iii.

represented to us being "changed into the same image from glory to glory."

But to let this pass, and still to improve our former meditation further; let us in the next place consider, that Christ, who received all this power after his resurrection and ascension, did not receive it in vain and to no purpose, either taking no notice of our human transactions here below, as having removed his pavilion too far into those regions of light and glory from us; or else remaining, notwithstanding, an idle spectator, and no way concerning or interesting himself in the issues of our human affairs. Which will be so much the more improbable, if we consider what the Scripture and experience tell us, that the devil and apostate spirits are perpetually active and busy in promoting the concernments of the kingdom of darkness. And therefore doubtless he, whom God hath made the shepherd and bishop of our souls, can never be so regardless of his office, nor so careless of his flock and tender lambs committed to his charge, as to suffer those cruel wolves to prey upon them at pleasure; and to have no pity at all for them, nor to extend his watchful providence over them, whom once he vouchsafed to redeem with his own precious blood. No certainly; he that waded through so many difficulties and agonies for us in the days of his flesh; he, that "bore our griefs and carried our sorrows;" he, that was "wounded for our transgressions, and bruised for our iniquities;" that sweat drops of blood in the garden, and was nailed to the cross for us in Golgotha; he cannot so easily forget those whom he hath so dearly bought, nor suffer all that power which God hath invested him with for the good of his church, to lie by him idle and unemployed.

But to the end that there might not be the least ground of suspicion or distrust left in the minds of men concerning this particular, Christ, after his ascension into heaven, thought good to give us a sensible demonstration both of his kingly power, and of his watchful care and providence over his church, that he would not leave them orphans, and destitute of all assistance, by sending down his Holy Spirit on the day of Pentecost, in a visible and miraculous manner, upon his disciples. (Acts 2: 32.) "This Jesus hath God raised up, of which we are all witnesses: therefore, being by the right hand of God exalted, and having received of the Father the promise of the Holy Ghost, he hath shed forth this, which you now see and hear." And verily, if there had been no news heard of our Lord and Saviour Christ, after he ascended above the clouds out of his disciples' sight, no real and visible demonstration of his existence, power, and providence over his church; the distrustful

hearts of men would have been too prone to suspect, that the pretence of an invisible kingdom at God's right hand above, had been no better than a mere dream, an airy and fantastic notion; and they would have been too ready to have called in question the truth of all his other miracles, his resurrection and ascension, witnessed only by his own disciples, and to have surmised those several apparitions of his, that we read of after his death, had been nothing else but spectres, or phantasms, like the vulgarly believed apparitions of the ghosts of men in airy bodies. But the sensible and miraculous pouring out of the Holy Ghost upon his disciples, after his ascension into heaven, was a palpable confirmation of all Christ's other miracles, of the validity of his meritorious death and passion, of the truth of his resurrection and ascension; and gives most comfortable assurance to all believers to the world's end, that though his bodily presence be withdrawn from them, yet he hath not left his church utterly forlorn, and destitute of all assistance; but that his Spirit, the holy Comforter, continueth to be present amongst them, as his vicegerent, and to assist them for all the holy purposes of the gospel, to the world's end. Now the principle effects of Christ's Holy Spirit, which are to be hoped for and expected by every true believer and private Christian, are comprised by the apostle under three heads here in the text, as consisting in a threefold victory over a threefold enemy. "The sting of death is sin, and the strength of sin is the law: but thanks be to God, which giveth us the victory through our Lord Jesus Christ."

1. A victory over sin, as that which is the cause of death.

2. A victory over the law, as that which aggravates the guilt, and exasperates the power of sin.

3. Lastly, A victory over death, the fruit and consequent of sin.

First, therefore, There is a victory over sin to be obtained in and through Christ.

Some there are, that will acknowledge no other victory over sin but an external one; that whereby it was conquered for us by Christ upon the cross, sixteen hundred years since, where he "spoiled principalities and powers, and made a show of them openly, triumphing over them in it," (Col. 2: 15,) and where he "redeemed us from the curse of the law, being made a curse for us," (Gal. 3: 13). And doubtless this was one great end of Christ's coming into the world to make a propitiatory sacrifice for the sins of mankind: not only that he might thereby put a period to those continually repeated and ineffectual sacrifices of brute beasts, and the offering of the blood of bulls and goats, that could not take away sin, nor propitiate his Divine Majesty; but also that he might

at once give a sensible demonstration, both of God's high displeasure against sin, and of his placableness and reconcilableness to sinners returning to obedience; and, therefore, to that end, that the despair of pardon might not hinder any from repentance and amendment of life, promulgate free pardon and remission of sins, through his blood, to all that should repent and believe the gospel.

But it is a very unsound and unwholesome interpretation of this salutary undertaking of Christ's in the gospel, as if the ultimate end and design of it were to procure remission of sin, and exemption from punishment only, to some particular persons still continuing under the power of sin, and to save them at last in their sins, that is, with a mere outward and carnal salvation; it being a thing utterly impossible, that those undefiled rewards of the heavenly kingdom should be received and enjoyed by men in their unregenerate and unrenewed nature.

For what is this else, but to make Christ the grand patron of the kingdom of darkness, and to suppose God to be such a being as may be bribed and corrupted, by sacrifice and intercession, to a partial connivance and fond indulgence of men in their sins to all eternity? or else to insinuate, that there is no other evil at all in sin, but only in respect of that outward punishment consequent upon it? Which is to destroy the nature and reality of sin, and to make it nothing but a mere name or fancy; as if good and evil, just and unjust (as some philosophers dreamed), were not *Φύσει*, but *Νόμῳ* and *Δόξᾳ*, only, had no reality in nature, but depended only upon arbitrary laws, enforced by outward punishments, or mere opinions: and so were only *Ποιητὰ*, as Democritus expresseth it) mere factitious things, or else *Φανταστὰ*, fictitious and imaginary: either of which opinions, if they were true, then indeed remission of sin, and exemption from punishment, would quite take away all the evil of sin.

But if sin be not a mere name or fancy, but that which hath a real and intrinsical evil in it, greater than that of outward punishment; then certainly it cannot be so transcendent a happiness, as some men carnally conceit, to have an impunity in sinning to all eternity, that the accomplishment thereof should be thought the only fit undertaking for the Son of God to engage in, and that which would deservedly entitle him the Saviour of mankind. For that of Socrates in Plato must then needs be true, *Τὸν ἀδικοῦντα μὴ διδόναι δίκην, πάντων μέγιστόν τε καὶ πρῶτον κακῶν εἶναι*, that (in those which are not incorrigible and incurable) it is the greatest evil that can possibly befall them, to continue in wickedness unpunished; and the greatest kindness they can receive, by the lesser evil of punishment and castigation, to be cured of the

greater evil of sin.—For (as the same philosopher speaks) Ἰατρικὴ τῆς πονηρίας δίκη, chastisement and correction is the natural remedy and cure of wickedness;—which our Saviour confirms, when he said, [1]"As many as I love, I rebuke and chasten:" and sure the remedy is not worse than the disease.

Wherefore it was so far from being the ultimate end of Christ's undertaking to die for sin, that men might securely live in it, that on the contrary, the death of Christ was particularly intended as an engine to batter down the kingdom of sin and Satan, and to bring men effectually unto God and righteousness, as the Scripture plainly witnesseth, (1 Pet. 2: 24.) "His own self bare our sins in his body on the tree, that we, being dead to sin, might live to righteousness." The death of Christ conducing to this great end, not only as it was exemplary, and hieroglyphically instructed us, that we ought to take up the cross likewise, and follow our crucified Lord and Saviour, [2]suffering in the flesh, and ceasing from sin; but also as it doth most lively demonstrate to us God's high displeasure against sin, and the malignant nature of it, that could not otherwise be expiated than by the blood of that innocent and immaculate Lamb, the only-begotten Son of God; and, lastly, as the hope of pardon and free remission of sin, in the blood of Christ, for the truly penitent, might invite and animate men to cheerful and vigorous endeavors against sin.

Others there are, that tell us, there is indeed something further aimed at in the gospel besides the bare remission of sins, but that it is nothing else but the imputation of an external righteousness, or another's inherent holiness, which is so completely made ours thereby to all intents and purposes, as if we ourselves had been really and perfectly righteous; and this upon no other condition or qualification at all required in us, but only of mere faith scrupulously prescinded from all holiness and sanctification, or the laying hold or apprehending only (as they use to phrase it) of this external and imputed righteousness; that is, the merely believing and imagining it to be ours: which kind of faith therefore is but the imagination of an imagination, or of that, which really is not, and, as Pindar calls man Σκιᾶς ὄναρ, the very dream of a shadow.

For though this be pretended by some to be spoken only of justification as contradistinct from sanctification, the latter of which they conceive must by no means have any conditional influence upon the former; yet it will unavoidably extend to the taking away of the ne-

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[1] Rev. 3: 19. [2] 1 Pet. 6: 1.

cessity of inherent righteousness and holiness, and all obligation to it: upon which very account it is so highly acceptable, because under a specious show of modesty and humility it doth exceedingly gratify men's hypocrisy and carnality: for he that is thus completely justified by the imputation of a mere external righteousness, must needs have *ipso facto* a right and title thereby to heaven and happiness without holiness; for (Rom. 8: 30.) "Whom he justifieth them he also glorifieth." Neither can any thing be required inherently in them, where all inherency is perfectly supplied by imputation. And though it be pretended, that sanctification will spontaneously follow after by way of gratitude; yet this is like to prove but a very slippery hold, where it is believed, that gratitude itself, as well as in all other graces, is already in them by imputation. Neither can it be reasonably thought, that true holiness should spring by way of gratitude or ingenuity from such a principle of carnality, as makes men so well contented with a mere imaginary righteousness.

But this opinion, as it makes God, in justifying, to pronounce a false sentence, and to conceive of things otherwise than they are, and to do that, which himself hath declared to be abominable, to justify the wicked (in a forensic sense) and as it is irreconcilable to those many Scriptures, that assure us [1]God will render to every man according to his works; so it also takes away the necessity of Christ's meritorious and propitiatory sacrifice for the remission of sins: for where a complete righteousness is imputed, there is no sin at all to be pardoned. And, lastly, it vainly supposes righteousness and holiness to be mere fantastical and imaginary things; for otherwise it were no more possible, that a wicked man should be made righteous by another's righteousness imputed, than that a sick man should be made whole by another's imputed health. "If a brother or sister be naked and destitute of daily food, and one of you say unto them, Depart in peace, be you warmed, and be you filled; notwithstanding you give them not those things, which are needful for the body; what doth it profit? (James 2: 15, 16.) Even so, what doth it profit, my brethren, if a man say he hath faith (or imputed righteousness) and have not works? (that is, real and inherent righteousness, or inward regeneration) can such a faith (that is, imagination or imputation) save him?" Certainly no more than mere words can clothe a naked man's back, or feed a hungry man's belly, or warm and thaw him, whose blood is frozen and congealed in his veins. Nay, it is no more possible for a man to be made holy, than to be made

[1] Prov. 17: 15.

happy, by mere imputation, which latter few men would be contented withal; and, were it not for their hypocrisy, they would be as little contented with the former; and it would as little please them to be *opinione tantum justi*, as *opinione tantum beati*, to use Tully's expression against the Epicureans. Nay, since it is most certain, that the greatest part of our happiness consisteth in righteousness and holiness, it will unavoidably follow, that if we have no other than an imputative righteousness, we can have no other than an imputative happiness, and a mere imaginary heaven, which will little please us, when we feel ourselves to be in a true and real hell.

But it is not our intention here to quarrel about words and phrases, as if Christ's meritorious satisfaction might not be said to be imputed to those that repent and believe the gospel for remission of sins; much less to deny what the holy Scripture plainly asserts, true and living faith, that worketh by love, which is the very essence of the new creature, or regenerate nature, λογίζεσθαι εἰς δικαιοσύνην, to be imputed, or accounted for righteousness—under the gospel dispensation, where God will not proceed according to legal rigor and severity with his fallen creatures, but according to that equity and Ἐπιείκεια, which the philosopher tells us is the truest justice. But our only design is, to caution against that Antinomian error, which is too often insinuated under the notion of imputed righteousness, as if there were no necessity of inherent righteousness, and a real victory over sin, in order to salvation, but that an imputed or imaginary one might serve the turn. Which error springing up very early amongst the Gnostic Christians, St. John gives a very seasonable antidote against it. (1 John 3: 7.) "Little children, let no man deceive you; he that doth righteousness, is righteous, even as he is righteous:" and in chap. ii. ver. 4. "He that saith, I know him, and keepeth not his commandments, is a liar, and the truth is not in him." To which purpose is that also in his first chapter, (ver. 5.) "This is the message which we have heard of him, and declare to you, that God is light, and in him is no darkness at all. If we say that we have fellowship with him, and walk in darkness, we lie, and do not the truth: but if we walk in the light, as he is in the light, we have fellowship one with another, and the blood of Jesus Christ his Son cleanseth us from all sin." Wherefore the same apostle, in that Epistle, tells us of overcoming the wicked one, (chap. 2: 14.) and of overcoming the world, by our faith in Christ, (chap. 5: 4.) And in the Apocalypse he propoundeth, from Christ himself, divers remarkable promises, to him that overcometh: That he shall eat of the tree of life, that is in the midst of the paradise of God, (chap. ii. ver. 7.) That he shall not

be hurt of the second death, (ver. 11.) That he shall have the hidden manna, and a white stone with a new name written in it, which no man knoweth, saving he that receiveth it, (ver. 17.) That he will give him the morning-star, (ver. 28.) That he shall be clothed in white raiment, and his name shall not be blotted out of the book of life, (chap. iii. ver. 5.) That he shall be a pillar in the temple of God, (ver. 12.) And that he shall sit with Christ in his throne, as he overcame and sat down with his Father in his throne, (ver. 21.) The condition of all which promises being overcoming, we may well conclude from thence, that there is a real, and not an imaginary victory only, to be obtained over the power of sin, as well as the guilt of it.

Nay, it is true, and very observable, that those places, which are usually quoted as the foundation of an imputed righteousness in some other sense than what we before mentioned, are indeed no otherwise to be understood than of a real inward righteousness, that is wrought or infused by the spirit of Christ. As that principal one, Philip. 3: 8. "Yea doubtless, and I count all things lost for the excellency of the knowledge of Christ Jesus my Lord;———that I may win him, and be found in him, not having mine own righteousness, which is of the law, but that which is of the faith of Christ, the righteousness which is of God by faith." Where Christ, whom the apostle desires to win, and to be found in, and the righteousness, which is through the faith of Christ, and the righteousness, which is of God through faith, are no external imputed righteousness, but the real inward righteousness of the new creature, wrought, by the Spirit of Christ through faith, which is opposed here to our own righteousness, and the righteousness which is of the law; that is, the righteousness of outward works done by our own natural power, according to the letter of the law, in our unregenerate state: for so the following words explain the meaning, "that I may know him, and the power of his resurrection, and the fellowship of his sufferings, being made conformable unto his death; if by any means I might attain to the resurrection of the dead." And this same inward and real righteousness is often elsewhere called Christ and the new man, that is said to be in us, and which we are exhorted to put on, not by conceit or imagination only, but by real conformity to his nature, and participation of his spirit.

And whereas the magnifiers of free grace in an Antinomian sense, and the decriers of inherent righteousness, commonly conceive, that the free grace of God consists in nothing but either in the pardon of sin and exemption from punishment, or the imputation of an external holiness, and accounting men just freely, without any condition but on-

ly the mere believing of this, that they are so accounted; and that faith is no otherwise considered in the gospel, than in order to the believing of this imputation; and that our own works, when they are comparatively undervalued to grace and faith, are to be taken for all inherent righteousness and holiness, even the new creature itself: that all these are errors, as it might be abundantly proved from sundry other places of Scripture, so it may sufficiently appear from that one, Eph. 2: 4, etc. "God, who is rich in mercy, for his great love wherewith he loved us, even when we were dead in sins, hath quickened us together with Christ, (by grace ye are saved), and hath raised us up together ——That in the ages to come he might show the exceeding riches of his grace, and his kindness towards us in Christ Jesus. For by grace are ye saved through faith, and that not of yourselves; it is the gift of God: not of works, lest any man should boast. For we are his workmanship, created in Christ Jesus unto good works." For when we are here said to be saved by grace, it is plain, that the apostle means by saved, inwardly quickened and sanctified: σώζεσθαι, (saith Grotius well here) is *purgari a vitiis:* which inward sanctification is here attributed to God's free grace, and denied to ourselves and to works; the meaning whereof is, that it is not effected by our own good works (whether of outward morality or legal ceremonies) done by our own natural power in the unregenerate state, but by the quickening and enlivening spirit of Christ inwardly creating us anew. And, lastly, faith is plainly made the instrument of this inward sanctification, that is not wrought by our own works, but the grace and spirit of Christ. Whence we may well conclude, that the true object of the Christian faith is not only the blood of Christ shed upon the cross for the remission of sin, but also the renewing spirit of Christ for the inward conquering and mortifying of it, and the quickening or raising of us to an heavenly life.

And I dare be bold to say, that the inward sense of every true and sincere-hearted Christian in this point speaks the same language with the Scripture. For a true Christian, that hath any thing of the life of God in him, cannot but earnestly desire an inward healing of his sinful maladies and distempers, and not an outward hiding and palliation of them only. He must needs passionately long more and more after a new life and nature, and the Divine image to be more fully formed in him; insomuch, that if he might be secured from the pains of hell without it, he could not be fully quieted and satisfied therewith. It is not the effects and consequences of sin only, the external punishment due unto it, that he desires to be freed from, but the intrinsical evil of sin itself, the plague of his own heart. As he often meditates with

comfort upon that outward cross, to which his Saviour's hands and feet were nailed for his sins; so he impatiently desires also to feel the virtue of that inward cross of Christ, by which the world may be crucified to him, and he unto the world; and the power of Christ's resurrection in him, still to raise him further unto newness of life. Neither will he be more easily persuaded to believe, that his sinful lusts, the malignity and violence whereof he feels within himself, can be conquered without him, than that an army here in England can be conquered in France or Spain. He is so deeply sensible of the real evil, that is in sin itself, that he cannot be contented to have it only histrionically triumphed over. And to fancy himself covered all over with a thin veil of mere external imputation, will afford little satisfactory comfort unto him, that hungers and thirsts after righteousness, and is weary and heavy laden with the burden of sins, and doth not desire to have his inward maladies hid and covered only, but healed and cured. Neither can he be willing to be put off till the hour of death, for a divorce betwixt his soul and sin; nor easily persuaded, that though sin should rule and reign in him all his life-long, yet the last parting groan, that shall divide his soul and body asunder, might have so great an efficacy, as in a moment also to separate all sin from his soul.

But that we may not seem here either to beat the air in generals and uncertainties, or by an indiscreet zeal to countenance those conceited and high-flown enthusiasts of latter times, that, forgetting that example of modesty given us by the blessed apostle, [1] "Not as though I had already attained, or were already perfect———But this one thing I do; forgetting those things which are behind, and reaching forth unto those things which are before, I press towards the mark," boldly arrogate to themselves such an absolute perfection, as would make them not to stand in need of any Saviour, nor to be cleansed by the blood of the Lamb, which therefore they allegorize into a mystical sense; we must declare, that we speak not here of inherent righteousness, and a victory over sin in a legal or pharisaical sense, but in such an evangelical sense, as yet notwithstanding is true and real.

The first degree whereof is a principle of new life, infused into the soul by the spirit of Christ through faith (which the apostle calls *semen Dei*, the seed of God),[2] inclining it to love God and righteousness, as a thing correspondent to its nature, and enabling it to act freely and ingenuously in the ways of God, out of a living law written upon the heart, and to eschew sin as contrary to a vital principle. For the true

[1] Phil. 3: 12. [2] 1 John 3: 9.

gospel-righteousness, which Christ came to set up in the world, doth not consist merely in outward works, whether ceremonial or moral, done by our own natural power in our unregenerate state, but in an inward life and spirit wrought by God. Which those very philosophers seemed in a manner to acknowledge, that denied ἀρετὴν to be διδακτόντι, that virtue could be taught by outward rules and precepts like an art or trade; Aristotle himself also, when he inclines to think, that men are θείᾳ μοίρᾳ ἀγαθοὶ, and that their being good, depends upon some extraordinary divine influence and assistance. Which I the rather take notice of, because some late pretenders to philosophy have profanely derided this doctrine after this manner, as if it made good thoughts and virtuous dispositions to be *poured* and *blown* into men by God. But there is a second degree of victory over sin, which every true Christian ought not only to look upon as possible, but also to endeavor after, and restlessly to pursue; which is "such a measure of strength in the inward man," and such a degree of mortification or crucifixion of our sinful lusts, as that a man will not knowingly and deliberately do any thing that his conscience plainly tells him is a sin, though there be never so great temptations to it.

Whether or no this be that evangelical perfection, which was the mark that St. Paul pressed towards, and which he seems mystically to call the "resurrection from the dead," or any thing further, I leave it to others to make a judgment of. But doubtless, they, that have attained to such a principle of new life, and such a measure of inward strength, as is already mentioned, that is to the perfection of unfeigned sincerity, may, notwithstanding the irregularities of the first motions, violent assaults, and importunities of temptations, sudden incursions, and obreptions, sins of mere ignorance and inadvertency, (which are all washed away in the blood of Christ) in a true evangelical sense be said to have attained to a victory over sin.

Wherefore I demand, in the next place, why it should be thought impossible, by the grace of the gospel, and the faith of Christ, to attain such a victory as this is over sin? For sin owes its original to nothing else but ignorance and darkness, Πᾶς ὁ πονηρὸς ἀγνοεῖ, Every wicked man is ignorant.—And therefore in that sense, that other maxim of the Stoics may have some truth also, that ἄκοντες ἁμαρτάνουσι, men sin against their will;—because if they knew that those things were indeed so hurtful to them, they would never do them. Now, we all know, how easily light conquers darkness, and upon its first approach makes it fly before it, and, like a guilty shade, seek to hide itself from it, by running round about the earth. And certainly the light of God arising in

the soul can with as much ease scatter away the night of sinful ignorance before it. For truth hath a cognation with the soul; and falsehood, lies, and impostures, are no more able to make resistance against the power of truth breaking forth, than darkness is able to dispute with light. Wherefore the entrance in of light upon the soul is half a conquest over our sinful lusts.

Again, though sin have had a long and customary possession in the soul, yet it has no just title, much less a right of inheritance in it. For sin is but a stranger and foreigner in the soul, an usurper and intruder into the Lord's inheritance. Sin it is no nature, as St. Austin and others of the fathers often inculcate, but an adventitious and extraneous thing; and the true and ancient nature of the soul of man suffers violence under it, and is oppressed by it. It is nothing else but the preternatural state of rational beings, and therefore we have no reason to think it must needs be perpetual and unalterable. Is it a strange thing that a jarring instrument by the hand of a skilful musician should ever be set in tune again? Doubtless if an instrument of music were a living thing, it would be sensible of harmony as its proper state, and abhor discord and dissonancy as a thing preternatural to it. The soul of man was harmonical as God at first made it, till sin, disordering the strings and faculties, put it out of tune, and marred the music of it: but doubtless that great Harmostes, that tunes the whole world, and makes all things keep their times and measures, is able to set this lesser instrument in tune again. Sin is but a disease and dyscrasy in the soul; righteousness is the health and natural complexion of it; and there is a propension in the nature of every thing to return to its proper state, and to cast off whatever is heterogeneous to it. And some physicians tell us, that medicaments are but subservient to nature, by removing obstructions and impediments; but nature itself, and the inward Archæus released and set at liberty, works the cure. Bodies, when they are bent out of their place, and violently forced out of the natural position of their parts, have a spring of their own, and an inward strong propension to return to their own natural posture, which produceth that motion of restitution, that philosophers endeavour to give a reason of. As for example, air may be forced into much a lesser room, than it would naturally expand itself into: but whilst it is under this violence, it hath a spring or strong *conatus* to return to its proper state, (of which several ingenious observations have been lately published by a learned hand.) Now sin being a violent and preternatural state, and a sinner's returning to God and righteousness being *motus restitutionis et liberationis*, whereby the soul is restored to its true freedom and an-

cient nature; why should there not be such an elater or spring in the soul, (quickened and enlivened by divine grace) such a natural *conatus* of returning to its proper state again? Doubtless there is, and the Scriptures seems sometimes to acknowledge it, and call it by the name of Spirit, when it speaketh of our free-acting in God's ways from an inward principle. For the spirit is not always to be taken for a breath or impulse from without; but also for an inward propension of the soul, awakened and revived in it, to return to its proper state, as it is intellectual, and then to act freely in it according to its ancient nature. For if the spirit were a mere external force acting upon the soul, without the concurrence of an innate principle, then to be acted by the spirit would be a state of violence to the soul, which it could not delight always to continue under; whereas the state of the spirit is a state of freedom, and not of violence, as the apostle witnesseth, when he calls it the freedom of the spirit: it is the soul's acting from an inward spring and principle of its own intellectual nature, not by a mere outward impulse, like a boat, that is tugged on by oars, or driven by a strong blast of wind. Wherefore the soul's returning from sin to righteousness, which is its primitive nature, must needs have great advantages, it going on *secundo flumine*, according to the genuine current of its true intellectual nature, and having besides the assistance of a gentle gale of the Divine Spirit from without to help it forwards.

Why should it be thought so great an impossibility for men willingly to do that, which is agreeable to the law of goodness, since this is the genuine nature of the soul, when once it is freed from mistakes and incumbrances, from that which is heterogeneous and adventitious to it; that clogs it and oppresses it; and every life and nature acts freely according to its own propension? Why should it seem strange, that the superior faculties of the soul should become predominant, since they are φύσει δεσποτικαὶ, of a lordly nature, and made to rule, and the inferior faculties of a servile temper, and made to be subject; why should it seem impossible for equity, light, and reason to be enthroned in the soul of man again, and there to command and govern those exorbitant affections, that do so lawlessly rebel against them? For if some grave commanders and generals have been able by the majesty of their very looks to hush and silence a disorderly and mutinous rout of soldiers; certainly reason re-enthroned in her majestic seat, and re-invested with her ancient power and authority, which is natural and not usurped, would much more easily be able to check and control the tumultuous rabble of lusts and passions in us.

Doubtless God hath no other design upon us in religion, and the

gospel of his Son, than what is for our good, and to restore us to the rectitude and perfection of our beings: wherefore he seeks to redeem and call off our affections from the perishing vanities of this world, which being so infinitely below us, to debase and pollute our spirits: wherefore he would not have us to addict ourselves wholly to the gratifications of our lower faculties, which are but the brute in us, but he would have the best in us to be uppermost, the man to rule the brute, and the τὸ Θεῖον that is of God in us, to rule our manly and rational faculties. He would not have us, Narcissus-like, to be always courting our own shadow in the stream; for, according to the ancient Democritical philosophy, this whole visible world is nothing else but mere extended bulk, and hath nothing real in it but atoms or particles of a different magnitude, diversely placed and agitated in a continual whirlpool. But all the color, beauty and varnish, all that which charms and bewitches us in these objects without us, is nothing but the vital sensations and relishes of our own souls. This gives all the paint and lustre to those beauties, which we court and fall in love withal without us, which are otherwise as devoid of reality and fantastical as the colors of the rainbow. So that this outward world is not unfitly compared to an enchanted palace, which seems indeed mighty pleasing and ravishing to our deluded sense, whereas all is but imaginary and a mere prestigious show; those things, which we are enamoured with, thinking them to be without us, being nothing but the vital energies of our own spirits. In a word, God would have man to be a living temple for himself to dwell in, and his faculties, instruments to be used and employed by him; which need not be thought impossible, if that be true, which philosophy tells us, that there is *cognatio quædam*, a certain near kindred and alliance between the soul and God.

Lastly, we must observe, though this inward victory over sin be no otherwise to be effected than by the spirit of Christ through faith, and by a divine operation in us, so that in a certain sense we may be said to be passive thereunto; yet notwithstanding we must not dream any such thing, as if our active co-operation and concurrence were not also necessarily required thereunto. For as there is a spirit of God, in nature, which produceth vegetables and minerals, which human art and industry could never be able to effect; namely, that *spiritus intus alens*, which the poet speaks of, which yet notwithstanding doth not work absolutely, unconditionately, and omnipotently, but requireth certain preparations, conditions, and dispositions in the matter, which it works upon; (for unless the husbandman plough the ground and sow the seed, the spirit of God in nature will not give any increase:) in like manner

the Scripture tells us, that the Divine Spirit of grace doth not work absolutely, unconditionately, and irresistibly in the souls of men, but requireth certain preparations, conditions, and coöperations in us; forasmuch as it may both be quenched, and stirred up or excited in us. And, indeed, unless we plough up the fallow-ground of our hearts, and sow to ourselves in righteousness, (as the prophet speaks) by our earnest endeavors; we cannot expect, that the Divine Spirit of grace will shower down that heavenly increase upon us. Wherefore, if we would attain to a victory over sin by the spirit of Christ, we must endeavor to fight a good fight, and run a good race and to "enter in at the strait gate," so that overcoming we may receive the crown of life. And thus much shall suffice to have spoken at this time concerning the first particular, the victory over sin.

I shall now proceed to speak something briefly to the two other victories that remain, which are attainable also by Christ over the law and death.

And the law may be considered two manner of ways: first as an outward covenant of works, that pronounceth death and condemnation to all, that do not yield absolute and entire obedience to whatsoever is therein commanded; and which imposed also with the same severity a multitude of outward ceremonial observations, which had no intrinsical goodness at all in them, but kept men in a state of bondage and servility. Now the law, in this sense, as it is an outward letter and covenant of works, is already conquered externally for us by Christ's death upon the cross; (Gal. 3: 13,) "Christ hath redeemed us from the curse of the law, being made a curse for us; for it is written, Cursed is every one that hangeth on a tree; that the blessing of Abraham might come on the gentiles through Jesus Christ, that we might receive the promise of the Spirit through faith." And he hath thereby freed us also from our obligation to those commandments that were not good,[1] having "broken down the middle wall of partition, that was betwixt Jew and Gentile, abolishing in his flesh the enmity, even the law of commandments, (Eph. 2: 14, 15,) and blotting out the hand-writing of ordinances, that was against us, which was contrary to us, and taking it out of the way, nailing it to his cross." Col. 2: 14.

Secondly, The law is sometimes also considered in Scripture as an inward state of mind, wrought by the law and truth of God, whether written outwardly in the letter of the Scripture, or inwardly in the conscience, prevailing only so far as to beget a conviction of men's duty,

[1] Ezek. 20: 25.

and of the wrath of God against sin, but not enabling them with inward strength and power to do what is commanded, willingly, out of a love of it. It is such a state when men are only passive to God's law, and unwillingly subject unto it (as an enemy) for fear of wrath and vengeance. And this must needs be a state of miserable bondage and servility, distraction and perplexity of mind; when men are at once strongly convinced of the wrath of God against sin, and yet under the power of their lusts hailing and dragging of them to the commission of it. It is that state (as I conceive) which St. Paul describes, (Rom. vii,) after this manner: "The law is spiritual, but I am carnal, sold under sin: for that which I do, I allow not; for what I would that do I not, but what I hate, that do I." And again, "I see another law in my members warring against my mind, and bringing me into captivity under the law of sin. O wretched man that I am! who shall deliver me from this body of death?" Now from the law in this sense, that is, from the bondage and servility of the legal state, we are not delivered, nor made conquerors, by what Christ did outwardly upon the cross, as some imagine; as if he had there purchased for us an indulgence to sin without control; but by the inward working of his Holy Spirit, freeing us from the power and bondage of sin, and unbewitching us from the love of it.

Wherefore there is a double freedom from this legal state to be taken notice of; a true and false freedom; which I cannot better explain, than by using the apostle's own similitude in the beginning of the seventh chapter: "Know ye not, brethren, that the law hath dominion over a man as long as he liveth? (or rather, as long as it, that is the law, liveth?) For the woman, which hath a husband, is bound by the law to her husband so long as he liveth, but if her husband be dead, she is loosed from the law of the husband. So then, if while her husband liveth she be married to another man, she shall be called an adultress: but if her husband be dead, she is free from that law; so that she is no adultress, though she be married to another man." Where the law is compared to a husband; and one, that is under the law, or in a legal state, to a woman, that hath a husband. And as there are two ways, by which a woman may be freed from her husband; the one, if she break loose from him whilst he yet liveth, contrary to the laws of wedlock, and marry to another man; which is an undue and unlawful freedom, for then she is justly styled an adultress: another, if she stay till her husband be dead, and then, being free from the law of her husband, does lawfully marry to another man: in like manner there are two ways, by which men may be freed from the law, as it is an in-

ward state of bondage and servility. The first is, when men do illegally and unlawfully break loose from the law, which is their husband, whilst he is yet alive, and ought to have dominion over them, and marry themselves to another husband; which husband's name is carnal liberty, or licentiousness, too often miscalled in these latter times by the name of Christian liberty: and such as these may well be styled, in the Scripture-language, adulterers and adultresses. But there is another freedom from the law, which is a due and just freedom, when we do not make ourselves free before the time, violently breaking loose from it; but when we stay till the law, which is our husband, is dead, and the compulsory power of it be taken away by the mortification of our lusts and affections, and so marry another husband, which is Christ, or the Spirit of righteousness, (Rom. 8: 2,) "The law of the spirit of life in Christ Jesus hath made me free from the law of sin and death."

Wherefore there are three general states of men, in order to God and religion, that may be here taken notice of. The first is of those, that are alive to sin, and dead to the law. This the apostle speaks of, (Rom. 7: 9,) "I was alive without the law once." These are those, whose consciences are not yet considerably awakened to any sense of their duty, nor to the discrimination of good and evil, but sin freely, without any check or control, without any disquieting remorse of conscience.

The second is, when men are at once alive both to the law and sin, to the conviction of the one, and the power and love of the other; both these struggling together within the bowels of the soul, checking and controlling one another. This is a broken, confounded and shattered state; and these, in the apostle's language, are said to be slain by the law. "I was alive without the law once; but when the commandment came, sin revived, and I died. And the commandment, which was ordained to life, I found to be unto death. For sin, taking occasion by the commandment, deceived me, and by it slew me." Here is no peace, rest nor comfort to be had in this state, men's souls being distracted and divided by an intestine and civil war between the law of the mind and the law of the members conflicting with one another.

Wherefore the third state is, when men are dead both to the law and sin, and "alive unto God and righteousness; the law of the Spirit of life freeing them from the law of sin and death." In the first of these three states, which is the most wretched and deplorable of all, we are sin's freemen, that is, free to commit sin without check or control. In the second, we are bondmen to God and righteousness, and serve God out of a principle of fear, and according to an outward rule only; children of Hagar the bondmaid, and of the letter. In the third, we

are God's freemen and sons, and serve him in the newness of the spirit, out of a love to God and righteousness; children of the New Testament, and of Sarah the free-woman.

Wherefore here are two mistakes or errors to be taken notice of, that defeat and disappoint the design of Christ in giving us the victory over the law. The first is of those, that we have already mentioned, that seek to themselves a freedom from the bondage of the law otherwise than by Christ and the Spirit of righteousness; namely, in a way of carnal liberty and licentiousness; whereby, instead of being bondmen to God and righteousness, they become perfect freemen to sin and wickedness, which is the most deplorable thraldom in the world. Wherefore these men, instead of going forward from the second state unto higher perfection, wheel back again unto the first; just as if the children of Israel, after they had been brought out of Egypt, and travelled a while in the desert of Arabia, where the law was given, instead of entering into Canaan, should have wheeled back into Egypt, and then, enjoying the garlic and onions, and flesh-pots thereof, should persuade themselves this was, indeed, the true "land of promise, that floweth with milk and honey." And there is very great danger, lest when men have been tired out by wandering a long time in the dry and barren wilderness of the law, where they cannot enjoy the pleasure of sin as formerly, and yet have not arrived to the relish and love of righteousness, by reason of their impatience, they should at last make more haste than good speed, being seduced by some false shows of freedom, that are very tempting to such weary travellers, and promise much comfort and refreshment to them, inviting them to sit down under their shadow; such as are a self-chosen holiness, ceremonial righteousness, opinionative zeal, the tree of knowledge mistaken for the tree of life, high-flown enthusiasm and seraphicism, epicurizing philosophy, antinomian liberty, under the pretence of free grace and a gospel spirit.

The second mistake, that is here to be heeded, is, of those, that would by all means persuade themselves, that there is no higher state of Christian perfection to be aimed at, or hoped for, in this life, than this legal state; That the good they would do, they do not: the evil they would not do, that they do; that the law of sin in their members still leads them captive from the law of their minds: having no other ground at all for this, but a novel interpretation of one paragraph in the Epistle to the Romans, contrary to other express places of Scripture, and the sense of all ancient interpreters; and yet with so much zeal, as if it were a principal part of the gospel-faith to believe this (which is indeed arrant infidelity), as if it were no less than presumption or im-

piety to expect a living law written upon our hearts. But this is nothing else, but, instead of seeking liberty out of the bondage of the law, to fall in love with our bonds and fetters, and plainly to deny the victory over the law by Christ, and to affirm, that the gospel is but the ministration of a dead and killing letter, and not of the Spirit that quickeneth and maketh alive.

I come now, in the third and last place, to the victory over death, expressed by the resurrection of the body to life and immortality; which, as it was meritoriously procured for us by Christ's dying upon the cross (his resurrection afterward being an assured pledge of the same to us), so it will be really effected at last by the same Spirit of Christ that gives us victory over sin here. Rom. 8: 11, "If the Spirit of him, that raised up Jesus dwell in you, he that raised up Christ from the dead, shall also quicken your mortal bodies by his Spirit, that dwelleth in you:" as if he should have said, If the Spirit of Christ dwell in you, regenerating and renewing your souls, the very same Spirit hereafter shall also immortalize your very bodies. Avicen, the Mahometan philosopher, in his Almahad, hath a conceit, that the meaning of the resurrection of the body is nothing else but this, to persuade vulgar people, that though they seem to perish, when they die, and their bodies rot in the grave; yet, notwithstanding, they shall have a real subsistence after death, by which they shall be made capable, either of future happiness or misery. But because the apprehensions of the vulgar are so gross, that the permanency and immortality of the soul is too subtile a notion for them, who commonly count their bodies for themselves, and cannot conceive, how they should have any being after death, unless their very bodies should be raised up again; therefore, by way of condescension to vulgar understandings, the future permanency and subsistence of the soul, in prophetical writings, is expressed under this scheme of the resurrection of the body, which yet is meant κατὰ δόξαν only, and not κατ' ἀλήθειαν. Which conceit, how well soever it may befit a Mahometan philosopher, I am sure it no way agrees with the principles of Christianity; the Scripture here and elsewhere assuring us, that the resurrection of the body is to be understood plainly, and without a figure; and that the saints, departed this life in the faith and fear of Christ, shall not be mere souls without bodies to all eternity, as Avicen, Maimonides, and other philosophers dreamed, but consist of soul and body united together. Which bodies, though, as the doctrine of the church instructeth us, they shall be both specifically and numerically the same with what they were here; yet, notwithstanding, the Scripture tells us, they shall be so changed and altered, in respect of

their qualities and conditions, that in that sense they shall not be the same. Ver. 36, 37, "Thou fool, that, which thou sowest, is not quickened, except it die: thou sowest not that body, that shall be, but bare grain, it may chance of wheat, or of some other grain; but God giveth it a body, as it pleaseth him, and to every seed his own body." The apostle here imitating the manner of the Jews, who (as appeareth from the [1] Talmud) were wont familiarly to illustrate the business of the "resurrection of the body" by the similitude of seed sown into the ground, and springing up again. Accordingly he goes on, "It is sown in corruption, it is raised in incorruption; sown in dishonor, it is raised in glory; sown in weakness, it is raised in power; sown a natural body, raised a spiritual body." Which epithet was used also in this case, both by the philosophers and the Jews; for Hierocles upon the Golden Verses calls them *ὀχήματα πνευματικά*, *vehicula spiritualia*, spiritual bodies;—and R. Menachem, from the ancient cabalists, רוחנות התלבשות, the spiritual clothing.—Lastly, the apostle concludes, thus; "Now this I say, brethren, that flesh and blood cannot inherit the kingdom of God, neither doth corruption inherit incorruption." For which cause he tells us elsewhere, that they, which do not die, must of necessity be changed. And, indeed, if men should be restored after death to such gross, foul, and cadaverous bodies, as these are here upon earth, which is the very region of death and mortality, without any change at all; what would this be else, but as Plotinus the philosopher against the Gnostics writes, *ἐγείρεσθαι εἰς ἄλλον ὕπνον*, to be raised up to a second sleep,—or to be entombed again in living sepulchres? "For the corruptible body presseth down the soul, and the earthly tabernacle weigheth down the mind, that museth upon many things." Wisdom 9: 15. Wherefore we must needs explode that old Jewish conceit, commonly entertained amongst the rabbinical writers to this day, that the future resurrection is to be understood of such gross and corruptible bodies, as these are here upon earth, to eat, drink, marry, and be given in marriage, and (which must needs follow) afterward to die again. Nachmanides, in his Shaar Haggemul, is the only Jewish author that ventures to depart from the common road here, and to abandon this popular error of the Jews, endeavoring to prove, that the bodies of the just after the resurrection, shall not eat and drink, but be glorified bodies: but [2] Abravanel confutes him with no other argument than

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[1] See Gemera, in Chetuboth, cap. 13. E in Israel, num. 50.

[2] In Nachalath Avoth, cap. 4. הואוגו', רעת חנוצרים this is the very same with the opinion of the Christians, that hold, that after the resurrec-

this; that this was the doctrine and opinion of the Christians. Let us therefore now consider, how abundantly God hath provided for us by Jesus Christ, both in respect of our souls, and of our bodies; our souls, in freeing us by the Spirit of Christ (if we be not wanting to ourselves) from the slavery of sin, and bondage of the law, as it is a letter only; our bodies, in that this corruptible shall put on incorruption, and this mortal immortality, and that these vile bodies shall be made like Christ's glorious body. In both which the complete salvation of man consisteth, the perfection and happiness both of soul and body. For, though our salvation consists chiefly in the former, in the victory over sin, and in the renovation of the mind, yet without the latter, which is the victory over death, and the immortalizing of our bodies, it would be a very lame and imperfect thing. For righteousness alone, if it should *male habitare*, dwell always in such inconvenient houses, as these earthly tabernacles are, however the high-flown Stoic may brag, it could not render our condition otherwise, than troublesome, solicitous, and calamitous. Wherefore the holy men in Scripture, not without cause, longed for this future change. Rom. 8: 23, "We groan within ourselves, waiting for the adoption, to wit, the redemption of our bodies." 2 Cor. 5: 2, "In this we groan earnestly, desiring to be clothed upon with our house, which is from heaven." But there is no obtaining of this future victory over death and mortality, except we first get a victory over sin here. For this is that crown of life, that Christ, the first-begotten from the dead, will set upon the heads of none, but those, that have here fought a good fight, and overcome. For as death proceeds only from sin and disobedience, so the way to conquer death, and to arrive at life and immortality, is by seeking after an inward conquest over sin. For "righteousness is immortal," Wisd. 1: 15, and will immortalize the entertainers of it; and, as the Chaldee oracle speaks,

——————*ἐκτείνας πυρινὸν νοῦν,*
Ἔργον ἐπ' εὐσεβείας ῥευστὸν, καὶ σῶμα σαώσεις.

Having hitherto showed, what are the great things we hope for by Christ, and are to endeavor after, namely, to procure an inward and real victory over sin by the Spirit of Christ, that so we may hereafter attain a victory over death and mortality; we cannot but take notice

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tion men shall not eat, drink, marry, or be given in marrage, or die again, but continue eternally in those bodies, resembling the heavenly bodies; and these they vulgarly call glorified bodies.

briefly of some errors of those, that, either pretending the impossibility of this inward victory over sin, or else hypocritically declining the combat, make up a certain religion to themselves out of other things, which are either impertinent, and nothing to the purpose, or else evil and noxious.

For, first, some (as was intimated before) make to themselves a mere fantastical and imaginary religion, conceiting that there is nothing at all for them to do, but confidently to believe, that all is already done for them: that they are dearly beloved of God, without any conditions or qualifications to make them lovely. But such a faith as this is nothing but mere fancy and carnal imagination, proceeding from that natural self-love, whereby men fondly dote upon themselves, and are apt to think that God loves them as fondly and as partially as they love themselves, tying his affection to their particular outward persons, their very flesh and blood; hereby making God a being like unto themselves, that is, wholly acted by arbitrary self-will, fondness, and partiality; and perverting the whole nature and design of religion, which is not mere phantastry and an historical show, but a real victory over the real evil of sin, without which God can neither take pleasure in any man's person, nor can there be a possibility of being happy, a real turning of the soul from darkness unto light, from the power of Satan unto God.

Again, some there are, that, instead of walking in the narrow way, that Christ commendeth to us, of subduing and mortifying our sinful lusts, make to themselves certain other narrow ways of affected singularity in things, that belong not to life and godliness, outward strictnesses and severities of their own choosing and devising; and then persuade themselves, that this is the strait gate and narrow way of Christ, that leadeth unto life. Whereas these are, indeed, nothing else but some particular paths and narrow slices cut out of the broad way. For though they have outward and seeming narrowness, yet they are so broad within, that camels with their burdens may easily pass through them. These, instead of taking up Christ's cross upon them, make to themselves certain crosses of their own, and then laying them upon their shoulders and carrying them, please themselves with a conceit, that they bear the cross of Christ; whereas in truth and reality they are many times too much strangers to that cross of his, by which the world should be crucified to them, and they unto the world.

Some place all their religion in endless scrupulosities about indifferent things, neglecting in the mean time the *τὰ βαρύτερα τοῦ νόμοῦ*, the more weighty things—both of law and gospel, and (as our Saviour further expresseth it) *διϋλίζοντες τὸν κώνωπα, τὴν δὲ κάμηλον καταπίνοντες,*

straining at a gnat and swallowing a camel;—that is, being not so scrupulous as they ought to be about the substantials of religion and a good life. For as we ought not to place the chief of our religion in the mere observation of outward rites and ceremonies, whilst in the mean time we hypocritically neglect the morals and substantials; which may deservedly be branded with the name of superstition: so we ought to know, that it is equal superstition to have such an abhorrence of indifferent things, as to make it the main of our religion to abstain from them; both of these arguing equal ignorance of the nature of God, as if he were some morose, humorous, and captious being; and of that righteousness, which the kingdom of God consisteth in, as if these outward and indifferent things could either hallow or defile our souls, or as if salvation and damnation did depend upon the mere using or not using of them. The apostle himself instructeth us, that the kingdom of God consisteth no more in ἀκροβυστία than in περιτομὴ, no more in uncircumcision than in circumcision;—that is, no more in not using outward ceremonies and indifferent things than in using of them. Wherefore the negative superstition is equal to the positive, and both of them alike call off men's attention from the main things of religion, by engaging them over-much in small and little things. But the sober Christian, that neither places all his religion in external observances, nor yet is superstitiously anti-ceremonial, as he will think himself obliged to have a due regard to the commands of lawful authority in adiaphorous things, and to prefer the peace and unity of the Christian church, and the observation of the royal law of charity, before the satisfaction of any private humor or interest; so he will be aware of that ἀμετρία τῆς ἀνθολικῆς, which many run into, of banishing away all the solemnity of external worship, the observation of the Lord's day, and of the Christian sacraments, under the notion of ceremonies, quite out of the world. To conclude; unless there be a due and timely regard had to the commands of lawful authority in indifferent things, and to order, peace, and unity in the church, it may easily be foreseen, that the reformed part of Christendom will at length be brought to confusion, by crumbling into infinite sects and divisions, and then to utter ruin.

Again, many mistake the vices of their natural complexion for supernatural and Divine graces. Some think dull and stupid melancholy to be christian mortification: others, that turbulent and fiery zeal is the vigor of the Spirit. Whereas zeal is one of those things, that Aristotle calls τὰ μέσα, of a middle nature,—neither good nor bad in itself, but which, as it is circumstantiated, may indifferently become either

virtue or vice. For there is a πικρὸς ζῆλος, as the apostle calls it, a bitter zeal,—which is contrary to all christian love and charity, and is nothing else but the vices of acerbity, envy, malice, cruelty, tinctured and gilded over with a religious show. And there may be also a turbulent and factious zeal, when men, under a pretence of acting for the glory of God, violate just and lawful authority, in order to the advancement of their own private self-interest. Indeed, there was amongst the Jews a certain right, called *jus zelotarum*, or the right of zealots—whereby private persons, acted by a zeal for God, might do immediate execution upon some malefactors, without expecting the sentence of any court of judicature. And some conceive, that our Saviour, by this right of zealots, did whip the buyers and sellers out of the temple, and overturn the tables of the money-changers; because he was never questioned by the Jews for it. But this was then a legal and regular thing, permitted by the public laws of that nation in some certain cases, yet so as that those zealots were afterward accountable to the Sanhedrin for what they did. However, a little before the destruction of the temple, as Josephus tells us, there were a crew of desperate miscreants, that, abusing this right, and calling themselves by the name of Kennain, i. e. zealots, made a pretence from hence to commit most villanous actions. And I wish some had not too much entertained this opinion, that private persons might reform public abuses, whether belonging to the ecclesiastical or the civil polity, without and against the consent of the supreme magistrate, in a turbulent manner, *jure zelatorum*, by the right of zealots;—nay, and that actions, that are otherwise altogether unwarrantable in themselves, may notwithstanding be justified by zeal for God and good ends. But God needs no man's zeal to promote an imaginary interest of his in the world, by doing unjust things for him. "Will you speak wickedly for God, or talk deceitfully for him? will you accept his person?" was the generous expostulation of Job with his friends; and he tells them in the following words, that this was nothing else, but to mock God as one man mocketh another.

The Divine zeal is no corybantic fury, but a calm and regular heat, guided and managed by light and prudence, and carried out principally neither for nor against indifferent rites and unnecessary opinions, but those things that are immutably good and fundamental to Christianity; always acknowledging a due subordination to that authority, civil and ecclesiastical, that is over us.

Lastly, some there are, whose pretence to religion and the Spirit is founded in nothing else but a faculty of rhetoricating and extemporiz-

ing with zeal and fervency, which they take to be nothing less than Divine inspiration, and that which the Scripture calls "praying in the Holy Ghost," an undoubted character of a person truly regenerated. Which being a great delusion, whereby many are hindered from seeking after the real effects of the Divine Spirit, by idolizing, instead thereof, that which is merely natural (if not artificial): I think it not impertinent here to speak a little of it. And certainly that, which is frequently attained to in the very height by persons grossly hypocritical and debauched, can never be concluded to be Divine inspiration, or to proceed from any higher principle than mere natural enthusiasm. For there is not only a poetical enthusiasm, of which Plato discourseth in his Ion, but, though oratory be a more sober thing, a rhetorical enthusiasm also, that makes men very eloquent, affectionate and bewitching in their language, beyond what the power of any bare art and precepts could enable them unto; insomuch that both these, poets and orators, have oftentimes conceited themselves to be indeed divinely inspired: as those known verses testify:

Est Deus in nobis, agitante calescimus illo:

And,

Sedibus æthereis Spiritus ille venit.

And, concerning orators, the like might be proved, if the time would here permit, by sundry testimonies: but I shall here instance only in Aristides, a famous orator, who not only speaks positively of himself, as inspired in his orations, but affirms the same also concerning rhetoric in general, when it is extraordinary, that it comes by immediate inspiration as oracles and prophecies do, and not from art or nature. Wherefore it is not at all to be wondered at, if, when men are employed in religious and devotional exercises, the same natural enthusiasm, especially having the advantage of religious melancholy, which makes men still more enthusiastical, should so wing and inspire the fancies of these religious orators, as to make them wonderfully fluent, eloquent, and rapturous, so that they beget strange passions in their auditors, and conclude themselves to be divinely inspired. Whereas, notwithstanding, they may have no more of Divine inspiration in all this than those poets and orators before mentioned had; that is to say, be no otherwise inspired, than by a rhetorical or hypochondriacal enthusiasm, that is merely natural. But it is far from my intention here to disparage the sincere and ardent affections of devout souls, naturally and freely breathing out their earnest desires unto God in private; al-

though perhaps this be not without some kind of enthusiasm also. For enthusiasm, as well as zeal, and other natural things, may be well used, and, being rightly circumstantiated and subservient to a better principle, become irreprehensible. Some have observed, that no great work of the brain, that begot much admiration in the world, was ever achieved without some kind of enthusiasm; and the same may be affirmed of the most transcendently virtuous and heroical actions. But then the goodness of these actions is never to be estimated merely by the degree of enthusiastic heat and ardour that is in them, but by such other laws and circumstances, as moralize human actions. Wherefore, my meaning, as I said before, is only this, to caution against that vulgar and popular error of mistaking the natural and enthusiastical fervor of men's spirits, and the ebulliency of their fancy, when it is tinctured with religion, and idolizing of it instead of the supernatural grace of God's Holy Spirit; and of looking for the effect of God's Spirit, principally in words and talk, or thinking, that God is chiefly glorified with a loud noise, and long speeches. For the true demonstration of God's Holy Spirit is no where to be looked for but in life and action, or such earnest and affectionate breathings after a further participation of the Divine image, as are accompanied with real and unfeigned endeavors after the same: which is the true praying in the Holy Ghost, though there be no extemporaneous effusion of words. And, therefore, when some Corinthians were puffed up, by reason of a faculty which they had of rhetoricating religiously, St. Paul, like an apostle, tells them, that he would come amongst them and [1] "know, not the speech of them that were puffed up, but the power. For the kingdom of God (saith he) consisteth not in word, but in power and life." Wherefore, laying aside these and such-like childish mistakes, and things that are little to the purpose, let us seriously apply ourselves to the main work of our religion; that is, to mortify and vanquish our sinful lusts by the assistance of God's Holy Spirit through faith in Christ; that so being dead to sin here, we may live with God eternally hereafter.

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[1] 1 Cor. 4:19.

CONTENTS

OF

VOLUMES FIRST AND SECOND.

CONTENTS.

VOL. I.

CHAPTER I.

Containing an account of the atomic physiology, as made the foundation of the atheistic fate, or the material necessity of all things.

I. Three fatalisms (or the necessity of all human actions and events maintained upon three several grounds); which are so many false hypotheses of the intellectual system of the universe . . page 51

II. Concerning the mathematical or astrological fate . . 52

III. Of the opinion of those who supposed a fate superior to the highest Deity 54

IV. The moderation of the intended discourse concerning liberty and necessity 55

V. The atheistical hypothesis, or Democritic fate, as founded upon the atomic physiology; which therefore briefly described . . 56

VI. The antiquity of this atomic physiology, with the account given thereof, by Aristotle 58

VII. A clear and full record of the same physiology in Plato, not commonly taken notice of 60

VIII. That neither Protagoras, nor Democritus, nor Leucippus, nor any Atheist, was the first inventor or founder of this atomic physiology: and the necessity of being thoroughly acquainted therewith, in order to the confutation of the modern Atheism 62

IX. The tradition of Posidonius the Stoic, that Moschus an ancient Phœnician, before the Trojan war, was the first inventor of this atomical physiology, briefly suggested 63

X. That this Moschus, the inventor of the atomical physiology, was probably the same with Moschus the physiologer in Jamblichus; with whose sucessors, priests, and prophets, Pythagoras conversed at Sidon . 63

XI. Other probabilities for this, that Pythagoras was acquainted with the atomic physiology 64

XII. That Pythagoras's monads were sometimes taken for corporeal atoms; from Ecphantus in Stobæus and Aristotle . . . 64

XIII. Proved clearly, that Empedocles, who was a Pythagorean, physiologized atomically 65

XIV. The same further evinced from Plato, Aristotle, and Plutarch 66

XV. That Anaxagoras (senior to Democritus) was a spurious or bungling Atomist, and an unskilful imitator of that physiology before in use 68

XVI. That Ecphantus the Pythagorean, Xenocrates, Diodorus, and Metrodorus Chius, were all ancient assertors of the atomic physiology; together with Aristotle's testimony, that the generality of former physiologers went that way 68

XVII. How Aristotle is to be reconciled with himself, and the credit of other writers to be salved, when they impute this philosophy to Leucippus and Democritus; that these were the first atheizers thereof, and consequently the founders of that philosophy which is atheistically atomical 70

XVIII. That the Atomists before Democritus were assertors of a Deity and substance incorporeal 70

XIX. A confutation of those Neoterics, who deny incorporeal substance to have been asserted by any of the ancients. The antiquity of that doctrine proved from Plato, who also professedly maintained it . 71

XX. Aristotle likewise an assertor of incorporeal substance . 72

XXI. That Epicurus confuteth this opinion, as that which had been before maintained by Plato and other ancients 73

XXII. That all those philosophers, who before Plato held the immortality of the soul, and a Deity distinct from the world, were undoubtedly Incorporealists; as particularly Pythagoras, who also maintained a Trinity of Divine hypostases 74

XXIII. Parmenides a strenuous assertor of incorporeal substance, together with those who held that all things did not flow, but some things stand 76

XXIV. Empedocles vindicated from being either an Atheist or a Corporealist, at large 76

XXV. Anaxagoras an open and professed assertor of an incorporeal mind 81

XXVI. Inferred from all this, that the ancient Atomists, before Democritus, were both Theists and Incorporealists: and this further confirmed 82

XXVII. That there is not only no inconsistency betwixt Atomology and Theology, but also a natural cognation, proved from the origin of the atomical physiology, which proceeded in general from the victory and triumph of reason over sense 82

XXVIII. A more particular account of the origin of this atomical philosophy, from that one principle of reason, that in nature "nothing comes from nothing, nor goes to nothing." And that the ancient Atomology was built upon this foundation proved at large 86

XXIX. That this self-same principle, which made the ancient Atomists discard qualities and substantial forms, made them also assert incorporeal substance 93

XXX. And with it the immortality of souls 95

XXXI. That the doctrine of pre-existence and transmigration of souls had also the same original 96

XXXII. This not confined by those ancients to human souls, but extended to all souls and lives whatsoever 98

XXXIII. All this proved from Empedocles, who plainly asserted the pre-existence, as well as the post-existence, of all souls, from this fundamental principle, that "nothing can come from nothing, nor go to nothing 98

XXXIV. A censure of this doctrine, that from this ground may be solidly proved the future immortality of human souls, but not their pre-existence; because all souls must be created by God, some time or other 102

XXXV. An hypothesis to solve the incorporeity of the souls of brutes, without their post-existence, and successive transmigration . . 104

XXXVI. And this will not prejudice the immortality of human souls 104

XXXVII. But that the Empedoclean hypothesis is indeed, of the two, more rational, than the opinion of those who make the souls of brutes all corporeal 105

XXXVIII. Moreover, that the constitution of the atomical physiology is such in itself, as that whosoever entertains it, thoroughly understanding the same, must needs hold incorporeal substance in five particulars 106

XXXIX. Two great advantages of the atomical or mechanical physiology; the first whereof is this, that it renders the corporeal world intelligible, which no other philosophy doth 107

XL. The second advantage of it, that it prepares an easy and clear way for the demonstration of incorporeal substance 108

XLI. Concluded from all these premises, that the ancient Moschical

philosophy was integrated and made up of these two parts, atomical physiology, and theology or pneumatology 110

XLII. But that this entire philosophy was afterwards mangled and dismembered, some taking one part thereof alone, and some the other 111

XLIII. That Leucippus and Democritus being atheistically inclined, took the atomical physiology alone, endeavoring to atheize the same, and so begat a mongrel and spurious philosophy, atheistically atomical, or atomically atheistical: and their unsuccessfulness herein . . 111

XLIV. That Plato took the theology or pneumatology of the ancients alone, rejecting their atomical physiology; and upon what prejudices he did so 113

XLV. That Aristotle followed Plato herein. A commendation of his philosophy (together with an impartial censure), and a deserved preference thereof before the Democritic and Epicurean 114

CHAPTER II.

Wherein are contained all the pretended grounds of reason, for the atheistic hypothesis.

I. That the Democritic philosophy, made up of Corporealism and Atomism complicated together, is essentially atheistical . . 120

II. Though Epicurus, who was an atomical Corporealist, pretended to assert a democracy of gods, yet was he for all that an absolute Atheist. And that Atheists commonly equivocate and disguise themselves . 120

III. That the Democritic philosophy, which makes senseless atoms not only the first principles of bodies (as the ancient atomology did) but also all things whatsoever in the universe, and therefore of soul and mind, is nothing else but a system of Atheology, or Atheism swaggering under a pretence to wisdom and philosophy. And though there be another opposite form of Atheism, which we call Stratonical, yet is the Democritic Atheism chiefly considerable; all the dark mysteries whereof will be here revealed 123

IV. That we being to treat concerning the Deity, and to bring all those profane and unhallowed mysteries of Atheism into light, in order to a confutation of them, the Divine assistance and direction ought to be implored, as it commonly was by Pagans themselves in such cases . 124

V. That we are both to discover the Atheists' pretended grounds of reason against the Deity, and their attempts to solve all the phenomena without a God. The first of their grounds, that no man can have an

idea or conception of God, and therefore he is but an incomprehensible nothing 125

VI. A second atheistic argumentation, that there can be no creation out of nothing, nor omnipotence, because nothing can come from nothing; and therefore whatsoever substantially is, was from all eternity, of itself, uncreated by any Deity 126

VII. A third pretended ground of reason against a Deity; that the strictest notion of a God implying him to be incorporeal, there can be no such incorporeal Deity, there being no other substance besides body. Because whatsoever is, is extended; and whatsoever is extended, is either empty space, or body 127

VIII. The Atheists' pretence, that the doctrine of incorporeal substance sprung from a ridiculous mistake of abstract names and notions for realities. Their impudence in making the Deity but the chief of spectres, an Oberon or prince of fairies and fancies. This the fourth atheistic argument, that to suppose an incorporeal mind to be the original of all things, is nothing else, but to make the abstract notion of a mere accident to be the first cause 129

IX. A fifth pretended ground of Atheism, that an incorporeal Deity being already confuted, a corporeal one may be disproved also, from the principles of Corporealism in general; because matter being the only substance, and all other differences of things nothing but the accidents thereof, generable and corruptible; no living understanding being can be essentially incorruptible. The stoical god incorruptible only by accident 132

X. Their further attempt to do the same atomically, that the first principle of all things whatsoever in the universe being atoms, or corpuscula devoid of all manner of qualities, and consequently of sense and understanding (which sprung up afterwards, from a certain composition or contexture of them) mind or deity could not therefore be the first original of all 133

XI. A further atheistic attempt to impugn a Deity by disproving the world's animation, or its being governed by a living, understanding animalish nature, presiding over the whole; because, forsooth, sense and understanding are peculiar appendices to flesh, blood, and brains; and reason is no where to be found but in human form 137

XII. An atheistic instance, that God being taken by all for a most happy, eternal, and immortal animal (or living being), there can be no such thing; because all living beings are concretions of atoms, that were at first generated, and are liable to death and corruption, by the dissolution of their compages; life being no simple primitive nature, but an ac-

cidental modification of compounded bodies only, which upon the disunion of their parts, or disturbance of their contexture, vanisheth into nothing 138

XIII. A ninth pretended atheistic demonstration, that by God is meant a first cause or mover, and such as was not before moved by any thing else without it; but nothing can move itself, and therefore there can be no unmoved mover, nor any first in the order of causes, that is, a god 140

XIV. Their further improvement of the same principle, that there can be no action whatsoever without some external cause; or that nothing taketh beginning from itself, but from the action of some other agent without it: so that no cogitation can arise of itself without a cause; all action and cogitation being really nothing but local motion: from whence it follows, that no thinking being could be a first cause, any more than a machine, or automaton 140

XV. Another grand mystery of Atheism, that all knowledge and mental conception is the information of the things themselves known, existing without the knower, and a mere passion from them; and therefore the world must needs have been before any knowledge, or conception of it, but no knowledge or conception before the world as its cause . 141

XVI. A twelfth atheistic argumentation, that things could not be made by a God, because they are so faulty and ill-made. That they were not contrived for the good of man, and that the deluge of evils, which overflows all, shows them not to have proceeded from any Deity . 142

XVII. A thirteenth instance of Atheists, from the defect of Providence, that in human affairs all is *tohu* and *bohu*, chaos and confusion 144

XVIII. A fourteenth atheistic objection, that it is impossible for any one being to animadvert and order all things in the distant places of the whole world at once; but if it were possible, that such infinite negociosity would be absolutely inconsistent with happiness 145

XIX. Queries of Atheists, why the world was not made sooner? and, what God did before? why it was made at all, since it was so long unmade? and how the architect of the world could rear up so huge a fabric? 146

XX. The Atheists' pretence, that it is the great interest of mankind there should be no God; and that it was a noble and heroical exploit of the Democritics, to chase away that affrightful spectre out of the world, and to free men from the continual fear of a Deity, and punishment after death, embittering all the pleasures of life 148

XXI. The last atheistic pretence, that Theism is also inconsistent with civil sovereignty, it introducing a fear greater than the fear of the

leviathan: and that any other conscience, besides the civil law (being private judgment) is *ipso facto* a dissolution of the body politic, and a revolt to the state of nature 150

XXII. The Atheists' conclusion from all the former premises (as it is set down in Plato and Lucretius), that all things sprung originally from nature and chance, without any mind or God, or proceeded from the necessity of material motions undirected for ends. And that infinite atoms, devoid of all life and sense, moving in infinite space from eternity, did by their fortuitous rencounters and entanglements produce the system of this whole universe, and as well all animate as inanimate things . . 151

CHAPTER III.

An introduction to the confutation of the atheistic grounds; wherein is contained a particular account of all the several forms of Atheism; together with a necessary digression concerning a plastic or artificial nature.

I. That the grounds of the hylozoic Atheism could not be insisted on by us in the former chapter, together with those of the atomic, they being directly opposite to each other; with a further account of this hylozoic Atheism 157

II. A suggestion in way of caution, for the preventing of all mistakes that every Hylozoist must not therefore be presently condemned as an Atheist, or but a mere counterfeit histrionical Theist . . . 158

III. That nevertheless such Hylozoists as are also Corporealists, or acknowledge no other substance besides body, can by no means be excused from the imputation of Atheism for two reasons . . 159

IV. That Strato Lampsacenus (commonly called Physicus) was probably the first assertor of the hylozoic Atheism, he acknowledging no other god but the life of nature in matter 160

V. Further proved, that this Strato was an Atheist, and of a different form from Democritus, he attributing an energetic nature, but without sense and animality, to all matter 161

VI. That Strato, not deriving all things from a mere fortuitous principle, as the Democritic Atheists did, nor yet acknowledge any one plastic nature to preside over the whole, but deducing the original of things from a mixture of chance and plastic nature both together, in the several parts of matter, must therefore needs be an hylozoic Atheist . . 162

VII. That the famous Hippocrates was neither an hylozoic nor Democritic Atheist, but rather an Heraclitic corporeal Theist . . 162

VIII. That Plato took no notice of the hylozoic Atheism, nor of any other, save what derives the original of all things from a mere fortuitous nature; and therefore either the Democritical, or the Anaximandrian Atheism, which latter will be next declared 163

IX. That it is hardly imaginable, there should have been no philosophic Atheists in the world before Democritus and Leucippus; Plato observing also, that there have been some or other in all ages sick of the atheistic disease: and Aristotle affirming many of the first philosophers to have assigned only a material cause of the mundane system, without either intending or efficient cause. They supposing matter to be the only substance, and all other things nothing but the passions and accidents thereof generable and corruptible 165

X. The doctrine of which Materialists may be more fully understood, from those exceptions which Aristotle makes against them. His first exception; that they assigned no cause of motion, but introduced it into the world unaccountably 166

XI. Aristotle's second exception, that these Materialists assigned no cause τοῦ εὖ καὶ καλῶς, of well and fit;—that is, gave no account of the orderly regularity of things. Anaxagoras said to be the first Ionic philosopher, who made mind and good a principle of the universe . 166

XII. Concluded from hence, that these Materialists in Aristotle were down-right Atheists, not merely because they held all substance to be body, forasmuch as Heraclitus and Zeno did the like, and yet are not therefore numbered amongst the Atheists (these supposing the whole world to be an animal, and their fiery matter originally intellectual); but because they made stupid matter, devoid of all understanding and life, to be the only principle 167

XIII. And supposed every thing besides the bare substance of matter, to be generable and corruptible; and consequently, that there could be no other god, than such as was native and mortal. That those ancient theologers and theogonists, who generated all the gods out of night and chaos without exception, were only verbal Theists, but real Atheists; senseless matter being to them the highest numen . . . 168

XIV. The difference observed betwixt Aristotle's atheistical Materialists and the Italic philosophers; the former determining all things, besides the bare substance of matter, to be made or generated; but the latter, that no real entity was either generated or corrupted; they thereupon both destroying the qualities and forms of bodies, and asserting the ingenerability and incorporeity of souls 169

XV. How Aristotle's atheistic Materialists endeavored to baffle and elude that axiom of the Italic philosophers, that "Nothing can come from

nothing, nor go to nothing." And that Anaxagoras was the first amongst the Ionics, who yielded so far to that principle, as from thence to assert incorporeal substance, and the pre-existence of qualities and forms; he conceiving them to be things really distinct from the substance of matter 171

XVI. The error of some writers, who from Aristotle's affirming, that the ancient philosophers did generally conclude the world to have been made, from thence infer them to have been all Theists; and that Aristotle contradicts himself in representing many of them as Atheists. That the ancient Atheists did generally κοσμοποιεῖν, assert the world to have been made,—or have had a beginning; as, on the other hand, some Theists did maintain its ante-eternity, but in a way of dependency upon the Deity. That we ought therefore here to distinguish betwixt the system of the world, and the bare substance of the matter; all Atheists contending the matter to have been not only eternal, but also such independently upon any other being 173

XVII. Some of the ancients concluded this Materialism, or hylopatian Atheism, to have been at least as old as Homer; who made the ocean (or fluid matter) the father of all the gods: and that this was indeed the ancientest of all Atheisms, which verbally acknowledging gods, yet derives the original of them all from Night and Chaos. A description of this atheistic hypothesis in Aristophanes; that Night and Chaos first laid an egg, out of which sprung forth Love, which afterwards mingling again with a Chaos, begat heaven and earth, animals, and all the gods . . 176

XVIII. That, notwithstanding this, in Aristotle's judgment, not only Parmenides, but also Hesiod, and other ancients, who made Love senior to the gods, were to be exempted out of the number of Atheists, they understanding by this Love an active principle or cause of motion in the universe; which therefore could not result from an egg of the Night, nor be the offspring of Chaos, but must be something in order of nature before matter. Simmias Rhodius's "Wings" a poem in honor of this Divine or heavenly Love. This not that Love neither which was the offspring of Penia and Porus in Plato. In what rectified and refined sense it may pass for true theology, that Love is the supreme Deity, and original of all things 178

XIX. That however Democritus and Leucippus be elsewhere taxed by Aristotle for this very thing, the assigning only a material cause of the universe; yet were they not the persons intended by him in the forementioned accusation, by certain ancienter philosophers, who also were not Atomists, but assertors of qualities, or Hylopathians . . 180

XX. That Aristotle's atheistic Materialists were indeed all the first

Ionic philosophers before Anaxagoras, Thales being the head of them. But that Thales being acquitted from this imputation of Atheism by several good authors, his next successor Anaximander, is rather to be accounted the ἀρχηγὸς, or prince—of this atheistic philosophy . . 180

XXI. A passage out of Aristotle objected, which at first sight seems to make Anaximander a Divine philosopher, and therefore hath led both modern and ancient writers into that mistake. But that this, well considered, proves the contrary, that Anaximander was the chief of the old atheistic philosophers 182

XXII. That it is no wonder, if Anaximander called senseless matter τὸ Θεῖον, or the Divinity, since to all Atheists that must needs be the highest numen. And how this may be said to be immortal, and to govern all: with the concurrent judgment of the Greek scholiasts upon this place 183

XXIII. A further account of the Anaximandrian philosophy, from whence it appeareth to have been purely atheistical . . . 185

XXIV. That as the vulgar have always been ill judges of the Theists and Atheists, so have learned men commonly supposed fewer Atheists than indeed there were. Anaximander and Democritus Atheists both alike, though philosophizing different ways; and that some passages in Plato respect the Anaximandrian form of Atheism, rather than the Democritical 188

XXV. The reason why Democritus and Leucippus new-modelled Atheism into this atomic form 189

XXVI. That besides the three forms of Atheism already mentioned, we sometimes meet with a fourth, which supposes the universe to be, though not an animal, yet a kind of plant or vegetable, having no regular plastic nature in it, but devoid of understanding and sense, which disposes and orders the whole 190

XXVII. That this form of Atheism, which makes one senseless plastic and plantal nature to preside over the whole, is different from the hylozoic, in that it takes away all fortuitousness; subjecting all things universally to the fate of this one methodical unknown nature . . . 191

XXVIII. Possible, that some in all ages might have entertained this atheistical conceit, that all things are dispensed by one regular and methodical senseless nature; nevertheless it seemeth to have been chiefly asserted by certain spurious Heraclitics and Stoics. Upon which account this cosmo-plastic Atheism may be called pseudo-Zenonian . . 192

XXIX. That, besides the philosophic Atheists, there have been always in the world enthusiastic and fanatic Atheists; though indeed all Atheists

may in some sense be said to be both enthusiasts and fanatics, as being merely led by an ὁρμὴ ἄλογος, or irrational impetus 193

XXX. That there cannot easily be any other form of Atheism besides these four already mentioned: because all Atheists are Corporealists, and yet not all Corporealists Atheists; but only such of them as make the first principle not to be intellectual 194

XXXI. A distribution of Atheisms producing the forementioned *quaternio*, and showing the difference that is betwixt them . . 196

XXXII. That they are but mere bunglers at Atheism, who talk of sensitive and rational matter specifically differing. And that the canting astrological Atheists are not at all considerable, because not understanding themselves 197

XXXIII. Another distribution of Atheisms, that they either derive the original of all things from a merely fortuitous principle, and the unguided motion of matter; or else from a plastic, regular, and methodical, but senseless nature. What Atheists denied the eternity of the world, and what asserted it 199

XXXIV. That of these four forms of Atheism, the atomic or Democritical, and hylozoic or Stratonical, are the principal: which two being once confuted, all Atheism will be confuted 203

XXXV. These two forms of Atheism being contrary to each other, that we ought in all reason to insist rather upon the atomic: nevertheless we shall elsewhere confute the hylozoic also; and further prove against all Corporealists, that no cogitation nor life can belong to matter . 207

XXXVI. That in the mean time, we shall not neglect the other forms of Atheism, but confute them all together, as they agree in one principle. As also, by way of digression here insist largely upon the plastic life of nature, in order to a fuller confutation, as well of the hylozoic as the cosmo-plastic Atheism 208

1. That these two forms of Atheism are not therefore condemned by us, merely because they suppose a life of nature, distinct from the animal life: however this be a thing altogether exploded by some professed Theists, therein symbolizing too much with the Democritic Atheists 208

2. That if no plastic artificial nature be admitted, then one of these two things must be concluded; that either all things come to pass by fortuitous mechanism or material necessity (the motion of matter unguided), or else that God doth αὐτουργεῖν ἅπαντα, do all things himself immediately and miraculously;—framing the body of every gnat and fly, as it were, with his own hands: forasmuch as Divine laws and commands cannot

execute themselves, nor be alone the proper efficient causes of things in nature 209

3. To suppose the former of these, that all things come to pass fortuitously, by the unguided motion of matter, and without the direction of any mind, a thing altogether as irrational as impious; there being many phenomena both above the mechanic powers, and contrary to the laws thereof. That the mechanic Theists make God but an idle spectator of the fortuitous motions of matter, and render his wisdom altogether useless and insignificant. Aristotle's judicious censure of this fortuitous mechanism, and his derision of that conceit, that material and mechanical reasons are the only philosophical 210

4. That it seems neither decorous in respect of God, nor congruous to reason, that he should αὐτουργεῖν ἅπαντα, do all things himself immediately and miraculously,—without the subserviency of any natural causes. This further confuted from the slow and gradual process of things in nature, as also from those errors and bungles that are committed, when the matter proves inept and contumacious; which argue the agent not to be irresistible 212

5. Reasonably inferred from hence, that there is an artificial or plastic nature in the universe, as a subordinate instrument of Divine Providence, in the orderly disposal of matter: but not without a higher providence also presiding over it; forasmuch as this plastic nature cannot act electively or with discretion. Those laws of nature concerning motion which the mechanic Theists themselves suppose really nothing else but a plastic nature, or spermatic reasons 213

6. The agreeableness of this doctrine with the sentiments of the best philosophers of all ages. Anaxagoras, though a professed Theist, severely censured both by Plato and Aristotle as an encourager of Atheism, merely because he used material and mechanical causes more than mental and final. Physiologers and astronomers, for the same reason also, vulgarly suspected of Atheism in Plato's time 214

7. The plastic artificial nature no occult quality, but the only intelligible cause of that which is the grandest of all phenomena, the orderly regularity and harmony of things; which the mechanic Theists, however pretending to solve all phenomena, give no account of. A God or infinite mind asserted by these, in vain and to no purpose . . . 218

8. Two things here to be performed; to give an account of the plastic artificial nature; and then to show how the notion thereof is mistaken and abused by Atheists. The first general account of this nature according to Aristotle, that it is to be conceived as art itself acting inwardly and

immediately upon the matter; as if harmony living in the musical instruments should move the stings thereof without any external impulse 219

9. Two pre-eminences of nature above human art; first, that whereas human art acts upon the matter without, cumbersomely or moliminously, and in a way of tumult or hurlyburly; nature, acting upon the same from within more commandingly, doth its work easily, cleverly and silently. Human art acteth on matter mechanically, but nature vitally and magically 219

10. The second pre-eminence of nature, that whereas human artists are often to seek and at a loss, anxiously consult and deliberate, and upon second thoughts mend their former work; nature is never to seek or unresolved what to do, nor doth she ever repent of what she hath done, and thereupon correct her former course. Human artists themselves consult not as artists, but always for want of art; and therefore nature, though never consulting nor deliberating, may notwithstanding act artificially and for ends. Concluded, that what is by us called Nature, is really the Divine art 220

11. Nevertheless, that nature is not the Divine art pure and abstract, but concreted and embodied in matter. The Divine art not archetypal but ectypal. Nature differs from the Divine art or wisdom, as the manuary opificer from the architect 221

12. Two imperfections of nature, in respect whereof it falls short of human art. First, that though it act for ends artificially, yet itself neither intends those ends, nor understands the reason of what it doth; for which cause it cannot act electively. The difference betwixt spermatic reasons and knowledge. That nature doth but ape or mimic the Divine art or wisdom; being itself not master of that reason according to which it acts, but only a servant to it, and drudging executioner thereof . . 222

13. Proved, that there may be such a thing as acteth artificially, though itself do not comprehend that art and reason by which its motions are governed. First, from musical habits; the dancer resembles the artificial life of nature 224

14. The same further evinced from the instincts of brute animals, directing them to act rationally and artificially, in order to their own good and the good of the universe, without any reason of their own. These instincts in brutes but passive impresses of the Divine wisdom, and a kind of fate upon them 225

15. The second imperfection of nature, that it acteth without animal fancy, *συναίσθησις*, con-sense, or consciousness, and hath no express self-perception and self-enjoyment 226

16. Whether this energy of the plastic nature be to be called cogita-

tion or no, nothing but a logomachy, or contention about words. Granted, that what moves matter vitally, must needs do it by some energy of its own, distinct from local motion; but there may be a simple vital energy, without that duplicity which is in synæsthesis, or clear and express consciousness. Nevertheless, that the energy of nature may be called a certain drowsy, unawakened, or astonished cogitation . . . 226

17. Several instances, which render it probable, that there may be a vital energy without synæsthesis, clear and express con-sense or consciousness 228

18. Wherefore the plastic nature, acting neither knowingly nor fantastically, must needs act fatally, magically, and sympathetically. The Divine laws and fate, as to matter, not mere cogitation in the mind of God, but an energetic and effectual principle in it. And this plastic nature the true and proper fate of matter, or of the corporeal world. What magic is, and that nature, which acteth fatally, acteth also magically and sympathetically 229

19. That nature, though it be the Divine art, or fate, yet for all that, is neither a god, nor goddess, but a low and imperfect creature, it acting artificially and rationally no otherwise than compounded forms of letters when printing coherent philosophic sense; nor for ends, than a saw or hatchet in the hands of a skilful mechanic. The plastic and vegetative life of nature, the lowest of all lives, and inferior to the sensitive. A higher providence than that of the plastic nature governing the corporeal world itself 230

20. Notwithstanding which, forasmuch as the plastic nature is a life, it must needs be incorporeal. One and the self-same thing having in it an entire model and platform of the whole, and acting upon several distant parts of matter, cannot be a body. And though Aristotle himself do no where declare this nature to be either corporeal or incorporeal (which he neither clearly doth concerning the rational soul) and his followers commonly take it to be corporeal; yet, according to the genuine principles of that philosophy, must it needs be otherwise . . . 232

21. The plastic nature being incorporeal, must either be a lower power lodged in souls, which are also conscious, sensitive, or rational: or else a distinct substantial life by itself, and inferior soul. That the Platonists affirm both, with Aristotle's agreeable determination, that nature is either part of a soul, or not without soul 233

22. The plastic nature, as to the bodies of animals, a part, or lower power, of their respective souls. That the phenomena prove a plastic nature, or *archeus*, in animals; to make which a distinct thing from the soul, would be to multiply entities without necessity. The soul endued

with a plastic nature, the chief formatrix of its own body, the contribution of other causes not excluded 236

23. That, besides the plastic in particular animals, forming them as so many little worlds, there is a general plastic or artificial nature in the whole corporeal universe, which likewise, according to Aristotle, is either a part and lower power of a conscious mundane soul, or else something depending thereon 237

24. That no less according to Aristotle, than Plato and Socrates, ourselves partake of life from the life of the universe, as well as we do of heat and cold from the heat and cold of the universe. From whence it appears, that Aristotle also held the world's animation, which is further undeniably proved. An answer to two the most considerable places in that philosopher objected to the contrary. That Aristotle's first immovable mover was no soul, but a perfect intellect abstract from matter, which he supposed to move only as a final cause, or as being loved; and besides this, a mundane soul and plastic nature to move the heavens efficiently. Neither Aristotle's nature nor mundane soul the supreme Deity. However, though there be no such mundane soul, as both Plato and Aristotle conceived, yet may there be, notwithstanding, a plastic or artificial nature depending upon a higher intellectual principle . . . 238

25. No impossibility of other particular plastics; and though it be not reasonable to think every plant, herb, and pile of grass, to have a plastic or vegetative soul of its own, nor the earth to be an animal: yet may there possibly be one plastic artificial nature presiding over the whole terraqueous globe, by which vegetables may be severely organized and framed, and all things performed, which transcend the power of fortuitous mechanism 242

26. Our second undertaking, which was to show, how grossly those Atheists (who acknowledge this artificial plastic nature, without animality) misunderstand it, and abuse the notion, to make a counterfeit God Almighty, or numen of it; to the exclusion of the true Deity. First, in their supposing that to be the first and highest principle of the universe, which is the last and lowest of all lives, a thing essentially derivative from, and dependent upon, a higher intellectual principle, as the echo on the original voice. Secondly, in their making sense and reason in animals to emerge out of a senseless life of matter. That no duplication of corporeal organs can ever make one single unconscious life to advance into redoubled consciousness and self-enjoyment. Thirdly, in attributing (some of them), perfect knowledge and understanding to this life of nature, which yet themselves suppose to be devoid of all animal sense and

consciousness. Lastly, in making this plastic life of nature to be merely corporeal; the hylozoists contending, that it is but an inadequate conception of body as the only substance, and fondly dreaming, that the vulgar notion of a God is nothing but such an inadequate conception of the matter of the whole universe, mistaken for an entire substance by itself the cause of all things. And thus far the digression 242

XXXVIII. That though the confutation of the atheistic grounds, according to the laws of method, ought to have been reserved for the last part of this discourse, yet we, having reason to violate those laws, crave the reader's pardon for this preposterousness. A considerable observation of Plato's, "That it is not only gross sensuality, which inclines men to atheize, but also an affectation of seeming wiser than the generality of mankind. As likewise, that the Atheists making such pretence to wit, it is a seasonable and proper undertaking, to evince, that they fumble in all their ratiocinations." And we hope to make it appear, that the Atheists are no conjurors; and that all forms of Atheism are nonesense and impossibility 245

CHAPTER IV.

The idea of God declared, in way of answer to the first atheistic argument; and the grand objection against the naturality of this idea (as essentially including unity or oneliness in it) from the pagan Polytheism, removed. Proved, that the intelligent Pagans generally acknowledged one supreme Deity. A fuller explication of whose Polytheism and idolatry intended; in order to the better giving an account of Christianity.

I. The either stupid insensibility or gross impudence of Atheists, in denying the word of God to have any signification, or that there is any other idea answering to it besides the mere phantasm of the sound. The disease called by the philosopher ἀπολίθωσις τοῦ νοητικοῦ, the petrifaction or dead insensibility of the mind 263

II. That the Atheists themselves must needs have an idea of God in their minds; or otherwise, when they deny his existence, they should deny the existence of nothing. That they have also the same idea of him in general with the Theists; the one denying the very same thing which the others affirm 265

III. A lemma, or preparatory proposition to the idea of God, That though some things be made or generated, yet it is not possible that all things should be made, but something must of necessity exist of itself

from eternity unmade, and be the cause of those other things that are made 266

IV. The two most opposite opinions concerning what was self-existent from eternity, or unmade, and the cause of all other things made; one, that it was nothing but senseless matter, the most imperfect of all things. The other, that it was something most perfect, and therefore consciously intellectual. The assertors of this latter opinion, Theists, in a strict and proper sense; of the former, Atheists. So that the idea of God in general is, a perfectly conscious understanding being (or mind), self-existent from eternity, and the cause of all other things . . 266

V. Observable, that the Atheists, who deny a God, according to the true idea of him, do notwithstanding often abuse the word, calling senseless matter by that name; they meaning nothing else thereby but only a first principle, or self-existent unmade thing: according to which notion of the word God, there can be no such thing at all as an Atheist, no man being able to persuade himself, that all things sprung from nothing 267

VI. In order to a more punctual declaration of this Divine idea, the opinion of those taken notice of, who suppose two self-existent, unmade principles, God and matter, according to which, God not the principle of all things, nor the sole principle, but only the chief . . . 268

VII. These Materiarians, imperfect and mistaken Theists. Not Atheists, because they suppose the world made and governed by an animalish, sentient, and understanding nature; whereas no Atheists acknowledge conscious animality to be a first principle, but conclude it to be all generable and corruptible: nor yet genuine Theists, because they acknowledge not omnipotence in the full extent thereof. A latitude therefore in Theism; and none to be condemned for absolute Atheists but such as deny an eternal unmade mind, the framer and governor of the whole world 270

VIII. An absolutely perfect being, the most compendious idea of God: which includeth in it, not only necessary existence, and conscious intellectuality, but also omni-causality, omnipotence, or infinite power. Wherefore God the sole principle of all things and cause of matter. The true notion of infinite power. And that Pagans commonly acknowledge omnipotence, or infinite power, to be included in the idea of God . 273

IX. That absolute perfection implies yet something more than knowledge and power. A vaticination in men's minds of a higher good than either. That, according to Aristotle, God is better than knowledge; and hath morality in his nature, wherein also his chief happiness consisteth. This borrowed from Plato, to whom the highest perfection, and supreme Deity, is goodness itself, substantial, above knowledge and intellect.

Agreeably with which, the Scripture makes God, and the supreme good, Love. This not to be understood of a soft, fond, and partial Love; God being rightly called also an impartial law, and the measure of all things. Atheists also suppose goodness to be included in the idea of that God whose existence they deny. The idea here more largely declared 276

X. That this forementioned idea of God essentially includeth unity, oneliness, or solitariety, in it; since there cannot possibly be more than one absolutely Supreme, one Cause of all things, one Omnipotent, and one infinitely Perfect. Epicurus and his followers professedly denied a a God, according to this notion of him 282

XI. The grand objection against the idea of God, as thus essentially including oneliness and singularity in it, from the Polytheism of all nations formerly (the Jews excepted), and of all the wisest men, and philosophers. From whence it is inferred, that this idea of God is not natural, but artificial, and owes its original to laws and arbitrary institutions only. An inquiry therefore here to be made concerning the true sense of the pagan Polytheism; the objectors securely taking it for granted, that the Pagan Polytheists universally asserted many unmade, self-existent, intellectual beings and independent deities, as so many partial causes of the world 283

XII. The irrationality of which opinion, and its manifest repugnancy to the phenomena, render it less probable to have been the belief of all the pagan Polytheists 285

XIII. That the Pagan deities were not all of them universally looked upon as so many unmade self-existent beings, unquestionably evident from hence; because they generally held a theogonia, or generation of gods. This point of the Pagan theology insisted upon by Herodotus, the most ancient prosaic Greek writer. In whom the meaning of that question, Whether the gods were generated or existed from all eternity, seems to have been the same with this of Plato's, Whether the world were made or unmade? 286

Certain also that amongst the Hesiodian gods, there was either but one self-existent, or else none at all. Hesiod's Love supposed to be the eternal God, or the active Principle of the universe 287

That the Valentinian thirty gods, or Æons (having the greatest appearance of independent deities), were all derived from one self-originated being, called Bythus, or an unfathomable Depth 289

That besides the Manichæans, some Pagans did indeed acknowledge a ditheism, or duplicity of unmade gods, one the principle of good, the other of evil. (Which, the nearest approach that can be found, to the supposed Polytheism.) Plutarchus Chæronensis one or the chief of these,

though not so commonly taken notice of by learned men. His reasons for this opinion proposed 290

Plutarch's pretence, that this was the general persuasion of all the ancient philosophers and Pagan nations. His grounds for imputing it to Plato examined and confuted 295

The true account of the Platonic origin of evils, from the necessity of imperfect things 298

Pythagoras and other philosophers purged likewise from this imputation 300

That the Egyptians probably did but personate evil (the confusion, and alternate vicissitude of things in this lower world), by Typhon. The only question concerning the Arimanius of the Persian magi. This, whether a self-existent principle, or no, disputed 301

Plutarch and Atticus the only professed assertors of this doctrine among the Greek philosophers (besides Numenius in Chalcidius); who therefore probably the persons censured for it by Athanasius . 302

Aristotle's explosion and confutation of πολλαὶ ἀρχαὶ, many principles 304

That a better judgment may be made of the Pagan deities; a general survey of them. They all reduced to five heads; The souls of men deceased, or heroes, the animated stars and elements, demons, accidents, and things of nature, personated; and lastly, several personal names given to one supreme God, according to the several manifestations of his power and providence in the world; mistaken, for so many substantial deities, or self-existent minds 305

Pagans acknowledging omnipotence, must needs suppose one sovereign Numen. Faustus the Manichæan's conceit, that the Jews and Christians paganized in the opinion of monarchy. With St. Austin's judgment of the Pagans thereupon 311

XIV. Concluded, that the pagan Polytheism must be understood of created intellectual beings, superior to men, religiously worshipped. So that the Pagans held both many gods, and one god, in different senses; many inferior deities subordinate to one Supreme. Thus Onatus the Pythagorean in Stobæus. The Pagan's creed in Maximus Tyrius; one god the King and Father of all, and many gods the sons of gods. The pagan Theogonia thus to be understood, of many gods produced by one god 313

This pagan Theogonia really one and the same thing with the Cosmogonia. Plato's Cosmogonia a Theogonia 316

Hesiod's Theogonia the Cosmogonia 321

The Persians and Egyptians in like manner, holding a Cosmogonia, called it a Theogonia 322

This pagan Theogonia, how by some mistaken 322

Both this Theogonia and Cosmogonia of the ancient Pagans to be understood of a temporary production 323

That Plato really asserted the newness or beginning of the world 323

Amongst the Pagans, two sorts of Theogonists, atheistic and Divine. Plato a Divine Theogonist 326

Other pagan Theogonists, Theists, or assertors of an unmade Deity 329

These Divine Theogonists also made Chaos and Night senior to the gods; that is, to the generated ones 343

The Orphic cabala of the world's production from Chaos (or Night) and Love; originally Mosaical 345

Other pagan Theists neither Theogonists nor Cosmogonists; they holding the eternity of the world, and of the gods; as Aristotle and the junior Platonists 347

These notwithstanding acknowledged all their eternal gods save one, *γενητοὺς*, that is, to have been derived from that one; and that there was, in this sense, but *εἷς Θεὸς ἀγένητος*, one only unmade, or self-existent God 353

Necessary here to show, how the Pagans did put a difference betwixt the one, supreme, unmade Deity, and their other many inferior generated gods 353

This done, both by proper names, and appellatives emphatically used 354

Θεοὶ, or gods, often put for inferior gods only, in way of distinction from the Supreme 360

Τὸ Θεῖον and *Τὸ Δαιμόνιον* also the supreme Deity . . . 364

Other full and emphatical descriptions of the supreme God, amongst the Pagans 365

XV. Further evidence of this, that the intelligent Pagan Polytheists held only a plurality of inferior deities subordinate to one Supreme. First, because after the emersion of Christianity, and its contest with Paganism, no Pagan ever asserted many independent deities, but all professed to acknowledge one Sovereign, or Supreme 366

Apollonius Tyanæus set up amongst the Pagans for a rival with our Saviour Christ 366

He, though styled by Vopiscus a true friend of the gods, and though a stout champion for the pagan Polytheism, yet a professed acknowledger of one supreme Deity 372

Celsus the first public writer against Christianity, and a zealous Polytheist; notwithstanding freely declareth for one first and greatest omnipotent God 373

The next and most eminent champion for the Pagan cause, Porphyrius, an undoubted assertor of one supreme Deity. Who in Proclus not only opposeth that evil principle of Plutarch and Atticus, but also contendeth, that even matter itself was derived from one perfect being 374

Hierocles the next eminent antagonist of Christianity, and champion for the Pagan gods, did, in the close of his Philalethes (as we learn from Lactantius) highly celebrate the praises of the one supreme God, the Parent of all things 374

Julian, the emperor, a zealous contender for the restitution of Paganism, plainly derived all his gods from one 377

This true of all the other opposers of Christianity, as Jamblichus, Syrianus, Proclus, Simplicius, etc. Maximus Madaurensis, a Pagan philosopher in St. Austin, his profession of one sovereign Numen above all the gods. The same also the sense of Longinianus . . . . 370 b

The Pagans in Arnobius universally disclaim the opinion of many unmade deities, and profess the belief of an omnipotent God . . 371 b

These Pagans acknowledged by others of the fathers also to have held one sovereign Numen . . . . . 374 b

But of this more afterwards, when we speak of the Arians.

XVI. That this was no refinement or interpolation of Paganism, made after Christianity (as might be suspected), but that the doctrine of the most ancient Pagan theologers, and greatest promoters of Polytheism, was consonant hereunto; which will be proved from unsuspected writings . . . . . 377 b

Concerning the Sibylline oracles, two extremes . . . 378 b

That Zoroaster, the chief promoter of Polytheism in the east, professed the acknowledgment of one sovereign Deity (and that not the sun neither, but the maker thereof), proved from Eubulus in Porphyry 382

Zoroaster's supreme God Oromasdes 385

Of the Triplasian Mithras 386

The magic, or Chaldaic trinity 388

The Zoroastrian trinity, Oromasdes, Mithras, and Arimanes. Thus the Persian Arimanes no substantial evil principle, or independent god 389

Concerning the reputed magic or Chaldaic oracles 391

XVII. That Orpheus, commonly called by the Greeks the Theologer, and the father of the Grecanic Polytheism, clearly asserted one supreme Numen. The history of Orpheus not a mere romance . 394

Whether Orpheus were the father of the poems called Orphical 396

Orpheus's Polytheism 399

That Orpheus, notwithstanding, asserted a Divine monarchy, proved

from Orphic verses, recorded by Pagans: there being other Orphic verses counterfeit 402

In what sense Orpheus, and other mystical theologers amongst the Pagans, called God *Ἀῤῥενόθηλυν*, Hermaphrodite, or of both sexes, male and female together 404

Orpheus's recantation of his Polytheism a fable; he at the same time acknowledging both one unmade God, and many generated gods and goddesses 406

That besides the opinion of monarchy, a trinity of Divine hypostases subordinate was also another part of the Orphic cabala. Orpheus's trinity, Phanes, Uranus, and Chronus 406

The grand arcanum of the Orphic theology, that God is all things; but in a different sense from the Stoics 409

God's being all, made a foundation of pagan Polytheism and idolatry 411

XVIII. That the Egyptians themselves, the most polytheistical of all nations, had an acknowledgment amongst them of one supreme Deity. The Egyptians the first Polytheists. That the Greeks and Europeans divided their gods from them, and as Herodotus affirmeth, their very names too. A conjecture, that *Ἀθηνᾶ* of the Greeks was *Νῄϊθ* or *Νῃϊθὰς*, the tutelar god of the city Sais: a colony whereof the Athenians are said to have been. And that Neptune, the Roman sea-god, was derived from the Egyptian Nephthus, signifying the maritime parts. Of the Egyptians worshipping brute animals 412

Notwithstanding this multifarious Polytheism and idolatry of the Egyptians, that they had an acknowledgment of one supreme God, probably first from that great fame which they had for their wisdom. Egypt a school of literature before Greece 415

The Egyptians, though attributing more antiquity to the world than they ought, yet of all nations the most constant assertors of the Cosmogonia, or novity and beginning of the world: nor did they think the world to have been made by chance, as the Epicureans; Simplicius calling the Mosaic history of the creation an Egyptian fable 417

That besides the pure and mixed mathematics, the Egyptians had another higher philosophy, appears from hence; because they were the first assertors of the immortality and transmigration of souls, which Pythagoras from them derived into Greece. Certain therefore, that the Egyptians held incorporeal substance 419

That the Egyptians, besides their vulgar and fabulous, had another arcane and recondite theology. Their sphinges, and Harpocrates, or sigalions, in their temples 420

This arcane theology of the Egyptians concealed from the vulgar two manner of ways, by allegories and hieroglyphics. This doubtless a kind of metaphysics concerning God, as one perfect being, the Original of all things 423

An objection from Chæremon (cited by Porphyrius, in an epistle to Anebo, an Egyptian priest), fully answered by Jamblichus, in the person of Abammo, in the Egyptian Mysteries 424

That monarchy was an essential part of the arcane and true theology of the Egyptians, may be proved from the Trismegistic writings, though not at all genuine (as the Pœmander, and Sermon in the Mount, concerning regeneration); because, though they had been all forged by Christians never so much, yet being divulged in those ancient times, they must needs have something of truth in them; this at least, that the Egyptians acknowledged one supreme Deity; or otherwise they would have been presently exploded 427

That Casaubon, from the detection of forgery in two or three at the most of these Trismegistic books, does not reasonably infer them to have been all Christian cheats: those also not excepted, that have been cited by ancient fathers, but since lost 428

That there was one Theuth or Thoth (called by the Greeks Hermes) an inventor of letters and sciences amongst the ancient Egyptians, not reasonably to be doubted. Besides whom, there is said to have been a second Hermes, surnamed Trismegist, who left many volumes of philosophy and theology behind him, that were committed to the custody of the priests 429

Other books also written by Egyptian priests, in several ages successively, called Hermaical (as Jamblichus informeth us), because entitled (*pro more*) to Hermes, as the president of learning 430

That some of those old Hermaic books remained in the custody of the Egyptian priests, till the times of Clemens Alexandrinus . . . 432

Hermaic books taken notice of formerly, not only by Christians, but also by Pagans and philosophers. Jamblichus's testimony of them, that they did really contain Hermaical opinions, or Egyptian learning. Fifteen of these Hermaic books published together at Athens, before St. Cyril's time 432

All the philosophy of the present Hermaic books, not merely Grecanic, as Casaubon affirmeth. That nothing perisheth; old Egyptian philosophy, derived by Pythagoras, together with the transmigration of souls, into Greece 435

The Asclepian Dialogue, or Perfect Oration (said to have been trans-

lated into Latin by Apuleius), vindicated from being a Christian forgery 437

An answer to two objections made against it; the latter whereof from a prophecy taken notice of by St. Austin, "That the temples of the Egyptian gods should shortly be full of the sepulchres of dead men" . 438

Petavius's further suspicion of forgery, because, as Lactantius and St. Austin have affirmed, the Christian Logos is herein called a second God, and the first begotten Son of God. The answer, that Lactantius and St. Austin were clearly mistaken, this being there affirmed only of the visible and sensible world 440

That besides the Asclepian Dialogue, others of the present Trismegistic books contain Egyptian doctrine. Nor can they be all proved to be spurious and counterfeit. This the rather insisted on, for the vindication of the ancient fathers 442

Proved that the Egyptians, besides their many gods, acknowledged one first Supreme, and universal Deity, from the testimonies of Plutarch, Horus Apollo, Jamblichus (affirming that Hermes derived all things, even matter itself, from one Divine principle); lastly, of Damascius declaring, that the Egyptian philosophers at that time had found in the writings of the ancients, that they held one principle of all things, praised under the name of the Unknown Darkness 446

The same thing proved from their vulgar religion and theology; Hammon being a proper name for the supreme God amongst them; and therefore styled the Egyptian Jupiter 450

Though this word Hammon were probably at first the same with Ham or Cham the son of Noah, yet will not this hinder but that it might be used afterwards by the Egyptians for the supreme God . . 451

The Egyptian God Hammon neither confined by them to the sun, nor to the corporeal world, but according to the notation of the word in the Egyptian language, a hidden and invisible Deity. This further confirmed from the testimony of Jamblichus. 452

This Egyptian Hammon more than once taken notice of in Scripture 453

That the Egyptians acknowledged one universal Numen, further proved from that famous inscription upon the Saitic temple, "I am all that was, is, and shall be, and my veil no mortal hath ever yet uncovered." That this cannot be understood of senseless matter, nor of the corporeal universe, but of a Divine mind, or wisdom, diffusing itself through all. The *peplum*, or veil, cast over the statue as well of the Saitic as Athenian Minerva, hieroglyphically signified the invisibility and incomprehensibility of the Deity which is veiled in its works. From what Proclus addeth to

this inscription beyond Plutarch, "And the sun was the fruit which I produced;" evident, that this was a demiurgical Deity, the creator of the sun and of the world 455

How that passage of Hecatæus in Plutarch is to be understood, "That the Egyptians supposed the first God and the universe to be the same," viz. because the supreme Deity diffuseth itself through all things. *Το πᾶν* a name of God also amongst the Greek philosophers . . . 458

That Pan, to the Arcadians and other vulgar Greeks, was not the corporeal world, as senseless and inanimate, but as proceeding from an intellectual principle diffusing itself through all; from Macrobius and Phornutus. Socrates's prayer to Pan as the supreme God, in Plato's Phædrus 458

Our Saviour Christ, called the great Pan by demons . . . 460

How the old Egyptian theology, that God is all things, is every where insisted upon in the Trismegistic writings 461

That the supreme God was sometimes worshipped by the Egyptians under other proper personal names, as Isis, Osiris, and Serapis, etc. 466

Recorded in Eusebius, from Porphyrius, that the Egyptians acknowledged one intellectual Demiurgus, or Maker of the world, under the name of Cneph, whom they pictured, putting forth an egg out of his mouth. This Cneph said to have produced another God, whom the Egyptians called Ptha, the Greeks, Vulcan, the soul of the world, and artificial plastic nature. The testimony of Plutarch, that the Thebaites worshipped only one eternal and immortal God under this name of Cneph . . . 469

Thus, according to Apuleius, the Egyptians worshipped one and the same supreme God, under many different names and motions . 470

Probable, that the Egyptians distinguished hypostases in the Deity also. Kircherus's Egyptian hieroglyphic of the Trinity. An intimation in Jamblichus of an Egyptian trinity. Eicton, Emeph, or Hemphta (which is the same with Cneph), and Ptha 470

The doctrine of God's being all, made by the Egyptians a foundation of Polytheism and idolatry, they being led hereby to personate and deify the several parts of the world, and things of nature (which, in the language of the Asclepian Dialogue, is to call God by the name of every thing, or every thing by the name of God), the wise amongst them nevertheless understanding, that all was but one simple Deity, worshipped by piece-meal. This allegorically signified by Osiris's being dismembered and cut in pieces by Typhon, and then made up one again by Isis . 472

XIX. That the poets many ways depraved the Pagan theology, and made it to have a more aristocratical appearance 473

Notwithstanding which, they did not really assert many self-existent

and independent gods, but one only unmade; and all the rest generated or created. Homer's gods not all eternal and unmade, but generated out of the ocean; that is, a watery chaos. Homer's Theogonia, as well as Hesiod's, the Cosmogonia, and his generation of gods, the same things with the production or creation of the world 476

Nevertheless, Homer distinguished, from all those generated gods, one unmade God, the Father or Creator of the world 478

Homer thus understood by the Pagans themselves, as Plutarch, Proclus, and Aristotle 479

Though Hesiod's gods, properly so called, were all of them generated, yet did he suppose also one unmade God, the Maker of them, and of the world 480

Pindar likewise a Divine Theogonist; an assertor of one unmade Deity (and no more) the cause of all things; yet nevertheless, of many generated gods, besides his one God to be worshipped far above all the other gods 481

The suspicion, which Aristotle sometime had of Hesiod, and Plato of Homer, seems to have proceeded from their not understanding that Mosaic cabala, followed by them both, of the world's being made out of a watery chaos 482

That famous passage of Sophocles, concerning one God the Maker of heaven, earth, and seas (cited by so many ancient fathers), defended as genuine 483

Clear places in the extant tragedies of Euripides to the same purpose; with other remarkable ones cited out of his own inextant tragedies: besides the testimonies of other Greek poets 483

The consent of Latin poets also, in the monarchy of the whole 486

XX. After the poets of the Pagans, their philosophers considered. That Epicurus was the only reputed philosopher, who, pretending to acknowledge gods, yet professedly opposed monarchy, and verbally asserted a multitude of eternal unmade deities, but such as had nothing to do either with the making or governing of the world. He therefore clearly to be reckoned amongst the Atheists. All the Pagan philosophers, who were Theists (a few Ditheists excepted), universally asserted a mundane monarchy 490

Pythagoras a Polytheist as much as the other Pagans; nevertheless a plain acknowledger of one supreme God, the Maker of the universe 492

Pythagoras's dyad no evil god or demon self-existent, as Plutarch supposed 494

But this dyad of his, whether matter or no, derived from a monad. One simple unity the cause of all things 495

That Pythagoras, acknowledging a trinity of Divine hypostases, did therefore sometimes describe God as a monad, sometimes as a mind, and sometimes as the soul of the world 496

The Pythagoric monad and first God the same with the Orphic Love, senior to Japhet and Saturn, and the oldest of all the gods, a substantial thing. But that Love, which Plato would have to be the youngest of the gods (the daughter of Penia, or Indigency, and a parturient thing), nothing but a creaturely affection in souls, personated and deified. Parmenides's Love, the first created god, or lower soul of the world, before whose production Necessity is said to have reigned; that is, the necessity of material motions undirected for ends, and good 497

That Pythagoras called the supreme Deity not only a monad, but a tetrad or tetractys also. The reasons for this given from the mysteries in the number four, trifling. More probability of a late conjecture, that the Pythagoric tetractys was not the Hebrew tetragrammaton, not altogether unknown to the Hetrurians and Latins 499

Xenophanes a plain assertor both of many gods, and of one God, called by him, One and All. Simplicius's clear testimony for this theosophy of Xenophanes, out of Theophrastus. Xenophanes misrepresented by Aristotle, as an assertor of a spherical corporeal god . . 501

Heraclitus, though a cloudy and confounded philosopher, and one who could not conceive of any thing incorporeal, yet both a hearty moralist, and a zealous assertor of one supreme Deity . . . 502

The Ionic philosophers before Anaxagoras, being all of them Corporealists, and some of them Atheists; that Anaxagoras was the first who asserted an incorporeal mind to be a principle, and though not the cause of matter, yet of motion, and of the regularity of things. The world, according to him, not eternal but made, and out of pre-existent similar atoms; and that not by chance, but by mind or God. This mind of his purely incorporeal, as appeareth from his own words, cited by Simplicius 504

Probable, that Anaxagoras admitted none of the inferior Pagan gods. He condemned by the vulgar for an Atheist, because he ungodded the stars, denying their animation, and affirming the sun to be but a mass of fire, and the moon an earth. This disliked also by Plato, as that which in those times would dispose men to Atheism 506

Anaxagoras further censured, both by Plato and Aristotle, because, though asserting mind to be a principle, he made much more use of material than of mental and final causes; which was looked upon by them as an atheistic tang in him. Nevertheless Anaxagoras a better Theist

than those Christian philosophers of latter times, who quite banish all mental causality from the world 507

Parmenides's acknowledgment of one God the cause of gods. Which supreme Deity, by Parmenides, styled One-all-immoveable. That this is not taken physically, but metaphysically and theologically; proved at large. The first principle of all, to these ancients, one, a simple unity or monad. This said to be all, because virtually containing all, and distributed into all; or because all things are distinctly displayed from it. Lastly, the same said to be immoveable, and indivisible, and without magnitude, to distinguish it from the corporeal universe . . . 509

Ἓν τὸ πᾶν, One-all, taken in different senses; by Parmenides and Xenophanes, etc. divinely, for the supreme Deity (one most simple Being, the Original of all things); but by others in Aristotle atheistically, as if all things were but one and the same matter diversely modified. But the One-all of these latter, not immoveable but moveable; it being nothing else but body: whereas the One-all-immoveable is an incorporeal Deity. This does Aristotle, in his Metaphysics, close with, as good divinity. That there is one incorporeal immoveable principle of all things Simplicius's observation, that though divers philosophers maintained a plurality or infinity of moveable principles, yet none ever asserted more than one immoveable 512

Parmenides in Plato distinguishes three Divine hypostases, the first whereof called by him, ἕν τὸ πᾶν, one-all; the second, ἕν πάντα, one all things; and the third, ἕν καὶ πάντα, one and all things . . . 513

But that Parmenides by his One-all-immoveable really understood the supreme Deity, yet further unquestionably evident from the verses cited out of him by Simplicius; wherein there is also attributed thereunto a standing eternity, or duration, different from that of time . . 515

The only difference betwixt Parmenides and Melissus, that the former called his One-all-immoveable, finite; the latter, Infinite; this in words rather than reality: the disagreeing agreement of these two philosophers fully declared by Simplicius. Melissus's language more agreeable with our present theology. Though Anaximander's infinite were nothing but senseless matter, yet Melissus's Infinite was the true Deity . . 516

That Zeno Eleates, by his One-all-immoveable, meant not the corporeal world neither, no more than Melissus, Parmenides, and Xenophanes; but the Deity, evident from Aristotle. Zeno's demonstration of one God, from the idea of a most powerful and perfect being, in the same Aristotle 518

Empedocles's first principle of all things, τὸ ἕν, or a unity likewise, besides which he supposed contention and friendship to be the principles

of all created beings: not only plants, brutes, and men, but gods also 519

Empedocles's original of all the evil both of human souls and demons, from this νεῖκος, discord and contention, together with the ill use of their liberty 521

XXII. The doctrine of divers other Pythagoreans also the same; as Philolaus, Archytas, Ocellus, Aristæus, etc. Timæus Locrus's God the Creator of gods. Onatus's many gods, and his one God, the Coryphæus of the gods. Eulides Megarensis's one the very Good. Antisthenes's many popular gods, but one natural God. Diogenes Sinopensis's God that filleth all things 521

XXIII. That Socrates asserted one God, undeniable from Xenophon 528

But that he disclaimed all the other inferior gods of the Pagans, and died, as a martyr, for one only God, in this sense, a vulgar error 531

What the impiety imputed to him by his adversaries, appeareth from Plato's Euthyphro, viz. that he freely and openly condemned those fables of the gods, wherein wicked and unjust actions were imputed to them 532

That Plato really asserted one only God and no more, a vulgar error likewise; and that thirteenth epistle to Dionysius, wherein he declared himself to be serious only when he began his epistles with God, and not with gods (though extant in Eusebius's time), spurious and supposititious. He worshipping the sun and other stars also (supposed to be animated) as inferior gods 533

Nevertheless, undeniably evident, that Plato was no Polyarchist, but a Monarchist, no assertor of many independent gods, or principles, but of one Original of all things; one first God, one greatest God, one Maker of the world and of the gods 534

In what sense the supreme God, to Plato, the cause and producer of himself (out of Plotinus); and this notion not only entertained by Seneca and Plotinus, but also by Lactantius, that Plato really asserted a Trinity of universal Divine hypostases, that have the nature of principles. The first hypostasis in Plato's Trinity properly αὐτόθεος, the original Deity—the Cause and King of all things: which also said by him to be ἐπεκεινα τῆς οὐσίας, or ὑπερούσιος, above essence 536

Xenophon, though with other Pagans he acknowledged a plurality of gods, yet a plain assertor also of one supreme and universal Numen 540

XXIV. Aristotle a frequent acknowledger of many gods. And whether he believed any demons or no, which he sometimes mentions (though sparingly), and insinuates them to be a kind of aërial animals, more im-

mortal than men; yet did he unquestionably look upon the stars, or their intelligences, as gods 541

Notwithstanding which, Aristotle doth not only often speak of God singularly, and of the Divinity emphatically, but also professedly opposes that imaginary opinion of many independent principles, or unmade deities. He confuting the same from the phenomena or the compages of the world, which is not επεισοδιώδης, but all uniform, and agreeably conspiring into one harmony 543

Aristotle's supreme Deity, the first immoveable Mover. The difference here betwixt Plato and Aristotle; Plato's original of motion; a self-moving soul Aristotle's an immoveable mind. But this difference not so great as at first sight it seems; because Aristotle's immoveable mind doth not move the heavens efficiently, but only finally, or as being loved. Besides which, he must needs suppose another immediate mover, which could be nothing but a soul of them 546

Aristotle's immoveable mind not only the cause of motion, but also of well and fit; all the order, pulchritude, and harmony, that are in the world, called therefore by Aristotle the separate good thereof. This together with nature (its subordinate instrument) the efficient cause of the whole mundane system: which, however co-eternal with it, yet is, in order of nature, junior to it 547

Aristotle and other ancients, when they affirm mind to have been the cause of all things, understood it thus, that all things were made by an absolute wisdom, and after the best manner. The Divine will, according to them, not a mere arbitrary, humorsome, and fortuitous thing, but decency and fitness itself 549

From this passage of Aristotle's, that the Divinity is either God, or the work of God, evident, that he supposed all the gods to have been derived from one and therefore his intelligences of the spheres 550

That, according to Aristotle, this speculation of the Deity constitutes a particular science by itself, distinct from physiology and geometry: the former whereof (physiology) is conversant about what was inseparable and moveable, the second (geometry), about things immoveable, but not really separable; but the third and last (which is theology) about that which is both immoveable and separable, an incorporeal Deity . 551

Four chief points of Aristotle's theology or metaphysics, concerning God; first, that though all things are not eternal and unmade, yet something must needs be such, as likewise incorruptible, or otherwise all might come to nothing. Secondly, that God is an incorporeal substance, separate from sensibles, indivisible, and devoid of parts and magnitude. Thirdly, that the Divine intellect is the same with its intelligibles, or con-

taineth them all within itself; because the Divine mind, being senior to all things, and architectonical of the world, could not then look abroad for its objects without itself. The contrary to which supposed by Atheists. Lastly, that God being an immoveable substance, his act and energy are his essence; from whence Aristotle would infer the eternity of the world 551

Aristotle's creed and religion contained in these two articles, first, that there is a Divinity which comprehends the whole nature, or universe. And, secondly, that besides this, there are other particular inferior gods; but that all other things, in the religion of the Pagans, were fabulously superadded hereunto for political ends 553

Speusippus, Xenocrates, and Theophrastus, monarchists . . 554

XXV. The Stoics no better metaphysicians than Heraclitus, in whose footsteps they trode, admitting of no incorporeal substance. The qualities of the mind also, to these Stoics, bodies 555

But the Stoics not therefore Atheists; they supposing an eternal unmade mind (though lodged in matter) the maker of the whole mundane system 557

The stoical argumentations for a God not inconsiderable, and what they were 557

The stoical god, not a mere plastic and methodical, but an intellectual fire. The world, according to them, not a plant, but animal; and Jupiter the soul thereof. From the supposed oneliness of which Jupiter, they would sometimes infer the singularity of the world: (Plutarch on the contrary affirming, that though there were fifty, or a hundred worlds, yet would there be, for all that, but one Zeus or Jupiter . . . 560

Nevertheless the Stoics as polytheistical as any sect. But so, as that they supposed all their gods, save one, to be not only native, but also mortal; made out of that one, and resolved into that one again: these gods being all melted into Jupiter, in the conflagration . . . 561

Wherefore during the intervals of successive worlds, the Stoics acknowledged but one solitary Deity, and no more; Jupiter being then left all alone, and the other gods swallowed up into him. Who therefore not only the creator of all the other gods, but also the decreator of them 563

The Stoics, notwithstanding this, religious worshippers of their many gods; and thereby sometime derogated from the honor of the Supreme, by sharing his sovereignty amongst them 564

Nevertheless, the supreme God praised and extolled by them far above all the other gods; and ackowledged to be the sole Maker of the world 567

Their professing subjection to his laws as their greatest liberty 569

And to submit their wills to his will in every thing, so as to know no other will but the will of Jupiter 570

Their pretending to look to God, and to do nothing without a reference to him; as also to trust in him and rely upon him . . . 571

Their praising him as the Author of all good 571

Their addressing their devotions to him alone, without the conjunction of any other god; and particularly imploring his assistance against temptations 572

Cleanthes's excellent and devout hymn to the supreme God . 573

XXVI. Cicero, though affecting to write in the way of the new academy, yet no sceptic as to Theism. Nor was he an assertor of many independent deities. Cicero's gods (the makers of the world) the same with Plato's eternal gods, or trinity of Divine hypostases subordinate. This language the Pagans in St. Cyril would justify, from that of the Scripture, "Let us make man" 575

Varro's threefold theology, the fabulous, the natural, and the civil or popular; agreeably to Scævola the Pontifex's three sorts of gods, poetical, philosophical, and political. The former condemned by him as false; the second, though true, said to be above the capacity of the vulgar: and therefore a necessity of a third or middle betwixt both; because many things true in religion not fit for the vulgar to know. Varro's supreme Numen the great soul or mind of the whole world: his inferior gods. Parts of the world animated. Image-worship condemned by him as disagreeable to the natural theology 580

Seneca, a pagan Polytheist, but plain assertor of one supreme Numen excellently described by him. That in his book of Superstition (now lost) he did as freely censure the civil theology of the Romans, as Varro had done the fabulous or theatrical 582

Quintilian, Pliny, Apuleius, their clear acknowledgments of one sovereign universal Deity. Symmachus (a great stickler for Paganism), his assertion, that it was one and the same thing which was worshipped in all religions, though in different ways 583

The writer De Mundo, though not Aristotle, yet a Pagan. His cause that containeth all things, and God from whom all things are. Which passage being left out in Apuleius's Latin version, gives occasion of suspicion, that he was infected with Plutarch's Ditheism, or at least held matter to be unmade 585

Plutarch, a priest of Apollo, however unluckily engaged in those two false opinions of an evil principle, and matter unmade, yet a maintainer of one sole principle of all good 587

Dio Chrysostomus, a Sophist, his clear testimony, βασιλεύεσθαι τὸ ὅλον, that the whole world was under a kingly government or monarchy 587

Galen's true hymn to the praise of Him, that made us, in his book De usu Partium 588

Maximus Tyrius's short account of his own religion; one supreme God the monarch of the whole world, and three subordinate ranks of inferior gods, the sons and friends of God, and his ministers in the government of the world 589

A most full and excellent description of the supreme God in Aristides's first oration, or hymn to Jupiter, wherein he affirmeth all the several kinds of gods to be but a defluxion and derivation from Jupiter . . 590

All the latter philosophers after Christianity (though maintainers of the world's eternity, yet) agreed in one supreme Deity, the cause of this world, and of the other gods. Excellent speculations in them concerning the Deity, especially Plotinus; who, though deriving matter and all from one Divine principle, yet was a contender for many gods: he supposing the grandeur and the majesty of the supreme God to be declared by the multitude of gods under him. Themistius; that the supreme God was worshipped by Pagans, Christians, and all nations, though in different forms: and that God was delighted with this variety of religions . 591

The full testimony of St. Cyril, that the Greek philosophers universally acknowledged one God, the Maker of the universe, from whom were produced into being certain other gods, both intelligible and sensible 592

XXVII. This not only the opinion of philosophers and learned men, but also the general belief of the vulgar among the Pagans. A judgment of the vulgar and generality to be made from the poets. Dio Chrysostomus's affirmation, that all the poets acknowledged one first and greatest God, the Father of all the rational kind, and the king thereof . . 593

The testimony of Aristotle, That all men acknowledged kingship or monarchy amongst the gods: of Maximus Tyrius, that notwithstanding so great a discrepancy of opinion in other things, yet throughout all the Gentile world, as well the unlearned as learned, did, universally agree in this, that there was one God the King and Father of all, and many gods the sons of that one God; of Dio Chrysostomus also to the same purpose; he intimating likewise, that of the two, the acknowledgment of the one supreme God, was more general than of the many inferior gods . . 593

That the sense of the vulgar Pagans herein is further evident from hence, because all nations had their several proper names for the one supreme God; as the Romans Jupiter, the Greeks Zeus, the Africans and Arabians Hammon, the Scythians Pappæus, the Babylonians Bel, etc. 595

True, that Origen, though allowing Christians to use the appellative names for God in the languages of the several nations, yet accounted it unlawful for to call him by those proper names; because not only given to idols, but also contaminated with wicked rites and fables: according to which, they should be indeed rather the names of a demon than of a God. Notwithstanding which, he does not deny those Pagans ever to have meant the supreme God by them, but often acknowledge the same. But Lactantius indeed denies the Capitoline Jupiter to be the supreme God, and that for two reasons. First, because he was not worshipped without the partnership of Minerva and Juno, his daughter and wife. Granted here, that there was a mixture of the fabulous or poetical theology with the natural to make up the civil. But that wise men understood these to be but three several names or notions of one supreme God. This confirmed from Macrobius 595

Vossius's conjecture, that in this Capitoline Trinity there was a further mystery aimed at, of three Divine hypostases. This Roman trinity derived from the Samothracian Cabiri. Which word being Hebraical, gives cause to suspect this tradition of a trinity among the Pagans to have sprung from the Hebrews 596

Lactantius's second reason, because Jupiter being Juvanus Pater, was a name below the dignity of the supreme God. The answer, that the true etymon thereof was Jovis Pater, the Hebrew Tetragrammaton . 597

That the Capitoline Jupiter was the supreme God, evident from those titles of Optimus Maximus; and of Omnipotens by the pontifices in their public sacrifices. Seneca's testimony, that the ancient Hetrurians by Jupiter meant the mind and spirit, maker and governor, of the whole world. The Roman soldiers' acclamation in Marcus Aurelius's German expedition (to Jove the god of gods, who alone is powerful) according to Tertullian a testimony to the Christian's God 598

That as the learned Pagans in their writings, so likewise the vulgar in their common speech, when most serious, often used the word God, singularly and emphatically, for the Supreme, proved from Tertullian, Minutius Felix, and Lactantius: together with the testimony of Proclus, that the one supreme God was more universally believed throughout the world than the many gods 600

That Kyrie Eleeson was anciently a Pagan litany to the supreme God, proved from Arianus. The supreme God often called by the Pagans also *Κύριος*, or the Lord 601

That even the most sottishly superstitious, idolatrous, and polytheistical, amongst the Pagans, did, notwithstanding, generally acknowledge

one supreme Deity; fully attested and elegantly declared by Aurelius Prudentius in his Apotheosis 602

However, some of the ancient Pagans were said to have acknowledged none but visible and corporeal gods, yet as they conceived these to be endued with life and understanding, so did they suppose one Supreme amongst them, as either the whole heaven or ether animated, or the subtile fiery substance, that pervadeth all things, the God of the Heraclitics and Stoics; or the sun the Cleanthean god 603

Though Macrobius refer so many of the Pagan gods to the sun, and doubtless himself looked upon it as a great god, yet does he deny it to be *omnipotentissimum Deum*, the most omnipotent God of all; he asserting a Trinity of Divine hypostases superior to it, in the Platonic way . 604

That the Persians themselves, the most notorious sun-worshippers, did, notwithstanding, acknowledge a Deity superior to it, and the maker thereof; proved from Eubulus. As also that the Persians' country-Jupiter was not the sun, confirmed from Herodotus, Xenophon, Plutarch, and Curtius. Cyrus's Lord God of heaven, who commanded him to build a house at Jerusalem; the same with the God of the Jews . . 606

That as (besides the Scythians) the Ethiopians in Strabo, and other barbarian nations, anciently acknowledged one sovereign Deity; so is this the belief of the generality of the Pagan world to this very day . 607

XXVIII. Besides Themistius and Symmachus, asserting one and the same thing to be worshipped in all religions, though after different ways, and that God Almighty was not displeased with this variety of his worship; Plutarch's memorable testimony, that as the same sun, moon, and stars, are common to all, so were the same gods. And that not only the Egyptians, but also all other Pagan nations worshipped one reason and providence ordering all; together with its inferior subservient powers and ministers, though with different rites and symbols . . . 608

Titus Livius also of the same persuasion, that the same immortal gods were worshipped every where (namely, one supreme and his inferior ministers); however the diversity of rites made them seem different . 609

Two Egyptian philosophers, Heraiscus and Asclepiades, professedly insisting upon the same thing, not only as to the Egyptians, but also the other Pagan nations: the latter of them (Asclepiades) having written a book entitled, The Symphony, or Harmony of all Theologies or Religions, to wit, in these two fundamentals, that there is one supreme God, and besides him, other inferior gods, his subservient ministers, to be worshipped. From whence Symmachus and other Pagans concluded, that the differences of religion were not to be scrupulously stood upon, but every man ought to worship God according to the law and religion of his own coun-

try. The Pagans' sense thus declared by Stobæus, that the multitude of gods is the work of the Demiurgus, made by him together with the world 610

XXIX. That the pagan Theists must needs acknowledge one supreme Deity, further evident from hence; because they generally believed the whole world to be one animal, actuated and governed by one soul. To deny the world's animation, and to be an Atheist, all one, in the sense of the ancient Pagans. Against Gassendus, that Epicurus denied the world's animation, upon no other account, but only because he denied a providential deity. This whole animated world, or the soul thereof, to the Stoics, and others, the πρῶτος Θεὸς, the first and highest God . 611

Other Pagan theologers, who though asserting likewise the world's animation, and a mundane soul, yet would not allow this to be the supreme Deity, they conceiving the first and highest God to be no soul, but an abstract and immoveable mind superior to it. And to these, the animated world and mundane soul but δεύτερος θεὸς, a second god 612

But the generality of those, who went higher than the soul of the world, acknowledged also a principle superior to mind or intellect, called τὸ ἕν and τἀγαθὸν, the one, and the good; and so asserted a Trinity of Divine hypostases subordinate, Monad, Mind, and Soul. So that the animated world or soul thereof was to some of these but τρίτος θεὸς, the third god 613

The Pagans, whether holding soul, or mind, or monad, to be the highest, acknowledged only one in those several kinds, as the head of all; and so always reduced the multiplicity of things to an unity, or under a monarchy 613

Observed, that to the Pagan theologers universally, the world was no dead thing, or mere machine and automaton, but had life or soul diffused through it all; those being taxed by Aristotle as Atheists, who made the world to consist of nothing but monads or atoms, dead and inanimate. Nor was it quite cut off from the supreme Deity, how much soever elevated above the same: the forementioned Trinity, of Monad, Mind, and Soul, being supposed to be most intimately united together, and indeed all but one entire Divinity; displayed in the world; and supporting the same 614

XXX. The sense of the Hebrews in this controversy. That according to Philo, the pagan Polytheism consisted not in worshipping many independent gods, and partial creators of the world, but besides the one Supreme, other created beings superior to men 615

That the same also was the sense of Flavius Josephus, according to whom, this the doctrine of Abraham; that the supreme God was alone

to be religiously worshipped, and no created thing with him. Aristæus's assertion in Josephus, that the Jews and Greeks worshipped one and the same supreme God, called by the Greeks Zene, as giving life to all 617

The latter rabbinical writers generally of this persuasion, that the Pagans acknowledging one supreme and universal Numen, worshipped all their other gods, as his ministers, or as mediators and intercessors betwixt him and them. And this condemned by them for עכירה ודה strange worship or idolatry.—The first commandment thus interpreted by Maimonides, and Baal Ikkarim; Thou shalt not set up, besides me, any inferior gods as mediators, nor religiously worship my ministers or attendants. The miscarriage of Solomon and other kings of Israel and Judah this, that believing the existence of the one supreme God, they thought it was for his honour, that his ministers also should be worshipped. Abravanel's ten species of idolatry, all of them but so many several modes of creature-worship; and no mention amongst them made of many independent gods 618

Certain places of Scripture also interpreted by rabbinical writers to this purpose; that the Pagan nations generally acknowledged one sovereign Numen 621

The Jews, though agreeing with the Greeks and other Pagans in this, that the stars were all animated, nevertheless denied them any religious worship 622

XXXI. This same thing plainly confirmed from the New Testament; that the Gentiles or Pagans, however Polytheists and idolaters, were not unacquainted with the true God. First from the Epistle to the Romans, where that, which is knowable of God, is said to have been manifest amongst the Pagans; and they to have known God, though they did not "glorify him as God, but hold the truth in unrighteousness;" by reason of their Polytheism and idolatry (or image-worship), the latter of which accounted by the Jews the greatest enormity of the Pagans, as is proved from Philo: and this the reason, why their Polytheism called also idolatry. Plainly declared by St. Paul, that the Pagan superstition consisted not in worshipping many independent gods and creators, but in joining creature-worship some way or other with the worship of the Creator. *Παρὰ τὸν κτίσαντα*, how to be understood; and in what sense the Pagans, though acknowledging the Creator, might be said to have worshipped the creature, beyond him 623

Again, from St. Paul's oration to the Athenians, where their "unknown God" is said to be that same God, whom St. Paul preached, who made the world and all things in it. And these Athenian Pagans are affirmed *εὐσεβεῖν*, religiously and devoutly to worship this true God 626

Lastly, that Aratus's Zeus was the true God, whose offspring our souls are, proved not only from the context of that poet himself, undeniably, and from the scholiast upon him, but also St. Paul's positive affirmation. Nor was Aratus singular in this; that ancient prayer of the Athenians, commended by M. Antoninus for its simplicity, (ὕσον, ὕσον, ὦ φίλε Ζεῦ, Rain, rain, O gracious Jupiter, etc.) no otherwise to be understood. And how that other passage of St. Paul, that in the wisdom of God, "the world by wisdom knew not God," does not at all clash herewith . 627

XXXII. In order to a fuller explication of the Pagan theology, and making it the better appear, that the Polytheism thereof was not contradictious to the acknowledgement of one supreme omnipotent Numen; three things to be considered. First, that much of their Polytheism was but seeming and fantastical only, and really nothing but the polyonymy of one God. Secondly, that their real and natural Polytheism consisted only in religiously worshipping, besides this one supreme universal Numen many other particular and inferior created beings; as animated stars, demons, and heroes. Thirdly, that they worshipped both the supreme and inferior gods, in statues, images, and symbols; these were also sometimes abusively called gods. To one or other of which three heads, all the pagan Polytheism referrible 630

For the better persuading, that much of the pagan Polytheism, was really nothing but the polyonymy of one supreme God, or the worshipping him under several personal names; to be remembered again, what was before suggested; that the Pagan nations generally, besides their vulgar, had another more arcane theology, which was the theology of wise men and of truth. That is, besides both their fabulous and poetical, their political and civil theology, they had another natural and philosophic one. This distinction of the vulgar and civil theology, from the natural and real, owned by the Greeks generally, and amongst the Latins, by Scævola the Pontifex, Varro, Cicero, Seneca, and others 630

That the civil theology of the Pagans differed from the natural and real, by a certain mixture of fabulosity in it. Of the Romans suffering the statue of Jupiter's nurse to be kept in the very capitol, as a religious monument. Jupiter's nativity, or his having a father and a mother, atheistically fabulous; poets themselves acknowledging so much of the natural and true theology, that Jupiter being the father of gods and men, the maker of the whole world, was himself eternal and unmade . . 632

That the civil as well as poetical theology had some appearance of many independent deities also; they making several supreme, in their several territories and functions; one chief for one thing, and another for another. But according to the natural and philosophic theology, the

theology of wise men and of truth, all these but poetical, commentitious, fictitious, and fantastic gods ; such as had no distinct substantial essences of their own ; and therefore really to be accounted nothing else but several names or notions of one supreme God 632

Certain, that the Egyptians had several proper and personal names for one supreme universal Numen, that comprehends the whole world, according to several notions of it, or its several powers: as Ammon, Phtha, Osiris, Neith, Cneph ; to which may be added Serapis and Isis too. Besides Jamblichus, Damascius's testimony also to this purpose ; concerning the Egyptian theology. This the pattern of the other, especially European theologies, the Greek and Roman . . 633

That the Greeks and Romans also often made more gods of one, or affected a polyonymy of the same gods, evident from those many proper and personal names bestowed, first upon the sun (of which Macrobius,) who therefore had this epithet of *πολυώνυμος*, given to him ; and then upon the moon, styled also polyonymous, as well as her brother the sun ; and lastly upon the earth, famous likewise for her many names, as Vesta, Cybele, Ceres, Proserpina, Ops, etc. Wherefore not at all to be doubted, but that the supreme God, or sovereign Numen of the whole world, was much more polyonymous. This title given to him also, as well as to Apollo in Hesychius. He thus invoked by Cleanthes. Zeno, the writer De Mundo, Seneca, Macrobius, clearly confirm the same. Maximus Madaurensis in St. Augustine his full acknowledgment thereof . . 634

The first instances of the polyonymy of the supreme God amongst the Pagans in such names as these ; *Βρονταῖος, Ἑτέιος, Πολιεὺς, Μειλίχιος, Φίλιος, Ξένιος, Σωτὴρ*, etc. And amongst the Latins, Victor, Invictus, Opitulus, Stator, Tigillus, Centupeda, Almus, Ruminus, etc. Again, *Ἀνάγκη, Εἱμαρμένη, Πεπρωμένη, Μοῖρα, Ἀδράστεια*, all several names of the one supreme God, as likewise were Clotho, Lachesis, and Atropos, in the writer De Mundo. And amongst the Latins, not only Fate, but also Nature and Fortune too, as Cicero and Seneca affirm 636

But besides these, there were other proper names of the supreme God, which had a greater show and appearance of so many several gods, they having their peculiar temples, and several appropriated rites of worship. And, first, such as signify the Deity, according to its more universal nature. As for example, Pan ; which not the corporeal world inanimate, or endued with a senseless nature only, but a rational or intellectual principle displaying itself in matter, framing the world harmoniously, and being, in a manner, all things. This also the universal pastor and shepherd of all mankind 638

Again, Janus; first invoked by the Romans in their sacrifices, and

never omitted. The most ancient god, and first beginning of all things. Described by Ovid, Martial, and others, as an universal Numen. Concluded by St. Austin to be the same with Jupiter, the soul or mind of the whole world. The word Janus probably derived from *Ζανὸς* the Ætolian Jupiter 639

Genius also, one of the twenty select Roman gods, according to Festus, an universal Numen; that God, who is the begetter of all things. And, according to Varro in St. Austin, the same with Jupiter . 640

That Chronos, or Saturn, no particular deity, but an universal Numen also, which comprehends the whole nature of the world, affirmed by Dionysius Halicarnassensis. The word Saturn Hetrurian (and originally from the Hebrew סתר) signifies *hidden;* called by the Latins, *Deus Latius* the hidden God; whence Italy *Latium*, and the Italians Latins; as worshippers of this hidden God, or the occult principle of all things. This, according to Varro, he that produceth out of himself the hidden seeds and forms of all things, and swalloweth them up into himself again; which, the devouring of his male children. This *sinus quidam naturæ*, etc. a certain inward and deep recess of nature containing all things within itself; as God was sometimes defined by the Pagans. This to St. Austin the same with Jupiter; as likewise was Cœlus, or Uranus, in the old inscription, another name of God too. The poetic theology of Jupiter's being the son of Saturn, and Saturn the son of Cœlus; an intimation (according to Plato) of a Trinity of Divine hypostases universal 641

Though Minerva or Athena were sometimes confined to a narrower sense, yet was it often taken for a name of God also, according to his universal notion; it being to Athenagoras the Divine wisdom displaying itself through all things. This excellently described by Aristides, as the first-begotten offspring of the original Deity or the second Divine hypostasis, by which all things were made; agreeably with the Christian theology 643

Aphrodite Urania, or the heavenly Venus, another name of God also, according to his universal notion; it being the same with that Love, which Orpheus, and other philosophers in Aristotle, made the first original of all things. Plato's distinction of an elder and a younger Venus: the former, the daughter of Uranus, without a mother, or the heavenly Venus: said to be senior to Japhet and Saturn. The latter, afterwards begotten from Jupiter and the nymph Dione, the vulgar Venus. Urania, or the heavenly Venus, called by the oriental nations, Mylitta; that is, the mother of all things. Temples in Pausanias dedicated to this heavenly Venus. This described by Æschylus, Euripides, and Ovid, as the supreme Deity, and the Creator of all the gods. God Almighty also thus

described, as a heavenly Venus, or Love, by Sev. Boethius. To this Urania, or the heavenly Venus, another Venus in Pausanias near a-kin; called Ἀποστροφία or Verticordia; as conversive of men's minds upwards, from unchaste love, or unclean lust 644

Though Vulcan, according to the common notion of him, a special god, yet had he sometimes a more universal consideration. Zeno in Laertius, that the supreme God is called Vulcan as acting in the artificial fire of nature. Thus the soul of the world styled by the Egyptians Phtha; which, as Jamblichus tells us, was the same with the Greeks' Hephæstus, or Vulcan 647

Besides all which names of the supreme God, Seneca informs us, that he was sometimes called also *Liber Pater*, because the Parent of all things: sometimes Hercules, because his force is unconquerable; and sometimes Mercury, as being reason, number, order, and knowledge 647

But besides this polyonymy of God, according to his universal notion, there were other *dii speciales*, or special gods also, amongst the Pagans; which likewise were really but several names of one and the same supreme Deity, *varie utentis sua potestate* (as Seneca writeth), diversely using his power, in particular cases, and in the several parts of the world. Thus Jupiter, Neptune, and Pluto (mistaken by some Christians for a trinity of independent gods), though three civil gods, yet were they really but one and the same natural and philosophic God; as acting in those three parts of the world; the heaven, the sea, the earth, and hell. Pluto in Plato's Cratylus, a name for that part of Divine Providence which is exercised in the government of separate souls after death . . 648

This styled by Virgil the Stygian Jupiter. But by others, Pluto together with Ceres, the manifestation of the Deity, in this whole terrestrial globe. The celestial and terrestrial Jupiter, but one God. Zeus and Hades one and the same to Orpheus. Euripides doubtful whether God should be invoked by the name of Zeus, or Hades. Hermesianax the Colophonian poet, makes Pluto the first of those many names of God synonymous with Zeus 649

Neptune also, another special god, a name of the supreme Deity, as acting in the seas only. This affirmed by Zenocrates in Stobæus, Zeno in Laertius, Balbus and Cotta in Cicero, and also by Maximus Tyrius 650

The Statue of Jupiter with three eyes, in Pausanias; signifying, that according to the natural theology, it was one and the same God, ruling in those three several parts of the world, the heaven, the sea, and the earth; that was called by three names, Jupiter, Neptune, and Pluto. Wherefore, since Proserpina and Ceres are the same with Pluto, and Salacia with

Neptune, concluded, that all these, though several poetical and political gods, yet were but one and the same natural and philosophic God 650

Juno also another special god, a name of the supreme Deity, as acting in the air. Thus Xenocrates and Zeno. The Pagans in St. Austin, that God, in the ether. From whence St. Austin disputeth against the Pagans. Maximus Tyrius, of these and many other gods of the Pagans, that they were but *θεῖα ὀνόματα*, Divine names 651

Yet many other special gods amongst the Pagans, which also were really nothing but Divine names, or names of God, as variously exercising his power, or bestowing several gifts; as in corn and fruit, Ceres; in wine, Bacchus; in medicine, Æsculapius; in traffic, Mercury; in war, Mars; in governing the winds, Æolus; etc. 653

That not only philosophers did thus interpret the many poetical and political gods, into one and the same natural God; but the poets themselves also sometimes openly broached this more arcane, free, and true theology; as Hermesianax amongst the Greeks, and Valerius Soranus amongst the Latins 653

That St. Austin, making a large enumeration of the other special gods amongst the Pagans, affirmeth of them universally, that, according to the sense of the Pagan doctors, they were but one natural god, and all really the same with Jupiter 654

Apuleius, in his book De Deo Socratis, either not rightly understood by that learned and industrious philologer, G. I. Vossius, or else not sufficiently attended to. His design there plainly to reduce the Pagan's civil theology into a conformity with the natural and philosophic; which he does as a Platonist, by making the *dii consentes* of the Romans, and other invisible gods, to be all of them nothing but the Divine ideas; and so the offspring of one highest God. An occasion for this fancy, given by Plato, where he calls his ideas animals 655

Nor was Apuleius singular herein; Julian in his book against the Christians going the very same way; and no otherwise understood by St. Cyril, than as to make the invisible gods worshipped by the Pagans to be the Divine ideas. A fancy of the same Julian, who opposed the incarnation of the eternal Word, that Æsculapius was first of all the idea of the medicinal art, generated by the supreme God, in the intelligible world, which afterwards, by the vivific influence of the sun, was incarnated, and appeared in human form about Epidaurus. And that this Pagan doctrine, older than Christianity, proved out of Philo, writing of a sun, and moon intelligible, as well as sensible, religiously worshipped by the Pagans; that is, the ideas of the archetypal world. And thus were these ideas of the Divine intellect, *νοητοὶ θεοὶ*, intelligible gods,—to Plotinus also 659

Wherefore Julian, Apuleius and those others, who thus made all the Pagan invisible gods to be nothing else but the Divine ideas, the patterns of things in the archetypal world, supposed them not to be so many independent deities, nor really distinct substances, separate from one another but only so many partial considerations of one God. Julian before affirming them, ἐξ αὐτοῦ γεγεννῆσθαι αὐτοὺς, συνυπάρχειν τε καὶ ἐνυπάρχειν αὐτῷ, as to have been generated out of him; so also to coexist with him, and inexist in him 662

That the Pagans appointed some particular god or goddess by name, to preside over every thing (there being μηδὲν ἄθεον, nothing at all without a god to them),—appeareth from that catalogue of their ignoble or petty gods, collected by St. Austin out of Varro. Now it is incredible, that they should think all these to be so many single substantial spirits of each sex, really existing apart in the world: they must therefore needs take them to be so many partial considerations of the Deity, either in the way of the more high-flown Platonists, as his ideas exemplarily and virtually containing all things; or else in that more common and easy way of the generality; as so many several denominations of him, according to the several manifestations of his power and providence; or, as the Pagans in Eusebius declare themselves, those several virtues and powers of the supreme God, themselves personated and deified. Which yet, because they were not executed without the subservient ministry of created spirits, angels, or demons, appointed to preside over such things; therefore might these also, collectively taken, be included under them . . . 662

But for the fuller clearing of this point, that the pagan Polytheism was in great part nothing but the polyonymy of one God, two things here to be taken notice of. First, that the Pagan theology universally supposed God to be diffused through all, to permeate and pervade all, and intimately to act all. Thus Horus Apollo of the Egyptians. Thus, among the Greeks, Diogenes the Cynic, Aristotle the Italic, and Stoical philosophers. Thus the Indian Brachmans before Strabo. Thus also the Latin poets; and Seneca, Quintilian, Apuleius, and Servius, besides others 664

That Anaxagoras and Plato also, though neither of them confounded God with the world, but affirmed him to be unmingled with any thing, yet concluded him in like manner to permeate and pervade all things. Plato's etymology of δίκαιον, as taken for a name of God, to this purpose in his Cratylus. Where a fragment of Heraclitus, and his description of God agreeably hereunto; a most subtile and swift substance, that permeates and passes through every thing, by which all things are made. But

Plato, disclaiming this corporeity of the Deity, will neither have it fire nor heat; but a perfect mind, that passes through all things unmixedly 666

Wherefore no wonder, if the Pagans, supposing God to be diffused through all things, called him, in the several parts of the world, and things of nature, by several names, as in the earth Ceres, in the sea Neptune, etc. This account of the pagan Polytheism given by Paulus Orosius, that whilst they believed God to be in many things, they indiscreetly made many gods of him 667

Further to be observed, that many of the Pagan theologers seemed to go yet a strain higher, they supposing God not only to pervade all things, but also to be himself all things. That the ancient Egyptian theology ran so high, evident from the Saitic inscription. A strong tang hereof in Æschylus; as also in Lucan. Neither was this proper to those who held God to be the soul of the world, but the language also of those other more refined philosophers, Xenophanes, Parmenides, etc. they affirming God to be one and all, with which agreeth the author of the Asclepian Dialogue, that God is *unus omnia*, one all things;—and that before things were made, he did then κρύπτειν, hide them,—or occultly contain them all within himself. In like manner Orpheus . 668

This not only a further ground of the polyonymy of one God, according to the various manifestations of himself in the world, but also of another strange phenomenon in the Pagan theology, their personating the inanimate parts of the world, and natures of things, and bestowing the names of gods and goddesses upon them. Thus Moschopulus before cited, and Arnobius. This Plutarch thinks to have been done at first metonymically only, the effects of the gods being called gods: as the books of Plato, Plato. And thus far not disliked by him. But himself complaineth, that afterwards it was carried on further by superstitious religionists, and not without great impiety. Nevertheless, that inanimate substances, and the natures of things, were formerly deified by the ancient Pagans, otherwise than metonymically, proved from Cicero, Philo, and Plato. For they supposing God to pervade all things, and to be all things, did therefore look upon every thing as sacred or Divine; and theologize the parts of the world and natures of things; titularly making them gods and goddesses. But especially such things, as wherein human utility was most concerned, and which had most of wonder in them 670

This properly the physiological theology of the Pagans, their personating and deifying the natures of things and inanimate substances. That the ancient poetic fables of the gods were many of them, in their first and true meaning, thus physiologically allegorical, and not mere herology, affirmed against Eusebius. Zeno, Cleanthes, and Chrysippus, famous for

thus allegorizing the fables of the gods. Chrysippus's allegorizing an obscene picture of Jupiter and Juno in Samos. Plato, though no friend to these poetic fables, yet confesses some of them to have contained allegories in them: the same doth also Dionysius Halicarnassus; and Cicero likewise, who affirmeth this personating and deifying the natures of things, to have filled the world with superstition 673

Against Eusebius again, that the whole theology of the Pagans consisted not in thus deifying the natures of things, and inanimate bodies; because he that acknowledgeth no animant God, acknowledgeth no God at all, but is a downright Atheist 676

Neither ought this physiological theology of the Pagans, that consisted in personating and deifying the natures of things and inanimate bodies, to be confounded with that natural and philosophical theology of Varro, Scævola, and others, which admitted of no other but animant gods, and such as really existed in nature: for which cause it was called natural, in opposition to the fictitious and fantastic poetic gods 676

St. Austin's just censure and condemnation of the Pagans, for their thus theologizing of physiology, or fictitiously personating and deifying the natures of things 677

But though the Pagans did thus verbally personate and deify the things of nature, yet did not the intelligent amongst them therefore count these true and proper gods. Cotta in Cicero, "though we call corn Ceres, and wine Bacchus, yet was there never any one so mad, as to take that for a god which himself feeds upon and devours." The Pagans really accounted that only for a god, by the invoking whereof they might expect benefit to themselves; and therefore nothing inanimate. This proved from Plato, Aristotle, Lucretius, Cicero, and Plutarch. Wherefore these natures of things deified, but fictitious and fantastic gods. Nor can any other sense be made of them than this, that they were really but so many several names of one supreme God, as severally manifested in his works: according to that Egyptian theology, that God may be called by the name of every thing, or every thing by the name of God. With which agreeth Seneca, that there may be as many names of God, as there are gifts and effects of his; and the writer De Mundo, that God may be denominated from every nature, he being the cause of all things . 677

Wherefore these deified natures of things were not directly worshipped by the intelligent Pagans, but only relatively to the supreme God, or in way of complication with him only; and so not so much themselves as God worshipped in them. The Pagans' pretence, that they did not look upon the world with such eyes as oxen and horses do, but with religious eyes, so as to see God in every thing. They therefore wor-

shipped the invisible Deity in the visible manifestations of himself; God and the world together. This sometimes called Pan and Jupiter. Thus was the whole world said to be the greatest God, and the circle of the heavens worshipped by the Persians; not as inanimate matter, but as the visible manifestation of the Deity, displayed from it, and pervaded by it. When the Roman sea-captains sacrificed to the waves, their worship intended to that God who stilleth the waves and quieteth the billows 680

These Pagans also apprehended a necessity of permitting men to worship the invisible God in his visible works. This account given by them in Eusebius. Plato himself approved of worshipping the invisible God in the sun, moon, and stars, as his visible images. And though Maximus Tyrius would have men endeavour to rise above the starry heavens, and all visible things, yet does he allow the weaker to worship God in his progeny. And Socrates persuades Euthydemus to be contented herewith. Besides which, some Pagans worshipping the elements, directed their intention to the spirits of those elements, as Julian in Ammianus (these being supposed also to be animated), or else to those demons whom they conceived to inhabit them, or preside over them . . . 682

XXXIII. Further to be observed, that amongst those natures of things, some were merely accidental, as hope, love, desire, memory, truth, virtue, piety, faith, justice, concord, clemency, victory, echo, night. According to which, the vulgar Athenians supposed St. Paul to have deified Anastasis, or made a goddess of the resurrection, as well as a god of Jesus. Vices also sometimes thus deified by them, as Contumely and Impudence (to whom were temples dedicated at Athens), though to the end that these things might be deprecated. These accidents sometimes deified under counterfeit proper names, as Pleasure under the name of Volupia, and Lubentina Venus; Time, under the name of Chronos or Saturn; Prudence, or Wisdom, under the names of Athena or Minerva; against which, Origen in his answer to Celsus. Cicero himself allowed of dedicating temples to mind, virtue, piety, faith, etc. 684

But such accidents and affections of things deified could not possibly be accounted true and proper gods, they having not ὑπόστασιν καὶ οὐσίαν, any real subsistence, or substantial essence of their own.—And thus does Origen again dispute against Minerva's godship, as tropologized into Prudence. As he doth also elsewhere upon the same ground, against that of Memory, the mother of the Muses, and that of the Graces; he conceiving, these and such-like, therefore, to be nothing but figments of the Greeks, they being things personated, and feigned with human members. Thus the Pagans condemned by Prudentius also, for feigning things incorporeal with counterfeit members. These gods plainly exploded by Cotta, or

Cicero in disguise; as having only *vim rerum*, but not *deorum*, the force of things, but not of gods in them; or being but *naturæ rerum*, and not *figuræ deorum* 686

Wherefore the true meaning of these deified natures of things could be no other than this, that God was to be acknowledged and worshipped in all things; or as the Pagans themselves declare it, that the force of every thing was both governed by God, and itself Divine. Pliny of this breaking and crumbling of the Deity into parts, every one worshipping that in God, and for a god, which himself most stood in need of. This dividing of the simple Deity, and worshipping it brokenly by parcels and piecemeal, as manifested in all the several things of nature, and parts of the world, justly censured, and elegantly perstringed, by Prudentius against Symmachus. Where Prudentius grants, that Symmachus, who declared, that it was one thing which all worshipped; when he sacrificed to Victory, did sacrifice to God Almighty, under that partial notion, as the giver of victory. This, in the Egyptian allegory, Osiris mangled and cut in pieces by Typhon. Victory and Virtue, as well as Neptune, Mars, and Bellona, but several names or notions of Jupiter, in the prologue of Plautus's Amphitryo 688

Vossius's opinion, that these deified accidents and natures of things, as well as the other Pagan invisible gods, were commonly looked upon by the vulgar, as so many single substantial minds, or spirits created by the supreme God, and appointed to preside over these several things respectively. Where it is acknowledged, that neither the political nor the poetical gods of the Pagans were taken, so much as by the vulgar, for so many independent deities 690

Probable, that by these gods the wiser Pagans sometimes understood demons in general, or collectively; that is, whosoever they were, that were appointed to preside over those several things, or dispense them. As Æolus in Arrianus seems to be taken for the demons appointed by God Almighty to preside over the winds 691

Lactantius's reason, why the *consentes* and select gods, vulgarly worshipped by the Romans, could not be single demons or angels . 693

And from Aristotle's observation, against Zeno, that, according to law, or civil theology, one god was chief for one thing, and another for another, concluded, that these political gods were not properly the subservient ministers of the Supreme; and therefore could be nothing but several names and notions of one natural God, according to his various powers and effects 693

And thus does Vossius himself afterwards confess, that according to the natural theology, all the Pagan gods were but several denominations

of one God. Where, notwithstanding, this learned and industrious philologer seems to take the natural and philosophic theology for the physiological, he making the god thereof the nature of things. Whereas the natural theology was the true, and real, and philosophical, opposed both to the fictions of the poets, and the institutes of law-makers and politicians. As Varro affirmeth, that in cities those things were worshipped and believed, according to false opinions, which had no nature, nor real subsistence, neither in the world, nor without it. The God of the Pagans not the nature of things, which could be the Numen of none but of Atheists; but an understanding Being, the great Mind, or Soul of the whole world, pervading all things. Thus unquestionably true, that the many poetical and political gods were but several names or notions of one natural, real, and true God. Besides which, there were other inferior ministers of this supreme God, acknowledged to be the instruments of his providence, and religiously worshipped also. A brief but full account of the Pagans' natural theology, set down by Prudentius 694

And when the more high-flown Pagans referred these poetical and political gods to the Divine ideas, or patterns of things in the archetypal world; which, besides the Platonists, the Egyptians in Celsus are said to have done, making the brute animals worshipped by them, but symbols of the eternal ideas; they hereby made these gods to be so many partial considerations of one God neither, as being all things, or containing in himself the causes of all things; as Julian himself declareth in his sixth oration 696

An anacephalæosis, that much of the pagan Polytheism was but the polyonymy of one God; he being worshipped under several names. First, according to several general notions of him; as of Janus, Genius, Saturn, Minerva, Urania, or the heavenly Venus, or Love, and others before declared. So also of Summanus, according to St. Austin, and Themis, afterwards to be mentioned 697

And, secondly, according to other more particular notions of them (in their special gods), as acting in some parts of the world only, or exercising some particular powers 699

And, lastly, as pervading all things, and being all things, or the cause of all things, he was thereupon called by the name of every thing, or every thing by his name. The Pagans in St. Austin; that their ancestors were not so sottish, as not to understand, that those things of nature were but Divine gifts, and not themselves gods. And the Pagans in Eusebius; that the invisible God, the cause of all things, ought to be worshipped in his visible effects, wherein he hath displayed himself . 699

Though the two former kinds of these gods only called by Athanasius

poetical and fictitious, he opposing them to those of the third sort, that were natural and real things; yet may these also be well called poetical, fictitious, and fantastical gods too; because though themselves were real things, existing in nature, yet was their personation and deification, mere fiction, fancy, and poetry. And accordingly were they before called by Origen Ἑλλήνων ἀναπλάσματα, mere fragments of the Greeks . 700

XXXIV. Of those Pagans, who supposed the supreme God to be the whole animated world. Hitherto showed, that even the most refined of the Pagans agreed in these two things. First, in breaking and crumbling the one simple Deity, and multiplying it into many gods; or parcelling it out into several particular notions, according to its several powers and virtues (Πολυώνυμον being, to these Pagans, the same thing with Πολυδύναμον). And then, in theologizing the whole world, personating and deifying the natures of things, accidents, and inanimate bodies. They supposing God to pervade all things, and himself to be in a manner all things: therefore every thing to the religious, sacred, and Divine; and God to be worshipped in all 701

We shall now add, that both those forementioned principles, of God's pervading all things, and his being all things, were carried on further by those Pagan theologers, who had no higher notion of the supreme Deity, than as the soul of the world. For, first, whereas the more refined Pagans supposed God to pervade all things unmixedly; those mingled and confounded him with the whole world; some of them supposing him also to be a subtile body 702

Again, whereas the other more sublimated Pagans affirmed God so to be all, as nevertheless to be something also above all; these concluded him to be nothing higher than the animated world . . . 703

And though they supposed, that as well in this mundane animal as in other animals, there was something principal and hegemonical (whether the sun, or ether, or fire), which therefore was emphatically called God; yet did they conceive the whole matter thereof to be animated, and so to be all God. Not barely as matter, but by reason of the soul thereof . 704

Now if the whole world animated be the supreme God, then must all the parts and members of the world be the parts and members of one God; but not themselves therefore properly so many gods. This affirmed by Origen, as the true sense of these Pagans, against that unwary assertion of Celsus, that if the whole were God, then must the several parts thereof needs be gods 705

Wherefore, though these Pagans deified the parts of the world and natures of things, as well as the powers of the mundane soul; yet did not the intelligent amongst them worship them severally, as so many true

and proper gods, but only as the parts and members of one great animal or god; or rather worship the great mundane Soul (the Life of the whole world) in them all. This proved from St. Austin . . . 707

The same plainly declared also by the Pagans in Athanasius, that not the divided parts of the world were by them accounted so many several gods, but the whole, made up of them all, one God; which yet might be worshipped in its several parts 708

The Pagans being thus divided, as to their opinions concerning the natural and true theology, some of them worshipped the world as the body of God, but others only as his image or temple. Thus Plutarch, though disliking the deifying of inanimate things, did notwithstanding approve of worshipping God in the whole world, as his most sacred temple. And the Persian Mági, allowing of no artificial temples made with men's hands, worshipped God *sub dio*, and upon the tops of mountains, as conceiving the whole world to be his natural temple. For the same reason did they condemn also artificial statues and images, concluding fire, earth, and water, and the like parts of the world, to be the natural images of the Deity. Thus Dino in Clemens Alexandrinus. This difference amongst the Pagan theologers noted by Macrobius. Thus were all the Pagans world-worshippers, in different senses; but not as a dead and inanimate thing, but either as the body of God, or else as his temple or image 709

Furthermore, the Pagans universally acknowledging the world to be an animal, those of them, who supposed it not to be the first and highest God, conceived it to be either a second or else a third god; and so worshipped it, not only as a temple or image, but also as the son of the first God. Celsus pretended the Christians to have called their Jesus the Son of God, in imitation of these Pagans who styled the world so . 711

Thus have we made it fully to appear, that, according to the saying of Antisthenes, the many popular gods of the Pagans were but one and the same natural God; or, according to that of Euclides, their many gods were but many names. So that neither their poetical theology, was look-upon by them as true and natural 712

Nevertheless, the wiser Pagans generally concluded, that there ought to be another theology, besides the natural, fitly calculated for the vulgar, and having a mixture of falsehood and fabulosity in it. Varro and Scævola agreed, that the vulgar being incapable of the true and natural theology, it was expedient for them to be deceived in their religion. Strabo also, that the vulgar cannot, by philosophic reason and truth, be carried on to piety; but this must be done by superstition, and by the help of fables, and prodigious relations. The same partly acknowledged by Synesius for true. Plato also, that it is hard to find out God, but impossible to

declare him to the vulgar; and therefore a necessity of a civil theology, distinct from the natural and philosophical 713

XXXV. We come now to the next thing proposed, that, besides this seeming and fantastic Polytheism of the Pagans, which was nothing but the polyonymy of one God, they had another real Polytheism, even in their natural and philosophic theology itself. But this not of self-existent gods, but generated or created ones only. Thus, according to Plutarch, one highest unmade God is the Maker and Father of all the other gods, generated or derived from him. And Proclus concludes all the gods to derive their godship from the first God, who therefore is the fountain of the Godhead 715

These inferior Pagan gods styled by Ammianus Marcellinus substantial powers, in way of opposition to those other poetical and political gods, that were not substantial or real, but only several names or notions of one supreme God. Those substantial powers (as divination and prophecy was by them imparted to men) said to be all subject to that one sovereign deity, called Themis, placed by Pagan theologers in the throne of Jupiter. This Themis also another name or notion of the supreme God, besides those beforementioned. Poetry and phantastry intermingled by the Pagans with their natural or philosophic theology 716

Thus the Pagans held both one God and many gods, in different senses. Onatus and Plotinus, that the majesty of the supreme God consisteth in having multitudes of gods dependent on him, and ruled by him, and that the honor done to them redounds to him. The gods of the original Pagans not mere dead statues and images, but living understanding beings, represented by them. That Christians asserted no solitary Deity, as Pagans pretended, but agreed with this of Seneca, that God hath generated or created innumerable understanding beings superior to men, ministers of his kingdom; the only difference being this, that they gave them no religious worship: out of Lactantius 718

XXXVI. That besides the inferior gods, generally received by all the Pagans (namely, animated stars, demons, and heroes), the more refined of them, who accounted not the animated world the supreme Deity, acknowledged a trinity of Divine hypostases superior to them all. Which doctrine affirmed by Plotinus to have been very ancient, and no invention of Plato's 720

Parmenides an assertor of a trinity long before Plato. This imputed to the Pythagoreans, by Moderatus in Simplicius, and Jamblichus in Proclus. Before Pythagoras, Orpheus had his trinity, Phanes, Uranus, and Chronus; the same with Plato's three kings or principles. Probable, that Pythagoras and Orpheus derived the same from the theology of the

Egyptian Hermes. Some footsteps of such a trinity, in the Mithraic mysteries, amongst the Persians, and the Zoroastrian cabala. The same expressly declared in the Magic or Chaldaic oracles. A trinity of Gods worshipped anciently by the Samothracians, and called by a Hebrew name *cabiri*, the mighty gods. From thence the Roman Capitoline trinity derived; the second whereof, Minerva, or the Divine wisdom. The Ternary, a number used by the Pagans, in their religious rites, as mysterious 721

It being no way probable, that such a trinity of Divine hypostases should have sprung from human wit, we may reasonably assent to what Proclus affirmeth, that it was at first θεοπαράδοτος θεολογία, a theology of Divine tradition or revelation;—as having been first imparted to the Hebrews, and from them communicated to other nations. Nevertheless, as this Divine cabala was but little understood by the Pagans, so was it by many of them depraved and adulterated 222

This called universally by them a trinity of gods; or a first, second, and third god: by some a trinity of causes, and of principles, and of opificers. The tradition of the three gods, in Proclus, ancient and famous. Numenius's three gods, called by him the father, the son, and the nephew (or grandson). Nous, or intellect, to Plotinus, a second god: as also the world an image of all the three gods. Plotinus and Porphyrius, their ecstatic union with the first of these three gods 723

That Philo, a religious Jew, and zealous opposer of the pagan Polytheism, called, notwithstanding, the Divine Word, also a second god. This not agreeable to the principles of Christianity. Nevertheless St. Austin partly excuses this language in the Pagans 725

And they perhaps the more excusable, because they sometimes called also those three hypostases, taken all together, the first god . 726

Nor was this trinity of Divine hypostases ill-languaged only by the Pagans, but also the cabala thereof much depraved and adulterated by some Platonists and Pythagoreans. As first, such as made the world to be the third god. Such a trinity, a confounding of God and creature together 727

And that this an adulterated notion of the Trinity, evident from hence; because no reason, why these philosophers should stop here, since the sun, moon, and stars, and their other generated gods, differ not in kind, but only in degree, from the world 728

Neither will this excuse them, that they understood this chiefly of the soul of the world; since if there were such a mundane soul, as together with the world made up one animal, this itself must needs be a creature also 728

This probably the reason, why Philo, though acknowledging the Divine Word as a second god, and second cause, yet no where speaketh of a third god; lest he should thereby seem to deify the whole created world. Though he call God also, in some sense, the soul of the world too (whether meaning thereby his first or his second god). So that Philo seems to have acknowledged only a duality, and not a trinity, of Divine hypostases 728

Another depravation of this θεοπαράδοτος θεολογία, theology of Divine tradition—or cabala of the Trinity, that some of these Platonists and Pythagoreans, concluding all those several ideas of the Divine intellect, or archetypal world, to be so many distinct substances, animals, and gods; have thereby made their second hypostasis, not one, but a heap of innumerable gods and hypostases, and consequently destroyed their trinity 729

Though Philo again here Platonized so far, as to suppose an incorporeal heaven and earth, and an intelligible sun, moon, and stars, to have been made before the corporeal and sensible; yet does he nowhere declare them to be so many distinct substances and animals, much less gods; but on the contrary censures that for Pagan idolatry. This pretence of worshipping the Divine ideas, in all sensible things, that which gave sanctuary and protection to the foulest and sottishest of all the Pagan idolatries; the Egyptians worshipping brute animals thus, and the Greeks the parts of the world inanimate, and natures of things 730

A third depravation or adulteration of the Divine cabala of the Trinity, by Proclus and other latter Platonists, asserting an innumerable company of henades, particular unities, superior to the first Nous, or Intellect, their second hypostasis; as also innumerable noes, substantial minds or intellects, superior to the first Psyche, their third hypostasis . . 731

These noes seem to be asserted by Plotinus also; as likewise the henades and agathotetes were by Simplicius 732

A swarm of innumerable Pagan gods from hence; besides their intelligible gods, or ideas, particular henades and noes, unities and intellects 733

Now since these particular henades and noes of theirs must needs be creatures, the trinity of Proclus and such others nothing but a scale or ladder of nature, wherein God and the creature are confounded together, the juncture or commissure betwixt them being nowhere discernible; as if they differed only in degrees; a gross mistake and adulteration of the ancient cabala of the Trinity 733

This that Platonic, or rather pseudo-Platonic trinity, by us opposed to the Christian, viz. such a trinity, as confounds the differences betwixt God and the creature; bringing the Deity by degrees down lower and lower,

and at length scattering it into all the animated parts of the world; a foundation for infinite Polytheism, cosmolatry or world-idolatry and creature worship. Hence the Platonists and Pythagoreans the fittest men to be champions for Paganism against Christianity 734

Concerning the Christian Trinity, three things to be observed. First, that it is not a trinity of mere names and words, nor logical notions, or inadequate conceptions of God; this doctrine having been condemned by the Christian church, in Sabellius and others; but a Trinity of hypostases, subsistences, or persons 735

The second thing observable in the Christian Trinity, that though the second hypostasis thereof were begotten from the first, and the third proceedeth both from the first and second; yet neither of them creatures. First, because not made ἐξ οὐκ ὄντων, or from an antecedent nonexistence brought forth into being, but both of them coeternal with the Father. Secondly, because all necessarily existent and unannihilable. Thirdly, because all of them universal, or infinite, and creatures of all other particular beings 736

The third observable as to the Christian Trinity, that the three hypostases thereof are all truly and really one God; not only by reason of agreement of will, but also of a mutual περιχώρησις and ἐνύπαρξις, permeation of each other, and inexistence.—Though no instance of the like unity to be found elsewhere in nature; yet since two distinct substances, corporeal and incorporeal, make one man and person in ourselves, much more may three Divine hypostases be one God 737

Though much of mystery in the Christian Trinity, yet nothing of plain contradiction to reason therein; that is, no nonsense, and impossibility. The ill design of those who represent the Christian Trinity as absolutely contradictious to reason, that they may thereby debauch men's understandings, and make them swallow down other things, which unquestionably are such 737

The Christian Trinity much more agreeable to reason than the pseudo-Platonic, in the three particulars before mentioned. First, its making their third hypostasis the animated world, or mundane soul. Which, not only too great a leap betwixt the second and third, but also a gross debasement of the Deity, and confounding it with the creature; a foundation for world-idolatry, and worshipping inanimate things, as parts and members of God 737

God to Origen, but *quasi anima mundi*, as it were the soul of the world, and not truly and properly such. All the perfection of this notion to be attributed to God, but not the imperfection thereof 738

Certain, that, according to the more refined Platonists, their third Di-

vine hypostasis, not a mundane, but supra mundane soul, and the δημιουργὸς, or opificer—of the whole world. So to Amelius, Porphyrius, and Plotinus. A double soul of the world to Plato likewise. The third hypostasis, to these, no creature, but a creator 740

So in their second particular (whereby the forementioned pseudo-Platonic trinity, no trinity), its making all the ideas and archetypal paradigms of things, so many hypostases, animals, and gods. This a monstrous extravagancy. Not to be doubted, but that Plato well understood these ideas to be nothing but noemata, or conceptions of the Divine mind, existing nowhere apart by themselves; however called οὐσίαι, essences or substances,—because not such accidental and evanid things as our human thoughts are, they being the standing and eternal objects of all science: as also ζῶα, or animals:—to signify, that they were not mere dead forms, as pictures upon paper, or carved statues. And thus did not only Amelius understand St. John concerning the Logos, whatsoever was made was life in him, but also divers of the ancient fathers, Greek and Latin. This deifying of ideas but a piece of Pagan poetry 741

Lastly, whereas Proclus and others intermingle many particular gods with those three universal hypostases, and henades, and agathotetes, unities and goodnesses, substantial above the first intellect; and noes, particular minds or intellects, above the first soul; this hypothesis of theirs altogether irrational and absurd; there being nothing essentially goodness, wisdom, and sanctity, but the three Divine hypostases, all other beings having only a participation thereof. Thus Origen expressly; who therefore acknowledgeth no higher rank of created beings than such as the Platonists call souls, that are self-movable, vitally unitable to bodies, and peccable. With whom agreeth St. Jerome, and others of the fathers, that God is the only impeccable being; but all understanding creatures free-willed and lapsable 742

An opinion of Simplicius, that even in that rank of beings called souls (though not essentially immutable, but self-movable) some are of so high a pitch, as that they can never degenerate, nor sink or fall into vicious habits. Insomuch that he makes a question, whether proæresis belong to them or no 744

But whatever is to be thought of this, Origen too far in the other extreme, in denying any other ranks of souls above human; and supposing all the difference, that is now betwixt the highest angels and men, to have proceeded only from their merits, and different uses of their free will; his reason being this, because God would be otherwise a *prosopoleptes*, or accepter of persons. This also extended by him to the soul of our Saviour Christ; as not partially chosen to that dignity, but for its faithful

adherence to the Divine Word in a pre-existent state; which he would prove from Scripture. But if a rank of souls below human, and specifically differing from them, as Origen himself confesses those of brutes to be; no reason, why there might not also be other ranks or species superior to them 745

But least of all can we assent to Origen, when from this principle, that all souls are essentially endued with free will, and therefore in their nature peccable, he infers those endless circuits of souls, upwards and downwards, and consequently denies them any fixed state of holiness and happiness by Divine grace; an assertion contrary to the tenor and promises of the gospel. Thus perhaps that to be understood, that "Christ brought life and immortality to light through the gospel;" not as if he were the first who taught the soul's immortality, a thing believed before by the pharisaic Jews, and generality of Pagans; but because these held their endless transmigrations and circuits, therefore was he the first who brought everlasting life and happiness to light 747

That Origen, a man well skilled in the Platonic learning, and so much addicted to the dogmata thereof, would never have gone so far into that other extreme, had there been any solidity of reason for either of those henades, or noes, of the latter Platonists. This opinion all one as if the Christian should suppose besides the first person, or Father, a multitude of particular paternities, superior to the second person; and also besides the one Son, or Word, a multitude of particular sons or words, superior to the third, the Holy Ghost. This plainly to make a breach upon the Deity, and to introduce a company of such creaturely gods, as imply a contradiction in their very notion 748

Lastly, this not the catholic doctrine of the Platonic school neither, but a private opinion only of some late doctors. No footsteps of these henades and agathotetes to be found any where in Plato; nor yet in Plotinus. This language little older than Proclus. Nor does Plato speak of any abstract or separate mind, save only one; his second things about the second, being ideas; as his thirds about the third created beings. Plotinus also doubtful and staggering about these noes, he seeming sometimes to make them but the heads or summities of souls. Wherefore this pseudo-Platonic trinity to be exploded, as confounding the differences betwixt God and the creature. Whereas the Christian Trinity homogeneal, all Deity or Creator; all other things being supposed to be the creatures of those three hypostases, and produced by their joint concurrence and influence; they being all really but one God 748

Nevertheless, these forementioned depravations and adulterations of that Divine cabala of the Trinity, not to be charged upon Plato himself,

nor all the other ancient Platonists and Pythagoreans; some of which approached so near to the Christian Trinity as to make three hypostases all truly Divine, and creators, other things being the creatures of them 750

First, therefore, Plato himself, in his Timæus, carefully distinguisheth betwixt God and the creature, and determineth the bounds of each, after this manner. That the first is that which always is, and never was made; the second, that which is made and had a beginning, but truly is not. His meaning here perverted by junior Platonists, whom Boetius also followed. Where Plato also takes it for granted, that whatsoever hath a temporary and successive duration, had a beginning; and whatsoever had no beginning, hath no successive but permanent duration; and so concludes, that whatsoever is eternal, is God; but whatsoever exists in time, and hath a beginning, creature 751

Now to Plato, more eternal gods than one. Which not ideas or noemata, but true substantial things; his first, second, and third, in his epistle to Dionysius, or trinity of Divine hypostases, the makers or creators of the whole world. Cicero's gods, by whose providence the world and all its parts were framed 753

The second hypostasis in Plato's trinity, to wit, mind or intellect, unquestionably eternal, and without beginning. The same affirmed by Plotinus also of the third hypostasis, or Psyche, called the word of the second, as the second the word of first. Porphyrius's testimony to this purpose in St. Cyril; where also mind or the second Divine hypostasis (though said to have been begotten from the first, yet), called *αὐτοπάτωρ*, and *αὐτογένητος*, its own parent, and its own offspring,—and said to have sprung out *αὐτογόνως*, self-begottenly 754

This mysterious riddle expounded out of Plotinus. The plain meaning thereof no more than this, that though this second hypostasis proceeded from the first, yet was it not produced by it after a creaturely manner, nor arbitrariously by will and choice, but in way of natural and necessary emanation. Thus have some Christians ventured to call the Logos, *αυτόθεον*, and *ex seipso Deum*, God from himself . . 755

Dionysius Petavius, having declared the doctrine of Arius, that the Father was the only eternal God, and the Son, or Word, a creature, made in time, and out of nothing; concludes it undeniably manifest from hence, that Arius was a germane, true, and genuine Platonist. Whereas it is most certain from hence, that Arius was no Platonist at all; and that Petavius himself did not well understand the Platonic doctrine. Had Plato denied the eternity of his second hypostasis, called Nous, he must have denied the eternity of wisdom and understanding itself; this being to him that wisdom by which God himself is wise, and whereby he made the

world. With which agreeth also Athanasius; "Our Lord is wisdom, and not second to any other wisdom; and, the Father of the Word is not himself Word; and, that was not word and wisdom, which produced word and wisdom." This in opposition to Arius, who maintained another word and wisdom, senior to that word and wisdom in Christ. These Platonists, so far from denying the eternity of the word, that they rather attributed too much to it, in making itself begotten. Wherefore Plato, asserting the eternity of his second hypostasis, Nous or Logos, and not of the world, did thereby, according to Athanasius's own doctrine, make it to be no creature 756

Nor is there any force at all in that testimony of Macrobius, cited by Petavius, to the contrary, wherein the first hypostasis is said to have created Mind from itself, and the second to have created Soul; because these ancient Pagans did not confine the word *creare* to such a narrow sense, as Christians commonly do; but used it generally for all manner of production. Petavius's mistake, chiefly from that spurious trinity of the latter Platonists, whose third god is by themselves called *ποίημα*, a creature. But this not the doctrine of the ancients 757

Nevertheless some more reason to doubt, whether Plato's third hypostasis were eternal, because in his Timæus, he generates the mundane soul, this controversy decided, by supposing a double Psyche, *ἐγκόσμιον*, and *ὑπερκόσμιον*, a mundane, and supra-mundane soul; the first of these called by Plotinus a heavenly Venus, and a separate soul. Wherefore, though the lower Venus, or mundane soul, according to Plato made in time together with the world; yet the higher Divine soul, or heavenly Venus, the son of Chronos without a mother, his third hypostasis, eternal, and without beginning 758

This further evident from hence, because Plato, in his epistle to Dionysius, affirmeth as well of the second and third, as of the first, that in all those things that are cognate to our human soul (or creaturely) there is *οὐδέν τοιοῦτο*, nothing like thereunto 759

Secondly, the three hypostases of Plato's trinity not only all eternal, but also necessarily existent, and absolutely unannihilable. Nor could the first any more exist without the second and third, than the sun without its primary light and secondary splendour. These also, according to Plotinus, the three principles of the universe; so that there could be neither more, nor fewer. They who called the second autopator, signified thereby the necessity of its existence 760

Thirdly, these three Platonic hypostases, as eternal and necessary, so likewise universal, or comprehensive of the whole world, that is, infinite and omnipotent. Therefore called principles, and causes, and opificers.

Though nous, or mind, vulgarly looked upon as the highest principle of all things, yet Plato set before it one most simple good. When Nous, said by Plato to be γενούστης, of the same kind with the first cause of all things, this all one as if he had affirmed it to be ὁμοούσιος, coessential or consubstantial with it 760

Plato's third hypostasis, Psyche, or the superior mundane soul, called by him Zeus, from ζῆν, as also the cause and fountain of life, and the prince and king of all things. And when said to be ἔκγονος, the offspring of the highest mind,—thereby made consubstantial with it also. So that Plato's whole trinity homoousian 761

Though by the demiurgus or opificer Plato commonly meant the second hypostasis, mind or intellect, yet Atticus, Amelius, Plotinus, and others, called the third, or the higher Psyche also, by that name. Wherefore, according to the genuine Platonic and Parmenidian trinity, all the three hypostases joint creatures of the whole world. Thus Ficinus often, and Proclus. Porphyrius's affirmation, that the Deity, according to Plato, extends to three hypostases 762

Certain therefore, that Arius did not Platonize, but rather Athanasius and the Nicene fathers; who, notwithstanding, made not Plato but the Scriptures their foundation. The genuine trinity of Plato and Parmenides, a middle betwixt that of Sabellius and that of Arius; it being neither a trinity of words and names as the former; nor an heteroousious trinity, a confused jumble of God and the creature together; but homoousious and homogeneal: all eternal, necessarily existent, infinite or omnipotent, and creator 762

But that it may yet more fully appear, how far the most refined Platonic and Parmenidian trinity does either agree or disagree with the Scripture and christian doctrine, two things farther to be observed concerning it. First, that the Platonists universally asserted an essential dependence of their second and third hypostases upon the first, as also a gradual subordination in them. Thus Plotinus; Chronos, or the second hypostasis, is in a middle state betwixt his father who is greater, and his son who is inferior. And that in this eternal generation or emanation no progress upward, but all downward, and a gradual descent 762

More of the dependence and gradual subordination of the second and third hypostases of the Platonic trinity to the first. Each following hypostasis called ἴχνος and τόπος and εἰκὼν, and εἴδωλον, and μίμημα, of that before it. Philo's offensive expression, that the Logos, or Word, is the shadow of God. This gradation commonly illustrated by the ἔκλαμψις, or ἀπαύγασμα, the effulgency or out-shining splendor of the sun 764

The same further manifested from the several distinctive characters

given to each hypostasis in the true Platonic or Parmenidian trinity. The first, ἓν πρὸ πάντων, one before all things;—the second, ἓν πάντα, one all things,—as to their distinct ideas; the third, ἓν καὶ πάντα, one really producing all things. The first, Unity and Goodness essential; the second, Understanding and Wisdom; the third, self-active Love and Power. The first, or Father ἀνενέργητος, above action;—the second or Son, the Demiurgus, the Maker or contriving Architect of the world, but an immoveable nature; the third a movable Deity, and the immediate Governor of the whole world. Amelius's distinction of them into τὸν ὄντα, τὸν ἔχοντα, τὸν ὁρῶντα 766

The greatest difficulty in the distinctive characters of these three Platonic hypostases; that understanding, reason, and wisdom, should be made peculiar to the second, as if the first were therefore devoid of mind, reason and wisdom. This an arcanum of the Platonic and Pythagoric theology; that whereas Anaxagoras, Aristotle, and the vulgar, make mind and understanding the oldest of all things, and the highest principle in the universe; this supposes mind, knowledge, and wisdom, to be not the first, but second. Partly because there is a multiplicity in knowledge, but there must be unity before multiplicity. And partly because there must be Νοητὸν before Νοῦς, an object or intelligible before intellect.—As also, because intellection or knowledge is not the highest good, or happiness; and therefore to be some substantial thing, in order of nature superior to mind. Hence concluded, that the supreme Deity is better than Logos, reason, word, or intellect. That no Logos, from whence Logos is derived. Thus Philo; The God before Reason, or Word, better than all the rational nature. But this difficulty common to Platonism with Christianity; which likewise makes Word, or reason and wisdom, not the first, but second hypostasis. Thus does Athanasius deny, that there is any word, reason or wisdom, before the Son of God. What then? Is the first hypostasis therefore ἄνους and ἄλογος, devoid of reason and mind?—Plotinus's attempt to answer this; that the first hath φῶς ἁπλοῦν, a simple light,—different from that multiform light of knowledge. Again, that the first is νόησις αὐτή, intelligence itself,—and therefore superior to intellect, or that which hath intellection. (For ἡ νόησις οὐ νοεῖ, intelligence itself doth not understand.) Besides which, another attempt also to solve this difficulty 767

The ground of this Platonic dependence and subordination in the Divine hypostases; because there is but one fountain of the Godhead; so that the second must needs differ from the first, as the ἀπαύγασμα from the φῶς, the splendor from the sun 771

Though the second hypostasis said to have been begotten from the

first; yet this not to be taken for such a generation as that of men, where three men (father, son, and grandson), all adult, have no essential dependence upon one another, nor gradual subordination. This but an imperfect generation 771

Furthermore, the Platonists would recommend this their gradation in the Deity, or subordination of hypostases, from hence, because by this means, not so great a leap or jump in the creation, as otherwise there must be; nor the whole Deity screwed up to such a disproportionate height, as would render it incapable of having any intercourse with the lower world. Where the whole Deity, either one simple monad, or else an immovable mind, it could have no such liberty of will as is commonly attributed to it, nor be affectible with any thing here below; nor indeed any fitter object for men's devotion than an adamantine rock. Whereas all the phenomena of the Deity solvable by this Platonic gradation 772

As also, according to this hypothesis, some reasonable satisfaction to be given, why just so many Divine hypostases, and neither fewer nor more 773

The second thing to be observed, concerning the genuine Platonic or Parmenidian trinity; that though the hypostases thereof be called three natures, and three principles, and three opificers, and three gods; yet they all really make up but one Divinity. For the world, being created by all three, and yet having but one creation, they must needs be all one Creator. Porphyrius in St. Cyril explicitly, that according to Plato, the essence of the Deity extendeth to three hypostases 773

Platonists further add, that were it not for this essential dependence and subordination, the three Divine hypostases must needs be three coordinate gods; and no more one God than three men are one man, or three suns one sun. Whereas the sun, its splendor, and derivative light, may all well be accounted one and the same thing 775

These Platonists therefore suppose so close a union, and so near a conjunction, betwixt their three hypostases, as no where else to be found in nature. Plotinus, that there is nothing between them, and that they are only not the very same. They acknowledge also their perichoresis or mutual inexistence. The three hypostases one Divinity to the Platonists, in the same manner as the centre, radius distance immovable, and movable circumference of a sphere, all one sphere. The first infinite Goodness, the second infinite Wisdom, the third infinite active Love, and power substantial 775

From this full account of the true and genuine Platonic trinity, its both agreement and disagreement with the Christian, plainly appeareth.

First, its agreement in the three fundamental things before mentioned; and consequently its discrepance from Arianism 777

Secondly, its disagreement notwithstanding, from the now-recited doctrine, in that it supposes the three hypostases not to have one and the same singular essence, nor yet an absolute coequality, but a gradual subordination, and essential dependence. Upon which account, said by some to symbolize with Arianism, however different from it in the main point 778

Besides which, the best of the Platonists sometimes guilty of extravagant expressions. Plotinus's ὁμοειδὴς δὲ καὶ ἡμετέρα, that our human soul is of the same species with the mundane soul, or third hypostasis;—that being but the elder sister. Which indeed is to make it coessential or consubstantial with us men, as St. Austin understood it. This a foundation for creature-worship or idolatry. Why the Arians by Constantine called Porphyrianists. But this doctrine, as repugnant to Plato, so elsewhere contradicted by Plotinus himself 779

That notwithstanding a Platonic Christian would apologize for Plato and the genuine Pythagoreans after this manner. First, that having no Scriptures, councils, nor creeds, to direct them in the darkness of this mystery, and to guide their language, they the more excusable, if not always uniform, and sometimes extravagant. More to be wondered at, that they should approach so near the christian truth 779–2

And for their gradual subordination of hypostases, and dependence of the second and third upon the first; that these Platonists herein the more excusable, because the majority of christian doctors, for the first three centuries, seem to have asserted the same 779–2

The Platonic Christians' further apology; that the Platonists' intention in subordinating their three hypostases, only to exclude a plurality of co-ordinate independent gods. That none of Plato's three hypostases, creatures, but that the essence of the Godhead belongeth to them all; they being all eternal, necessarily existent, infinite or omnipotent and creators. Therefore in the sense of the Nicene council, consubstantial and coequal. The essence of the Godhead, wherein all the three hypostases agree, as well to the fathers as Platonists, general and universal . 780

Besides which the genuine Platonists would acknowledge also all their three hypostases to be homoousian, coessential, or consubstantial, yet in a further sense, as making up one entire Divinity: as the root, stock, and branches, coessential to a vine. The trinity not so undivided as if three were not three in it. The inequality and subordination in the Platonic trinity within the Deity itself only, and in the relation of the hy-

postases to one another; they being *ad extra*, all one and the same God, jointly concurring in the same actions, and in that respect devoid of inequality 782

Furthermore, the Platonic Christian would urge, that according to the principles of Christianity itself, there must needs be some dependence and subordination in these hypostases, in their relation to one another; a priority and posteriority of order and dignity: that which is originally of itself, having some kind of priority and superiority over that which is wholly derived from it. The second and third hypostases not so omnipotent as the first, because not able to beget or produce that. Hence first styled by Macrobius, the most omnipotent of all. Sundry passages in Scripture favoring this hypothesis, as also orthodox fathers. Athanasius's resemblances to the original light and the secondary splendor; to the fountain and the stream, the root and the branch, the water and the vapor. The equality asserted by the orthodox, in way of opposition to the Arian inequality of God and creature; that they equally God, or uncreated. Notwithstanding which, some inequality amongst them allowed by Petavius and others, as this God and that person 785

However, no necessity of any more inequality and subordination in the Platonic, than in the christian trinity; they being but infinite goodness, and infinite wisdom, and infinite active love, and power substantial. Another hypothesis of some Platonists hinted by St. Austin out of Porphyry, which makes the third hypostasis a middle betwixt the first and second; and implies not so much a gradation, as a circulation in the trinity 788

As for the Platonists supposing their three hypostases (though one entire Divinity) to have their distinct singular essences, without which they conceive they could be nothing but three names; the Platonic Christian would make this apology, that the orthodox fathers themselves were generally of this persuasion, that the essence of the Godhead, wherein all the three persons agree, not one singular, but only one common or universal essence. Their distinction to this purpose, betwixt οὐσία and ὑπόστασις· that the former was common or generical, the latter singular or individual. Theodoret, Basil, and many others. Petavius's acknowledgment, that the Greeks universally agreed therein . . . 789

The opinion of Gregory Nyssen, Cyril, Damascen, and others, that the persons of the Trinity no otherwise one, than as three individuals under the same species, or as three men agree in the same common humanity. These the chief assertors of an absolute, independent, and unsubordinate coequality. This the only fault that St. Cyril finds in the Platonists, that they did not after such a consubstantiality. Whereas this trinity, Trithe-

ism; the three persons thereof being no more one God than three men are one man; however this certain, that these fathers did not suppose the three hypostases of the Trinity to have all the same singular essence. Another extreme, that sprung up afterwards in the room of the former Tritheism, and owned by no other authority than of a Lateran council 791

And that this sameness of singular essence was not asserted by the Nicene fathers, and first opposers of Arius) first, clearly acknowledged by Petavius 793

But this further evident from hence; because the same orthodox fathers, who opposed Arianism, did also condemn Sabellianism; which asserted, Father, Son, and Holy Ghost, to be but one hypostasis, that is, to have but one and the same singular essence; and consequently acknowledged no other trinity than of names or words 794

It appeareth also from hence, because the word homoousious had never any other sense, than to signify the agreement of things numerically differing, in some common and general nature or essence. St. Basil, that the same thing is not homoousious, coessential, or consubstantial with itself: but always one thing with another. *Τὸ ὁμοούσιον* the same with *συγγένεια* in Plotinus. So also in Athanasius, he affirming the branches to be homoousious and congenerous with the root. Besides which, *ὁμογενὴς*, *ὁμοειδὴς*, and *ὁμοφυὴς*, used by Athanasius and others as synonymous with *ὁμοούσιος*. None of which words signify an indentity of singular essence, but general or universal only. The council of Chalcedon, that our Saviour Christ, as to his humanity, was homoousious or consubstantial with us men. Thus does Athanasius deny the Son or Word, as such, to be homoousious or consubstantial with creatures; as also he affirmeth men to be consubstantial and coessential with his Father . 795

Moreover, the sense of the Nicene fathers, in their consubstantiality, may more fully appear from the doctrine of Arius opposed by them; which made the Son a creature, and therefore (as Athanasius writeth) *ἑτεροῦσιον* or *ἀλλοτριούσιος*, of a different essence or substance from the Father. Proved clearly from Athanasius, that by the consubstantiality of the Word was meant no more, that its being not a creature or uncreated 796

Further proof, out of Athanasius, that by consubstantiality is not meant a sameness of singular, but only of general essence. As also out of St. Austin 799

Lastly, that the homoousian fathers did not assert against Arius, a sameness of singular essence, evident from their disclaiming those two other words, *ταυτοούσιον*, and *μονοούσιον* (as having a Sabellian sense in

them), the former by Epiphanius, the latter by Athanasius. So that they, who asserted the Son to be homoousious, consubstantial with the Father, denied him to be monoousious, or tautoousious, that is, to have the same singular essence 802

CONTENTS TO VOL. II.

FROM all these considerations, concluded by the Platonic Christian, that as the genuine trinity of Plato agreed with that of the orthodox Christians, it being not heteroousian, but homoousian, coessential or consubstantial; not made up of God and creature, but all homogeneal of uncreated, or creator: so did the Trinity of the first orthodox Anti-Arians herein agree with the Platonic trinity, that it was not monoousian, or tautoousian, one and the same singular essence, under three names or notions only; but really three hypostases or persons 5

Nevertheless, here remaineth a question to be answered; whether Athanasius, the Nicene fathers, and all the first Anti-Arians, did therefore assert the same thing with Greg. Nyssen, Cyril, and others, that the three persons in the Trinity were but three co-ordinate individuals, under the same species, having only a specific unity or indentity (besides consent of will); or that they all agree in the uncreated Nature only. This grossly asserted in the Dialogues of the Trinity, vulgarly imputed to Athanasius, and to that purpose also, that three men are not three men, but only then when they dissent from one another in will and opinion. But these Dialogues pseudepigraphous. Nevertheless to be granted, that Athanasius himself, in that book of the Common Essence of the Persons, seems to lay something too much stress upon this common nature, essence, or substance, of the three persons, as to the making of them all but one God. However, it is certain, he does not there rely upon that alone; and elsewhere acknowledgeth it to be insufficient. The true reason why Athanasius laid so great a stress upon the Homoousiotes, not because this alone would make them one God, but because they could not possibly be one God without it. For if the Father be uncreated, and the Son a creature, then can they not both be one God. Several passages of Athanasius cited to this purpose. Those expressions in him of one Godhead, and the sameness of the Godhead, and one essence or substance in the Trinity, not so to be understood, as if the three persons were but several names, notions, or modes of one thing 5

Wherefore though Athanasius lay his foundation in this εἰδικη ἑνότης, common specific unity of the persons (which is their consubstantiality), in order to their being one God; yet does he superadd other considerations also thereunto. As; [illegible] of all this, that they are not three principles, but only one; the essence of the Father being the root and fountain of the Son and Spirit; and the three hypostases, gathered together under one head. Where Athanasius implies, that, were they perfectly co-ordinate and independent, they would not be one but three gods . . 10

In the next place, he further addeth, that these three hypostases are not three separated disjoined things, but indivisibly united; as the splendor is indivisible from the sun, and wisdom from him that is wise. That neither of these persons could be without the other: nor any thing come between them: they so immediately conjoined together, as that there is a kind of συνέχεια, or continuity betwixt them 11

Thirdly, Athanasius goes yet higher; affirming these three hypostases not only to be indivisibly conjoined, but also to have a mutual inexistence in each other. This afterwards called an Emperichoresis. That of our Saviour, "I am of the Father, and the Father in me," therefore quarrelled at by the Arians, because they conceived of things incorporeal after a corporeal manner. That the Godhead of the Son is the Godhead of the Father; and the Father exercises a providence over all, in the Son 12

Lastly, Athanasius also, in sundry places, supposes the three Divine hypostases to make up one entire Divinity: as the fountain and the stream make up one entire river; the root, stock, and branches, one entire tree. Accordingly the word homoousios used by Athanasius, in a further sense, not only to signify things agreeing in one common and general essence, but also such as essentially concur to the making up of one entire thing. That the three hypostases do outwardly, or *ad extra*, produce all, μίαν ἐνέργειαν, one and the self-same action;—the Father by the Word in the Holy Spirit, doing all things. That all this doctrine of Athanasius would have been readily assented to by Plato and his genuine followers. The Platonic Christian therefore concludeth, that there is no such real difference betwixt the genuine Platonic trinity, and that of the first orthodox Anti-Arian fathers, as some conceive. From which notwithstanding that tritheistic trinity, of St. Greg. Nyssen, Cyril, and others, of three co-ordinate individuals under the same species (as three men), seems to have been a deviation 14

Hitherto the Platonic Christians' apology, for the genuine Platonic Trinity; or endeavor to reconcile it with the doctrine of the ancient church; where nothing is asserted by ourselves, but all submitted to the

judgment of the learned in these matters. And whatsoever in Plato's trinity shall be found discrepant from the sense of the first orthodox Anti-Arian fathers, utterly disclaimed by us. Athanasius a great instrument of Divine Providence, for preserving the Christian church from lapsing into a kind of paganic and idolatrous Christianity . . . 15

The reason of this apology, for the genuine Platonic trinity; because it is against the interests of Christianity that this should be made more discrepant from the Christians' than indeed it is. Moreover certain, that genuine Platonic trinity was Anti-Arian; or rather the Arian Anti-Platonic. Wherefore Socrates wondered, that Georgius and Timotheus presbyters should adhere to the Arian faction; when one of them was accounted much a Platonist, the other an Origenist 16

Furthermore, Platonic Pagans, after Christianity, highly approved of the beginning of St. John's Gospel concerning the Logos, as exactly agreeing with their Platonic doctrine. Thus Amelius in Eusebius, and others. A Platonist in St. Austin, that it deserved to be writ in golden letters, and set up in some eminent places in every Christian church. But that, which is most of all considerable, to justify this apology, the generality of Christian fathers, before and after the Nicene council, looked upon this Platonic trinity, if not as really the same thing with the Christian, yet as approaching so near thereunto, that it differed chiefly in circumstances, or manner of expression. Thus Justin Martyr, Clemens Alexandrinus, Origen, St. Cyprian, or the author of the book De Spiritu Sancto, Eusebius Cæsariensis, and, which is most of all to the purpose, Athanasius himself, he giving a signal testimony thereunto. To which may be added St. Austin and Theodoret. St. Cyril, though blaming the Platonic subordination (himself supposing the Trinity to be three co-ordinate individuals under the same specific nature of the Godhead), yet acknowledges, that Plato was not altogether ignorant of the truth, etc. But that Plato's subordination of his second hypostasis to the first, was not (as the Arian) of a creature to the Creator; already made unquestionably evident . 17

Wherefore a wonderful providence of Almighty God here to be taken notice of; that this doctrine, of a trinity of Divine hypostases, should be entertained in the Pagan world before Christianity, as it were to prepare a way for the reception of it amongst the learned. Which the junior Platonists were so sensible of, that besides their other adulterations of the Platonic trinity before mentioned (for the countenancing of their Polytheism and idolatry), they at length innovated and altered the whole cabala, now no longer acknowledging a trinity, but at least a quaternity of Divine hypostases; namely, before and besides the Trinity, another hypostasis superior thereunto, and standing alone by itself. This first start-

ed by Jamblichus, carried on by Proclus, taken notice of by St. Cyril: besides which, Proclus also added other fantastic trinities of his own 22

Another advantage of this Platonic trinity, extending to the present time; perhaps not unintended also by Divine Providence to abate the confidence of those conceited wits, who so boldly decried the Trinity for nonsense, absolute contradiction to reason, and impossibility, when they shall find, that the best and freest wits amongst the Pagans, though having no Scripture revelation to impose upon them, were yet fond of this hypothesis 25

And now it sufficiently appears, that the ancient Platonists and Pythagoreans were not to be taxed for Polytheists and idolaters, in giving religious worship to their three Divine hypostases. One grand design of Christianity, to free the world from idolatry and creature-worship: and this the reason why the ancient fathers so zealously opposed Arianism, because it thwarted that design, it paganizing and idolatrizing that which was intended for the unpaganizing of the world. One remarkable passage of Athanasius to this purpose 25

Where first observable, that Athanasius expressly affirmeth the Pagans to have worshipped only one uncreated and many created gods. Thus Greg. Naz. that there was but one Divinity amongst the Pagans also. And Irenæus, that they attributed the first place of the Deity to one supreme God, the Maker of this universe. And, secondly, that to Athanasius, and all those other fathers who charged the Arians with idolatry, this was supposed not to consist in worshipping many independent and self-existent gods, but in giving religious worship to creatures: as the Arians gave a religious worship to the Son or Word, supposed by themselves to be but a creature 27

But if Arians guilty of Polytheism or idolatry, for bestowing religious worship upon the Son or Word, as a creature (though the chief of creatures, and that by which all others were made), much more they guilty hereof, who religiously worshipped other inferior beings. Athanasius; that no creature the object of religious worship, and that the orthodox worshipped the Divinity in the humanity of our Saviour Christ. Nestorius branded with the name of a man-worshipper. Some suppose that necessary to idolatry, which is impossible, to worship more than one, as omnipotent, or with mental *latria* 28

And now have we sufficiently answered the objection against the naturality of the idea of a God, as including oneliness in it, from the pagan Polytheism. What further here intended concerning the same (as a foundation for our defence of Christianity) deferred, to make room for a confutation of all the atheistic arguments.

CHAPTER V.

A particular confutation of all the atheistic grounds.

THE first atheistic argument; that there is no idea of God. That in answer to this, the idea of God hath been already declared; viz. a perfect understanding being, unmade, or self-existent from eternity, and the cause of all other things, in which nothing inconceivable nor contradictious. That these confounded Atheists themselves, who deny that there is any idea of God at all, must notwithstanding, of necessity, suppose the contrary; because otherwise, denying his existence, they should deny the existence of nothing. And that they agree also with Theists in the same idea; the one denying the existence of that which the other asserteth, that an understanding nature is the original of all things. This idea of God, as containing oneliness and singularity in it, not only largely defended and made good against that objection from the pagan Polytheism; but also proved, that the generality of mankind have a natural prolepsis or anticipation in their minds concerning the real and actual existence of such a being. Atheists but monsters, and anomalies of mankind. This a sufficient confutation of the first atheistic argument . . . 32

Nevertheless, that Atheists may pretend any of their strength to be concealed, all their particular exceptions against the idea of God here declared, being five. Their first exception, that we can have no idea nor thought of any thing not subject to sense; much less any evidence of the existence thereof. The answer, First, that whereas the Atheists suppose sense to be the only knowledge, or at least original knowledge; sense, as such, is not knowledge, or understanding; because if it were, then every one that sees light and colours, or feels heat and cold, would understand light and colours, heat and cold. Plainly proved also from that atomic philosophy (which the Epicurean Atheists so much pretend to), that there is a higher faculty of the soul, which judges of sense, detects the phantastry thereof, resolves sensible things into intelligible principles, etc. No passion able to make a judgment, either of itself, or of other things. The confounded Democritus himself sometimes acknowledged sense to be but seeming and phantasy, and not to reach to the absolute truth and reality of things. He therefore exploded qualities out of the rank of entities, because unintelligible; concluding them to be but our own phantasms. Undeniably evident, that we have ideas, notions, and thoughts, of many things, that never were in sense, and whereof we have no genuine phan-

tasms. Atheists attend not to their own cogitations. That opinion, that there is nothing in the understanding which was not before in sense, false and atheistical. Men having a notion of a perfect understanding being, the cause of all things, as the object of their devotion; the Atheists, notwithstanding, would here persuade them, that they have none, and that the thing is a nonentity, merely because they have no sensible idea or phantasm thereof. And so may they as well prove, not only reason and understanding, appetite and volition, to be nonentities, but also fancy and sense itself; neither of these falling under sense, but only the objects of them. Were God indeed corporeal, as some mistaken Theists suppose, yet his essence chiefly consisting in mind and understanding, this of him could not possibly be subject to sense. But that there is also substance incorporeal, which therefore in its own nature is insensible, and that the Deity is such will be elsewhere demonstrated 33

Though the evidence of singular bodies existing, depend upon the information of sense, yet the certainty of this very evidence, not from sense alone, but a complication of reason and understanding with it. Sense fantastical, not reaching to the absolute truth of things; and obnoxious to delusion. Our own imaginations taken for sensations and realities in sleep, and by melancholized persons when awake. Atomic Atheists themselves assert the existence of such things as they have no sense of; atoms, membranes, or exuvious images of bodies, nay, incorporeal space. If the existence of nothing to be acknowledged which falls not under sense, then not the existence of soul and mind. God the great mind that rules the whole universe; whence our imperfect minds derived. The existence of that God, whom no eye can see, demonstrated by reason from his effects 36

The second atheistic pretence against the idea of God and his existence, from Theists' own acknowledging him to be incomprehensible; from whence they infer him to be a nonentity. Here perhaps it may be granted, in a right sense, that whatsoever is altogether inconceivable, is either in itself, or at least to us, nothing. How that of Protagoras, that every man is the measure of all things to himself, in his sense false. Whatsoever any man's shallow understanding cannot clearly comprehend, not therefore to be presently expunged out of the catalogue of beings. Nevertheless, according to Aristotle, the soul and mind in a manner all things. This a crystalline globe, or notional world, that hath some image in it of whatsoever is contained in the real globe of being . . 38

But this absolutely false; that whatsoever cannot be fully comprehended by us, is therefore utterly inconceivable and consequently nothing. For we cannot fully comprehend ourselves, nor have such an ad-

equate conception of any substance, as perfectly to master and conquer the same. That of the Sceptics so far true, that there is something incomprehensible in the essence of every thing, even of body itself. Truth bigger than our minds. Proper to God Almighty (who alone is wise) perfectly to comprehend the essences of all things. But it follows not from hence, that therefore we have no idea nor conception at all of any thing. We may have a notion or idea of a perfect being, though we cannot fully comprehend the same by our imperfect minds; as we may see and touch a mountain, though we cannot enclasp it all round within our arms. This therefore a false theorem of the Atheists, that whatsoever cannot be fully comprehended by men's imperfect understandings, is an absolute nonentity 38

Though God more incomprehensible than other things, because of his transcendent perfection, yet hath he also more of conceptibility: as the sun, dazzling our sight, yet hath more of visibility also than any other object. The dark incomprehensibility of the Deity, like the azure obscurity of the transparent ether, not any thing absolutely in itself, but only relative to us 39

This incomprehensibility of the Deity, so far from being an argument against its existence, that certain, on the contrary, were there nothing incomprehensible to our imperfect minds, there could be no God. Every thing apprehended by some internal congruity. The scantness and imperfection our narrow understandings must needs make them asymmetral or incommensurate to what absolutely perfect 40

Nature itself intimates, that there is something vastly bigger than our mind and thoughts, by those passions implanted in us, of devout veneration, adoration, and admiration, with ecstasy and pleasing horror. That of the Deity, which cannot enter into the narrow vessels of our minds, must be otherwise apprehended, by their being plunged into it, or swallowed up, and lost in it. We have a notion or conception of a perfect being, though we cannot fully comprehend the same; because ourselves being imperfect, must needs be incommensurate thereunto. Thus no reason at all, in the second atheistic pretence, against the idea of God and his existence; from his confessed incomprehensibility 40

The third follows, That infinity, supposed to be essential to the Deity, is a thing perfectly inconceivable, and therefore an impossibility, and nonentity. Some passages of a modern writer to this purpose. The meaning of them, that there is nothing of philosophic truth in the idea or attributes of God, nor any other sense in the words, than only to signify the veneration and astonishment of men's own minds. That the word infinite signifies nothing in the thing itself so called, but only the inability of

our understandings, and admiration. And since God, by Theists, is denied to be finite, but cannot be infinite, therefore an inconceivable nothing. Thus another learned well-willer to Atheism. That we have no idea of infinite, and therefore not of God. Which, in the language of Atheists, all one as to say, that he is a nonentity 41

Answer. This argument, that there can be nothing infinite, and therefore no God, proper to the modern and neoteric Atheists only; but repugnant to the sense of the ancients. Anaximander's ἄπειρον, infinite matter,—though Melissus's Ἄπειρον, the true Deity.—Formerly both Theists and Atheists agreed in this; that there must be something or other infinite, either an infinite mind, or infinite matter. The ancient Atheists also asserted a numerical infinity of worlds. Thus do Atheists confute or contradict Atheists 42

That the modern Atheists do no less contradict plain reason also, and their very selves, than they do their predecessors, when they would disprove a God from hence, because there can be nothing infinite. For, first, certain, that there was something or other infinite in duration, or eternal without beginning; because, if there had been once nothing, there could never have been any thing. But hardly any Atheists can be so sottish, as in good earnest to think there was once nothing at all, but afterwards senseless matter happened to be. Notorious impudence in them, who assert the eternity of matter, to make this an argument against the existence of a God; because infinite duration without beginning an impossibility 43

A concession to the Atheists of these two things; that we neither have a phantasm of any infinite, because there was never any in sense; and that infinity is not fully comprehensible by finite understandings neither. But since, mathematically certain, that there was something infinite in duration, demonstrated from hence, against Atheists, that there is something really existing, which we have neither any phantasm of, nor yet can fully comprehend in our minds 43

Further granted, that as for infinity of number, magnitude, and time, without beginning; as we have no phantasm nor full comprehension of them, so have we neither any intelligible idea, notion, or conception: from whence it may be concluded, that they are nonentities. Number infinite in Aristotle, only in a negative sense, because we can never come to an end thereof by addition. For which very reason also there cannot possibly be any number positively infinite since one or more may always be added. No magnitude so great neither, but that a greater may be supposed. By infinite space, to be understood nothing but a possibility of more and more body, further and further infinitely, by Divine power; or

that the world could never be made so great, as that God was not able to make it still greater. This potential infinity, or indefinity of body, seems to be mistaken for an actual infinity of space. Lastly, no infinity of time past, because then there must needs be time past which never was present. An argument of a modern writer. Reason therefore concludes, neither world nor time to have been infinite in past duration . . 44

Here will the Atheist think he has got a great advantage for disproving the existence of a God; they, who thus take away the eternity of the world, taking away also the eternity of a God. As if God could not be eternal otherwise than by a successive flux of infinite time. But we say, that this affordeth a demonstration of a God; because, since both the world and time had a beginning, there must of necessity be something whose duration is not successive; but permanent, which was the creator of them both. Wherefore the Atheists can here only make grimaces, and quibble upon *nunc-stans;* as if this standing eternity of the Deity was nothing but a pitiful moment of time standing still; and as if all duration must needs be the same with ours, etc. 45

Concluded, that infinite and eternal are not words which signify nothing in the thing itself, but only the idle progress of our minds, or our own ignorance, stupid astonishment, and veneration: not mere attributes of honour and compliment, but attributes belonging to the Deity (and that alone), of the most philosophic truth. And though we have no adequate comprehension thereof, yet must we have some notion of that which we can demonstrate to belong to something 46

But the thing, which the Atheists principally quarrel with, is infinite power, or omnipotence; which they pretend also to be utterly inconceivable, and impossible, and a name of nothing. Where indeed our modern Atheists have the joint suffrage of the ancients also, who concerned themselves in nothing more than disproving omnipotence, or infinite power 47

This omnipotence either wilfully or ignorantly misrepresented by Atheists, as if it were a power of doing things contradictious. An irony of a modern Atheist, that God could turn a tree into a syllogism. The absurd doctrine or Cartesius, that God could have made twice two not to have been four, or the three angles of a triangle not to have been equal to two right. This to make one attribute of the Deity devour and destroy another; infinite will and power, infinite understanding and wisdom. To suppose God to understand and be wise only by will, really to give him no understanding at all. God not so omnipotent as that he can destroy the intelligible natures of things; which were to baffle and befool his own wisdom. Infinite power that which can do all that is possible;

that is, conceivable, or implies no contradiction. The very essence of possibility, conceptibility. And thus all the ancient Theists. Absurd for Atheists to say, that a power of doing nothing but what is conceivable is inconceivable 47

But because Atheists look upon infinity as such a mormo, we shall take off the vizard from it; by declaring, that it is really nothing else but perfection. Infinite understanding and knowledge, perfect understanding without any defect, and the knowledge of all things knowable. Infinite power, perfect power, or a power of doing all things possible. Infinite duration, perfection of essence. Because infinity, perfection; therefore nothing, which includeth any thing of imperfection in the essence of it, can be truly and properly infinite; as number, magnitude, and time: all which can but counterfeit infinity. Nothing one way infinite which is not so every way, or a perfect being 49

Now, that we have an idea of perfection, plain from that of imperfection. Perfection first in order of nature, as the rule and measure. This not the want of imperfection, but imperfection the want of perfection. A scale or ladder of perfections in nature, perceived by means of that idea which we have of a being absolutely perfect, the measure of them. Without which we could not take notice of imperfection in the most perfect of all those things which we ever had sense of. Boethius; that whatsoever is imperfect in any kind, implies something in that kind perfect from whence it was derived. And that the nature of things took not beginning from any thing incomplete and imperfect; but descended downward, from what was absolutely perfect, by steps and degrees, lower and lower 49

Wherefore, since infinite the same with perfect, we having a notion of the latter must needs have of the former. And though the word infinite be negative, yet is the sense positive. Finite the negation of infinite, as which, in order of nature, is before it; and not infinite of finite. However, in things incapable of true infinity; infinity, being here a mere imaginary thing and nonenity, can be only conceived by the negation of finite, as nothing is by the negation of something. An infinite being nothing but a perfect being, such as never was not, and could produce all things possible, or conceivable 50

The fourth atheistic pretence against the idea of God; that it is an arbitrarious compilement of contradictious notions. Where first we deny not, but that as some religionists extend the Divine power to things contradictious, so many others compound contradictions together in the nature of the Deity. But it does not follow from thence that theology itself is therefore contradictious, no more than that philosophy is so because

some philosophers also hold contradictious things; or that nothing is absolutely true, neither in divinity nor philosophy, but all seeming and fantastical; according to the Protagorean doctrine 51

But though it be true, that whatsoever really implies a contradiction is a nonentity; yet is this rule obnoxious to much abuse, when whatsoever men's shallow understandings cannot reach to, is therefore presently cried down by them, as an impossibility, or nothing. As when the Atheists and Materialists explode incorporeal substance upon this pretence; or make it only an attribute of honor, expressing the veneration of men's minds, but signifying nothing in nature, nor having any philosophic truth. But the Atheists' true meaning in this objection, and what kind of contradictions they are which they impute to all theology, may appear from a passage of a modern writer, namely, such as these: when God is said to perceive sensible things, and yet to have no organs of sense; as also to understand, and yet to have no brains. The undisguised meaning of the writer, that religion is not philosophy, but law, and all mere arbitrary constitution; nor God a subject of philosophy, as all real things are; he being no true inhabitant of the world or heaven, but only of men's brains and fancies; and his attributes signifying neither true nor false, nor any thing in nature, but only men's reverence and devotion towards what they fear. And so may any thing be said of God, no matter what, so it be agreeable to civil law. But when men mistake attributes of honor for attributes of philosophic truth, that is, when they will suppose such a thing as a God really to exist; then is all absurd nonsense and contradiction. God's understanding without brains no contradiction . . 52

Certain, that no simple idea, as of a triangle, or a square, can be contradictious to itself; much less can the idea of a perfect being, the most simple of all. This indeed pregnant of many attributes, which, if contradictious, would render the whole a nonentity; but all the genuine attributes of the Deity as demonstrable of a perfect being as the properties of a triangle or square; and therefore can neither be contradictious to it, nor one another 54

Nay, the genuine attributes of the Deity not only not contradictious, but also all necessarily connected together 54

In truth all the attributes of the Deity, but so many partial and inadequate conceptions of one and the same perfect being, taken into our minds as it were by piece-meal 55

The idea of God neither fictitious nor factitious. Nothing arbitrarious in it; but a most natural and simple idea, to which not the least can be added, nor any thing detracted from it. Nevertheless may there be different apprehensions concerning God; every one that hath a notion of a

perfect being, not understanding all that belongeth to it; no more than of a triangle, or of a sphere 55

Concluded therefore, that the attributes of God no confounded nonsense of religiously-astonished minds, huddling up together all imaginable attributes of honor, courtship, and compliment; but the attributes of necessary philosophic truth; and such as do not only speak the devotion of men's hearts, but also declare the real nature of the thing. Here the wit of a modern atheistic writer ill placed. (Though no doubt but some, either out of superstition or ignorance, may attribute such things to the Deity as are incongruous to its nature.) Thus the fourth atheistic pretence against the idea of God confuted 55

In the next place, the Atheists think themselves concerned to give an account of this unquestionable phenomenon; the general persuasion of the existence of a God in the minds of men, and their propensity to religion; whence this should come if there were no real object for it in nature. And this they would do by imputing it, partly to the confounded nonsense of astonished minds, and partly to the imposture of politicians. Or else to these three things: to men's fear; and to their ignorance of causes; and to the fiction of law-makers and civil sovereigns . 56

In the first of these atheistic origins of religion; That mankind, by reason of their natural imbecility, are in continual solicitude and fear concerning future events, and their good and evil fortune. And this passion of fear raises up in them, for an object to itself, a most affrightful phantasm; of an invisible understanding being, omnipotent, etc. They afterwards standing in awe of their own imagination, and tremblingly worshipping the creature of their own fear and fancy 57

The second atheistic origin of Theism and religion; That men having a natural curiosity to inquire into the causes of things, wheresoever they can discover no visible and natural causes, are prone to feign causes invisible and supernatural. As Anaxagoras said, never to have betaken himself to a God, but only when he was at a loss for necessary material causes. Wherefore no wonder, if the generality of mankind, being ignorant of the causes of all or most things, have betaken themselves to a God, as to a refuge and sanctuary for their ignorance 57

These two accounts of the phenomenon of religion; from men's fear and solicitude, and from their ignorance of causes and curiosity, joined together by a modern writer. As if the Deity were but a mormo or bugbear, raised up by men's fear, in the darkness of their ignorance of causes. The opinion of other ghosts and spirits also deduced from the same original. Men's taking things casual for prognostics, and being so addicted to omens, portents, prophecies, etc., from a fantastic and timorous supposi-

tion, that the things of this world are not disposed of by nature, but by some understanding person 58

But lest these two accounts of the phenomenon of religion should prove insufficient, the Atheists superadd a third, imputing it also to the fiction and imposture of civil sovereigns; who, perceiving an advantage to be made from hence, for the better keeping men in subjection, have thereupon dexterously laid hold of men's fear and ignorance; and cherished those seeds of religion in them, from the infirmities of their nature: confirming their belief of ghosts and spirits, miracles, prodigies, and oracles, by tales, publicly allowed and recommended. And that religion might be every way obnoxious to their designs, have persuaded the people, that themselves were but the interpreters of the gods, from whom they received their laws. Religion an engine of state; to keep men busily employed; entertain their minds; render them tame and gentle, apt for subjection and society 58

All this not the invention of modern Atheists. But an old atheistic cabal; that the gods made by fear. Lucretius; that the causes of religion, terror of mind and darkness; and that the empire of the gods owes all its being to men's ignorance of causes; as also, that the opinions of ghosts proceeded from men's not knowing how to distinguish their dreams and other frightful fancies from sensations 59

An old atheistic surmise also; that religion a political invention. Thus Cicero; the Atheists in Plato, that the gods are not by nature, but by art and laws only. Critias, one of the thirty tyrants of Athens, his poem to this purpose 60

That the folly and falseness of these three atheistic pretences, for the origin of religion, will be fully manifested. First, as to that of fear and fancy. Such an excess of fear, as makes any one constantly believe the existence of that for which no manner of ground, neither in sense nor reason, highly tending also to his own disquiet; nothing less than distraction. Wherefore the generality of mankind here affirmed by Atheists, to be frighted out of their wits, and distempered in their brains; only a few of themselves, who have escaped this panic terror, remaining sober, or in their right senses. The sobriety of Atheists nothing but dull stupidity and dead incredulity; they believing only what they can see or feel 62

True, that there is a religious fear consequent upon the belief of a God; as also, that the sense of a Deity is often awakened in men's minds by their fears and dangers. But religion no creature of fear. None less solicitous about their good and evil fortune than the pious and virtuous; who place not their chief happiness in things alien, but only in the right

use of their own will. Whereas the good of Atheists wholly in things obnoxious to fortune. The timorous complexion of Atheists, from building all their politics and justice upon the foundation of fear . . 62

The Atheists' grand error here; that the Deity, according to the general sense of mankind, nothing but a *terriculum*, a formidable, hurtful, and undesirable thing. Whereas men every where agree in that Divine attribute of goodness and benignity 63

Φθονερὸν τὸ δαιμόνιον, in the worst sense, taken by none but a few ill-natured men, painting out the Deity according to their own likeness. This condemned by Aristotle in the poets (he calling them therefore liars), by Plutarch in Herodotus, as spoken universally; Plutarch himself restraining the sense thereof to his evil principle. Plato's ascribing the world to the Divine goodness, who therefore made all things most like himself. The true meaning of this proverb; That the Deity affecteth to humble and abase the pride of man. Lucretius's hidden force, that hath, as it were, a spite to all overswelling greatnesses, could be no other than the Deity. Those amongst Christians, who make the worst representation of God, yet fancy him kind and gracious to themselves . . 63

True, that religion often expressed by the fear of God. Fear *prima mensura Deitatis*, the first impression that religion makes upon men in this lapsed state.—But this not a fear of God, as mischievous and hurtful, nor yet as a mere arbitrary being, but as just, and an impartial punisher of wickedness. Lucretius's acknowledging men's fear of God to be conjoined with a conscience of duty. A natural discrimination of good and evil, with a sense of an impartial justice presiding over the world, and both rewarding and punishing. The fear of God, as either a hurtful, or arbitrary and tyrannical being (which must needs be joined with something of hatred), not religion, but superstition. Fear, faith, and love; three steps and degrees of religion, to the son of Sirach. Faith better defined in Scripture than by any scholastics. God such a being, as if he were not, nothing more to be wished for 65

The reason why Atheists thus mistake the notion of God, as a thing only to be feared, and consequently hated; from their own ill-nature and vice. The latter disposing them so much to think, that there is no difference of good and evil by nature, but only by law; which law, contrary to nature as restraint to liberty. Hence their denying all natural charity, and acknowledging no benevolence or good-will but what arises from imbecility, indigency, and fear. Their friendship at best no other than *mercatura utilitatum*. Wherefore, if there were an omnipotent Deity, this (according to the atheistic hypothesis) could not have so much as that spurious love or benevolence to any thing, because standing in need of noth-

ing, and devoid of fear. Thus Cotta in Cicero. All this asserted also by a late pretender to politics; he adding thereunto, that God hath no other right of commanding than his irresistible power; nor men any obligation to obey him but only from their imbecility and fear, or because they cannot resist him. Thus do Atheists transform the Deity into a monstrous shape; an omnipotent being that hath neither benevolence nor justice in him. This indeed a mormo or bugbear 66

But as this a false representation of Theism, so the atheistic scene of things most uncomfortable, hopeless, and dismal, upon several accounts. True, that no spiteful designs in senseless atoms; in which regard Plutarch preferred even this atheistic hypothesis before that of an omnipotent mischievous being. However, no faith, nor hope neither, in senseless atoms. Epicurus's confession, that it was better to believe the fable of the gods, than that material necessity of all things, asserted by the other atheistic physiologers before himself. But he not at all mending the matter by his supposed free will. The panic fear of the Epicureans, of the frame of heaven's cracking, and this compilement of atoms being dissolved into a chaos. Atheists running from fear plunge themselves into fear. Atheism, rather than Theism, from the imposture of fear, distrust, and disbelief of good. But vice afterwards prevailing in them makes them desire there should be no God 68

Thus the Atheists, who derive the origin of religion from fear, first put an affrightful vizard upon the Deity, and then conclude it to be but a mormo or bugbear, the creature of fear and fancy. More likely of the two, that the opinion of a God sprung from hope of good than fear of evil; but neither of these true, it owing its being to the imposture of no passion, but supported by the strongest and clearest reason. Nevertheless, a natural prolepsis, or anticipation of a God also, in men's minds, preventing reason. This called by Plato and Aristotle, a vaticination 70

The second atheistic pretence to solve the phenomenon of religion, from the ignorance of causes, and men's innate curiosity (upon which account the Deity said by them to be nothing but an asylum of ignorance, or the sanctuary of fools), next to be confuted 70

That the Atheists, both modern and ancient, here commonly complicate these two together, fear, and ignorance of causes; making Theism the spawn of both; as the fear of children in the dark raises bugbears and spectres. Epicurus's reason why he took such great pains in the study of physiology; that, by finding out the natural causes of things, he might free men from the terror of a God, that would otherwise assault their minds 71

The Atheists thus dabbling in physiology, and finding out material

causes for some of those phenomena, which the unskilful vulgar solve only from a Deity; therefore confident, that religion had no other original than this ignorance of causes: as also, that nature, or matter, does all things alone without a God. But we shall make it manifest, that philosophy and the true knowledge of causes lead to a Deity; and that Atheism, from ignorance of causes, and want of philosophy 71

For, first, no Atheist, who derives all from senseless matter, can possibly assign any cause of himself, his own soul, or mind; it being impossible, that life and sense should be naturally produced from what dead and senseless; or from magnitudes, figures, sites, and motions. An atheistic objection, nothing to the purpose; that laughing and crying things are made out of not laughing and crying principles: because these result from the mechanism of the body. The Hylozoists never able neither to produce animal sense and consciousness. The Atheists, supposing their own life and understanding, and all the wisdom that is in the world, to have sprung merely from senseless matter, and fortuitous motions; grossly ignorant of causes. The philosophy of ourselves, and true knowledge of the cause of our own soul and mind, brings to God 72

Again, Atheists ignorant of the cause of motion, by which they suppose all things done; this phenomenon being no ways solvable, according to their principles. First, undeniably certain that motion not essential to all body or matter as such, because there could have been no mundane system, no sun, moon, earth, etc. all things being continually torn in pieces, and nothing cohering. Certain, also, that dead and senseless matter, such as that of Anaximander, Democritus, Epicurus, cannot move itself spontaneously, by will or appetite. The Hylozoists further considered elsewhere. Democritus could assign no other cause of motion than this, that one body moved another from eternity infinitely; without any first cause or mover. Thus also a modern writer. To assert an infinite progress in the causes of motion, according to Aristotle, to assign no cause thereof at all. Epicurus, though an exploder of qualities, forced here to fly to an occult quality of gravity. Which, as absurd in infinite space, and without any centre of rest; so indeed nothing but to make his own ignorance, and he knows not why, to be a cause. The motion of body, from the activity of something incorporeal. Though motion taken for translation be a mode of matter; yet as it is taken for the *vis movens*, a mode or energy, of something that is incorporeal and self-active. The motion of the whole corporeal universe originally from the Deity. Thus the ignorance of the cause of motion another ground of Atheism . 73

Thirdly, the Atheists also ignorant of the cause of that grand phenomenon, the τὸ εὖ καὶ καλῶς, the regular and artificial frame of the mundane

system,—and of the bodies of animals; together with the harmony of all. They who boast they can give causes of all things without a God, able to give no cause of this, but only, that it happened by chance so to be. This, either to make the absence of a cause (chance being but the absence of an intending cause); or their own very ignorance of the cause, and they know not why, to be a cause; or to make one contrary the cause of another (confusion of order and harmony, chance of art and skill): or, lastly, to deny it to have any cause at all, since they deny an intending cause 76

But here the Atheists make several pretences for this their ignorance. First, that the world is not so well made, but that it might have been much better; and many flaws to be found therein: whereas a God, or perfect being, would have bungled in nothing, but have made all things after the best manner. But this a twelfth atheistic argumentation, and the confutation thereof to be expected afterward. Reason why some modern Theists give Atheists so much advantage here, as to acknowledge things be ill made; whilst the ancient pagan Theists stood their ground, and generously maintained, that mind being the maker of all things, and not blind fortune or chance, nor arbitrary will, and irrational human omnipotent; the τὸ βέλτιστον, that which is absolutely the best, in order to the good of the whole (so far as the necessity of things would admit), the measure and rule of nature and Providence . . . 76

Again, the atomic and Epicurean Atheists pretend, that though many things serve for uses, yet it does not therefore follow, that they were made intentionally for those uses; because things that happen by chance may have uses consequent. Thus Lucretius, and the old atheistic philosophers before Aristotle, of the parts of the bodies of animals, and all other things. The answer, that when things consist of many parts, all artificially proportioned together, with much curiosity, as for example the eye; no man who considers the anatomy thereof, and its whole structure, can reasonably conclude, that it happened so to be made; and the use of seeing followed: but that it was made intentionally for the use of seeing. But to maintain, that not only eyes happened to be so made, and the use of seeing followed, but also ears, and a mouth, and feet, and hands, and all the other parts organical and similar (without any of which the whole would be inept or useless), all their several uses, unintended, following; gross insensibility, and stupidity. Galen of the Use of Parts 77

Democritus's dotages; countenanced also by Cartesius's book of Meteors (first written with design to solve all those phenomena without a God), but unsuccessfully. Nevertheless we acknowledge, that God and

nature do all things in the most frugal and compendious way; and that the mechanic powers are taken in, so far as they will serviceably comply with the intellectual platform. But nature not mechanical and fortuitous only, but also vital and artificial; the Archeus of the whole world 79

Again, Atheists further pretend, that though it may well seem strange, that matter fortuitously moved, should, at the very first, fall into such a regularity and harmony as is now in the world; yet not at all strange, that atoms, moving from all eternity, and making all manner of combinations and contextures, and trying all experiments, should, after innumerable other inept and discongruous forms, at length fall into such a system as this. They say, therefore, that the earth at first, brought forth divers monstrous and irregular shapes of animals; some wanting feet, some hands, some without a mouth, etc. to which the ancients added centaurs, scyllas, and chimeras; mixedly boviform and hominiform animals. Though Epicurus, ashamed to own these, would seem to exclude them, but without reason. But because we have now no such irregular shapes produced out of the earth, they say, that the reason is, because none could continue and propagate their kind by generation, but only such as happened to be fitly made. Thus Epicurus, and the Atheists before Aristotle. They also add hereunto their infinite worlds; amongst which they pretend, not one out of a thousand, or of ten thousand, hath so much regularity in it as this of ours. Lastly, they presage likewise, that this world of ours shall not always continue such, but after awhile fall into confusion and disorder again; and then we may have centaurs, scyllas and chimeras, as before 80

Nevertheless, because this universal and constant regularity of things, for so many ages together, is so puzzling; they would persuade us that the senseless atoms, playing and toying up and down from eternity, without any care or thought, were at length taught by the necessity of things, and driven to a kind of trade, or habit of artificialness and methodicalness 82

To all which atheistic pretences replied, first, That this is an idle dream, or impudent forgery, that there was once an inept mundane system; and in this world of ours, all manner of irregular shapes of animals: not only because no tradition of any such thing; but also because no reason possibly to be given, why such should not be produced out of the earth still, though they could not continue long. That also another atheistic dream, that in this world of ours, all will quickly fall into confusion and nonsense again. And as their infinite worlds an impossibility, so their assertion of the irregularity of the supposed other worlds well enough answered, by a contrary assertion; that were every planet a habitable

earth, and every fixed star a sun, having all more or fewer such habitable planets moving round about them, and none of them desert or uninhabited, there would not be found so much as one ridiculous or inept system amongst them all; the Divine act being infinite 83

Again, that the fortuitous motion of senseless atoms should in length of time, grow artificial, and contract a habit, or trade of acting regularly, as if directed by perfect art and wisdom; this atheistic fanaticism . 84

No more possible, that dead and senseless matter, fortuitously moved, should at length be taught and necessitated by itself to produce this artificial system of the world; than that a dozen or more persons, unskilled in music, and striking the strings as it happened, should at length be taught and necessitated to fall into exquisite harmony; or that the letters in the writings of Plato and Aristotle, though having so much philosophic sense, should have been all scribbled at random. More philosophy in the great volume of the world, than in all Aristotle's and Plato's works; and more of harmony than in any artificial composition of vocal music. That the Divine art and wisdom hath printed such a signature of itself upon the matter of the whole world, as fortune and chance could never counterfeit 84

But, in the next place, the Atheists will for all this undertake to demonstrate, that things could not possibly be made by any intending cause, for ends and uses; as eyes for seeing, ears for hearing; from hence, because things were all in order of time, as well as nature, before their uses. This argument seriously propounded by Lucretius in this manner; if eyes were made for the use of seeing, then of necessity must seeing have been before eyes: but there was no seeing before eyes; therefore could not eyes be made for the sake of seeing 85

Evident, that the logic of these Atheists differs from that of all other mortals; according to which the end for which any thing is designedly made, is only in intention first, but in execution last. True, that men are commonly excited from experience of things, and sense of their wants, to excogitate means and remedies; but it doth not therefore follow, that the Maker of the world could not have a preventive knowledge of whatsoever would be useful for animals, and so make them bodies intentionally for those uses. That argument ought to be thus framed: whatsoever is made intentionally for any end, as the eye for that of seeing, that end must needs be in the knowledge and intention of the maker, before the actual existence of that which is made for it: but there could be no knowledge of seeing before there were eyes; therefore eyes could not be made intentionally for the sake of seeing 86

This the true scope of the premised atheistic argument, however dis-

guised by them in the first propounding. The ground thereof, because they take it for granted, that all knowledge is derived from sense, or from the things known pre-existing without the knower. And here does Lucretius triumph. The controversy therefore at last resolved into this; whether all knowledge be in its own nature junior to things: for if so, it must be granted, that the world could not be made by any antecedent knowledge. But this afterwards fully confuted; and proved, that knowledge is not, in its own nature, ectypal, but archetypal; and that knowledge was older than the world, and the Maker thereof . . . 87

But Atheists will except against the proving of a God, from the regular and artificial frame of things; That it is unreasonable to think, there should be no cause in nature for the common phenomena thereof; but a God thus introduced to solve them. Which also, to suppose the world bungled and botched up. That nature is the cause of natural things, which nature does not intend, nor acts for ends. Wherefore the opinion of final causality for things in nature but an *idolum specus*. Therefore rightly banished by Democritus out of physiology . . . 88

The answer: Two extremes here to be avoided; one of the atomic Atheists, who derive all things from the fortuitous motion of senseless matter; another of bigotical religionists, who will have God to do all things himself immediately without any nature. The middle betwixt both, that there is not only a mechanical and fortuitous but also an artificial nature, subservient to the Deity, as the manuary opificer and drudging executioner thereof. True, that some philosophers have absurdly attributed their own properties, or animal idiopathies, to inanimate bodies. Nevertheless, this no idol of the cave, or den, to suppose the system of the world to have been framed by an understanding being, according to whose direction, nature, though not itself intending, acteth. Balbus's description of this artificial nature in Cicero. That there could be no mind in us, were there none in the universe. That of Aristotle true, that there is more of art in some things of nature than in any thing made by men. Now the causes of artificial things, as a house or clock, cannot be declared without intention for ends. This excellently pursued by Aristotle. No more can the things of nature be rightly understood, or the causes of them fully assigned, merely from matter and motion, without intention or mind. They, who banish final or mental causality from philosophy, look upon the things of nature with no other eyes than oxen and horses. Some pitiful attempts of the ancient Atheist to solve the phenomena of animals without mental causality. Democritus and Epicurus so cautious, as never to pretend to give an account of the formation of

the fœtus. Aristotle's judgment here to be preferred before that of Democritus 89

But nothing more strange than that these Atheists should be justified in this their ignorance by professed Theists and Christians; who atomizing likewise in their physiology, contend, that this whole mundane system resulted only from the necessary and unguided motion of matter, either turned round in a vortex, or jumbled in a chaos, without the direction of any mind. These mechanic Theists more immodest than the atomic Atheists themselves; they supposing these their atoms, though fortuitously moved, yet never to have produced any inept system, or incongruous forms; but from the very first, all along, to have ranged themselves so orderly, as that they could not have done it better had they been directed by a perfect mind. They quite take away the argument for a God, from the phenomena, and that artificial frame of things, leaving only some metaphysical arguments; which, though never so good, yet by reason of their subtilty cannot do so much execution. The Atheists gratified to see the cause of Theism thus betrayed by its professed friends; and the grand argument for the same totally slurred by them . 93

As this great insensibility of mind, to look upon the things of nature with no other eyes than brute animals do; so are there sundry phenomena, partly above the mechanic powers, and partly contrary to the same, which therefore can never be solved, without mental and final causality. As in animals, the motion of the diaphragma in respiration, the systole and diastole of the heart (being a muscular constriction and relaxation;) to which might be added others in the macrocosm; as the intersection of the planes of the equator and ecliptic; or the earth's diurnal motion upon an axis not parallel with that of its annual. Cartesius's confession, that according to mechanic principles, these should continually come nearer and nearer together; which since they have not done, final or mental causality here to be acknowledged, and because it was best it should be so. But the greatest phenomenon of this kind, the formation and organization of animals; which these mechanists never able to give any account of. Of that posthumous piece of Cartesius, De la Formation du Fœtus . 94

Pretended, that to assign final causes, is to presume ourselves to be as wise as God Almighty, or to be privy to his counsels. But the question, not whether we can always reach to the ends of God Almighty, or know what is absolutely best in every case, and accordingly conclude things therefore to be so; but whether any thing in the world be made for ends otherwise than would have resulted from the fortuitous motion of matter. No presumption, nor intrusion into the secrets of God Almighty, to say, that eyes were made by him intentionally for the sake of seeing. Anaxa-

goras's absurd aphorism, that man was therefore the most solert of all animals, because he chanced to have hands. Far more reasonable to think (as Aristotle concludeth), that because man was the wisest of all animals, therefore he had hands given him. More proper to give pipes to one that hath musical skill, than upon him, that hath pipes, to bestow musical skill 95

In the last place, mechanic Theists pretend, and that with some more plausibility, that it is below the dignity of God Almighty to perform all those mean and trivial offices of nature, himself immediately. This answered again ; that though the Divine wisdom itself contrived the system of the whole for ends, yet is there an artificial nature under him, as his inferior minister and executioner. Proclus's description hereof. This nature, to Proclus, a god or goddess ; but only as the bodies of the animated stars were called gods, because the statues of the gods 96

That we cannot otherwise conclude, concerning these mechanic Theists, who derive all things in the mundane system, from the necessary motions of senseless matter, without the direction of any mind, or God ; but that they are imperfect Theists, or have a certain tang of the atheistic enthusiasm (the spirit of infidelity) hanging about them . . 97

But these mechanic Theists counterbalanced by another sort of Atheists, not fortuitous, nor mechanical ; namely, the Hylozoists, who acknowledge the works of nature to be the works of understanding, and deride Democritus's rough and hooky atoms, devoid of life : they attributing life to all matter as such, and concluding the vulgar notion of a God to be but an inadequate conception of matter, its energetic nature being taken alone by itself as a complete substance. These Hylozoists never able to satisfy that phenomenon, of the one agreeing and conspiring harmony throughout the whole universe ; every atom of matter, according to them, being a distinct percipient ; and these unable to confer notions one with another 98

Nor can the other Cosmo-plastic Atheists (to whom the whole world but one huge plant or vegetable, endowed with a spermatic artificial nature, orderly disposing the whole, without sense or understanding) do any thing towards the solving of this or any other phenomena ; it being impossible that there should be any such regular nature otherwise than as derived from and depending on a perfect mind 98

Besides these three phenomena of cogitation, motion, and the artificial frame of things, with the conspiring harmony of the whole (no way solvable by Atheists,) here further added, that those who asserted the novity of the world, could not possibly give an account neither of the first beginning of men, and other animals, not now generated out of putrefaction. Aris-

totle sometimes doubtful and staggering concerning the world's eternity. Men and all other animals not produced at first by chance, either as worms out of putrefaction, or out of eggs, or wombs, growing out of the earth; because no reason to be given why chance should not as well produce the same out of the earth still. Epicurus's vain pretence, that the earth, as a child-bearing woman, was now grown effete and barren. Moreover, men and animals, whether first generated out of putrefaction, or excluded out of wombs or egg-shells, supposed by these Atheists themselves to have been produced in a tender infant-like state, so that they could neither supply themselves with nourishment, nor defend themselves from harms. A dream of Epicurus, that the earth sent forth streams of milk after these her new-born infants and nurslings, confuted by Critolaus in Philo. Another precarious supposition, or figment of Epicurus; that then no immoderate heats, nor colds, nor any blustering winds. Anaximander's way of solving this difficulty; that men were first generated and nourished in the bellies of fishes, till able to shift for themselves; and then disgorged upon dry land. Atheists swallow any thing rather than a God 99

Wherefore here being *dignus vindice nodus*, a *Θεὸν ἀπὸ μηχανῆς*, reasonably introduced, in the Mosaic cabala, to solve the same. It appearing, from all circumstances put together, that this whole phenomenon surpasses, not only the mechanic but also the plastic powers: there being much of discretion therein. However, not denied but that the ministry of spirits (created before man, and other terrestrial animals) might be here made use of. As in Plato, after the creation of immortal souls by the supreme God, the framing of mortal bodies is committed to junior gods 101

Furthermore, Atheists no more able to solve that ordinary phenomenon, of the conservation of species, by the difference of sexes, and a due proportion of number kept up between males and females. Here a providence, also, superior as well to the plastic as mechanic nature . 102

Lastly, other phenomena, as real, though not physical; which Atheists cannot possibly solve, and therefore do commonly deny; as of natural justice or honesty, and obligation; the foundation of politics, and the mathematics of religion. And of liberty of will, not only that of fortuitous self-determination, when an equal eligibility of objects; but also that which makes men deserve commendation and blame. These not commonly distinguished as they ought. Epicurus's endeavor to solve liberty of will, from atoms declining uncertainly from the perpendicular, mere madness and frenzy 102

And now have we already preventively confuted the third atheistic

pretence, to solve the phenomenon of Theism, from the fiction and imposture of politicians; we having proved, that philosophy and the true knowledge of causes infer the existence of a God. Nevertheless, this is to be here further answered 102

That statesmen and politicians could not have made such use of religion, as sometimes they have done, had it been a mere cheat and figment of their own. Civil sovereigns in all the distant places of the world could not have so universally conspired, in this one piece of statecraft or cozenage; nor yet have been able to possess the minds of men every where with such a constant awe and dread of an invisible nothing. The world would long since have discovered this cheat, and suspected a plot upon their liberty, in the fiction of a God; at least governors themselves would have understood it; many of which, notwithstanding, as much awed with the fear of this invisible nothing, as any others. Other cheats and juggles, when once detected, no longer practised. But religion now as much in credit as ever, though so long since decried by Atheists for a political cheat. That Christianity, a religion founded in no human policy, prevailed over the craft and power of all civil sovereigns, and conquered the persecuting world, by suffering deaths and martyrdoms. This presignified by the prophetic spirit 103

Had the idea of God been an arbitrarious figment, not conceivable, how men should have universally agreed in the same, and the attributes belonging thereunto (this argument used by Sextus): nor that civil sovereigns themselves should so universally have jumped in it . . 104

Furthermore; not conceivable, how this thought, or idea of a God, should have been formed by any, had it been the idea of nothing. The superficialness of Atheists, in pretending, that politicians, by telling men of such a thing, put the idea into their minds. No notions or ideas put into men's minds by words but only the phantasms of the sounds. Though all learning be not remembrance, yet is all human teaching but maieutical or obstetricious; not the filling of the soul as a vessel, by pouring into it from without; but the kindling of it from within. Words signify nothing to him that cannot raise up within himself the notions or ideas correspondent to them. However, the difficulty still remains; how statesmen themselves, or the first inventor of this cheat, could have framed any notion at all of a nonentity 105

Here the Atheists pretend, that there is a feigning power in the soul, whereby it can make ideas and conceptions of nonentities; as of a golden mountain, or a centaur: and that by this an idea of God might be framed, though there be no such thing. Answer: that all the feigning power of the soul consisteth only in compounding ideas of things, that really exist

apart, but not in that conjunction. The mind cannot make any new conceptive cogitation which was not before; as the painter or limner cannot feign foreign colors. Moreover, the whole of these fictitious ideas, though it hath no actual yet it hath a possible entity. The Deity itself, though it could create a world out of nothing, yet can it not create more cogitation or conception than is or was always entertained in its own mind from eternity; nor frame a positive idea of that which hath no possible entity 106

The idea of God no compilement or aggregation of things, that exist severally apart in the world; because then it would be a mere arbitrarious thing, and what every one pleased; the contrary whereunto hath been before manifested 107

Again: some attributes of the Deity no where else to be found in the whole world; and therefore must be absolute nonentities, were there no God. Here the painter must feign colors, and create a new cogitation out of nothing 108

Lastly, upon supposition that there is no God, it is impossible, not only that there should be any for the future, but also that there should ever have been any; whereas all fictitious ideas must have a possible entity, since otherwise they would be inconceivable, and no ideas . . 108

Wherefore some Atheists will further pretend, that besides the power of compounding things together, the soul hath another ampliating or amplifying power; by both which together, though there be no God existing, nor yet possible, the idea of him might be fictitiously made; those attributes, which are no where else to be found, arising by way of amplification or augmentation of something found in men . . 108

Answer: first, that according to the principles of these Atheists, that all our conceptions are nothing but passions from objects without, there cannot possibly be any such amplifying power in the soul, whereby it could make more than is. Thus Protagoras in Plato: no man can conceive any thing but what he suffers. Here also, as Sextus intimateth, the Atheists guilty of that fallacy called a circle or diallelus. For having first undesignedly made the idea of imperfection from perfection, they then go about again to make the idea of perfection out of imperfection. That men have a notion of perfection, by which, as a rule, they judge things to be imperfect, evident from that direction given by all theologers, to conceive of God, in way of remotion or abstraction of all imperfection. Lastly, finite things added together can never make up infinite; as more and more time backward can never reach to eternity without beginning. God differs from imperfect things, not in degree, but kind. As for infinite space, said to consist of parts finite; we certain of no more than this,

that the finite world might have been made bigger and bigger infinitely; for which very cause it could never be actually infinite. Gassendus's objection, that the idea of an infinite God might as well be feigned as that of infinite worlds. But infinite worlds are but words or notions ill put together, or combined; infinity being a real thing in nature, but misapplied, it being proper only to the Deity 109

The conclusion that since the soul can neither make the idea of infinite, by amplification of finite; nor feign or create any new cogitation, which was not before; nor make a positive idea of a nonentity; certain, that the idea of God no fictitious thing 110

Further made evident, that religion not the figment of civil sovereigns. Obligation in conscience the foundation of all civil right and authority. Covenants, without this, nothing but words and breath. Obligations, not from laws neither, but before them; or otherwise they could not oblige. Lastly, this derived not from utility neither. Were obligation to civil obedience made by men's private utility, then could it be dissolved by the same. Wherefore if religion a fiction or imposture, civil sovereignty must needs be so too 110

Had religion been a fiction of politicians, they would then have made it every way pliable, and flexible; since otherwise it would not serve their turn, nor consist with their infinite right 111

But religion in its own nature a stiff inflexible thing, as also justice, it being not factitious, or made by will. There may therefore be a contradiction betwixt the laws of God and of men; and in this case does religion conclude, that God ought to be obeyed rather than men. For this cause, atheistic politicians of latter times declare against religion as inconsistent with civil sovereignty; it destroying infinite right, introducing private judgment, or conscience, and a fear greater than that of the Leviathan; to wit, of him who can inflict eternal punishment. Senseless matter the Atheists' natural god: the leviathan or civil sovereign his artificial one. Religion thus disowned and disclaimed by politicians, as inconsistent with civil power, could not be the creature of political art. Thus all the three atheistic pretences to solve the phenomenon of religion, from fear, ignorance of causes, and fiction of politicians, fully confuted . 112

But because, besides those ordinary phenomena before mentioned, there are certain other extraordinary ones that cannot be solved by Atheists, which therefore they will impute, partly to men's fear and ignorance, and partly to the fiction and imposture of civil governors (viz. apparitions, miracles, and prophecies); the reality of these here also to be briefly vindicated 114

First, as for apparitions; though much of fabulosity in these relations,

yet unquestionably something of truth. Atheists imputing these things to men's mistaking their dreams and fancies for sensations, contradict their own fundamental principle, that sense is the only criterion of truth; as also derogate more from human testimony than they ought . 114

That some Atheists sensible hereof have acknowledged the reality of apparitions, concluding them nevertheless to be the mere creatures of imagination; as if a strong fancy could produce real substances or objects of sense. The fanaticism of Atheists, who will rather believe the greatest impossibilities, than endanger the being of a God. Invisible ghosts permanent easily introduce one supreme ghost of the whole world 114

Democritus yet further convinced; that there were invisible beings superior to men, independent upon imagination, and permanent (called by him idols), but having nothing immortal in them; and therefore that God could be no more proved from the existence of them than of men. Granted by him, that there were, not only terrestrial, but also aëreal and ethereal animals; and that all those vast regions of the universe above were not desert and uninhabited. Here something of the fathers, asserting angels to have bodies; but more afterwards 115

To this phenomenon of apparitions may be added those two others, of witches and demoniacs: both of these proving, that spirits are not fancies, nor inhabitants of men's brains only, but of the world: as also, that there are some impure spirits, a confirmation of the truth of Christianity. The confident exploders of witchcraft suspicable for Atheism. As for demoniacs or energumeni, certain from Josephus, that the Jews did not take these demons or devils for bodily diseases, but real substances, possessing the bodies of men. Nor probable, that they supposed, as the Gnostics afterward, all diseases to be the infestation of evil spirits; nor yet (as some think) all demoniacs to be madmen. But when there were any unusal and extraordinary symptoms in any bodily distemper, but especially that of madness, they supposing this to be supernatural, imputed it to the infestation of some devil. Thus also the Greeks 116

That demoniacs and energumeni are a real phenomenon; and that there are such also in these times of ours, asserted by Fernelius and Sennertus. Such maniacal persons, as not only discover secrets, but also speak languages which they had never learned, unquestionably demoniacs or energumeni. That there have been such in the times since our Saviour, proved out of Psellus; as also from Fernelius. This for the vindication of Christianity against those who suspect the Scripture-demoniacs for figments 119

The second extraordinary phenomenon proposed; that of miracles,

and effects supernatural. That there have been such things amongst the Pagans, and since the times of Christianity too, evident from their records. But more instances of these in Scripture 122

Two sorts of miracles. First, such as, though they cannot be done by ordinary causes, yet may be effected by the natural power of invisible spirits, angels, or demons. As illiterate demoniacs speaking Greek. Such amongst the Pagans that miracle of the whetstone cut in two with a razor. Secondly, such as transcend the natural power of all second causes and created beings 122

That late Politico-Theological Treatise, denying both these sorts of miracles, inconsiderable, and not deserving here a confutation . 123

Supposed in Deut. that miracles of the former sort might be done by false prophets, in confirmation of idolatry. Wherefore miracles alone not sufficient to confirm every doctrine 123

Accordingly in the New Testament do we read of τέρατα ψεύδους, lying miracles;—that is, miracles done in confirmation of a lie, and by the power of Satan, etc. God permitting it, in way of probation of some, and punishment of others. Miracles done for the promotion of creature-worship or idolatry, instead of justifying the same, themselves condemned by it 123

Had the miracles of our Saviour been all of the former kind only, yet ought the Jews according to Moses' law, to have acknowledged him for a true prophet, he coming in the name of the Lord, and not exhorting to idolatry. Supposed in Deut. that God would not permit false prophets to do miracles, save only in the case of idolatry; or when the doctrine is discoverable to be false by the light of nature; because that would be an invincible temptation. Our Saviour, that eximious prophet, foretold, by whom God would again reveal his will to the world; and no more out of flaming fire. Nevertheless some miracles of our Saviour Christ's such also as could be done only by the power of God Almighty . . 124

All miracles evince spirits; to disbelieve which is to disbelieve sense, or unreasonably to derogate from human testimony. Had the Gentiles entertained the faith of Christ, without miracles, this itself would have been a great miracle 126

The last extraordinary phenomenon, divination or prophecy. This also evinces spirits (called gods by the Pagans): and thus that of theirs true; if divination, then gods 126

Two sorts of predictions likewise as of miracles. First, such as might proceed from the natural presaging power of created spirits. Such predictions acknowledged by Democritus, upon account of his idols. Not

so much contingency in human actions, by reason of men's liberty of will, as some suppose 126

Another sort of predictions of future events imputable only to the supernatural prescience of God Almighty. Epicurus's pretence, that divination took away liberty of will; either as supposing or making a necessity. Some Theists also denying the prescience of God Almighty, upon the same account. Certain, that no created being can foreknow future events otherwise than in their causes. Wherefore predictions of such events as had no necessary antecedent causes, evince a God . . . 127

That there is foreknowledge of future events, unforeknowable to men, formerly the general persuasion of mankind. Oracles and predictions amongst the Pagans, which evince spirits, as that of Attius Navius. Most of the Pagan oracles, from the natural presaging power of demons. Nevertheless some instances of predictions of a higher kind amongst them; as that of Vectius Valens, and the sibyls. Thus Balaam divinely assisted to predict our Saviour 129

Scriptures triumphing over Pagan oracles. Predictions concerning our Saviour Christ, and the conversion of the Gentiles. Amongst which that remarkable one of the seventy weeks 131

Other predictions concerning the fates of kingdoms, and of the church. Daniel's fourth ten-horned beast, the Roman empire. This prophecy of Daniel's carried on further in the Apocalypse. Both of them prophetic calendars of times, to the end of the world 132

That this phenomenon of Scripture-prophecies cannot possibly be imputed by Atheists, as some others, to fear, or ignorance of causes, or to the fiction of politicians. They not only evince a Deity, but also the truth of Christianity. To this purpose, of more use to us, who now live, than the miracles themselves recorded in Scripture . . . 132

These five extraordinary phenomena all of them evince spirits to be no fancies, but substantial inhabitants of the world; from whence a God may be inferred. Some of them immediately prove a Deity . . 133

Here have we not only fully confuted all the atheistic pretences from the idea of a God, but also, by the way, already proposed several substantial arguments for a Deity. The existence whereof will now be further proved from its very idea 133

True, that some of the ancient Theists themselves declare God not to be demonstrable. Thus Alexander Aprodis. Clemens Alexand. But their meaning therein no more than this, that God cannot be demonstrated *a priori* from any antecedent necessary cause. Not follow from hence, that therefore no certainty or knowledge of the existence of a God; but

only conjectural probability, faith, and opinion. We may have a certain knowledge of things, the διότι whereof cannot be demonstrated *a priori;* as, that there was something or other eternal, without beginning. Whensoever a thing is necessarily inferred from what is altogether undeniable, this may be called a demonstration. Many geometrical demonstrations such; or of the ὅτι only 133

A special position of Cartesius; that there can be no certainty of any thing, no, not of geometrical theorems, nor common notions; before we be certain of the existence of a God, essentially good, who therefore cannot deceive. From whence it would follow, that neither Atheists, nor such Theists as assert an arbitrary Deity, can ever be certain of any thing: as that two and two are four 135

However, some appearance of piety in this assertion; yet is it a foundation of eternal scepticism, both as to all other things, and the existence of a God. That Cartesius here went round in a circle, proving the existence of a God from our faculties, and then the truth of our faculties from the existence of a God: and consequently proved nothing. If it be possible that our faculties might be false, then must we confess it possible, that there may be no God; and consequently remain for ever sceptical about it 135

Wherefore a necessity of exploding and confuting this new sceptical hypothesis, of the possibility of our faculties being so made as to deceive us in all our clearest perceptions. Omnipotence itself cannot make any thing to be indifferently true or false. Truth not factitious. As to the universal theorems of abstract science, the measure of truth no foreign or extraneous thing, but only our own clear and distinct perception. Here whatsoever is clearly perceived, is; the very essence of truth, perceptibility. Granted by all, that there can be no false knowledge or understanding. The perception of the understanding never false, but only obscure. Not nature that erreth in us, but we ourselves, in assenting to things not clearly perceived. Conclusion; that Omnipotence cannot create any understanding faculties, so as to have as clear and distinct conceptions of all falsehoods and nonentities as of truths; because whatsoever is clearly and distinctly perceived, hath therefore an entity; and Omnipotence itself (to speak with reverence) cannot make nothing to be something, or something nothing. This no more than that it cannot do things contradictious. Conception the measure of power 136

True, that sense as such is but fantastical and relative; and were there no other perception, all truth would be private, relative, and seeming, none absolute. This probably the reason why some have suspected the same of knowledge also. But mind and understanding reach beyond

fancy and appearance, to the absoluteness of things. It hath the criterion of truth within itself 138

Objected; that this an arrogance, for creatures to pretend to an absolute certainty of any thing. Answer: that God alone is ignorant of nothing, and infallible in all things; but no derogation from the Deity, to suppose, that he should make created minds such as to have a certainty of something; as the whole to be greater than the part, and the like: since otherwise they would be but a mere mockery. Congruous to think, that God hath made men so as that they may possibly attain to some certainty of his own existence. Origen, that knowledge is the only thing that hath certainty in it 139

Having now some firm ground or footing to stand upon, a certainty of common notions, without which nothing could be proved by reason; we shall endeavour, by means hereof to demonstrate the existence of a God from his idea 140

Cartesius's undertaking to do this with mathematical evidence; as this idea includeth in it necessary existence. This argument hitherto not so successful, it being by many concluded to be a sophism. That we shall impartially set down all that we can, both for it and against it; leaving others to make a judgment 140

First, against the Cartesian demonstration of a God. That because we can frame an idea of a necessarily-existent being, it does not at all follow that it is; since we can frame ideas of things that never were, nor will be. Nothing to be gathered from hence, but only that it is not impossible. Again, from this idea, including necessary existence, nothing else inferrible, but that what hath no necessary existence is not perfect; and, that if there be a perfect being, its existence always was and will be necessary; but not absolutely, that it doth exist. A fallacy, when from the necessity of existence affirmed only hypothetically, the conclusion is made absolutely. Though a perfect being must exist necessarily, yet not therefore follow, that it must and doth exist. The latter a thing indemonstrable 141

For the Cartesian demonstration of a God. As from the notion of a thing impossible, we conclude, that it never was nor will be; and of that which hath a contingent schesis to existence, that it might be, or might not be; so from that which hath necessary existence in its nature, that it actually is. The force of the argumentation not merely hypothetical; if there be a perfect being, then is its existence necessary; because this supposes that a necessary existent being is contingent to be or not to be: which a contradiction. The absurdity of this will better appear, if, instead of necessary existence, we put in actual. No Theists can otherwise

prove that a God, though supposed to exist, might not happen by chance to be. Nevertheless God, or a perfect being, not here demonstrated *a priori*, when from its own idea. The reader left to make a judgment 142

A progymnasma, or prelusory attempt towards the proving of a God from his idea, as including necessary existence. First, from our having an idea of a perfect being, implying no manner of contradiction in it, it follows that such a thing is possible. And from that necessary existence included in this idea, added to the possibility thereof, it further follows that it actually is. A necessary existent being, if possible, is; because, upon the supposition of its non-existence, it would be impossible for it ever to have been. Not so in contingent things. A perfect being is either impossible to have been, or else it is. Were God possible, and yet not, he would not be a necessary but contingent being. However, no stress laid upon this 144

Another plainer argument for the existence of a God, from his idea. Whatsoever we can frame an idea of in our minds, implying no contradiction, this either actually is, or else, if it be not, is possible to be. But if God be not, he is not possible to be. Therefore he is. The major before proved, that we cannot have an idea of any thing which hath neither actual nor possible existence 145

A further ratiocination from the idea of God, as including necessary existence, by certain steps. First, certain, that something or other did exist of itself from eternity, without beginning. Again, whatsoever did exist of itself from eternity, did so exist naturally and necessarily, and therefore there is a necessary existent being. Thirdly, nothing could exist of itself from eternity naturally and necessarily, but what contained necessary self-existence in its nature. Lastly, a perfect being, and nothing else, containeth necessary existence in its nature. Therefore it is. An appendix to this argument; that no temporary successive being could be from eternity without beginning. This proved before . . 145

Again, the controversy betwixt Atheists and Theists first clearly stated from the idea of God, and then satisfactorily decided. Premised, that as every thing was not made, so neither was every thing unmade. Atheists agree in both. The state of the controversy betwixt Theists and Atheists; whether that, which being itself unmade, was the cause of all other things made, were the most perfect or the most imperfect being. A certain kind of atheistic Theism, or Theogonism, which acknowledging a God, or soul of the world, presiding over the whole, supposed him, notwithstanding, to have emerged out of Night and Chaos; that is, to have been generated out of senseless matter 147

The controversy thus stated easily decided. Certain, that lesser per-

fection may be derived from greater, or from that which is absolutely perfect; but impossible, that greater perfection, and higher degrees of entity, should rise out of lesser and lower. Things did not ascend, but descend. That life and sense may naturally rise from the mere modification of dead and senseless matter, as also reason and understanding from sense; the philosophy of the kingdom of darkness. The Hylozoists so sensible of this, that there must be some substantial unmade life and understanding; that atheizing, they thought it necessary to attribute life and understanding to all matter as such. This argument a demonstration of the impossibility of Atheism 148

The controversy again more particularly stated, from the idea of God, as including mind and understanding in it; viz. whether all mind were made or generated out of senseless matter, or whether there were an eternal unmade mind, the maker of all. This the doctrine of Theists, that mind the oldest of all things; of Atheists, that it is a post-nate thing, younger than the world, and an umbratile image of real beings . 150

The controversy thus stated again decided. Though it does not follow, that if once there had been no corporeal world or matter, there could never have been any; yet it is certain, that if once there had been no life nor mind, there could have never been any life or mind. Our imperfect minds, not of themselves from eternity, and therefore derived from a perfect unmade mind 150

That Atheists think their chief strength to lie here, in their disproving a God, from the nature of understanding and knowledge. According to them, things made knowledge, and not knowledge things. All mind and understanding the creature of sensibles, and a fantastic image of them; and therefore no mind their creator. Thus does a modern writer conclude, that knowledge and understanding are not to be attributed to God, because they imply dependence upon things without; which is all one as if he should have said, that senseless matter is the more perfect of all things, and the highest numen 151

A compendious confutation of the premised atheistic principles. Knowledge not the activity of sensibles upon the knower and his passion. Sensible things themselves not known by the passion, or fancy of sense. Knowledge not from the force of the thing known, but of the knower. Besides phantasms of singular bodies, intelligible ideas universal. A late atheistic paradox, that universals nothing but names. Axiomatical truths in abstract sciences no passion from bodies by sense, nor yet gathered by induction from many singulars; we at once perceiving it impossible that they should be otherwise. An ingenious observation of Aristotle's, that could it be perceived by sense, the three angles of a triangle to be equal

to two right; yet would not this be science, or knowledge, properly so called: which is of universals first, and from thence descends to singulars 152

Again, we have conceptions of things incorporeal, as also of such corporeals as never did exist, and whose accuracy sense could not reach to; as a perfect straight line and plain superficies, an exact triangle, circle, or sphere. That we have a power of framing ideas of things that never were nor will be, but only possible 153

Inferred from hence, that human science itself not the mere image and creature of singular sensibles, but proleptical to them, and in order of nature before them. But since there must be νοητὸν before νοῦς, intelligibles before intellection;—the only true account of knowledge and its original is from a perfect omnipotent being, comprehending itself, and the extent of its own power, or the possibilities of all things, their relations and immutable truths. And of this one perfect mind all imperfect minds partake 154

Knowledge, therefore, in the nature of it, supposes the existence of a perfect omnipotent being, as its νοητὸν, or intelligible.—This comprehending itself, the first original knowledge, a mind before the world, and all sensibles not ectypal, but archetypal, and the framer of all. Wherefore not Atheism, but Theism, demonstrable from knowledge and understanding 154

This further confirmed from hence; because there are eternal verities, such as were never made, nor had any beginning. That the diagonal of a square incommensurable to the sides, an eternal truth to Aristotle. Justin Martyr's αἰώνια δίκαια, or eternal morals,—geometrical truths, not made by any man's thinking, but before all men; as also before the world and matter itself 156

Now if there be eternal verities, the simple reasons and intelligible essences of things must needs be eternal likewise. These called by Plato things that always are, but were never made, ingenerable and incorruptible. However Aristotle quarrels with Plato's ideas, yet does he also agree with him in this, that the forms or species of things were eternal, and never made; and that there is no generation of them; and that there are other things besides sensibles the immutable objects of science. Certain, that there could be no immutable science, were there no other objects of the mind but sensibles. The objects of geometrical science no material triangles, squares, etc.: these, by Aristotle, said to be nowhere. The intelligible natures of things to Philo the most necessary essences . 157

Now if there be eternal truths and intelligibles, whose existence also is necessary; since these can be nowhere but in a mind, there must be

an eternal necessarily-existing mind, comprehending all these ideas and truths at once, or being them. Which no other than the mind of a perfect omnipotent being, comprehending itself, and all possibilities of things, the extent of its own power 159

Wherefore there can be but one only original mind; which all other minds partake of. Hence ideas, or notions exactly alike in several men; and truths indivisibly the same: because their minds all stamped with the same original seal. Themistius; that one man could not teach another, were there not the same notion both in the learner and teacher. Nor could men confer together as they do, were there not one mind that all partaked of. That anti-monarchical opinion, of many understanding beings eternal and independent, confuted. And now have we not only asserted the idea of a God, and confuted all the atheistic pretences against it; but also from this idea demonstrated his existence . . 160

SECTION II.

A CONFUTATION of the second atheistic argument, against omnipotence and Divine creation; that nothing can, by any power whatsoever, be made out of nothing. In answer to which, three things to be insisted on. First, that *de nihilo nihil,* nothing out of nothing,—is in some sense an axiom of unquestionable truth, but then makes nothing against Theism, or Divine creation. Secondly, that nothing out of nothing, in the sense of the atheistic objectors, viz. that nothing, which once was not, could by any power whatsoever be brought into being, is absolutely false; and that if it were true, it would make no more against Theism than it does against Atheism. Lastly, that from this very axiom, nothing from nothing, in the true sense thereof, the absolute impossibility of Atheism is demonstrable 161

De nihilo nihil, nothing from nothing, in some sense is a common notion of unquestionable truth. For, first, certain that nothing, which once was not, could ever of itself come into being: or, that nothing can take beginning of existence from itself; or that nothing can be made or produced without an efficient cause. From whence demonstrated, that there was never nothing, or, that every thing was not made, but something did exist of itself from eternity unmade or underived from any thing else 161

Again, certain also that nothing could be efficiently produced by what hath not at least equal perfection, and a sufficient active or productive power. That of an effect, which transcends the perfection of its supposed cause, must come from nothing, or be made without a cause. Nor can

any thing be produced by another, though having equal perfection, unless it have also a sufficient active or productive power. Hence certain, that were there once no motion at all in the world, and no other substance besides body which had no self-moving power, there could never possibly be any motion or mutation to all eternity, for want of a sufficient cause or productive power. No imperfect being hath a productive power of any new substance which was not before, but only of new accidents and modifications; that is, no creature can create. Which two forementioned senses respect the efficient cause 162

Thirdly, nothing can be materially produced out of nothing pre-existing or inexisting. And, therefore, in all natural generations (where the supernatural power of the Deity interposes not) no new real entity or substance produced which was not before, but only new modifications of what substantially preexisted 163

Nothing out of nothing, so much insisted on by the old physiologers before Aristotle, in this sense, commonly misunderstood by modern writers, as if they designed thereby to take away all Divine creation out of nothing pre-existing. Granted, this to have been the sense of the Stoics and of Plutarch; he affirming the world to have been no otherwise made by God, than a house is by a carpenter, or a garment by a tailor. Plutarch and the Stoics therefore imperfect Theists, but nevertheless zealous religionists. But the ancient Italic philosophers here acted only as physiologers, and not as theologers, or metaphysicians; they not directing themselves against a Divine creation out of nothing pre-existing: but only contending, that neither in natural generations any new real entity was created, nor in corruptions annihilated; but only the modifications of what before existed, changed: or, that no real entity could be made out of matter 163

That this was the true meaning of those ancient physiologers, evident from the use which they made of this principle, nothing out of nothing; which twofold. First, upon this foundation they endeavoured to establish a peculiar kind of physiology, and some atomology or other, either similar or dissimilar: homœomery, or anomœomery. Anaxagoras from hence concluded, because nothing could be made out of nothing pre-existing and inexisting, that therefore there were in every body similar atoms, of all kinds, out of which, by concretions and secretions, all natural generations made; so that bone was made out of bony atoms pre-existing and inexisting; flesh out of fleshy, and the like. This the Anaxagorean homœomery, or similar atomology, built upon this principle, nothing out of nothing 165

But the ancient Italics, both before and after Anaxagoras (whom

Leucippus, Democritus, and Epicurus, here followed,) with greater sagacity concluded, from the same principle, nothing out of nothing, that those qualities and forms of bodies, naturally generated and corrupted, were therefore no real entities, distinct from the substance of matter, but only different modifications thereof, causing different fancies in us; and this an anomœomery, or dissimilar atomology, the atoms thereof being devoid of qualities. Those simple elements or letters (in nature's alphabet,) out of which, variously combined, these philosophers spelled out or compounded all the syllables and words (or complexions) of corporeal things, nothing but figure, site, motion, rest, and magnitude of parts. Were qualities and forms real entities distinct from these, and not pre-existing (as Anaxagoras dreamed,) they must then have come from nothing, in natural generations; which impossible . . . 166

Another improvement of this principle, nothing out of nothing, made by the Italic philosophers; that the souls of animals, especially human, since they could not possibly result from the mere modifications of matter, figure, site, motion, etc. were not produced in generations, nor annihilated in deaths and corruptions: but being substantial things, did pre and post-exist. This set down as the controversy betwixt Atheists and Theists, in Lucretius. Whether souls were generated, or insinuated into bodies. Generations and corruptions of animals, to these Pythagoreans, but anagrammatical transpositions. That those philosophers, who asserted the pre-existence and ingenerability of souls, did not therefore suppose them to have been self-existent and uncreated, but derived them all from the Deity. Thus Proclus, though maintaining the eternity of souls with the world. The ingenerability of souls in Plato's Timæus no more than this, that they were not generated out of matter; and for this cause also were they called principles, in the same sense as matter was so accounted. Souls, therefore, to Plato, created by God, though not in the generation of animals, but before 167

St. Austin himself sometime staggering and sceptical in the point of pre-existence. That we have a philosophic certainty of no more than this, that souls were created by God out of nothing pre-existing, some time or other; either in generations, or before them. That unless brutes be mere machines, the reason the same also concerning brutish souls; that these not generated out of matter, but created some time or other by the Deity; as well as the matter of their bodies was . . 169

That all these three forementioned particulars, wherein it is true, that nothing can possibly come from nothing, are reducible to this one general proposition, that nothing can be caused by nothing; which will no way clash with the Divine omnipotence or creative power, as shall be showed

afterwards; but confirm the same. But those same words, nothing out of nothing, may carry another sense; when that ἐξ οὐκ ὄντων, out of nothing,—is not taken causally, but only to signify the *terminus a quo*, the term from which, or an antecedent nonexistence: and the meaning thereof will be, that nothing which before was not, could afterwards, by any power whatsoever, be brought into being. And this the sense of the Democritic and Epicurean objectors; viz. that no real entity can be made, or brought out of nonexistence into being; and therefore the creative power of Theists an impossibility 170

Our second undertakings in way of answer hereunto; to show, that nothing out of nothing, in this sense is false; as also, that, were it true yet it would make no more against Theism than it doth against Atheism; and therefore ought not to be used by Atheists as an argument against a God. If this universally true, that nothing at all, which once was not, could ever be brought into being, then could there be no making nor causing at all no motion nor action, mutation or generation. But ourselves have a power of producing new cogitation in our minds, and new motion in our bodies. Wherefore Atheists forced to restrain this proposition to substantials only. And here some deceived with the equivocation, in this ἐξ οὐκ ὄντων, out of nothing; which may be taken either causally, or else to signify the term from which that is, from an antecedent nonexistence; they confounding both these together; whereof the first only true, the latter false. Again, others staggered with the plausibility of this proposition; partly because no artificial thing (as a house or garment) can be made by men, but out of pre-existing matter; and partly because ancient physiologers maintained the same also concerning natural generations, that no new real entity or substance could be therein produced; and lastly, because it is certain that no imperfect created being can create any new substance; they being therefore apt to measure all power whatsoever by these scantlings. But as easy for a perfect being to create a world, matter and all, out of nothing (in this sense, that is, out of an antecedent nonexistence), as for us to create a thought, or to move a finger, or for the sun to send out rays. For an imperfect substance, which once was not, to be brought into being by God, this not impossible, in any of the forementioned senses; he having not only infinitely greater perfection, but also sufficient productive or emanative power. True, that infinite power cannot do things in their own nature impossible; but nothing thus impossible but what contradictious: and though a contradiction for any thing, at the same time, to be and not be; yet none at all, for an imperfect being (which is in its nature contingent to existence), after it had not been to be. Wherefore, since the making of a substance to be, which was not

before, is no way contradictious, nor consequently in its own nature impossible: it must needs be an object of perfect power . . . 171

Furthermore, if no real entity or substance could possibly be brought out of nonexistence into being; then must the reason hereof be, because no substance can derive its whole being from another substance. But from hence it would follow, that whatsoever is substantial, did not only exist from eternity, but also of itself, independently upon any thing else. Whereas first, the pre-eternity of temporary beings not agreeable to reason; and then, to suppose imperfect substances to have existed of themselves and necessarily, is to suppose something to come from nothing, in the impossible sense; they having no necessary self-existence in their nature. As they, who affirm all substance to be body, and no body to be able to move itself, though supposing motion to have been from eternity; yet make this motion to come from nothing, or be caused by nothing. What in its nature contingently possible to be, or not be, could not exist of itself; but must derive its being from something else, which necessarily existeth. Plato's distinction therefore betwixt two kinds of substances must needs be admitted, that, which always is, and was never made; and that which is made, or had a beginning 173

Lastly, if this true, that no substance makeable or producible, it would not only follow from thence (as the Epicurean Atheist supposes) that matter, but also that all souls (at least human), did exist of themselves, from eternity, independently upon any thing else; it being impossible, that mind or soul should be a modification of senseless matter, or result from figures, sites, motions, and magnitudes. Human souls substantial, and therefore according to this doctrine, must have been never made; whereas Atheists stiffly deny both their pre and post-existence. Those pagan Theists, who held the eternity of human minds, supposed them, notwithstanding, to have depended upon the Deity, as their cause. Before proved, that there can be but one understanding being, self-existent. If human souls depend upon the Deity as their cause, then doubtless matter also 174

A common but great mistake that no pagan Theist ever acknowledged any creative power out of nothing; or else, that God was the cause of any substance. Plato's definition of effective power in general, and his affirmation, that the Divine efficiency is that whereby things are made after they had not been. Certain, that he did not understand this of the production of souls out of matter, he supposing them to be before matter, and therefore made by God out of nothing pre-existing. All philosophers, who held the immortality and incorporeity of the soul, asserted it to have been caused by God, either in time or from eternity. Plutarch's singu-

larity here. Unquestionable, that the Platonists supposed one substance to receive its whole being from another; in that they derive their second hypostasis or substance, though eternal, from the first; and their third from both; and all inferior ranks of beings from all three. Plotinus, Porphyrius, Jamblichus, Hierocles, Proclus, and others, derived matter from the Deity. Thus the Chaldee oracles; and the old Egyptian or Hermaic theology also, according to Jamblichus. Those Platonists, who supposed the world and souls eternal, conceived by them to have received their being as much from the Deity as if made in time 176

Having now disproved this proposition, "nothing out of nothing," in the atheistic sense, viz. That no substance was caused or derived its being from another, but whatsoever is substantial, did exist of itself from eternity, independently; we are, in the next place, to make it appear also, that were it true, it would no more oppose Theism than it doth Atheism. Falsehoods (though not truths) may disagree. Plutarch, the Stoics, and others, who made God the creator of no substance, though not genuine yet zealous Theists. But the ancient Atheists, both in Plato and Aristotle, generated and corrupted all things; that is, produced all things out of nothing, or nonexistence, and reduced them into nothing again; the bare substance of matter only excepted. The same done by the Democritic and Epicurean Atheists themselves, the makers of this objection: though according to the principles of their own atomic physiology, it is impossible, that life and understanding, soul and mind, should be mere modifications of matter. As Theists give a creative power of all, out of nothing, to the Deity: so do Atheists to passive and dead matter. Wherefore this can be no argument against Theism; it equally opposing Atheism 178

An anacephalæosis; wherein observable, that Cicero makes *de nihilo fieri*, and *sine causa*, to be made out of nothing, and to be made without a cause, one and the self-same thing; as also that he doth not confine this to the material cause only. Our third and last undertaking; to prove that Atheists produce real entities out of nothing, in the first impossible sense; that is, without a cause 183

A brief synopsis of Atheism; that matter being the only substance, is therefore the only unmade thing; and that whatsoever else is in the world besides the bare substance thereof, was made out of matter, or produced from that alone 185

The first argument: when Atheists affirm matter to be the only substance, and all things to be made out of that, they suppose all to be made without an efficient cause; which is to bring them from nothing, in an impossible sense. Though something may be made without a material

cause pre-existing; yet cannot any thing possibly be made without an efficient cause. Wherefore if there be any thing made, which was not before, there must of necessity be, besides matter, some other substance as the active efficient cause thereof. The atheistic hypothesis supposes things to be made without any active or effective principle. Whereas the Epicurean Atheists attribute the efficiency of all to local motion; and yet deny matter or body (their only substance) a self-moving power. They hereby make all the motion that is in the world to have been without a cause, or to come from nothing; all action without an agent: all efficiency without an efficient 185

Again, should we grant these Atheists motion without a cause, yet could not dead and senseless matter, together with motion, ever beget life, sense, and understanding; because this would be something out of nothing in the way of causality, local motion only changing the modifications of matter, as figure, place, site, and disposition of parts. Hence also those spurious Theists confuted, who conclude God to have done no more in the making of the world, than a carpenter doth in the building of a house (upon this pretence, that nothing can be made out of nothing); and yet suppose him to make souls out of dead and senseless matter, which is to bring them from nothing in way of causality . . 186

Declared before, That the ancient Italics and Pythagorics proved in this manner, that souls could not possibly be generated out of matter; because nothing can come from nothing in way of causality. The subterfuge of the atheistic Ionics out of Aristotle; that matter being the only substance, and life, sense and understanding, nothing but the passions, affections, and dispositions thereof; the production of them out of matter, no production of any new real entity 186

Answer: Atheists taking it for granted, that there is no other substance besides body or matter, therefore falsely conclude life, sense, and understanding to be accidents or modes of matter; they being indeed the modes or attributes of substance incorporeal and self-active. A mode that which cannot be conceived without the thing whereof it is a mode; but life and cogitation may be conceived without corporeal extension; and indeed cannot be conceived with it 187

The chief occasion of this error from qualities and forms; as because the quality of heat, and form of fire, may be generated out of matter; therefore life, cogitation and understanding also. But the atomic Atheists themselves explode qualities, as things really distinct from the figure, site and motion of parts, for this very reason, because nothing can be made out of nothing causally. The vulgar opinion of such real qualities in bodies, only from men's mistaking their own fancies, apparitions,

passions, affections, and seemings, for things really existing without them. That in these qualities, which is distinct from the figure, site, and motion of parts, not the accidents and modifications of matter, but of our own souls. The Atomic Atheists infinitely absurd when exploding qualities, because nothing can come out of nothing, themselves bring life, sense and understanding, out of nothing, in way of causality. That opinion, that cogitation is nothing but local motion, and men themselves but mere machines, prodigious sottishness or intolerable impudence . 188

Very observable here, that Epicurus himself, having a mind to assert contingent liberty, confesseth, that he could not do this, unless there were some such thing in the principles; because nothing can be made out of nothing, or caused by nothing: and therefore does he ridiculously feign a third motion of atoms, to solve that phenomena of free will. Wherefore he must needs be guilty of an impossible production, of something out of nothing, when he brings soul and mind out of dead senseless atoms. Were there no substantial and eternal life and understanding in the universe, there could none have been ever produced; because it must have come from nothing, or been made without a cause. That dark philosophy which educes not only real qualities and substantial forms, but also souls themselves, at least sensitive, out of the power of the matter, educes them out of nothing, or makes them without a cause; and so prepares a direct way to Atheism 190

They who suppose matter otherwise than by motion, and by a kind of miraculous efficiency, to produce souls, and minds, attribute that creative power to this senseless and inactive matter, which themselves deny to a perfect being as an absolute impossiblity. Thus have we demonstrated the impossibility and nonsense of all Atheism from this very principle, That nothing can be made from nothing, or without sufficient cause 192

Wherefore, if no middle betwixt these two, but all things must either spring from a God, or matter; then is this also a demonstration of the truth of Theism, by deduction to impossible: either there is a God, or else all things are derived from dead and senseless matter: but this latter is impossible; therefore a God. Nevertheless, that the existence of a God may be further directly proved also from the same principle, rightly understood, nothing out of nothing causally, or nothing caused by nothing neither efficiently nor materially 192

By these steps; first, that there was never nothing, but something or other did exist of itself from eternity, unmade, and independently upon any thing else, mathematically certain; from this principle, "nothing from nothing." Had there been once nothing, there could never have been any thing. Again, Whatsoever did exist of itself from eternity, must have so

existed necessarily, and not by any free will and choice. Certain, therefore that there is something actually in being, whose existence is and always was necessary. Now that which exists necessarily of itself, must have necessity of existence in its nature; which nothing but a perfect being hath. Therefore there is a perfect being; and nothing else besides this did exist of itself from eternity, but all other things whatsoever (whether souls or matter) were made by it. To suppose any thing to exist of itself necessarily, that hath no necessary existence in its nature, is to suppose that necessary existence to have come from nothing . . . 193

Three reasons why some Theists have been so staggering and sceptical about the necessary self-existence of matter. First, from an idiotical conceit, that because artificial things cannot be made by men but out of pre-existent matter, therefore nothing by God, or a perfect being, can be otherwise made. Secondly, because some of them have supposed ἀλὴν ἀσώματον, an incorporeal hyle, or first matter unmade; an opinion older than Aristotle. Whereas this really nothing but a metaphysical notion of the potentiality or possibility of things, respectively to the Deity. Lastly, because some of them have conceived body and space to be really the same thing; and space to be positively infinite, eternal, and necessarily existent. But if space be not the extension of the Deity itself, as some suppose; but of body, only considered abstractedly from this or that, and therefore immoveably; then no sufficient ground for the positive infinity or the indefinity thereof, as Cartesius imagined: we being certain of no more than this, that be the world and its space or extension never so great, yet it might still be greater and greater infinitely; for which very cause it could never be positively infinite. This possibility of more body and space, further and further indefinitely, or without end, as also its eternity, mistaken, for actual space and distance positively infinite and eternal. Nor is there perhaps any such great absurdity in the finiteness of actual space and distance (according to this hypothesis), as some conceive . 194

Moreover, the existence of a God may be further proved from this common notion, "nothing from nothing causally;" not only because were there no God, that idea which we have of a perfect being must have come from nothing, and be the conception of nothing; but also all the other intelligible ideas of our minds must have come from nothing likewise, they being not derived from sense. All minds, and their intelligible ideas by way of participation, from one perfect omnipotent being comprehending itself 195

However, certain from this principle, "nothing from nothing," or "nothing caused by nothing;" that souls and minds could never have emerged out of dead and senseless matter, or from figures, sites, and mo-

tions; and therefore must either have all existed of themselves, necessarily from eternity; or else be created by the Deity out of nothing pre-existing. Concluded, that the existence of a God is altogether as certain, as that our human souls did not all exist from eternity, of themselves necessarily. Thus is the second atheistic argumentation against omnipotence or Divine creation, from that false principle, "nothing out of nothing," in the atheistic sense (which is, that nothing could be brought out of nonexistence into being, or no substance derive its whole being from another substance, but all was self-existent from eternity), abundantly confuted; it having been demonstrated, that unless there be a God, or a perfect omnipotent being, and creator, something must have come from nothing in the impossible sense; that is, have been caused by nothing, or made without a cause 196

SECTION III.

The six following atheistic argumentations, driving at these two things (the disproving, first of an incorporeal and then of a corporeal Deity), next taken all together. In way of answer to which, three things. First, to confute the atheistic argumentations against an incorporeal Deity, being the third and fourth. Secondly, to show, that from the very principles of the atheistic Corporealism, in their fifth and sixth arguments, incorporeal substance is demonstrable. And, lastly, that therefore the two following atheistic arguments (built upon the contrary supposition) are also insignificant 196

Before we come to the Atheistic arguments against an incorporeal Deity, premised; that though all Corporealists be not Atheists, yet Atheists universally mere Corporealists. Thus Plato in his Sophist, writing of those who maintained that nature generated all things without the direction of any mind, affirmeth, that they held body and substance to be one and the self-same thing. From whence it follows, that incorporeal substance is incorporeal body, or contradictious nonsense; and that whatsoever is not body is nothing. He likewise addeth, that they who asserted the soul to be a body, but had not the confidence to make prudence and other virtues bodies (or bodily), quite overthrow the cause of Atheism. Aristotle also represented the atheistic hypothesis thus, that there is but one nature, matter; and this corporeal (or endued with magnitude) the only substance; and all other things, the passions and affections thereof 197

In disproving incorporeal substance, some difference amongst the Atheists themselves. First, those who held a vacuum (as Epicurus and

Democritus, etc.) though taking it for granted, that what is unextended or devoid of magnitude is nothing; yet acknowledged a double extended nature; the first impenetrable and tangible, body: the second penetrable and intangible, space or vacuum; to them the only incorporeal. Their argument thus; since nothing incorporeal besides space (which can neither do nor suffer any thing,) therefore no incorporeal Deity. The answer: if space be a real nature, and yet not bodily; then must it needs be either an affection of incorporeal substance, or else an accident without a substance. Gassendus's officiousness here to help the Atheists, that space is neither accident nor substance, but a middle nature, or essence betwixt both. But, whatsoever is, must either subsist by itself, or else be an attribute, affection, or mode of something, that subsisteth by itself. Space, either the extension of body, or of incorporeal substance, or of nothing; but nothing cannot be extended; wherefore space, supposed not to be the extension of body, must be the extension of an incorporeal substance infinite, or the Deity; as some Theists assert . . . 198

Epicurus's pretended gods, such as could neither touch nor be touched, and had not *corpus*, but *quasi corpus* only; and therefore incorporeals distinct from space. But granted that he colluded or juggled in this 199

Other Atheists, who denied a vacuum, and allowed not space to be a nature, but a mere imaginary thing, the phantasm of a body, or else extension considered abstractedly, argued thus: whatsoever is extended, is body, or bodily; but whatsoever is, is extended; therefore whatsoever is, is body 200

This argument against incorporeal substance answered two manner of ways; some assertors of incorporeal substance denying the minor, whatsoever is, is extended; others the major of it, whatsoever is extended is body. First, the generality of ancient Incorporealists really maintained, that there was something unextended, indistant, devoid of quantity, and of magnitude, without parts, and indivisible. Plato, that the soul is before longitude, latitude, and profundity. He also denies, that whatsoever is in no place, is nothing. Aristotle's first immoveable mover also devoid of magnitude. So likewise is mind, or that which understands, to him. He also denies place and local motion to the soul otherwise than by accident with the body 200

Philo's double substance, distant and indistant. God also to him, both every where (because his powers extend to all things) and yet no where, as in a place; place being created by him, together with bodies. Plotinus much concerned in this doctrine. Two books of his upon this subject, that one and the same numerical thing (viz. the Deity) may be all, or the whole every where. God, to him, before all things that are in a place: therefore wholly present to whatsoever present. This would he

prove also from natural instincts. He affirmeth likewise, that the human soul is numerically the same, both in the hand and in the foot. Simplicius's argument for unextended substance; that whatsoever is self-moving, must be indivisible and indistant. His affirmation, that souls, locally immoveable, move the body by cogitation 204

None more full and express in this than Porphyrius. His assertion, that were there such an incorporeal space (as Democritus and Epicurus supposed,) mind, or God, could not be coextended with it; but only body. The whole Deity indivisibly and indistantly present to every part of divisible and distant things 206

Thus Origen in his against Celsus. St. Austin, that the human soul hath no dimensions, of length, breadth, and thickness, and is in itself *illocabilis*. Boethius reckons this amongst the common notions, known only to wise men, that incorporeals are in no place 207

This therefore no novel or recent opinion, that the Deity is not part of it here, and part of it there, nor mensurable by yards and poles; but the whole undivided, present to every part of the world. But because many objections against this, we shall further show, how these ancient Incorporealists endeavoured to quit themselves of them. The first objection, that to suppose the Deity, and other incorporeal substances, unextended, is to make them absolute parvitudes, and so contemptible things. Plotinus's answer; that what is incorporeal, not so indivisible as a little thing; either a physical minimum, or mathematical point: for thus God could not *congruere* with the whole world, nor the soul with the whole body. Again, God not so indivisible, as the least, he being the greatest of all, not in magnitude, but power. He so indivisible, as also infinite. This an error proceeding from sense and imagination; that what unextended, therefore little. Incorporeal substance, the whole of which is present to every part of body, therefore greater than body. Porphyrius to the same purpose, that God is neither to be looked upon as the least, nor as the greatest, in way of magnitude 208

The second objection; that what neither great nor little, and possesses no place, a nonentity. This, according to Plato, Plotinus, and Porphyrius, a mistake proceeding from men's adhering to sense and imagination. They grant, that an unextended being is ἀφάνταστον, unimaginable. Porphyrius, that mind and fancy are not the same, as some maintain. That, which can neither do, or suffer, not nothing, though it swell not out into distance. Two kinds of substances to Plotinus; bulky tumours, and unbulky active powers. Which latter, said by Simplicius to have nevertheless a certain depth or profundity in them. Something ἀφάνταστον, unimaginable,—even in body itself. We cannot possibly imagine the

sun of such a bigness, as reason evinces it to be urged also by Plotinus, that an unstretched-out duration, or timeless eternity, as difficult to be conceived as an unextended substance: and yet must this needs be attributed to the Deity 211

That God and human souls no otherwise incorporeal than as σῶμα λεπτομερὲς, a thin or subtile body, false. Because the difference of grossness and subtlety in bodies, according to true philosophy, only from motion. That the most subtile body may possibly be made as gross as lead or iron; and the grossest as subtile as ether. No specific difference of matter 214

The third argument against unextended substance; that to be all in the whole, and all in every part, a contradiction and impossibility. This granted by Plotinus to be true of bodies, or that which is extended; that it cannot be ὁμοῦ πᾶν· but impossible, that what hath no parts, should be a part here, and a part there. Wherefore the word ὅλον (in that, whole in the whole, and whole in every part) to be taken only in a negative sense, for μὴ μεμερισμένον, undivided.—The whole undivided Deity every where; and not a part of it here only, and a part there 215

The last objection is against the illocality and immobility of finite created spirits, and human souls only. That this not only absurd, but also contrary to that generally-received tradition amongst Theists, of souls moving locally after death, into another place, called Hades. Two answers of Plotinus to this. First, that by Hades may be meant only the invisible, or the soul's acting without the body. Secondly, that if by Hades be meant a worser place, the soul may be said to be there where its idol is. But when this same philosopher supposeth the soul (in good men) to be separable also from this idol, he departeth from the genuine cabala of his own school. That souls always united to some body or other. This asserted here by Porphyrius; that the soul is never quite naked of all body; and therefore may be said to be there, wheresoever its body is 216

Some excerptions out of Philoponus; wherein the doctrine of the ancients, concerning the soul's spirituous or airy body (after death,) is largely declared 219

Intimated here by Philoponus, that, according to some of these ancients, the soul hath such a spirituous body here in this life, as its interior indument, which then adheres to it, when its outer garment is stripped off by death. An opinion of some, that the soul may, in this spirituous body, leave its grosser body for some time, without death. True, that our soul doth not immediately act upon bones and flesh; but certain thin and subtile spirits, the instruments of sense and motion. Of

which Porphyrius thus: "The blood is the food of the spirit, and the spirit the vehicle of the soul" 222

The same Philoponus further addeth, that, according to the ancients, besides both the terrestrial and this spirituous or airy body, there is yet a third kind of body, peculiar to such as are souls, as are more thoroughly purged after death; called by them a luciform, and heavenly and ethereal, and star-like body. Of this Proclus also upon the Timæus (who affirmeth it to be unorganized,) as likewise Hierocles. This called the thin vehicle of the soul, in the Chaldee oracles, according to Psellus and Pletho. By Hierocles, a spiritual body, in a sense agreeable to that of the Scripture: by Synesius, the Divine body. This distinction of two interior vehicles, or tunicles of the soul, besides the terrestrial body (called by Plato the ostreaceous,) no invention of latter Platonists since Christianity; it being plainly insisted upon by Virgil, though commonly not understood 223

That many of these Platonists and Pythagoreans supposed the soul, in its first creation, when made pure by God, to be clothed with this luciform and heavenly body; which also did always inseparably adhere to it, in its after-descents into the aëreal and terrestrial; though fouled and obscured. Thus Pletho. And the same intimated by Galen; when he calls this the first vehicle of the soul. Hence was it, that besides the moral and intellectual purgation of the soul, they recommended also a mystical or telestic way of purifying the ethereal vehicle, by diet and catharms. This much insisted on by Hierocles. What Pliny's dying by wisdom, or the philosophic death 225

But this not the opinion of all, that the same numerical ethereal body always adhereth to the soul; but only, that it every where either finds or makes a body suitable to itself. Thus Porphyrius. Plato also seems to have been of that persuasion 228

This affirmed by Hierocles to have been the genuine cabala of the ancient Pythagoreans, which Plato afterward followed. Hierocles's definition of a man, a rational soul together with a cognate immortal body; he declaring this enlivened terrestrial body to be but the idol or image of the true man, or an accession to him. This therefore the answer of the ancient Incorporealists to that objection against the illocality and immobility of created incorporeals; that these being all naturally united to some body or other, may be thus said to be in a place, and locally moved. And, that it does not follow, that because created incorporeals are unextended, they might therefore inform the whole corporeal universe . 229

That it would be no impertinent digression here to compare the forementioned Pythagoric cabala with the doctrine of Christianity; and to

consider their agreement or disagreement. First, therefore, a clear agreement of these most religious philosophers with Christianity in this, that the highest happiness and perfection of human nature consisteth not in a separate state of souls un-united to any body, as some high-flown persons have conceited. Thus Plotinus, who sometimes runs as much into the other extreme, in supposing human souls to animate not only the bodies of brutes but also of plants. Thus also Maimonides amongst the Jews; and therefore suspected for denying the resurrection. His Iggereth Teman written purposely to purge himself of this suspicion. The allegorizers of the resurrection, and of the life to come . . . 230

Again, Christianity correspondeth with the philosophic cabala concerning human souls in this, that their happiness consisteth not in conjunction with such gross terrestrial bodies as these we now have; Scripture, as well as philosophy, complaining of them as a heavy load and burden to the soul; which therefore not to be taken up again at the resurrection. Such a resurrection as this called by Plotinus a resurrection to another sleep. The difference betwixt the resurrection-body and this present body in Scripture. The resurrection-body of the just (as that of the philosophic cabala) immortal and eternal, glorious and lucid; star-like and spiritual; heavenly and angelical. Not this gross fleshly body, gilded and varnished over in the outside only, but changed throughout. This the resurrection of life, in Scripture emphatically called the resurrection. Our souls strangers and pilgrims in these terrestrial bodies: their proper home and country the heavenly body. That the grossest body that this, according to philosophy, may merely by motion be brought into the purity and tenuity of the finest ether 232

But whether human souls after death, always united to some body, or else quite naked from all body till the resurrection; not so explicitly determined in Christianity. Souls after death live unto God. According to Origen, this a privilege proper to the Deity, to live and act alone, without vital union with any body. If natural to the soul to enliven a body, then not probable that it should be kept so long in an unnatural state of separation 237

Again; probable from Scripture that wicked souls after death have punishment of sense or pain, besides remorse of conscience: which not easily conceivable how they should have without bodies. Thus Tertullian. He adding, that men have the same shape or effigies after this life which they had here. Though indeed he drive the business too far, so as to make the soul itself to be a body, figurate and colourate . . 238

But Irenæus plainly supposed the soul after death (being incorporeal) to be adapted to a body, such as has the same character and figure with its body here in this life 240

Origen also of this persuasion, that souls after death have certain subtile bodies, retaining the same characterizing form which their terrestrial bodies had. His opinion, that apparitions of the dead are from the souls themselves, surviving in that which is called a luciform body. As, also, that St. Thomas did not doubt but that the body of a soul departed might appear every way like the former: only he disbelieved our Saviour's appearing in the same solid body which he had before death . 241

Our Saviour telling his disciples, that a spirit had no flesh and bones, that is, no solid body as himself then had, seems to imply them to have thinner bodies, which they may visibly appear in. Thus, in Apollonius, is touch made the sign to distinguish a ghost appearing from a living man. Our Saviour's body after his resurrection, according to Origen, in a middle state betwixt this gross or solid body of ours, and that of a ghost 243

A place of Scripture, which, as interpreted by the fathers, would naturally imply the soul of our Saviour after death not to have been quite naked of all body, but to have had a corporeal spirit. Moses and Elias visibly appearing to our Saviour, had therefore true bodies . 244

That the regenerate here in this life have a certain earnest of their future inheritance (which is their spiritual or heavenly body,) gathered from Scripture by Irenæus and Novatian. Which prelibations of the spiritual body cannot so well consist with a perfect separation from all body after death till the day of judgment 245

This opinion of Irenæus, Origen, and others, supposed by them not at all to clash with the Christian article of the resurrection. Nothing in this point determined by us 246

The last thing in the Pythagoric cabala, that demons or angels, and indeed all created understanding beings, consist, as well as men, of soul and body, incorporeal and corporeal, united all together. Thus Hierocles, universally of all the rational nature; and that no incorporeal substance, besides the supreme Deity, is complete, without the conjunction of a body. God the only incorporeal in this sense; and not a mundane but a supra-mundane soul 246

Origen's full agreement with this old Pythagoric cabala, that rational creatures are neither body, nor yet without body: but incorporeal substances having a corporeal indument 248

Origen misrepresented by Huetius, as asserting angels not to have bodies, but to be bodies; whereas he plainly acknowledged the human soul to be incorporeal, and angels also to have souls. He proveth incorporeal creatures from the Scriptures; which, though themselves not

bodies, yet always use bodies. Whereas the Deity is neither body, nor yet clothed with a body, as the proper soul thereof . . . 249

Some of the fathers so far from supposing angels altogether incorporeal, that they ran into the other extreme, and concluded them altogether corporeal; that is, to be all body, and nothing else. The middle betwixt both these, the Origenic and Pythagoric hypothesis, that they consist of incorporeal and corporeal substance, soul and body joined together. The generality of the ancient fathers for neither of those extremes. That they did not suppose angels to be perfectly unbodied spirits, evident from their affirming devils, as the Greek philosophers did demons, to be delighted with the nidours of sacrifices; as having their vaporous bodies, or airy vehicles, refreshed thereby. Thus Porphyrius, and before him Celsus. Amongst the Christians (besides Origen,) Justin, Athenagoras, Tatianus, etc. St. Basil, concerning the bodies of demons or devils being nourished with vapours; not by organs, but throughout their whole substance 251

Several of the fathers plainly asserting both devils and angels to consist of soul and body, incorporeal and corporeal substance joined together. St. Austin, Claudianus, Mamertus, Fulgentius, Joannes Thessalonicensis; and Psellus, who philosophizeth much concerning this . . . 253

That some of the ancients, when they called angels incorporeal, understood nothing else thereby but only that they had not gross but subtile bodies 256

The fathers, though herein happening to agree with the philosophic cabala, yet seemed to have been led thereunto by Scripture. As from that of our Saviour, they who shall obtain the resurrection of the dead, shall be ἰσάγγελοι, equal to the angels;—that is, according to St. Austin, shall have angelical bodies. From that of St. Jude, that angels sinning lost their own proper dwelling-house; that is, their heavenly body (called οἰκητήριον by St. Paul,) which made them fit inhabitants of the heavenly regions; and thereupon cast down into the lower Tartarus; interpreted by St. Austin to be this caliginous air or atmosphere of the earth. Again, from that fire said to have been prepared for the devils: which being not to be taken metaphorically, therefore (as Psellus concludeth) implies them to be bodied; because an incorporeal substance alone, and not vitally united to any body, cannot be tormented with fire . . 258

Now if all created incorporeals, superior to men, be souls vitally united to bodies, and never quite separate from all body; then probable, that human souls, after death, not quite naked from all body, as if they could live and act completely without it; a privilege superior to that of angels, and

proper to the Deity. Nor is it at all conceivable how imperfect beings could have sense and imagination without bodies. *Origen contra Celsum*, "Our soul, in its own nature incorporeal, always standeth in need of a body suitable to the place wherein it is. And, accordingly, sometimes putteth off what it had before; and sometimes again putteth on something new." Where the following words being vitiated, Origen's genuine sense restored. Evident, that Origen distinguisheth the τὸ σκῆνος in St. Paul (translated *tabernacle*) from the earthly house; he understanding by the former a thin spirituous body, which is a middle betwixt the earthly and the heavenly, and which the soul remaineth still clothed with after death. This opinion of Origen's, that the soul after death not quite separate from all body, never reckoned up in the catalogue of his errors. Origen not taxed by Methodius for asserting souls to have bodies, but for not asserting them to be bodies; there being no truly incorporeal substance, according to Methodius, but the Deity. This one of the extremes mentioned. And the Origenic hypothesis to be preferred before that of Methodius 261

Already observed, that Origen not singular in this opinion concerning human souls; Irenæus, Philoponus, Joannes Thessalonicensis, Psellus, and others, asserting the same. St. Austin in his De Gen. ad Lit. granted, that souls after death cannot be carried to any corporeal places, nor locally moved without a body. Himself seems to think the punishment of souls, before the resurrection, to be fantastical. But gives liberty of thinking otherwise. In his book De Civ. D. he conceives that Origenic opinion not improbable, that some souls after death, and before the resurrection, may suffer from a certain fire for the consuming and burning up of their dross: which could not be without bodies 264

Hitherto showed how the ancient assertors of unextended incorporeals answered all the objections made against them; but especially that of the illocality and immobility of created incorporeals; namely, that by those bodies which they are always vitally united to, they are localized and made capable of motion; according to that of Origen, the soul stands in need of a body for local motions. Next to be considered their reasons for this assertion of unextended and indistant substance, so repugnant to imagination 267

That whatsoever arguments do evince other substance besides body, the same against the Atheists demonstrate, that there is something unextended; themselves taking it for granted, that whatsoever is extended, is body. Nevertheless, other arguments propounded by these ancients, to prove directly unextended substance. Plotinus's first, to prove the human soul and mind such. Either every part of an unextended soul, is soul; and of mind, mind; or not. If the latter, that no part of a soul, or mind, is by

itself soul, or mind; then cannot the whole made up of all those parts, be such. But if every supposed part of a soul be soul, and of a mind, mind; then would all but one be superfluous: or every one be the whole: which cannot be in extended things 267

Again, Plotinus endeavors to prove, from the energies of the soul, that it is unextended; because it is one and the same indivisible thing, that perceiveth the whole sensible object. This further pursued; if the soul be extended, then must it either be one physical point, or more. Impossible, that it should be but one physical point. If therefore more, then must every one of those points either perceive a point of the object, and no more, or else the whole. If the former, then can nothing perceive the whole, nor compare one part of it with another: if the latter, then would every man have innumerable perceptions of the whole object at once. A fourth supposition, that the whole extended soul perceives both the whole object, and all the parts thereof (no part of the soul having any perception by itself); not to be made; because the whole of an extended substance nothing but all the parts: and so if no part have any perception the whole can have none. Moreover, to say the whole soul perceiveth all, and no part of it any thing, is indeed to acknowledge it unextended, and to have no distant parts 269

Again, this philosopher would prove the same thing from the sympathy or homopathy which is in animals; it being one and the same thing that perceives pain in the head and in the foot, and comprehends the whole bulk of the body 272

Lastly, he disputes further from the rational energies. A magnitude could not understand what hath no magnitude and what is indivisible: whereas we have a notion, not only of latitude as indivisible to thickness, and of longitude as to breadth, but also of a mathematical point, every way indivisible. We have notions of things also that have neither magnitude nor site, etc. Again, all the abstract essences of things indivisible. We conceive extended things themselves unextendedly; the thought of a mile, or a thousand miles distance, taking up no more room in the soul, than the thought of an inch, or of a mathematical point. Moreover, were that, which perceiveth in us, a magnitude, it could not be equal to every sensible, and alike perceive things greater and lesser than itself . 273

Besides which, they might argue thus; that we as we can conceive extension without cogitation, and again cogitation without extension (from whence their distinction and separability is inferrible): so can we not conceive cogitation with extension; nor the length, breadth, and thickness of a thought; nor the half, or a third, or the twentieth part thereof; nor that it is figurative, round, or angular. Thoughts therefore must be nonenti-

ties, if whatsoever is unextended be nothing; as also metaphysical truths they having neither dimensions nor figure. So volitions and passions, knowledge and wisdom itself, justice and temperance. If the things belonging to soul and mind be unextended, then must themselves be so. Again, if mind and soul have distant parts, then could none of them be one, but many substances. If life divided, then half of it would not be life. Lastly, no reason could be given, why they might not be as well really as intellectually divisible. Nor could a Theist deny, but that Divine power might cleave a thought, together with the soul wherein it is, into many pieces 274

The sense of the ancient Incorporealists therefore this; that in nature two kinds of substances. The first of them passive bulk, or distant and extended substance; which is all one thing without another; and therefore as many substances as parts, into which it can be divided essentially antitypous; one magnitude joined to another always standing without it, and making the whole so much bigger. Body all outside, having nothing within, no internal energy, nor any action besides local motion; which it is also passive to 275

Were there no other substance besides this, there could be motion, action, life, cogitation, intellection, volition; but all would be a dead lump; nor could any one thing penetrate another. Wherefore another substance, whose character φύσις δραστήριος, the active nature,—life, self-activity, cogitation: which no mode or accident of extension, it having more of entity in it. Nor are these two, extension and life, inadequate conceptions of one and the same substance. A thinker a monad; or one single substance. Not conceivable, how the several parts of an extended substance should jointly concur to produce one and the same thing 276

The energies of these two substances very different. The one nothing but local motion, or translation from place to place; a mere outside thing: the other cogitation, an internal energy; or in the inside of that which thinks. Which inside of the thinking nature hath no length, breadth, or profundity, no out-swelling tumor; because then it would be outside again. Were a cogitative being extended, yet must it have, besides this extended outside, an unextended inside. But one and the same substance cannot be extended and unextended. Wherefore in this opinion of extended incorporeals, a complication of two substances, and a confusion of them together into one. True nevertheless, that all finite incorporeal substance is always naturally united with some extended body, as its outside 278

All summed up together 278

Hitherto the sense of the ancient assertors of unextended incorporeals

represented to the best advantage. Nothing asserted by us; but that these and other arguments, do demonstrate against the Atheists, some other substance besides body: but whether or no they prove this to be indistant and unextended, left to others to make a judgment. The Atheists, who deny this, must acknowledge every thought to be not only mentally but also physically divisible and separable, together with the soul; as also deny internal energy; and consequently make cogitation nothing but local motion; and, lastly, hold that no substance can coexist with another substance, more inwardly than by juxta-position 279

This the first answer to the forementioned atheistic argument against incorporeal substance, made by the ancients by denying the minor, that though whatsoever is extended be body, yet every thing is not extended. But the argument otherwise answered by some learned assertors of incorporeal substance, by denying the major; that though every thing be extended, or what unextended nothing; yet whatever is extended is not body; they asserting another extension incorporeal, which is both penetrable and not made up of parts physically separable from one another; to which belongeth life, self-activity, and cogitation. Probable, that some would compound both the forementioned hypotheses together; by supposing the Deity to be altogether unextended, and indivisibly all every where; but souls, or created incorporeals, to have an unextended inside, diffused, as it were, into an extended outside. Ourselves here only to oppose Atheists; and dogmatize no further than to assert, what all Incorporealists agree in, that besides body there is another substance, which consisteth not of parts really separable from one another; which is penetrable of body, and self-active, and hath an internal energy, distinct from local motion. All which is demonstratively certain. This the full answer to the first atheistic argument against incorporeal substance; that either there is something unextended, or at least extended otherwise than body, so as to be penetrable thereof, and indiscerpibly one with itself, and self-active 280

The second atheistic assault against incorporeal substance; by pretending the original of this mistake to have sprung from the scholastic essences, distinct from the things themselves; and the abuse of abstract names and notions, they being made to be substances existing by themselves. For, though the opinion of ghosts and spirits (whereof God is the chief) sprung first from fear; yet that these should be incorporeal could never have entered into the minds of men, had they not been enchanted with these abstract names and separate essences . . 281

The first general reply to this, that it is all but romantic fiction. That the opinion of the Deity sprung not from fear, and that all invisible ghosts

are not fancies, already sufficiently proved; as also the existence of a God demonstrated by reason. That apparitions are real phenomena; and reasonable to think, that there may as well be invisible aërial and ethereal, as there are visible terrestrial animals. Sottishness to conclude, that there is no understanding nature superior to man 282

The second particular reply, that the opinion of spirits incorporeal sprung not from the scholastic essences, whether considered concretely as universals only, or abstractly. No man supposing these to be things really and substantially existing without the mind; either a universal man and universal horse, or else humanity and equinity: and that these walk up and down in airy bodies; they being only *noemata*, or the intelligible essences of things, as objects of the mind. These essences of things said to be eternal as their verities. The meaning of these eternal essences, not that they are so many eternal substances incorporeal; but that knowledge is eternal, and that there is an eternal unmade mind that comprehends them; which all other minds partake of 282

Again, that another atheistic dream, that the abstract names and notions of the mere accidents of bodies were made substances incorporeal; souls, minds, and ghosts. Conscious life no accident of bodies as Atheists suppose; but the essential attribute of another substance, which incorporeal; as magnitude or extension is the essential attribute of body 283

The following atheistic arguments to be despatched with more brevity. That the four next, fifth, sixth, seventh, and eighth, proceed only upon this supposition, that there is no other substance in the world besides body or matter; and therefore signify nothing to the assertors of an incorporeal Deity. Stoics and the like, only concerned to answer them. Nevertheless, from the impossibility of these atheistic Corporealisms, contained in the fifth and sixth, a necessity of incorporeal substance will be evinced 284

Here two atheistic Corporealisms founded upon these suppositions, that all is body or matter; and, that matter as such, is devoid of life and understanding. The first in the way of qualities and forms generable and corruptible, called the hylopathian. This the most ancient atheistic form, as we learn from Aristotle; viz. that bulky extension the only substantial and unmade thing, and all other things but the passions, qualities, and accidents thereof; makeable out of it, and destroyable into it. The consequence from whence, that there is no substantial unmade life and understanding: and that no mind could be a God or Creator; it being all accidental, factitious, and creature 284

This hylopathian Atheism called also by us Anaximandrian. Though we are not ignorant that Simplicius conceives Anaximander to have held

an homœomery, or similar atomology, of eternal unmade qualities, as Anaxagoras afterward; only, that he acknowledged no unmade life or mind, but generated it all from the fortuitous commixture of those qualified atoms. (Which no improbable opinion, though not certain.) Because, however Anaximander supposed life and understanding to be at least secondary qualities, and accidents of body, generable and corruptible. And not fit to multiply forms of Atheism 284

The second atheistic Corporealism in the way of unqualified atoms, producing all things, even life and understanding, from figures, sites, motions, and magnitudes of parts. From whence it will also follow, that mind is no primordial thing, but secondary, compounded, and derivative; creature, and no creator. This called Democritic; not because Democritus was the first inor of the dissimilar atomology; but because he was the first atheizer of it, or the first who made dissimilar atoms the principles of all things whatsoever, even of life and understanding . 285

Not to be denied, but that from these two things granted, that all is body, and that the first principles of body are devoid of life and understanding, it would follow unavoidably, that there is no God. Therefore the Stoics who were corporeal Theists, denied the latter; they supposing an understanding fire, eternal and unmade, the maker of the whole mundane system. Truly observed by Origen, that this corporeal god of the Stoics was but by accident incorruptible and happy; and only because wanting a destroyer. This no genuine Theism . . . 285

But an absolute impossibility in both these atheistic Corporealisms; not only because they suppose no active principle; but also, because they bring life and understanding, that is, something out of nothing; or make them without a cause. Where the atomic Atheists of the two most to be condemned, because so grossly contradicting themselves. From that true principle, that matter, as such, is devoid of life and understanding, an absolute necessity of another substance incorporeal, which is essentially vital and intellectual. That all life cannot possibly be factitious and accidental, generable and corruptible; but there must be substantial life: and also some eternal 286

The truth of this understood and acknowledged by the Hylozoists; that there must of necessity be both substantial and unmade life and understanding; who therefore attribute the same to all matter as such, but without animality; which, according to them, is all factitious and accidental. Wherefore this hylozoic Atheism also brings conscious life and animality out of nothing; or makes them without a cause. The argument of the Epicurean Atheists, against Stratonism or Hylozoism, unanswerable; that upon this supposition there must be in every man

and animal a heap of innumerable percipients, as many as there are atoms of matter; and so no one thinker. The pretence of the Hylozoists, that all the particles of matter in every animal do confederate, ridiculous and impossible 287

Thus the fifth and sixth atheistic argumentations fully confuted; and from that true supposition in them, that matter, as such, is devoid of life and understanding, incorporeal substance plainly demonstrated: which was our second undertaking 288

The third and last, that there being undeniably substance incorporeal, the two following atheistic argumentations (built upon the supposition of the contrary) altogether insignificant. The seventh not properly directed against Theism, but against a religious kind of Atheism or Theogonism; which supposed a God or soul of the world generated out of senseless matter, and the offspring of Night and Chaos. A sober and true sense of the world's animation: that there is a living, sentient, and understanding nature, presiding over the whole world. But the sense of pagan Theists, that the whole corporeal world animated is a God, exploded by us. This argument therefore being not against Theism, but Theogonism; the confutation thereof might be here well omitted, without any detriment to our cause. But because the denying of a living understanding nature presiding over the world is atheistical, the ground of this assertion briefly declared, that life and understanding are accidents of bodies, resulting only from such a composure of atoms as produce flesh, blood, and brains, in bodies organized; and, that there is no reason to be found any where but only in human form: which also confuted. A brutish passage of a modern writer, "that it is inconceivable by men how God can understand without brains" 288

The next (which is the eighth atheistic argumentation,) that there can be no living being immortal, nor perfectly happy; built upon that false supposition also, that all life and understanding result from a contexture of dead and senseless atoms, and therefore are dissolvable and annihilable. But that there is life essential, and substantial, which naturally immortal: as also a necessity of an eternal life, and mind unmade, and unannihilable; which perfectly happy 290

SECTION IV.

The Epicurean Atheists further endeavour to disprove a God, from the phenomena of motion and cogitation; in the three following argumentations, the ninth, tenth, and eleventh. From motion, thus; that from

this principle, "nothing can move itself, but whatsoever is moved, is moved by another," it will follow, that there can be no first cause and unmoved mover, but one thing moved another from eternity infinitely; because nothing could move another which was not itself first moved by something else 291

Answer: the meaning of this axiom; not that nothing can act from itself, as the Atheist supposes; he taking it for granted that every thing is body, and that all action is local motion; but, that no body resting could ever locally move itself. A false supposition of the Atheists and some Cartesians; that were there but once motion in the matter, this would of itself continue to all eternity. True, that of Aristotle; that to make an infinite progress in the causes of motion, and no first mover, is all one as to say, that there is no cause at all thereof; or, that all the motion in the world is a passion without an agent, or comes from nothing. Clearly impossible, that there should be any motion at all, were there nothing self-moving or self-active 291

Wherefore from this principle, that no body can move itself, it follows undeniably, that there is some other substance in the world besides body that hath an active power of moving body 292

Another corollary from the same principle; that there is another species of action, distinct from local motion, and which is not heterokinesy, but autokinesy. That the action, by which local motion is first caused, could not be itself local motion. All local motion caused originally by cogitation. Thus the ninth atheistic argument from motion confuted: and from hence, that no body can move itself demonstrated, that there is something incorporeal the first cause of local motion, by cogitation 293

But the Atheists further pretend to prove, that cogitation itself is heterokinesy, the passion of the thinker, and the action of some other external agent upon him; because nothing taketh beginning from itself; and no cogitation can rise of itself, without a cause. That therefore thinking beings themselves are machines, and no cogitation local motion. And, no understanding being a first cause, nor perfectly happy; because dependent upon something else 293

Answer. True, that no substance beginning from itself; as also, that no action causeth itself. But false, that no action taketh beginning from the immediate agent; or, that nothing can act otherwise than as acted upon by something else. Atheists here affirm only what they should prove, and so beg the question. If nothing self-active, then all the motion and action in the universe must come from nothing, or be made without a cause 294

True, also, that our human cogitations are frequently occasioned from external objects, and that the concatenations of thoughts and phantasms often depend upon mechanic causes. But false, that all cogitations are obtruded upon us from without; and that no transition in our thoughts which was not before in sense. The human soul a principle of actions, and therefore also of cogitations. This a bubbling fountain of thoughts. But that there is such a perfect mind as at once comprehends all truth, and was before sensibles 294

This a prodigious paradox, and falsity of Atheists; that cogitation, local motion; and thinking beings, machines. Here a correction of what we wrote before, vol. ii. p. 188, and a change of our opinion, upon further consideration; that not only a modern writer, but also the ancient atheistic Atomists, did conclude cogitation to be really nothing else but local motion. Nevertheless, these men troubled with the fancy of cogitation; which because they cannot make local motion, they would persuade us to be no reality, or nothing. Atheists aware, that if there be any action besides local motion, there must then be some other substance acknowledged besides body. They, who make cogitation local motion, and men machines, no more to be disputed with than senseless machines 295

To affirm, that no understanding being can be happy, nor a God, because dependent upon something without it, all one as to affirm, that senseless matter is the most perfect of all things; and that knowledge, as such, speaking imperfection, is but a whiffling and fantastic thing. But of this more afterwards. Thus the tenth atheistic argument confuted 296

Another atheistic argument, from the nature of knowledge and understanding. That the world could not be made by an understanding being, because there was no knowledge before things, which are the objects of it; and the only things are sensibles, which knowledge a passion from. Therefore all mind, as such a creature, and none a creator . 297

This already fully answered, vol. ii. p. 150 and so forwards. Where proved, that singular bodies are not the only things and objects of the mind, but that it containeth its intelligibles within itself. And that knowledge is archetypal to the world, and the maker of all. So the existence of a God demonstrable from the nature of knowledge and understanding 297

That the Atheists can no more solve the phenomenon of cogitation than that of local motion, evident from their many hallucinations concerning it; whereof a catalogue subjoined. First, that all life and understanding, a mere accidental thing, generable and corruptible, and no life nor mind substantial or essential. This before confuted . . 297

Again, that life and mind no simple and primitive natures, but com-

pounded syllables of things; and therefore none immortal nor incorruptible. Answer: that life and understanding are active powers, and could never result from mere passive bulk; nor can any composition of dead and senseless matter, possibly forget life and understanding. Though no necessity, that there should be any external unmade red or green, because these might be made out of things not red nor green; nor that there should be eternal motion, because motion might be produced from a self-active principle; nor that there should be any eternal unmade matter, because there were none, it might notwithstanding be created by a perfect incorporeal being: yet an absolute necessity of eternal unmade life and mind; because had there been once none, there could never have been any 298

Another atheistic hallucination, that there is nothing of self-activity in cogitation; nor any thing could act otherwise than as it is made to act by something else. This to bring all action from nothing, or to suppose it without a cause 299

Another madness of theirs already mentioned, that cogitation, local motion, and thinking beings, machines. This equal sottishness or impudence, as to affirm number to be figure, etc. 300

Another paradox of the Epicurean and Democritic Atheists, that mental cogitation, as well as sensation, the mere passions of the thinker, and the actions of bodies existing without him; some of them supposing thoughts to be caused by certain finer images than sensations; others that they are the remainders of the motions of sense, formerly made. Answer: that sensation itself is not a mere corporeal passion, but the perception of a passion, in a way of fancy; much less mental cogitations such; and least of all volitions 300

But consentaneously hereunto these Atheists determine all knowledge and understanding to be really the same thing with sense. From whence follow two absurdities; first, that there can be no such thing as error, because all passion, is true passion, and all sense, true sense; that is, true seeming and appearance. This absurdity owned by Protagoras. Epicurus endeavoured to avoid this, but in vain, and contradictiously to his own principles 302

A second absurdity consequent thereupon; that there is no absolute truth nor falsehood, but all knowledge private and relative, and nothing but opinion. This freely owned likewise by Protagoras. Sometimes also by Democritus. Who therefore but a blunderer neither, in the atomic philosophy; which plainly supposes a higher faculty of reason and understanding, that judges of sense, and discovers the phantastry thereof; it reaching to absolute truth 303

Another atheistic error; that singular bodies are the only objects of mental conception, as well as of sensation. This imputed by Aristotle, to Democritus and Protagoras. But sufficiently before confuted . 304

The better to maintain this paradox, added by a modern atheistic writer, as his own invention; that universals are nothing else but names, by which many singular bodies are called; axioms or propositions, the addition and subtraction of names; and syllogistic reasoning the reckoning the consequences of them: and that therefore besides the passions of sense we know nothing at all of any thing but only the names by which it is called. Whence it would follow that geometrical truths not the same in Greek and in Latin, etc. 305

That the Atheists, according to these premised principles, endeavour to depreciate knowledge and understanding, as that which speaks no higher perfection than is in senseless matter. Thus the Atheists in Plato make it but a ludicrous, umbratile, and evanid thing; the mere image of bodies the only realities. Their design in this to take away the scale or ladder of entities 305

All the grounds of this again briefly confuted, and particularly, that opinion so much favouring Atheism, that there is nothing in the understanding which was not before in sense, out of Boethius. Just and unjust greater realities in nature than hard and soft, etc. Unquestionably a scale or ladder of entities, and therefore certain, that the order of things must be in way of descent, from higher perfection to lower, and not of ascent, from lower to higher. The steps of this ladder not infinite; the foot thereof inanimate matter; the head, a perfect omnipotent being, comprehending in itself all possibilities of things. Mind by nature lord over all; and sovereign king of heaven and earth . . . 307

The reason, why we so much insist upon this; because Atheists pretend, not only to solve the phenomenon of cogitation without a God; but also from thence to demonstrate the impossibility of his existence. Though modern writers not so much aware hereof, yet is the controversy betwixt Theists and Atheists thus stated by Plato; whether soul and mind juniors to senseless matter, and the offspring thereof; or else substantial things, and in order of nature before it. Accordingly Plato confuteth Atheism no otherwise than by proving soul not to be junior to inanimate matter, and generated out of the same. Evident, that Plato by soul here understood, not only the mundane soul, but also that whole rank of beings called soul; and that no life was generated out of matter 311

Those professed Christians who generate rational souls out of senseless matter, plain betrayers of the cause of Theism 313

Nor is the case much different as to others; who, though they pro-

fessedly generate only sensitive souls, yet making the rational but mere blanks, which have nothing in them but what was scribbled upon them by sense; and so knowledge, in its nature, junior to sense and sensibles; highly gratify the Atheists hereby 314

If any life and cogitation may be generated out of dead and senseless matter, then can no good reason be given why all should not be. Life not partly accidental, partly substantial; but either all conscious life, accidental, generable, and corruptible; or else none at all . . . 314

The doctrine of real qualities generable and corruptible, favorable to Atheism also. And though the atheistic Atomists explode all the other qualities, because nothing can come from nothing; yet contradicting themselves again, do they make life and understanding real qualities, generated out of matter, or caused by nothing 315

There being a scale or ladder of entities in nature, to produce a higher rank of beings out of a lower; as life and cogitation out of matter and magnitude, is to invert the order of this scale from downwards to upwards; and so to lay a foundation for Atheism. Wherefore great reason to maintain this post against the Atheists; that no souls can be generated out of matter 315

The grand objection against the substantiality of sensitive souls, from that consequence of their permanent subsistence after death. Cartesius so sensible thereof, that he would rather make brutes to be senseless machines, than allow them substantial souls: which he granted they must have if thinking beings. What clearly demonstrable by reason not to be abandoned, because attended with some difficulties, or seemingly offensive consequences 316

The Pythagoric hypothesis; that souls all created by God, not in the generation of animals, but in the cosmogonia. These therefore first clothed with thin and subtile bodies aërial or ethereal ochemata, wherein they subsist, both before their ingress into terrestrial bodies, and after their egress out of them. Thus Boethius and Proclus. Ammonius's irrational demons mortal; brutish souls in aërial bodies. Since the first creation no new substantial thing made or destroyed, and therefore no life. This looked upon by Macrobius as a great truth 317

That the Pythagoreans would endeavor to gain some countenance for this hypothesis from the Scripture 319

But if these aërial vehicles of brutish souls be exploded for a whimsey, and none but terrestrial bodies allowed to them; though after death they will not vanish into nothing, yet must they needs remain in a state of insensibility and inactivity till reunited to other terrestrial bodies. Wherefore these in one sense mortal, though in another immortal. Silk-

worms dying, and reviving in the form of butterflies, made an emblem of the resurrection by Christian theologers 322

But no absolute necessity, that the souls of brutes, though substantial should have a permanent subsistence after death, either in a state of inactivity; because whatsoever created by God may possibly by him be annihilated. The substantiality only of the rational soul demonstrable by reason; or that it will not of itself vanish into nothing; but not that it is absolutely impossible for it to be annihilated; the assurance of this depending upon a faith in the Divine goodness. Porphyrius's assertion that brutish souls are resolved into the life of the universe. The whole answer to this objection against the substantiality of brutish souls; that they may, notwithstanding, possibly be annihilated in the deaths of animals as well as they were created in their generations; but if they do subsist (without aërial vehicles), they must remain in a state of inactivity and insensibility 323

That this the doctrine of the ancient pagan theologers, that no life or soul generated out of dead and senseless matter; but all produced by the Deity, as well as matter; proved out of Virgil; though sundry other testimonies also might be added thereunto 324

The hylozoic Atheists themselves so sensible thereof, that there must be some substantial and unmade life (from whence the lives and minds of all animals are derived), that they attribute the same to matter; and conclude, that though the modificated lives of animals and men be accidental, generated, and corrupted, yet the fundamental life of them is substantial, and incorruptible. These also asserted a knowledge before sense, and underived from sensibles 325

This hylozoic Atheism again confuted. Absurd to suppose knowledge and understanding without consciousness; as also, that the substantial and fundamental life of men and other animals should never perish, and yet their souls and personalities, vanish into nothing. That no organization can produce consciousness. These Atheists not able possibly to give an account, whence the intelligible objects and ideas of this their knowledge of matter should spring. This hylozoic Atheism nothing but the crumbling of the Deity into matter 326

Concluded, that the phenomenon of mind and understanding can no way possibly be solved by Atheists without a God; but affordeth a solid demonstration of his existence 326

SECTION V.

There now remaineth only the atheistic objections against Providence, their queries and arguments from interests; their first objection, from the

frame of the world, as faulty: or, because things are ill made, that therefore not made by a God. This directed against the sense of the ancient theologers; that God, being a perfect mind, therefore made the world after the best manner. Some modern theologers deviating from this, as if the perfection of the Deity consisted not at all in goodness, but in power and arbitrary will only. The controversy betwixt these and Atheists; but whether matter fortuitously moved, or a fortuitous will omnipotent be the original of all things. No ground of faith in a mere arbitrarious deity. To have a will undetermined to good, no liberty nor sovereignty, but impotency. God to Celsus the head or president of the righteous nature. This not only the sense of Origen, but of the ancient Christians in general. Plotinus; the will of God essentially that which ought to be. God an impartial balance weighing out heaven and earth. The Deity not servilely bound to do the best; but this the perfection of its nature. No Atheists able to prove the world to be ill made 327

Not to be concluded, that whatsoever we cannot find out the reason or use of, is therefore ineptly made. For example; the *intestinum cæcum*, though seemingly an odd appendix, and which the generality of anatomists give little account of; yet, that, with the valve at its entrance, both together, an artificial contrivance of nature, to hinder the regurgitation of the fæces 330

The first atheistic instance of the faultiness of things; in the disposition of the equator and ecliptic intersecting each other in such an angle, whereby the terrestrial globe rendered not so habitable as it might have been. This objection founded upon a false supposition, that the torrid zone uninhabitable. But this the best disposition; which being contrary to mechanic causes, therefore its continuance, together with the constant parallelism of the earth's axis, a manifest eviction of Providence; and that the τὸ *Βέλτιστον*, the best, is a cause in nature 331

In the next place; the Atheists would prove against some Theists that all things were not made for the sake of man. This at first but the doctrine of strait-laced Stoics only; recommended afterwards by men's self-love. Whereas Plato's doctrine, the whole not made for any part, put the parts for the whole. Nevertheless, things in the lower world made principally (though not only) for man. Atheists no judges of the well or ill making of worlds, they having no standing measure of good. That nature a stepmother to man, but a froward speech of some discontented persons, seeking to revenge themselves by railing upon nature, that is, Providence 331

Evils in general from the necessity of imperfect beings, and incompossibility of things 332

Men afflicted more from their own fancies than reality of things. Pain (which a real evil of sense) often linked with pleasure, according to the Socratic fable. This not the evil of the whole man, but of the outside only. Serviceable to free men from the greater evils of the mind. Death, according to the atheistic hypothesis, an absolute extinction of all life; but according to genuine Theism, only a withdrawing into the tiring-house, and putting off the terrestrial clothing. The dead live to God. Christian faith gives assurance of a heavenly body hereafter. The Christian resurrection not the hope of worms. This the confutation of the twelfth atheistic argument 332

The thirteenth; but second objection against Providence as to human affairs, because all things fall alike to all; and sometimes vicious and irreligious persons most prosperous 334

Granted, that this consideration hath too much staggered weak minds in all ages. Some concluding from thence that there is no God, but that blind chance steereth all. Others, that though there be a God, yet he knows nothing done here below. Others, that though he do know, yet he neglecteth human affairs 334

Unreasonable to require that God should miraculously interpose at every turn; or to think, that every wicked person should presently be thunderstruck. That which steers the whole world no fond and passionate but an impartial nature. Yet, that there want not instances of an extraordinary Providence. Good reasons for the slowness of Divine vengeance. The notoriously wicked commonly met with at the long run . . 335

The sometimes impunity of wicked persons so far from staggering good men as to Providence, that it confirms them in their belief of future immortality and judgment after death. The evolution of human affairs a kind of dramatic poem, and God Almighty the skilful dramatist, who always connecteth that of ours which went before, with what of his follows after, into coherent sense. A geometrical distribution of rewards and punishments 336

That there ought to be a doubtful and cloudy state of things for the exercise of faith and the more difficult part of virtue. Had there been no monsters to subdue, there could have been no Hercules. Here we are to live by faith, and not by sight 337

But to make a full defence of Providence would require a large volume. The reader therefore referred to others for a supplement. Only some few considerations to be here propounded, not so much for the confutation of Atheists, as satisfaction of Theists, sometimes apt to call in question the Divine goodness, though the very foundation of our Christian faith 337

First that in judging of the works of God we ought not to consider the parts of the world alone by themselves, but in order to the whole. Were nothing made but the best, there could have been no harmony for want of variety. Plotinus, that a limner does not make all eye, nor place bright colors every where; nor a dramatist introduce only kings and heroes upon the stage 338

Secondly, that we ought not to confine God's creation to the narrowness of vulgar opinion, which extends the universe but little beyond the clouds and walls it in with a sphere of fixed stars. The world incapable of infinity of magnitude as well as of time. Nevertheless, as the sun is much bigger than we can imagine it, so much more may the world be. The new celestial phenomena widen the corporeal universe, and make those fancied flaming walls thereof to fly away before us. Not reasonable to think that all this immense vastness should be desert and uninhabited 340

Thirdly, that we cannot make a right judgment of the ways of Providence without looking both forwards upon what is future, and backwards upon what is past, as well as upon the present. That the Platonists and Pythagoreans solved many phenomena from the τὰ προβεβιωμένα, things done in a pre-existent state.—Our common Christianity supposeth but a kind of imputative pre-existence to solve the pravity of mankind and the evils of this state. The different fates and conditions of men here in this life to be resolved into a just though occult Providence . . 341

The third objection against Providence, or fourteenth atheistic argument; that it is impossible for any one being to animadvert and order all things; and, if it were possible, that it would be distractious and inconsistent with happiness. Moreover, that an irresistibly powerful and happy being would not concern itself in the welfare of others; benevolence arising only from imbecility 342

The reply; that because ourselves have but a finite animadversion and narrow sphere of activity; to measure the Deity accordingly, is but an idol of the cave or den. Certain, that were there nothing but what we could fully comprehend, there could be no God. Had the sun life, equally coextended with its rays, it would perceive every thing touched by them. Creatures but the rays of the Deity. Men able to manage affairs, in many distant places, without distraction. And innumerable notions lie together in our minds, without crowding one another, or any disturbance to us 342

But for the easing the minds of weak mortals, already suggested, that there is no necessity God should himself immediately do all things; he having ministers under him, executioners of his providence; as, an arti-

ficial plastic nature (for this reason, partly before insisted on ;) instincts also in animals a part of that Divine fate which is the servant of Providence. Above which, other knowing and understanding ministers of the Deity appointed to preside over human affairs. But all overlooked by the watchful eye of God Almighty, who may himself extraordinarily interpose 342

Wherefore no need to confine Providence to a few greater things only to free the Deity from distraction. Small things (upon which greater often depend) not neglected by it. Nevertheless, the chief employment of Divine Providence, in the economy of souls, by Plato reduced to this compendium ; the translating of them into better or worser states, according to their demeanors. . Thus may the slow wits of mortals more easily conceive Providence not to be laborious and distractious to the Deity 343

But that all benevolence arises from imbecility, and that what is perfectly happy would be troubled with no business, but enjoy its own ease ; idols of the Atheists' den. These other the narrow contractedness of their minds by vice and immorality 344

The atheistic queries next to be answered. The first query : If there were a God, who was perfectly happy in himself, why would he go about to make a world ? Answer : The reason of God's making the world was from his overflowing and communicative goodness, that there might be other beings happy besides himself. This consistent with God's making the world for his own glory. The reason why Plotinus would explode that. True, that God did not make the world merely to ostentate his skill and power ; but to display his goodness, which is chiefly his glory. The Atheists further demand, What hurt would it have been for us never to have been made ? Answer. No other than this, that we could never have enjoyed good, nor been capable of happiness. If no hurt not to have been made, then none to be annihilated ; the distance being as great from nothing to something, as from something to nothing . . 345

The second atheistic query : If God's goodness were the cause of his making the world, why then was it not made sooner ? This question capable of a double sense : First, Why was not the world from eternity ? The reply : This not from any defect in the Divine goodness, but because there is an impossibility of the thing itself ; the necessity and incapacity of such an imperfect being hindering it. Ourselves prone to think, that could the world have been from eternity, it should have been so. Thus Philoponus, in his confutation of Proclus's arguments for the world's eternity. And now no place left for those atheistic cavils against the novity of the creation ; as if God must therefore have slept from eternity ;

or had contracted a satiety of his former solitude. Another sense of the question: Why, though the world could not be from eternity, yet was it not made sooner? Answer. The world could not possibly have so been made in time, as that it should not have been once but a day old; and also once no more than five or six thousand years old . . 345

The third atheistic query: How could God move the matter of the whole world, especially if incorporeal? Answer. That all things being derived from the Deity, and essentially depending on him, they must needs be commandable by him, and obsequious to him. And since no body can move itself, that which first moved the matter must be incorporeal, and not move it by machines and engines, but by cogitation or will only. That conceit, that an incorporeal Deity could not move matter, because it would run through it, absurd; this moving not mechanically, but vitally. That cogitative beings have a natural power of moving matter, evident from our own souls moving our bodies, not by machines or engines, but merely by thought. More easy for the Deity to move the whole world by will and cogitation, than for us our bodies . 347

The last head the atheistic argumentation, from interest. First, that it is the interest of particular persons there should be no being infinitely powerful, who hath no law but his own will. The first reply; wishing is no proving. Nor will any man's thinking make things otherwise than they are 347

But, secondly, this wish of Atheists founded upon a mistaken notion of God Almighty, that he is nothing but arbitrary will omnipotent. God's will not mere will, but law and equity; ought itself willing. Nor does justice in God clash with goodness; but is a branch or particular modification thereof. The interest of none there should be no God, unless perhaps of such as are irreclaimably wicked, and wilfully abandon their own true good 348

To be without God, to be without hope. No faith nor hope in senseless matter. According to the atheistic hypothesis, no possibility of happiness nor security of good 348

God such a being, as, if he were not, nothing more to be wished for. To believe a God, to believe the existence of all good and perfection; and that things are all made and governed as they should be. Peccability from the necessity of imperfect free-willed beings. Infinite hopes from a being infinitely good and powerful. Democritus and Epicurus, however cried up so much of late, but infatuated Sophists, or witty fools, and debauchers of mankind 348

The last atheistic argumentation, That Theism or religion is inconsistent with the interest of civil sovereigns. Their first pretence for this,

that the civil sovereign reigns only in fear; and therefore must be no power nor fear greater than that of the leviathan 349

In answer to this, the atheistic ethics and politics to be unravelled. Their foundation laid in the villanizing of human nature. That there is no natural justice, equity, nor charity. No public nor common nature in men, but all private and selfish. That every man by nature hath a right to every thing, even to other men's bodies and lives. That an appetite to kill and torment, by nature gives a right. That nature hath brought men into the world without any fetters or shackles of duty and obligation, the hinderances of liberty. Lastly, that nature absolutely dissociates and segregates men from one another, by reason of the inconsistency of appetites and private good. Every man by nature in a state of war against every man 350

But, in the next place, they add, that though this state of nature, which is belluine liberty, and lawless freedom to every thing, be in itself the best; yet by accident, and by reason of men's imbecility, does it prove the worst. Wherefore, when men had been weary of hewing and slashing, they then bethought themselves at length of helping nature by art; by submitting to a lesser evil for the avoiding of a greater; abating their infinite right, and yielding to terms of equality with others, and subjection to a common power 351

Where these Atheists first slander human nature; and then debase justice and civil authority, making it the ignoble and bastardly brat of fear; or a lesser evil submitted to out of necessity for the avoiding of a greater. According to which atheistic hypothesis no man is willingly just. This no new invention of the writer De Cive, but the old atheistic generation of justice, and of a body politic, civil society, and sovereignty (before Plato's time;) it being fully described in his second book of a Commonwealth. Where the philosopher concludes justice, according to these, to be but a middle thing betwixt the best and the worst; loved, not as good in itself, but only by reason of men's imbecility: or, that justice is indeed another man's good, and the evil of him that is just. The same hypothesis also, concerning justice, as a factitious thing, that sprung only from fear and imbecility, and was chosen but as a lesser evil, insisted on by Epicurus 351

The vain attempts of our modern atheistic politicians, to make justice by art when there is none by nature. First, by renouncing and transferring men's right by will and words. For if nothing naturally unlawful, then can no man, by will and words, make any thing unlawful to himself. What made by will may be destroyed by will. The ridiculous conceit of these atheistic politicians, that injustice is nothing but *dati*

repetitio, and such an absurdity in life, as is in disputation when a man denies a proposition he had before granted; no real evil in the man, but only a relative incongruity in him as a citizen. Again, these justice-makers and authority-makers pretend to derive their factitious justice from pacts and covenants. But pacts and covenants, without natural justice (as themselves confess,) nothing but words and breath; and therefore can have no force to oblige. Wherefore they make another pretence also from certain counterfeit laws of nature of their own devising, that are nothing but mere juggling equivocation; they being but the laws of fear, or their own timorous and cowardly complexion. They ridiculously dance round in a circle, when they derive the obligation of civil laws from covenants; of covenants from laws of nature; and of laws of nature again from civil laws. Their vain attempt by art to consociate what nature hath dissociated, like tying knots in the wind or water. Their artificial obligation, or ligaments, by which the members of their leviathan are held together, more slender than cobwebs . . 353

These artificial justice-makers and obligation-makers sensible of the weakness of these attempts artificially to consociate what nature hath dissociated; therefore fly at last from art to force and power; making their sovereign to reign only in fear. This the true meaning of that opinion, that all obligation is derived from law; that is, the command of him who hath power to compel. If obligation to obey civil laws only from fear of punishment, then is no man obliged to hazard his life for the safety of his prince; and whoever can promise themselves impunity, may justly disobey. If civil sovereigns reign only in fear, then is their authority nothing but force; and power would justify rebellion. Lastly, if civil right or authority nothing but force and violence, then could it not last long; what natural prevailing against what is violent. . 355

Wherefore since civil authority and bodies politic can neither be merely artificial, nor yet violent things, there must be some natural vinculum to hold them together, such as will both oblige subjects to obey the commands of sovereigns, and sovereigns, in commanding, to seek the good of their subjects; something of a common, public, and conglutinating nature; which no other than natural justice. The authority of God himself founded in justice; of which civil authority a participation. Sovereignty no creature of the people and of men's wills; but hath a stamp of Divinity upon it. Had not God made a city, men, neither by art or political enchantment, nor by mere force, could have made any. The whole world one city of God and rational beings. The civil sovereign no leviathan; that is, no beast, but a god. He reigns not in mere brutish force and fear, but in natural justice and conscience, and the au-

thority of God himself. Nevertheless, need of force and fear too, to compel some to their duty; nor is the sovereign's sword here alone sufficient, but he must reign also in the fear of God Almighty 356

The second atheistic pretence, to make religion inconsistent with civil sovereignty; because it limits and confines that which in its own nature is and ought to be infinite. The reply: that the Atheists' infinite right and authority of civil sovereigns is nothing but belluine liberty; but true right and authority are essentially founded in natural justice; there being no authority to command, where there is not an obligation to obey; and commands not creating obligation, but presupposing it, without which they would signify nothing. The first original obligation not from will but nature. The error of those Theists who derive all obligation to moral things from the will and positive command of God, as threatening punishments and promising rewards. From whence it would follow, that no man is good and just but by accident only, and for the sake of something else. Justice a different species of good from that of private utility. Infinite justice as absurd as an infinite rule or measure. If no infinite justice, then no infinite right and authority. God's own authority bounded by justice: his will ruled by justice, and not justice by his will. Atheists, under a pretence of giving civil sovereigns infinite right, really divest them of all right and authority, leaving them nothing but brutish force. Proved here that the *summæ potestates* must of necessity be *ἀνυπεύθυνοι* 357

The last atheistic pretence for the inconsistency of religion with civil power, because conscience is private judgment of good and evil. Answer. That not religion, but Atheism, introduceth such private judgment as is absolutely inconsistent with civil sovereignty, it acknowledging nothing in nature that tends to public and common good, but making private appetite the only rule or measure of good, and utility of justice. The desperate consequence from hence, that private utility may justify rebellion and parricide. The Atheists' professed assertion, that they who have once rebelled may justly defend themselves afterward by force. Though private persons must make a judgment in conscience for themselves (the Atheists' public conscience being nonsense and contradiction,) yet is the rule of conscience not private, but public, except only to mistaken fanatics; who therefore sometimes make a pretence of conscience and religion, in order to sedition and rebellion. Religion and conscience oblige subjects, in all lawful things, actively to obey the sovereign powers: in unlawful, not to resist 359

The conclusion of the whole book: that all the atheistic grounds being fully confuted, and the impossibility of Atheism demonstrated; it

is certain, that the original and head of all things is no blind and unconscious nature, but a perfect understanding being, self-existent; who hath made all that was fit to be made, and after the best manner, and exerciseth a just providence over all. To whom be all honor and glory, etc. 360

ETERNAL AND IMMUTABLE MORALITY.

BOOK I.

CHAP. I.

THAT there have been some in all ages, who have maintained, that good and evil, just and unjust, were not naturally and immutably so, but only by human laws and appointment. An account of the most ancient of them from Plato and Aristotle; as also from Diogenes Laertius and Plutarch. Also in this latter age some have affirmed that there is no incorporeal substance, nor any natural difference of good and evil, just and unjust. The opinion of some modern theologers proposed, with its necessary consequences, owned by some of them, by others disowned; but all agreeing in this, that things morally good and evil, just and unjust, and not so by nature, and antecedent to the Divine command, but by Divine command and institution 367

CHAPTER II.

That good and evil, just and unjust, honest and dishonest, cannot be arbitrary things without nature made by will. Every thing must by its own nature be what it is, and nothing else. That even in positive laws and commands, it is not mere will that obligeth, but the natures of good and evil, just and unjust, really existing. The distinction betwixt things naturally and positively good and evil, more clearly explained. No positive command makes any thing morally good or evil, just or unjust; nor can oblige otherwise than by virtue of what is naturally just . . 373

CHAPTER III.

That the opinion of those who affirm that moral good and evil, just and unjust, depend upon the arbitrary will of God, implies a contradic-

tion. The essences of things not convertible into one another. Particular essences depend not on the arbitrary will of God. That there is in God a nature of goodness superior to wisdom, which measures and determines his wisdom, as this does his will. A mystical or enigmatical representation of the nature of God 378

BOOK II.

CHAPTER I.

That, to avoid the force of what is above demonstrated, some philosophers have denied there was any immutable nature of essence, affirming all being and knowledge to be fantastical and relative, of whom Protagoras the Abderite was the chief; whose intent in proposing it, and a consequence thereof was, the destroying of all morality, and to disprove the absolute and immutable nature of good and evil, just and unjust . 384

CHAPTER II.

The pretences or grounds for this opinion considered. That it was grounded on the Heraclitical philosophy, which introduced a movable essence, affirming that nothing stood, but all things moved. Protagoras's inference from hence, who to the Heraclitical added the old Atomical or Phenician philosophy, and by this mixture made up his own . 386

CHAPTER III.

That the Atomical or Mechanical philosophy was known to Protagoras, who lived before Democritus. A brief account of it. That by the motion of particles all things are generated and corrupted is asserted by him, and that all sensible qualities are nothing without us, but only passions and sensations in us 388

CHAPTER IV.

That the Atomical philosophy is more ancient than the Trojan war, and was invented by one Moschus a Sidonian. That this Moschus the Phenician is the same with Mochus the physiologer, who is the same with Moses the Jewish lawgiver. That Plato and Aristotle were not unacquainted with this Phenician philosophy, which was rejected by Plato because abused to skepticism, as also by Aristotle; but revived by Epicurus, who so blended it with impiety and immorality, that it soon sunk again. It hath been successfully restored in the last age . . 391

CHAPTER V.

That the paradoxes Protagoras and others grounded on this Atomical philosophy, are absurd and contradictious, and inconsequent from it; and the assertion that nothing is absolutely true, but only relatively to him that thinks so, is no less absurd, and overturns itself . . . 396

CHAPTER VI.

That these assertions of Protagoras, knowledge is sense, and knowledge is but fantastical and relative, are effectually overturned by the Atomical philosophy; of which the genuine result is, that sense alone is not the judge of what does really and absolutely exist, but that there is another principle in us superior to sense 398

BOOK III.

CHAPTER I.

What sense is, and that it is not knowledge. How sensation is performed. The soul is passive in sensation, though not altogether so. Various kinds of sensations 401

CHAPTER II.

That sense is a confused perception obtruded on the soul from without, but knowledge the active energy of an unpassionate power in the soul, which is vitally united to the body. The difference betwixt sensitive and intellectual cogitation, and their different uses in general . . 405

CHAPTER III.

The difference between sense or sensation and intellection or knowledge described more accurately in five particulars, with a further explication and demonstration from Plato 408

CHAPTER IV.

A further proof that sense is not science, illustrated by several instances. Sense is only a seeming or appearance of things corporeal existing, which may be, though the things have not a real existence. Reasons of this. Phantasms and sensible ideas are really or materially the same thing. Phantasms voluntary and involuntary. That phantasms may become sensations, and e contra 413

BOOK IV.

CHAPTER I.

That knowledge is an inward active energy of the mind, not arising from things acting from without. Sense is not a mere passion, but a passive perception of the soul, having something of vital energy, and is a cogitation. The immediate objects of intellection not things without the mind, but the ideas of the mind itself, which is not weakened by the most radiant and illustrious truths, as the sense is by what is exceedingly sensible. Hath a criterion in itself whereby to know when it hath found what it sought. Two kinds of perceptive cogitations in the soul, the one passive, which are either *αἰσθήματα*, sensations, or *φαντάσματα*, imaginations; the other kind are called *νοήματα*. That the *νοήματα* are not raised out of the phantasmata by the intellectus agens . . . 423

CHAPTER II.

That some ideas of the mind proceed not from outward sensible objects, but arise from the inward activity of the mind itself. The cause of men's mistake herein. How far the passion of sense reaches, and where the mind's activity begins. Sense no competent judge of the reality of relative ideas, which though they were mere notions of the mind or modes of conceiving, yet it follows not that they have no reality. They are not disagreeable to the reality of things, and so not false. The beauty, the strength and ability of natural and corporeal things, depend upon these relations and proportions. Instances proposed to illustrate this matter. All the ideas of things artificial have something in them that never came from sense. This true of plants and animals. No essential difference betwixt natural compounded and artificial things. Sense has no idea of the cogitative being joined to rational animals, nor of the universe as it is one corporeal frame, much less of the ideas or modes of thinking beings . 432

CHAPTER III.

That even simple corporeal things, passively perceived by sense, are known or understood only by the active power of the mind. That sensation is not knowledge of these things, much less any secondary result from sense. Besides esthemata and phantasmata, there must be noemata or intelligible ideas coming from the mind itself. This confirmed and illustrated by several instances and similitudes. That there is an intelligible idea of a triangle inwardly exerted from the mind, distinct from the phantasm or sensible idea; both which may be in the mind together. Some sensible ideas not impressed on the soul by things without. That sense is a kind of speech of outward nature conversing with the mind.

Two kinds of perceptive powers in the soul. Knowledge does not begin, but end in individuals. A double error of vulgar philosophers. Immediate objects of all geometrical science are the intelligible and universal ideas of a triangle, etc. exerted from the mind, and comprehended in it 449

CHAPTER IV.

That individual material things cannot be the immediate objects of intellection and knowledge, besides which there must be some other kind of beings or entities, as the immediate objects of them, such things as do not flow, but remain immutably the same. These immutable entities, what they are, from whence, and where they exist. That there is an eternal mind, from which all created understandings are constantly furnished with ideas. Conclusion, that wisdom, knowledge and understanding, are eternal and sub-subsistent things, superior to matter, and all sensible things 470

CHAPTER V.

That the intelligible notions of things, though existing only in the mind, are not figments of the mind, but have an immutable nature. The criterion of truth. The opinion, that nothing can be demonstrated to be true absolutely, but only hypothetically, refuted. Whatever is clearly intelligible, is absolutely true. Though men are often deceived, and think they clearly comprehend what they do not; it follows not, that they can never be certain that they clearly comprehend any thing. The conclusion with Origen, that science and knowledge is the only firm thing in the world 480

CHAPTER VI.

In what sense the essences of things are eternal and immutable. Evry thing is what it is, to science or knowledge whether absolutely or relatively, unchangeable by any mind; so that if moral good and evil, just and unjust in things so denominated, as the actions or souls of men, they must have some certain natures unalterable by any will or opinion. That the soul is not a mere rasa tabula. That it is in order of nature before the body and matter, does not result out of it, but commands, governs and rules it. The whole corporeal world a heap of dust and atoms. There can be no such thing as morality, unless there be a God. The commendation of the Atomical philosophy successfully revived by Cartesius. Epicurus taxed for his sottishness 489

The True Notion of the Lord's Supper 499
Sermon I. 545
" II. 583

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